JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD debate -
Wednesday, 14 Feb 2007

Avian Flu: Discussion with Departments of Agriculture and Food and Health and Children.

Chairman

I welcome Mr. Dermot Ryan, Mr. Billy McAteer and Ms Sally Gaynor from the Department of Agriculture and Food, Ms Theresa Cody from the Department of Health and Children and Dr. Kevin Kelleher from the Health Service Executive, who are here today to update members on animal health issues arising from avian flu. I understand that Mr. Ryan from the Department of Agriculture and Food will make his presentation first and this will be followed by questions and answers. We will then hear Ms Cody from the Department of Health and Children who will make her presentation, followed by questions and answers.

Before asking Mr. Ryan to commence his presentation, I draw to everyone's attention the fact that while members of the committee have absolute privilege the same privilege does not extend to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Mr. Dermot Ryan

This presentation is intended to complement the paper circulated to the committee last week. That paper outlined, in detail, what our response had been to the Suffolk outbreak at that time.

The Department has been continuing to keep this situation under active review and maintaining its very close and ongoing contact with colleagues in the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA, in London and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, DARD, in Belfast, in relation to the epidemiological investigation being undertaken in Suffolk. As we indicated in last week's paper, officials from this Department attended a meeting in Brussels on Tuesday of last week, at which UK officials made a presentation on the outbreak, and the matter was further discussed at a meeting of EU chief veterinary officers on Wednesday last.

The Department also met representatives of the poultry industry, including representatives of farm bodies, processors and IBEC, on Wednesday last to brief them on the situation and to discuss their concerns. We are also writing this week to every registered poultry flock owner in the country reiterating biosecurity advice and reminding them of the clinical symptoms of the disease of which they should be aware.

Furthermore, the Minister of State recently launched a water chlorination grants scheme for poultry flock owners to encourage the installation of chlorination facilities in those poultry units where the water supply is sourced from local surface water sources, such as rivers and lakes. This measure is designed to protect against the introduction of avian flu into commercial poultry units through the use of untreated or inadequately treated water.

Members of the committee will be aware, not least from media coverage of the possible source of introduction of the virus, of the speculation of a link with poultry products imported from Hungary. It may, in this regard, be useful to reflect briefly on events since the outbreak was confirmed on Saturday, 3 February.

As early as that Saturday when DEFRA confirmed that the strain of H5N1 was the highly pathogenic strain, it made clear that it was "similar to the virus found in Hungary in January". On 5 February, in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State pointed out that, while the most likely link was with the wild bird population, "this does not mean that we should not pursue other options in a serious way" and he confirmed that his Department was "pursuing all possible avenues of inquiry". In that regard, DEFRA confirmed on 8 February that, along with the Food Standards Agency and the Health Protection Agency, it was investigating "the possibility of a link between the Hungarian outbreaks, poultry meat from Hungary and the introduction of disease in the farm in Suffolk". On Monday last, the Secretary of State added that "nothing I have been told changes the working hypothesis about the most likely route of transmission following the genetic sequencing results reported last Thursday", though he again stated that "all options remain under investigation".

While our most recent information from DEFRA suggests that its epidemiological investigation may take some time to complete, it did confirm yesterday afternoon that the laboratory analysis of the Suffolk and Hungarian viruses is now complete and a 99.96% similarity between the viruses has been revealed. Notwithstanding this level of similarity, the UK's deputy chief veterinary officer reiterated that while "poultry to poultry transmission is the most likely source of the outbreak" DEFRA is not "discounting any line of enquiry" and he reaffirmed that "this is an ongoing investigation".

The Food Standards Agency in the UK also confirmed on 8 February that, notwithstanding the possible link with imported product from Hungary, "this is not a food safety issue and there are no consumer safety grounds, on the evidence available to us to justify a product recall". It went on to say that while "the possibility of a withdrawal for strictly animal health reasons has been discussed, DEFRA veterinary advice is that such action would be disproportionate and no product recall will therefore be required on those grounds". It confirmed on 12 February that its investigation "so far has not found anything that raises the risk to public health".

Since late last week, based on the speculation of the possibility of imported poultry product being the source of the Suffolk outbreak, much of the focus has been on the trading arrangements that apply when an outbreak of H5N1 avian flu has been confirmed.

Before dealing with the arrangements that are applied when an outbreak is confirmed, it is worth reiterating the comments of the UK's deputy CVO yesterday afternoon that, on the basis of its laboratory analysis, DEFRA's "working hypothesis" is that "poultry to poultry transmission is the most likely source of the outbreak". However, as the epidemiological investigation is ongoing, it is still not discounting other lines of inquiry. On Monday, the Secretary of State confirmed that "no further cases of bird flu beyond those on the infected premises have been found". Neither have there been any further outbreaks of avian flu in Hungary, or indeed elsewhere in the EU.

