I fully appreciate the Chair's problem in regard to this Estimate. It is a Supplementary one and I am as anxious as any other Deputy to co-operate with the Chair who has a difficult task of judgment here. This Estimate provides for increases for something that has been, so to speak, foreseen and it also provides in effect for increases in the strength of the Defence Forces, that is if we are to look at it by comparison with another Estimate for increases in activity. Where a Supplementary Estimate merely provides for increases for incidentals of course strict rules would require that comment should be limited to that, but I respectfully submit that where a Supplementary Estimate imports something that was not definite in the original Estimate, something that is an expansion of it in the sense of being a developed activity, something which the original Estimate left open, then correspondingly the debate must be somewhat broader.
It is because of that submission that I ask the Chair's indulgence in allowing me to refer to the strength of the Army as it relates to the provision of nearly £1 million of the Supplementary Estimate. There is also the tradition of the House that a debate can be conditioned by its scope and as certain matters have been raised— I am not referring to questions that were raised in face of the Chair's direction but matters that have been allowed—the scope of the debate is correspondingly widened and I should have the opportunity to refer to these matters. However, I have no desire to be disorderly and will not seek to pursue matters should the Chair intervene and say they are out of order. I trust that the Chair will accept those general submissions on my approach to this Supplementary Estimate.
Basically, this is an Estimate which the House will accept unanimously. It is right and proper that the matters concerned should be provided for but the occasion raises the question of our outlook in regard to the Defence Forces and we must ask why a situation can arise when as large a sum as £10 million is asked for by way of Supplementary Estimate. Some other speakers in various ways touched on this point, particularly Deputy Bermingham and to some extent Deputy O'Sullivan.
The situation arises because there has been a tendency to forget about the Defence Forces until there is a need in practical terms for them. The tendency has been to play down their importance and, inevitably, this means that the Defence Forces are starved of finance and resources during periods when they do not appear to be needed. Consequently, when the need for them arises there has to be a corresponding demand for resources but the tragedy is often that the demand for them is so sudden that it cannot be met in the most efficient or the most economical way.
Similar remarks could be made about the Garda Síochána. Most of us in this House have experienced traditional times of secure order, times in which the confidence of law and order were built into our society and during which there did not appear to be any need to provide for its protection to any great extent. This situation is not unique so far as we are concerned: it is one for practically all democracies. Furthermore, there has been a tendency in our society to treat the administrative side of the State as the most important and to neglect to some extent certain executive arms of the State. This has meant a disproportion between the position of that part of the public service which is called the civil service and these other parts such as the Army.
On many occasions when this party were on the Government side I tried to point out, particularly on the Estimates for Justice, that the day would come when there would be experienced the need for gardaí, prison officers and the Army and that inadequate provision was being made in this regard. I pointed out that the administrative people and also the ministerial element, in taking a shortsighted view of the overall social position would ultimately, in another situation, have to face the consequences of that outlook. It is no harm that we should reflect on the fact that the whole basis of our society as an ordered entity depends as much on the executive parts of the State service such as the Garda, the Army and teachers as it depends on the administrative staffs. I may cause confusion by the use of the word "executive" as distinct from the Government. However, staffs without fighting forces, to draw an Army analogy, are non-effective just as fighting forces cannot operate efficiently or effectively, if at all, without the staffs. I am endeavouring to point out that all the State services must be considered as an integrated unit and that common standards should be applied. The distinction between civil or any other service in the State is an unhappy one if it is pushed beyond a certain point. This Estimate recognises and provides for an area which, like the Garda, has been neglected in times when it was not needed.
I remember the situation before the last war. When I was fresh myself I put on the record of this House detailed information for the benefit of one of the Minister's predecessors in the first Coalition Government. I recorded my detailed memory of what I had learned of the situation that arose when the need for adequate Defence Forces became acute in 1939-1940. In the preceding years, because of narrow administrative and economic thinking, the Defence Forces were deprived of the means of developing. They were deficient in strength, in material, in resources and in organisation. The effort that had to be made in 1939-1940 to remedy that situation was one that taxed all the resources of the community to the utmost and were it not for a fortunate accident which resulted in time being available for an expansion of the forces the results could have been disastrous. At the time there were those who issued warnings.
