Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 12 Oct 1977

Vol. 300 No. 3

Statement by Taoiseach.

The Taoiseach

As Deputies know, I met the British Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, at 10 Downing Street, London, on 28th September. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Mr. Mason, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Mr. Judd, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. I was accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I sought the meeting following the general election last summer, so that we could have exploratory talks on subjects of common interest to our countries, including Northern Ireland, the European Community and bilateral relations generally.

The meeting lasted six hours and covered a wide range of subjects. At its conclusion, an agreed communiqué was issued, copies of which I have arranged to lay before the House. I do not intend here to go over ground covered by the communiqué, nor indeed would it be proper for me to go in detail into what we discussed. I should like, however, to put before the House some of the main points which emerged.

On Northern Ireland, there has, in the recent past, been what I may describe as the appearance of greater integration with the United Kingdom. Rumours of a pact, or understanding, with certain groups in the House of Commons and the establishment of the Speaker's Conference last July "to consider and make recommendations on the number of Parliamentary Constituencies that there should be in Northern Ireland" are among the indicators which lent some colour to this belief.

I obtained a firm assurance from the Prime Minister that there was not a scintilla of a move towards integration. He was emphatic in his view that the British people would not, in fact, agree to such a move. I was also happy to receive from the Prime Minister the further assurance that it was and remained the policy of the British Government to have devolved government with power-sharing in Northern Ireland and that there would be no devolved government without power-sharing.

In relation to the long-term approach I made clear my view to the Prime Minister that in the interests of all the people of Ireland and of Anglo-Irish relations generally there was a need to encourage the people of Ireland to come together by consent, by negotiation and under agreed structures.

Our discussion naturally led to our talking about the operation of direct rule. The main point I made was that however direct rule operated, it would, if continued over a long period, lead inevitably to a worsening of the situation in Northern Ireland. The immediate consequences of a political vacuum there might not be grave, but, in the medium or longer term, there could be no real stability and no real progress unless there were a forum in which the people of the North could express themselves and, to whatever extent might be agreed, govern themselves. I stressed the need for political action and the Prime Minister agreed that, if there was a general desire, the British Government would be ready to devolve a range of powers to a locally elected body under arrangements acceptable to both sides of the community. I understand that exploratory discussions will take place shortly to see whether this general desire exists.

I impressed on the Prime Minister the need for greater economic co-operation between both parts of Ireland. I have always thought it strange, to say the least, that the two administrations governing this small island have not found it possible to cooperate to a greater extent on economic projects for our mutual benefit. He welcomed my views in this respect and we agreed that officials of the two Governments would meet in the near future to review the arrangements and opportunities for economic co-operation between our two countries, with particular reference to Northern Ireland. They will review current and proposed cross-Border studies and identify subjects and areas for further examination, with EEC assistance where appropriate.

We discussed the present arrangements for security co-operation and both the Prime Minister and I agreed on the importance of this co-operation. The communiqué records the British expression of satisfaction at the degree of co-operation under the present arrangements. We agreed that, in the general context of further Anglo-Irish meetings, there should be continuing consultation about how this co-operation could be developed and improved as the security situation required it.

While in London I had the opportunity of meeting the Leader of the Opposition, Mrs. Thatcher. She was strong in her belief in the need for the United Kingdom Government to make political progress in Northern Ireland, and in her commitment to the concept of participation or partnership by the two parts of the Northern community in government.

This principle does not offer any threat to the future or to the integrity of any group in Northern Ireland. It is a truism that the only sound basis for democratic government is the consent of the governed. Almost by definition this consent cannot be obtained if large and homogeneous minorities are, through the ordinary operation of the law, permanently excluded from government. The participation of which I speak is a means by which the minority in Northern Ireland can be involved in the administration by which their lives are governed.

We are interested only in progress by reconciliation. We want for Northern Ireland the stability which only a lasting peace can bring: and all experience shows that a lasting peace can be achieved only through full participation in government by both sections of the Northern community. It is only in that way that the economic evils of poverty and unemployment which have sapped the hope and vigour of generations of men and women can permanently be overcome. We are ready at all times to discuss with the representatives of any elected party in the North ways by which we can help in attaining this objective—without commitment on their part and with the greatest of goodwill towards them on ours.