Following confirmation of an outbreak of H5N1, a 3 km protection zone, a 10 km surveillance zone, an area A, containing one or more protection-surveillance zones, and an area B, a buffer zone or further restricted area, must be established. There is a range of control measures which apply to these areas. For example: in the protection and surveillance zones, movements of poultry and other captive birds and eggs are restricted, other than under licence; biosecurity measures are imposed for people, premises and vehicles; poultry and captive birds should be housed or, at least, isolated from contact with wild birds; and there is a ban on bird gatherings.

In the further restricted area, which in the recent UK case is 2,090 sq. km, the Minister may, by order, direct that some or all of the measures that apply in the protection and surveillance zones may also apply. Somewhat similar arrangements are applied where cases of flu in wild birds are confirmed but these can be adapted to deal with the circumstances involved. This regional approach is designed to limit the area to which trading restrictions must apply and to allow the rest of the country to continue to trade normally. It is explicitly provided for in Community law. For any member state to impose more extensive trading restrictions on another would be illegal and lead to infringement proceedings being taken by the Commission. As the Minister pointed out in the Dáil last Tuesday night, this regional approach is one that Ireland supports, not least because it could prove very valuable to the poultry industry in the event that we were unfortunate enough to have a confirmed case or outbreak of avian flu in an area away from those parts of the country in which the domestic poultry industry is concentrated. The committee will also recall that we were able to avail of the regional approach in dealing with the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001.

According to Bord Bia there has been no significant change in poultry sales in Ireland following the outbreak in England, suggesting consumers now accept the message consistently delivered by agencies such as the FSAI, Safefood and the European Food Safety Authority about the safety of consuming properly cooked poultry meat. We will continue to monitor this situation carefully. We understand from industry contacts in the United Kingdom that there was no more than a "minor dip" in consumption of poultry over the week and consumers are described as having reacted in a mature and considered fashion. Sales of table eggs in the United Kingdom are described as having been "wholly unaffected". Some media reports suggest consumer reaction has been regionalised, with a greater drop of sales in the south of Britain. The performance of the UK market is important, as Ireland is a net exporter of turkey and duck, the majority to other EU countries, principally the United Kingdom.

Public and media reaction in Ireland, too, has been more muted on this occasion than when the single swan was found in Scotland last April, as evidenced, for example, by the number of calls to the Department's helpline. In the immediate aftermath of the case in Scotland we were receiving up to 100 calls daily, while on this occasion calls peaked at 57 on Monday, 5 February, before falling quickly to just eight on Friday last and nine on Monday and yesterday.

I reiterate that we are maintaining very close, daily contact with our colleagues in London, Belfast and Brussels and await with interest the outcome of the DEFRA investigation as to the source of the introduction of the disease. Having reviewed our contingency arrangements, we are satisfied that this event is the kind that would have been contemplated by our contingency plans which we will continue to keep under review, particularly in the light of any new information that may emerge on the Suffolk outbreak. We will continue our close co-operation with all those agencies on whose assistance we would rely in the event of a case or outbreak. We acknowledge that the geographical proximity of this outbreak does mean an increased risk to Ireland but are satisfied, based on the ornithological advice available to us, that the immediate risk of introduction through wild birds is low.

I again thank the Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to make this presentation and to assure them that we will be happy to keep the committee informed of any further significant developments in relation either to this particular outbreak or the more general risk of the introduction of H5N1 avian flu to Ireland.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Ryan for his presentation. I understand Senator Coonan is deputising for Deputy Naughten and I invite him to ask questions.

Senator Coonan

Deputy Naughten apologises for not being able to attend today.

I welcome Mr. Ryan and his colleagues. It is good to have another Tipperary man leading the field. I wish him success in his position.

There has been a great deal of media attention linking the outbreak of the disease in England to the outbreak in Hungary. The deputy chief veterinarian in Britain, Mr. Fred Landeg, is 99.96% certain that such is the case and that it seems to have originated from part-processed turkey imported to Britain. Will the delegates explain what is meant by part-processed turkey and how it is possible for the virus to be transmitted from Hungary to the United Kingdom? I would like to know if any part-processed product is being imported to Ireland from any country where there is bird flu. Does the Department of Agriculture and Food test, monitor and inspect such poultry imports?

Are the delegates satisfied that EU regulations on protection against bird flu are rigorous enough? I am not aware of a ban on the importation of poultry or other products from countries in which there have been cases of avian flu. Will the delegates confirm that this is correct? Is it not very important for Ireland to establish a distinctive and definitive food label such as a "'Green Ireland" label to ensure our product is readily distinguishable by consumers? When discussing this outbreak of avian flu, we must ensure we do not exaggerate to the extent that it affects the poultry industry which is so important to producers and the economy. Are EU laws on food labelling satisfactory? Is it possible for an Irish consumer to buy a product that he or she thinks is Irish when, in fact, it is not and has been relabelled? In the worse case scenario, if we had an outbreak of avian flu, are the delegates satisfied that we would have the facilities to deal with it? Were it to occur, there is an onus on everybody to work together to prevent its spread, as happened when we dealt with the foot and mouth disease outbreak.

