Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 15 Jul 1982

Vol. 337 No. 11

Social Welfare (No. 2) Bill, 1982: Committee Stage.

SECTION 1.

Minister for Social Welfare (Dr. Woods)

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 2, line 11, after "Where" to insert ", in relation to a stoppage of work, or a trade dispute, which was or is in existence on or after the 1st day of June, 1982,".

On May 6 we had a discussion on these measures in the House and the problems arising therefrom, and I gave an undertaking that the commencement of the Act would be brought forward. I think it is reasonable that the commencement date should be 1 June. A number of Deputies asked about the Comer International Ltd. dispute and whether it would be covered. Because that dispute was current at the time it could be referred to the tribunal.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Is that the only dispute that would come within the ambit of the Bill?

Dr. Woods

It is the only one I know of.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I think we should have further enlightenment on this. After the Clover Meats dispute a payment was allowed of £144,000 by the Minister for Agriculture to the workers as part of the ultimate settlement. That would be equivalent to the amount of lost social welfare benefits during the stoppage. Have payments been made to those workers directly, or indirectly through Clover Meats?

Dr. Woods

Not to my knowledge but I am not au fait. A State company, such as Fóir Teoranta or the IDA, might have been involved. I have no knowledge, so the answer is “No”.

Amendment agreed to.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 2:

In page 2, line 11, to delete "or" and substitute "and".

The question raised is whether when a dispute arises the decision of the deciding officer and/or the appeals officer would be adequate or whether the dispute should first be heard by the tribunal. We wondered whether it would be better if the matter, having been examined by the deciding officer, should then go on to the appeals officer. I am happy to accept the proposal made by Deputy O'Keeffe that "and" should be inserted, so that the reference to the tribunal would be after consideration by the deciding and the appeals officers. Of course, the dispute would be laid before the deciding officer in the first instance. My purpose in putting down the amendment was to ensure that the existing machinery would be used as the first resort. It is important that the existing means would be fully utilised before recourse to the tribunal.

Mr. Pattison

I do not see the need for this amendment, but I do not oppose it. I understand that under section 35 of the Consolidation Act it would be a matter of form for the deciding officer to investigate and this does not change anything in that section. Section 1 provides only for cases knocked down by section 35 and the amendment provides only a further procedure. There does not seem to be any necessity to provide substitution of "and" for "or" because in the normal course the dispute would go to the appeals officer via the deciding officer.

While section 35 stands it would be a waste of time in some cases if there is a statutory obligation to go through the appeals officer. It will waste the time of the appeals officer and the Department officials and we all know how much of a waiting list appeals officers have to deal with at times. I would like to see a compromise between the original wording of the Bill as introduced and the amendment, giving the option to go through the appeals officer or not to go through the appeals officer, because in some cases it will be clear that it would be a complete waste of time. Am I correct in saying section 35 stands in its entirety?

Dr. Woods

Yes. But, as I said, the basis of the case will be laid at the deciding officer stage within the context of section 35 and therefore a reference to the appeals officer would be quick and would not cause hardship at that stage. It is the full machinery which is there and, on balance, I accept the point made by Deputy O'Keeffe.

Amendment agreed to.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 2b:

In page 3, lines 13 and 14, to delete "of officers of the Labour Court".

The effect of this amendment is to broaden the provision to refer to all the services of the industrial relations procedures generally. This would include the Labour Court, the rights commissioners and the conciliation officers. It is really just to make sure that the full range of industrial relations services would be considered in that context and to broaden the range.

Mr. O'Keeffe

It seems to me that we should tease this out further. Does this provision then mean that if an employer is willing to go to the Labour Court but for some reason or other is not anxious to avail of the services of the rights commissioner that would be considered a black mark against him?

