I am very concerned at a number of developments arising from the first phase of the implementation plan of the review of the Defence Forces. I am asking the House to consider carefully the issues involved so that a more satisfactory and comprehensive set of solutions can be found to meet these difficulties.
Armies are looked at in a different light during peacetime. Members of the public often believe that the peace they enjoy is of a permanent nature. They can be lulled into a false sense of security which history, time after time, has shown can come home to haunt. Peace is often fragile and delicate. Ugly conflicts can arise in the most unexpected quarters. None of us can be sure whether such conflict will be internal or external.
The task of a defence force is to be always in a state of readiness in terms of numbers, morale, equipment, training and education to deal effectively with any contingency. No one doubts that this is a difficult task, one on which there is unanimity neither in the Oireachtas nor among the public generally as to the amount of financial resources, strategies and plans that should be permanently in place to provide maximum security at a reasonable cost.
The Irish people are immensely proud of their Defence Forces. Their involvement in peacekeeping missions with the United Nations has not only boosted morale in the Defence Forces but has instilled immense pride in the people of the country as a whole. The Defence Forces perform many other functions in aid of the civil power. One of their primary functions is to defend the State against armed aggression, and it is in this area that further debate is required so that when the reform process is completed the Defence Forces will be in a position to defend and protect our interests. The face of aggression may have changed but it is still very real, and no Government can afford to ignore it. It is not, therefore, viable to contemplate a reduction in manpower in the Defence Forces, and it is certainly not viable to proceed without a strategic plan, as the Government is bent on doing.
While I welcome the review of the Defence Forces in so far as it recognises some of the problems affecting the ability of the forces to meet their commitments, I cannot agree with the thrust of what is going on. No one disagrees that it is high time for change. However, for change to be effective it must embrace all the vital elements, fit into a strategic plan which is out in the open, transparent and capable of being understood and managed by members of the Defence Forces, covering the full period of the reform programme. Structures, personnel, equipment and infrastructure are the vital components, and a true sketch of changes proposed and their impact must be charted immediately. There can be no hidden agenda.
This Government is obviously not adopting an open approach. There is clearly no detailed planning in the area of organisational structures and personnel models, even though these have to be married successfully to current realities if the reform process is to succeed.
I accept that many of the underlying problems we face today did not grow up overnight. Here I cite an extract from "Defence '96" prepared by a group of retired military officers:
The failure of successive Governments to tackle the problem of defence in any meaningful way has led to many of the current problems in the Defence Forces. These problems were caused by piecemeal decisions at Government or departmental level, for example, the cancellation of recruiting, reduction in strength of 30 per cent of establishment. These decisions in turn have had a knock on effect leading to the average age of soldiers being too high, soldiers on security duties working very long hours, inability to undertake sub-unit and unit collective training, lack of sufficient up-to-date equipment, the imbalance of 80:20 between pay and resources.
Successive Governments stand indicted on the non-implementation of a constant recruitment drive. This starvation has been disastrous for the Army in terms of age profile, career development, promotional opportunity, etc. In fairness to the military personnel, many of the current problems were outlined by them but ignored by the Oireachtas. Fundamental problems such as age profile which is too high, organisational duplication, inadequate equipment and the imbalance between pay and non-pay at 80:20 which is far too high are undoubtedly all there. Many of the matters which have been highlighted in the Price Waterhouse review were well known and documented by military commanders, but they had not the power to institute change when the requirement was first identified. The old saying "a stitch in time saves nine" was not heeded. The problems are now compounded, will take longer to resolve and may well cost more money.
Some of the pressures would be eased if, in the first instance, the implementation group would clarify the type and nature of the force they believe is required for the future. There is general agreement that the force should be a conventional all-arms one with a light infantry-based element and that it should have a high degree of mobility and a capacity for rapid deployment. However, huge questions remain to be answered as to what is actually involved in these terms. Detailed information on these aspects is essential so that the working groups can do their work effectively. We must know at the outset the type and nature of the force in order to design a logistics system. Equally, the team dealing with personnel needs to know the mix of unit types the force will have before it can determine proper personnel arrangements, the ranks and the skills required.
Here we are in the first phase of implementation and a fleshed-out concept of the type of force which is intended has not been articulated. There is no plan, no mission, just a hotchpotch of stop-go measures which are the hallmark of past mistakes. We have had leaks, statements, counter-statements, denials. This House is entitled, and members of the Defence Forces have the right, to know the details of what is envisaged for them in the future. For any review to be successful, it is vital that the Defence Forces take ownership of the change process and be fully committed to its success. We live in an age where consensus is the order of the day — great minds think alike. Participation by those who must plan and implement decisions is vital. Not nearly enough is happening in this area, and this can lead to endless frustration.