I cannot over-emphasise the fact that our first priority is to help to establish peace and a basis for progress in Northern Ireland. This cannot be done by violence—or by the policies advocated by the men of violence. The Government will continue, by every means in their power, to apply the law against men who use violence and subversion to attain political ends.

But simply to campaign against violence is too negative an approach to a fundamental problem. The violence is a recurring symptom; and you cannot eradicate a disease by attacking the symptoms. In discussing the issue with Mr. Callaghan, I pointed out the effects which the negative guarantees of his Government are having and I stressed the legitimate aspiration of the vast majority of the Irish people to see this island united in peace, by consent and under agreed structures. I said that one inference from the results of the last election here was that this wish was as alive and as potent, among the people of this country, as it had ever been. I remain strong in my belief that it would take nothing from the honour of Britain or from the rights of the majority in Northern Ireland if the British Government were to acknowledge this aspiration and positively to encourage the people of this island to progress together, as a nation of many traditions, each with its own value and entitled to its own respect, in harmony with the people of the United Kingdom, with whom we have such close ties.

In our discussions of the European Economic Community, we talked of the applications of Greece, Portugal and Spain for membership. Enlargement of the Community will have the most profound effects. Politically, enlargement is eminently desirable. In my view, these political considerations out-weigh the institutional and financial difficulties—large as these are. It must be our priority, as a Community, to improve the working and financing of the institutions so that they can stand up to the strains of enlargement without being destroyed. I do not say this to take in any way from the rights of the applicant countries to membership —but simply to stress that they themselves could hardly wish to be members of a Community so weakened by accession as to become little more than a loose agglomeration of states. What the Community would be then would not be the Community they have sought to join.

In relation to the common agricultural policy, I said that our interest was paramount. While I am not by any means arguing that the CAP cannot be improved, I think that arguments for improvement based on the proportion the CAP takes of the Community's budget are not well based. The total budget is in fact, only a small proportion—perhaps .6 per cent —of the gross national product of the countries of the Community. It follows that any policy involving worthwhile action must, almost inevitably, absorb a large proportion of the total. The CAP may produce distortions in the market but, without it, the distortions —and the vulnerability of Europe—would be even greater. And the effects on social, regional and industrial policies of a stable and prosperous agriculture should not be minimised.

We also discussed direct elections to the European Parliament. Mr. Callaghan gave me an indication of how he saw prospects in the United Kingdom. I reciprocated with an account of how our legislation was developing. As far as we are concerned, we will be able— and we fully intend—to have elections next Summer, if that fits in with the general European approach.

In discussing fisheries, I emphasised our unique position and the regional aspects of the problem. As Deputies know, the matter is the subject of more detailed discussions between the Minister for Fisheries and the British Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries and other Community Ministers and interests.

We also discussed the project for the construction of the massive facilities for research into nuclear fusion, known as JET. I indicated our preference for siting the project in the best location, technically, and where the maximum benefit to the Community as a whole would accrue. Consensus on this issue, if at all possible, is obviously highly desirable.

We also discussed some aspects of the contributions by the different "new" member countries of the Community to the Community Budget in the years 1978 and 1979, which will see their transition to the full "own resources" system of financing.

Finally, we discussed the economic prospects for our countries particularly in the international context. We had a useful exchange of views on the likely development of incomes policies and on industrial relations generally. The Prime Minister indicated his country's willingness to press ahead as soon as possible with the proceedings for the division of the Continental Shelf between the two countries. It is obviously in the interests of both countries to get this issue settled as soon as possible.

In conclusion, I found the discussions extremely useful. Of their nature, they could not be expected to produce immediate and dramatic results. Their purpose was basically exploratory. It is essential that countries which have so much in common should have an understanding of the basic purposes and intentions of the other. This, I hope, our talks helped to achieve. Relations between us are good, and it is by developing what we have in common that I think progress can best be attained to the advantage of both peoples.

Dr. FitzGerald

Before putting to the House the views of my party on the matters raised by the Taoiseach, I wonder if it would be in order to ask him one question which could help to clarify a point? The question is why the communiqué omits reference to the view that the objective of peace and stability in Northern Ireland can be achieved only if both sections of the community share power in a system of Government providing for partnership and participation? Could I ask if the Taoiseach sought such a reference in the communiqué and if not why not?

