Public opinion in this country and around the world has been shocked by the swiftness with which the crisis has escalated into what amounts to open war in the South Atlantic. War, for whatever reason it starts, develops its own momentum and all too frequently creates evils far beyond those it is intended to rectify. It is a negation of human values and civilised behaviour.
The Falklands Crisis: Statement by Taoiseach.
I would ask that copies of the Taoiseach's statement be distributed to Deputies.
(Limerick East): On a point of order, is this part of the Order of Business?
The statement can be made before the Order of Business.
Arrangements have been made to supply copies of the statement to the leaders of the parties, in accordance with usual practice, and I will endeavour to get copies for other Members as soon as possible.
Thinking people throughout the world find it difficult to accept that there should be war over the ownership of these islands in the South Atlantic. It is surely the duty of responsible statemen everywhere to seek to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible moment.
When it is said that such a war is an anachronism we may in fact be doing an injustice to previous generations who showed more practical sense and wisdom than is being displayed today. It is both sobering and instructive to recall that slightly over two hundred years ago in 1770 in similar circumstances a dispute over the ownership of the Falkland or Malvinas islands almost caused a major European war, which was only prevented by the exercise of firm and wise statesmanship.
The Irish Government have from the outset regarded the armed intervention by Argentina in the Falkland Islands as contrary to the rule of law. Disputes between nations, of which there are many around the world, cannot be solved by the recourse to force. The principles of the rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes must be upheld. We are all anxiously aware of the fact that there are many places around the world where the use of force could quickly result in the holocaust of a world war.
We have deliberately refrained in present circumstances from taking a position on the issues involved. Territorial rights cannot be exercised, regardless of human rights, and before any people are transferred to the jurisdiction of another Government they are entitled to receive guarantees and assurances of their identity, their rights and of fair and equal treatment. In any case, the outbreak of conflict is not the time to adjudge conflicting claims or to take sides.
Following the recent armed intervention by Argentina, Ireland joined with other countries in the United Nations Security Council in laying down the principles that should govern the solution of the crisis. The preamble to Resolution 502 specifically referred to the call by the President of the Council to both the British and Argentine Governments to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands. The body of the resolution demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces, and a diplomatic solution to the differences between the two Governments.
In his address to the Council on that occasion, Ireland's Permanent Representative stressed the responsibility of the international community to avert conflict and referred to the availability of the UN's peace-making and peace-keeping facilities. In the following days, he and his colleagues were active in developing and discussing with person in key positions in the UN specific ideas for UN efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in accordance with Resolution 502.
Far from their being anything in the resolution authorising either side to send troops or reinforcements to the area, both sides were asked to refrain from the use or threat of force and to cease hostilities immediately.
This was also the purpose of the economic sanctions adopted by the EEC. It was precisely because of the possibility that they could help to promote implementation of the Security Council Resolution that, despite some reservations about their effectiveness, Ireland agreed to the adoption of these measures in a spirit of Community solidarity. The hope was that the sanctions would complement other pressures which my Government understood to be directed towards an outcome that would respect the Security Council Resolution and, in particular, would prevent major hostilities. We had hoped that the efforts of Mr. Haig would achieve that result. While these were in train efforts specifically within the UN framework were understandably suspended.
The purpose of diplomatic pressure, certainly so far as Ireland was concerned, was to make it clear that a fait accompli would not be acceptable and that negotions were imperative. It was hoped specifically to prevent and render unnecessary further military action.
When it became apparent the weekend before last that the United States mediation effort had not been attended with success, the Irish Government expressed serious concern at the deteriorating situation. They urged that the possibilities offered by the United Nations should be fully exploited and that further military escalation which would only make negotiations all the more difficult should be avoided.