This is not only my view, it is the view of the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers. To prove my point let me quote from their presentation to the Select Committee on Legislation and Security on 30 April last:
The manner in which the Implementation Group carried out its work had an extremely negative effect on officers. In the aftermath of the Goverment decision the previous July, officers had been optimistic and confident regarding the future of the Defence Forces and eager to participate in shaping the organisation of the future. However, they now felt that the Implementation Group had excluded them from real involvement in the process and this had a major negative impact on the professional self-esteem of all officers. To them it reflected a low evaluation by their military and civilian superiors of their professionalism, skills and commitment to Defence Forces. The damage which this did to the morale of the Officer Corps should not be under estimated.
This lack of communication and involvement was compounded by the continuous leaks to the media concerning elements of the review, which led to a great degree of uncertainty among the members of the Forces and had a serious negative effect upon their morale. This resulted in a situation where officers became extremely suspicious of the motivation behind the process and where they began to view it as "something which is being done to them", rather than something which is positive and with which they are intimately and vitally involved. In short, the Implementation Group failed to achieve the single most important ingredient for successful change — i.e. ownership of the process by those who must implement it.
The failure to produce an Overall Strategic Plan added greatly to the uncertainty felt by officers regarding the future of the Defence Forces. The plan concentrates on the area of structure/personnel which will, in the main, impact negatively on members of the Forces and includes only brief references to the positive areas (for officers as professionals) of equipment and infrastructure/facilities. Officers consider that it will be difficult to maintain the momentum for charge beyond the first phase, particularly when the matters to be dealt with in the later phases involve additional expenditure, rather than overall savings as in phase one. The experience of the period during which the Implementation Group was preparing its plan led to a high degree of scepticism among the members of the Officer Corps regarding the level of commitment to positive reform of the Defence Forces which exists outside the Forces and regarding what is the "real agenda" of the process. The belief that the process had been hijacked by those who see it solely as an opportunity to achieve financial cuts and savings in the short-term and who have no interest in the long-term well being of the Defence Forces became widespread among officers.
On the closure of barracks and lack of transparency in the Government in dealing with this vital issue. I do not have time this evening to go into the importance of Army barracks, particularly in small towns, where householders have had an opportunity to integrate with local communities and become involved in their cultural, sporting and other activities. Since it appears the Minister is under the impression that, whenever we raise this issue, we are endeavouring to cause problems and annoyance without any justification I will quote a further extract from the position paper of the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers to the Select Committee on Legislation and Security at its meeting held on 30 April last, page 16 under the heading "Logistical Support — Existing Barracks/Facilities". It reads:
It is implicit in the Government's statement of 3 July 1995 on the matter of facilities that the Implementaton Group was required to ensure that the Plan put forward provided for the maintaining of all current facilities pending an eventual decision on the matter by Government. However, RACO's analysis of the Implementation Group's plan for Phase 1 clearly indicates that it is based on the assumption that approximately eight of our existing barracks/posts will close.
The logistics structures proposed by the Group are, we understand, designed to allow the operational units to operate independently in the field and to provide a barrack housekeeping structure which does not impair this ability. The Group proposes a "Camp Staff" section in the Logistics Battalion of each Brigade to provide this structure. This staff would provide personnel to support barracks and units in a number of areas including fuel, energy and utilities, clothing the soft ordnance, building maintenance and furnishings, and rations, cooking and dining. However, it is clear that this Camp Staff element is insufficient to meet the needs of all existing barracks/posts. Indeed, during a briefing by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Working Groups in December 1995, RACO was informed that this staff was designed to maintain only five barracks per Brigade, thus confirming the results of the Association's own analysis in this area.
The association fully accepts that there is no mention of the closure of facilities in the Group's report. Equally we fully accept the assurances the Minister for Defence has personally given in this regard. However, the Association is absolutely satisfied that the Group's proposals in respect of "Camp Staffs" will, if implemented, mean that the review of facilities when it takes place will inevitably conclude that up to eight barracks cannot be supported. This, of course would provide a strong argument for their closure.
I want the Minister to clarify these matters this evening because it is not good enough to say closures will not take place during the first phase of the implementation plan. I have said time and time again that such decisions are being put off in the hope of a future Government having to take them.
