Northern Ireland Situation: Motion.

The Taoiseach

I move:

That Dáil Éireann takes note of recent events affecting Northern Ireland.

We have had two debates in this House on Northern Ireland since December last. The necessity for the present debate arises from the collapse of the power-sharing Executive there and the proroguing of the Assembly and I welcome the opportunity to hear the views of Deputies on the matter. Our debate here today can make an important contribution to lessening tension and bringing about a calm atmosphere in Northern Ireland in which fruitful discussions can take place.

I have already put on record my views on the causes of the collapse of the political institutions in that part of the country before they got a chance to fulfil their promise for the peace and prosperity of all its people. I will simply say again today that I regret this untimely breakdown. These institutions derived from a valid election on a proportional representation basis. I regret, particularly, the collapse of the power-sharing Executive, made up of politicians of different traditions and backgrounds working together as a team. Shortlived it may have been— but remember that Government with as short a life-span have not been uncommon in some of the countries with which we are associated in the European Economic Community. The men who made up this Executive deserve our respect for their courage and dedication. We had met these men. We had tested them in negotiation. We respected them as a team. Representatives of the majority worked with their partners with complete conviction and integrity. The minority, once given legislative guarantees of their rights in their turn took a full part in the institutions of Government. And, in the short period they were in office, their representatives showed that they have the capacity as well as the will to play the fullest part in the administration of Northern Ireland in the interests of all its people. I acknowledge the great efforts of the SDLP over the past few years in continuing, with courage and dedication, despite setbacks to influence the members of their community in the North towards the paths of political action rather than violence.

In the end the Executive fell just as the effects of its work and the evidence that persons from he two parts of the Northern community could co-operate were beginning to be apparent and to command respect throughout the North and, indeed, throughout this island and elsewhere. It is not a surprise to me that many people in the North believe that the events which caused the fall of the Executive were not primarily directed or motivated by the desire for destruction of that body. I say this because there remains a basis for the construction of an administration in the North in which all sections of the community there can work together for the common good.

Part of the base for such a development is the response, which we should all acknowledge and commend, of those on the majority side who laid aside their doctrinal position and were prepared to accept, in the manner in which it was given, the agreement to participate in Northern institutions by the representatives of the minority. I have also noted with interest, statements made recently by some of the spokesmen who have emerged in the Loyalist groups. They are saying—and this is part of the reality of which proposals for future progress must take account—that there cannot be any peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland without the consent of the Protestant majority. They also seem to recognise that the arrangements for such a settlement cannot be effected without the consent of the minority.

This is a welcome development as I am convinced that any lasting settlement must be based on an agreed form of power-sharing.

The evidence we have had on how the two sections of the Northern Ireland community can work together effectively and constructively is in stark contrast to the results of violence, perpetrated by ruthless men who stop at nothing in their efforts to see that their particular abstraction will prevail.

We have seen now the effects over five years of this type of intransigence. We have seen violence kill and maim the people of the North and destroy the hearts of their towns and cities, and to a far lesser extent, we have seen this happening in some of our own streets and in the cities of Britain. We have heard of more than 1,000 dead and more than 10,000 injured in the bombings and shootings in the North. We have heard of the destruction of property there to the extent of some £120 million.

But these figures do not, nor could any figures ever, adequately describe the human misery and suffering which violence has brought to the ordinary people of the North. They do not show the value in human terms of the opportunities that have been destroyed—the jobs that in more favourable circumstances would have come into existence for the lasting benefit of the people of Northern Ireland. They do not show the corrosion of everyday life — the deprivation of the simple human pleasure of being able to do a day's work, or take a day's rest, in an atmosphere free of fear and hatred. They do not show the impact on the childern of Northern Ireland, above all on those in the most severely affected areas who have lost their childhood and in many cases also, perhaps lost the opportunity of a future as stable and balanced human beings. These things are nonetheless real although they cannot be assessed in terms of arithmetic. The lives of a whole generation in Northern Ireland have been blighted.

We have not borne the sort of burden, which, whatever its causes, has been inflicted on the Northern people. Nevertheless what has been happening in the North has had its real and direct consequences here. Measured simply in financial terms, Northern violence in the five years to 31st March last has cost us an extra £40 million in public expenditure— in meeting the costs of expanding the Army and Garda force, in compensation for the destruction of property, in increased industrial grants and other similar types of expenditure. These extra costs are now running at an annual figure of the order of £17 million to £18 million—and they are likely to rise with further expansion in both Army and Garda forces as well as other expenditure.

In comparison with our total budget, now approaching £1,500 million, these figures may not, perhaps, seem significant. In the abstract they may even seem meaningless. It is only if we speak of them in terms of what they could have achieved for people that they begin to have meaning. The £40 million could have built 7,000 to 8,000 houses, accommodating eventually some 30,000 to 40,000 people. Used as industrial grants, the money might have provided jobs for an extra 20,000 workers. It could have financed a school building programme for two years or a programme for building hospitals for four years.

The £17/18 million of annual costs would finance here an increase of about 50 per cent in children's allowances or in the non-contributory old age pensions—or almost double the rates of unemployment assistance. It could finance a reduction in income tax almost equivalent to the reductions effected by the Minister for Finance in his last budget. I do not need to go on with this sort of argument. There is hardly a person in this country who could not, if asked, produce a worthwhile scheme or worthwhile project for spending money of this order for the real benefit of the people of this island.

But this is far from being the whole story. Our whole economy has suffered from the events in Northern Ireland —most directly through its impact on tourism. It has been estimated that the volume of tourist activity in Ireland today might have been twice its present level, if pre-1969 growth rates had been maintained, and if we had not suffered the drop in tourism brought about by those events. The calculation of the full measure of the economic loss we have suffered is highly conjectural but we do know it has been significant.

But as I have said, these are relatively small losses when measured against the appalling impact of violence on the people of Northern Ireland. The aggregate result in terms of suffering and misery there, in lost jobs and lost opportunities, in the ordinary lives of ordinary people, is beyond measure. Can the perpetrators of violence explain to those without housing what it is they are offering that is so much better than the comfort of a decent home?

Can they offer anything to those whose employment prospects are put in jeopardy? Can they tell the relatives of the dead or the living victims of a bomb blast what it is that they wish to bring about which is worth so much in terms of human suffering? This is the sort of question which those who deal in violence must answer. They have killed for long enough for abstractions. Let them now deal in realities.

The reality of the situation in the North is daily death by violence. The first priority now is to put an end to that tragedy. I suggest that the basic need is to effect a community settlement which will allow all the people of Northern Ireland to live in peace. Anything we can do to advance such a settlement, we will do. However, we must recognise that our most helpful contribution may be to do nothing, by word or deed, that will prejudice the outcome of discussions between the various groups in Northern Ireland. It is now up to the people there to reach an agreement among themselves which will allow them to live and work together in peace.

For our part, in this part of the country, we must ensure that we do everything within our power to eradicate violence. I have frequently pointed out that most of the violence in the North is perpetrated by people from within that area and, of course, that is the simple fact of the matter. Nevertheless, the Government have recognised that our territory might be used as a haven by those responsible for bombings and killings in the North or might be a source of arms and explosives. We have resolved that this should not be allowed to happen. We have acted on this resolution. As the House knows, we have substantially increased the strength of our security forces, both Army and Garda, and we are for some time now engaged in a recruiting campaign for the Army. We have nearly 3,000 men engaged on security duties in the Border area.

The Minister for Justice later in the debate will deal in more detail with this but it is sufficient to say that the British observers have had to pay tribute to the effectiveness of our security in these areas. We have taken effective steps to ensure that arms and explosives do not fall into the hands of irregular or illegal organisations. Our security forces have apprehended and our courts have convicted and sentenced hundreds of those engaged in crime connected with the campaign of violence. We have undertaken to introduce legislation to deal effectively with the problem of fugitives wanted for such crimes and the Government will continue to take every action open to them to prevent the killing and destruction.

In this we need the whole-hearted support of all our people and it must be clear to all that we have it. If we propose to encourage the establishment of the necessary conditions for the securing of communal peace in Northern Ireland, we must, all of us, clearly demonstrate that there is no sympathy here for those who would contribute to the wrecking of those conditions. People must not be tricked into lending credibility to demonstrations which play on natural sympathy for human suffering. They must beware of misleading propaganda which trades on false analogies which have no foundation in events in the past in our history. No vestige should remain of an idea which fails to recognise the humanity of some of our fellow-countrymen and which regards in some circumstances their murder, or a crippling injury, as a justifiable act. Any condoning of violence can only encourage those standing in the wings of the two traditions in Ireland waiting for their ultimate opportunity —the wrecking of the entire democratic institutions of this island.

I believe the vast bulk of our people realise fully the potential for chaos and anarchy inherent in the violence we have seen, in addition to its intrinsic evil. They have been sickened by the crimes we have seen. But we must be vigilant. The small number in our midst who are not sick of violence must be made aware of our determination to end their methods and of our detestation of their methods and of their ideas. We must accept our responsibilities. I believe we do now, more than ever.

We have only to look to the North to see the damage to prospects for economic and social progress which violence brings. For some years, the Northern economy weathered the storm surprisingly well. More recently, however, there have been ominous signs: for example, the numbers of professional and skilled men and women and their families leaving Northern Ireland at the moment is disquietingly large. These are the people who have decided that Northern Ireland has no future. They do not come down here; neither is the emigration from one community only. Their road is the same road that all Irish emigrants have taken when oppressed, as they are, by violence; that road takes them to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, America, to anywhere far away where they may give their children a chance.

Our primary concern is for peace in Northern Ireland and justice and prosperity for all its people. How this is to be achieved must be a matter for agreement between the divided sections of the Northern community. It is they who will have to live with the institutions yet to be established there. But these institutions, if they are to endure and to achieve these aims, must necessarily provide access for both sections of the community to a share in government, through participation of valid representatives of majority and minority alike in the running of the affairs of Northern Ireland, however this participation be described.

We have legitimate interests in these arrangements because failure to resolve the divisions that have torn Northern Ireland apart threatens our peace and our prosperity too. Moreover, in an increasingly interdependent world, two parts of a small island linked together as closely as we are economically and socially cannot succeed in developing their full potential without close co-operation. It is this, a recognition of this kind of reality, that has prompted the establishment of groups like the Nordic Union and Benelux, as well, of course, as the larger EEC membership which has created new bonds of common interest between North and South. In certain respects, indeed, this island must be treated as one for the practical purpose of the working of the Community — this is patently true of plant health and animal health. But in many other areas there are strong common interests which we share and which, understandably, at times diverge from the interests of Great Britain, a great industrial power with a minimal agricultural sector. Both parts of Ireland find themselves in a very different situation because agriculture is relatively more important in Ireland, North and South, and because neither part of Ireland has the resources within its own boundaries to provide adequately for the needs of peripheral areas.

These common interests in such areas of community policy as agricultural and regional policy suggest that consultation and joint action are necessary in the interest of both parts of the country. I have made an offer of co-operation which I hope will be received in the spirit in which it is intended. For our part, we must continue and, indeed, accelerate the process of creating the kind of society in the Republic with which the Northern majority would wish to be closely linked with a view to our common benefit. The sort of development of which I am speaking means more than the development simply of the right mental or psychological climate. It means the creating here of an economy which is strong and growing, as ours has been growing recently. It means the creating within our island, by co-operation and effort, of the wealth with which to build a society which cares for people and has the ability to match that care with the resources to give it substance. Prosperity can bring us a unity of hearts and of purpose far more valuable than the bitter fruits of violence.

I have not spoken at any length on the interests of the British Government in Northern Ireland. I have not done so because I believe that, while the British Government have an important influence for good or ill in Irish affairs, the problems of Northern Ireland must essentially be settled in Ireland between Irishmen. I will make just a few brief points.

Some people say that the British Government should be asked now to make a declaration of their intent to withdraw at some time in the future to be determined by parties in Ireland, or to withdraw their troops to barracks as a first step in a phased withdrawal. Suggestions of this kind ignore reality — for example, the reality of the exposed position of the minority in many parts of the North and the absence of any Northern Ireland security force acceptable to the whole community there. The fact is, moreover, that British decisions on these matters will be taken, not exclusively by reference to the views of Irish parties or to the interest or convenience of people here, but also on the basis of Britain's own interests and priorities. The Government will continue to seek that the British Government will shoulder its share of the responsibility to create the conditions in which the problems in Northern Ireland can be settled by agreement. The Government were greatly heartened and encouraged by the broad acceptance of the necessity for this which was shown by the British Government, the Opposition front bench, and MPs of all parties in the recent Westminster debate. For our part we cannot ignore that what is happening in Northern Ireland today is a direct threat to the security and the lives of the people in this part of Ireland. It is important that we fully acknowledge that here today. We have had tragic evidence of this reality and it is only prudent in the present situation to keep our security arrangements under review—in particular, the strength of our security forces. The Government are doing this on a continuing basis and I would ask young men who are finishing their education to consider the desirability of a period of service in the Army.

The Government have decided that the time has come for us to ask for more involvement in security by the people themselves in a structured way. We are setting up in each city and town voluntary local security service units, based on the local Garda stations, to carry out rostered patrolling and to report to the Garda any activity arousing suspicion. Unattended vehicles, which now constitute the sneak artillery of the dealers in violence, will be a particular object of attention for the new force. We want to ensure that our citizens will be able to carry on their normal commerce in our cities and towns in the knowledge that they are being protected by the Garda with the assistance of the new force. We want to promote a general spirit of vigilance in our citizens. We want to make it difficult for the violent to leave their deadly packages in public places with impunity. Many of the people who, I am sure, will volunteer for this force will already be members of existing organisations such as the Red Cross and the Civil Defence Force. The present intention is that people so involved already would be eligible and acceptable on the basis that their commitments to their original organisations would have priority. I know that when the arrangements will be announced in each city and town we can count on generous support from our citizens.

Our primary obligation is to safeguard the institutions which have been entrusted to us as elected representatives of the people and to safeguard the lives and property of our citizens. Likewise it is the duty of the elected representatives of Northern Ireland to act on behalf of all their people. They must surely realise the terrible consequences of the failure to achieve a political agreement between themselves. They must recognise that the effects of such a failure will not be confined to Northern Ireland but must determine not alone what we do here, but what the British Government may do. The political leaders of these islands have devoted considerable time and energy to the formulation of policies for securing peace with justice in Northern Ireland. In the past it was to a large extent on the initiatives of the British and Irish Governments that such formulations were devised. I think that it is to the Northern political leaders that we should now look for the next steps in this process.

Mr. J. Lynch

When I asked for this debate I did so for a number of reasons. First, I felt that the developments in the North of Ireland had reached the point that Dáil Éireann should review them and maintain its continuing involvement in these developments and show its concern for their consequences. Secondly, statements by Government Ministers touching on Coalition policy on Northern Ireland were being made in a variety of locations, in a variety of circumstances, but not in this House. Dáil Éireann is the place where such statements could best be made so that they could be considered and debated by Members of the Dáil.

The statement of the Taoiseach today is sadly lacking in any indication of Government thinking or Government policy. It is in marked contrast with the thinking expressed and exposed at party workers' meetings in Dún Laoghaire, or Blackrock, or in other places. The only new thing that emerged was the announcement of the formation of a vigilante force of people who will watch areas and vehicles and places wherein car bombs might be left. I would support the Taoiseach in appealing to people to come forward and give their assistance in this exercise. I will also support him in his suggestion to young men to contemplate, at least for a short period, service in our Defence Forces.

The third reason why I asked for the debate was that I believed that a vacuum had arisen following the prorogation of the Northern Executive and in particular, following the counsel of despair in the speeches emanating from some Coalition Ministers. Therefore, I felt that we in this House should have an opportunity of considering whether new initiatives of a positive nature might be possible. Some initiatives may be indicated in subsequent Government speeches but, apart from the single matter I mentioned, nothing has emerged from the speech of the Taoiseach.

The kind of Government speech I had in mind in particular was one— although it was delivered after I had made my request for this debate— made in Dún Laoghaire on Thursday, 13th June in which the Taoiseach said:

They——

——meaning the people of Ireland——

——are expressing more and more— and I mention this simply as a matter of record, without comment one way or the other — the idea that unity with an area or close association with the people, so deeply imbued with violence and its effects is not what they want. In this sense the violence is accentuating the mental partition and doing what nobody in history has ever done before. It is killing here the desire for unity which has been part of our heritage.

I believe that it shows great lack of leadership on the part of the Taoiseach to put forward such a concept in such a way. He should have stated whether he believes it to be true. He certainly gave many people the impression that he did. It may be, of course, that some people have become disillusioned with the situation in the North because of the continuing violence and because of the failure of some proposals for solutions which have been made from time to time to receive any acceptance by those who refuse to be diverted from their path of violence. To imply, however, that we should cease—and I assert there was that implication—to aspire to a united Ireland by peaceful means in co-operation, understanding and justice because of violence is, in itself, a concession to those who pursue that violence.

I am certain that the people in this part of Ireland do not want to abandon that aspiration. Above all, they do not want to abandon the minority in the North to the kind of life, the kind of subjection and domination they have suffered there for over 50 years. If that were the case, the minority in the North could hardly be blamed if they saw no way out of their dilemma other than to turn to the men of violence. I have said that there was a strong implication in the statement of the Taoiseach in Dún Laoghaire that there was a diminution in the aspiration to unity. That implication has made itself felt in parts of the world other than here, and other than in the North of Ireland. In Le Figaro of 25th of this month, there is a heading to this very effect, to the effect of the disenchantment of the Irish people with the aspiration for unity. In The Economist of June 22nd under the heading “World International Report”, there is an article and I will quote some passages from it:

Although it is strenuously denying it the Irish Government is preparing the ground for a new Ulster policy.

I am not attributing this statement to the Government but if it is the case, and the Government I feel sure must be aware of this article, then this is the place and now is the time to put forward their ideas so that we can debate them. The article goes on to say:

The first and biggest departure will be a reformulation of the Republic's territorial claim to Northern Ireland.

Again, we on this side of the House would be very anxious to know if such is the case and what the nature of that reformulation will be. Lower down the article states:

Dr. Conor Cruise-O'Brien, the Irish Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, who is now dominating Cabinet thinking on Northern Ireland——

I make no comment on that

——said at the week-end that—— and this is his quote

——"both persuasion and force are hopeless" in bringing about Irish unity.

Surely, we all have abandoned force, at least those who really seek genuine unity, but must we also abandon persuasion? Is it Government policy that we must seek to try to persuade our Northern brethren no matter on what side of the political or religious divide they may be to come along with us and build up our country? If this is Government policy the Taoiseach has not indicated that but if it is Government policy I hope subsequent speakers will indicate it.

This article is very illuminating and it goes on further to state:

Mr. Cosgrave is prepared, once a solution to the present crisis in the North is found, to put to the people a revision of the Republic's Constitution, deleting the Articles that make territorial claims to Northern Ireland.

Again, this is an aspect of Government policy, if there is to be a change in it, in which we on this side of the House will be very interested. In my view the writer used this as a preface for his next paragraph which reads:

He recognises——

——that is the Taoiseach recognises——

——that this line is certain to widen the cracks in his Government's unity with the opposition Fianna Fáil Party on Northern policy. But he is prepared for this, and he even sees some party political advantage to be gained.

If that is his intention he is going to be disillusioned.

He thinks that Mr. Lynch's attempts to placate Fianna Fáil's "republican" wing——

——republican is in inverted commas——

Mr. Coughlan

With a question mark. The Deputy can put a question mark after republican.

Mr. J. Lynch

To continue the quotation:

——may split Fianna Fáil, or at least lose it votes.

This is a republican party and there is no need for a republican wing in it. The article goes on to say, and this is something that causes some concern to me and I am sure to the Members of my party:

The new policy is unlikely to be spelt out until after the Dáil's next debate on Northern Ireland.

This is after this debate. I should like to hear from subsequent Government speakers whether in fact there is to be a new policy; in what form is it to be promulgated? Are we to get an opportunity of debating it here? If there is a new policy why not tell us here and now while we have the opportunity of debating it?

I will pass from that and come to what I propose to say for myself and not quote what writers or commentators have said about Government intentions or give quotes as to what the man who is now dominating Cabinet thinking on Northern Ireland says, The real test of the fibre of a people comes not in easy times but in adversity.

A Deputy

Standing idly by.

Mr. J. Lynch

If I am going to be interrupted I want to warn the Deputies opposite that I do not wish to upset the even tenor of this debate and I do not want words attributed to me that I never used. I hope that message gets across here and now.

Mr. Coughlan

The Deputy dropped the word "republican".

An Ceann Comhairle

Order. Let us not have any further interruptions.

Mr. J. Lynch

There has not been a single interruption from this side of the House but now we have interruptions from that side of the House from people who are now cock-a-hoop because of local election results in certain places.

Mr. Coughlan

Yes, and we showed it in no uncertain terms.

An Ceann Comhairle

Deputy Coughlan should desist from any further interruptions.

Mr. J. Lynch

When Labour do the count-up in the end they will be disillusioned and they will see how affected they are by their Coalition with Fine Gael. It is they who stole Labour's seats.

Mr. Coughlan

Time is the best judge of that. We will put you out.

(Interruptions.)

Mr. J. Lynch

The failure of the brave experiment of power-sharing we regret profoundly, but while we commend all who engaged in it we cannot afford the time to lament.

For our part we in Fianna Fáil do not suggest that there is any easy solution but we are determined, and are confident, that a solution will be found. Now is the time to bring forward again positive proposals in our search for peace and progress pointing to the failures of the past, not in a spirit of recrimination but in an endeavour to widen our knowledge and understanding.

We reject the tendency towards the mentality—although it may be understandable—of some sections in Britain which would say "a plague on both your houses" as the best that Britain can offer. It is only fair to say that this is not the policy of the three main parties in Britain and it is right that we should commend the efforts of the present and last British Governments for their efforts to establish power sharing in the North.

We can accept without difficulty that Britain has abandoned long since any imperialist pretensions to any part of this country. But in the process she has continued to make the mistake of failing to listen to advice from those who are in a position to give the best and right advice. Repeated assurances of there being no change unless the Northern majority wished it, given in the Ireland Act of 1949, repeated in the Downing Street Declaration and in the Sunningdale Agreement, seemed to have made those who were being re-assured more obstinate and demanding.

I said that this was a negative policy on the part of the British Government; that they should have a positive policy. I said that they should rather encourage amongst Irish people the idea of Irish unity rather than give guarantees. In a speech at the Garden of Remembrance in Dublin on 11th July, 1971, I said that this kind of guarantee "makes intransigence a virtue and silences reason". I went on to say: "It would take nothing away from the honour of Britain or the rights of the majority in the North if the British Government were to declare their interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland, by agreement, in independence and in a harmonious relationship between the two islands."

This is not a declaration of intent nor do I suggest that the Taoiseach implied that, although some others have. This is not the sort of declaration of intent that other people have been clamouring for because I realise the dangers that would arise in such a declaration. In my view there is a great difference in what I proposed in 1971 and what I still advocate as a means of bringing Irish people together and this so-called declaration of intent.

The Loyalists are loyal, but to whom? Certainly not now to the British Government or people: perhaps to the British crown—but that is an abstraction in any event. Most of all they are loyal to themselves and to the idea that only they are entitled to rule what they call "Ulster". The issue then is not so much the preservation of any link with Britain as the maintenance of power by a particular group over part of this island in perpetuity. This is the extravagant position that extreme loyalists are now adopting. It is a position that will command the sympathy of no one in these islands, other than themselves. What kind of society is it and who would want to live within it—the raison d'être of whose members is domination and deprivation of their neighbours, a society whose intransigence is motivated and cemented, as Mr. Bob Cooper, former Manpower Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive has said, by their depth of hatred of their neighbours because of their religious beliefs? On the other hand, who would want a united Ireland achieved by men whose codes and moral standards are so low as to use young people and exploit their idealism as carriers of bombs, not caring whether these bombs kill the young people themselves or innocent people? What sort of country would it be that would be governed by those who seek power by these methods?

We know that there are on both sides of the Border and in both communities in Northern Ireland a small minority of men who seek in violence the ultimate solution to the Irish problem. They are a tiny minority in both communities but put together have disgraced the name of Ireland and their vile activities have put further and further back the attainment of legitimate aspirations. We must remember the effect that these things are having on ourselves and on our children. If we do not stop the kind of things which have been happening in Ireland over the past five years we may, North and South, be faced with a new kind of emigration. The Taoiseach referred to this as well. In the past, people have emigrated from Ireland through poverty and economic necessity.

It would be ironic if at this point in Irish history when the possibilities of great economic achievements are at hand, that people should start to emigrate through sheer frustration and disgust at the violent behaviour of a small minority of their neighbours, and because of failure to find in their own country what is fundamental to all living, that is peace and freedom from fear. Indeed, if the activities of the UVF, the IRA or whatever title the men of violence give themselves. continue, there will be no economic future for any part of Ireland. Bob Cooper recently said: "The tragedy is that it is the people whose talents we need to rebuild, who are getting out". He put the number of people seeking to emigrate in the week following the Loyalists' strike at over 2,000. When this figure was put side by side with the annual average of about 10,000 workers it gave some idea of the size of this problem.