By Tuesday of last week, however, there were indications that diplomatic and economic pressure was simply viewed as complementary to military action. There were concurrent indications that neither party was particularly open to immediate involvement of the United Nations, through the Security Council, the good offices of the Secretary General or otherwise. Two major vessels, one on each side, had been lost, with considerable loss of life, and a number of planes shot down. The world seemed to be standing by while young lives were being lost. There was, and is, no assurance as to where the military action will end, how many more lives will be lost, how much damage caused. The longer it continues the more likely the theatre of war is to extend, and the more countries are likely to become embroiled. It is not possible to say how it might end or who might be engulfed.
It was not only the Irish Government that was appalled by the sinking of the General Belgrano and HMS Sheffield. It is abundantly clear that most of the Governments of our European partners and the American Government are also deeply concerned at developments which threaten to wreck valuable links and friendships.
This was the background to the Irish Government's statement of Tuesday, which indicated that Ireland would seek a meeting of the Security Council and also that the Government regarded the application of economic sanctions by the Community as no longer appropriate and would be seeking their suspension. The Irish view was that the whole situation had changed in that, tragically, the steps hitherto taken had not succeeded in preventing conflict. We saw a grave risk that military action on both sides would acquire its own momentum and would escalate, increasing the threat to world peace and making negotiations much more difficult.
It seemed important to us that an initiative should be taken which would restore diplomacy and the search for a peaceful solution to the centre of the stage. Ireland, for the duration of its period as one of the 15 members of the UN Security Council, shares a special responsibility for the prevention of armed conflict among the community of nations. We do not regard that post purely as an honour. We take our responsibilities seriously. The Security Council has a vital role in halting the spread of war. The non-implementation of Resolution 502 seemed to us to render a new UN initiative necessary to secure the cessation of hostilities.
While a formal meeting of the Security Council, as requested by Ireland, has been deferred for the time being so as not to hinder in any way the efforts of the UN Secretary General, there is no doubt, as he himself has acknowledged, that our call strengthened his hand and gave a significantly increased weight and impact from that time to diplomatic negotiations at the UN. Our action has helped the Secretary General to establish a framework for the negotiations which are still continuing. His task is a very difficult and delicate one. I am sure that all in this House would wish him every success and would want the Security Council to do whatever they can to help the Secretary General to persevere and to encourage the parties to the dispute to give him their full co-operation.
Should, however, these efforts break down and should there be any intensification of the conflict, we are ready to reactivate our call for a formal meeting of the Security Council should this appear to be necessary. Our paramount concern will be to stop the fighting.
We have also sought an end to economic sanctions against Argentina by the EEC. As a neutral country, we are not prepared to back military action. Nothing in our EEC obligations requires us to give such backing. We consider that it would be inappropriate for these measures to remain in force if they were being applied or seen to be operating so as to reinforce a military solution to the crisis rather than to promote a diplomatic and negotiated settlement. It is also the judgment of the Government that suspension of the sanctions would now be more helpful in creating an atmosphere in which UN efforts would obtain a receptive hearing on both sides. The relevant Community regulation had itself made provision for a possible review within the one-month period of its operation, precisely to allow for a change in circumstances such as occurred last week. Accordingly, our Minister for Foreign Affairs sought a lifting of the sanctions at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs last week. He also explained the Government's attitude. While our other partners considered that the measures might remain in force for the moment, there was widespread agreement with the Irish view that these measures were intended to advance a diplomatic solution and not any military alternative, and no commitment was given with regard to the renewal of sanctions after 17 May.
Although it is not the practice for formal decisions to emerge from what are informal meetings, nonetheless, given the urgency of the Falklands crisis, it was considered important that the consensus of the meeting should be clearly reflected in the customary press briefing given by the Presidency afterwards. Consequently, the following press guidelines were agreed for use by President Tindemans. I think it would be helpful if I were to read them to the House.
The objective of the Ten is to support efforts to secure a peaceful negotiated settlement between Argentina and Britain in accordance with Resolution 502 of the UN Security Council. The Ten fully support the efforts of the UN Secretary General, with the support of the Security Council to create a framework in which negotiations can be successfully pursued.
The Ministers have agreed that the Community should continue to maintain the measures currently in force vis-à-vis Argentina with the aim of securing a peaceful negotiated settlement in accordance with Resolution 502. Thus it should be clearly understood that these measures are intended to reinforce political and diplomatic efforts to this end and not a military solution to the conflict.