This is a time for consensus, for being open and frank about what is proposed for the future of the Defence Forces. There is much cynicism about politicians, including Ministers, to which we add when we do not face up to realities. For example, the former Minister for Defence, Deputy Coveney, said in an interview on "Morning Ireland" that there will be closures and 24 hours later he said the opposite, that there would not be closures during the implementation of the first phase.
It is now time to call a spade a spade, to say exactly what will happen in the term of the plan, thus letting communities know whether barracks located in their areas will close. It is clear from what commissioned officers have said — and they accept the Minister's word that nothing will happen during the first phase — that it will be impossible, on the basis of the staffing levels proposed, to maintain present numbers.
There is no career structure for enlisted personnel in the Defence Forces. It is crucial for the morale of the force that their terms of pay, conditions of service, career development and social needs be protected and developed. Under the proposed manpower policy career development must be realistic, rewarding and capable of fulfilling the individual career aspirations of our soldiers.
The criteria for promotion and extension of service have not been dealt with adequately either by the Gleeson report or in the implementation plan. Because of the uncertainty it is very important that we deal with these issues now.
Chapter Seven of the submission document of PDFORRA to the Select Committee on Legislation and Security dated 16 April 1996 under the heading "Manpower Policy" reads as follows:
PDFORRA considers that the Government's position that the age profile of all ranks of the Defence Forces is the overriding problem needing to be addressed under proposed manpower models is flawed and that it does not stand the test of in-depth analysis.
Lack of proper performance appraisal particularly for the private soldier, a job description, physical, military and general education criteria for promotion and extension of service are more contributory to the perceived shortcomings of members of the Defence Forces than a rising age profile.
To suggest that a soldier who does not reach the rank of corporal within 5 years or a sergeant within 12 years should be discontinued in service even though he has proved an excellent soldier is contradictory. The emphasis on addressing the age profile has more relevance in the manpower models for enlisted infantry soldiers than for enlisted technicians and for commissioned officers. The retention in service for longer periods of the latter two categories is based on a return for investment but is inconsistent and contradicts the stated necessity of letting infantry Privates go after five years and infantry Corporals after 12 years to avail of a recurrence of increasing the ageprofile. An officer it appears can serve in all cases to over 50 years of age while enlisted personnel who are technicians from Private up to Sergeant rank can serve for 21 years.
PDFORRA's position is that once an individual can function satisfactorily based on a job description, age becomes secondary.
Present members of the Defence Forces have served loyally and with distinction particularly whilst undergoing United Nations missions
The criteria for promotion and continuance in service under which they enlisted has been met otherwise they would not be serving.
The capping of service in the rank on future promotion for existing enlisted personnel is also a change in conditions of service and inconsistent with the Voluntary Early Retirement offer.
Serving personnel should they not be selected or avail of VER may at a future date be faced with redundancy under these proposals. PDFORRA has never been at any time consulted on this proposition prior to the release of the Government Implementation Plan.
The so-called 1994 intake of contract soldiers who are three years into their term do not yet have a proper performance appraisal or criteria and will be interviewed before a board for selection for continuance in service. It will be very difficult for such a board to be objective. Under the present restrictions on promotion in an army undergoing troop cuts and reorganisation they do not have a reasonable expectation to be promoted in fair competition.
Female infantry soldiers in operational units have their opportunities for promotions severely curtailed as they are prevented by a decision of the military authorities from serving below company HQ level whilst on service with the United Nations in South Lebanon. A good overseas performance appraisal rating is essential for promotion.
The Minister and I, as members of the Select Committee on Security and Legislation, have had a good opportunity to touch briefly on the five year contract. While most people agree the contract is a good arrangement, it is presenting problems that need to be overcome. It is very important that it is indicated at this stage what changes are possible in the five year contract. It was argued in committee discussions that it takes up to three years to train a soldier and, whether it takes three years and six months or more, it is very important that the country has access to the most highly qualified and active soldiers in the Department of Defence. For that reason I propose the following options; to indicate that it will be possible to increase the length of the planned period of contract or that significant numbers will be offered a second contract.
Where the State has made an investment in the skills and training of highly motivated people who have served with the United Nations, it is important that they have better career opportunities than the proposed five year contract gives them. No one wants to return to a situation where age profile difficulties will arise, however no one wants to frustrate the career opportunities for highly trained and motivated soldiers. Fianna Fáil on its return to office intends to do something positive about this and will ensure that significantly greater numbers of those who have satisfactorily completed their contracts will have an opportunity to accept another contract.
The Minister is providing for an in-depth study of the Naval Service, the Air Corps, the Reserve Defence Forces, civilianisation, equipment and military accommodation. Does he believe it is possible to implement the first phase of this plan successfully without knowing what the studies will throw up? Does he intend to have these studies completed very quickly? Will the plan be put in abeyance in some instances until the studies produce information which will enable him to proceed? It is crucial that one or other of those options is taken.