A couple of months ago I commended the proposal of the then Minister of Education in the Northern Executive, Mr. Basil McIvor, for integrated education at primary school level on a pilot scheme basis. I realise the difficulties that exist in integrated primary education in the North but I am still convinced that children of different religions being educated apart from each other in their formative years is one of the contributory factors to the violence that has taken place intermittently over the past 50 years and in greater intensity over the past five years. I believe that as long as this continues to be the case we will have the recurrence again and again of that kind of violence. I mentioned in my speech on that occasion that we have experience here of integrated education in our vocational education system, on whose Committees of management clergy from the main branches of the Christian churches are represented. A further step in that direction was the establishment by Fianna Fáil of community schools and of boards of management set up under a trust deed which would involve parents, religious communities and vocational education committees. The criterion of selection of persons to represent parents on these boards would not in any way be sectarian.

A reasonable progression of this development would be to make integrated education available in this part of the country at primary level on a pilot scheme basis and on a limited scale. I have no doubt, because of our experience in vocational education that adequate provision could be made for religious instruction for different denominations and full safeguards provided for the preservation of religious beliefs. I am disappointed that in some respects the present Minister for Education seems to have pulled back from the purport and concept of community schools. I think it would be interesting to hear some of his Government colleagues, who I am sure would support me in what I suggest, comment on the action now being taken, or rather the lack of action, by the Minister for Education in this sphere. I know that these things cannot be done overnight, I know that it is not easy to change methods and systems that have long been established and which, in the main, have proved to be satisfactory, but if the ultimate result of the establishment of such a system—a vocational system, a community school system and a possibility of introducing it on a limited scale in primary schools—would contribute to the saving of life and the elimination of violence in any part of our country, then I believe as Christians we should support such an objective.

Once again it is the middle-of-theroad people, as they are called, who will be called upon to deliver Northern Ireland from further desolation and destruction. When in Government, Fianna Fáil believed that power-sharing was the best hope of solving the legitimate grievances of the minority and of producing that degree of co-operation and understanding which were necessary for the economic progress of the North which I am sure both the majority and the minority desire. Our belief has not changed, nor has that of all the elected leaders of the minority and many of those leaders of the majority. Despite the disappointments and set-backs of the past weeks I think the principles which were acted upon were right and are the only principles that offer hope for the future.

My party sought and supported power-sharing as the only way to achieve peace and fair play for all in the North. We still believe that Irish unity is the only permanent basis for peace and co-operation in all Ireland and I have already stated and I repeat that the Irish unity which my party seeks is one based on consent. We do not wish to see the Unionists in a united Ireland against their will; because we know that that form of unity would not be real unity. The unity we seek is a unity based on respect—respect by Nationalists for Unionists, and respect by Unionists for Nationalists, but we know that that form of unity will not come about in the short-term.

To the Unionists of Northern Ireland I would say, as Grattan said centuries ago: "Gentlemen, you have a country". The Northern Ireland Unionists are at all times welcome to share in a country of free citizens. This I believe is their true destiny and will give them their true identity. It could create a greater, more generous and more exciting society than either North or South can create on its own. There is only one thing more important to us than to have the Northern majority in this society and that is not to have them in it against their will.

While Sunningdale was not the ideal solution to Irish problems, nevertheless Fianna Fáil gave it support because it confirmed the establishment of a power-sharing Executive which we, when in Government, had advocated and in which Irishmen of all religious and political divisions, for the first time in Northern Ireland, attempted to reach out across the sectarian and political divide to work together for the common good. I mentioned it confirmed the establishment of a power-sharing Executive because, despite what had been suggested to the contrary—and I am not taking credit for it—it was confirmed, not initiated, at Sunningdale. Power-sharing has not succeeded. However, although the Executive were not given time to succeed, they did not fail in that they demonstrated that there are possibilities and promise not previously believed to exist.

It was said after Sunningdale—I think by the Taoiseach—that there were no winners and no losers. There is now a danger that we could move towards a situation where we could be all losers and have no winners. This need not, and must not, happen. There is nothing particularly sacrosanct about the institutions proposed at Sunningdale. My party would like to see them established and we were prepared to co-operate in the changes that were necessary for their establishment. But the important thing is not the institutions proposed but the principles that are involved. These principles, I believe, have an abiding value, especially for those middle-of-the-road and moderate people to whom I have referred, and can be summed up in the words—respect, power-sharing and co-operation.

Fundamental to the respect I speak of is that the Nationalist majority of the whole island should respect the wish of the Northern majority to remain part of the United Kingdom but that is not the end of it. The Northern majority should respect the wish of the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland to aspire towards a united Ireland. There is no point in us here saying that we would respect all the Unionist's rights provided he ceases to be a Unionist. Likewise, there is no point in the Unionist saying that he would respect all the Nationalist's rights provided he ceases to be a Nationalist. Such statements are not promises to respect a man's position and identity and they have been made. On the contrary they are threats to deny it.

The value of powersharing is well known and I have already dealt with it. Under the head of co-operation. I would include co-operation between North and South in the creation of a security system which would guarantee equal civil rights and political rights to all persons living in this island and would effectively protect them against violence. Under this head I would also put economic co-operation between North and South for the benefit of all the people of Ireland.

This is a time of national trauma when even the extent of economic co-operation that already exists between both parts of the country could receive a set-back, or at least be considerably slowed down. Therefore we must pause to consider, but not pause for so long that all momentum which is of value is lost. One must recognise the nature and extent of the void that has been opened but we should not be intimidated by it so as to turn it into an abyss. How then are we to continue the progress towards an all-Ireland character?

There is no controversy that there are many adjoining areas of the Twenty-six and the Six Counties which are capable of development together as an economic unit to the mutual advantage of the people. Neither is it a matter of controversy that there are many projects of mutual value to the Six Counties and to the Twenty-six where their joint efforts are superior to their individual efforts. No section of either area, no matter how diametrically opposed their views may be on political matters, contest that this type of project can be handled together. I would not anticipate that a proposal to move forward in this sphere would be opposed from any source that need cause any of us concern.

It is my proposal, therefore, that an authority should be set up to commence as a matter of urgency projects in the regional, economic, technological and planning spheres which are of mutual interest and concern to North and South and in particular to underdeveloped or less fully developed areas of the Six Counties and the Twenty-six Counties. I visualise that such an authority would have real power of initiation, financing and supervision, that it would represent in a practical and concrete way, and by participation and membership, all the varying sections of political thinking in every part of this country.

On the 27th of April last when I spoke in Cork I asked could we not have an all-Ireland convention for peace. I urged that rank and file members of all parties would come together as soon as possible with one single term of reference—how we could bring about an end to the violence and the suffering in this island. Unfortunately my suggestion received no response; perhaps the proposal of a peace conference is not yet possible, however desirable; but it does seem to me that there can be no real obstacles to an all-Ireland convention, similar in concept, which would have as its object the setting up of an authority to take over the non-controversial fields about which there is and always has been a mutuality of interest.

Speaking in this context, as I did in the context of a convention for peace, on behalf of the largest political party in the country, I want to say that we would play our part, that we would sit down with representatives of any other legitimate party and that we would strive for an agreement as to the personnel, the scope, the powers, the financing and the administration of an authority to deal with important matters of all kinds in the common interest.

As an example of the kind of project I have in mind, I point to the part of the Six County area west of the Bann, and in particular to the area surrounding Derry city. We all know how Derry and the Foyle valley have suffered as a result of Partition, and these difficulties have been reflected for many years on both the eastern and western sides of the Foyle. The need for the development of the Foyle valley is pressing and obvious, and both North and South could co-operate in and derive great benefit from this work. I would hope that this could be done by mutual agreement in Ireland, but I feel that it must be done promptly so that the links that are still there and about which there is no controversy may be strengthened and augmented at the time when progress in the political field is checked.

I make another suggestion. There is much debate—and some controversy —on the possibility of open broadcasting in this country and of providing a second RTE channel. I make no comment on the merits of these proposals. It is not necessary for the purpose of my suggestion, nor is this the appropriate occasion to make such comment.

I suggest that instead of the stated objective of the second RTE channel proposed by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, the feasibility of a television and radio service which would be neither exclusively British nor for want of a better term, Southern Irish, be examined.

I suggest further that a body be established to examine the possibility of the three "Irish" channels, BBC Northern Ireland, UTV and RTE coming together to form a unified channel, instead of RTE 2 as envisaged by the Minister. The Minister shakes his head; I may be wrong. However, I think my suggestion is in recognisable enough terms to enable the Minister to deal with it.

Early in my speech I said the real test of a people comes not in the easy, every day conditions of life. Now is the time when we, the Irish people North and South, are being put to the test. It is essential that we do not move further apart by recriminations on things about which we do not agree. I appeal to everybody who wants to eliminate violence and generally desires peace, justice and economic progress to develop things on which we do agree and matters in which we are united. The men of violence are daily sundering us and making living on this island, especially the northern part of it, intolerable. They must be positively repudiated and given no recognition in any form.

We have suffered disappointments in the past but we can now echo the sentiments of the Northern poet, John Hewitt:

This is our fate: eight hundred years' disaster,

erazily tangled as the Book of Kells,

The dream's distortion and the land's division,

The midnight raiders and the prison cells.

Yet like Lir's children banished to the waters

Our hearts still listen for the landward bells.

Minister for Justice (Mr. Cooney)

I think it can be salutary for us at this stage to recall the motion we are debating here. The motion is: That Dáil Éireann takes note of recent events affecting Northern Ireland. It is important that we would keep those recent events very much in the forefront of our minds when we come to speak in this debate and to consider what views we should contribute on this subject.

The recent events in Northern Ireland have seen the breakdown of the Executive and have seen the end of the Sunningdale package, the package which was designed to take account of the conflicting interests in Northern Ireland, the package that was designed to reassure the majority up there that there could be no change in their constitutional status without their consent, and at the same time give the minority a real share in their own affairs. It was a package of checks and balances, intended to be fair, and, in my opinion, it was a fair package. In spite of having these qualities it has fallen and is now broken. I think it has fallen and broken because the majority up there were not reassured by it. Whatever the reasons, whether there were any inherent faults in the package or whether their lack of trust in it was something that can never be overcome or whether their lack of trust in it was due to sentiments and actions insensitively said or done so as to frighten them that this package was not the fair package it purported to be, it is clear from the events that brought the Northern Executive down that the Northern majority were afraid of Sunningdale and its implications.

I think that is the reality of the Northern situation today. We must now start on a long haul to reassure those people that the Sunningdale package was a bona fide package, that it was full of good intentions and that they were meant. We must try to regain the confidence of those people that, when we say we do not want any change in the constitutional position in this island without the consent of the majority up there, we really mean it. It is now incumbent on us here to have a look at our situation and see how we can contribute towards the reassurance of the people in the North.

We must be carefully sensitive in all we say or do in this regard. I do not know if we have been as sensitive as we should have been, if we have been as careful as we should have been in regard to the future of this island having regard to this undeniable reality, the fear of the Northern majority. We cannot ignore it. We cannot put it aside. Wishful thinking will not remove it from the Irish political scene. As I say, we have to start on the long haul towards reassuring that majority, because it is only when it is reassured that there may be a glimmer of political hope. The tenor and emphasis of this debate should be an acknowledgement by this Parliament of that reality.

One of the factors which led to the failure of the Northern majority to have confidence in the Sunningdale package was the myth that this State was not serious about confronting, fighting and conquering the IRA. This fear was propounded by many people in the North, some genuinely believing it, others for propaganda reasons in the hope that it would have a destructive effect on the Sunningdale arrangement. Whatever their motives, it was a point of view that was put forward frequently and trenchantly, and it did have the effect of coming to be believed by many of the Northern majority, not, I might say, by those who would be professionally engaged in the area of security; they knew it was untrue, but it was not their place or their duty to speak out. However, it was a canard that took flight early on after the Sunningdale Agreement, and it was impossible to shoot it down before it had done a lot of harm. Nevertheless it has been to some extent removed from the scene, but as part of the process of reassurance it is very important that it should go from this House in the course of this debate that this State and this Government are determined to conquer the IRA.

It is, unfortunately, necessary to have to say that, not because we do not want to carry out this duty; we do, but it is odd that it should be necessary to say it, that there should be any doubt about it. This is where the difficulty arises about the North, that there is this lingering residual doubt, and it is understandable that there should be such a doubt. An observer on the outside not fully acquainted with all the nuances of Irish history—and that includes people in Northern Ireland who have been reared and educated in the British tradition—having seen certain events happening down here, might need reassurance about the complete determination of the, if I may use the word, Establishment, to deal with this evil.

If they looked on some fairly recent political happenings in this State they might have cause to have a doubt which now has to be removed and assuaged, and they have to be reassured. That is a fact. I do not want to harp on it; it is a piece of history that is not history but, nevertheless, the fact that it happened must necessarily be a contributory factor towards doubts that might be held in the North in regard to this jurisdiction down here.

Again too, there were public reactions down here of a massive and irrational kind to certain tragic events which led to the burning down of the British Embassy in Dublin some years ago. This frightened people and led to a questioning of what sort of a nation is it? What sort of people are they? Are they all deep down supporters of the philosophy of violence? Again, possibly there has been delay on the part of the people here in coming to a full realisation of the inherent viciousness of the IRA mentality. Indeed, to use the word "mentality" in regard to IRA people—I have to use the word "people"; they are human—is to give a dignity to these people they do not deserve because "mentality" imputes a certain amount of rationality, whereas, by all their actions, they have shown themselves to be mindless, vicious savages.

I do think that the people in the North have felt that there has not been a full realisation down here by all the people of the full viciousness of the IRA. Consequently, we have to reassure the people in the North— and I think it has to go forth from this Parliament—that we are conscious of it as a real evil and that we are determined to stamp it out. We have to reassure the people that this warped mentality, this ambivalence to violence, that they sense is widespread down here is not in fact widespread. This is the task we have to undertake.

The mentality of the IRA is mindless and savage. It is so irrational that it prohibits us from understanding the mentality of the person who can support or be a member of the IRA. It is an irrational mentality that can go misty-eyed over a song like "The Croppy Boy", "Kevin Barry" or some such sentimental ballad and, at the same time, put a bullet in a neighbour's head, or, at the same time, boast about destroying the enemy's economic targets. But what he means is that he has burned down the shops of his Protestant neighbours. This is the irrational mentality that defies comprehension.

There is always a worry, I think, on the part of those in the North who have experienced this irrationality to wonder how widespread is it; is there some taint of it in the Irish character as a whole? I think what we have to show is that there is not; that this irrationality is confined to a small minority and that the Establishment— the Government and this Dáil is determined to ensure that it be rooted out of our society. I think this is possibly the primary assurance that this debate can give to the people of the North on the long haul back towards power-sharing, the long haul back towards mutual trust.

As I have said, the lie took flight that, following Sunningdale, we were not fulfilling our obligations in the security field. It took flight quickly and was sponsored by many people. I want to give some statistics. Statistics are dull and in the context of a debate of this nature may seem out of place. Nevertheless, I think they have to be put on record to show that we are active, and actively active, in this field.

The police force is now at the highest level it has ever reached in the history of this State. Recruiting is continuing and, as the Taoiseach said, it is the Government's determination that if the present high level of police is not sufficient to discharge our task in conquering the IRA, then it will be increased. The Army is at its highest peace time level for many years and recruiting is continuing there. Since January of this year 238 people have been arrested and charged with what I might call terrorist offences; 323 were convicted in 1973. A total of 747 weapons, not to mention vast amounts of explosives, vast amounts of explosive materials—detonators and all the other paraphernalia that bomb fiends need—have been seized as well.

The Garda have been continually patrolling, searching, all along the Border. There is a very high incidence of patrolling. People who travel regularly on those roads can bear this out. But, in addition to this visible patrolling on the roads, there have been regular and widespread searches of that large area which covers the Border, the whole territory continuing to the Border from Derry right around to Dundalk. This is a huge amount of territory that has to be, and is, regularly searched and patrolled.

Likewise, the amount of patrolling and searching throughout the country has been stepped up because, as a result of the vigilance of the guards in the Border area, some of the IRA activities have been moved south. Recently a bomb-making factory was discovered in County Cork. The fact that it was discovered is a tribute to the success of the Garda tactics. Garda officers are very aware—and I have indicated to them my concern about this—of the need continually to search vacant houses and hunt out places where explosives might be manufactured. Therefore, there is constant Garda activity, not merely now in the Border areas but right throughout the area of the Republic.

A lot of play was made of a number of incidents which took place earlier this year when there was confrontation between unarmed guards and armed terrorists in which, on some occasions, shots were fired at the guards. On other occasions guards were physically assaulted or their motor cars or equipment damaged. In one case a guard's uniform was taken. We all felt affronted by these incidents. We all felt as if we had been personally insulted by these incidents and there was a feeling of anger and frustration. Why should the like of it happen?

This gets back to what is basic Government policy in this country, and has been, since the foundation of this State, the deliberate policy to maintain an unarmed police force. I am satisfied that that is the correct policy and I am supported in that belief by the officers and men of the Garda. They feel that their effectiveness in their task is increased and enhanced by virtue of the fact that they are unarmed. This is not to say that, should the need arise or such situations arise where arms would be necessary and the employment of arms necessary, they will not be available and are not at this moment available. But to vindicate the police in their judgement and in their courage in operating in an unarmed State, I just want to draw attention to what has happened in regard to some of these incidents which caused so much unrest at the time they took place. There was a total of 11 incidents. One of them involved a search in Buncrana where a number of armed men confronted the search party of Garda and made their escape. There was considerable anxiety that this should have happened. But the point now is that some of these culprits have been apprehended and have been sentenced. I think the Garda policy of no arms, their professional expertise in their time, on their terms and on their ground, has been vindicated in regard to that incident. There were other incidents in which shots were fired at guards in County Leitrim. Two men have been apprehended and have been tried and convicted. In the 11 incidents I have mentioned, people have been arrested and are awaiting trial. In two of no less than five other incidents no one has yet been apprehended.

The House will understand that in the majority of these incidents the guards, coming later to carry out their function, have successfully arrested and in some cases have successfully secured convictions of the people who confronted them. This is the policy which has been decided on, that this war will be fought on our terms and on our ground and the State will not be provoked by any incidents designed and stage managed to try to ensure such provocation, to try to ensure a large-scale confrontation in a situation that would be to the disadvantage of the forces of this State.

Much play was made of the escape from Mountjoy of three prisoners last October-November but, again, the security forces of the State in regard to that incident rearrested one of the escapees and he has since been convicted for that crime. Those who assisted him from within the prison have also been identified and convicted. There are two escapees still at large. Whether they are at large in this jurisdiction is a very moot point indeed. Most significantly, and this is something which has been overlooked, two other people have been convicted of the crime of conspiring to arrange that escape and the chief conspirator, the person who planned that audacious escape, has been arrested, tried and convicted and is presently serving a long prison sentence. One of his accomplices, a lesser figure, was also tried and convicted with him. So while that, at the time, was a spectacular escapade it has gone very sour for those who planned it in that a person of importance in the IRA is now behind bars for a long time as a result of his activities in it.

While it might appear to the casual observer and to the public when they read of these spectacular confrontations that they should not happen I think they will agree with me, when they see what is their consequence, that in all these cases, with the exception of two or three—and I am confident that in those two or three the culprits will be apprehended in due course, apprehended on the guards' terms and without loss of life on the part of the gardaí—the House will agree that the tactics of an unarmed police force, applying orthodox police methods on a wide scale and with determination and vigour is the correct one but, as I said, if situations should arise where armed intervention is necessary the arms are available.

In this duty of reassuring the people in the North of our desire to see the IRA eliminated from this country, we have to pay attention to what was an important feature of the Sunningdale arrangement, that was that it was in the interest of both jurisdictions that men of violence would be apprehended and convicted and sentenced and in this regard the Government intend to honour the commitment which was a consequence of Sunningdale and which was agreed in the legal commission set up to study the problem, the commitment to have extra-territorial jurisdiction conferred on our courts so that there can be no question of this jurisdiction being a haven for subversives from Northern Ireland. It is the Government's intention to bring in legislation to implement the commission's report and there will, of course, be reciprocating legislation introduced in the Parliament at Westminster and I am certain that when this legislation has been introduced and is being implemented this particular step, by itself, will be an important step in this process of reassuring the people in the North of our intentions.

Again, too, we have a mutual interest in defeating terrorism and if there were any lingering doubts about that mutual interest down here, and I do not think there were, they were removed by the tragedies of the bombings in this city. At that time I paid tribute to the co-operation which the guards had received from the RUC in the aftermath of that incident. I repeat those tributes now. They do show the need for effective co-operation if the IRA— and the IRA is the enemy of every right-thinking citizen on this island entirely—are to be removed from this country. If they are to be removed it will have to be a joint operation. I think it is important to say that so that those in the North who might have had any doubts about the determination of the people down here will be reassured. It is important in this entire process of reassuring them, and this is what we have to be at now in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Executive, in the aftermath of the failure of Sunningdale, that we make it very clear that in the field of security we are ready, willing and anxious to co-operate. We will provide, I hope before the Recess, the legal mechanisms for this co-operation. Co-operation between the two police forces is a fact of life and has always been a fact of life. It is my intention to see that this co-operation continues and, where necessary, is expanded so that it can become effective. It is not in our interest, if we are good neighbours, to allow our territory to be a haven or to have ineffective measures. We do not want to do that for our own sake and for the sake of our neighbour.

Our police force is at the highest level at which it has ever been since the foundation of the State and, if necessary, it will be augmented further. Our Army is at, I think, its highest peace-time level since the end of the Civil War. Recruiting for the Army is continuing. Nevertheless, there are numerical limitations imposed on us by the size of our country, by the size of our population and by the size of our resources but within those limitations we are able and have the capacity to deal with the security problems of the Twenty-six Counties and, in co-operation with our neighbours in the North, the problems of the Six Countries so far as they impinge on this jurisdiction. Our security forces are stretched, they are at their limit in looking after the affairs, looking after the security considerations of this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where they can be increased they will be increased because, as the Taoiseach said, we have to forego a lot of economic benefits in order to maintain stability, in order to maintain peace.

The security forces by themselves can only do so much. I have said before that to be fully effective they need the full and total co-operation of the people. There must be a realisation that the guards are our guards and that they are doing our job, that they are not working, so to speak, on behalf of some distant or remote Government in Dublin. The guards are working on behalf of every citizen and are entitled to the active help of every citizen. It is important, in this process of reassurance in the North, that there would be no doubts in the North but that the guards have that co-operation. I made an appeal some time ago for co-operation in a number of ways. I asked people to give information to the guards. I asked them to refrain from contributing to the collection boxes of front organisations, to refrain from buying the propaganda sheets of the IRA, to be careful not to find themselves patronising a social function with the objective of raising funds for some of these front organisations.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Minister has three minutes left.

Mr. Cooney

I am glad to say that that appeal for co-operation has met with much success. I am told by the Garda that the flow of information coming to them has improved immensely. I make the appeal confidently again to the people of this country to continue to co-operate with the Garda, to give them any information that comes their way concerning the men of violence.

Only by total co-operation between the people and the police will the problem of the IRA be ended in this country. In ending it here we will have done a lot towards re-assuring the people in the North. As I said, when I started, the objective of this debate should be to start on the long road towards re-assuring the people in the North that we have no territorial designs until such time as they are ready to come with us, to reassure them that the old shibboleths and the old stances are no longer apt or proper for this time.

Major de Valera

The Taoiseach invited us to contribute our views in this debate and it is in the spirit of that invitation that I would like to comment on the subject matter before us. It is understandable that most people in this House are sorry at the collapse of the Sunningdale experiment, even though towards the end it seemed as if Sunningdale and what it meant for the nationalist portion of the population would be watered down and concessions appeared to be demanded mainly from one side only. Nevertheless, it was a brave attempt to meet a problem and it has failed. Surely at this point one should ask for a fresh diagnosis of the problem.

It is not likely that a solution to the problem will be found without formulating the problem itself. I fear in our anxiety to get a solution we have either over-simplified the formulation of the problem or we have forgotten what the problem is at its base. It is, therefore, in the spirit of the doctor who seeks to diagnose the disease of the patient before attempting treatment that I would like to approach this problem. I should like to approach it as far as one can with clinical detachment.

Before attempting that, I should like to say that recognising the ugly features of the disease does not lessen one's abhorrence or that understanding what is happening does not mean one is condoning it. I say that at this stage to protect myself from possible charges of that nature. There is a problem here and it has to be faced. The problem is deeply rooted in history.

We must face the fact that the majority of people in this country belong to a tradition and a culture which has been asserting itself for hundreds of years against the very largely successful attempt at conquest by a neighbour. This is a fact and it is only in our time that the majority of the people of this island succeeded in asserting themselves beyond the dream of Irishmen of 100 years ago. This is a fact that cannot be ignored. One will make a mistake if one, in the anxiety to be Christian, to accommodate, to be friendly, forgets that basic fact and, therefore, miscalculates on what the implications of that are.

On the other hand, in the course of that long history when there was considerable success with the conquest and particularly the intermingling through plantation and otherwise of people of another culture and tradition amongest us we have with us a strong element of another culture coming into the present day. This is particularly true in the northern part of the country, in north eastern Ulster. One must recognise it as a fact that these people are there. They are established there, prescriptive right if you like, but that is as big an element of the situation as the other.

No solution can be attained unless this basic fact is recognised with other basic facts. I do not think any decent person has much choice in coming to a conclusion on it. It is for this reason that approaches to this problem through violence, attempting to solve it through violence, are not only unjustifiable but ineffective, no matter from which side the violent approach comes.