The Taoiseach

It is highly unusual for the Deputy but since he has asked a question I can give him an answer. Had I put a question on similar lines to my predecessor I would not have been given an answer. The Deputy knows well that in these discussions many things may be agreed that do not appear in the official communiqué. I need say no more.

Dr. FitzGerald

I am grateful to the Taoiseach for an answer which helps me in formulating my remarks. The twin objectives of policy in Northern Ireland are clearly the restoration of peace and the establishment of a system of self-government acceptable to both sections of the community. These must be our short-term objectives. The achievement of both has been long delayed. In the context of what the Taoiseach has just said it is worth considering why they have been long delayed.

An essential prerequisite for the ending of violence, apart from the enforcement of law and order, is a realisation by the paramilitary bodies that their activities cannot and will not produce the results they desire. So far as the Loyalist paramilitaries are concerned, the total failure of the British Government to deal early and firmly with the May, 1974, strike encouraged the illusion that action in the streets, intimidation and violence could prevent a political solution being found. It even encouraged them to believe that these methods could positively force a political solution along the lines they sought, but this illusion was shattered when this year's attempted repetition of the strike was broken. The illusion of the Loyalist paramilitaries as to the efficacy of their strong-arm methods has also been repeatedly encouraged by the tendency of British political leaders, in Government and in Opposition, to talk of terrorism as if terrorist activities were confined to the IRA, ignoring the fact that the present period of violence in Northern Ireland was started by Loyalist paramilitaries in the late sixties and that, while the bulk of Loyalist paramilitary violence in recent years has been reactive to the IRA, it remains a major threat to peace in the North.

On the IRA side, the idea that their methods might secure sympathy or support from elected politicians, or that elected politicians might be brought to the conference table at the point of a gun, has received no support in the Republic since the events of May, 1970. Since that time the various IRA's have had no grounds for any illusion as to the willingness of any Government here to deal with them or to tolerate them. Unfortunately, this was not true of successive United Kingdom Governments. A Conservative Northern Ireland Secretary met IRA spokes-men personally and also conceded to them special treatment in prison akin to that of prisoners of war, thereby deluding them into thinking that persistence with their campaign would bring that Government to the conference table with them. His successor authorised his officials to enter into discussions with the political representatives of the Provisional IRA who are not easily distinguishable from members of that organisation. I believe that these actions have prolonged violence in Northern Ireland by a number of years. Only since these contacts have apparently been terminated by the present Secretary of State has there been any evidence that the penny has started to drop and that the IRA have begun to realise that they were being led up the garden path and that there will never be negotiations with such a grossly unrepresentative group for political solutions in Northern Ireland.

These mistakes on the part of the UK Government, which have served to prolong the agony of Northern Ireland, have had some parallel on the political side and this is the point I want to bring out in relation to the Taoiseach's statement. A political solution to the Northern Ireland problem that will command the acceptance of both sections of the community there must, in the light of the historic exclusion of the minority from any participation in Government for over half a century, involve for a period the participation of elected representatives of that minority in a system of self-government in Northern Ireland, This truth was recognised first by my own party which, as early as September, 1969, called for a period of what we then described as joint government, several years before this need was recognised in Northern Ireland itself, even by the minority. Since 1972, when Stormont was abolished, the policy of no devolution without power sharing has been the common ground on which successive Irish and British Governments have stood together. The success of this stance depended and depends, as in the matter of violence, on its being maintained with vigour and determination throughout so that the intransigent opponents of any sharing of power in government, who have even rejected the chance of controlling 70 per cent of the seats in a devolved Government, be left under no illusion that they would secure devolution on any other terms.

In fairness to the great mass of Unionists, whose long experience of total control of government and whose deep-seated fears as a minority in the island of Ireland naturally encouraged them to delude themselves as to the chances of recovering such total control, it has been vital throughout that they be not left in any doubt on this issue any more than the IRA or the Loyalist paramilitaries should have been left in any doubt of the possibility of being accepted as negotiating partners in the search for a political solution.

