I am glad the Minister for Defence, Deputy Coveney, is here to take the motion because it gives this House an opportunity to discuss, in a non-confrontational way, progress in the Defence Forces over the next number of years.
We must take account of the history, tradition, culture and distinctive nature of the Defence Forces in any review and we must have the Army at heart. When outside consultants consider the resources and potential for change, the Army and its activities are often neglected. We must ensure that does not happen and we must try to gauge the leadership, structures, equipment, training and resources necessary to implement the role of the Defence Forces and satisfy the needs of society and our dependence on them. We must also understand the strain involved in many of these tasks. It is said that no soldier glories in war. They must carry out many tasks on our behalf at a risk to their lives and safety. Everyone in this House wants to pay tribute to their generosity, commitment and service both here and abroad.
Since the end of the Civil War and the establishment of the State, the Defence Forces have eschewed any involvement in politics; there has never been a suggestion of partiality on their part. They are, therefore, entitled to full consideration of their views about changing times and needs and the prospects for enhancement in any new review. I was disappointed to learn of unease in many ranks of the Defence Forces as a result of announcements made by the Minister, although these may not have been intended in the way they were interpreted. It is helpful, therefore, to thrash this matter out in the Dáil and make the Government aware of potential difficulties if consultation about proposed changes does not take place between the representatives of the Defence Forces.
In every democratic country people are proud of the activities of their Defence Forces, the men and women who take many risks for society, and nowhere is that more evident than here. Today it is taken for granted that Irish soldiers should serve alongside soldiers of other nationalities as part of the UN peacekeeping forces. Since Ireland's admission to the UN in 1955, 35,000 troops have contributed to peacekeeping missions throughout the world. A large number of Irish officers have also participated in the UN observer mission since 1958. In this way peacekeeping duties are a significant element in Irish military life and a concrete manifestation of Ireland's commitment to the UN and the maintenance of peace. The involvement of the Defence Forces in peacekeeping activities over the years is now an established tradition which affords many advantages.
The success of the participation of the Defence Forces in peace-keeping to date is evidence that it has a sufficiently high level of discipline and expertise. Further evidence is provided by the manner in which the Defence Forces carry out the many varied roles they are asked to fulfil, whether aiding the civil power or keeping vital State services going during industrial disputes and other emergencies. These soldiers are drawn from all sections of society. The majority live in homes alongside their civilian counterparts and not in barracks or military bases. This has further assisted the integration of the Defence Forces in society as well as helping to foster its democratic ethos.
The involvement of the Defence Forces in UN operations has been considerable. When one considers its small size, the contribution has been enormous. This involvement has been a great incentive for young people to join the Defence Forces. It has boosted morale and created a better public image of the Army. The publicity surrounding the operations of the UN and the involvement of the Defence Forces has been of enormous benefit to the country. Some 34 lives have been lost since 1958 in these activities, which shows how dangerous they are.
Irish troops are accustomed to working without heavy support weapons and it is ironic that this has worked in their favour during peacekeeping operations. Participation in peacekeeping operations has been the most significant development in the Defence Forces since their establishment and is now a substantial part of military life in Ireland and the personnel have made significant contributions to the cause of peace. They have also enhanced the image of the Defence Forces as a disciplined and well integrated military force at home and abroad.
While we must take cognisance of the tasks performed by the Defence Forces and their contribution to political stability and the institutions of State, the review currently being undertaken must ensure the substantial contribution being made to UN operations is not diminished in any way.
Many of us do not take due account of the varied roles thrust upon the Army. It must be capable of meeting immediate and short term requirements, provide a deterrent to would-be aggressors and provide for planned augmentation of the standing force. Few if any countries can afford to maintain adequate forces to meet a worst case scenario and this leads to the requirement to prioritise the roles or tasks in relation to threat assessment. Needless to say this is one of the primary functions the Government faces in setting these priorities.
Ireland has approximately 10 per cent of its Defence Forces officer strength abroad on UN or other peace missions at any one time. Approximately half of these rotate on a six-monthly basis; others on a 12-month or even an 18-month basis. In effect this means approximately 15 per cent of its officer strength is on overseas posting in any one year.
Fishery protection requires a capability to patrol an area of 132,000 square miles, which is 22 per cent of the entire sea fishery of western Europe. Concurrent with the fishery protection operations is the implementation of the basic principle of the law of the sea, which requires that a State must have the means properly to monitor activity by sea and air and assert jurisdiction over the territorial seas and economic zone of the State. The role requires the capability to deal on an ongoing basis with search and rescue; air ambulance services; ministerial air transport service; major disasters, including aircraft, shipping, train, oil or chemical spillage; natural disasters — forest fires, floods, storms and snow; disruption of essential services; and engineering and other technical services. The Defence Forces also deal with drug interdiction.
Experience has shown the Defence Forces have been involved in many disaster relief and maintenance of essential services operations such as fire services, water and sewerage works, refuse, ambulance service, fuel supplies and public transport. While specific training for such operations is not practicable, the capacity to provide a wide range of technical skills, allied with an organised and disciplined approach, has proved of immense value.