This is the diagnosis of the problem. This is basically the problem we have to face in the context in which we have it. The context in which we have it is aggravated by the impact of the Reformation, that one tradition remained Catholic and that the other tradition was strongly Protestant. This is something we have to recognise also in approaching this problem here. This may seem academic and elementary but it is fundamental.

Time does not permit a more detailed analysis. We have the situation at the present day where here in the Twenty-six Countries, as a result of our own painful evolution, particularly through the history of the last 50 years, we have a sovereign State, recognised as such and the name of the Irish nation, however you care to describe that, is recognised in the councils of the nations of the world. You have also had in north-eastern Ulster a situation which was supported by Britain, which was an abnormality. Granted the differences in the communities, the support and the structure of it was an abnormality. An unnatural border was interposed 50 years ago which further aggravated the problem and, because of a certain separation of the two traditions on both sides of it, when it would have been better for us that they should mix, here you have the proximate cause of all the troubles that we have. Violence, disorder, stunted growth and all the rest are directly attributable to this. Incidentally, many of the things said in this House back in 1948 are as valid today as they were then because they were an expression of an historical evolution.

Added to that diagnosis then was the fact that this partition was artificially supported by the British. We might as well say it and I say it with the greatest friendliness; it is a fact of the diagnosis. This, then, leads us to the formula about which we are talking. What does one do about it? What does one do about the coming together by consent? It is too late for either tradition to think in terms of exterminating or completely dominating the other. The consensus we all agree to seek must be the basis on which we come together by consent. That does not mean the mutual ignoring of each other and going our own different ways. Reconciliation in, shall I say, marriage is not divorce. In the same way we have to face the situation that this island is one geographically. There are good economic reasons why we must live together and good historical reasons why we must seek a solution together. Here I come to the parting of the ways in argument with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. It is here, whatever logic may say, that we must take into account sentiment and the historical feeling of both communities.

The Irish people as a whole will not be satisfied without achieving that desired integration. I am avoiding the word "unity" at the moment lest it might be that that might connote domination of the North by the South or the South by the North, or anything like that. Time does not permit a lengthy discussion on this, but it is interesting to note running through the speech of the Taoiseach this kind of uncertainty—the tendency to recognise two Irelands and unity at the same time. In one place he says "our most helpful contribution may be to do nothing". In another part he points out the reasons why the country is one. This is characteristic of the difficulties in our thinking at the present time. It is a sort of ambivalence which can destroy constructive effort because we are not clear on where we are going. Later he says:

Moreover in an increasingly interdependent world two parts of a small island linked together as closely as we are economically and socially cannot succeed in developing their full potential without close co-operation.

How true. And that co-operation means coming together.

I am not suggesting for a moment that that co-operation is the imposition of our structure here on them, but there must be a coming together in the broad sense of unification of Ireland, demanded geographically, economically, socially and historically and that will be the only solution and that can only be achieved without the interference or, if you like, the support of anybody outside.

Mr. Blaney

Hear, hear.

Major de Valera

I make this statement again in a spirit of diagnosis, not in a spirit of domination or aggression. It is futile to approach this on a wrong basis. Violence will not be eliminated in this way. In 1798 the whole island was involved and you had this problem of dominance by what is now represented by the remnant in the North. You had this attempted dominance of the South because of the South's tradition. You had links with the French Revolution. Time does not permit a proper analysis, but let us consider the facts and the outcome: 1798 went down in disaster and woe and anybody at the time of the Union would have said: "That is that. That is the end of the Irish individualist national character." But, if that was not the end, we had the Famine within 50 years and, if anything should have been efficacious in the extermination of a nation, it should have been the combined effect of these two. Within decades of the Famine you had the Fenian Rising and you had bombs in Westminster. You had all that we now know back again. Even when the problem down here was solved—the Taoiseach will understand I do not wish to go into detail in bringing up our own traumatic experience—we still had problems during the war years. There was still 1956 and following on that the trouble in the North. It is an illusion to think that formulae which do not take into account the realities will solve the problem or eliminate the violence. On the other hand, when the problem was basically solved, you had eliminated violence. If you go back for many years now, except for the irritation of the partition problem, political violence was unknown in this 26-county State. I say that to make my point on history.

That is our history. Consider the history of Israel. Would anybody think, when I was a youngster at school, that he would see the Jews back in their own land, a powerful people in the face of all the odds with which they were confronted? Let that be a sobering reflection on the inherent power, force and strength of a people's tradition.

I am saying this about our own southern tradition. Indeed, I respect also the traditions of the Northern Protestant in his way. I would not ask him to bury his culture either in that sense. It highlights the fact that the realities of the situation must be recognised and the people must be brought together. It is most unfortunate that the situation is bedevilled by religion and by bigotry. When one comes to talk about that, one can only say in all truth that one abhors inequity and violence. It might be well if everybody approached it on the basis of the principles of religion and not the labels of religion.

There are two other things I want to say before my time is up. I want to talk about the role of the British. As I have said, this is in no spirit of hatred, or revenge for the past, or anything like that. The fact is that they made the problem. I know it is a problem for them now. They are involved in it with their Army and they have supported the situation with economic support. While that goes on the problem will remain. As truly as it will remain if the basic requirements of unity are ignored so, too, the problem of violence will remain, and remain for the British themselves while this abnormality is there.

Let them look at history again. Let them look at Coventry before the war and the House of Commons and other incidents since, all very deplorable, horrible and to be condemned. These are symptoms of a disease. One can understand, and not only not condone but condemn. That is the attitude I wish to take. Surely they should have learned by now that, in all their half dealings with a problem of this nature, this is the inevitable result whether in the Middle East, in India, or in Ireland. That could be spelled out in detail but it is still a fact in this situation.

I have attempted a diagnosis because the remedies failed and it is time to look at the patient again. The Taoiseach said that the problems of Northern Ireland must essentially be settled in Ireland between Irishmen. He also said he rejected the idea of a phased withdrawal. I am saying that the indications are that it must be settled on the following basis. The communities must be brought together in some form of unity. The situation seems to demand that we should work to get everybody into consultation and then Irishmen North and South should be ready to work out an arrangement that will at last bring peace and prosperity to this island.

As an ancillary and necessary concommitant the British will have to withdraw sooner or later. When I say they will have to withdraw, I am not referring merely to military forces. I understand the force of the case which says this must be a considered matter and that you must consider the status quo before you take precipitate action. Nevertheless withdrawl from this country is a sine qua non for lasting peace. When I say “Withdrawal” I mean total withdrawal. The Taoiseach talked only about military withdrawal. He did not say anything about economic and political withdrawal which is at the root of the problem. In the long run there can be no solution until this is provided for. Remember that this withdrawal will be for the benefit of the British themselves.

Not only has the experience of military interference and then military withdrawal been traumatic for them and for the people involved whether in the Middle East, or India, or Ireland, but the problems of economic and political withdrawal have also been traumatic for them. As Ireland has often been the start of a larger problem for them, they had better think at this stage of repercussions in Wales, Scotland and elsewhere. Surely, therefore, the thing to be done is to recognise the realities of the Irish Sea, and the need for co-operation between both of the islands and not only the parts of the island themselves. We must recognise the need for rational physical and social and political organisations in order that we may all play our part in the greater communities of nations which are developing and must develop because of the technical and physical progress of mankind.

These are the answers I am giving. We cannot abandon the concept of unity. Here I take issue with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. Perhaps his logic may be driving him a little too far in that field. The form of it I leave open. Whether it is popular, and it may seem to be unhelpful to say it now, in the long term the role of the British here must be the role they have in this State at the moment. In other words, we want to co-operate with them and be friendly but, while they have their finger in the pie distorting the whole situation, the problem seems to me to be insoluble.

I want to refer now to the Minister for Justice. I have no objection to security. I agree that we should look after our own security but I do not think we should be anybody else's policeman. We should look after our own security and everybody will give all the help they can. The idea of doing it on a community basis is good. The Minister mentioned the IRA. I have noticed this about the Government and even the Taoiseach. The IRA are mentioned. I have no brief for the IRA. What about the Northern violence people? It was not the IRA who bombed Dublin. Let us get on an even keel. By all means let us have security.

Violence in the North did not start with the IRA. The IRA are the symptom and the product of an unnatural situation in the North, a very unnatural state of violence, the B Specials, the later extremist elements up there and the persecution of the Catholic and national minority up there. That was not the IRA. I do not like saying this because I have no brief for the IRA. Violence is wrong in this context for the reasons I have said. The Minister for Justice might do more justice to himself, if I may put it that way, if he was a little bit more catholic in his security arrangements.

Mr. Kelly

I am sick hearing people say that they have no brief for the IRA, but——

(Interruptions.)

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy has one minute to conclude.

Major de Valera

I did not hear what the Parliamentary Secretary had to say. In my final minute I will say something to religious bigots. Perhaps Catholic and Protestant alike might take the 50th psalm, 51st in the Protestant version, and pray for deliverance from the blood spilling, extol justice and hope to find a solution in justice because it is only in justice and reality and facing all the facts such as they are, whether we like them or not, that a solution to this problem can be found.

Mr. Blaney

The first thing I should like to say is that thanks be to God there is still a de Valera in the Fianna Fáil Party and in this House. It is the first bit of sanity I have heard talked in relation to this matter over the last five years and for that we can all be grateful. So far as the debate itself is concerned I can say that by and large it is just a set piece. It is a scandalous reflection on this House, a scandalous reflection on what is allegedly the Government, the Irish Government, and the Irish Parliament, that we have to wait until this time to have what is now a so-called debate. The debate is closed to the point that there is only approximately seven hours to go with set speakers to say their set pieces at the start and set speakers closing it leaving for general debate a matter of a couple of hours for the voice of the vast majority of the people of all the parties in this House who do not, I am quite satisfied, agree with the so-called bipartisan policy of the two front benches in this House at present. The front benches have a bipartisan policy which has proved over the years to be a policy of doing nothing. We can see the result now.

It is a scandal. The reduction of this House to the situation it finds itself in this evening should go down to the shame of this Government, and the Opposition who agreed to half an hour per speaker to discuss a matter like this. Westminster was recalled for two days, a step which was unprecedented in the history of that Parliament. I asked for this debate on more than one occasion and I got stoney silence from there and no support from here and then we have the leader of the Opposition talking about the debate that is now on at his request. I think we must be gone daft. We are gone daft and there is no doubt about that.

Mr. Harte

The Deputy is not speaking for me.

Mr. Blaney

However, that is wasting some of the time that is deliberately made all too short for a matter of major importance. I could start off no better than by putting on the record of the House, and as fast as I can read it, the analysis which was brought out by The Sunday Times“Insight” Team and an excerpt from their book, “Ulster”:

The border was itself the first and biggest gerrymander: the six counties it enclosed, the new province of Ulster, had no point or meaning except as the largest area which the Protestant tribe could hold against the Catholic. Protestant supremacy was the only reason why the State existed. As such, the State itself was an immoral concept. It therefore had to be maintained from the first by immoral means—the fiddling of internal boundaries too, the steady pressure on Catholics to emigrate by making it hard for them to live and work, the police bullying... And in the end the Army on the streets, internment, "deep interrogation". For the British, the tragedy was that—through historical obligation, and then through sloth and lack of perception—they became involved in the defence of a morally indefensible entity. For the Northern Ireland Catholics the tragedy was that the British defence prolonged that entity's existence a few more, painful years. Nothing was more certain than that Catholics would continue to struggle against the State.

A still more important point also followed. Since Protestant supremacy was the reason why the State was there at all, there was an essential philosophical contradiction about the notion of reform. Dismantle the apparatus of Protestant supremacy, and you have destroyed Northern Ireland's only justifications for being a State on its own. It might just as well not exist.

In my view that is worth having on the record of this House, compiled as it was by The Sunday Times“Insight” Team. In a very few words it says a great deal and is worthy of the greatest consideration by the Members of the Government, and all Members of this House.

I should like to refer quickly to what has been said by the Minister for Justice which only sums up what is the general perception of the leading speakers and spokesmen of the Government, and, indeed, some of the Opposition at the top, and that is that if the IRA are defeated the whole problem is solved. The IRA itself is not a cause; it is an effect. That point has been well and truly made and taken by Deputy de Valera. So long as we have the situation that obtains there of a country sundered against the wishes of the vast majority of the people of this land then so long will there be an IRA, call them what you will because it does not matter what the tag is. There will be that type of movement there that will never be in peace and cannot be in peace and will not be in peace so long as that is the situation. So long as there is the third party participating and supporting and guaranteeing its support militarily, economically and financially, such as Britain has been stupidly doing in these recent times, we will have the continued demand down to the point of a stand-still strike being carried out by the majority to impress Britain and to frighten the people here, including the Members of this House, into the belief that there can be nothing done about it.

Take the British presence out, take her guarantees out and one is dealing with an entirely different and completely new situation. One will find then that the most unreasonable people as they would appear, the not an inch brigade, the no surrender outfit, would be the first to sit down and talk reason for the first time since the creation of the Border. Then they would know they were on their own and that they had to live on their own with the rest of us for the future. They would realise they were there to bargain the best deal they could get out of it within the foreshores of this country without outside control, interference or support. Try and visualise that situation and stop running away from this whole problem that has been such a tragedy in our time, particularly in the last five years, but not confined to that last five years. The tragedy is there for the last 50 odd years. The violence and the brutality have been there for the last 50 years and if we have not been hearing about it, or seeing it, or taking any particular notice of it, it is not because of the fact that it did not exist. Of course, it did exist and it will continue to exist no matter what sort of glossing over may be done by Sunningdale-type arrangements or any other glossing and veneering which is the only outcome of the sort of situation that disregards the basics as outlined by Deputy de Valera.

If we gloss over, even down to the point that we get back to what would be regarded by some as normality, which would be the situation of ten years ago, we merely are saying that the half million Nationalists are to take the boot and the hammer as they have done for the last 50 years; do not mind about them. We are saying that the people living on the Border, such as those in my own county and constituency also are to take the rap and say nothing about it; that we must bend the knee to the majority within the contrived state of the six counties; that we must at all times be subservient to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain in so far as this matter is concerned. That seems to be the philosophy and the perception particularly of the main spokesmen of the present Government. It is condoned, either from silence or a passive sort of interest, by the Leader of the Opposition who is not blameless in this matter since 1970 either.

Get the dark, dark glasses off your eyes and wake up to the facts; they are that not one blade of grass or sod of this country, all of it, its 32 counties, belongs to Her Majesty nor can it be defended or is it capable of being controlled by or is there any right for it to be controlled by any outside power whatsoever. Get that through and then try to find the solution. The first thing is Britain's declaration to go. Then, and not till then, will there be a reasoned discussion, which I know people here do not believe is capable of being given by the majority in the Six Counties. I do not concede for one moment that these people are as unreasonable as they are made out to be. I do not concede that their "no surrender" attitude is, in fact, their basic belief. It is only consistent with their situation wherein they must day in and day out proclaim their loyalty to the Crown, proclaim their loyalty to Great Britain and keep insisting that they are part of Great Britain so that the bread keeps coming, the manna keeps falling, and they are getting more of it than they are individually entitled to. When that is no longer the prospect, the Northern majority—let them be called Protestant, Presbyterian, or Unionist—of today, will talk. I am looking forward to that day because it will not be the South which will take over the North but the North will take over the South. We should have the sense to get Britain out of this country and get ourselves going as an entity. They will make the people down here sit up and take notice.

I was appalled when I heard the speech by the Minister for Justice, Deputy Cooney. The IRA seems to be an obsession. I should like to ask the Government a question. What organisations have been banned or proscribed, as the case may be, under the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act? Why only one organisation? Why are the organisations which are suspected, if not known, to have perpetrated the bombings south of the Border not being proscribed? Why are none of their members locked up, as there are 350 Republicans locked up on this side of the Border at the moment? What is the point of this selectivity? Why should there not be a massive effort on the part of our forces to ensure that those who not only mean ill to us but have done ill to us, should be treated as the people we want to have locked up and taken care of so that they will not blow us up? But no, we make an absolute virtue out of harassing Republican-minded people whether they are in the IRA or not. If one gets oneself associated in any way with anybody who is outspoken about Republican-ism, or who seems to favour the IRA in any way, immediately the finger is put on one. This is a virtue in today's Government.

I have many other comments I should like to make but I have not the time. I protest strongly at the manner in which this subject is to be debated. The last thing I want to appear to say in this debate about the situation in the North is "I told you so" although I would be within my rights to do so. We have heard from too many people claiming to have answers who did not look at the basic facts. None of these people so far has been prepared to admit how tragically wrong he has been in regard to the solutions he proposed. It is time for all of us to examine the mistaken policies which have been followed— that is, if we can call doing nothing most of the time a policy—and which this House as a whole has supported over the past five years.

If we can I believe we should stop the denunciations, although this will be difficult. We should stop blaming our mistakes on the Provisional IRA which, as I say, are an effect rather than a cause, or any other militant body. We should begin with some humility to decide where we were wrong and how may be begin to follow a policy of realism and, above all, honesty.

There is no point, as somebody said earlier, in weeping and holding a requiem over Sunningdale. The Taoiseach blamed the Provisional IRA for its failure. Other Government spokesmen blame the Loyalists. The present Westminster Government blame what they call the Protestant Nationalists. To my mind, the blame is clear from our history. Sunningdale, like the Treaty of 1921, failed because it was a British imposed solution. There cannot, and I repeat, there will not, even be the beginning of a solution until Britain, the main architect, the third partner in propping up the unsteady statelet of Northern Ireland, openly announces her intention of getting out of Ireland. The whole world is, I think, of the opinion and the belief that this is what Britain wants. What is stopping her?

I know, and Deputies in their hearts know, that one of the main obstacles to a British declaration of intent to withdraw from this country has been the mistaken policies adopted by successive Governments in the Twenty-six Counties over the past four years. The situation has become so ludicrous that when a junior British Minister was put up recently to fly a kite about the withdrawal of the British Army from the North we had the ironic spectacle of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy FitzGerald, and Mr. Fitt, the erstwhile leader of the minority in the North, rushing to London from Dublin and Belfast to go down on their bended knees to beg the British to stay in Ireland. Worse than that, we have had the cynical approach of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Deputy Cruise-O'Brien, and others on both front benches, warning all and sundry that civil war will descend upon us if Britain even attempts to begin any such withdrawal.

I have been attacked time and time again from all sides of this House and from outside as being intemperate in my views on this question. I have been deliberately misrepresented, accused of encouraging violence, sneered at as a long-range Republican by people who have become noted for political deviousness and lack of principle in their pursuit of power. Whatever I may have been at least I believe I have been consistent and honest in so far as my knowledge goes. I have maintained that until Britain makes a declaration of intent to go from Ireland there can be no start towards the beginning of the finding of a lasting peace.

It is a welcome sign that a growing number of the Members of this House agree with me. This is why I say that this debate is a charade because the time is limited and Members cannot express what they know to be the public opinion of their constituents. What is Parliament about if the Members are not given an opportunity to discuss a matter of such vital importance? We can spend seven days on many subjects but on this very important topic we are allowed seven hours.

The policy I believe we should be pursuing, and to help Britain make up her confused mind, is to keep pressing on her day in and day out that the making of such a declaration is the only contribution of use which she can make at this particular time. This is the only policy which can bring about meaningful discussion between all the elements involved. To use the Provisional IRA, the UDA, the UFF or any other military or para-military organisation as scapegoats and visit on them all the sins and stupidity of this Parliament, Stormont and Westminster is, in fact, a cowardly and dishonest method of sliding away from the real problem and trying to find a solution which is our responsibility and the responsibility of Westminster.

Not so long ago we found that the British agent, Wyeman, had penetrated to the heart of our security system. What did the Government do? They huffed and puffed and did nothing. If that had happened in any other country it would have led to a diplomatic storm at the very least but, sadly, in our case it has led to further subservience, to a situation where the Garda and the Army are asked to act as John Bull's policemen. Our present security set-up is a cruel masquerade, designed to hide from our people the real role our troops and police are being asked to play by the Government.

The Minister for Defence ties himself in knots on public occasions, extolling the patriotic duty of our soldiers in rounding up and harassing Republicans. There are hundreds of gardaí crowding the roads leading to the North but, in my experience travelling regularly across the Border to and from my constituency, until the recent bombings in Dublin efforts were directed towards what was going into the North rather than preventing any danger coming into the South. The gardaí and the Army are in a position to inform Ministers or any other Member of the House that this is the situation. I have checked with them on several accasions. What were they watching and who were they minding?

With apparent pride, the Minister for Foreign Affairs points to the fact that we are doing John Bull's work and doing it well, that we have 350 Republicans locked up on this side of the Border. However he cannot, and I am sure he will not, point with any pride to the fact that there has been a trail of bombings from Dublin to Lifford in recent years, for which British secret agents and Loyalists have been openly blamed. In many cases they have claimed responsibility but not a single culprit has been arrested or questioned. I do not blame the gardaí or the Army; in fact, I have the greatest pity for them at the moment. They are pushed into this kind of situation, they are asked to fill a most distasteful role in order to placate Westminster and Stormont critics who continually complain. I am sick listening to their complaints that the Dublin Government are not doing enough and have not been doing enough in recent years.

Have those critics in Westminster or in the Six Counties been given the reply that if they cannot look after their six little counties, with more than 30,000 men carrying arms in their name, how do they expect us to look after it for them with the Twenty-Six Counties when we have a security force of only 12,000 men? It is about time that was rammed down their throats to stop the carryon we have been listening to for so long that we are not doing enough. We fall for it every time and we are falling over ourselves now trying to do more. What we are doing is harassing those who have a Republican outlook or sympathy while we let the others go their way.

While all this is going on we ignore the real roots of the violence—the corrupt and partisan RUC which, incidentally, the SDLP have once again discovered to be a Loyalist organisation. That is a reconversion. Having regard to the disgraceful bias of the courts and judiciary in the North, what about the common law enforcement proposal that has been mentioned? How could we accept courts in the North trying people from the South for crimes committed here or elsewhere and expect justice and fair judgment? We will try anything at this stage to get this phoney situation, which is supposed to be a peaceful situation, if we can suppress those who are not prepared to lie down and be booted around, as the minority have been treated in the last half-century and even longer.

There is also the concentration camp at Long Kesh but we do not mention that here. I am sure the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs will not do very much to get inside the camp with some of his teams, who are very good technically, in order to show the world the situation. It would be worthwhile and would be the means whereby the world could put pressure on Britain to do her duty by this country, of declaring her intention to get out and, as the Taoiseach has said, to let Irishmen settle the question of Ireland between themselves. It cannot be done while the others are here. The Taoiseach is sadly lacking in perception when he talks about the Irish settling it among themselves when the British are here in every sense of the word and when there is no push to convince them they must go.

I could be amused but I am much more saddened by the utterances of some of the minority representatives and Alliance spokesmen on internment. Among others, Mr. John Hume blames the Provisional IRA for keeping internment going. He claims that without internment the IRA would have no support. I will give him this solution for nothing: why does he not convince those who are keeping them interned to let them out? Then there would be no support for the IRA, there would be no IRA and everyone, including the front bench here, would be happy. It is all too simple: no internment, no support for the IRA and, therefore, no IRA. Then we could have Long Kesh, Armagh, Magilligan Camp closed and all the internees released. I put on record my view that the IRA are not the cause of the present situation. There was no IRA in 1969——

Dr. FitzGerald

The Deputy helped to create them.

Mr. Blaney

There were two lone people in the Falls in 1969 to try to defend the people of the area—just two. I have been accused of helping to create the Provisional IRA——

Dr. Cruise-O'Brien

The Deputy has admitted it.

Mr. Blaney

Certainly I offered help, as did many of the Deputy's party and the other parties in this House, to any who were prepared to do what we were not prepared to do, namely, to help to defend the minority in the Six Counties who were being overrun at the time. It was only when we opted out of that commitment, only when we gave a clear indication that we were not going to live up to our responsibilities of minding all our citizens whether in Belfast or Cork, that the vacuum was filled by the emergence of the Provisional IRA. Do not let us start on who created them—the circumstances of the time created them. If some of us can be said to have aided the creation of the Provisional IRA, it was on the basis that there was need for protection for the minority on which we, as a Government, welshed because we did not regard them as the equal of the citizens on this side of the Border. So far as we were concerned they could be damned; we did not put our foot in in case our toes got trampled on.

So long as we have public denunciations confined solely to the IRA— no word about the UDA, UVF, UFF and many others—describing the IRA as criminals and devil's agents, so long as we keep fooling ourselves by those kind of denunciations, we will fail to grasp and identify the reasons we have the IRA. The Government and the House should take a hard look at this. As was outlined brilliantly by Deputy de Valera this afternoon, the basic problem is the land and the country of the Thirty-two Counties within the four shores of Ireland, it is one entity and always has been, and until it is put together again there cannot be any real peace.