Unfortunately, although less dramatically perhaps, British politicians of both parties, in Government and in Opposition, have at times found it expedient to permit doubts to arise on their determination on this issue of no devolution without power sharing. The omission of references to power sharing in many utterances of Conservative spokesmen between 1974 and 1976 and the way in which Unionists were received at last year's Conservative Party Conference—I am not yet in a position to assess how they were received this year—deluded many Unionists into thinking that a new Conservative Government might drop this principle. On the other side, private discussions between Unionists, Loyalist M.P.'s at Westminster, who, incidentally, have no interest in losing their unique representative role by seeing devolution restored, and the present British Government—not, I think, the Northern Ireland Secretary—may also have helped to delude Unionist opinion as to the attitude of the present British Government. Thus the precondition for success of the policy instituted by the Irish and British Governments five years ago, and carried on since then by successive Governments, of requiring power sharing in any devolved Government, that is, the precondition that it be pursued with fairness and unambiguously, has not been fully met. Consequently, there has been a long delay in re-establishing self-government.

It is against this background that the Taoiseach's talks in London must be seen. The primary aims of the National Coalition Government in their relations with the UK Government were to ensure, as far as possible, that the actions or defaults of that British Government did not give rise to misunderstandings either amongst the paramilitaries about their possible role in a political solution or amongst the Unionists about the possibility of devolution without power sharing. That is why, when the former Taoiseach, Deputy Liam Cosgrave, met the British Prime Minister on 11th September, 1974, the communiqué recorded that the aim of restoring peace and stability to Northern Ireland on a basis commanding widespread acceptance there can be achieved only if both sections of the Community share power in government.

That is why the communiqué after the following bilateral meeting between the two Heads of Government on the 1st November of that year re-affirmed this commitment by both heads of Government. That is why at the next bilateral meeting between the two Heads of Government on the 5th March last year, the communiqué affirmed that an acceptable form of Government could be established— here I am quoting—“only through both sections of the community agreeing on a system of Government providing for partnership and participation”. That is why at the frequent meetings which I had with successive Northern Ireland Secretaries of State I pressed this point continually and that is why, when a question on this issue was posed to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State on the 28th October last year, after a period of intensive consultation between our Government and the British Government and the principal Opposition party, the reply was given in the House of Commons that no system of government within Northern Ireland would be stable or effective unless both parts of the community acquiesced in that system and were willing to work it. This meant, the reply continued, a system which would command widespread support throughout the community and in which both majority and minority would participate.

That is why, finally, in the discussions I had with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State on May 26th last—less than a month before the general election—I secured from him agreement that he would continue to make it clear that the basic objective is that of a devolved executive Government based on power sharing and that any interim council that might be established would be without significant executive powers and would be part of a two-stage process leading to self-government with power sharing.

Against this background the House will understand why my party were concerned that, for the first time, a communiqué issued after a Heads-of-Government meeting, did not state clearly that a devolved system of government could be established only if both sections shared power in Government. Instead, the communiqué was confined to stating that it was the policy of the British Government to work towards a devolved system of government in which all sections of the community could participate on a fair basis.

That is a formula that lends itself to other interpretations as is evidenced by the reaction to it of some Unionists. I can understand the Taoiseach's concern to use the London meeting as a means of de-emphasising or putting in cold storage the October 1975 Fianna Fáil statement about seeking from the UK Government a commitment to withdraw from Northern Ireland. I am glad for the country's sake that the Taoiseach has succeeded in getting himself off that hook. If Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland showed equal skill with him in getting off their anti-power sharing hook, we should have made much more progress by now towards a political solution. However, possibly because of excessive concern with this aspect, it was regrettable that the Taoiseach should have done what we refused to do at every meeting, that is, to lend his name to a communiqué which for the first time seemed to drop the concept of power sharing as being a prerequisite for devolution of power to an Executive in Northern Ireland. It would be deplorable if this should mislead any Northern Unionist into believing that a return to devolution with majority rule is realistically open to them, especially since for reasons of internal British politics the waters seem already to have been muddied on this point by British Ministers who have been willing to talk in ambiguous terms to Westminster Unionists in order to secure their support in Parliament should the Lib-Lab pact fail.

The primary thrust of the Taoiseach's visit to London should have been to clarify this issue and to reject out of hand any formulation in the communiqué which might be read or misread as weakening the position we had established and held throughout our four-and-a-quarter years in office in discussions with successive British Governments.

Frankly, an ex parte statement by the Taoiseach at a press conference or even in this House that he received an assurance from Mr. Callaghan that there would be no devolved government without power sharing is not good enough. This type of unambiguous language employed in all earlier communiqués but notably absent from this one has perhaps postponed still further the time when Unionist opinion in Northern Ireland faces this reality.