The Naval Service requires very special attention. I suggest that the implementation plan for the Naval Service should be put in abeyance until the study has been completed. It is important that the study must not be conditioned by the process that has developed so far. The Naval Service was not represented on the study group and hence many of its special requirements were not even adverted to. The Naval Service has no fear that an honest assessment of its special circumstances will not bring forward recommendations for increased personnel and equipment.
It is absolutely crucial that the implementation group in its endeavours to reduce numbers in the Defence Forces gives special consideration to the Naval Service. It is clear that the defence role of the Naval Service should be enhanced and that better equipment should be available to it to discharge these functions.
It is clear that its non military role creates the greater problems for the Naval Service. As a maritime nation with a massive coastline to protect, including fishery protection, enforcement of maritime law, drug interdiction and rescue, the Naval Service is not equipped in terms of facilities or personnel to discharge these responsibilities and can only provide a fire brigade service for the area of 132,000 square miles. It is unspeakable to think that the implementation group would further reduce these hopelessly inadequate resources.
The Departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Finance are also involved in the context of the growing demands on the Naval Service in a number of vital areas. An essential part of its work is combating and intercepting drug barons and intermediaries on their way to this country. The resources are not adequate to do this job properly. It is clear that the Naval Service will require much greater autonomy in these areas which have a token defence element in the traditional meaning of the word. Fianna Fáil will see to it that substantial changes are made with greater autonomy in management and more dedicated resources to meet those tasks. Recruitment and proper career development is vital to ensure that this capacity is developed. Why are staff in the Naval Service leaving it faster than any other arm of the Defence Forces? Clearly because they are understaffed and badly equipped.
It is estimated that up to two billion fish are raked from our seas each year as the Spanish and other fleets continue vacuuming our coastal waters because of inadequate supervision of logging. It is clear that resources have to be provided in this area. The introduction of the Casa aircraft, welcome as it is, is only throwing up how inadequate the Naval Service is to meet those demands. It is estimated that more than 20 per cent of the trawlers that are boarded are logging the fish species incorrectly and are driving a coach and four through EU fishery laws. I am told that it can take up to two hours for the Naval Service to board and inspect a ship which means that it is not possible to board any more than two or three ships each day. All of the surveillance and intelligence indicates that ships from other countries are raking the Irish box. Surely it is crucial in the context of the implementation of the first phase of this plan that we do not go down the road of reducing still further its capacity in the light of the problems in that area.
The FCA has been virtually rubbished in the Price Waterhouse report which proposes to reduce the numbers from 16,000 to a little more than 7,000. The FCA reserves need to have meaningful involvement with the Minister and his Department on what will happen to them in the future. Surely it is possible for the Minister to indicate to the FCA during its jubilee celebrations that he will not accept its virtual rubbishing. The reserves have been available to ensure an immediate supply of voluntary service throughout the country. The FCA has been able to continue to recruit young girls and boys in spite of all the difficulties they have had to overcome in recent times. They have perpetuated the Force in remarkable circumstances. It is critical that Fianna Fáil is in a position to say that it does not have any intention of accepting the recommendations of the Price Waterhouse report to massively reduce the numbers in the Force, which is unacceptable and unnecessary. I do not know if anybody has quantified in terms of financial resources the meagre amount provided for first and second line reserves over a long time against the benefits to the community gained from the voluntary service of young people who risk their health and take other risks to provide that service. It is time we recognised that service and rejected the proposals in the Price Waterhouse report.
We have heard welcome proposals about the Army Band and the Army Equitation School. In the limited time available I want to deal briefly with some of the more pertinent problems concerning the five year contract, career development and the lack of promotional opportunities. Fianna Fáil will produce a White Paper on Defence in the first year it is next in office. This paper will charter a course for the Defence Forces well into the next century. It will be open and transparent. It will focus on what a real army should be doing, training, education, equipment, infrastructure and the resources necessary to implement such a charter. Fianna Fáil will indicate that any savings made as a result of the proposed changes will be ploughed back into the Department of Defence and into facilities and equipment for Defence Forces personnel. We will review the five year contract with a view to ensuring that greater numbers can avail of an extended contract. I hope that the patriotic public service, loyalty and discipline which the State has enjoyed from the Defence Forces, on which it could depend in every crisis, will be recognised, that we will respond to their needs by solving some of the present problems and that we will not take that loyalty for granted at any stage in the future.