If we want the kind of intermittent peace we have had in the last 50 years, where the minority have to take the rap whenever the majority feel like giving it to them, we should be honest and say so. If it is true that the only preparation being made by the Government is the arrangement for receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees some months ahead, they should tell us. If the Government are not prepared to talk for the country as a whole, tell the people that. Tell them, as the Government were reported to have told recent deputations from the SDLP, that they were not prepared to do anything other than to mind this part of the country. If that is what the Government intend, in the interests of all concerned would they publicly state that this is so rather than waffle along, talking about a bipartisan approach, about new solutions, power-sharing, about some arrangement similar to Sunningdale? Sunningdale is gone; it was gone even before it had started. The Executive was but a dream at best, the whole Assembly set-up could not have had any end other than what has happened. We should stop fooling ourselves that there is any possibility of getting the kind of easy solution that would appear to have been in the Sunningdale package even down to the point of giving the right to the majority always to dictate the terms in the Six Counties to which I and thousands and thousands of people in this country will never agree.

There is no easy solution. We must face up to the basic fact that Britain must get out of the marital bed before there can be a true marriage. Let us push that idea and then we shall find that the "not an inch", "no surrender" Protestant Unionists or whatever you name them are not the difficult, awkward people we have come to regard them as. They will be in there making their deal and when that time comes all I can say is "the best of luck to them", and I swear to God they will get the best of it. But get Britain on the move and then we are on the move to the beginning of peace in this country for the first time in our history.

Minister for Posts and Telegraphs (Dr. Cruise-O'Brien)

Concern has been expressed lest anything that might be said in this debate should trouble what is called the bipartisan policy. I think what is really aimed at by those who use this phrase is all-party consensus; there are three parties in this House, not two, and Government policy is in itself bipartisan. I can certainly understand the concern that is felt about this.

A considerable degree of meaningful consensus exists between the Government and the Leader of the Opposition, as emerged from the two speeches which opened this debate, based on common acceptance of a peaceful approach and total and unequivocal rejection of violence. In that sense there was a solid consensus between what the Taoiseach said and what Deputy Lynch said; in that sense bipartisanship can be held to stand. But in another sense what consensus can we establish with those benches over there in the light of what we have just heard where it is quite apparent there is no consensus? The second speaker for the Opposition today—and I speak without any disrespect to Deputy de Valera; he has his views and he is entitled to them —was warmly congratulated from up there just now by Deputy Blaney, a man who was dismissed from office by the first speaker on that side and who accused the first speaker on that side of welching on his responsibilities.

I can only say that I understand why Deputy Blaney praised what Deputy de Valera said, because Deputy de Valera's speech, while it included repeated formal condemnations of violence, contained at the same time as its whole thrust a passionate justification of violence. Deputy de Valera suggested that the IRAs were merely symptoms of what is happening, not blameable in themselves, just symptoms. If they are symptoms, the second speaker on the Opposition side in this debate is a symptom of something very serious that seems to be happening inside Fianna Fáil and one which, I am sorry to say, makes consensus in this House on the subject difficult.

I agree that there was a need for a maximum of meaningful consensus on this subject. But I would put a little more emphasis on the "meaningful" than is, perhaps, usually done. It is, of course, much easier to reach apparent consensus, which is, in fact, meaningless, than to reach meaningful consensus. Apparent consensus can be reached, for example, by blurring definitions, and by repeating shibboleths, which are emotionally important to some people and to which others, who do not, in fact, believe in them, are willing to pay lip service for the sake of apparent consensus. This is a tendency which exists in politics everywhere, but which has, perhaps, exerted an exceptionally and unhappily strong influence on politics in this Republic. I suggest that this type of consensus— fudged consensus—is not what we require at the present time, and further, that we cannot even afford this type of consensus at the present time.

Let us agree as far as we can. Agreement is of value to our country at this time, but if we do sincerely disagree let us state precisely on what we disagree. Therefore, I would resist the tendency to sell us, under the guise of bipartisanship a sort of fudged consensus. Fudged consensus is dangerous for two reasons mainly.

The first reason is that of its nature it tends to mask realities from us and from those whom we represent, and that it is imprudent and irresponsible to mask realities in times of danger. The times we live in are exceedingly dangerous. Not merely are we not out of the wood yet but we may not yet have reached the darkest part of the wood.

The second reason is that the things we here have been in the habit of saying about Northern Ireland, many of which have been already said, I am sorry to say, in the last two speeches in this debate, the things we are most used to and, therefore, find it easiest to repeat and agree on, are precisely the things that tend to exacerbate the situation in Northern Ireland, and to increase the danger.

For 50 years it has been a political habit in the Republic to underestimate the size, the intensity and the durability of the opposition of the majority in Northern Ireland towards any form of political unification. Habitually, as again here this afternoon, the easy option has been taken of putting all the blame on Britain and of assuming, or pretending to assume, that British withdrawal would open the way to the unity of Ireland. This assumption runs counter to the known facts of the situation; massive facts which one would have thought should have become chillingly clear to all at the time of the Loyalist strike. It is by no means apparent what force could possibly avert Loyalist take-over in the event of a British withdrawal or avert the serious consequences of such a take-over for the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, especially in the Belfast region.

Yet such is the strength of our habitual assumptions, and of our tendency to mistake comforting notions for facts, that some of us continue to think or say they want something, from the actual consequences of which they would recoil in horror, if it ever happened, which God forbid. A number of people, including some Members of this House, recently signed an open letter calling on the British to declare their intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland. I do not question the sincerity and humane motivation of those who signed this document, but I did question a few of them about whether they had fully considered the implications of what they were proposing, and specifically the dangers to the Catholic minority in the Belfast region if the British withdrew, in the present state of feeling between the two communities.

The answers I got were not altogether clear, but they were to the general effect that what was wanted was not a withdrawal, now or at any near time—but just a declaration of intent to withdraw. The British should say they intended to withdraw, but, in fact, they should stay for a comfortably long time.

It would be less comfortable, but more prudent to assume that, if and when the British declare their intent to withdraw, they will withdraw and in a short time. It has been assumed, by some influential commentators that such a declaration would bring the Loyalists to their senses, which means agreeing with us. That assumption was made by the last speaker in the debate. There is absolutely no ground for this belief and there never has been any.

The mere fact that a number of well-intentioned persons put their names to such an appeal illustrates what I have been saying about the dangers of the kind of vague consensus politics in which we have so often indulged on these very serious questions. Those who call for British disengagement now sometimes seem to forget that the situation before 1969 was one of a considerable measure of disengagement and disinterest in which Northern Ireland affairs were almost never allowed to be discussed at Westminster and the Unionist majority was left to run the Province in its own way. Those who call for disengagement now do not, of course, mean a return to that system, but, in fact, what would result under present conditions—speaking of the here and now—would be worse than the pre-1969 system: it would be naked extreme loyalist rule instead of cautious unionism, open oppression rather than concealed discrimination. That is what we have to avoid. That is what we have to do all we can to prevent happening.

The outcome foreseen by the open letter to which I have referred is, of course, rather different, but the assumptions on which this optimism is based are unrealistic. They say, for example, that the withdrawal of troops to barracks would enable normal unarmed policing to be resumed. No one is more anxious than myself to see normal unarmed policing in Northern Ireland, but that step forward was achieved and it resulted in the systematic slaughter of unarmed policemen by the Provisional IRA. Rearming of the police in those conditions was inevitable and there should be no doubt as to who was responsible. In any case, does anyone who thinks about it for a moment consider that the ultimate sanction of armed force should rest exclusively in the hands of two sets of opposing illegal private armies, that there should be no Government authority with the power to assert itself against the gangsterism which forms part of the daily experience of Northern Ireland?

The open letter says that Irish reunification should be achieved by consent. But rather than frankly recognising that consent is absent and likely to remain so for the indefinitely foreseeable future, the letter goes on to say that "the prerequisite for winning the consent of the Northern majority is a declaration of intent to work towards (British) disengagement". In other words, the Northern majority is to be forced by some means into changing their minds. The letter continues: "Realistically, the issue for them then becomes one of obtaining the best possible deal within a united Ireland situation". Again, also affirmed by the last two speakers in the debate.

The whole question of a possible independent Ulster is swept aside in that word "realistically" meaning, presumably, that British money would no longer be forthcoming. The question of money is an interesting one. Are taxpayers in the Republic to shoulder the burden laid down by the vastly broader shoulders of their British counterparts? Of course not. If the British give in to a mood of despair, if they disengage suddenly from Northern Ireland, we are asked to suppose that they will be willing to pour out even more hundreds of millions indefinitely, as they face the biggest balance of payments crisis in their history.

According to a subsequent radio statement by one of the organisers of this appeal, it appears that he expects the British, while doing all this, also to be prepared to use force to crush Protestant resistance to a united Ireland. We have seen that the British proved either unwilling or unable— or, perhaps, both—to deal adequately with the Loyalist response, in the form of the strike, to the mere idea of a Council of Ireland with a veto. We are asked to believe that the British would be both willing and able to force these same people into a united Ireland That that idea, so divorced from any possible reality, should be seriously discussed here is a measure of the debasement of habitual discourse in this area.

Some Northern comment has been much more to the point. The result of the cutting off of British financial support was outlined in an article by Mr. Hugh Logue, the SDLP Assemblyman in The Irish Times of 25th June, 1974, just the other day, when he wrote :

The Independent Ulster of such men——

the extreme Loyalists

——would be a vicious anti-Catholic State. With Britain gone, unemployment would be at an unprecedented level; 150,000 men and women would be out of work, all of them Catholic. Recompense from Social Security would be negligible.

Thus it is clear that a Catholic view of the withdrawal of British financial support is that the burden would fall mainly on Catholics and that Protestants would be relatively unscathed. If this is a Catholic view, one can be sure that it is also an unspoken Protestant belief too. This belief explains the equanimity with which Vanguard leaders and others have talked about independence.

Mr. Coughlan

Nobody believes that.

Dr. Cruise-O'Brien

Our policy in relation to Northern Ireland must hinge, not on abstractions or traditional slogans or on hopeful but wild assumptions, but on intelligent, informed concern for people, their lives, their security, their jobs, their future and the future of their children.

There are three groups whom we must consider: the majority in Northern Ireland, the minority there, and the people of this Republic. The majority ask little from us, except that we leave them alone. I suggest that we be prepared to do just that, provided that they do not deny equality of status and equal rights to the minority in Northern Ireland. If we can make it clear that this is, indeed, our real interest in the area, we make it that much easier to reconstruct power-sharing which is a difficult task. If, on the other hand, we insist on seeing progress towards unification, we will neither see that progress nor power-sharing. As regards the minority, with whom we have so many ties, we should do everything we can to restore to them their proper share in the running of Northern Ireland, and we should use all our influence with the British and with other countries for this end.

The SDLP have recently proposed that the objective at which we should aim should be, in their words, "an agreed Ireland". That is a reasonable formula and one to which almost all of us here could probably subscribe. Yet experience shows that it will be no easy task to reach a basis for agreement. We here should not make that task any harder by setting our sights impossibly high, that is, by demanding agreement on things on which it is certain that no agreement can be found. The fact is that if there should be a second failure to reach a sustained agreement on power-sharing, the chances of a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, in chaotic conditions, would be greatly increased. In that event the consequences for the Catholic minority would be likely to be even more serious than simple exclusion from a share in power. I have deliberately, and I think for good reason, understated the extent of dangers now foreseeable. According to a statement published this morning. The Central Citizens Defence Committee of Belfast have said that the Catholics in the North are entitled to know if the Dublin Government are now prepared to help them and if so there should be "reassuring contingency plans for all eventualities". The Government will certainly do everything that can be done to help members of the Catholic minority in any emergency but it would be false friendship and entirely wrong to pretend that any Government here can provide "reassuring contingency plans" to cover any possible emergency. If certain things happen, neither we nor anyone else can avert dire consequences for many people. The important thing is to do everything we can, while we can, to prevent those things happening. The most useful thing we can do now is to help in laying the most realistic basis we can for the reconstruction of power-sharing.

This is essential in terms of the interests of the minority and—because of the implications for peace—in terms also of the long-term interest of the majority in Northern Ireland. But it is also essential in terms of the interests of those whom we represent: men, women and children living in this Republic. As I have made clear, I do not believe in pressure for political unification. But that does not mean that I think we can ignore the interaction that necessarily takes place between the situation in Northern Ireland and the situation in the Republic. The vocal and public expressions of the wish that Ireland should be united are accompanied by less public but no less fervent expressions of a wish that Northern Ireland would somehow go away. Both wishes are equally unrealistic. In all foreseeable circumstances we shall have to continue to share an island with people who do not wish to be politically united with us. That is the basic problem. What we have to do is to find a way of sharing this island under different political institutions, but in peace and in co-operation, including co-operation in the field of security, against all the violent and fanatical organisations which now plague us. The first serious attempt to work out such arrangements failed with the collapse of the power-sharing executive. That failure was due to a number of causes, most of which cannot fairly be laid at our door and I mean any of us here, this whole Dáil. But there is one which can fairly be laid at our door, which it is in our power to correct in relation to new attempts at power-sharing, and which we should correct. During the lifetime of Sunningdale, commentators here repeatedly suggested that the Sunningdale arrangements were a long step in the direction of unification. This was, of course, precisely what the anti-Sunningdale Loyalists also asserted and what the pro-Sunningdale Unionists and Alliance denied. Thus every time this was stated, suggested or implied in our Press and other media, or by anybody, the degree of Protestant support, without which the Sunningdale arrangements could not survive, was subjected to further and ultimately fatal erosion. Commentary of this nature, in fact, worked to the disadvantage of all the moderates and played into the hands of all the extremists. It was not intended to have this effect but it did have it. If, as I have suggested, commentary of this kind flows from a failure to question past assumptions and habits of speaking and writing, then the circumstances that led to the collapse of the Executive are surely a compelling illustration of the need to question these assumptions and habits.

If the British were to leave Northern Ireland, without stable political agreements having been achieved there, the shock-waves of the consequent events would be felt throughout this Republic, nor would any measures, however strong or wise, be then adequate to do more than mitigate the effects of those shock-waves. What is important is to prevent that situation from coming into being, to give time for the reconstruction of power-sharing, and that requires an adequate interim of direct rule, and not to call for the withdrawal of British troops until it can be clearly seen that adequate arrangements exist for preventing a sharp and general deterioration of the security situation —already quite bad enough—after these troops are withdrawn.

The Taoiseach has set a realistic keynote to this debate. His realism, in a recent speech outside this House, seems to have come as a shock, or was represented as a shock, in some quarters; not so much that anyone really doubted its truth as because it is an area in which people have been unaccustomed in the past to hear truth clearly stated. But that speech did receive a welcome, from where it is most important in present conditions that it should be welcomed, from those with whom it is necessary to reach agreement if any kind of agreed Ireland is to come into being: that is from a wide spectrum of Protestant opinion in Northern Ireland, from Mr. Faulkner round to Mr. Harry West. Without the agreement of such a spectrum there can be no reconstruction of power-sharing, and without that reconstruction the future would be very ominous, not merely for Northern Ireland but for this Republic. Power-sharing has to be reconstructed, without misunderstandings and without false hopes, on a solid basis that will stand new buffeting and survive it. The Taoiseach's statements work in that direction. I said in those parts of my remarks that I had prepared that I hoped this debate as a whole would also serve that end. I believe that the statement made by the Leader of the Opposition did indeed serve that end. He was critical of things said and done over here, as it is his complete right to be, but the thrust of his speech was generous and pacific. He said one or two things that I would question. He accused us of abandoning persuasion. We do not want to abandon persuasion. We want to use persuasion. We want to reach people's minds.

We want to try to help to reconstruct power-sharing but there is no point in pretending to try to persuade people to do something that you know there is no chance of their doing at all. There is no chance, no possibility, even no physical possibility, of going into the Shankhill Road to persuade people that they ought to come into a united Ireland These things are not possible. We ought to talk about what is possible. We ought to persuade people of things that we hope it may be possible to persuade them on. The objective now is to persuade people of the possibility of power-sharing.

I should like briefly to refer to Deputy Lynch's references to the idea of constructing broadcasting on, if you like, an international or multibase approach, I have considerable doubts whether that is praticable but, as an approach, I think it is philosophically sound. I have discussed it with some of those concerned and I would like to do what the Deputy has suggested we should do if it could be done but I think the doing of it presents very serious problems.

I listened to Deputy de Valera with very grave misgivings and sadness. I accept completely his sincerity. I know that he believes the things he said and that he thought it important to say them and that he thought it his duty to say them. But, and it is a very large "but", like the editorials in his paper, what these words do, what this view of history and indeed of geography does, is to have this effect. He said repeatedly, and again I accept his sincerity in the actual words he used, that he condemns violence. He does so in very strong terms—"absolutely condemns", "utterly repudiates", et cetera. That does not mean what it says. That is the trouble. Because in the same breath he said: “But violence is inevitable in conditions where the British will not get out and where the unity of Ireland is postponed. That violence is inevitable. The IRA are only the symptom.” Of course that justifies the violence of the IRA. How can it help but to do that? I would hope that from those benches opposite we will hear some clear repudiation of that view, not merely a condemnation of violence. Anyone can condemn violence, indeed everybody condemns violence, but you need to see what people means in political terms by that. If you condemn violence and what you mean is that all the blame for the violence is on the other side then you are not condemning violence, you are not condemning all the political violence in the sense that we are and that is the sense in which I would hope we would find a consensus of most of the Members of this House and I hope that that consensus will find expression in the rest of this debate.

Ruairí Brugha

I regretted to note that in the opening passages of the speech of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs it seemed to me that he had reverted to his role of divisiveness.

Mr. Brennan

Hear, hear.

Ruairí Brugha

I found myself in considerable agreement with some of his remarks but I have to agree with Deputy Blaney that unfortunately the time allotted to us is too short to deal with other than what one wishes to say oneself.

We have reached a crisis point where open debate and plain speaking can be a contribution to sanity and may not worsen the situation in Northern Ireland. This is because the recent strike in Northern Ireland and Britain's obvious inability to maintain any kind of established order, despite her security responsibility, has created a situation that could hardly be worse. It is useless to blame the Unionists for their own failure to provide stability. They are the heirs to an unnatural political development in which they were expected to provide government of a small part of this island in a political vacuum which was itself unnatural. As the dominant group in the North of Ireland they have tried to run things since we in this part of the country achieved independence, in a situation full of division. I do not think they should be blamed because the original concept of partition, as proposed by Lloyd George in 1914, was itself fundamentally wrong and unnatural. This the British political parties have only now realised.

The idea of creating a one-party State, based on a false concept of democracy, as if Northern Ireland were attached to the British mainland, was simply a way out of an awkward problem for British politicians of the early 20th century, who presumably hoped the thing would go away or that their successors could cope with it. Why the events we have seen in the North in the past few years did not occur earlier will be a matter for historic speculation but they have occurred and all of us on this island have to try to pick up the pieces.

Times have changed for Britain. She has now a different role to play in international and European affairs and with the changing times British leaders have found that the new role being played by the Republic, in Europe and elsewhere, is not alone not a threat to her interests but can be an asset to her in the future. Not only does Britain not want to have bad relations with the Republic, I believe she needs, to suit her own interests, to have good relations with the Twenty-six Counties and, if possible, with the whole of Ireland. If she had to choose between Northern Ireland and the Republic she would, for obvious reasons, choose the latter.

It now seems clear that Britain needs a fresh start with Ireland and to get this she is prepared to write off her ties with the past, including, if necessary, Northern Ireland. Some time ago one of the few thinking Unionists I have met recently expressed their dilemma to me. He said they would have to realise that things had changed in Ireland. He set out three choices which Unionists would have to face up to in order to decide what their future role would be. They should try to hold their traditional position and make Britain stand by her commitments, they should become independent of Britain and go it alone or they should play a major role in Ireland.

He expressed the view that the first choice was impractical because Britain did not want it and the second choice would carry with it financial, administrative, social service and security costs that would make it impossible. He felt the minority would not accept the second choice anyway since from their point of view it would involve a return to Unionist domination without British money. He added that a break with Britain could involve exclusion from Europe. He felt there were grounds for believing that the Europeans anyway feel some reluctance about Britain because of her involvement in Northern Ireland whereas Europeans had shown themselves anxious to have Ireland as a member for a variety of reasons.

There could be no likelihood, he felt, of full membership of the European Community for Northern Ireland and any form of association must be excluded on agricultural and practical grounds. He said that he as a Unionist was left with the conclusion that the only choice left open was eventual full participation in the affairs of Ireland. The prospects, he said, for Irish Unionists in an Ireland which is a full member of the European Community were very attractive. He believed that many of his friends had in the back of their minds that eventually they must become involved in Ireland. He said that what impressed him most was that all political parties in the Republic would welcome co-operation and that the Unionists were the only ones who had given no serious consideration to this question—that is, of course, not all Unionists.

Mr. Coughlan

Does the Deputy believe that?

Ruairí Brugha

I will talk to the Deputy outside the House.

An Ceann Comhairle

Order, please. The Deputy in possession, without interruption.

Ruairí Brugha

If the Deputy is going to interrupt I hope I will be allowed injury time. I have a certain amount to say and I hope I will be allowed say it.

An Ceann Comhairle

There is a time limit to this debate.

Ruairí Brugha

He concluded that no time should be wasted in getting down to discussions with political leaders in the Twenty-six Counties because they were the only people who were genuinely interested in both the Unionists and Ireland. What depressed him most was the political fact that Unionists were intent on exploring every avenue to find a solution to their problem except the obvious one.

One of the great evils this country suffers from, I believe, is bigotry. In case it may be thought that I would blame Protestants only let me begin by saying that it is a two way process. In recent times we have realised that we in the Twenty-six Counties have made our own unconscious contribution to the unChristian attitude of mind that exists in this country. By ignoring the deep-seated problems of the North in the past we have given the impression that we were on one side in a sectarian fashion. By a rigid interpretation of the ne temere decree we have imposed unreasonable restraint on our fellow-Protestants here who have a right to Christian charity, compassion and good-neighbourliness. If any of our churchmen have been intolerant in the past it is those of us who have been members of the Church who have been responsible because we have encouraged them and were afraid to speak up.

The bigotry of the South is a civilised arrangement compared to what has been going on in the North for the past 60 years. Anyone who has lived in some areas of Belfast, as I have, knows that for the past 50 years from time to time there exists between some elements in both communities a hatred of one another which only needed a stone or a bottle to start a riot and leave someone fatherless. In addition, for generations some public figures have sought position by fanning the flames of hatred and bigotry. In Northern Ireland today we have reached a point where a correspondent can write:

It cannot go on. Are we saying that we need our civil war so that one wipes out the other? No political society will tolerate the tensions that are now mounting. We have no common political institutions in which we can fight the civil war verbally. Are we saying that there is no other alternative to handle the tensions but a shoot out? Let us be clear. Look then to your young son of 16 or 18. Look to your impressionable daughter. Enjoy their presence while you can. Admire their whole young bodies while you may and if God is kind to you he will spare you the night the same young body is brought back to you shattered and mutilated by bomb, bullet or machine gun burst.

Is this the best life we can offer in this country to our youth?

However, there are differences that should be spelt out. No one in this part of Ireland would say that you must accept a Catholic Ireland. In the North it seems to me that many of one million people are saying to half a million neighbours that they must accept a Protestant State in Ireland. In this part of Ireland no politician in his senses would say to the electorate that they must vote for a Protestant heritage or a Catholic one.

Too much nonsense has been talked about articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Some of our own crackpots here have had too much to say as have immature politicians and bigots in the North. Unionists should ask themselves what they would do if asked to draft a constitution for Ireland. What has been offered to them and what has offended them is a simple expression of an ultimate ideal expressed in de jure terms. They should ask themselves why, after 2,000 years of life on this island, the events of 1916 and 1921 should suddenly make two worlds of what God made one. After all, those events resulted from a will for independence in this part of the country and a similar will is becoming manifest in Northern Ireland amongst Unionists at the present time.

I believe there has been too much political pawnbroking with a simple document, our Constitution, which had to be written in order to pave the way for a future life in this country. If this question continues to trouble the Unionists there is plenty of room at the table to discuss it and to make changes. And the table does not have to be either at Chequers or Downing Street.

The North has recently experienced a grave threat to life as a result of the Ulster Workers' Council strike. For the first time in their lives Protestants living outside the ghetto areas have known real fear, the kind of fear that large numbers of Catholics have had to live with for over 50 years. Britain's cowardice in face of a threat to the life of the Northern community was a betrayal, I believe, of the democracy British statesmen profess to uphold. One can only hope that amongst the Council of Ulster Workers some kind of dicipline and sanity will prevail. One of the worst forms of insanity Europe has known is that of the powermad dictator.

The UDA ought to understand that one of the objects of the IRA campaign has been to keep them off balance so that no settlement can be arrived at. I wonder would the late Edward Carson, Dublin man, have promoted a "no warning" bombing campaign directed at innocent people in response to IRA activities.

The campaign conducted by the IRA over the last three years has taught us many lessons. When the first troubles erupted in Derry and Belfast there was no IRA in existence. What basically created the IRA of today was mainly lack of political foresight on the part of British politicians who seem to forget what the French and Americans learned the hard way in the East, namely, that you cannot indefinitely maintain an occupation army in an area where the inhabitants are hostile. Britain failed to realise until recently that there can be little hope of peace or security for either Unionists or Nationalists in the North except in the context of a security arrangement for the whole island.