With regard to the renewal of the measures after 17 May, the Ministers agreed to remain in touch on this issue with a view to taking a final decision closer to the 17 May and in the light of developments.
We consider the outcome of the meeting to have been satisfactory from our point of view, and our decision to oppose the renewal of sanctions has given many of our partners who have reservations about military action a chance to reflect on the situation.
Furthermore, the Ten fully endorsed the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to secure a negotiated settlement. From the outset this has been the basic aim of Irish policy in regard to the crisis over the Falklands.
While in the event we have received considerable support, Ireland is not afraid to stand alone on the issue of peace or to reassert our traditional policy of neutrality. We have always been unique in the Community in not belonging to NATO. That is something that has always been accepted. In the past we have maintained our neutrality despite intense pressures on us. The people of this country are deeply attached to our neutrality, and they are not prepared to see it eroded. Both in principle and in practice we have now made it clear that we will not permit that to happen.
We intend to support the preservation of European unity and solidarity to the greatest extent possible. We have sought not to act unilaterally. It would help unity and solidarity however, if the Community and all its institutions were more conscious of the limitations of Community action imposed by the true nature and the ideals of the Community. The Community has no role in the military sphere, and it would be better for European unity and solidarity if it were not seen to take actions supportive of or complementary to military action, which would inevitably cause division. The European Community should cherish its reputation as a peaceful intermediary.
It is of importance that I make it clear that we have not acted in any spirit of animosity towards our closest neighbour but rather in a desire to help. We believe that we can see the Falklands crisis objectively and separate it from other issues as a mature and responsible member of the community of nations.
We have given every support to a diplomatic solution to the conflict based on Resolution 502. In trying to halt the conflict and prevent further loss of life we are acting in a way that seems to us the only sane and reasonable course to take.
There are indeed important principles at stake. But wars also have results in no way related to principles. It is not clear to us what the long-term outcome of the present situation is likely to be and we must note the clear statement of US Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, that "strictly military solutions cannot endure".
We have taken up our position on this grave international crisis independent of other issues and on its own merits. We have not allowed ourselves to be influenced by feelings which we may legitimately have on other issues and happenings both inside and outside the Community.
We appeal to both Governments to draw back from conflict and to enter negotiations. The object of the dispute does not merit the loss of life, and we believe that an accomodation and a peaceful negotiated settlement between both sides is possible, given patience, perseverance and wisdom. Otherwise the ensuing conflict could bring about a wider war and even then the underlying issue would still remain to be resolved. We appeal particularly to the friends and allies of Britain and Argentina to exercise a decisive influence to prevent further escalation of conflict and loss of life and to bring this dangerous crisis to an end. To fail to do so, to sit mute on the sidelines would be a failure of statesmanship and an abdication of political responsibility.
To sum up, Ireland has acted consistently throughout this crisis. From the outset, my Government felt that Ireland should take an active part and could be helpful in trying to avert conflict and have the crisis resolved in a manner that would be satisfactory to both parties involved. The record will show that Ireland has always taken very seriously her responsibilities as a member of the United Nations which, as a small neutral nation, we have always seen as the pre-eminent forum for the maintenance of world peace and of the rule of law in international affairs. Our current position as a non-permanent member of the Security Council both imposes a duty and affords an opportunity to be helpful to two countries with whom we have maintained friendly relations.
The threat of war however still looms darkly over the South Atlantic, and the Irish Government remain ready to play a further active diplomatic role in the effort to prevent further heavy loss of life and to preserve the maintenance of world peace.
When I set out the aims of Irish foreign policy, as I saw them, shortly after my appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs in March 1973, I gave precedence to the maintenance of world peace — not because I thought that our role in this matter would be likely to be important, given the small size of our country, but because in logic it was the necessary pre-condition for the attainment of all other objectives of foreign policy. These other objectives included as a priority the attainment of peace in this island, a resolution of the political differences that divide us here and the strengthening of the European Community, whose survival and development is especially important to us as the country which is by far the greatest net beneficiary of membership.