Many people — the same may be true of the review — underestimate the wide range of these activities and the public expectation that the Defence Forces should make provision for all these contingencies. Clearly the State does not have the resources to provide specific courses earmarked for the various operations so a highly trained, multi-skilled, versatile force is required, organised, equipped and trained along conventional lines, which can easily adapt to the requirements of different situations. I strongly support that and Fianna Fáil, in the context of the ongoing debate, will support measures leading towards such developments which will have to be achieved on a consultative basis.
In the Dublin area there are 850 troops from infantry, artillery and cavalry. In McKee Barracks and Clancy Barracks there are personnel in signals, engineering, ordnance, military police, supply and transport. Forces must be provided within the city for tasks associated with Dublin Airport and Casement Aerodrome, Dublin port, the Dáil, Government Buildings, Mountjoy Jail, the television station, the Central Bank, embassies, the Special Criminal Court, vital installations, and ceremonial duties. Tasks associated with the above frequently involve the deployment of groups larger than one battalion under the control of the headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. Permanent guards and patrols must also be provided to vital installations in accordance with the current threat assessment.
Having provided for the Border and Dublin city, the other areas are still left with a variety of tasks — security at Portlaoise and Limerick prisons; the explosives factory at Enfield and the explosives storage magazine at Cork; a military presence at civilian quarries, etc. for explosive blasting operations; Cork, Shannon and Knock international airports; seaports; Mount Gabriel radar station; cash centres; vital installations; and ceremonial duties. There are barracks in Athlone, Galway, Limerick, Cork and Kilkenny. Given the spread of deployment and range of tasks, it is imperative these units are controlled by a brigade headquarters and supported by brigade service support units.
The Defence Forces engage in joint operations with the Garda on searches, checkpoints, roadblocks, patrols, escorts of prisoners, explosives and cash, bomb disposal, crowd and riot control, and other areas. The Garda Síochána and the military are different forces with different philosophies and modus operandi. The requirement for co-operative procedures, including training, cannot be over-emphasised and these can only be achieved by deployment which takes account of the Garda deployment also.
Despite the many and varied tasks outlined, since 1979 defence spending has declined significantly as a percentage of Government spending and gross national product. The growth in defence spending has not kept pace with inflation. For instance, the expenditure on war-like stores over the past decade is as follows: in 1984, £10 million; 1985, £11 million; in 1986, £9.5 million; 1987, £11.8 million; 1988, £8.8 million; 1989, £7.5 million; 1990, £7.6 million; 1991, £5.1 million; 1992, £5 million; 1993, £4.5 million.
We have had no radical reorganisation of structure in the past 25 years. The tasks have increased, the resources have not kept pace with inflation, and the strength of the forces has declined. All parties agree, therefore, that it is time for change and modernisation and to ensure the resources necessary are provided.
Since 1988 the Defence Forces have been under scrutiny from a number of reviews, including those by Brady, and Gleeson and two by the EAG. This process has already had considerable impact on the organisation; it has also identified many of the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Defence Forces and the areas which need immediate attention.
It must however be clear that the pattern of Irish defence spending in the last decade has been such that there are no potential savings to fund the once-off costs of redundancies which will be necessary and the other reorganisation measures. The capacity has been eroded by the reduction in personnel numbers and the decline in expenditure on capital and operational items, as already outlined.
Any solution proposed would have to be broadly accepted by the military authorities if it were to be implemented. If we have a difference with the Minister it is here, at the kernel of the problem. The Minister should not say he has had adequate consultations because he has met representative organisations on one or two occasions to discuss one or two items. The success of the changes — which we all would like to see take place in a modern Ireland — is dependent on the Defence Forces having a belief in and a commitment to ensuring that success.
Will the Minister say whether the Price Waterhouse report was driven more by cost considerations rather than the primary requirement, which is to ensure we have a balanced approach and the proper resources necessary in a successful defence force? Was there too much emphasis on systems bought in from elsewhere, particularly Canada?
The absence of ongoing recruitment to redress in a balanced fashion the decline in personnel has also contributed to the problems being experienced. The problem areas are: the inability to carry out worthwhile collective training; insufficient number of troops on the ground in peak units; the unacceptably high age profile of the Defence Forces and the necessity to rationalise the numbers and strength of units; the need for a comprehensive personnel policy for the recruitment of young soldiers and a system of retirement to correct the age profile; structures to deal with the excessive number of personnel medically unfit for duties; the engagement by the military in activity not required by their assigned roles; the reform of the top structure of the Department of Defence, both military and civil, so that authority is aligned with responsibilities; the wide geographic deployment of the forces; soldiers employed on duties which could more appropriately be carried out by civilian employees; and the multiple layering of command structures.
In implementing proposals to remedy those problems it is vital that the military authorities are comfortable with and have confidence in the approach taken. The consultants' approach — to decide the strength and numbers for the Defence Forces based on a predetermined savings target — is scarcely the way to tackle this fundamental problem. It will and should be necessary to consider the requirements and strength in numbers of the Defence Forces on the basis of the roles assigned to them and on the Government's and national requirements of the day. It is clear when we look at the Price Waterhouse proposals that a reduction of the Permanent Defence Force by 3,000, following the reduction of 2,500 in the past decade, can scarcely be acceptable.
