I hope the Minister will do so when he is replying. He is trying to give the impression that Ireland is on the move, Ireland is doing this, that and the other thing, Ireland is making disproportionate contributions abroad. I would like to see the practical evidence of what this contribution was. It is not just enough to say that in this, as in other areas, we have been making significant contributions and exerting great influence. That gloss is beginning to wear a bit thin. We now look for performance rather than presentation. There will be more of that in other areas at a later stage. Self praise is very little praise indeed, and until we get the evidence to indicate what the contribution was I reserve my right to criticise what has been presented here this morning.
What, as I said, is the position and the attitude of the developing nations to this? We have seen an attempt within the last week, which has in fact, as the Minister referred to this morning in his opening speech, fallen apart, to get representatives of the developing nations, the European Community and the OPEC countries together in Paris. That fell apart completely because I believe there were not proper consultations, there was not proper interest, there was not a proper acceptance on the part—there could not be in my view—of the OPEC countries or the Third World, the developing nations, that the other oil consuming nations, the wealthy nations of the western world, really had their interests in mind in coming to such an agreement. We gather that some of our officials, because of our presidency of the council at the moment, spent a long time over the last few days working literally to exhaustion. Why? Is there any indication that the community they represent, and particularly the international wealthy communities, have really the sympathy of the developing countries and the OPEC countries?
There are signs of a new awareness in the community—I am glad to see it—with regard to development aid to the Third World, but not such as will help them to overcome what is for them even a much more serious problem than it is for us. These are the tests by which one judges any agreement. What will its effect be on those who control the oil supplies? I think this agreement will not be in our interest in view of the manner in which it was born, in view of the representations involved and, more important, in view of those that have been excluded. What will its effects be on the multi-nationals who control the whole thing? I think, unfortunately, it will have little or no effect. As has been rightly pointed out, the budget of any one of these companies would dwarf the budgets of most of the member states in this agency and it certainly would dwarf ours. What effect will this new agency have on them? They can thumb their noses at it if they wish and I see nothing in this agreement that will deal with them. What effect will it have on the European Community which, in fact, could have and should have found a common ground in energy which could be a strengthening base to develop the aims of that Community? However, this agency will, possibly, have the effect on the Community of doing the very opposite and undermining whatever moves towards unity and co-operation there might have been. The effect of it on the developing nations I have mentioned cannot be one that will arouse their support and admiration.
The actual agreement is as detailed as any Bill that ever came before this House. Unfortunately, we will not have an opportunity of having a Committee Stage debate on this agreement although it warrants it. I will have to roll up the Second Stage and the Committee Stage in one on this agreement and ask some pertinent questions of the Ministers involved as to the effect of many of these provisions.
This is an agreement we are proposing to sign in ignorance of what our own potential resources may be. We do not know—and Deputy Barrett rightly pointed this out—what our resources may be. The Government have given little indication as to what their programme for the development of these oil resources may be. We know what they are against; I wish we knew what they are for.
In the light of that we are signing an agreement which involves, to a certain extent, obligations to share whatever resources we would have. Equally, of course, it involves obligations or rights to a share in allocation of the resources which the other member countries may have. We are doing that with a blindfold over our eyes. To a certain extent this may indicate the Norwegian position, which I hope the Minister for Foreign Affairs will explain in his reply. It is possible we could follow their example by becoming associate members although the agreement does not provide for associate membership.
The agreement refers to the various Governments desiring to promote and secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitable terms. That hits out immediately at the first fundamental purpose of this. It is understandable, but that is what caused the reaction of the OPEC countries to this agency. The agreement goes on to say that it desires to take common effective measures to meet oil supply emergencies by developing an emergency self-efficiency in oil supplies. It then goes on to say:
Desiring to promote...
A beautiful cliché which can be found through this agreement.
... co-operative relations with oil producing countries and with other oil consuming countries,
That is a lovely bland statement of the type we have heard frequently in the European Community. When one goes through this agreement one will find that there is very little in it that enables these co-operative relations to be effective. There is little in it that enables the OPEC and developing countries to be involved in decisions which will arise under this agency. The agreement also states:
Desiring to play a more active role in relation to the oil industry by establishing a comprehensive international information system and...