Dr. Woods

No. It is the other way round. If we specified only the Labour Court then if he was going to a rights commissioner or a conciliation officer these would not be adequate. In fact it is to make it quite clear that, where the employer is taking any reasonable step through any part of the industrial relations machinery and not just the Labour Court itself, this is adequate.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Time does not permit a detailed analysis of this. Is it the case that there would not be an obligation on the employer to avail of all the services but that if he is availing of any of them which would be normal in an industrial relations situation he would be clear? Is the Minister satisfied that that will be the interpretation of the clause as amended?

Dr. Woods

Yes, that is the purpose, because the use of any of those procedures would be a reasonable approach on the part of the employer.

Amendment agreed to.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Amendment No. 2b meets Deputy O'Keeffe's amendment No. 3. Amendments Nos. 3a and 4, which are alternatives, are related. It is proposed for discussion to take amendments Nos 2b, 3, 3a and 4 together.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I have no great objection to it except that, even though there is some relationship here, what we are talking about in my amendment No. 3, which would be the ministerial amendment No. 2b, is a question to be considered by the tribunal whereas the next amendment is in regard to a factor relating to the adjudication of the decision-making situation of the tribunal, which is somewhat different to the question to be considered by it.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

If amendment No. 2b is accepted, amendment No. 3 could not be moved at all.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Amendment No. 2b appears to be the Minister's interpretation of my amendment No. 3.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Yes.

Mr. O'Keeffe

That is all right. They should be taken together, but not in conjunction with the next amendments.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I said that in anticipation of there being an agreement. If there is not agreement, the Deputy is entitled to have his amendments taken in whichever fashion is appropriate to him.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I have separate points to make in relation to the Minister's second next amendment.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

We are taking discussion on amendments Nos. 2b and 3 together.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 2a:

In page 3, between lines 30 and 31, to insert the following:—"(iv) the question whether the conduct of the applicant or of a trade union acting on his behalf was reasonable;".

This amendment is an abbreviation of amendment No. 3 in Deputy O'Keeffe's name. Deputy O'Keeffe's more extensive amendment would, it is felt, force workers to go to the Labour Court whereas the conciliation machinery of the Labour Court is based on voluntary participation. But the amendment which I have proposed refers to reasonable conduct and is adequate for the purpose intended.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I should say first that the person who is making out these amendments was not very good at reading my writing. The word in my amendment was "reasonable" and not "desirable" as is typed here. What I had in mind was that as well as considering the conduct of the employer it would be relevant that there should be a specific question for consideration by the tribunal as to the conduct of the applicant. The Minister has accepted this point in principle in that his amendment takes the point that the conduct of the applicant and as to whether it is reasonable is to be specifically taken into account. However the second part of my amendment was to some extent related to the obligation on the part of the employer to avail of the services of the Labour Court and quite clearly it would be a black mark against the employer if he had not done so, and rightly so because the Labour Court and the various services associated with it should be availed of in times of an industrial dispute. My worry is that, even though the Minister has accepted the spirit of my amendment as to inquiry into the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employee, he has not accepted the question as to whether such employee has been willing to avail of the services of the Labour Court.

How does the Minister suggest that it is reasonable that an employer must avail of the services of the Labour Court while there is no similar obligation on the employee? I would suggest that an employer who comes before the tribunal without being willing to avail of the services of the Labour Court does not come with the clean hands and that the same would apply to an employee. There seems to be a lack of balance in not totally accepting my amendment.

Mr. Pattison

The Bill without this amendment is an attempt to correct an imbalance. We must remind ourselves that practically all the references to this legislation will arise from some initiative on the part of the employer who seeks to make changes in conditions of employment which in the opinion of the trade union and the workers, would make them less favourable than previously. The emphasis in the Bill must be on dealing with such problems. There is a loophole in existing legislation which enables actions by employers to create difficult work situations. The Bill is not designed to deal with a strike which results solely from a decision by employees since that matter is already adequately covered.

I should prefer to see consistent phraseology in the Bill and in the amendments. What is the difference between "any action or decision by the employer" and "conduct of the applicant"? Could not the same words be used in both cases?