In this connection I note the willingness of the British Government to explore an interim arrangement involving the devolution of a range of powers to a locally-elected body in accordance with arrangements acceptable to both sides of the community. Such an arrangement would be the more difficult to achieve to the extent that any doubt subsists as to such an arrangement being only a step on the way to devolution on a power sharing basis. In conjunction with reports of Labour-Loyalist talks at Westminster, the ambiguity in the communiqué has, as the Taoiseach is aware, aroused fears among the minority in Northern Ireland that such an interim arrangement, which could be desirable and a step forward, might merely reinforce the present system of direct rule instead of pointing away from it and towards full devolution on a power sharing basis.

So far as economic co-operation is concerned, I should be glad if it transpired that these London talks lead to real progress. Throughout our period in government we found successive British Governments hesitant and indecisive on this matter. But I am hopeful from the tone of what the Taoiseach has said that he will be able to make faster progress than we were able to make in this area. However, this was not due to any lack of effort on our part but perhaps the time is now regarded by the British Government to be more appropriate.

I note that part of the Taoiseach's statement which refers to the legitimate aspirations of the vast majority of the Irish people to come together by consent, by negotiation and under agreed structures. I note, too, his suggestion that the British Government should acknowledge this aspiration. In this connection I trust that in his discussions with the British Government the Taoiseach did not overlook the solid and unprecedented commitment of the previous British Government at Sunningdale to support this concept when the majority of the people of Northern Ireland indicate a wish to become part of a United Ireland and which, as his own reference to agreed structures makes clear, is the only basis on which this Government and the other parties in this House would seek to have effect given to this aspiration. May I add, however, and I hope without heat or rancour, that I and many of us on this side of the House would be disturbed at the apparent implications contained in the following statement of the Taoiseach:

One inference from the result of the last General Election here was that the wish to see this island united in peace by consent and under agreed structures was as alive and potent among the people of this country as it has ever been.

Does this statement carry an implication that the parties on this side of the House who were defeated in the election do not share this wish with the Government party? Any such implication would be both false and offensive. Such a suggestion made by the Taoiseach to the British Prime Minister could carry with it a highly dangerous and misleading implication of a lack of support among a large section of the people of this State for a coming together of the Irish people by agreement. I trust that on reflection the Taoiseach will withdraw this remark which, at best, is open to misrepresentation and is damaging to the interests of the nation.

Finally, I am glad to note that the Leader of the Opposition in the UK, Mrs. Thatcher, expressed to the Taoiseach her commitment to the concept of participation, of partnership in Government by the two parts of the Northern Ireland community. This is all the more welcome in view of reports in at least one English newspaper on the day following the Taoiseach's discussions with Mrs. Thatcher that she had said she believed power sharing to be no longer a possible objective.

I note also what the Taoiseach has said regarding the EEC in respect of matters of common interest to both ourselves and Britain, but as further opportunities will arise for discussion of these matters I shall refrain from further comment at this stage.

Mr. Cluskey

First, I should like to express a welcome for the continuance of the precedent set during our term in office of bringing matters of this nature before the House for discussion at the earliest possible opportunity.

The omission of the words "power sharing" in the communiqué issued after the Downing Street talks is of some significance and has given rise to legitimate concern among very many people on both sides of the Border. However, I noted that during a press interview after the talks the Taoiseach assured everyone concerned that the question of power sharing had been discussed and accepted fully by the British Prime Minister. But it still leaves a cloud. The Taoiseach will appreciate the significance of the absence of an official joint communiqué after a meeting of that nature and of a reassurance at a press conference given by himself in connection with that meeting. However, assurances given by the Taoiseach were a relief, and we can take it that the principle of power sharing is fully accepted by the British Government. Our unequivocal support for power sharing as a solution was very forcibly put forward by the Taoiseach on behalf of the Irish people.

Another matter that arose in the discussions was the question of integration, and the Taoiseach in his statement to the House rightly said he accepted that integration was not on. Anyone looking at the present situation would agree that the last thing the British Government would wish for would be a situation such as General de Gaulle found himself in in relation to metropolitan France, as Algeria was regarded to be. I do not think there is any great danger of integration being pursued. How detailed were the discussions with regard to what could be termed an interim arrangement—pending devolved government on a power sharing basis in the North—on what was referred to as the local elected body and the powers that would be conferred upon it? If any details of those powers were discussed, if any area of the responsibility that would be given to it was defined, we would like further information because what we have is somewhat vague. However, vague though it is, it is helpful.