We here in the Republic are not in a position to maintain order in the Nationalist areas of the North and neither the British nor the Unionists are able to do it without imposing a tyranny. It can only be done with the consent and support of the people of those areas and their elected representatives. I believe one mistake of the IRA is that they never had a mandate from anyone to protect anyone. They are self-appointed and do not have the advantage their predecessors, whose name they use, had from 1919 to 1921; who had to obey Dáil Éireann. They do not understand that any success on their part can only lead to civil war because their activities, especially bombing, can only alienate people. Some people believe they want a civil war, but that hardly seems likely. The methods used by them were and are counter-productive. For example, does anyone think that the blowing up of the North/South power link by the IRA could in any conceivable circumstances be seen as contributing to their cause since it meant that, when the Ulster Workers' Council strike took place, there was no way we could help the Northern people deprived of current?

One need hardly ask the question of any mother or father who has been through an Irish school: "Do you think James Connolly or Patrick Pearse would send teenagers into the market place carrying bombs set to detonate?" The real threat to life in the North now is that a point is being reached where no one set of armed extremists may be able to control the situation. It seems to be drifting into the hands of immature children.

Although Stormont was undemocratic and founded on a false concept one ought to regret to some extent the ending of an Irish institution because people need institutions so that life can go on. All that was needed in Stormont was a change of heart on the part of Unionists. Unfortunately, they were unable to change and it would appear that, only time itself can bring them into the 20th century and to a sense of realities; they seem to be unable to change. One could have hoped that following the suspension of Stormont the Unionists would have had time to think and adjust to a new life in Ireland. Unfortunately, both the IRA and the British Army at Lenadoon saw to it that they were deprived of a breathing space.

The Sunningdale Agreement was, I believe, an honest effort at compromise. Unfortunately I believe history will prove it had some major defects. No agreement was reached on an acceptable method of providing security except by the British Army. This alone would have caused failure. Another defect was that the Council of Ireland was not set up right away at Sunningdale. The representatives of the minority did not get the support they deserved and so they had to bring home with them a well nigh intolerable burden, the permanent presence of the British Army in their constituencies. Apparently the sovereign Governments were not strong enough to take firm action. I hope that what I feel is not true, but it would seem to me that the two sovereign Governments have now reached a point where they may concede a fundamental principle that one section of the Irish community, the Unionists, should have rights while another section in Northern Ireland, the minority, should not have rights. I hope that will not happen, but I must confess to a feeling of depression.

One other aspect to which I should like to refer in regard to those on the Government benches is the question of Government policy. I should like to ask those responsible for Government policy on the North is it the Cabinet, exercising its collective wisdom on the problem, or is it the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, who has just left the House, exercising his considerable influence on individual members of the Government? We are entitled to know on a matter of such paramount importance who holds the mandate for the view that Northern Ireland should be quietly abandoned as a painful embarrassment for us all. If the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs believes that both persuasion and force are useless in bringing about the changes we seek—he used the word "unity"—may I ask the Taoiseach does he also hold that view?

Great credit is due to the minority representatives of the Northern Executive for the courage and fortitude they have shown over the past eight months. To them and to the people who elected them we here in Dáil Éireann should say: "We have not forgotten you and we will not abandon you. Give all your support to your representatives. It is only through them that a settlement can be reached. They are the people who have to be consulted. Their hands must be strong and only you can strengthen them".

I should say a word of appreciation for the efforts over the past 12 months of Mr. Brian Faulkner and on the manner in which he moved away from the intransigence of the past although, unhappily, his efforts have been undermined.

The delay in setting up the Council of Ireland was fatal, I believe. This body with a Unionist veto was no threat to anyone, especially to the Loyalists, and it could have provided the essential Irish dimension which would have brought peace to Ireland.

An ingredient which has been lacking all along in the Northern situation is a simple declaration by Britain of her interest in Irish affairs. That is not to suggest that she should at any stage have declared her intention to withdraw her forces overnight so as to get out of an awkward position, but rather quite simply that Britain should say what she wants in the context of the seventies in relation to Ireland.

Most of us, and no doubt the majority of the British public, believe that it can no longer serve Britain or her people to continue with an uneasy, uncomfortable and potentially disastrous involvement in Ireland. I would hope that many hundreds of thousands of Unionists in the North would also welcome a clear forthright statement from Britain which could set the stage for a meeting of minds between all of us who live on this island.

We have always maintained that responsibility for Irish affairs should be held by Irish elected representatives without the help or hindrance of any other country. It is time for Britain to say that she wants no involvement in Irish affairs, that she has no business pushing Irish people, Unionits or otherwise around. Britain should recognise that, for so long as she claims the right to interfere in Ireland's affairs, there cannot be much hope of settlement or peace. However much public men or leaders of the Churches in Ireland or Britain may condemn the ugly violence being done, it is a mistake to gloss over the fundamental fact that the origin of the trouble in Ireland lies in the previous arrogant assumption by Britain that she had a right to influence the affairs of this country in any way and to continue her historic role of manipulating any section of the people of this island. This historical involvement of Britain in our affairs is one of the propaganda planks of the IRA.

If we are to find fault with the present situation, apart from Britain's involvement in it, I believe we should point to the errors on both sides. Those on the Nationalist side who encourage young people to believe that the human division in Ireland can be solved by guns and bombs carry great responsibility. An even greater responsibility rests on those on the Unionist side who encourage their followers to believe that their existence in Ireland needs to be defended by stock-piling weapons which can be used to exterminate their neighbours.

Learning from the past, from past mistakes, we must have the maturity to appreciate that, if the situation in Northern Ireland is inherently unstable—and I doubt that anyone would deny that it is—any similar set-up which would try to contain within it in an all-Ireland context many hundreds of thousands of people who would be opposed to such a system would also be unstable.

Therefore, it is necessary to try again to find some interim workable basis on which both communities can agree to co-operate, always bearing in mind that either extreme element can frustrate the best efforts of good men. Let us, therefore, work on the basis of agreement. We agree on many things; on peace, on justice, and on ultimate stability for the whole of this country.

Minister for Labour (Mr. M. O'Leary)

The preservation of a democratic Government in this part of the island is, I believe, an inseparable condition for the achievement of any settlement of the Northern question. Too often in consideration of the matter little attention is given to this aspect. I believe that the achievement of peace based on consent in Northern Ireland would not be brought nearer by the fall or even the impairment of democratic institutions in this part of the island. Adherence to the writ of our democratic institutions, loyalty to the State, support for law and order on the part of our citizens, do not indicate a kind of Twenty-six County isolationism. Indeed, that attitude of mind which places a high priority on loyalty to our democratic State is an essential element in the political makeup of the citizen who wishes to play a constructive part, a constructive role, in the search for agreement on this island.

Far from its being an abrogation of our responsibility to achieve a settlement in the area of Northern Ireland, our adherence to and our interest in the maintenance of democratic institutions in the State is an inseparable condition to our usefulness in seeking such a settlement of the Northern question. The need for this duty to the State and its institutions will become even more important in the months and, perhaps, years ahead.

Groups have emerged in the North whose skill in killing, bombing and maiming their fellow mortals must command, not respect, but recognition of their potential for inhuman violence. For such groups killing has become a casual routine. Anyone is grist to their terrible mill, from teenage volunteers to the owners of shops or public houses to which they are sent by those to whom Bishop Daly referred only this week—those who give the orders to such groups and such teenage volunteers—as "the anonymous warlords".

Of course, on such missions of violence those who chiefly suffer are the innocent, the shoppers, the house-wives, the ordinary innocent onlookers. If the leaders of the war organisations in Northern Ireland are adversaries of the democratic leaders there, it follows that they must also be the enemies of democratic leaders and free institutions. In the rest of Ireland only their realisation of the support democratic institutions enjoy throughout this State prevents their using bomb and bullet here against those they conceive to be their enemies. No one should be in any doubt of their enmity towards the State.

When speaking on the Northern situation, there is a danger that one is apt to relapse into a recital of past events, how it all happened, what the elements were that went into it since 1969. There is in such a recital a danger of losing sight of the present situation or, if one is not caught up in a recital of past events, there is the other trap that one may be caught up in a vision of future happiness and harmony throughout Ireland, forgetting unhappy features of the present situation. That vision has trapped many people, that abstraction has caused many killings and bombings, and has been used in advance as a basis of motivation by many armed groups throughout this present conflict. We must make an effort to recognise facts as they are now refusing to permit our judgment to be overswayed by past wrongs or the possibility of a future perfection.

The great need of the hour remains the restoration of peace in Northern Ireland. Since the return of peace is the only guarantee that further lives will not be lost through violence our obligation as a State to seek peace continues even more urgently in the present situation. The re-establishment of peaceful conditions within Northern Ireland would be the greatest single development of hope for the minority in Northern Ireland who have suffered most from the perpetrators of violence.

The question we must continually ask ourselves not alone in this debate but over the months ahead in this part of the country is how our words and actions may best contribute to the restoration of that peace, the attainment of which is the overwhelming desire of all the Northern people. The attitude of this House towards an ultimate settlement for this island is often described as one based on unity by consent and agreement. Our words and statements, based on this unity and consent by agreement, must be unambiguous. It is clear that those who adhere to the policy of consent and agreement must be in no doubt that if this approach is to have any meaning the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland must have our full acceptance. No one will be deceived as to our real feelings on this matter, if objectives based on what is described as consent by agreement mask a refusal to concede the right of the majority in Northern Ireland a say on the framework of the political Constitution under which they live. The corollary to this acceptance of the right of the majority is that minority rights must also be respected within Northern Ireland.

The rights of the minority within Northern Ireland are best safeguarded by a scheme of power-sharing between both communities. The disappearance of no single part of the Sunningdale Agreement is more to be regretted than the disappearance of the power-sharing Executive. It is not by edict from Westminster that the rights of the minority are protected within Northern Ireland solely: it also requires an administration within the area in which they participate to safeguard their interests and to see that the area is run as a fair society. The establishment of that executive represented the greatest single step forward towards common standards of citizenship made in that Northern community for nearly half a century. Those who have consigned all of the efforts that comprise the Sunningdale Agreement are wrong in seeing no element of it renewed in the future because some form of power-sharing will continue to be an essential element in the bringing into being of a stable society in that part of Ireland.

Despite the fate of the last attempt at power-sharing fresh efforts must be made to restore it as a means of administration in Northern Ireland because only such an Administration will possess the basic strength and support to withstand the gunmen of either persuasion. Only an Administration based on partnership would possess the possibility of holding the consent of both communities. The evidence of the recent Executive is there to show that men of goodwill of both political traditions in Northern Ireland can work together for the good of their common community.

In Industry and Commerce, John Hume showed brilliance and flare dedicated to his task on behalf of all the citizens in his campaign for industrial expansion. The proposals of Basil McIvor in Education gained encouraging support from both sides of the cultural divide in Northern Ireland. One thinks of Bob Cooper whose plans in the area of manpower training and industrial relations were imaginative and augured well for the future training of the young people of the area.

The faith which drew these men of different traditions together was their common belief that Northern Ireland and its community could be wrested from the stranglehold of history. In a wider setting they also believe that those who live on this island have a common interest in living in peace with one another. The question we must ask ourselves is how we may assist in the future any fresh attempts at power-sharing and, in particular, how may we assist those of the majority who in future may take part in any renewed attempt at power-sharing. One way we may help is by the clear expression of our full acceptance that the will of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland must be gained before any change can be contemplated in the status of that area. There must be no ambiguity about our acceptance of that right of the majority in relation to the status of the area.

By clearly expressing our acceptance of that right of the majority we assist those of the minority who in the future may wish to take part in a power-sharing Executive. We do not assist the emergence of any attempts at power-sharing by denying the rights of the majority in this respect. If the restoration of peace is the imperative, then we must also see that political institutions to safeguard peace are brought into existence and that there is the participation of the minority with the majority in any such Administration. We can see how, therefore, this full acceptance by us of the rights of the majority are essential in any return in any future power-sharing Executive.

Stormont fell because the consent of the Northern minority was withdrawn. In turn, the power-sharing Executive fell because the majority withdrew their consent in a massive display of their capacity to bring the industrial life of the North to a halt. The strike weapon which may obstruct production in an undertaking or even over a whole industrial sector in the industrial breakdown situation which has become, unfortunately, so common in recent years in most European countries, when it becomes a political weapon aimed by its organisers at forcing a political change in direction may prove just as strong and decisive. In the normal strike situation those involved seek only a cash improvement or a change in their conditions of work. Sooner or later a compromise settlement is achieved between the main protagonists.

The recent strike in the North showed an entire community united massively in, admittedly, negative opposition. The possibility of Protestant backlash has, of course, always been underestimated in the Twenty-six Counties. Pundits have not been lacking who have indulged in a scarcely veiled racism suggesting that the Protestant side in the North were a docile breed whom the British could prod along in any direction Westminster desired, but when credence in the Twenty-six Counties was given to the remote possibility of a Protestant backlash, it was usually visualised in terms similar to the bomb and bullet campaign of the IRA. There has been evidence of this, of course, and regrettably this manifestation of the backlash on the Protestant side may extend in the future. The largest manifestation of the backlash to date has been the political strike. It came in a way never visualised by those who had denied or downgraded its possibility. It came in a form which left no one in any doubt as to the strength of feeling on the Protestant side.

The Ulster Workers' Council strike accomplished in Northern Ireland what five years of physical violence had failed to do. It brought the economy of the area to its knees. Throughout the violence and disruption since 1969 the economy of Northern Ireland in new jobs and prosperity generally grew faster than any other depressed area in these two islands. It appeared that when ordinary people could no longer depend on safety in their homes and neighbourhoods they went to work as though seeking relief from the dreadful tensions of the community.

This prosperity owed much to the productive drive of the workers of the area and their remarkably low loss of man days due to absenteeism and industrial disputes as it did to the support of the British Government. It is noteworthy that in the recent years of strife and violence in the streets, towns and countryside of the North, the dispute record of Northern Ireland in industrial matters has made it one of the most peaceful in Europe.

The Ulster Workers' Council strike showed that the discipline exhibited by all workers in previous years—we have consistently paid tribute to the part played by the traditional trade union organisations and leadership—could be turned equally effectively, as in this case, by the loyalist workers to political ends.

In a matter of weeks, a £225 million loss was sustained by the Northern economy—the equivalent of what would have been only a few years ago the total annual subvention by the British Government to the area. It is estimated that there are still up to 20,000 workers unemployed as a result of the stoppage. Much of the direct loss is, of course, irrecoverable. It may take years to replace all the jobs. We should be under no illusion that there was support for the strike because it enjoyed, right across the board, the support of the Protestant majority community. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed as a mere temporary happening of no significance.

It was suggested that British troops should be withdrawn from Northern Ireland. This is one of the objectives of the Provisional IRA. It is clear that the British presence in Northern Ireland is no longer an impediment towards the emergence of new political institutions in the North, or indeed, to a changed political relationship throughout the whole island. It has been said that a withdrawal of British troops would help the situation. It was also suggested that an announcement of a phased withdrawal would transform Protestant intransigence into a willingness to work towards all-Ireland institutions. Anyone who took note of the recent Ulster Workers' Council strike could not come to that conclusion unless he ignored the lesson of that strike. It is obvious that those who put forward those views ignored certain facts which do not help their case. That strike was a manifestation of strength. It exposed an attitude of mind on the majority side in the North which could afford no shred of support to the idea that the departure of British troops would help towards the amelioration of relations between the majority and the minority. In the absence of any political framework in the area or of any arrangement about power-sharing, in the absence of local administration which would have the consent of both communities, the more likely consequence spelled out by the departure of troops would be an escalation of violence between both sides in the North. That objective does not help towards an improvement of the situation. It does not assist us towards the re-establishment of a power-sharing Executive.

In this debate it behoves all of us to be unambiguous in our support for the idea of the restoration of peaceful conditions in Northern Ireland and of a renewed attempt at power-sharing by both communities. We should be unambiguous, also, in asserting our whole-hearted agreement to the rights of the majority in Northern Ireland about the political configuration of the area. Just as our security forces pursue purveyors of violence who may seek harbour in this part of the country we should be at pains to point out the chasm which separates democrats here, who desire to see a peaceful solution and a new political relationship, from those who put forward ideas which seek any kind of support for an armed or coercive solution to this question. That must be the role of this assembly and I hope Deputies will bear it in mind.

Mr. Colley

In considering the present situation in Northern Ireland it should not be forgotten that the British Government were parties to the Sunningdale negotiations and subscribed fully to the basic principles of power-sharing and the Irish dimension. No one expected that these principles would be applied without difficulty. The fact that the going has got tough does not entitle the British Government to wash their hands of their responsibility. Fifty years ago the then British Government failed to live up to its responsibilities by yielding to Loyalist intransigence and thereby brought about the misery of the Stormont misrule based on the "herrenvolk" type theory of Protestant ascendancy.

The present British Government must know that a repeat of that mistake and a further yielding to Loyalist intransigence cannot solve the problem. The ambivalent ghost of Lloyd George which seems to hover again over the Palace of Westminster must be exorcised. One often hears British people expressing the view that they should get out of Northern Ireland and "let the Irish get on with it". Presumably they mean by that, let the Irish fight out their troubles to the finish. Perhaps it is no harm in this context to remind the British that the Irish people did not create the problem, that they did not wish it on the British. It might be well to remind them that present-day British politicians have a responsibility which they have so far failed to discharge.

The British Government should take the following steps at this time. First, they should end internment without trial. Secondly, they should end their one-sided approach to para-military organisations. At the present time the UDA and kindred organisations know that apart from some token arrests and searches their members and the stockpile of arms are safe from the British, no matter how illegally the members act. Thirdly, the British Government should embark on a major educational programme to bring home to Loyalists the stark economic reality that without British subventions the standard of living and of social services in the North would be way below those in the South. Fourthly, the British Government, without rhetoric, should make it clear that they are prepared to apply economic sanctions rather than allow a tiny minority of what they regard as the British electorate to dictate to West-minister in regard to the British commitment to power-sharing and the Irish dimension. Fifthly, they should make a public declaration on the lines outlined by the Leader of this party here today.

Some people speak and write in regard to the present situation in the North as though it had changed radically because of the recent Ulster Workers' Council strike. I wonder if it has. Here I would find myself in disagreement with a number of interpretations of that strike that we have just heard from the Minister for Labour.

It is true the power-sharing Executive have gone but the problems of the North are the same and the solutions are still the same. It is possible for us to visualise changes in the circumstances obtaining in the North which could result in a blood bath or in a civil war but if that happened at the end of the day the problems would still be there, would still be the same and the ultimate solutions would be the same.

The UWC strike was organised very skilfully and it was clearly assisted by leakage of information concerning the plans of the Executive to deal with it. It should be remembered that the strike did not get the broad support from the Protestant community which it had later; it did not get that support in its early days despite widespread intimidation. It got that support only when it became clear that the British Government were vacillating and lacked the will to defeat it.

It should also be remembered that that kind of strike is a weapon of self-destruction and, if met with firmness, is bound to fail because those who support it are those who suffer most. I believe if Mr. Faulkner's backbenchers had not lost their nerve this would have been clear for all to see, and the strikers themselves implicitly admitted this when they called off the strike without achieving their previously vociferously made demands for an undertaking for elections. They did not get that but they called off their strike. We should not overlook these factors. It is important that we remember them when considering threats to use the same weapon again in the future.

In so far as that strike may have helped to restore Protestant self-respect in the North—it has been said it did—it may not have been an entirely deplorable development because self-respect is vitally important to any community. However, self-respect is one thing but dominance over the Catholic community is another. The sounds emanating from some Loyalist quarters—not all of them—are demands for dominance over the other community. It is vitally important that everyone concerned, but particularly loyalists, should understand clearly that dominance of one community over the other in Northern Ireland will never again be accepted and that without power-sharing there is no future for Northern Ireland. That applies to both communities.

The minority in the North who have been cruelly wronged by Partition have accepted that proposition. They have accepted that neither alone nor in conjunction with the South can they seek or achieve dominance over the Protestant community in the North. The South has accepted this unequivocally. The Protestant community in the North must accept it too if they want to have any kind of normal life in the future.

Some Loyalists have been misled by their own propaganda and perhaps by some leader writers down here who, when the proposition of power-sharing was put forward by Deputy Lynch as Taoiseach, apparently misunderstood the position completely in their comments. Because of that kind of propaganda, but particularly because of Unionist and Loyalist propaganda during the years, quite a number of Loyalist spokesmen argue that if they are the majority they should be the people to exercise power as in other democracies. What they are forgetting is that Northern Ireland is an artificial creation, deliberately created to achieve a permanent majority for one community. In circumstances of that kind, by definition normal democracy is not possible.

It was the widespread recognition of the fact that normal democracy was not possible in Northern Ireland that enabled the concept of power-sharing to get off the ground. It applies, as I say, to both communities, and it is very important that both communities, and in particular the Loyalists, should understand clearly that there is no future for either community in Northern Ireland without power-sharing.

To imagine that one can ignore or forget the Irish dimension to the problem of Northern Ireland is to try to ignore or forget the reality of geography and history. The Irish dimension is a fact and must be catered for. This does not mean that Unionists are to be forced into a united Ireland. We have repeatedly made clear that we want to achieve unity, but unity by consent. The proposed structure of the Council of Ireland contained a built-in veto for Unionists to ensure that if there were any progress towards a united Ireland it would be by consent. We are not asking Loyalists to forego anything. Why should they ask nationallyminded people in the North to give up their aspirations, or why should the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs ask the minority in the North and the people down here not to mention unity?

I refuse to believe that the bulk of the Unionist-minded people in the North, when all the facts, including the economic facts, have been explained to them, will be so unthinking and so intransigent and uncaring of the consequences as to follow the lead of some of the self-appointed Loyalist spokesmen in this matter. Already some of these spokesmen are trying to brush aside the people elected by the Unionist-minded community, and the direction in which they are trying to go is quite clear. If such people are given in to, the future for those who disagree with them in Northern Ireland, whether Catholic or Protestant, is bleak indeed.

The irrelevance of the IRA to the problems of Northern Ireland is becoming increasingly obvious. Not only are they still pretending that the real problems which exist between the two communities in the North are of no great significance but they are, by their mindless bombing and killing, sharply accentuating these problems and without achieving anything of their professed aims. There should be ample food for thought for the leaders of the IRA, if they think at all, in the fact that the Loyalist strike did more to advance the date of British withdrawal than all the bombs and bullets of the IRA.

The attitude of the Coalition Government here in Dublin in regard to all these problems is giving rise to increasing disquiet. Perhaps the flavour of that attitude may be got if one recalls that on the occasion of a debate in this House on the Sunningdale Communique the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs challenged this House to a general election on the Sunningdale Communique provisions. Apart from the clearly definable objectives of that Minister in many of his speeches on this matter of creating division here in the South, if it was not obvious to people when he said that, it should now be very clear to most people just how hollow was his challenge and just how short term is his approach to these problems.

The poor negotiating ability of this Government was demonstrated at Sunningdale both by the delicate lack of clarity in the wording, which led to enormous confusion North and South and a great deal of difficulty and contributed to delay in implementation, and by the failure to secure in those negotiations provision for the immediate or very early implementation of the arrangements made. I suppose it can be fairly said that all this is water under the bridge, but, perhaps, much more disturbing than that are the recent manifestations of attitude by this Government.

The first of those manifestations would be the recent speech by the Taoiseach in Blackrock, to which the Leader of this party referred and in which the Taoiseach appeared to be suggesting that the people of the South were abandoning their age-old aspiration to Irish unity, to Irish unity achieved in peace and by agreement. Not alone is such a statement untrue, but I believe it is a dangerous statement in so far as it appears to yield to intransigence amongst Loyalists.

We in Fianna Fáil, when we were in Government, established, with very great difficulty, the right of the Government in Dublin to be vitally involved in all efforts to solve the problems of Northern Ireland. I suppose most people, if reminded, will quickly remember the exchange of telegram between Mr. Heath, then British Prime Minister, and the Leader of this party who was then Taoiseach, in the course of which Mr. Heath in effect, said that Northern Ireland was none of our business. It would have been noted, of course, that subsequently the British Government accepted that it was a vital part of our business. A great deal of work and effort went into the establishing of that position, but it would appear now that the Government are uncaring of that and are throwing away what was achieved at that time, because the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs keeps telling us that we should not talk about unity. If we are not to talk about unity, what interest have we got in Northern Ireland? As far as I could see, there was no mention in the speech of the Taoiseach today of the Irish dimension.

In replying to the debate recently on the Estimate for his Department, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs appeared to say that he did not accept that the Irish people had an inalienable right to unity, as we have maintained on this side of the House. The Official Report on the matter is somewhat ambiguous and I wonder if some member of the Government in speaking in this debate, would spell out precisely what this Government's attitude is in that regard.

The minority in the North are historically and intrinsically part of the Irish national majority. When members of this Coalition Government suggest, by implication, that they have not a right to regard themselves as part of that Irish national majority, they do not speak for Fianna Fáil. I wonder for how many members of Fine Gael and Labour they speak. In view of the threats and statements emanating from some Loyalist spokesmen and the apparent uncertainty and lack of resolution in Westminster, I wonder have the Government here considered fully the implications of our role as second guarantors of the rights of the minority in the North. Common prudence demands certain preparations. I have no wish whatever to foment tension but realities cannot be ignored and the known existence of our will to protect the minority in a doomsday situation is the best guarantee that such a situation will not occur.