Deputy Upton

I thank Mr. Ryan and his colleagues for the presentation. Some of my questions have been posed. I am particularly interested in the issue of substantial transformation where a product is imported from another country and by adding breadcrumbs or garlic, it can then be labelled as Irish. I appreciate that this is an issue for the European Union but I wish to highlight it and wonder what pressure we can apply to try to define, as a minimum, what is meant by "substantial transformation" and to have the results of the process labelled in order that the consumer is aware of where the product originated. The question of labelling, indicating the country of origin, was raised, but it is particularly important when the consumer wants to know whether he or she is buying home produced and processed poultry. Consumers must have confidence in the product. We have had a long battle to ensure the label on beef includes its country of origin. I would like to have the same standard of labelling applied to the poultry industry.

I have statistics for 2005 on the import of poultry meat from third countries. Ireland is a net exporter, exporting 96,000 tonnes and importing 8,000 tonnes of poultry meat. These figures may have changed in the meantime. Concern is expressed about products, where it is unclear from the label whether a product has been substantially transformed in Ireland or originated from here.

Newspaper reports on the outbreak of avian flu at the Bernard Matthews farms suggest the management of the farms left a lot to be desired. I am quoting from the Daily Mail, which states: “Separately, it has emerged that muck and waste, including carcasses, from the Suffolk factory farm sheds where the virus was found may have been left out in the open in the days before the bird flu was diagnosed”. The witnesses might have an update for us on that, but we would need reassurance about such an incident that this was not the case. If it was it would be a cause for concern.

What do we know about the risk of transfer from birds, the first victims of the disease, to other animals? Recent reports suggest it can be transferred to other animals and we require clarification on the matter. Perhaps the level of risk could be indicated, although I hope it would not be at a significant level. It is an important issue, with cats mentioned as potential carriers, so what is the real significance from a risk management perspective?

Do the witnesses have any comments on how quickly production was resumed after the event? DEFRA and the EU felt it to be appropriate but the issue of how well the virus survives and how it can tolerate adverse environmental conditions, etc., is relevant. Are we absolutely confident that opening the plant and starting processing again in such a short period of time is acceptable?

Chairman

There is a vote in the Dáil but we may have time for one more speaker. Deputy Ferris will understand if I have to cut him short.

Deputy Ferris

I thank Mr. Ryan for his presentation. I read in The Observer a comment from Professor David King, the British Government’s chief scientist, who stated that they now knew for certain that the H5N1 at the Bernard Matthews turkey farm at Holden was identical to the strain in Hungary. Apparently, 13,000 geese died on a farm in south Hungary.

It is also very relevant that Bernard Matthews is involved in the poultry industry in Hungary, with approximately 38 tonnes a week coming in from production there. It appears to be accepted that the transfer of the H5N1 virus came from semi-processed to live poultry. Does any of the Bernard Matthews processed or semi-processed meat find its way to the Irish market? Have precautions been put in place in that regard since the outbreak?

The last outbreak in the UK, to my knowledge, involved a swan in Scotland. I find it very alarming that processed and semi-processed poultry found its way onto the foodchain in western Europe in this way. I am told there is a very severe outbreak of the virus in Hungary. Has the EU done anything to protect production of poultry in our own country, and across the EU?

Sitting suspended at 11.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

Deputy Ó Fearghaíl

I join colleagues in thanking the group for its comprehensive presentation which provided members with a useful overview. I compliment everyone in the Department on the way in which they have handled matters to date.

In the context of the migratory patterns of wild birds, are there any particular species of which the ornithologists advising the Department have said we should be especially conscious? Are there particular times of the year when birds are migrating during which we need to be especially aware? Are there particular locations nationally which might be more susceptible to problems owing to the movement patterns of birds?

Deputy Blaney

I commend the Minister and her Department for the way this scare has been dealt with. Unfortunate scare stories circulated following meetings of local authorities in Northern Ireland. References were made to burial grounds, even human burial grounds, such was the havoc expected from an epidemic of this disease. I, therefore, commend the Minister and the officials of her Department. All appropriate steps were taken in preparation for a possible epidemic in Ireland. So far, this has not happened but the crisis has been dealt with in the proper fashion. We all remember the effect foot and mouth disease had on the country's economy. An epidemic would be dreadful but a scare could also affect the economy. When discussing these issues, careful consideration should be taken of this danger. The Department is very well prepared but we should all be careful in how we react to this matter.