It is against the backdrop of these objectives of our foreign policy, which were not challenged at the time or since, that the Government's actions with respect to the Falkland Islands must be judged. The record of their actions makes curious reading, and the Taoiseach's speech makes even more curious reading, riddled as it is with inconsistencies and contradictions. First, the Government joined in voting for Resolution 502 and in supporting the application of sanctions against Argentina — after the despatch of the British Task Force to the South Atlantic had been announced. It is difficult to reconcile that with the suggestion in the earlier part of the Taoiseach's speech that economic sanctions were adopted with a view to avoiding military activity, before military activity began or was envisaged. That implication was clearly in his speech but it does not fit with the facts of the sequence of events.
Then a report appeared, which was subsequently positively identified in the press as having emanated from the Taoiseach's Department, that our action at the UN in voting for Resolution 502 had been taken by our representative there without instructions and on his own initiative. This report was not denied by the Taoiseach or by his Minister and the talsity of it was not exposed until the attention of the newspaper in question was drawn to it at another level, and the libellous character of the allegation demonstrated. The Government's failure at the time to accept responsibility for their own decision in this matter, and the attempt to evade it by allowing this report to stand for a week, was an inglorious political tactic, an abdication of responsibility, and an act of disloyalty to those who were carrying out their instructions — a failure that has no precedent of which I am aware in this State.
There followed a broadcast interview by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he belatedly — but, I must say, unambiguously — enunciated the Government's position; their rejection of Argentine aggression and their support for the measures in which they had joined to bring this aggression to an end. I congratulated him on that interview in which he expressed our position very cogently, even if it was something that should have been said much earlier.
The second phase of this affair has evolved gradually, with the perception by political and public opinion in many countries that the two parties to this dispute were heading towards an armed confrontation, in an atmosphere of war-mongering and jingoism that was alarming to anyone concerned with the preservation of peace.
At this point many countries began to indicate to the participants to the dispute to which each was closest their concern that a solution be arrived at without bloodshed. Quiet diplomacy, the most effective type of pressure to exert at a time of high emotions in the countries concerned, began to play its part. Ireland, together with a number of other European countries, including Germany.
Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands, used the procedures for political consultation between the members of the European Community to express our concern to Britain and to press for flexibility in the British approach to negotiations, the objective of which must be, in accordance with Resolution 502, the achievement of a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the island.
Into this carefully calculated diplomatic exercise our Government chose last Tuesday, quite evidently without taking account of the advice and information available from their diplomats, to throw a spanner. Had they bothered to check what was happening at the United Nations, they would never have proposed at that delicate point, when the Secretary-General was putting forward "ideas" to both of the participants, to call an "immediate" meeting of the Security Council, at which the dispute could only have been exacerbated as Britain and Argentina faced each other across the table, each forced by the pressures of domestic nationalism to attack the other's position.
At one stage in his speech the Taoiseach dismissed the good offices of the Secretary-General saying there were indications that neither party was particularly open to them. At that time the Secretary-General was putting forward ideas which have proved to be a useful basis and one in respect of which both parties are prepared to have discussions. Later in his speech the Taoiseach used different words in regard to the Secretary-General's approach. He said that we dropped our initiative for a meeting of the Security Council in order not to hinder the efforts of the Secretary-General, which he had dismissed as not being acceptable to the parties.
I noticed that in the whole of his speech there is no reference to the wording used by the Government at that time — a proposal for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The word "immediate" has disappeared, in the same way as the word "idly" disappeared 12 years ago from the phrase "standing idly by". That was what the Government proposed and it was from that proposal that they had to withdraw within hours of having put it forward with so little thought. The proposal for an immediate meeting was modified to eliminate this requirement of immediacy. That was done within hours and the request for the meeting itself was then indefinitely postponed, in deference to the views of all those concerned with the settlement of the dispute, those concerned with a settlement rather than making public noises.