Listen to this——
... a permanent framework for consultation with oil companies,
Let us be frank, who is it who has made the bonaza out of the supply of oil over the last ten to 40 years? The Arabs or the multi-national oil companies? Who, in recent times, was involved in the more significant increases? What does this agreement provide for? It desires to establish a permanent framework for consultation with these oil companies many of whom are more powerful by far economically than the people who desire to consult with them. If the multi-nationals do not want to consult what can this agreement do about it?
In my reading of it and in my guess, there is absolutely nothing they can do about it. It is fine but that seems to be the way it is.
The agreement, while it is contractually binding in international law, I would say it must be in terms of the expressions it uses, the phraseology, to say the least of it, the loosest I have ever seen in any agreement, in agreements even for a tenancy of the smallest property here. There are doubts and questions that arise in relation to the actual meaning of the obligations referred to in it. It seems to be a very strange basis of proceeding with a serious topic.
One reads through it before one realises that most of the definitions are contained in the end rather than the beginning, but that is only a matter of difficulty in interpretation. As I go through it I find that if I start with Article 2 I have to refer to Article 73 and so on each time to explain what it is precisely, where reservations are, but if I come to the institutional arrangements I find, in Chapter IX that this new agency shall have: a Governing Board, a Management Committee, and Standing Groups on Emergency Questions, the Oil Market, Long Term Co-operation and relations with Producer and other Consumer Countries.
Article 49, subparagraph 2, reads:
The Governing Board or the Management Committee may, acting by majority, establish any other organ necessary for the implementation of this Programme.
What exactly is referred to there, and what limitation is there on the Governing Board or the Management Committee in establishing whatever organ it is we are talking about? There is no way of having any idea beyond guessing what it is they would want to establish. Another organ which can impose binding obligations on us as members of it?
Article 50 tells us about the governing board which under this agreement will have more authority than the Council of Ministers of the European Community. In subparagraph 1 we read:
The Governing Board shall be composed of one or more ministers or their delegates from each Participating Country.
Will the Minister tell me what precisely that means? Does it mean that some countries will have more than one minister on the governing board, because it says that it shall be composed of one or more ministers or their delegates from each participating country? Does it mean, for instance, that the United States could be represented by three ministers while we would have one? I doubt if this is the intention, but it is not clear from this agreement. Article 50 is clear.
Have the Government asked, and if they have have they been told, about this? If they are told later, after they have signed it, that this enables the United Kingdom to have three men to our one because they are a more powerful country it would be a bit late to start complaining about something which, on any legal interpretation of it, would allow other countries—or our country for that matter—to have more than one. Why did they, in fact, say one at all? Why they did not say that it shall be composed of ministers or their delegates from each participating country is something that I cannot clearly understand. In article 51 it says:
In its activities concerning economic and monetary implications of developments in the international energy situation, the Governing Board shall take into account the competence and activities of international institutions responsible for overall economic and monetary questions.
What do they mean by saying that "the governing board shall take into account the competence and activities of international institutions responsible for overall economic and monetary questions"? Does this cut across in any way the competence and activities of these international institutions? Does this agency have powers which can conflict with the other international institutions, whatever they may be, which will enable that governing board to take decisions against the interests of these international institutions? I hope we will be given a clear indication of what that is intended to mean. By any standards it is loose language—for instance, in an agreement that would be drawn up between Deputy Barrett and myself as to our contractual rights one with another, over the usage of anything. Here it is enshrined in an international agreement.
We come to Article 52:
Subject to Article 61, paragraph 2, and Article 65, decisions adopted pursuant to this Agreement by the Governing Board or by any other organ by delegation from the Board shall be binding on the Participating Countries.
Remember the governing board can establish organs not merely those mentioned in this agreement but any other organ necessary for implementation of the programme, any organ not even in existence at present. A decision by it, if it is on delegation from the governing board, shall be binding on the participating countries. That is a power we have not faced in any international agreement to which we are party at present. We have faced it to a limited extent in the European Community. We have had enough talk here from those absent benches over there about national sovereignty, what the European Community meant by diminution of national sovereignty. Here is one agreement that really cuts across national sovereignty and there is no one here to raise even a squeak against it. Perhaps the Minister would be able to explain what is meant, or how far-reaching may be those decisions. It does say "subject to Article 61" which says:
The Governing Board shall adopt decisions and recommendations for which no express voting provision is made in this Agreement, as follows:
(a) by majority:
—decisions on the management of the Programme, including decisions applying provisions of this Agreement which already impose specific obligations on Participating Countries
—decisions on procedural questions
—recommendations
(b) by unanimity:
—all other decisions, including in particular decisions which impose on Participating Countries new obligations not already specified in this Agreement.