In this context it is extremely disturbing to read and hear the leaks put out by members of this Government who have not got the guts to say it in public themselves—suggesting that the will to protect the minority in a doomsday situation does not exist in the Government. The shame of this is all the more when one finds the Leader of the British Tory Party, Mr. Heath, spelling out recently the fact that, in a doomsday situation, we here in the South would have no option but to intervene and to be drawn in. We do not want that situation and I agree entirely with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs that we should do everything in our power to prevent it. But it is a possibility of which we are all aware; it is a possibility that requires the Government to take any steps open to them to deal with it. I repeat if it is clearly known and stated that, in such an almost unthinkable situation, the Government here would have no option but to intervene—if that is known—it will, of itself, help to prevent the occurence of the doomsady situation.

What are we to make of the contemptible whisperings, obviously put out by this Government, that the elected representatives of the Northern minority are not welcome when they come here to inform us of the situation at first hand? Is the idea that on no account must Loyalists be upset now to be carried to the extent that we disown or withdraw ourselves from those who, at enormous personal sacrifice, have given the Northern minority such superb leadership over the last six troubled years?

Dr. FitzGerald

Hear, hear.

Mr. Colley

I believe it is time that some members of this Government stopped regarding themselves as spokesmen for the Loyalists, stopped warning us about Loyalist sensitivities and paid some attention to the sensivitities of the much abused and long suffering minority in Northern Ireland. I do not wish, in any way, to make the situation more difficult but I do think that this Government appears to be unaware of the effect of what its members are saying both on the minority in the North and on people generally here in the South. Nobody, and least of all the minority in the North, wants to see a situation of even greater violence than exists there at present. But one thing is certain, and that is, that they do not want to be abandoned to the organisers of the Ulster Workers' Council strike, to be told that if those people can get away with it with the British Government, our Government are going to deplore it but do no more. That is an invitation to civil war in this country and this Government should realise it.

We are dealing with an almost intractable problem. We are dealing with some people—and I say some; I believe they are not a huge percentage of the Unionist-minded people in the North—who are totally intransigent, who have been encouraged in that intransigence by their history, by the attitude of successive British Governments and encouraged in that intransigence only recently by the present British Government. We are making no demands on Loyalists to forego anything but it must be made absolutely clear that intransigence, private armies and the illegal use of force are not going to be allowed to succeed in this country, North or South. As I said earlier, people in the North and, perhaps, in the rest of the country, whether Catholic or Protestant, have a very bleak time facing them if that kind of intransigence is bowed to by the British Government but, above all, by the Irish Government.

There comes a time when people's sensitivities may have to be upset. If people are so intransigent that any reasonable statement will upset their sensitivities but, on the other hand, an undue preoccupation with their sensitivities creates fear, alarm and despondency amongst the other community involved, in this case in the North, then the time has come for the Government of Ireland, under the Constitution—that is its title— to know precisely, in its own mind and to let the public know where it stands——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy has one minute left.

Mr. Colley

——and where it should stand. There should be no doubt as to where it should stand, which is in trying to pursue reasonable policies in the North but making it absolutely clear that it will not, under any circumstances, give way and surrender to intransigence from any quarter.

Mr. Harte

I do not intend to be very long nor do I intend to take up the time allocated to me.

First of all, it would appear that the debate so far has been on a very low note. It would be my judgment that it will not go down on the records of this House as being one of the most outstanding debates that has ever taken place here. In fact, I would go so far as to say I am very disappointed so far because the wording of the motion before the House is for us to take note of what happened in Northern Ireland. Instead of that, we have had political knocking across the floor. But what has happened in Northern Ireland since Sunningdale? Eleven MPs have been elected to represent the Loyalists in the Imperial Parliament in London; the Loyalists workers' strike has taken place; the Executive has fallen and the Loyalists are demanding Assembly elections. That is the stark reality of what has happened North of the Border and, to my mind, that to which the motion before the House refers.

Having said that, very few speakers, indeed, have paid any attention to why 11 Loyalists were elected to the Imperial Parliament, why the Loyalists workers' strike took place, why the Executive fell or, indeed, what is going to happen henceforth. I can add nothing to the debate so far that will solve the issue of Northern Ireland but I believe, and have done for many years, that we in the South must unite ourselves, politically speaking, on the question of Northern Ireland before we can ask the Northern people to unite themselves. We have political platitudes being thrown across the House occasionally about how we can unite this country when, in fact, we cannot, as two mature National Parties, sit down and agree on what type of policy should be adopted by Dáil Éireann in approaching that Northern situation.

I have spoken on many occasions of the historical divisions between the political parties here in the South, but we have moved away from that position and we have now reached a position of political maturity where I am convinced that every politician in this House is falling down in his duty if he does not support the type of thinking I have put forward. I do not say this in a boastful way. If it appears that way that is not my intention. I am convinced that the bipartisanship which has existed in this House over the last number of years is weak, archaic, and not suited to the present situation. Indeed, it is amazing that it works at all because we had today the former Taoiseach, Deputy Lynch, saying that speeches were being made outside this House which should be made inside this House. We had Mr. Lynch telling us that here is the place where Northern policy should be formulated, that it is in this political assembly that we should formulate policy in which we believe, and on my extreme Left we had Mr. Blaney criticising speeches from this side of the House.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy should refer to speakers as Deputy Lynch and Deputy Blaney.

Mr. Colley

Extreme what?

Mr. Harte

Extreme political views. If I believe what Deputy Lynch has said, and I, as a member of this party, am prepared to listen because I have a very strong conviction that we, when spelling out what should happen north of the Border, when talking about power-sharing north of the Border, are missing the point that on northern politics we ourselves should be sharing power.

It is not so long ago that I was speaking from the Opposition benches and it is not so long ago that I sincerely criticised the Government of the day for hogging the Northern situation, for telling the Opposition nothing. It is not so long ago that I can forget that. I sense at the moment a similar situation in the Opposition benches. This has bedevilled the Irish situation for far too long. It is not now when is the country to be united but which party is going to unite it. I say this for the noblest of reasons. I do not say it from the point of view of criticising my own Government, who are doing a magnificent job at a very difficult time, who are living up to their obligations, but who are falling for the human temptation of not telling the Opposition what is happening or so the Opposition are accusing them as indeed I, as an Opposition Deputy, criticised the Government of that day.

I am conscious of the difficulties within the Fianna Fáil Party but any Deputy in the Fianna Fáil Party who does not follow his leader or who does not agree with the majority decision of this House should remember that a similar situation occurred in the Unionist Party in the North of Ireland not so long ago. That monolithic party that could never disappear was destroyed and is now almost a thing of the past because certain individuals refused to listen to the majority vote. As a word of warning, I mention this to the few Deputies— I hope they are few—in the Fianna Fáil Party who may at this time believe that they have a monopoly of wisdom on how the country should be united or how the Northern problem should be solved.

In this democratically eleced Parliament there are 144 Deputies. On each Deputy's shoulders rests the responsibility of stopping the destruction, stopping the murder, that is taking place in Northern Ireland and serving the country in the manner in which the people who elected him want him to serve it. I believe it is my solemn duty to say publicly that the present bipartisan agreement between Opposition and Government is not good and it is destined to fail. Every time we had a discussion in this House about Northern Ireland, particularly since the change in Government, I had a very strong suspicion that all is not right on the Opposition benches and that there are people over there who want to rock the boat for very simple reasons, basically to gather a few dozen votes. But who the hell cares whether one gets a couple of dozen votes or whether one does not? The main responsibility of a Deputy in this House is to do what he thinks is right. If I were an Opposition Deputy I would possibly be still criticising the Government if the criticism coming from over there is as sincere, and I do not doubt that it is, as it was when I was speaking on this particular point. I felt most inadequate as a Deputy trying to convey my point of view to a Government that would not listen, trying to put across the points of view, as I saw them, north of the Border, to a Government that did not care about my view. I want to get Northern Ireland above party politics in the South. I believe Northern Ireland must be above party politics in the South. It must be taken out of the political arena in the South and if this is to be done we, the politicians of this Parliament, must play our part and if some of us find ourselves being out-voted by other people, if some of us find ourselves not agreeing exactly with the politics of Northern Ireland, let us not forget the meaning of democracy, that the majority must rule.

If Deputy Lynch is saying what I think he is saying it is time for him to spell out clearly his views on bipartisanship. It is time for him to spell out clearly what he sees wrong in Government policy. It is also time for the Taoiseach to extend an invitation to the Leader of the Opposition and have a bipartisan agreement that will be lasting until such time as the position is sorted out. This does not mean that the Government of the day should not govern because such system as we have inherited from the British system in the two-party system, must operate. It also means that the Government of the day have a vast responsibility on their shoulders to carry with them the popular support of the south of Ireland. I, as a Government Deputy, do not ignore the fact that the Opposition party is the largest political group south of the Border and that they have the support of almost 50 per cent of the people south of the Border. If we were to make any contentious political point in the Northern picture there is no reason to doubt that the Fianna Fáil Party, if they wanted to make capital out of it, could create havoc and it would result in at most the collapse of the present Government and victory for Fianna Fáil. That would be the net position south of the Border but what sort of chaos would follow north of the Border and would it be worth the exercise?

As far as I am concerned, I would stay in the Opposition benches for the rest of my political life if it meant that we could get a bipartisanship on which the southern Irish people are in complete agreement because without it we are going nowhere and we are paying lip service to the Northern people. If we cannot hear the desperate cry of the Northern people looking for solutions then we are not fit to take our places in this Parliament.

I believe that Deputy Lynch must spell out clearly to Dáil Éireann and to the southern people what he means when he says that he takes exception to the Taoiseach, Government Ministers and indeed Government Deputies speaking outside Parliament on Northern Ireland. If Deputy Lynch means what I think he means, then I will be listening very attentively. The proposal I have in mind, which has been made public on a number of occasions, is that the Taoiseach should set up a subcommittee like the Council of State. It could be composed of three Cabinet Ministers and three shadow Cabinet members from the Opposition. There is no reason why the confidence of Government would be broken because I expect, in the event of a change of Government, that the three Opposition shadow members would be trusted by their leader with matters on which he would expect total confidence. There is no reason why there cannot be total agreement between the Leader of the Opposition and the Taoiseach on this matter. Unless this happens soon the Fianna Fáil Party will find themselves outside the political game when we are talking about Northern politics.

Since the fall of the Executive most people have been asking where do we go now. Do we again have power-sharing, or total integration, UDI, negotiated independence? Do we redraw partition, repatriate the Loyalists to Britain or fight it out in a civil war? Those are basically the choices we have. I have yet to be told that anything can surpass the promise that power-sharing offers north of the Border. The power-sharing, however, which was in being before the fall of the Executive was not completely power-sharing. When Ian Paisley and other Loyalist leaders in the North criticised it as being forced coalition the remarks were not without justification. I believe the failure of the Executive was that it did not have Loyalists in its ranks. I believe the Loyalists who did not take their place in negotiating such a settlement at the time under-estimated the success of the SDLP, the Faulkner Unionists and the Alliance Party.

The Loyalists believed that these three groups could not, in fact, succeed. When they saw they were going to succeed they had to wreck the Executive and they did so in a very shrewd manoeuvre. Let nobody be misguided by the view that it was the Loyalist workers who organised, executed and professionally managed the Loyalist workers' strike. I have yet to be convinced that the Loyalist workers' leaders had it in their power to have a strike operated and executed the way that strike was operated and executed north of the Border. There was something more sinister behind it but whatever the reasons let us now understand that any time the Loyalists in the North want to say: "We are not going that way" they can repeat as often as they like the Loyalists' strike which they organised a few weeks ago.

When William Craig said he would obliterate and annihilate—or used words to that effect—Catholics north of the Border we understood him to mean that he would shoot them or burn them out. Let us not for a minute dismiss the fact that what he could have been referring to was a strike such as that which had already taken place. If they want to say to the Catholics in certain parts of Northern Ireland: "We do not want you any more" they can cut off their electricity, their oil supplies, their food supplies and they can tell them to go away. We know that would have devastating results and we know it would invite a backlash from the Catholic community north of the Border. Let us not dismiss the fact that the Loyalist workers' strike was, in fact, a much more sinister operation than just stopping the economy of Northern Ireland and saying to the British Government: "We want a Protestant state north of the Border".

Mr. Wilson

I agree with the Deputy.

Mr. Harte

I am convinced that if we in the South, because we have only jurisdiction over the South, talk about the North we are only talking on lines of what we would like to do if we had the authority to do it. We have the authority to do certain things south of the Border and we are failing to do them because of petty political divides that separate the political thinking of our two parties but which do not separate the political thinking of the individual Members of this House who make up the political parties. I have had conversations with Deputies of all parties in this House. We have expressed our opinions and it is very seldom that I disagree with any member of the Fianna Fáil Party in private conversation. I concede there are people to whom I did not talk and whose views may not be in line with my political thinking. If my judgment is right, the majority of the people making up the Fianna Fáil Party at the moment are men of integrity and wisdom, men who want to see the country settled and restored to peace and on the road to unification if it is to come about at all.

I can speak with more authority when speaking about my own party. There is an obligation on all Members of this House, irrespective of what party they are elected to represent here, to sit down and work out a political formula that will spell out clearly to the northern community, Catholics, Protestant, Nationalist, Loyalist, Republican and Unionist, where we stand on this and the situation will no longer be bedevilled by statements such as that of my colleague from north-east Donegal, Deputy Blaney, who is trying to score political points, basically for no other reason than to cause confrontation between himself and the leadership of his former party.

There is an obligation on all of us to sit down and work out a policy about which we are in total agreement. If we cannot achieve that unity in this House, how can we expect unification between power-sharing groups in the Northern Assembly to operate? It is ludicrous in the extreme for us to say that we want power-sharing north of the Border and that we will support power-sharing there but we cannot operate it south of the Border. The people who support the Fianna Fáil Party will argue at street corners about whether that party could provide better Government for this country, build more houses, provide better facilities for the under-privileged people, provide better jobs for the unemployed and create a better society south of the Border. We will argue in fair debate and disagree at the end of the argument but we will not fall out about it nor will we stop to shoot or kill anyone over it. However, when we start arguing on Northern Ireland, irrespective of whether it is Fianna Fáil supporters who are arguing with Fine Gael supporters or just Irish people arguing among themselves we will end our arguments as opponents and ill feeling will be generated because this is the most emotive subject that has ever come in front of the Irish people and we, the politicians of this Parliament, are doing nothing to defuse it. In fact, some of us are doing everything in our power—I do not include the majority in this and I hesitate to name those whom I would accuse— to inflame the situation simply for the purpose of rocking the boat within their own party or, perhaps, getting a few more votes. It is a sad situation. I will mention just one individual and not just because I want to knock him. Mr. Kevin Boland contested the Sunningdale Agreement in the High Court. What has Mr. Kevin Boland gained out of his taking that issue to the court? A great deal of publicity in the South, a defeat in his court case, and yesterday's news wraps tomorrow's garbage. He has gained nothing as far as the South of Ireland is concerned. But many of the things that were said in that court case were so inflammatory as far as the Northern situation was concerned that Mr. Kevin Boland can now be accredited as one of the prime wreckers of Sunningdale, one of the prime wreckers of the Executive and of the Assembly selected last year.

We have in this House a colleague of Mr. Kevin Boland, Deputy Blaney. He knocked everything in the Sunningdale Agreement and every political party except the group he calls the Independent Fianna Fáil Party. Everyone is wrong but Deputy Blaney. He spoke here for half an hour this evening and told us all the mistakes inherent in our policies. He told us about all the conniving between the Government and the Opposition and all the wrongs of Government policy. Only he was right; and he tells us only his forecasts were right. But Deputy Blaney did not put forward one constructive proposal to offset the criticisms he offered, not alone to the Taoiseach but to the leader of his former party. Deputy Blaney criticised internment. Does Deputy Blaney think the Irish people are a lot of lunatics, that they do not remember that Deputy Blaney as a Minister in a Fianna Fáil Cabinet interned people in this country? When he talks about Partition and the wrongs in Northern Ireland does he forget that from 1948 to 1957 as a Deputy of this House he condoned all the things he is now criticising? As a Minister in a Fianna Fáil Cabinet from 1956 to 1970, for 13 long years, he subscribed to all the things he is now criticising.

Deputy Blaney makes me sick. His public statements are made for no other purpose than to promote friction between himself and Deputy Lynch and, if any member of the Fianna Fáil Party does not see that, he is not fit to be a member of that party. It is time Fianna Fáil were told that. For what purpose does Deputy Blaney do this? He does it because he wants to embarrass the Fianna Fáil Party. He wants to try to prove he was right. He wants to tell the backbenchers of the Fianna Fáil Party that the great saviour of the republican movement of the South is here to speak on their behalf. Let those young Deputies realise that Deputy Blaney was part of the Fianna Fáil Party from 1948 until he was kicked out—not until he resigned—in 1970. It is only after four years of trying to understand what Deputy Blaney was trying to tell us and, with the greatest of charity, holding my peace and refraining from causing friction in a situation that was already too explosive that I have decided to break my silence. I am no longer prepared to allow people like Deputy Blaney, or anyone else, who can offer only division, hatred, illfeeling, murder, and all that goes with it——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy must not ascribe murder to any Member of this House.

Mr. Harte

All I am saying is that any person who cannot offer us anything other than division should keep quiet.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy must withdraw the word "murder".

Mr. Harte

I take the point and I withdraw the word. We had Deputy Blaney telling us that it was not the IRA who bombed Dublin. We know that. Does anyone believe that Northern Ireland Protestants, or Loyalists, or anyone else who would plan such a terrible deed, would have come down here if the IRA were not bombing in the North of Ireland? When Deputy Blaney condones the actions of the IRA does he also condone the kidnapping of the young boy in Donegal who came back last week to his father's funeral? Does he condone the destruction done to Protestant church property such as that perpetrated in the town of Convoy on Saturday night last? Does he condone the thousand and one other things that have been done? No one can switch off violence. One just cannot have a little violence and then switch it off. If one starts violence, one accepts complete responsibility for the end product, which is death and destruction. One cannot switch it off. Let Deputy Blaney go and crow somewhere else. He has not codded me and I hope he will not cod any member of the Fianna Fáil Party who would be mad enough to listen to him.

I did not intend to speak at any great length. Basically, the speakers on the Opposition benches have taken us on an historical outing, talking about what happened in 1798 and what happened right up to the Treaty. Whatever happened in those times we cannot now re-write history. These things happened and there is nothing we can do to alter the chain of events. Neither can we alter the period from 1921 to 1974. What we have to do is to try to remedy the situation as it exists today. If we are not prepared to rise above the things that might divide us we are not giving a lead to the people who want to be led out of the inflammable situation in Northern Ireland at the moment and we are not fulfilling our obligations to the people who sent us here to represent them.

Mr. Wilson

This motion reads: "That Dáil Éireann takes note of recent events affecting Northern Ireland." One of the recent events which considerably affected Northern Ireland in recent times was the passing of the Constitution Act by the Parliament of Great Britain. This Act was duly discussed and debated in the two Houses that constitute the Parliament of that country. It was duly passed and, as a result, a form of Government was set up in the North of Ireland incorporating the concept of power sharing. One very important aspect of government, namely, that of security, was retained by what calls itself the Mother of Parliaments.

Quite recently we saw a large-scale conspiracy in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland to bring down the Executive set up under that Constitution Act and we saw that Executive brought down by people who claimed a loyalty to the sovereign head of that country whose name was subscribed to the Constitution Act. This conspiracy was, as Deputy Harte has said, a most pervasive one. Very few people even now understand all its ramifications. No in-depth study, such a study as the Insight team used to perform, has as yet been made of it. Did it involve the Army? Did it involve the police? These are questions that must be asked and I suggest the Government of this country has a valid interest in the answers to these questions because they, on our behalf, negotiated the Sunningdale Agreement. Was the Civil Service involved in it and to what extent? On the day before the collapse—the collapse was on a Tuesday if my memory serves me right—I was going around my constituency and I was listening to the BBC on my car radio. I was convinced that the people who were in charge of the BBC Northern Ireland were in part, at least, involved in the conspiracy to bring down that Executive.

What was our intelligence on the matter? The Fianna Fáil Party were concerned and, before the actual collapse, they had been firing off telegrams to the Prime Minister of Great Britain to try to see when he would act to shore up the Executive which was established under an Act of the British Parliament. What intelligence had our Government here? What intelligence had the Executive about what was going on? Have we any intelligence? Has there been any statement about how pervasive this conspiracy was that brought down the Executive, an Executive formed of very able men, an Executive formed of men from both wings of the political teams in Northern Ireland, the Faulkner Unionists, the SDLP and the Alliance Party, men who were indulging in a great experiment, men who would, I hoped, put houses in places where they were needed and not where people professed a certain faith, men who would put factories where the workers were, where people had been rotting with unemployment for generations? I hoped they would put them there on their merits and I hoped for the prosperity of those regions.

There was no leadership from our Government. For several days we had no Government. We had no leadership in London. There was no backing up by the security forces and, remember, the British Government reserved to themselves the rights, in the matter of security. There was no action from the British Government's point of view to deal with this coup d'etat. It just stopped short of being a coup d'etat. Perhaps it was a practice run for the next time when it will be a complete coup d'etat.

The Taoiseach said this morning that any condoning of violence is a threat to our democratic institutions. He was right. This was condoning of violence, not positive condoning, but condoning of violence by inaction on the part of the British Government, I regret to say, a British Government composed of a party which always assumed a moral stance in the world and for which I had great respect because of their social and economic achievements in the past. This was condoning violence because it showed men that by violence they could succeed. As a result of what happened then we had a summoning of people to meetings, but the people who were elected were to be excluded. Note the lesson which was learned. Paisley is an elected man. Craig is an elected man. West is an elected man. They were to be excluded because the lesson was learned that, if you showed enough muscle with your club in your hand on street corners in Belfast, violence could succeed.

This Government should have condemned that exhibition of violence, and the British Government should have dealt with that exhibition of violence, just as we are all committed to dealing with violence in this part of the country. I mentioned that it was a coup d'etat manqué. It fell short of a complete take-over. I agree with Deputy Harte that we still do not know how pervasive that conspiracy was. The people who did that could take over and they have shown that they will take over if the opportunity re-occurs.

I am an Ulsterman and I am glad to be one. References have been made to the fact that there is not an understanding here of the depth of feeling on the majority side in the Six Counties. There may not be an understanding all around of the depth of feeling but I understand that the feeling is deep. It ranges across the dark section of emotion from dislike to bitter and murderous hate. This has been shown in action, not only in this century but in the past century also. Those people will not be coerced into a united Ireland. I should like to say by way of gloss that all generalisations are lies. There are many people, Church of Ireland people, Presbyterian people, who could not find it in their hearts to hate anyone and who are totally committed to Christian principles. They never press forward to the public view.

I was very friendly with Sam Thompson, the Belfast playwright, who was a Church of Ireland man. Unfortunately for this country he died prematurely. He told me his life story and his experiences of anti-Catholic pogrom and riot. The lesson could never be forgotten. He was only one of many. I agree with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs on very little but I agree that there is a deep feeling, a deep anti-Catholic feeling, a deep anti-United Ireland feeling in that community. I repeat that those people will not be coerced.

It is as well to put on record that those of us who believe that this country is one, and that it is a valid political objective to strive for a united Ireland, will not be coerced either. We want to put that on record because there is no point in the shilly-shallying which is going on, as if the Orange and Loyalist group was an angry lion and we should not do anything to disturb him. If I know my fellow Ulstermen's minds, they prefer one to be blunt and straight and say what one is thinking in this regard. At the moment there is a kind of psychological war going on, a big orchestra with the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in charge and the Minister for Foreign Affairs as second fiddle trying to say we must not say we believe a united Ireland can be achieved and that we will strive for it. This kind of thing is dangerous and it is silly. One had better state one's convictions and beliefs, and stick to them, and negotiate from that position.

The grand panjandrum of culture, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, comes in here and asks what do we mean by national culture. He says it is a vague term and then he proceeds not to say what he means by it but what other people mean when they write it down. As I told him, unfortunately by way of interruption in the debate on the Estimate for the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, when I speak of national culture I regard it as omni-comprehensive. It takes in the poet in Kerry and Seán Bullock in the North of Ireland, William Carleton, and you mention any of the northerners.

When I think of our shared culture I like to think of a museum I used to visit quite regularly in Hollywood, a few miles north-east of Belfast. It is a museum of national culture and the artefacts of our common Ulster civilisation are on display there, artefacts conected with the great industries of the Six Counties and the other three and connected with the great linen industry. There is a Cavan spade on the wall. There is a Tyrone spade. There is a cottage from Donaghadee, and so on. This is our Ulster culture. When we talk of national culture here we should, and we do, pace the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, include in it all the groups in the country.

Another popular word nowadays is "myths". How can a rational conviction that this country is one and can be administered as one be regarded as a myth? I am not talking of any emotional desire that this should be so. I am talking about a conviction in the hearts of people, in the minds of people, that this can be so, and a conviction also that all the resources of our intelligence should be brought to bear on achieving this purpose. I emphasise deliberately, all the resources of the human intellect in this country, all the resources of the intellects of people charged with political procedure.

Another point I should like to touch on is a tendency nowadays to say that certain elected representatives of the people should not be coming to Dublin so often; that they should in some way try to keep that old lion quiescent by staying at home and not be seen in this capital city. I reject that suggestion. They have every right to consult with the Government and the Opposition, and Government and Opposition should take their views into account. So, too, if they wished, and, unfortunately they do not wish at this stage, have the representatives of the Protestant majority a right to come here and consult and have their views taken into account. In my view it would be a sad day if journalists and politicians should in some way try to make the representatives of any group in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland ashamed of coming to Dublin for consultation any time they like.