Ireland's stock at the UN has rarely been as low as at the moment for it has been a characteristic of our diplomacy in that forum, under all Governments, that it has always been carried on in a totally disinterested manner, and has been seen as such by all the other members. The respect that has been won by successive Irish Foreign Ministers, from Liam Cosgrave and Frank Aiken's time down to the present day, was dissipated overnight by the Government's action because our Cabinet here chose to throw all this away in the pursuit of short-term gain in the form of a hoped-for domestic reaction that they were "doing something".
This error was compounded by the fact that the Government did not even have a resolution ready to put forward. The statement issued at the end of the Government meeting that decided upon this ham-fisted approach suggested a certain line of approach but one that had it been pursued would have undermined, indeed thrown away, the essential element of Resolution 502: namely, the withdrawal of Argentine troops.
That this Government statement was issued without the benefit of expert advice is self-evident; that the Government did not know what they were doing is perhaps the most charitable interpretation that can be put upon its formulation. Certainly the Taoiseach was quick to climb down when challenged by us in this House two hours later. He then conceded that the withdrawal of Argentine forces — no reference to which had been made in the Government statement — must be a prerequisite of any solution. But the absence of any thought-out approach on the part of the Government was exposed by his uncertainty as to whether the wording proposed in the Government's statement of two hours earlier was to be regarded as supplementary to the existing Resolution 502, or whether it was envisaged that the Government's draft would have to be amended to add in the essential element which they had omitted.
The confusion of the Government in this House was paralleled at the UN, where no one was clear as to whether in fact there was an Irish draft resolution, or, if so, what it contained. Nothing more unlike the traditional professional and skilled approach of Ireland to problems at the UN could be imagined, and it has left many friends of Ireland there bemused and disappointed.
The other barrel of this shot-gun diplomacy consisted of a public announcement that we would propose to our EEC partners the cessation of sanctions against the Argentine. On this issue too, it became clear in the House that the Government did not know their own minds. At first the Taoiseach sought to give the impression that it was intended to seek a cessation of sanctions on the following Saturday with effect from that day. Only when it was pointed out that sanctions had been agreed to run till 17 May did he hastily modify this, agreeing that they would have to continue until that day. But he remained, and still remains, clearly uncertain as to whether it is proposed that if our partners decided to continue sanctions after that date, the Irish Government would accept a majority EEC decision, or break ranks with our Community partners on the issue. At the end of the Taoiseach's statement I am not any wiser in that respect.
The effect of this announcement in Brussels was to upset those of our partners who had been pursuing with us the path of private diplomacy, seeking to influence the British to adopt a more flexible negotiating posture by hinting that if war were preferred to diplomacy, the question of sanctions would have to be reconsidered. This delicate exercise, undertaken by inspired leaks and hints to the press, which was having some visible effects on British opinion, was scuttled by the blundering announcement from Dublin. The matter having thus been brought out into the open, where Britain wanted it, her diplomats were enabled immediately to put pressure on our partners to declare themselves against the Irish move. The result was that last Saturday's meeting was much less effective in putting pressure on Britain than it might otherwise have been. Indeed, here again we see the internal contradictions of the Taoiseach's statements. He quoted from the statement issued after the meeting but the quotation from that is in direct contradiction to what has gone before. His quotation included the following:
The Ministers have agreed——
That includes the Irish Minister because there is no dissenting note here.
—that the Community should continue to maintain the measures currently in force vis-à-vis Argentina with the aim of securing a peaceful negotiated settlement in accordance with Resolution 502.
That contradicts what was said by the Taoiseach earlier in his script:
We consider that it would be inappropriate for these measures to remain in force if they were being applied or seen to be operating so as to reinforce a military solution to the crisis....
Yet, having said that, our position is that we publicly support their continuance in an agreed statement to which we have joined at a meeting to which we went with the objective of getting these sanctions removed. How much of a fool does the Taoiseach want to make of this country?