The amendment is superfluous to the real purpose of the Bill.

Mr. Gallagher

(Waterford): I fail to see the reason for amendment No. 2b. The earlier amendment, by deleting the words “of officers of the Labour Court”, has clearly set down guidelines whereby the participants would come before the tribunal. Who can define “reasonable” conduct? What would be reasonable to one man might be unreasonable to another. The tribunal will decide whether or not the conduct of an employer has been reasonable.

Dr. Woods

My amendment refers to "reasonable" conduct and I am informed that this is adequate.

Mr. O'Keeffe

We have provided earlier in the Bill that the employer must have recourse to the services of the Labour Court and the purpose of the second part of my amendment was to impose a similar obligation on the employee. It seems sensible that both parties should be encouraged to go to the Labour Court to get the problem resolved. If there is pressure on the employer to go to the Labour Court or one of the associated services I fail to see why there should not be similar pressure on the employee.

Dr. Woods

If the employee does not take reasonable steps he will be seen to be unreasonable. The nature of the machinery involves voluntary participation by employees. The employer is obliged to refer to the services normally availed of by employers in the interest of good industrial relations and he is not tied specifically to the Labour Court. The employee must behave in a reasonable way in relation to the various procedures open to him. It is not necessary to force the employee to go specifically to the Labour Court and this is not normal procedure.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I appreciate that attendance at the Labour Court is voluntary and perhaps in many ways that is the strength of the Labour Court. We have removed the pressure on the employer to go to the Labour Court but he must avail of the services normally availed of by employers in the interest of good industrial relations. Is it not the natural corrollary that the employee should similarly avail of services normally availed of by employees in the interest of good industrial relations? I am merely trying to encourage both sides as far as possible to use normal industrial relations.

Mr. Gallagher

(Waterford): It appears that Deputy O'Keeffe is losing sight of the reason why this legislation is before us. It is not to protect the interests of employers or act against their interests but to cater for the contingency where, because of a loophole in the legislation, employers were exploiting the situation to force unfavourable conditions and changes in work practices on workers.

Dr. Woods

The purpose of the Bill is to prevent situations in which employers are forcing employees into the kind of positions we are talking about. It is sufficient for the employees to behave in a reasonable way. That covers the point. The tribunal will decide what is reasonable for an employee in those circumstances. What is reasonable will mean the normal use of procedures which are available to employees. It is covered by "reasonable behaviour" and the tribunal will take that into consideration.

Mr. O'Keeffe

In a situation where, to put it colloquially, the employer has been acting the "louser", we should find a way to deal with that. Let us remember that we are introducing a Bill which may have wider effects. Under the first section, anyone who is disqualified from receiving employment benefit can go to the tribunal.

Mr. Pattison

If they are disqualified under section 35.

Mr. O'Keeffe

The tribunal is entitled to take all the circumstances into account. One of my worries is that there would be a rush on the tribunal to the detriment of the Labour Court. People should be encouraged as far as possible to go to the Labour Court from the point of view of trying to get a dispute settled. My real worry is that no matter what the circumstances, an employee in dispute with an employer will be looking at any angle he can to ensure he will get unemployment benefit, possibly to the detriment of the Labour Court procedure.

That is the background to my suggestion that there should be pressure on the employer, through the Bill, to avail either of the Labour Court or normal industrial relations procedures and similarly there should be pressure on the employee to avail of normal industrial relations procedures. I should not like to see a situation where employees would concentrate their attention on the tribunal and try to get an adjudication against the employer while the strike continues and normal industrial relations procedures through the Labour Court are neglected. The employer should have to have recourse to the Labour Court and similarly with the employee. That is why I included it as the second part of my amendment. I am glad the Minister accepted my amendment in that regard. It would be ridiculous to think that the employer could succeed unless he was acting reasonably. Since it is spelled out for the employer that acting reasonably includes availing of industrial relations procedures, why do we not have the same thing in regard to employees?