The late Seán Lemass, go ndéana Dia trócaire ar a anam, showed the way by going to consult with the then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and the Prime Minister came south also. That broke a certain log jam. It was an important if purely formal gesture. I do not like to see this tendency now by sophisticated people saying: "What will they think if they see the SDLP running to Dublin?" Let them think. Dublin has the only sovereign Government in this country and anybody who so chooses has a right to come and consult with that Government or with the Opposition.

As Deputies Lynch and de Valera said there is in this party a strong desire for a united Ireland to be achieved by peaceful means. There is no condoning of violence on this side of the House. I hope we shall always be unblinkered and see violence whereever it is and condemn it wherever it is and not on an ex-parte basis. I pointed out the danger of meetings of the Ulster Workers' Council and I agree with Deputy Harte that they are not the whole story nor even a large part of the story but there is a danger if they think that by the action they got away with they have established a principle where people do not have to be elected by anybody to take control of a country. Power-sharing was being tried and as I mentioned already, many of us who feel strongly that the optimum development in this country would be a united Ireland were delighted that the power-sharing Executive seemed to be a step on the road. The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs said this was dangerous; this was only ruffling the Loyalists; this was only helping to break the Sunningdale Agreement and the power-sharing Executive. I do not believe that.

The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs stated that those who pointed out that the power-sharing Executive and the Council of Ireland and all that went with the Sunningdale Agreement was a step on the road to a united Ireland were wrecking the arrangement in the Six Counties. I do not believe that for one moment. What wrecked it was people who organised, again I am not sure who they were, this paralysis in the North of Ireland. They were not worried about the Council of Ireland. They are on record as having said after the collapse that they would not share power with anybody who held that there should be a united administration in this country.

When castigating the British Government for their lack of action during those vital days I maintain that if they had taken action in time there would have been no blood spilt and that, in my philosophy, is a very important point but they were paralysed somewhere either in the people they were ordering to take action or in their own minds. This brings up the point of the inner politics of Great Britain which are not a direct concern of us except in so far as they impinge on this country. We know the British Government is a minority Government. We know also that our affairs at any time were merely peripheral to that Parliament and that Government, and they are peripheral now.

Only today we heard people discussing this new Unionist group that has been formed in Westminster of the people who were elected in the last Westminster election. The British have always prided themselves on their pragmatism and I would fear that their pragmatism might take that particular line at this time and that the ten votes that would be available to the Conservative and Unionist Party might be more important than the welfare of the Six Counties.

One case where, perhaps, an expanded exercise in power sharing at local level might be worked at the moment is in the city of Derry. The Leader of this party referred to that area as a possible area of co-operation in economic development. My point is not exactly the same one but is ancillary to it and in no way contradicts it. In that city power sharing in the city council for the first time has been in operation for some time. It took a rather comical twist at the last election to the mayoralty in that city. Nevertheless, if governmental functions could be passed on—there is no Executive now—straight from West-minister to that council, finance et cetera, to allow them to develop that area in an exercise of giving very great and unprecedented power to a local council it might point the way to how power sharing in the Six Counties and power sharing could be made to work. It would be an object lesson also for any other areas, for instance Newry or Armagh, where this could be brought about at local level. The functions of local government could be extended and the finances extended and an encouragement to people at that level, seeing that at a higher level it had been wrecked by the Ulster Workers' Council. It could also be pointed out to them that this was to be the position; there was to be power sharing and if there was not power sharing there would be no local power at all.

The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs told us to question past assumptions and that this was important. Words like "myth" and "shibboleth" are flung around and it is a good thing and a good exercise. I have examined some of my own past assumptions, the assumption that this is one country and that it is desirable that it should have one administration, and I came to the conclusion that my original assumption was right.

Deputy Harte spoke about agreement on a bipartisan policy. Did he mean agreement on the basis of the Taoiseach's speech in Dún Laoghaire where he said that people in the South were getting chary of association with a community which was becoming imbued with violence? There could be no bipartisanship on a statement like that.

The Taioiseach holds the most important political position in this country. When he made that statement did he make it off the top of his head? Did he make it on the basis of remarks at cocktail parties in the most affluent constituency in the country? Did he make it as a result of a wideranging social survey to try to find out the ideas of the people? We have not been told. One assumes that a man enjoying the position of Taoiseach would not make such a statement without having evidence from a wideranging political or social survey. We are in the dark as to where he got his ideas. The belief of the people in the Fianna Fáil Party is that there is no foundation for that type of statement nor could there be any justification for the disturbance which a statement like that made in the Six Counties. This is not realism. It is nonsense, not backed by facts. We expect more from the Taoiseach.

I am not making a party political point in this but at that time I felt there was no leadership in this country, that there was a vacuum because we did not know what was happening. I do not know if the Government knew what was happening but I would be alarmed to think that such a situation could ever occur again.

The Leader of the Fianna Fáil Party contended that there should be a positive encouragement to unity from Great Britain. When he makes an appeal like that he should be listened to. Everybody knows of his anxiety about the Six Counties and about the problems which the situation is creating both there and here.

As some form of compensation for what the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in a pathetic bleat said was lack of ability or will to deal with the people who revolted in the Six Counties, the British Government should give positive encouragement without coercion to the idea that unity can be achieved and people can work together effectively for the good of the country.

When I made my maiden speech not so very long ago I said that we need the people from that part of my native Province because of their ability. It is probably the greatest tragedy that ever happened in that area that the men of ability chosen by their respective parties to experiment in power sharing did not get the chance to develop their muscles and to develop the administration in that area.

Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach (Mr. Kelly)

I have only half the length of time which the other Deputies had but I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute. Because I have such a short time at my disposal I will confine myself to some points which I heard raised this afternoon.

The Leader of the Opposition appeared to blame the Taoiseach not so much for what he said but for what others thought he said or the meanings others put on the words he said. When I was in Opposition in the other House whenever the opportunity presented itself I had occasion to give the House an account of my interpretation of what Deputy Lynch was then doing. Often it took the form of saying: "Deputy Lynch may not have intended this but this is how it reads in Lurgan, Portadown, Newry and Bangor". It caused unmitigated fury on the Fianna Fáil side because they could not get the point I was trying to make. I did not and never could have accused Deputy Lynch of wishing to make a bad situation worse. I and all my party have always understood that he wished the best for the North but, of course, words leave themselves open to misinterpretation by people who are ill-willed and disposed to misinterpret them.

It is one thing to assume that a Loyalist of a most intransigent, malicious and malignant kind will be likely to misinterpret and turn to his own dishonest advantage, words used by a Taoiseach here—that is what happened in the incumbency of the previous Taoiseach, not through his wishing it as I always made clear— but it is a quite different thing when words used here by the Taoiseach are subject to an interpretation, not by people who are malignant towards a different political tradition, but by people who belong to a different political party in this small republic.

I felt poorly about Deputy Lynch this afternoon when he blamed the Taoiseach for doing something for which he will go down in history and that is for speaking the plain unvarnished truth. He referred to the people "in this country". It is a convention now which overrides natural speech that one must never say "this country", although it comes naturally to the tongues of people on both sides, to use an artificial form of speech and always say, "this Republic" or "this part of the country" or "these Twenty-six Counties". I spit on conventions like that. When this country is united, as it will be one day, "this country" will mean the whole country of 32 counties. Until that time I have nothing but contempt for the superficial convention which would wish us to bury our tongue in our throats. Everybody knows what is meant in a particular context when we use the words "this country".

This Taoiseach has said that the people of this country—and we know what he meant by it, so let no one try to throw dirt on him for speaking his mind honestly—are getting fed up with the North of Ireland. He did not say that—although these were the words which the Leader of the Opposition was trying to put in his mouth—with the intent of saying that he or the Government were fed up with the North.

What I took him to mean, and applauded him in my heart for saying, was that the savageries committed in the name of the Tricolour had in turn provoked other savageries which were making people who had been brought up in the Nationalist tradition feel ashamed of it. He was brought up in that tradition. His father was sentenced to death in 1916 and reprieved at the last moment. This was in his blood so why should he be ashamed of that position? He should be ashamed when he sees others dragging it in the dirt. That is what he was saying and I applaud him. He was saying that because of what the IRA had done and the unspeakable brutalities they caused others to commit, the majority of the ordinary people, and not those who Deputy Wilson sneered at who attended the cocktail parties, were becoming disgusted with the North and everything to do with it. That is what he meant but he did not welcome it. He deplored it and laid it at the door of violent men who do not care what happens to the ordinary people or how they cast their votes. He has spoken the truth as he sees it and every Opposition Deputy knows it is the truth.

No one who has not been near this Government over the past 15 months can have the faintest idea of the agonies this Government have, rightly and willingly, gone through on account of the North. This Government would go through further and worse agony if necessary. No one can have any conception of the serious and dedicated way in which this Government lavished their life's blood on the North of Ireland over the last 15 months in which matters of colossal national importance—I mean national in the Thirty-two County sense—have been given a lower priority on the Government agenda because of the requirements of the North of Ireland and the plight of the minority there. This plight has been produced by their so-called defenders, as well as by the people who have triumphed over them for the last 50 years.

This Government have nailed themselves to that question during the last 15 months and I will not take from the Leader of the Opposition or anyone else the impression that we are washing our hands of it. That is simply not true. What is happening is that an agonised warning was given, not for the first time, to the people who wrap the green flag around them in word or in deed, or who get others to wrap it around them while they are smuggled into press conferences and away from the conferences. The warning has been given to those people that by their acts they are destroying the whole moral basis for the very existence of the Tricolour, that they are sickening the people on whom they would rely for political support if national unity ever took place. That is the warning that he gave; he was right to do so and he should be honoured for that. If he has spoken the truth, not for the first time, if he has used plain language and is being realistic, not for the first time, in contrast to what went before for 16 years, he deserves the thanks of the Irish people, North and South.

When Deputy de Valera was speaking I was provoked into interrupting him. I do not know if my interruption got on the record of the House. Deputy de Valera said: "I hold no brief for the IRA". I am sick of hearing people say this because it is always followed by "but". Why cannot the Deputy stand up and say he detests the IRA? That is what I wanted to hear. He went on to ask why it was that we heard condemnation of the IRA only and no condemnation of the UVF, the UDA or the savages on the other side. I will give him good reason why not.

Until the sun grows cold nobody will blame Fine Gael, the Labour Party or Fianna Fáil for the unspeakable brutalities committed by the UDA or the UVF. Nobody will saddle us with the moral responsibility for the horrible cruelties committed in the name of the Union Jack, in the name of the union, of loyalty or of the rule of law. The decent people on the Loyalist side must stand up and disclaim that, and if there are fewer of them doing that than on our side here in regard to our savages that is their shame, not ours. I do not mind saying it loudly because not enough of them have spoken. The few who have are politically very weak but that is the shame of the others. Many of them are well educated and have many advantages—advantages which the leaders of the SDLP or their fathers did not have. They have not responded to the moral challenge of standing up and telling their own unspeakable bullies: "Get off our backs. Do not disgrace us in the eyes of the world; do not drag the name of Ulster through the filth." They have not done that, they have welshed on their responsibilities but that is no reason why we should do the same.

We carry a moral responsibility to disclaim anything done in the name of our flag of which we would be ashamed. We have not shirked that responsibility. I will say to the credit of Deputy Lynch and four or five of his front bench colleagues, and probably some of the backbenchers who may not have had the opportunity, that when he was in office he lost few opportunities to condemn these people. I do not extend the same credit to all of his party, but he lost few opportunities of speaking his mind about these people whose activities must make us ashamed.

The point I was trying to get across in my disorderly interruption of Deputy de Valera was that it is no use saying he does not hold a brief for the IRA and then proceed to add a qualification. These people have taken it upon themselves to take these actions without a vote from the people. When they stand for an election, even in constituencies they choose themselves, they get only 2 or 3 per cent of the vote. However, it makes no difference to them because they still represent themselves as the defenders of the people. They have taken it upon themselves to spill blood and to inflict unspeakable cruelties, in no way distinguishable from the cruelties inflicted by the savages on the Loyalist side. They have done that in the name of the flag that flies over this House. That is why a responsibility lies on the Government and on the Opposition to show teeth to these savages. That is the reason. It is not because they are worse than the Loyalists, because they are less sincere in their savagery, but because we are the ones whose tradition they claim to represent. I am sorry if my language is violent; the only excuse I can plead is that it must be violent in order to carry any kind of weight with the soft-headed people who talk about "the lads" and "the boys". There are many of them still around who seem to think that because the coffins are draped with the Tricolour that is an excuse for what they do. I feel badly about them because they are misusing the flag of this State.

Deputy de Valera and those who think like him should apologise for temporising about people who are disgracing our side. Let us do nothing, by deed or omission, that brings our side into disrepute. If the so-called decent educated people on the Loyalist side who should know better do not speak up with the same volume in regard to those who are disgracing their tradition that is their shame, but let us mind our own house first.

The point of view enunciated by the Taoiseach and others, that the sad events of the last month in the North have been helped along by the deeds of these flag wavers is true. Until those words sink into the minds of the Members, whether they are decent, democratic members of the Labour Party, Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil, there is no hope for the North or for the Republic.

I hope this will not be taken as a destructive contribution to this debate. My remarks were not so intended. I merely wanted to defend the Taoiseach against the impression the Leader of the Opposition appeared to create, that he was proclaiming a gospel of indifference to Irish unity. That is the opposite of the truth, the opposite of his whole tradition and the tradition of the bulk of the people who follow him. Secondly, I am fed up and ashamed of the kind of temporising which produced the words here from a very much respected Member of this House when he said: "I hold no brief for murderers but...".

Mr. Brennan

The debate so far was generally reasonable and good and justified our asking for it. It is true the allocation of time to each Member was hardly sufficient to enable him to develop in detail the points he would like to make. Most speakers were constructive but we did not get much that was new. The Taoiseach referred to a new local security force it is proposed to create but that was the only item that was new.

The Leader of our party spelled out a number of matters that might be proceeded with in order to get back to power sharing, of which there has been much talk. Some Deputies, like the last speaker, simply tried to vindicate their own party and to lecture others on how they should behave. On the whole, the debate has done some good although there has been the usual point scoring. I do not think any of the speakers, with a few exceptions, showed any lack of responsibility having regard to the importance of the occasion. It is a difficult occasion, one on which the climate does not permit one to be irrational or, perhaps, to say all the things one would like to say. We could be at a crossroads. Whither Ireland? is the question on many peoples' lips today. Most people hope for the best. Some dread the future. All of us hope there will not be a civil war.

About this time 52 years ago British guns were shelling the Four Courts for the first time, the start of a bloody civil war. Most people will have sad memories. While we are being told by some people here we should forget a lot of the past, the emotional past, I think we should learn from the past. No parliamentarian is worthy of the name if he cannot look back at the past and learn from it. As the poet said:

Lives of great men all remind us We can make our lives sublime, And departing leave behind us Footprints on the sands of time.

Living in Donegal, that most beautiful county of Ulster, where half of my neighbours are Protestants, I can say they are the nicest people you could live with. I often wondered what would have happened if the Feetham Commission had put us in with the other six counties? Would I not be talking to Alec Maxwell and James Dean today? Would we be fighting? Would we be putting bombs outside each other's door, or would we be as friendly as we are? They are excellent citizens and make a great contribution to the economy of this Republic. It is by accident that they are not a part of the troubled area about which we are talking here all day.

I still think there is a great deal of good in our friends just across the other side if we could eradicate this mass psychology which seems to operate when they congregate and the bigotry that pervades their actions at times when they are provoked. We should have a lot more mixing and getting together.

When I spoke here on the Sunningdale Agreement before I criticised it where I thought it should be criticised, and some of the Government Members were quite irate because I did so. They thought there was little need for all the assurances that were given. The good I saw in it, apart from the power-sharing, which was good anyhow, was that there would be a Council of Ireland where we would have more rapport with the people of the other side. We would be able to work together in matters of common interest, of mutual benefit to both areas. This could be self-generating; one thing might lead to another and we could become deeply involved in a single council that would ultimately get each of us to understand the other and learn that he had not horns, and that could ultimately lead to unity. I say that in spite of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs saying that this is something we should never have read into it. As a matter of fact, it was the great good I saw in it.

I thoroughly agree with Deputy John Wilson when he says we should talk out straight about what we want, without having any sneaking approach or pretence about it. Surely we can learn to understand each others aspirations. In the South we can allow our neighbours to go to whatever house of worship they wish to attend, and they can allow us to do likewise. Surely we have the right to think politically, too, and speak our minds out on these matters.

I thought the one weakness in the Sunningdale Agreement was that it did not provide for immediate ratification. It was quite obvious as regards those people who wished to wreck the power-sharing Assembly and Executive— sometimes I thought it was because they were not part of it—that all they wanted was time. Time was on their side. The election in Britain helped considerably because they made Sunningdale an issue. The election was a general election where Sunningdale was not an issue, but they succeeded in claiming that the 11 candidates returned were anti-Sunningdale candidates.

I never quite understood why Sunningdale was referred to as an agreement. There were signatures appended. Then we were told it was a communique. It was sometimes referred to as a blueprint. However, it did require ratification. Ratification was being delayed and eventually bits were being chipped off, whereas at first we were told it was a package: take it or leave it. Then there was the final disaster. There was little effort to retrieve any part of it. The end was regarded as inevitable and it seemed to be let die a natural death.

Deputy de Valera was blamed for using the words "unity" and "IRA". As a matter of fact, he has been misquoted as saying: "I have no use for the IRA, but". He said no "but". The IRA is a thing which exists and is something which is giving trouble and which people want to get rid of. What they are doing is contrary to the policy of this side of the House and, I think, the other side, too. So far they have succeeded in doing one thing, proving beyond yea or ney that violence is not a remedy. The British are anxious to get rid of it and to have peace. In Northern Ireland they want to have peace and to get rid of it. If there is to be peace and violence is to be eradicated, people must support political approaches. Their contribution to the first major political approach, which was to replace violence with the power-sharing Assembly, was certainly weak. If the British want the assistance which they are seeking from the Republic to end violence, they have a duty, too, as I have said here before in speaking on Sunningdale, to support the alternative, which is the political approach. In my opinion they gave it very poor support and allowed it to flounder without very much effort or protest. I think they have got to point out, and have got to be asked to point out, the inevitability of unity in this country.

I remember when Mr. Harold Wilson visited us as a member of the British Opposition—we had entertained him in Iveagh House—one of the things on which he agreed was that down through the years, instead of guaranteeing the constitutional position of the North, the British Government would have been better employed pointing out occasionally or frequently—either in private or public, or both—that "You must one day prepare for the inevitable hour when you will not have us; you will be all one country again." This would have turned their minds and heads in another direction and would have prepared them for what is the inevitable day. Peace, peace, peace—everybody is talking about peace. Peace is not much good unless it is based on unity and, thereby, is a lasting peace. Down through the years we have had trouble. This is not the first time; perhaps it is the longest spell of trouble we have had. We have had trouble since the Treaty, time and again. Is it merely going to be sufficient now to follow the dictates of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, who wants to eradicate from the minds of the people what he calls a fantasy culture and blames that for the cause of the trouble?

Without harking back on emotional history, up to 1921 this country had a struggle for freedom, a freedom for 32 counties. There was a compromise arrived at which was held to be a temporary one. Most of us know the history of how the Six Counties were eventually cut off. Indeed, when a serious effort was being made to avoid civil war here and the packed de Valera/Collins election was arranged, there were questions being asked in the House of Commons if this was not a breach of the Treaty. In case it was, the British were standing by ready to attack. These are the things which, despite what the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs will say, most people must remember, cannot forget. Does he think he is doing a service by making statements such as that which he made when winding up the debate on his own Estimate and which has not yet been completed? At columns 1187-88 of Volume 372, of the Official Report for 13th June, 1974 he said:

One element in our culture, which distinguishes it from some others is the considerable element of fantasy which enters into it. This is by no means entirely a bad thing. On the contrary, it has helped to shape Ireland's contribution, which has been out of proportion to our numbers over the years to the arts, especially to literature, and most especially, perhaps, in poetry and drama. It enriches also our daily living with the interplay of wit and humour. These are valuable parts of our culture and I should like to see them reflected even more than at present in our broadcasting. This is where culture is all one interacting field. When that element of fantasy enters into our politics it gets us into very serious trouble and that is what we are in at present.

Listen to this: this is fantasy. He is blaming the present trouble and the actions of people joining the IRA on the fantasy of our culture, which leads them to believe silly notions we had in the past. He then refers to his colleague who has just left the House, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, who said something which was not in conformity with what he, Deputy Conor Cruise-O'Brien would like him to say and took him to task. The Parliamentary Secretary said there was a weakening of nationalism. This is what the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs had to say about that at column 1192 in the same debate:

I believe that much of the Irish nationalism which prevailed in the First World War period was like nationalism elsewhere, idiotic, inflated and chauvinistic and that therefore the weakening of it is no bad thing. I agreed fully with the Parliamentary Secretary when he said "the prevention of Irish people ever being ashamed of what they are, of the way they speak, of where they come from and who their parents were and where they were born".

It is true that a certain inferiority complex existed. The fantasy, the idiotic, chauvinistic nationalism which led the people to fight for freedom in the past may sound all right—it should not be repeated—but we must remember that the vast majority of our people believe in unity. They believe in achieving it by political means. If they find that there is a Minister who sets himself up as the spokesman for the Government and that he is dispelling and even questioning the wisdom of the word being mentioned then those people are bound to be driven, in despair, into some other camp. If there are young men today becoming disillusioned with that sort of thing, then he is to blame for it. He must remember that the vast majority of the people of the 32 counties want a united Ireland. There is no use in our denying that. We can desire it and proceed to achieve it in whatever manner we can and, when we are totally opposed to seeking to achieve it by violence and are convinced—if it was necessary to convince us—that violence cannot succeed, then we must ensure that the political method is supported and pursued in the proper direction. That is where the British can help us if they want violence not to succeed. Otherwise they will have a temporary cessation now with a repetition of what has been happening in the last 50 years—merely sowing the seed. The sooner, clearer and better we recognise that, the sooner we will arrive at something worthwhile as a settlement.

We are being blamed for having done nothing about Partition during our years in office. Perhaps the Government did a little too much political drum-beating when Sunningdale was announced. Mind you, I agree with Deputy Harte that Partition and reunification are serious things and about which none of us should go out to score politically.

Dr. FitzGerald

It is a bit late in the debate to say that.

Mr. Brennan

There was every sign that that was being done. It was being frequently bandied across the House and the country that we, in our time, did nothing.

I assert that unity is unity of heart, mind, action and affection amongst people of the same country; that is real unity. I believe we had more of that unity in our time by a long shot than has existed in the last two years. In fact, I am afraid we have gone back half a century. The time Seán Lemass went up to see O'Neill—and there was a good deal of to-ing and fro-ing, a good deal of co-operation on cross-Border activities at the time, on drainage, electricity, tourism and in many other fields—there was no brandishing of flags or boasting about it. That was the effective, progressive way. I found that in Belfast then— and I went to it frequently; I remember spending a day fishing with Captain Long who was then a Minister of the Government—there was greater friendship between the two areas than ever existed before. There was unity of heart; there was everything except that one had to report at the Border coming back if one had bought any goods. That was the only way one would know a Border existed. There was a recognition that our Parliament was making progress, that we had progressed. The old accusations of former years—when it was said that we could not rule ourselves, we would be too small a unit, that we had not the British empire behind us —were all gone. We had grown up, we had become an economic unity. We had reached the stage where we were acceptable to the EEC. We had been really making progress. We had made many deliberate efforts and I do not think it went unnoticed that during the war this State remained neutral and conscription did not apply in the Six Counties. There are many things we can look back on with a certain pride. To those who say we did nothing, now that we find ourselves at square one, we can look back and show how much we did. We were making progress then. I know that when our Leader, Deputy Jack Lynch, went up to visit the Northern Prime Minister, there were a few snowballs thrown at him by Paisley and his party but at that time there was a very strong, growing element of support and friendship, get-togetherness and co-operation on which we could very easily build. I would mention that to those people who say that nothing happened in our time.

Deputy de Valera was blamed because he said it was necessary to diagnose the situation. He simply said that the IRA were there. He did not agree with anything they did. When the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs spoke he said he was glad there was agreement on that side of the House with the Leader of this side of the House, insinuating that there was not agreement on this side. I would like to give a message tonight to the people here and to the country—and I am long enough in this party and I have no ambitions towards leadership —that we are happy and loyal behind our Leader and what is more we believe he is the type of Leader this country badly needs at the present time because he is neither dilatory nor flamboyant but, by God he is honest and he will not let you down. If he has not gone through a difficult period of leadership during the last five years, no man ever has.

Dr. FitzGerald

You did not make it easy for him certainly.

Mr. Brennan

He is well fit to take it and he does not need a lesson from anybody. If you people are worried about unity in this party I would say do not worry yourselves too much, try to look after any mongrel foxes there might be on that side of the House. You might be much better employed. I am not saying that to change the tone of the debate in which there were a few bits of wishful thinking that we are not a solid, united party. We are, never more so. And we are the largest party in Ireland.