It is hard to conceive of a more blundering or counter-productive approach. It was inevitable that in joining with others to put pressure on Britain to open its mind to a negotiated settlement that might not satisfy jingoistic opinion in that country, we were risking some British hostility. It was right that we should do so. It would have been quite wrong for us to hang back from doing our duty with others in this matter because of fear of a British reaction, even though our interests in respect of Northern Ireland require that we avoid unnecessary conflict with Britain in respect of issues that do not directly concern other Irish national interests. But to take the lead in the matter, in such a blundering way as to help the British to get temporarily off the hook on the issue of avoidance of further violence and seeking a negotiated settlement, was to give us the worst of both worlds, to weaken the pressure for peace, while at the same time alienating British opinion to a quite unnecessary degree.
This whole sequence of events is to be deplored — starting with the effort to allow the responsibility for the Government's policy decisions to be placed on the shoulders of a civil servant, and ending up doing damage to our standing in both New York and Brussels, weakening even if, hopefully, only temporarily the pressure for a peaceful solution, and damaging to a quite unnecessary extent the Anglo-Irish relationship which the Taoiseach himself had done so much to build up in 1979 and 1980. Foreign policy is not to be made up on the spur of the moment in Edenderry or anywhere else, without careful consideration and the taking of expert advice. Our external interests are much too vital to be prejudiced by this kind of hasty and ill-considered action, not to be explained by anything other than the kind of desire to pull a propaganda stroke to which we are accustomed at home, and can more safely be indulged in the domestic forum.
In conclusion, I should add that all this, and specifically the changed approach of EEC sanctions, has nothing to do with neutrality and no one should be foolish enough to fall for the Government's use of this red herring. The Taoiseach has made his position on neutrality in relation to the EEC clear and I quote:
"We are neither ideologically neutral nor politically indifferent.... As the head of the then Fianna Fáil Government in 1969 Jack Lynch said `Being members of the Community we would naturally be interested in the defence of the territories embraced by the Communities. There is no question of neutrality there.' "
The Taoiseach made that statement in this House in March of last year.
I should add that this formulation, as well as others from Fianna Fáil spokesmen about going to the aid of our partners if they are attacked, represent a specifically Fianna Fáil formulation of our position. That of my own party has always been expressed in different terms, relating the question of involvement with defence within the EEC specifically to a future evolution of the Community, not on the horizon now nor likely to be so for a long time to come, into a genuine federation of confederation, with a common foreign policy, which is, I believe, a necessary prerequisite to a common defence policy.
One thing is clear: the Fianna Fáil Party with their unequivocal rejection of neutrality in the EEC context in this House barely a year ago are in no position to seek to play the neutrality card in this present matter in an effort to cover up their blunders. And no one should fall for this ploy.
To conclude: Our duty in this matter is to join with other like-minded countries in the Community and at the UN, who fear an escalation of this conflict in the South Atlantic, and to use our influence jointly with them to persuade the protagonists to negotiate a settlement to a dispute which is based on issues of pride and fear of loss of face, issues which should never be allowed to be the occasion for loss of life. Our credibility in this matter has unfortunately been severely damaged in the eyes of our European partners and our friends at the UN, but if we stop playing around with this desperately serious matter and concentrate on working with others towards a solution, we can yet do something useful.
Whether and how time will heal the unnecessary breach with Britain brought about by an attempt to use this issue to play for votes at home is something we must leave to the future. So also must we leave the final verdict on this episode, the verdict as to whether it reflects no more than bungling, or, at a deeper level, indicates that the Taoiseach has decided under pressures within and from outside his party — the fruits of which are to be seen in the nomination of an Independent Fianna Fáil Senator — to abandon the policy he adopted in 1979, of seeking a solution to the Northern Ireland problem through a new and closer relationship with Britain.