Therefore, any new obligations, not specified in this agreement, will have to be taken by unanimous decision. They say also "all other decision". I am wondering what precisely that means. "By majority decisions are reached on the management of the programme." Management is not defined in this agreement. "Including decisions applying provisions of this agreement which already impose specific obligations on participating countries." seems to me to mean that, for all effective decisions which we will be bound to follow, the criterion is "majority decision". Then there are "decisions on procedural questions" and "recommendations". Whatever are the others they are to be taken by unanimity. The others are not defined, except that is says "including in particular decisions which impose on participating countries new obligations", which are not specified. It goes on to say in Article 61, 2 (b):
Decisions mentioned in paragraph 2 (b) may provide... which are those to be taken by unanimity.
"that they shall be binding only under certain conditions."
It is impossible to understand from this which are and are not binding, which can and cannot be taken by "majority decision" or by "unanimity". I hope that the Ministers who have recommended this to us this morning, and who propose to do so, can tell us—and I hope it is not something they are going to be consulting about now at the last minute in response to my queries; I hope it is something on which they and their civil servants have informed themselves long ago because the questions are so obvious that they should not have had to await my raising them in the House at this moment.
In regard to this "majority" voting, could the Minister tell me that if he refers to Article 62 of the old agreement—the original provisional agreement—where he will see that Ireland was provided with three general voting weights, as indeed was every country which acceded to this agency. There is then another qualification—"Oil Consumption Voting Weights". On that occasion we, in conjunction with Denmark—of those who signed then— were given one oil consumption voting weight. But when the new agreement was drawn up—and that is the one that was first presented in this House —giving us a total, under the original proposal, of three and one, four, out of a maximum of 136, to accommodate the other members about to join, notably Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and New Zealand, what happened to Ireland? Denmark retained its one oil consumption voting weight. But where does Ireland stand? With Luxembourg, we have none. They take the vote from us we were meant to have, under the oil consumption voting weight, and the result is that, under the new agreement, we have three votes instead of four, three out of a greater number. Whereas originally we had four out of 136, we wind up now with three out of approximately 155 or 156 or 160. That is some tribute to the negotiating strength of our Ministers, or representatives, whoever was involved in the interim between this original draft and the final draft; we dropped one out of a greater number in our interests. Was this something we even thought about? The Minister did not even refer to this this morning. He must have known that we had got copies of the original draft also. Ireland now stands with a total of three votes out of approximately 155, when originally we had four votes out of a total of 136. So much for the Irish interest. I adopt entirely what Deputy Barrett, our spokesman on energy Transport and Power, said this morning—that even allowing for this weighted voting system one finds there are many occasions on which, allowing for the votes as they are provided—for instance, the United States with 51; Holland with 5; Japan with 18—they are the next biggest on the basis of oil consumption. Those two alone, between them, could effectively with the help of one other country literally in many cases outvote the others.
If I might just give an example, USA and Japan together make up 69; Germany 11; that makes 80. Those three alone can immediately outvote by a majority all the other members together and we think we have our international rights and self interest protected in this agreement. That table of voting strength is there in Article 62, page 79 of the agreement and we are happy with that arrangement. We are not a major consumer.
In our own conditions we are consumers at the moment but, by comparison with the consumption of the great powers, the great industrial nations like Japan and the United States, we hardly rate at all and, for that reason their rights under this agreement and their voting strength are much stronger than ours. Would it not have been possibly more appropriate to have some criterion such as percentage importation of each country concerned? After all, the United States is to a very considerable extent self-sufficient in its oil production, to the extent of about 80 per cent. We are totally dependent. A country that is 80 per cent self-sufficient has all this authority and muscle power under this agreement because the determination for voting strength is oil consumption and their 20 per cent dwarfs our 100 per cent. They have all this muscle power and we and others like us who are basically exclusively importers of oil, have so little. Would it not have been possible to introduce some criterion like that to balance the voting weights, so that the percentage importation, for instance, would be taken into account? If so, then we would qualify 100 per cent.