We are at a crossroads now and there are many areas of co-operation. We have an all-party committee which deals with such matters. It is a committee which is supposed to do its work confidentially without any Press although the newspapers sometimes have the report next day. Anybody can rhyme off a number of areas where there is a necessity for co-operation with the North. If one lives in an area contiguous to the Border one can clearly see the need for co-operation. I had the pleasure of establishing AnCo training colleges here in my time. If one goes across the Enniskillen one finds a college there which would serve Donegal excellently. In the field of education we could have marvellous co-operation. Drainage is a matter on which there has to be and is co-operation and rural electrification is another. The upper dam of the Erne drainage scheme is in Fermanagh. Tourism is an area where we could most profitably co-operate and there is no reason why we should not set about getting in touch with the people who are responsible and getting those things going immediately. I know they are very anxious in the North to co-operate with us in the matter of airstrips and airfields and this is something which should be commenced right away. One could name 101 important areas of co-operation which could lead to better living conditions for thousands of people on both sides of the Border and create the necessary rapport which has been talked about so much in relation to the Council of Ireland. There is no reason why we should not at this very stage get going in that direction.

Anything one says at this stage is likely to be repetition but there are a number of extremes which we should avoid. One of these quite definitely is the one on which the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs has been harping for a long time. We had some question about leadership on this side of the House. The Taoiseach today opened the debate with a speech which contained no new proposals except one concerning a local security force on which we would co-operate anyway. The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs speaking afterwards undertook to speak for the entire Government with regard to a request from the Defence Association in Belfast. He emphatically stated that doomsday or otherwise there would be no undertaking given to any such people.

This is none of our business but it is a question of leadership. We are concerned about leadership when we get those dogmatic lectures. They are not prefaced by: "In my opinion" or "One would think". They are saying: "You must take it this is the position". Because it is said by Deputy Conor Cruise-O'Brien you have got to take it. The word "unity" must not be mentioned. Emotional talk about past events, the lunatic nationalism of 1916 and those years is taboo. History should be written again. Everybody has been wrongly brought up. Songs are out. In other words, the simple solution, if the people would only support it, would be to go back to the union again. Then there would be peace. There would, and that is exactly what the whole thing is verging on if we go too far in that direction. We are talking for people who elected us a short time ago and we may think we are interpreting their minds but the people of this country are listening and watching and thinking and they have got to get leadership and they have got to see that the political system works. The people who most require peace are the people in the North and in Britain and they are the people who can best ensure that the political set-up will work. We will give every possible co-operation because the Irish dimension must be in it as otherwise it is not an effort towards peace. If the political institutions that should be set up are to work they must be supported with all the power that is available to those who set them up. There are not any signs that that has happened. That is one of the sure means of keeping the people from despair, losing faith and having to listen to this talk about culture fantasy, a weakening of nationalism, unnecessary emotionalism, idiotic, lunatic, chauvinistic nationalism of the past. These are very strong terms and the Irish people are not accepting them.

Nobody on the Government side of the House has repudiated them. As a matter of fact, the man who makes the statement poses more and more every day to be the Leader. If people are being driven to despair and losing faith with the political effort it is due more to that type of mishandling than to the straightforward approach which is: "We do not want blood; we will not have bloodshed. We are prepared to accept your right to aspire to this, that and the other thing. You should accept ours. Let us work together in the areas in which we can work together." There is much to be done in that respect and if we move in that direction with firm leadership, without any ranting or flag-waving we will make progress. If somebody points the way then progress will be made.

Deputy Harte spoke about the possibility of all parties getting together and having the one policy in relation to Northern Ireland. He wrote a personal letter to me, which I will not quote, in relation to this. They talk about supporting the bipartisan policy but there is no such thing, good bad or indifferent in this House. We happen to agree on certain matters. We pointed out at the beginning that so long as the Government follow the lines we are on we agree with them. There are no contacts between us. Sunningdale was kept a secret. We knew little or nothing about it from the day we set it going. I cannot understand why the bipartisan policy crept in. It was most important that we agreed on certain basic principles but there was no getting together and saying that we could work together, that this was a bipartisan policy. That does not exist.

Somebody on the other side of the House said today that there was a consensus. The solution to this is one of the greatest national problems this country has ever faced and it has now come to a crucial stage. We have got to deal with it in the best way we can. Apart from the petty points of political scoring, I believe everyone on this side of the House will rise to the occasion in support of any workable solution that will hold out hope for a just and lasting peace. That is the message that comes from this debate today. As our Leader has spelled out, and as everyone in our party agrees, that just peace must be based on ultimate unity. We must keep that message before our minds. So long as the people in the Government have the same views and pursue the same course—they can call it bipartisan policy, consensus, agreement, co-operation or anything they like—they are on the same wavelength as we are and we will give them every assistance and back them to the hilt in any steps they take in that direction.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. FitzGerald)

It is not easy for those of us participating in a debate of this kind to assess it and to appreciate or sum up what impact it will make outside the House. I hope the debate has proved helpful. I fear that in some measure it may not have done so. I fear in the debate there has been a reversion to an earlier approach to this problem from some speakers, which may not be helpful to the solution to the problem. Already comments have begun to filter back and they suggest to me at any rate from what I have heard that the debate in all its aspects will not be seen in Northern Ireland as helpful in a situation where help is desperately needed.

I will be dealing with individual speakers and remarks shortly. In saying that I am not implying that comment in any sense to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition but to some of the other things that have been said. There has been from some speakers an undue emphasis on abstractions and on old slogans. There has been a reversion to the belief that the important thing is to speak words rather than to do deeds, that as long as we say to ourselves, privately and publicly, three times a day before meals: "We want a united Ireland" then we have done our duty and we can go home happy but it is important that we say it.

There have been phrases which sound grand no doubt to the speakers but will not sound so good to people in Northern Ireland, fine phrases like: "We will not surrender to intransigence from any quarter." I am not quite sure what that means. We are not in Northern Ireland. We are here. It is in Northern Ireland that people are faced with surrendering or not surrendering to one another. We can use phrases of that kind but we are not, in fact, required to surrender. We are not, in fact, threatened. I do not think phrases of that kind help.

A question has been raised by some speakers as to whether we have the will to protect the minority in Northern Ireland but nobody raised at the same time the question of the extent to which we have the power to protect the minority in Northern Ireland, particular parts of Northern Ireland against particular forms of threat. It would be very satisfying, no doubt, for us down here to have the will to do things but it would not help anyone in Northern Ireland for us to speak in those terms, to mislead people who might not differentiate between will and power and who might read into speeches of that kind an expectation that they can be protected in certain circumstances if certain things happen. I am afraid in these respects the debate has not been helpful.

We have also had a return to the concept of our inalienable right to unity. I may say again that the Leader of the Opposition did not use this phrase. Indeed, he emphasised the principle of consent as the only basis in which unity could come about. If we all agree that is the only basis on which unity can come about, what is this inalienable right? What does it mean? What does it do? What effect does it have? It is an abstraction which, once you accept the principle of reunification only by consent, is only and abstraction. It appears to be some kind of abstruse, legal or moral concept unknown to the moral law or to theologians or unknown to international law but which, if you say it three times a day, will in some way do you good even if you then, having said it, make clear that you feel that this unity could only come about with the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland.

In these respects the debate has not been a good one, but there have been also many constructive contributions. Coming at a time when the way ahead chartered at Sunningdale has been blocked by events in Northern Ireland it is natural that this debate, more perhaps than others in the past, should have been marked—as well as by the less happy features I have mentioned on both sides of the House—be it said, by a search for a way through this impasse, a groping for some solution to the problem, the intractibility of which is now becoming apparent to all as, indeed, it has been apparent to many others for a long time past.

The solutions propounded, suggested and hinted at in this debate seemed to me to fall into three categories. First, there were those that involve agreement by consensus in Northern Ireland on behalf of Northern Ireland, and then those which involve more or less unilateral action by the British Government or unilateral action by ourselves. Let us consider each of these and the points that have been raised that fall under these headings. First, let us take those solutions which involve agreement or consensus in Northern Ireland or on behalf of the Northern Ireland community as a whole. These tend to flounder on the absence of any such consensus at this time. Let me exemplify by reference to the points made by the various speakers.

Thus, the Leader of the Opposition suggested progress might be made through the establishment of an authority that might have a real power of initiative, of financing and of supervision of joint North-South projects in the regional, economic, technological and planning sphere, an authority, he said, to be characterised by the participation and membership of the varying sections of political thinking in every part of the country. The idea is a fine one. Indeed, in substantial measure it was incorporated in the proposals we brought forward for the Council of Ireland, proposals which emerged in an attenuated form from the Sunningdale conference when not all the features we had sought were agreed to, and which were further whittled down in the months that followed and finally were blown away by the gale that swept Northern Ireland a few weeks ago. For this proposal to get off the ground would of its nature require, as the Leader of the Opposition said, the participation and membership of all the varying sections of political thinking in this country and this is precisely what is not forthcoming at this time for a project of this kind.

Again, the Leader of the Opposition proposed co-operation between North and South in the creation of a security system which would guarantee equal rights to all in this island and would effectively protect all against violence. This, too, was involved in various forms and aspects as part of the Sunningdale proposals and this, too, is for the moment at least impracticable because the necessary consent by a large part of the people of this island is withheld, though I would be hopeful that evidence of the advantages of what he suggested might enable it to emerge as a reality at a later stage and I would be hopeful too that it would be also true of the conception of a joint authority, whatever it may be called, to which the leader of the Opposition referred.

I turn now to the suggestions for action by Britain. Deputy de Valera and Deputy Blaney both suggested, though in different terms and in different tones, that total British withdrawal sooner or later was, in Deputy de Valera's words, a sine qua non or, in Deputy Blaney's terms, if the British would take out their subsidies and their army the Northern majority would become most reasonable, knowing they were on their own, and would negotiate with us to get the best deal possible.

Other speakers have dealt with the question of British withdrawal. I shall not dwell on this for long, but I think it is fair to say that, if I were a member of the Northern minority in east Ulster, having passed through the traumatic experiences through which they have passed over the years, I should be loth to risk the physical safety of my wife, my children and my home by relying on Deputy Blaney's assurances as to how the whole Northern majority, including the Loyalist para-military bodies, some of which have a long and bloody record, would react to the disappearance from the scene of the main elements of the security forces operating in Northern Ireland.

Deputy Blaney has in the past resented my referring to him as an "armchair Republican," but his Republican confidence expressed from his armchair in this House as to what would happen if the para-military bodies in the majority and minority communities were left to face each other without let or hindrance from any other force remains for me a particularly notable example of what I have described as armchair Republicanism. He may feel entitled to play forfeits with the lives of hundreds of thousands of members of the minority and, indeed, of the majority community too who could not escape unscathed from a holocaust in Northern Ireland, but he cannot expect either a reasonable Government or a responsible Opposition to join him in this pastime. Our primary responsibility here, and this needs to be said and has not, perhaps, been sufficiently adverted to in this debate, in addition to protecting the lives of people within the State is to pursue policies that will secure also the lives of those who live in Northern Ireland.

Deputy de Valera in his remarks first recognised that Northern Ireland is an established fact and he referred to it as having some kind of prescriptive right to that. He said its existence is a fact. He said there could be no solution of this whole problem unless facts like this were realised. He said a consensus must be the basis of a solution. He said we must take into account the historic feeling of the communities involved. He said that formulae which do not take facts into account will not solve problems. Unfortunately, he then proceeded to a number of non sequiturs, moving on from there to ignore half of the problem and say that unification is the only solution and that our people will accept nothing else but that. He did not, however, say what the Northern majority would or would not take. After the fine phrases of his opening he proceeded to come down firmly on one side and to say unification was the only solution and went on to talk about the withdrawal—I have referred to that already—and then he used this phrase that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach referred to: “I hold no brief for the IRA but...”. This is a phrase we have heard so often followed by that particular conjunction. It was, perhaps, unfortunate that Deputy Brennan when pointing out that strictly—I think he was correct—Deputy de Valera had not used the “but”, then said “but” himself and carried on with his own “but” thereby making the point which the Parliamentary Secretary was trying to make.

Deputy Blaney has two standards, one for the North and one for the South. He feels our security forces should concentrate on people who want to blow us up but, note, should ignore those who want to blow up Irishmen in Northern Ireland. Deputy de Valera has a similar concept: he said we should be no one else's policemen, that we should look after our own security. It is in this partitionist way that these Deputies who claim to speak for the nationalist tradition themselves speak when it comes to killing Irishmen but, of course, when it is not a question of killing Irishmen, they talk in broad terms, at times one might be tempted to say in platitudes, about unification. Deputy Blaney objects to our road blocks holding up traffic into Northern Ireland, asking who are we minding.

We are trying to mind all the people of this island, all of whom are at risk from the violence of the people about whose motives and intentions he expresses such understanding and such sympathy. Fortunately for Ireland his double standards, uniquely partitionist in character, are not shared by most of the Deputies in this House or by the majority of our people. Deputy de Valera told us that violence in the North did not start with the IRA. He mentioned the B Specials and other extremists. That is certainly true, but it is not the whole truth.

What he omitted, what Deputy Blaney omitted and very many people speaking on this subject omit to mention is a certain period in our history five years ago, which seems to have been wiped out from the history books as written by some Deputies in this House. There was, of course, a period when the Civil Rights movement met violence. That violence led, eventually, to the intervention of the British Government and its Army and the violence ended. For, I think, ten months there was no significant violence in Northern Ireland except once when the British Army had to deal with trouble in the Shankill Road. That period of peace in Northern Ireland which preceded the trouble that followed is not usually referred to by the Deputy de Valeras and Deputy Blaneys in their analysis of the position.

What we should be asking ourselves is not so much what back in history caused violence—indeed, we are all too prone to go far back in history—but what, in fact, led to the violence that followed from June, 1970, onwards. One factor, certainly, was the way in which the British Army intervened in the Falls Road and the way in which they imposed that curfew, the way in which they stupidly and wantonly alienated the feelings of many of the minority who up till then had been successfully protecting with the consent, support and, indeed, the enthusiasm of the minority.

More than anything else, what caused the violence that followed was the importation of arms into Northern Ireland which made the British Army feel that those searches were necessary and which gave them a colour of justification for going to their political leaders and seeking permission for those searches. That period of peace could have been maintained and would not have been disturbed had there been no guns to look for. Where did those guns come from? We know in this House where they came from. We know who financed them. We know who proudly speaks up to say he was responsible for helping to supply those guns and the money, and we know where some of that money came from. The violence we have faced since then would not have happened had those guns not been there, had there not been the excuse for that intervention which led to the alienation of the minority community. That is a part of the history of the past five or six years which is so frequently sup-pressed. No one who suppresses it is being truthful with himself about what had happened.

To Deputy Blaney the IRA is an effect, but not a cause. I am afraid that everything in life is partly an effect and partly a cause. The IRA are, of course, an effect of our history, an effect for which all of us in some measure share responsibility, because all of us at some point in the past have been neglectful, all of us have failed to speak the truth, all of us have kept silent in the years up to 1969 when we should have spoken out. We should have tried to demolish the myths which we knew in our hearts were corroding some people in our community and were liable to lead once again to violence. Of course, the IRA are an effect of neglect and an effect of our history; but they are the proximate and immediate cause of the deaths of 1,000 people, over 800 of them Irish. That is an aspect of their activities of which Deputy Blaney makes no mention in this House.

He told us it was cowardly to criticise the IRA. There are very many people in Northern Ireland and, indeed, in the Republic who have not got the courage to criticise them. In fact, for many people it requires great courage to speak out. Many who have spoken out and many who have tried to help to deal with this menace have, if they were lucky, had their knees shot off and, if they were unlucky, had a hole in the back of their heads. These are the facts to which Deputy Blaney never adverts in this House.

Coming back to the suggestions which have been made for solutions to this problem, the only other suggestion in the debate which I recall for British action came from the Leader of the Opposition and was expressed in very muted terms. He remarked that Britain had long since abandoned her imperialist pretentions to Ireland. This is a fact which I am glad he emphasised because it is something which some people try to brush aside, or brush under the carpet. Our problem today is not British Imperialist pretentions. They are the historical cause of our troubles but they are not the source of continuing difficulties because Britain no longer has an interest to pursue in this country and is not seeking to pursue its interest here. Let us be honest with ourselves about this.

Having said that, the Leader of the Opposition went on to say that he was not seeking a declaration of intent to withdraw. I understand that when I was out of the House—I could be incorrect about this—that Deputy Brugha sought what he described as a clear and forthright statement of intent. If I have got that out of context I am sorry, but I understand that he said that. There seems to be a conflict here. The Leader of the Opposition said he was not seeking a declaration of intent to withdraw and that he fully realised the dangers of such a declaration. He repeated a suggestion made in his Garden of Rememberance speech that the British Government should declare their interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland by agreement.

He and this House will recall that at Sunningdale the British Government declared that, if in the future, unity by agreement should become possible as a result of the emergence of a wish on the part of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish. I cannot but feel that this declaration of support is at least as valuable and, indeed, I would think rather more so, as a declaration of interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland by agreement. I do not think, in any event, that at this moment there is anything to be gained by seeking the substitution by Britain of one form of words for another.

The Leader of the Opposition made then one suggestion for action on our part which might help things forward. His proposal was limited in character and was expressed, and I think properly so, as having a possible ultimate result in contributing in some way to the saving of life and the elimination of violence. His suggestion was to make integrated education available in this part of the country at primary level and on a limited scale. Personally, I would endorse his proposal and his words of praise for Mr. Basil McIvor's corresponding initiative in Northern Ireland. This is one of many areas where we could show our genuine desire to create, in the words of the Taoiseach, "the kind of society in the Republic with which the Northern majority would wish to be closely linked, with a view to our common benefit."

I would not diminish the value of any initiatives of this kind, nor of the kind of initiatives which Deputy Brugha referred to with reference to the question of mixed marriages, although that is something which is not for the Government but rather for the Church authorities. I would not diminish the value of any initiative of this kind whether introduced in this area or in respect of parts of our Constitution or laws which in one respect or another are unattractive or alienating to the Northern majority. But let us face it. Steps of this kind are, as the Leader of the Opposition indicated, essentially long term in character and long term in their effects. They are not initiatives which can of themselves break the present deadlock.

In thus reviewing the proposals put forward in this House today for joint action with Northern Ireland, or for unilateral action by Britain, or by ourselves, I am concerned to bring the House back to the realities of the present situation. These realities are that a consensus must be found within Northern Ireland which will provide the basis for peace and for justice for all sections of the community there. We have a role to play in this. I hope that, in this debate, we have in some measure played that role, at least by showing our deep concern for the people of Northern Ireland and our determination to allow no interest of ours, no myths derived from our history, no prejudices inherited from our ancestors, to stand in the way of a solution founded on friendship between the two parts of this island. That message has at least come from this side of the House. I hope it can be detected, too, in some at least of the things said on the other side of the House.

Questions were raised in respect of our role in relation to the United Kingdom Government. Deputy Colley said—although he did not develop this thought or explain what he meant by it, or what possible justification he thought he had for it —that we had thrown away the right of consultation won by Fianna Fáil. I do not understand what he means. Consultation between ourselves and the British Government is close and continuous. We have fully maintained and, indeed, expanded and deepened and strengthened the co-operation that existed and the consultations that existed when Fianna Fáil were in power. We have maintained that close contract, even when recognising at times that, by doing so, we might become tarred by the brush of British action or inaction and blamed because the British did or did not do something after being in contact with us. We have never allowed that to inhibit us in contactting them and in seeking to persuade them to whatever course of action we feel is most in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland.

Deputy Blaney, of course, had his own version. I am sorry he is missing this part of the debate but, perhaps, we are getting through more quickly in his absence. He said that I rushed off to London on bended knees, a somewhat difficult physical process, to beg the British Government to repudiate what the Secretary of Defence had said. He was referring to an occasion when I visited London shortly after the British Secretary of Defence had made some rather impromptu remarks. I did not raise any question but the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland explained to me, off his own bat, before the meeting started, as soon as I sat down, what British Government policy was and the action being taken by the British Government to clarify their intentions. The discussions we had did not relate to that and I raised no issue on it but, naturally, took note of the assurance I received from him. Deputy Blaney's imagination in this, as in other matters, has run a little bit away with him.

But consultation is something which we must have not merely with the British Government but also with all the interests in Northern Ireland who are concerned with these problems. There are problems here, of course. First of all, not everybody at every moment is willing to consult with us or to talk to us, or has been so willing in the past. Moreover, at times when there are discussions or contacts formal or informal—mostly informal —there are good reasons why, from the point of view of the people concerned, they would prefer that nothing would be said about them. The best way we can have any contacts of that kind is by not disclosing them unless the people concerned wish to have them disclosed. This, at times, may give an impression of a rather onesided relationship but the facts are there and we have to face them. We have, when it has been possible, maintained such contacts as we have been able to do. During last year I had contacts with various Loyalist leaders and it is public knowledge that one Northern leader, John Taylor, on several occasions visited us here and put forward his views.

In my view these contacts are important and they need to be extended. I would hope that in the immediate future it would be possible to make a wider range of contacts and to ensure we understand fully the views of those concerned and that they understand our policies and our attitudes—which their public statements at times would suggest they misunderstand. Perhaps, like all politicians to a greater or lesser degree, what they say publicly does not totally correspond to their private opinions.

At the same time, of course, we have maintained the closest contact with the SDLP. Two speakers on the Opposition side produced a curious story, which they enlarged on at great length though on what basis they did not develop, that this Government did not want to have contact with the SDLP. I cannot understand the basis for this. We want to have the widest contact with all groups in Northern Ireland. Of course, we have an especially close relationship with the SDLP in the nature of the situation and we have a special interest in the problems the minority face in Northern Ireland, and we have always been glad to see them here or in Northern Ireland. We keep in the closest touch with them and nothing has changed in that respect. I would be sorry if the unfortunate remarks of Deputies Wilson and Colley should mislead anybody into thinking that there is any change in that or that we want anything but the closest contacts with the SDLP in the future. I should also like to say, naturally, that we want to have contacts with the widest range of people in Northern Ireland also and that is something which even when it happens does not always appear to happen for the reasons I have mentioned. I would be deeply disturbed if anything said on the other side of the House in any way disturbed our relationship with the SDLP or inhibited our relationship with any other groups in Northern Ireland.

Deputy Wilson wanted to know how well informed were we about events during the UWC strike. That is not a matter one obviously goes into but we have kept in touch, as, indeed, the previous Government did, at all times with events in Northern Ireland. There have been periods when there was contact, even in moments of crisis, almost hourly and we endeavour to keep as fully informed as possible with the developments there. Our ability to be informed is no less, and perhaps has developed to a greater extent, than in the time of the previous Government.

In talking of the development of our relationships with groups and people in Northern Ireland in a debate of this kind we can do no more than lay the foundations for future relationships. It should be clear from what the Taoiseach said in opening this debate, and from the character and, necessarily, the limitations of the initiatives suggested by others in this debate, that this is not the moment for us to propound a solution to a problem which concerns, above all, the people of Northern Ireland themselves. This is not, as somebody on the other side tried to suggest, a change of policy. Our policy remains what it has always been, to secure peace and justice for all in Northern Ireland and to secure the close harmonious and, hopefully, developing relationship between North and South.

The aspirations spoken of on the other side of the House are shared by all of us. Not all of us feel it equally necessary to enunciate them loudly and frequently, especially if by so doing we think this may make it more difficult to actually find solutions to practical problems but the policy remains the same. At this moment, for the reasons I have mentioned, and the suggestions from the other side of the House with their limitations confirm our view, the primary initiative in making another step forward must come from within Northern Ireland itself. Indeed, it must be said that it is from within Northern Ireland itself that initiatives have come in the past. The whole development of power-sharing, although certainly it was in the overall context of policies adumbrated here, is something which grew up in Northern Ireland. Somebody on the other side of the House said that Sunningdale confirmed this rather than created it, and that is a correct statement. The ground work had been done but Sunningdale was necessary in order to put this power-sharing in a wider context to make it fully acceptable to all the interests concerned.

Progress must now come from initiatives taken, therefore, in the first instance within Northern Ireland by the valid representatives of its people seeking, it would seem to many of us at an eleventh hour, almost, consensus on how Northern Ireland is to be governed and what its relationship is to be with the rest of Ireland. We cannot and should not hide our deep concern that this solution be based on the only principles that can prove enduring and can bring peace— the principle of access for both sections of the community in Northern Ireland to a share in the government of Northern Ireland and the principle of the need for consultation and joint action by both parts of this island in their mutual interest.

The Taoiseach, in his opening speech, indicated some of the reasons why it is in our mutual interest that there should be this close contact and indicated how our joint membership of the EEC has given new reasons and a new basis for a closer relationship and made it more necessary than ever. In saying that and in stating that these two principles must underline any solution, we do not wish to prejudice, as I fear we could all too easily do, the emergence of a consensus within Northern Ireland itself along these lines. We do not wish to prejudice this by seeking at this stage to specify particular forms or shapes that a solution based on these principles, as it necessarily must be, should take. That is for the future. I hope that this approach on our part to the problem will be recognised by the majority in Northern Ireland as a constructive one and at the same time the minority will see in our restatement of these two principles the essential basis of any progress forward and the most genuine expression of our practical concern of their interests.

Question put and agreed to.

The Dáil adjourned at 10.10 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Thursday, 27th June, 1974.

Dáil Éireann debate - Wednesday, 26 Jun 1974

Northern Ireland Situation: Motion.

A Deputy

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 26 Jun 1974