First, I would like to deal with the State's basic policy on neutrality, since defence of our neutrality has been invoked by the Government to support certain of their foreign policy initiatives in the course of this Falklands crisis. No Deputy on any side of the House seriously disputes the value of this country's frequently stated neutrality position. In my time in this House I have not heard any Deputy advocate our membership of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact Alliance, still less of that. Our neutrality has both an idealistic and a practical dimension. A small State with our history of anti-colonialism should, to the greatest possible extent, by remaining outside military pacts, seek to exercise a beneficial influence on the side of peace in the United Nations and in the broader world community context outside Europe. Under its idealistic aspect, this influence of ours in the United Nations may best be exercised by our State remaining untrammelled by the political constraints which inevitably occur inside a military alliance. Under the practical aspect, my own recent experience to take one example — working on the industry side of the Cabinet in the last Government confirms me in my view that neutrality as a policy position makes sound economic sense from the commercial and trade viewpoint. I know of one large US investment planned for this country in the arranging of which, in discussions with the principals, the matter of our neutrality was raised as being of positive assistance.
I see our commitment to neutrality as a foreign policy stance as primarily pragmatic. Too often our neutrality has been an occasion for rhetorical extravagance and emotional self-indulgence. Our neutrality has all-party support in this House precisely because it has always accorded with the national interest. Alignment with NATO means a military alliance. It commits us to the NATO nuclear deterrent policy with all the implications that has with regard to military intelligence facilities being placed on Irish soil. That would not be in the best interests of our people.
Our commitment to neutrality is based on the recognition that this policy has served our people well and continues to have the respect of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. But most important, it has the respect of the non-aligned countries, many of whom share a similar historical background to ourselves.
As I see it, our neutrality derives from our independence, and our independence is internationally sustained by our neutrality.
The Government's approach to the latest phase of the Falkland's crisis was to launch initiatives at both EEC and UN level and I should like to comment briefly on the elements comprising those two initiatives. Our demand for a Security Council meeting was described as a request for an immediate meeting. Some hours later the Taoiseach, was to say that Ireland was holding off on its request because the United Nations Secretary General was putting forward proposals. The Government statement did not make at all clear what we wished the Security Council to decide. The Government statement was confined to saying that there should be a cessation of hostilities by both Britain and Argentina pending a negotiated settlement. Only when the Dáil met later did the Taoiseach, under questioning, add the third element of Resolution 502 which included the demand for a withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands. Later, on RTE he was to add: a United Nations mediation force. To say the least — in the one day — this kind of improvised ad hoc foreign policy creation is highly confusing and dangerous to our reputation as a responsible, neutral State. It has never been satisfactorily explained — to my knowledge at any rate — why our approach could not have been summed up from the Government's point of view in a more comprehensive, balanced manner, in their first statement earlier that day.
There was little consistency in the Government's position between the Sunday statement of the Minister for Defence, the Monday disavowal of that statement by the Taoiseach and the extraordinary agglomeration of statements by the Taoiseach on Tuesday. The statements issued by the Government on Tuesday in particular seemed to suggest a lack of serious preparation.
It seems extraordinary that a public statement should be made in Dublin concerning a request for a meeting of the Security Council while, at the very same time apparently, the Secretary General was attempting to conduct a further peace initiative. The question might well be asked: Were there any prior consultations with our representative on the United Nations Security Council on the advisability of the Government's request? Did such prior consultation take place? If so, how could we then in conscience make that request? After all, we hold our place in the Security Council for the period we are members of the Security Council in large part because of the respect gained for our neutrality position under various Governments. We hold that position in the Security Council because we have the serious respect of many countries in the United Nations. We endanger that serious respect for our position in the United Nations if we go on in this ad hoc fashion taking initiatives that have no practical grounds, no basis for success, when they conflict and in fact may damage other initiatives occuring at the one time. At the very least the point could be made that iniatives that make good copy at home may, as in this instance, look singularly inept abroad.
We are not alone amongst EEC States in holding reservations on the nature and extent of the British military response. France has expressed her consternation. The Federal Republic of Germany has said there should be a cease-fire. However, the Irish response differed in that a formal statement was issued which committed us to two specific courses of action. First, there was a calling of an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council and then our announced opposition to the EEC trade sanctions against Argentina. There appears to have been no consultation with other EEC States before these two courses of action were decided. Apparently there was no prior exploration — at least not to my knowledge — of the possibility of concerted action with other EEC States or like-minded EEC States. Certainly the lack of any discernible success for these initiatives of ours to date seems to indicate an absence of prior consultation.