Peace time strength had been realistically worked out in the context of post-war needs. That strength was eroded in order to save money. Gradually the strength of the Army was let run down and so was the reserve. It was a pity and I refer to it now not for the purpose of recrimination but to point out that we are now attempting to correct that situation because of a particular stimulus. In correcting it we should not miss the chance of driving home the lesson learned. I say this not just for the benefit of the Minister but for the benefit of those who will succeed him in his ministerial office. We find ourselves with an Army insufficient for our current needs.
I am glad the Army is expanding. The Minister is doing the right thing in this but I feel that the Army is geared towards a security job. That is wrong. The Army should not be regarded as an auxiliary police force. I am not saying the purpose is to make it an auxiliary police force; I am merely arguing this way to emphasise the situation. I do not accuse the Minister of looking at the Army in that way. If it is to be regarded merely as an auxiliary police force then a great deal of expenditure on the Army is an extravagance. An auxiliary police force could be achieved much more economically.
I take it it is still our desire to provide Defence Forces in the fullest sense in so far as the resources of the State allow. There was a time— Deputy O'Sullivan referred to it— when the Army's principal function was internal security. That was true of the middle twenties. In the following decade the principal role of the Army was in the sphere of national defence in the more conventional sense and the Army and the Defence Forces as a whole played a unique and very necessary part in the negotiation of this State through the difficult period of World War II. Then, because of our established internal peace, we looked at the Army primarily as an aid to the civil power and, because of the situation now developing, I am afraid we may go to the extreme of regarding the Army as an auxiliary police force and nothing more. That impression should be corrected. The Minister will have difficulty with his civilian colleagues and even difficulty in making the public understand the long-term need but I would advise the Minister to encourage Army personnel to look on themselves as soldiers and not as policemen. When I say that, I imply absolutely no slight whatever on the Garda who have their proper functions, and very admirable and necessary functions for the community they are. We are talking here about the Army. In a modern context they should be encouraged to be the professional soldiers they are, that is, the regulars with their unshakeable professional loyalty, steadiness and efficiency, loyalty to the State, steadiness and reliability in whatever tasks they are called upon to perform, and efficiency in carrying them out.
That is the best approach towards the tasks they are called upon to undertake in the sphere of domestic security or in a wider area. It is also the best approach towards ensuring that pride, morale and esprit de corps which are so necessary in such organisations are maintained. I would ask that of the Minister in particular. I would not presume to tell him or to suggest what the doctrines should be in 1975. About 30 years ago I could, perhaps, have over-confidently offered my opinions and prescriptions, but we must all recognise that water flows under the bridge. When it comes to such matters, I feel I have been washed a long way down the river. I shall not attempt the armchair punditry anybody who takes an interest in such matters might be tempted to indulge in.
I hope the Minister will take my point. If the Army, from the officers down to the most junior privates, are encouraged to take that professional and patriotic view, this country will have a measure of general security which will be of great value to it, and the Army will be proud of themselves. If they are proud of themselves and satisfied with their role, there will be no question of the rest of us not being proud of them.
I am glad the Minister has provided in this Estimate for an increase in strength. I am all the more pleased when I find that the recruiting campaign which has been in progress since early last year is continuing to be very successful. The Minister said:
Its success is a measure of the attraction of Army life now and Deputies can assure any suitable young men in their constituencies, who may be comtemplating joining the Army, that, if they enlist, they will enjoy pay and conditions which compare very favourably with those obtainable in civilian life.
That is a sentence I am glad to read. I should like to add to it that they should be encouraged to join because there is a worthwhile national job to be done. Not only is it, so to speak, in modern cynical terms, a job worth having from the point of view of economics and social conditions, but it is a job in which one can fulfil an ideal of service to the community and in which one can achieve the personal satisfaction of feeling one is playing a role in the community that is worth while from the community's point of view.