I do not know what the procedure here is; whether the Minister for Transport and Power will be replying but I hope it will be noted that I am raising this query. Possibly the Minister for Foreign Affairs can deal with it in the interim. Will one or other of them tell me what attitude we adopted in relation to these voting weights, what alternatives we proposed, what reaction to them was, and finally how effectively we fought against losing the one little vote we had? So far as this agency is concerned, we are not a consumer at all. We have not got a vote as a consumer—a country which is totally dependent on imports of oil has no vote as a consumer. That is a farce by any standards. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, was very anxious, when we were negotiating membership of the European Community and when our Minister for Foreign Affairs was out there fighting for us and our rights, to assert our position. Here they are now throwing it away in an agreement that can impose binding contractual obligations. I should like to know the answers to those questions and what opportunity we may have of qualifying what has been done up to the present, and whether or not this agreement as it stands is capable of being amended in any event.
I come now to Article 53 which deals with the next organ of the communities after the governing body. Remember that the decisions of the governing body are binding. That is my major concern. Article 54 talks about the management committee. Listen to this for precise language for an international agreement! Subparagraph (1) provides that the management committee shall be composed of one or more senior representatives of the Government of each participating country. What do the words "senior representatives" mean? I have never seen that in an international agreement in my life and I am wondering what precisely it means.
It gives an impression that we will be out there at top level but does it, in fact, mean a member of the Government, a senior civil servant, or what is a senior representative? What do they mean by one or more? You would not put it into the constitution of a local hurling club, much less into the constitution of an international agency. There would be a row at every annual general meeting as to what it meant. If it does mean something, it is about time it was clearly spelled out.
"The standing groups shall be composed of one or more representatives." This time apparently there is a distinction between the standing groups and the management committee. The management committee are composed of one or more senior representatives. For the standing groups one or more representatives will do. How do we distinguish between a representative and a senior representative in an international agreement? We may have an impression that we know what it means. But an agreement is an agreement and must be read on its face value. I want to refer back to what I was dealing with before I came to the institutions. I thought it was important first of all to get to that section to indicate the agencies and the institutions of this Community.
With regard to the voting in Articles 61 and 62, it is important to put on the record of the House, although I suppose the agreement is on the record of the House, some indication as to the voting strengths of the various countries. I will refer to them quickly and give the total because each country has a general voting weight of three, whether the country is big or small. The real crux arises with the oil consumption voting weight which is determined by the amount of oil consumed. The combined voting weights are as follows: Austria, 4; Belgium, 5; Canada, 8; Denmark, 4; Germany, 11; Ireland, 3; Italy, 9; Japan, 18; Luxembourg, 3. Have we lost our capacity for tangling completely? Where do we rate with Luxembourg?
I am all for Luxembourg as a small country enjoying its place. Indeed, it has played a major role in the international communities to which it has belonged and I want to make it quite clear that I do not want to see any diminution of its position, but surely as between Ireland and Luxembourg we do not just measure on the basis of consumption. If Belgium warrants two votes more than us I would have thought that we might just warrant one more than Luxembourg. Be that as it may, apparently we do not.
The remainder of the voting weights are: Netherlands, 5; Spain, 5; Sweden, 5; Switzerland, 4; Turkey, 4; UK, 9; United States, 51. It is easy to know who will be the big boy provided it is a fellow member of an international community. My concern is that the big boys are not in the agreement at all, the boys we are supposed to consult with, the multi-nationals. I do not know about New Zealand because they apparently have joined since that last copy was presented.
Article 63—Relations with other Entities—in order to achieve the objectives of the programme, the agency may establish appropriate relations with non-participating countries, international organisations, whether governmental or non-governmental, other entities and individuals. Did you ever see anything as broad as that in your life? They can establish appropriate relations with everybody and anybody and it is possibly under that magnificently vague Article 63 that this latest creature which is not mentioned in the agreement—associate membership of Norway—has been developed.
I wonder what kind of appropriate relations the agency is talking about in Article 63. What do they mean? With whom do they mean and for what purpose? To achieve the objecttives of the programme? These things would not even have to be said in the agreement.