Alarm at the escalation of the crisis is clearly shared by other member states of the European Community, who agreed on Sunday to defer a renewal of trade sanctions pending the outcome of the talks being conducted by the United Nations Secretary General. However, the Government's decision to press for the immediate cessation of the sanctions might well have proved counter-productive if accepted by the Ten at this juncture.
Seeking a cessation of sanctions would in substance have reversed the earlier support given by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Collins, for the content of Resolution 502. It would have lessened rather than enhanced the prospects of negotiations. If it transpires that Britain is merely engaging in discussions with the Secretary General so as to allow the task force to be strengthened for a full-scale invasion of the Falklands, it will then be quite proper for the Government to press for the abandonment of trade sanctions. For then, clearly, military force would have replaced all diplomatic efforts at a negotiated settlement.
Neutrality has been referred to frequently in the course of the Government's comments on the crisis. I do not wish to rehash any of the general arguments raised in the debate on which neutrality was last referred to at length here in this House on 11 March 1981. However, there is one point that is relevant to this question of neutrality so often invoked in these past few days, one point I would ask the Taoiseach to clarify. In that debate the Taoiseach stated in Volume 327 column 1394, of the official report:
...we would of course have to review what would be the most appropriate defence arrangements for the island as a whole...
in the event of a satisfactory solution to the situation in Northern Ireland. This is a line of thought which effectively relates our neutrality to the continued political division of the island. In that defence debate of 11 March 1981 the Taoiseach appeared to envisage a fundamental alteration of our neutral position in the event of a political settlement of the Northern question. I would not subscribe to that version of our neutrality. In my view neutrality is the core of our foreign policy and is independent of any settlement of the Northern question. We must above all strive to avoid creating the impression abroad or at home that our neutrality is no more than the transference of the age-old "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity" stance into an international setting. While that served us well in the period before we became an independent sovereign state, it would clearly be inappropriate now.
I would ask the Taoiseach to give some consideration to making a formal statement or clarification as to his perception of our neutrality taking into account his most recent statement on that subject. A question does arise in the aftermath of the Government's statements and initiatives during this crisis as to the effect of these on the "special relationship" between Britain and Ireland on which such a short time ago the present Taoiseach set such great store. It was then the core of Anglo-Irish relations. Where do we go from here in the matter both of that special relationship and Anglo-Irish relations? Already we know that the next Anglo-Irish summit meeting has been postponed until July.
I should like to make it clear that the British Government can have no legitimate opposition to statements on the part of any Irish Government concerning the central importance of neutrality as the core of Irish foreign policy. British Governments today as in the past must live with the reality of our commitment to neutrality as a central part of our foreign policy. There is no reason to disguise or evade the fact that sometimes a price has to be paid for that commitment of ours, for example, when British interests are felt to be affected by it. We must always as a State be prepared to pay that price. We are not, however, called on to pay an unnecessary price. The outburst of the Minister for Defence may well entail the consequence of our paying an unnecessary price.
The Taoiseach was right to re-state our country's traditional policy of neutrality in the light of the serious escalation in the Falkland dispute. Phrases like "technically at war" do not disguise the reality that lives are being lost in the South Atlantic or the fact that Argentina and Britain are now at war. That is beyond dispute. It remains our serious task as a State to seek to the extent of our influence at the UN and elsewhere to aid the process of bringing the parties to the table for serious negotiations. It is a sad commentary on human folly in this matter that lives should be lost in a dispute which seems eminently capable of resolution-through negotiated settlement.
I support the Taoiseach's attempt to carry out an active foreign policy but I would caution him and his Ministers to remember that words are deeds in the world of diplomacy and once said words are impossible to retract. Statements and initiatives must be carefully prepared. The evidence of the Government's reaction to the Falklands crisis suggests an excessive reliance on improvisation which we can ill afford at this stage.