I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
This is the Bill to which I referred in the Seanad on Wednesday last when, in connection with a similarly entitled Bill introduced by Senator Robinson, I said I hoped to introduce legislation before the end of the present session to cure defects in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967.
The main purpose of the Bill is to provide that, where an accused person has been sent forward by the District Court for sentence with a plea of guilty, an appeal shall lie against the sentence as if he had been sentenced after conviction on indictment. This result is secured by section 1. The Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of the Attorney General v. Tyrrell (1970) decided that there could be no appeal from the sentence where an offender is sent forward to the Circuit Court for sentence under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967. Section 1 will apply to persons sent forward whether before or after the passing of the proposed Act. The ordinary provisions as to the need for leave to appeal will apply to all cases. Both the Circuit Court rules and the rules of the superior courts already allow for the enlargement of the times for appealing.
The Bill also provides—section 3— for the extension of free legal aid in two respects. Firstly, legal aid will now become available for the hearing in the court of sentence, where the accused has been sent forward for sentence, and for any subsequent appeal against sentence. Secondly, legal aid will become available for all preliminary examinations in the District Court. The grant of legal aid in either case will, of course, be subject to the conditions contained in the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962. The provision in the Criminal Procedure Act, which restricted legal aid in preliminary examinations to cases of murder, is being repealed. The Government see no valid reason why legal aid in preliminary examination cases should be restricted to murder.
The opportunity is being taken in section 2 to make provision for the correction of defects in the charge, where under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, an accused waives the preliminary examination and is sent forward for trial; and also where the accused, under section 13 of that Act, is sent forward for sentence with a plea of guilty. In relation to the case where the accused is sent forward for trial, the necessity for the provision in section 2 for correction of the charge arises from the fact that section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, which allows correction of the indictment, does not, I am advised, apply to cases where the preliminary examination is waived.
In relation to the case where the accused is sent forward for sentence, the necessity for the provision in section 2 for correction of the charge arises because the Supreme Court in Williams v. Casey (1969) decided that there is at present no power to amend the charge in such a case. In both instances, the power now being provided for to make a correction is subject to the proviso that, in the opinion of the court, the correction would not result in injustice. Where the accused has signed a plea of guilty in the District Court and the charge is subsequently corrected, the plea will be treated as a plea to the corrected charge. However, this is, of course, subject to the existing provision in section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, under which the accused may withdraw his plea of guilty if he so wishes. This provision in the 1967 Act is not being disturbed.
I hope that this short, though important, Bill will commend itself to the House.