Mr. Pattison

It is already covered in the existing Act. If an employee is out of work through his own fault he is disqualified. The Bill is to cover the other situation which was wide open until now. The Bill states that the employee concerned must satisfy all the other conditions. He must be available for work and free to go to work if his employer lets him. This Bill deals with a social welfare problem and not an industrial relations one as such. Deputy O'Keeffe's point is widening the Bill to take in industrial relations.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Trying to tighten it, not widen it.

Mr. Pattison

The Bill is to enable people who are out of work through an unreasonable act on the part of their employer to get social welfare benefits. There should not be any necessity to include the kind of amendment the Deputy proposes in the Bill.

Dr. Woods

I have accepted the principle of what Deputy O'Keeffe sought. I am assured that the way in which it is expressed in practice is quite adequate and suitable for situations which will arise. We are dealing with cases where an employee is forced into a situation and may not have any option open to him. In that situation the tribunal will have to decide whether the employee acted in a reasonable way.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I appreciate the fact that the Minister has accepted five of my seven amendments. I hope he appreciates the number of hours I spent making them out. Does the Minister envisage that it will be considered unreasonable behaviour on the part of the employee if he does not engage in normal industrial relations procedures?

Dr. Woods

Of course. The tribunal will so find.

Mr. O'Keeffe

If the Minister is quite satisfied on that I am happy.

Dr. Woods

That is the reason for including the term "reasonable" here, to ensure that the tribunal can consider the actions of the employee at the same time as those of the employer.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Subject to a later review, I accept the Minister's view on that.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No. 3 not moved.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 3a:

In page 3, line 35, after "employer" to insert "and having considered whether the conduct of the applicant or of a trade union acting on his behalf was reasonable and whether the employer or a body acting on his behalf was willing to avail of the services normally availed of in the interests of good industrial relations".

This is a revised version of amendment No. 4 by Deputy O'Keeffe and is drafted in more global terms to give the tribunal wider and more flexible terms of reference.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I accept that the Minister has taken the spirit of my amendment. An applicant should not be entitled to succeed in getting unemployment benefit while on strike in circumstances where he was not willing to engage in normal industrial relations procedures and the employer was. Problems would arise where normal industrial relations procedures were not being followed. That being so, I took the view in framing my amendment that, if they were being followed by the employer and not by the employee, the tribunal would be precluded from making an award.

Even though the Minister has largely accepted the wording of my amendment the effect of the change is that, instead of the tribunal being precluded in those circumstances, it merely considers those two points. I gathered from the Minister's speech that he took the view that an award would not be made by the tribunal to an applicant in either of these two circumstances: where the employer was engaged in normal industrial relations procedures or where the employer was not willing to engage in these procedures. While the wording is largely the same, there is a subtle difference in the effect of the two draft amendments.

Dr. Woods

In the latter case the employee would then be acting unreasonably in any event so the terms of amendment No. 3a are really to bring in the services normally availed of in the interest of good industrial relations rather than particularly specifying the Labour Court.

Mr. O'Keeffe

None of us is a judge of interpretation but is the Minister satisfied — and this is a matter which can be brought up in the review which is suggested in 12 months — that if an employer has been using the normal industrial relations procedures an award cannot be made? Is he also satisfied that if an employee has not been using normal industrial relations procedures an award cannot be made?

Dr. Woods

Basically the answer to both questions is "yes" unless there is a situation in which the employer is abusing the machinery. That is already covered and the tribunal could give a decision in accordance with that.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I accept the Minister's rephrasing of my amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No 4. not moved.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 4a:

In page 3, line 52, after "conclusive" to insert "but an appeal shall lie to the High Court on a question of law".

This is a revised drafting of amendment No. 5 on Deputy O'Keeffe's list. In substance it is the same, the Parliamentary Draftsman just made a variation on the text. This clause normally applies in many Acts and I have no objection to it applying here also.