With regard to the closure of 17 barracks, the costs of relocation far outweigh the cost benefits in the short term. The cost of relocating from Collins Barracks to other Dublin barracks is estimated to be £22 million. I have referred previously to Kickham Barracks in Clonmel where over 300 personnel are based. While I do not wish to speak in strictly economic terms, the total salary value of the barracks to that part of Tipperary is £4.5 million per year. It is an important and institutional part of the economic fabric of the area. I could speak about other areas and Deputy O'Rourke will discuss these matters in relation to the midlands.
It is clear that the Price Waterhouse proposals, while containing eminently sensible and practical recommendations which can be implemented after full consultation, also incorporate serious weaknesses which, if implemented, could present a high security risk to the State. The proposals were cost driven and do not take account of the threats, policy and roles. Despite the reduction in numbers of 2,500 since 1981, it is not practical to contemplate a further reduction of 3,000 if one considers the variety of roles which I already outlined and the essential nature of many of those tasks. While we need highly trained and highly motivated people who are always available, we hope it will not be necessary to carry out many of the tasks I have outlined. However, the State has an obligation to provide such security to the public and the public has never been found wanting in making resources available for these important areas. Regardless of deployment and security requirements, the Price Waterhouse proposed closure of 17 barracks is excessive.
The report proposes to reduce FCA numbers by more than 10,000. It proposes two brigade structures which would be inadequate for current commitments at home and overseas and could have major implications for the future operational capacity of the Defence Forces. Everybody accepts that the ratios of personnel to non-personnel spending are out of order. We look forward to proposals to move that ratio nearer to 70:30. However, this will require an injection of funds at the initial stages of implementation. This is necessary to solve the age profile problems and achieve a fully effective defence force. The funding injection should be considered in the context of the sharp decline in defence spending over the last decade.
Price Waterhouse is seriously short of technical specialists in its proposals and that would place restrictions on the numbers available for UN service. The provision of forces for commitments in the Dublin area is inadequate. The proposal for training does not solve the problem of the lack of collective training and adequate resources have not been provided for that. Manpower must be addressed as a matter of urgency. We do not have a manpower policy. Some of the problems that have developed are a result of that. A personnel policy document should be produced to address employee resourcing, employee relations and employee development. Previous studies in this area, including the Gleeson commission report, might be useful. A key area of overall personnel policy will be the proper staffing of personnel support services already instituted on foot of the Gleeson commission recommendation.
The Permanent Defence Force has an establishment of 17,966. The actual strength, however, is 28 per cent below that figure. The establishment of 12,326 which is proposed by the military authorities may not in any sense be interpreted as a notional figure — it is the minimum figure at which the Defence Forces must be maintained. Operational efficiency within this lower establishment is contingent on the satisfactory resolution of personnel issues. Since 1981 the age profile of other ranks has deteriorated to a current average of 34 years with a devastating decrease in the 16 to 25 year age brackets. This arises from low recruitment and low wastage.
Recruits enlisted after January 1994 are offered five years service with limited numbers extended beyond this period. This, together with reduced maximum entry ages, continuous recruitment and other measures would help to counter the imbalance. The new manpower policy must cater for planned intake of recruits, cadets and other apprentices into the Army, Navy and Air Corps to match a controlled wastage pattern. This scheme will require additional funding at the initial stages. The Minister might be in a position to say when this year's recruitment will start and how many will be recruited. We hope the number achieved last year will be achieved later this year. The introduction of a comprehensive manpower policy with implementable discharge schemes will eliminate the problem of excessive medically unfit personnel. The personnel establishment proposed is dependent on all personnel being medically fit.
Price Waterhouse highlighted the serious deficiencies in training, particularly in respect of collective training in the Defence Forces. The cost benefit analysis validated this assessment. However, having identified the problem so clearly, Price Waterhouse failed to address it. The proposal outlined by Price Waterhouse removes the command training cells, closes the command training depots, and the junior command staff school of the military college, creates a national training centre with little or no infrastructure for administration, transport, military police etc., closes the corps school and the Army apprentice school without proposing an effective solution to provide for specialist training. It does not address the collective training requirements at sub-unit and brigade level. To successfully prepare soldiers for combat, a training system must meet all the functional and command needs of the entire fighting entity. Since 1991, the number of personnel in the Defence Forces has fallen by almost 2,652. This decline in numbers, combined with the increase in operational taskings, has undermined the ability of the Defence Forces to provide for any meaningful collective training.
In the context of phasing in part or some of the proposals in the short to medium term all the necessary consultation should take place on the full package and there should be a broad canvas and consensus as to the necessary measures to be introduced. If we do not have a phased in, single measure approach, it will continue to undermine not only the strength of the Defence Forces but all the attitudes which have been carefully built up over a considerable period of time.