The Taoiseach in his statement to the House rather down-plays the danger of the political vacuum that exists in the North. It might be very dangerous not to take full cognisance of the SDLP's views in this respect: that a political vacuum is the most fertile possible ground for the men of violence. That vacuum should be filled as speedily as possible but, pending devolved government on a power sharing basis, it is necessary to proceed with this elected local body with specific powers as quickly as possible.

The Taoiseach also referred to cross-Border co-operation on the economic front. The Labour Party have always advocated that approach, and we welcome and encourage it. But it is necessary that these discussions which are to take place should do so as speedily as possible and that specific areas, not only on economic co-operation but also on social co-operation, should be discussed and the possibility of support from both the Regional Fund and the Social Fund of the EEC should be pursued.

It is of considerable importance that the Taoiseach did not press Fianna Fáil that there should be a commitment by the British Government to the withdrawal of British troops. That would be a very significant shift in the policy of Fianna Fáil. It was a wise and statesman-like decision that he came to in this respect and it may help considerably towards having a common approach to the situation in Northern Ireland, which is a continuing problem.

The Taoiseach referred to EEC matters that were discussed at the meeting. The question of our fisheries was mentioned, though not very extensively, in the Taoiseach's statement. Due to what this party regard as the gross national irresponsibility of the present Government while in Opposition, which spilled over into the time they took office, our fisheries problem in the EEC has been made considerably more difficult. Perhaps the Taoiseach in the near future would elaborate a little more on the discussions he had with the British Prime Minister on this issue vital to Ireland.

The question of the enlargement of the present Community was also discussed. As the Taoiseach said, the political desirability of such enlargement is obvious, and we accept that. We are also anxious that countries be given every consideration in their application for membership of the Community, but there are very definite practical difficulties involved. Very serious thought would have to be given by the present Government to applications from what are three underdeveloped economies into a Community which is not able, apparently, to cater for the present members of that Community who fall into that category of underdeveloped, such as ourselves, Italy, and indeed Britain. Unless there is a clear commitment by the Community to ensure that the Regional and Social Funds do the job that they were originally set up to do, there is not much prospect of a continuance of the Community. If that Community were to be enlarged without very definite steps in this respect being taken, it may collapse under the strain of enlargement, although enlargement is a most desirable thing politically.

I do not intend to say any more except that this party has at all times advocated as the only possible basis for the solution to the Northern problem an approach for eventual unity of the country based on agreement achieved by non-violent methods. This is my first opportunity as spokesman for the Labour Party on Northern Ireland to speak in this House on this problem. I assure the Taoiseach and the present Government that, as far as the Labour Party are concerned, as long as the Government's approach is one of reconciliation and a total rejection of violence irrespective of the source, and a commitment to unity based on consent, they will have the support of the Labour Party. However, I emphasise that we are not prepared ourselves to play party politics with the lives and future of our fellow countrymen. In view of what happened in 1975 and the desirable change that took place at Downing Street as regards Fianna Fáil policy in this area, we are not prepared to allow any party or any Government, for political purposes, to play fast and loose with the future and the very lives of the people of this island.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Order of business.

Mr. Clinton

On a point of order. I understood it to be the established practice of this House when a statement of this kind was made that ex-Ministers were issued with a copy of that statement. I would like to know why only some ex-Ministers were so supplied today.

The Taoiseach

As I was speaking I saw copies being handed out and I was not able to see to whom they were given or not given. I can assure Deputy Clinton that there was no discourtesy intended. I would not have minded if he had interrupted me to ask for a copy and he would have been given it, but I suppose it is better for him to make a protest rather than to be accommodated.

I know I would be breaking precedent if I replied to the statements made because these statements on occasions like this are by courtesy of the House. They are not debates and, therefore the right to reply is not always available. There are points to which I would have liked to reply, but as it is the first day of the first working session of this Dáil, I do not want to create a bad precedent. Anyway, we shall have plenty of time to debate all matters that have been raised by the leaders of both Opposition parties.