The security angle is, of course, the issue of the moment. I have the greatest sympathy with both the Garda and the Defence Forces who are called on to co-operate because, under modern circumstances, it very much seems like putting a man into a ring to fight and tying his hands behind his back before he starts. They have a very difficult job to carry out. The restrictions put on the forces of law and order nowadays in comparison with the indulgence, shall I say, available to those who are prepared to exploit the forces of disorder are one of the anomalies of modern life. These young men who join either the Army or the Garda have to exercise a degree of self-restraint which must make the sustained effort of discharging their duties very difficult.
From my own limited experience of uniformed life, I can appreciate that point. All I can say is this: it is admirable how in both forces, in the Garda and in the Army, this disciplined restraint has been evidenced and it should be appreciated by the community as a whole. They should, therefore, get the support of the Minister, and the administration behind the Minister, and the State as a whole, and from every individual citizen there should be sympathy for a spirit of co-operation with them collectively and individually. They are serving the community under very difficult conditions and this should be recognised. I for one, do not grudge at all the expenditure involved in providing for them.
In this modern world where an allcorrosive liberalism seems to have eroded traditional concepts of order, the tendency is to decry, even despise and obstruct orderly action and the will of the majority. In situations such as that it almost takes the quality of a religious vocation to accept the responsibilities of either a police officer or a soldier. Therefore, we should do all we can to support and help them in their trials, because trials they are, in a practical way, emphasising at all times that order and discipline are the key-notes—I am speaking about intellectual discipline—and, in order and discipline, will one find the strength to carry out the task, that order and that discipline being the hallmarks of people in these services and the key to self-respect and efficiency. There can be no morale without discipline; discipline is something that has to be fostered through encouragement.
The approach varies with the time. The trouble about the application of all these fundamental ideas is that the circumstances vary from time to time and applications that were valid in one period of history are completely invalid in another. I would not dare to comment how these principles should be applied when it comes to practical detail in a modern context. I leave it to the people whose business it is to know. But I would ask the remainder of us who may not know— and particularly those of us who are generally classed as civilians—to try to understand that there is something special here, to sympathise with it and encourage it because through it ultimately we are an ordered society and able to function as a peaceful society. I do not know whether the Minister will quite appreciate the point I am trying to make. In a sense it is abstract and I thank the Chair for allowing me to say this on a Supplementary Estimate.
When it comes down to the net, there is a sizeable amount involved here as a Supplementary Estimate which requires justification. The justification most certainly is there but the ultimate justification must be along the lines I have mentioned. Therefore, the things that have been said should be said. Do not let us ever again forget what we have twice forgotten before—when the acute need has passed the need itself does basically subsist all the time. I shall not speculate on what might have been. One wonders at various times at things that have happened; had the lamps been kept lighting and not lit at the 11th hour how much inconvenience, to say the least of it, could have been avoided? That may well apply in the not so distant past also. However, we are dealing with the present and the future. It is right that the Minister should make this provision. I am glad to note from these figures that the proportions appear to be much more balanced than they were many years ago. Where the Permanent Defence Forces are concerned they must be served and their numbers kept up to strength. That is the message and, in so far as the total moneys do that, the Minister has the unanimous support of the House.
The question arises on this Supplementary Estimate of reserves. I am constrained because it is a Supplementary Estimate and I do not wish to go into detail on this question. There must be, and there is, a limit to the size of the permanent force that we or any other State can maintain. The aim must be to have that force as efficient as possible, adequate for the immediate demands made upon it, having within it some elasticity and reserve so that there is an opportunity afforded for rapid expansion. That would be common doctrine anywhere. Certainly it is a valid conclusion from 50 years' experience of our Defence Forces.
The matter of the reserves of the Defence Forces has never been adequately catered for since the war. Before the war, in extraordinary circumstances, we were fortunate in our reserve position. Let us recognise it was due to a large extent to certain internal factors. In the first instance it was due to the fact that, within a workable period the actual First Line Reserve, that is discharged soldiers or those who had served in the Army and officers also, who could be considered trained, were still in the age group that rendered them perfectly effective when the need arose in 1939. Indeed, without them I do not think we could have expanded then. Then for other reasons there were other reserves and, in one particular instance, the volunteer force was developed. With those two amalgamated, and with their training, the material existed—some of it partially and some wholly processed. Then was the ultimate expansion in 1940 made possible, if only barely so.