Mr. Pattison

Is it correct to say that the parties to any question are the particular applicant for benefit and the Minister for Social Welfare? The employer gives evidence at the tribunal. In other words, the appeal shall lie to the High Court on a question of law. That would be mainly irrelevant to either the applicant or the Department. Would the employer have a right on a point of law because, strictly speaking, it is the Social Welfare Fund that we are talking about?

Dr. Woods

Essentially, any of the parties would have a constitutional right to apply on a point of law.

Mr. Pattison

But the applicant would be taking the case against the Department to the tribunal. They are the two opposing points of view. The decision of the deciding officer and appeals officer would represent the Department versus the applicant and the employer would be just the witness.

Dr. Woods

Any of the parties would be entitled on a point of law to appeal if they felt strongly enough about the point of law which they saw to exist in the interpretations which were made.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Deputy Pattison raised a very good point because the parties would be the applicant and the Minister of the Department. The employer would not be a party and the Minister is merely saying that any of the parties could apply to the High Court. That is not answering the question as to whether the employer could apply. On a practical basis the employer would not have any great interest in the matter since it is the Minister, representing PAYE workers, who is paying out and the employee who would be getting paid. The employer is not really interested one way or the other. It seems the employer is not a party to the proceedings but I do not know whether he would have some type of third party right of audience in the High Court.

Dr. Woods

Some of the Deputy's colleagues on the back benches raised the point that it could affect the climate in which employers operate. The two parties will be the appeals officer and the employee. As I understand it, the employer could have recourse also if he felt that there was a point of law because he would be party to the deliberations in any event. I will have that point checked and I will come back to it before we finish.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No. 5 not moved.

Dr. Woods

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 3, line 53, after "interested" to insert "(including the Minister)".

This amendment is the same as amendment No. 6 on Deputy O'Keeffe's list. We understand that the Minister is covered by the present provision but the amendment which Deputy O'Keeffe proposes would make it more specific and we have no objection to it.

Mr. Pattison

Under that provision, if a person is refused the application by the tribunal and applies for a review of their decision, will the tribunal have the power to go back to the original date or will it be from a current date? Sometimes there is much confusion in appeals under the social welfare code, particularly second and third appeals. In the event of an appeal being successful, on what date would the money be paid?

Dr. Woods

The wording here is quite broad in that the tribunal may review their decision if they are satisfied that a material change has occurred in the circumstances of the stoppage of work or trade dispute which caused the stoppage of work. The tribunal could review the position generally.

Mr. Pattison

And is there no time limit on it?

Dr. Woods

There is no time limit here. I am advised that in effect the tribunal would be entitled to review entirely, depending on the change in circumstances which is brought to their attention.

Mr. O'Keeffe

The reason I put down this amendment was that I wanted to make it quite clear, since the Minister is the person who on behalf of the taxpayer is paying out this money, that he would be entitled to a review situation if he thought it necessary.

Mr. Gallagher

(Waterford): Deputy O'Keeffe is making an assumption about payment of the money. The idea of a tribunal is to adjudicate and it does not follow that because an employee or a group of employees go to a tribunal the tribunal will necessarily adjudicate in favour of those employees.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I accept that the tribunal could adjudicate either way, but in either case either the applicant or the Minister could come back to the tribunal provided there is a material change in circumstances. I want to make it clear that both sides, the applicant particularly and the Minister, whether the tribunal give a decision favourable or unfavourable to the applicant, can come back if there is a material change in the circumstances.

Dr. Woods

I have been informed that the employer as an interested party would also have an appeal under section 1.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 4, between lines 26 and 27, to insert the following:

"(c) The Chairman shall be a High Court or Circuit Court Judge."