There is an interesting point in regard to the financial arrangements. The agreement says:
The Executive Director shall, in accordance with the financial regulations adopted by the Governing Board...
Think of that first—"adopted by the Governing Board"
... and not later than 1st October each year, submit to the Governing Board a draft budget including personnel requirements.
The executive director does that at the request of the governing board. Then it says: "The Governing Board, acting by majority, shall adopt the budget". Supposing the governing board, by a majority, decided not to adopt the budget would that conflict with their obligations under this agreement because here in Article 64, subparagraph 3, it says:
... acting by majority, shall adopt the budget.
How they can anticipate this, I do not know. If they do not adopt the budget, what happens? It is not explained here. The agreement is both imprecise and vague. Remember, that a majority in that situation in regard to the budget can be affected by three or four of the major powers taking a common view which might or might not be in the interests of smaller powers who, unlike them, are totally oil-importing countries. The United States, for instance, is 80 per cent self-sufficient in oil.
Article 65 says:
Any two or more Participating Countries may decide to carry out within the scope of this Agreement special activities, other than activities which are required to be carried out by all Participating Countries under Chapters I to V.
"Special activities", whatever they are, are not even attempted to be defined in this agreement. What do they mean by "special activities within the scope of this agreement"? I cannot even hazard a guess. Have our Government given any thought to this? "Any two or more of the countries may, within the scope of the agreement, carry out special activities other than those which are required to be carried out by all participating countries under Chapters I to V." Could some of these special activities involve agreements with the major multi-national companies? They are not specified under Chapters I to V. If they are special activities they are certainly more significant than anything that is specified in Chapters I to V. Again, I hope that those who have considered this agreement before signing our name to it and who had an opportunity of considering it subsequently when it is revised have the answers to these points and can let us have them here.
I shall go back now to the beginning of the agreement. Many of the questions I am raising in relation to the agreement are simply asking for clear definitions. We, on this side of the House, have no objection to entering into international obligations, subject to the criteria I mentioned and there are many provisions in this particular agreement we would obviously welcome, such as the provisions for demand restraint, the provisions for allocation between member states and the agency in the event of one country falling below a certain minimum reserve and the provisions for maintaining reserves. We welcome these provisions as things that should be done, provided the agreement in its terms of reference is quite clear. But there should be an opportunity for involving so many others who are not at present involved and for controlling others who, in my view, are in no way controlled by this agreement.
All the provisions on demand restraint are desirable. In Article 5 it says:
Each Participating Country shall at all times have ready a programme of contingent oil demand restraint measures enabling it to reduce its rate of final consumption in accordance with Chapter IV.
I should like to ask the Minister for Transport and Power if this country has a "programme of contingent oil demand restraint measures enabling it to reduce its rate of final consumption in accordance with Chapter IV". If we have not, we have to have it before 1st May under this agreement. If we have it, I should like to hear about it from the Minister when he is replying.
I do not think he has studied this agreement at all. He told us the history of the energy problem. We all know about that. He spoke about what the intentions were but he did not, in fact, get down to the bones of this agreement at all. He told us about the European Community and the common energy policy which they are hoping to achieve but this does not quite square up with this from the point of view of the French. He spoke of events in Paris last week. Any of us who are interested should know all about these things from reading the newspapers and we do know them. His speech is merely a summary of energy crisis throughout the world. It is not even an attempt to define our obligations under this agency agreement, much less explain them. I hope that information which we did not get in the opening speech will be given to us when the Minister is closing the debate but I have my doubts. I think many of the questions being asked now will have to be considered for the very first time.
I do not want to delay the House. I am going through an agreement of over 80 or 90 Articles and I have to combine the technique of Second Stage and Committee Stage debate. There are many points I noted when going through the Agreement some months ago. I do not want to go into them in too much detail; I prefer to concentrate on the major issues.
Article 7, subparagraph 3, dealing with the general area of allocation, says:
A Participating Country in which the sum of normal domestic production and actual net imports available during an emergency exceeds its supply right shall have an allocation obligation which requires it to supply, directly or indirectly, the quantity of oil equal to that excess to other Participating Countries...
I presume this means "supply to the agency". It does not specifically say so; it merely says "other participating countries". To which country or countries? I presume it would have to be done through the Governing Board. I do not want to make a big issue of this. The article goes on to say:
... This would not preclude any Participating Country from maintaining exports of oil to non-participating countries.