Since the war years I do not know— one hesitates to ask for a lot of information from the Minister by way of parliamentary question on matters of this type—the exact position in regard to the reserves. In any event, for certain roles, one must make allowances for two facts; firstly, that reserves are not easily called up for useful service, whole-time or even part-time, without considerable dislocation, without very compelling cause and, when they are so mobilised, it takes time to assimilate, order and deploy them. That applies even if one had reserves who had served with the colours for considerable periods. It is much more difficult when the bulk of one's reserves are operating on a part-time basis without much whole-time experience.
That is a remark that goes generally, but when you are dealing with the question of security the use of citizen reserves becomes a ticklish problem. I do not think it would be very helpful for me to analyse the ticklishness of the problem in detail but I am sure it will not have escaped either the Minister or his advisers, civil or military. Therefore, whether in the present context for a number of reasons including security, or in the broader context which does not seem to arise at the moment, what we must always remember is that it might and it could arise and looking at the forces in the world today I would not like to say it will not. In either context, the problem of the reserves is something that would need attention, and there is a considerable sum here required under subhead D for Reserve Defence Forces. I am glad to see that attention is being given to the matter, and all my comment is made to underline the importance of that element.
I am in a certain amount of difficulty in comparing figures with inflation going as it is and the value of money changing. It is very difficult casually to reach any conclusions in which one could have confidence by merely scrutinising sums of money. In so far as they are allocated for necessary purposes there can be no complaint. The only question that arises is: are all necessary purposes provided for? In relation to the question as to whether the sums provided are adequate for the purpose for which they are provided I confess that I find myself in no position to judge, and can only encourage the Minister and his advisers to do the right thing by unhesitatingly committing myself as a Deputy to this expenditure and, in so doing, taking equal responsiblity for it with the Minister and other Members of this House.
There are very many things that could be said on this matter but I think they are more appropriate to a general debate on the Estimate for the Minister or some general debate on the Army, and even then there are few of us in this House that are competent to give worthwhile criticism in this field. There are certain things one may comment on in so far as human factors are involved, but on the technical and professional aspects I think it would be wise to refrain from comment because much of that comment inevitably will be fatuous through ignorance. The thing for us to do is to recognise the need for the provision of these forces, to recognise what they are doing, to try to strive for that rapport between the community whom they are protecting and themselves that will develop a mutual loyalty and understanding, so that the community will do everything to support these forces.
At present the Defence Forces are primarily involved in internal security duties. It is not a nice role for an army; in a sense it is not an army's proper role at all, but it is a necessary role at the moment and, as with the Garda appreciation of the way in which they are discharging their duty should be recorded. In particular the House and the ordinary citizen can do much in silent support, because there is a tendency by people who may not have the same ideas as the majority of the community have to seize on every opportunity to denigrate, to complain about or wrongfoot either the Garda or the Army. It is futile to complain about this, particularly as, unfortunately, some people who will do this will do it out of mistaken convictions. There you are up against the problem of human conflict, and one of the anomalies of the present day is that we refuse to recognise the fact of conflict. I touched on that in the broadcasting debate last night, and I do not intend to go into it any further now.
If there is a steady realisation by the individual citizens of the role that the Garda and the Army are playing and of their importance to the community, then the individual citizen can by his quiet support and his approval or disapproval as appropriate—not disapproval of the forces but disapproval of those who take advantage of the discipline and restraint of the forces in carrying out their job—secure the effectiveness of the role these forces play, because the force of public opinion can be stronger than any protest or anything else. This is something that all in the political arena should realise and promote: this feeling among the citizens that it is their Army; that it is their police force, their protectors, their kith and kin. If that is achieved a very large contribution will be made towards security itself.
This Estimate, as I say, stimulates a lot of comment which, strictly speaking, would not be in order on the Supplementary Estimate. However, I urge the Minister to see that this money is efficiently applied to the purposes it is intended to serve, that there will be every effort to continue to recruit and to build up the Army and the Defence Forces morally and in numbers, that everything will be done to develop the morale, pride and esprit de corps of our Defence Forces. In doing that we can be certain that whatever our comments on individual cases are fundamentally the Minister will have the support of the House and of every thinking citizen in the State.