The supplementary list of amendments put out by the Minister made it obvious that we were to be all sweetness and light up to this. It was largely an acceptance of my amendments, but he has stopped at No. 6. I am concerned at the lack of definition of the post of chairman. This position will be highly important in that effectively two members will be nominated by the ICTU and two nominated by the employer organisations — I will have a point to make on that afterwards as to why we mention the ICTU and not the FUE——

Mr. Pattison

Or the CII.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I will be interested to know what is in the Minister's mind on that. The chairman, or chairperson, will be in the middle and this person will have a very important function. In that situation the Bill should contain some definition as to what kind of qualifications we should seek from the chairman and other aspects related to his role. Late last night when I was drafting these amendments I came to the conclusion that there should be some such definition. It seemed to me that a judge would at least guarantee total impartiality, but if the Minister has some alternative suggestion I would be quite prepared to look at it. Basically you are looking for somebody who is above and beyond the employer vested interest situation and similarly above and beyond the trade union vested interest situation.

Whether it is possible to find such a body in this country I do not know, but, as Deputy Crotty pointed out on Second Stage, everything will concentrate on this person. Naturally, two employers will approach the one tribunal, I will not say unfairly, but from an angle relating to their industrial background and environment. Similarly two trade unions will approach from a different angle. We want to find some way out of this impasse. I put down this amendment seeking that the chairman should be a judge, somebody who will be, and will be seen to be, totally impartial. If the Minister has other suggestions in that area I will not go totally bail on this, but I would be interested in his views on it. I trust he will understand and appreciate my reasons for attempting to define the position of chairman more so than is in the Bill.

Mr. Pattison

We have the unfair dismissals and redundancy tribunals and these have been reasonably successful. It has not happened that, irrespective of the merits of the case, in unfair dismissal cases the employer representative has consistently sided with the employer and the worker representative consistently sided with the worker, leaving the decision to the chairperson. It has worked reasonably well with both tribunals. I hope that we will get a chairperson with commonsense because, let me repeat what I said on Second Stage, I do not believe that a person from the High Court or Supreme Court with his legal experience — which is extremely limited, in fact it is non-existent as far as industrial relations are concerned — will be suitable. Anyone will tell you that a chairperson dealing with an industrial relations problem must have a completely trained outlook different from that of someone who is chairing, say, the Special Criminal Court or has a casting vote in the Supreme Court or something like that.

I oppose amendment No. 7 put down in the name of Deputy O'Keeffe. The provisions of this Bill will make it possible for the tribunal to have clear-cut evidence in all cases referred to them with very few grey areas in it. Decisions of the tribunal would not necessarily be two for the applicant and two against, lined up on the basis that the two employer representatives would vote against and the two worker representatives would vote for, irrespective of the merits of the case, and a decision taken by the chairperson. If we are to have that kind of tribunal we should forget about it now.

I would like the Minister to spell out in greater detail what he has in mind about the chairman, because that is not mentioned in the Bill. The Bill makes provision for the nomination and appointment of the other four members, but where the chairperson is to come from remains a mystery as far as the Bill is concerned.

Mr. Gallagher

(Waterford): I would appreciate it if the Minister would spell out what he would regard as the terms of reference or parameters by which he is to appoint this chairman. It would be an unmitigated disaster if he was to decide to appoint a chairman who would be a representative of the High Court, Circuit Court, District Court or any court. The whole history of the trade union movement has been to steer away from courts of law. The industrial relations scene is very complex. The type of person I would visualise as chairman of the tribunal would be one well versed in industrial relations procedures. If we move into the area of adopting legal personnel for this position, I could visualise many disasters ahead. One need only have regard to yesterday's papers to find an account of workers being jailed by High Court judges. Workers cannot have much confidence either in High Court judges vis-à-vis the manner in which injunctions are granted. There is a need for the Minister to spell out clearly the type of personnel he has in mind and the sort of qualifications they would need for these duties. Having said that I agree with Deputy Pattison that the Unfair Dismissals Tribunal and other tribunals also work quite well. I have appeared before the Unfair Dismissals Tribunal from time to time to represent employees and I have found that decisions were not weighted one way or the other. The tribunal seems to work quite fairly.