Can this be done, for instance, before they have discharged their obligations to participating countries? It does not preclude them from maintaining exports of oil to non-participating countries, and that may be to a certain extent very significant for the Americans. I do not know but certainly, as it reads to me, it is not by any means clear as to what exactly is the limitation on their right to maintain exports of oil to non-participating countries. Maybe such could be there for us as a friendly non-participating country or else an associate member such as Norway is. Have these avenues been explored by our Government in view of the obligations which membership of the agency will draw?
Now we come to Article 11. It says:
It is not an objective of the programme to seek to increase, in an emergency, the share of world oil supply that the group had under normal market conditions.
The objective seems to be just to maintain your share of oil under normal market conditions. We are not in such conditions any more. It also states:
Historical oil patterns should be preserved as far as is reasonable
Here is the cliché and the platitude:
And due account should be taken of the position of individual non-participating countries.
What do they mean by: "Due account should be taken of the position of individual non-participating"? Is that some way of making a passing reference to developing countries? Is it a reference to other countries who are in a stronger position than these countries? What does "due account", to be taken of all these things mean?
Someone sometime along the line, this governing body with its voting procedure, will decide what this "due account" is. Before we commit this House to giving our support we must have a clear impression of what this means. Deputy Barrett and Deputy Fitzgerald were quite right when they said this agreement, what it means and what it implies, should have been explained in great detail to this House by way of special committee, by way of explanatory memorandum and everything else of this nature. We have explanatory memorandum in this House for legislation which is not technical, and which is not as detailed as this, and this one was lying there and we really have no way of knowing except those of us who might have some little experience in going through sections of a contractual agreement to ask what these things mean. Even then finally we come up with no answer. We can only raise the queries.
Take activation, Article 12, which is when the whole machine starts to roll, when demand restraint is imposed, when allocation comes into being and how do things activate. It states:
Whenever the group as a whole or any participating country sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustain a reduction in its oil supplies, the emergency measures, which are the mandatory demand restraint referred to in Chapter II and the allocation of available oil referred to in Chapter III, shall be activated in accordance with this Chapter.
I do not know what precisely is meant by "can reasonably be expected to sustain a reduction in its oil supplies".
I must beg your indulgence and that of the House in raising all these queries. I am not just doing it for the sake of being difficult. I am not doing it for the sake of showing that had I or some other group on this side of the House or in some other profession been asked to draw up this Agreement we would have done a better job. I must consider this agreement as it is and all these questions present themelves to me, these and more besides. I have to ask these questions so that we will have a clear picture of where we are if and when we decide to participate in this agency.
Does the Minister know, for instance, that under Article 19 within 48 hours of receiving a management committee's report the governing board shall meet to review the finding of the secretariat in the light of that report "Within two days of receiving the management committee's report the governing board shall meet." That seems to me that this Minister sitting opposite, maybe, or the Minister for Transport and Power, sitting opposite, shall within two days of receiving the management committee's report meet somewhere, somehow.
Let us look at it from a practical point of view. I can begin to consider the burdens which must rest on the present Minister both in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of this nation and in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers and Community, and the other Ministers of this small nation. Here we find that within two days they will be required, after the management committee's report, to meet, unless the governing board is to be interpreted differently from what I see it. It says: "One or more Minister of the participating countries shall meet within two days." Has the Minister considered what this involves? How much time will he and his staff or whatever Minister is involved have? Have they been advised on what is necessary under this?
It could mean going to Japan. I cannot quite indicate where the governing board are to meet. It could mean going to New Zealand. It might mean going to Brussels. That might be convenient. I doubt that it will mean staying at home in Dublin, but that is another day's work That is another practical objection that I have to this energy agreement because we are finding more and more that we are becoming members of international organisations, many of which are aiming to do the same thing through different agencies. The European Community, after all, should have a common stand on energy. All their commitments seem to be in that direction. It should be sufficient as far as our international associations are concerned but now we find ourselves involved in another one to be serviced by the Minister and his hard working staff. Let us take the environment. The Council of Europe are concerned about that. We service that. The European Community are concerned about it. We service that. The United Nations are concerned about it. We service that. No trouble to a small nation like us.