Dr. Woods

The reason I am not accepting the amendment proposed by Deputy O'Keeffe is that I do not wish to tie the legislation to the extent that a High Court or a Circuit Court judge would have to be involved. It could happen that such person might be available and might have the suitable background in the area of industrial relations but it would be inadvisable to restrict ourselves at this stage to having to find either a High Court or a Circuit Court judge who was available and suitable and who was generally acceptable. As Deputy Pattison has said, a barrister may be the kind of person with the right sort of experience for the position. I can think of other kinds of people, too, people who are experienced in industrial relations, university people, barristers or judges as the case may be. In any case, it will be our desire to have someone who will be seen clearly as being objective, independent and impartial and having sound judgement as well as being reasonably well versed in industrial relations procedures. When all of those qualities are put together we may be confined to one or two people in the country but I think Deputies will recognise that there are people available who have these qualities. It will be our intention and very much our interest to find someone who will act as a competent, impartial and independent chairman. That is the approach we would take in any event.

Mr. O'Keeffe

I accept that the rarefied atmosphere of the Four Courts may not be the best place in which to get an indepth knowledge of industrial relations. At the same time, there are certain functions under this Bill which will require somebody who will be good at evaluating evidence since the tribunal will be involved in the whole area of whether an employer or an employee was fair and reasonable in his behaviour. I accept also that the person evaluating the evidence should have a knowledge of industrial relations. I would assume that both the employer and the employee representatives on the tribunal would be in a position to supply a lot of that expertise but there is the question of the man in the middle and he would need to be good at evaluating a situation and reaching a decision in the event of a tie.

I am impressed by the comments of Deputy Pattison and endorsed by Deputy Gallagher in relation to the operation of existing tribunals. The Deputies have told us that from their experience of these tribunals they do not come down either on the side of the employer or of the employee. That gives us some hope that we will have a tribunal in this instance who will be able to judge situations fairly.

Another aspect of this legislation that must be considered is that the tribunal will have power to take evidence on oath and there is the proviso that false evidence given on oath will be effectively perjury. The question of the evaluation of evidence in that sort of situation might require someone with some legal training. I put down the amendment merely to highlight the difficulty in finding a chairman with all the characteristics necessary and to get the Minister's view as to the kind of person he has in mind. Perhaps the problem could be resolved if under subsection (5) the Minister were to indicate that the term of office of members of the tribunal would not be over long so that in the event of the appointment of an unmitigated disaster, whether of a legal or other nature, the person concerned could be got rid of after a short time. If the Minister were prepared to give us an assurance on those lines, my apprehensions might be allayed in this area.

Dr. Woods

We do not envisage many cases coming before the tribunal and consequently I would not envisage an appointment, particularly in the early stages, for a very long duration. That is a matter that could be considered also when we are reviewing the operation of the Bill after a period of a year. However, I accept the point the Deputy makes and I agree that it will not be appropriate at this stage to appoint someone for a long duration.

Mr. O'Keeffe

Perhaps the Minister will indicate what period he has in mind.

Dr. Woods

In the first place it is difficult to have any idea of how many cases there may be but if they are few and far between it may be sufficient to make the appointment for a short term. In the first instance, perhaps appointment for a year would be appropriate.

Mr. O'Keeffe

On that basis, I am withdrawing the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed: "That section 1, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Mr. O'Keeffe

As we shall not have the opportunity of dealing with the other amendments, there are a few points I should like to make on the section generally. The point here is that any person who is disqualified from benefit under section 35 of the Consolidation Act will be entitled to go to the tribunal. That was the basis of my original apprehensions about this whole Bill, that even though we are providing and hopefully we are, only for very isolated hardship cases, of which there have been two only, as I understand it, in the past——

An Ceann Comhairle

Might we interrupt business now for the Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach to move two motions?

Progress reported: Committee to sit again.