Mr. Ryan

I appreciate the comments made by members.Comprehensive contingency plans and arrangements are in place. In particular, we have been working very closely with our colleagues in the Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. Early last week, in consultation with our colleagues in Belfast, we introduced a measure parallel to one they had introduced. These parallel measures apply throughout the island of Ireland. We are anxious to maintain that all-island approach in dealing with the threat posed by avian flu, in particular by the outbreak in England.

With regard to the rigour of the legislation and our confidence in it, a very comprehensive and large EU Council directive has been transposed into Irish law as the European Communities Control of Avian Influenza Regulations 2006, which runs to 75 pages. It covers all eventualities and the circumstances that would apply if we were affected. We have total confidence in the rigour and comprehensive nature of the legislative basis on which we would act in the event of an outbreak.

A regional approach would be taken. The poultry industry is concentrated in a small number of locations. In the event of an outbreak a regional approach would be applied which would protect the trading status of the majority, if not all, those involved in the poultry industry. The industry is valued at approximately €150 million per annum and employs approximately 6,000 people. The Government and the Department are conscious of its value, both to the national economy and the areas in which it is concentrated.

A number of members raised the question of labelling. This is a perennial issue. Origin labelling requirements are laid down in EU legislation. Fresh or frozen unprocessed poultry that originated in a non-EU country must bear the name of the country of origin on its label. There is no need to indicate origin if the poultry was slaughtered in an EU country or it has been processed in any way. The last point is significant since large amounts of poultry are subject to some degree of processing such as the addition of seasoning, crumbing, cooking and so on. The Department's continually stated preference is for a legislative framework requiring origin labelling of all poultry and poultry products sold in retail and catering establishments. To this end, the Minister for Agriculture and Food impressed on the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection and her EU ministerial colleagues her desire for comprehensive origin labelling. The Department has participated in a European Commission consultative process on food labelling wherein we stressed our strong preference for common EU-wide legislation requiring origin labelling of meat and meat products.

Deputy Upton asked about the level of contact with colleagues in the United Kingdom and Brussels. There are continual formal communications between the respective Departments and the Commission. Most of us also have informal and personal contacts with DEFRA in London, the DARD in Belfast and throughout the Commission. All of these contacts have been used in the past ten days to ensure we have as much immediate information as possible. We are satisfied with the level of information provided for us. There has been much media speculation and we have tried to be careful not to react to all of it. There is always a question of how well informed such speculation is and we have been taking our advice directly from the competent authorities, in this case DEFRA and the Commission. If we had an unfortunate incident in this country, we would expect competent authorities in other member states to take their advice from us, notwithstanding media speculation

Deputy Ferris referred to the comments of the chief scientist in the United Kingdom. I also saw those comments reported. It is important to make the point that the laboratory analysis to which I referred in my statement was completed only yesterday and is the most recent information we have. It suggests 99.96% similarity with the Hungarian strain. It is a matter of opinion whether that proves the strains are identical. I am quoting directly from the report issued by the deputy chief veterinary officer in the United Kingdom yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Billy McAteer

I would like to address a number of issues. It is important that we see the outcome of the full epidemiological report, currently being processed in the United Kingdom, if we are to determine the exact source of the outbreak. The epidemiological report is almost like a detective story. Several avenues must be explored in great depth and a number of records, including ornithological records, must be checked in the United Kingdom and Hungary. These are being exhaustively looked at in the United Kingdom. It is understandable that certain elements of this incident are seized upon and driven to a particular conclusion. We should wait until we see the outcome of the epidemiological report. I expect we will then be able to rule out certain sources, even if the exact source cannot be identified. I am aware that considerable work is being done on that investigation. I urge that we await the result rather than rely on media speculation in the interim.

The question of our satisfaction with Community rules was raised. Mr. Ryan has outlined the directive which deals with this. Regionalisation of an outbreak, whereby zones are closed off, allows the remainder of the country to continue trading. This could be important in our case. The basis of EU animal health policy is that there should be free trade, unless there is a disease, in which case controls are applied in a restricted area and trade continues outside it. It is important for us to realise we could be relying on that in future.

There were some specific questions relating to cats. Cats have contracted the disease and the H5N1 strain was detected in a number of such animals in Germany. Cats are not known to transmit the disease to humans and in the event of an outbreak, we would simply advise that cats be kept indoors.

A question was asked on pigs becoming infected, and the directive referred to by Mr. Ryan has a related provision. Pigs can become infected with the H5N1 virus and if they are on the same holding as an infection, they would have to be taken into account and we would have to test them to ensure they were free of the disease. If they were to test positive we would have to deal with it accordingly. They would certainly be looked at as part of the overall equation.

Our information is that the premises in Hungary are about 160 miles from the current outbreak in Hungary. It is no harm to state that there were 26 outbreaks in south-east Hungary last year affecting ducks and geese. They were cleared but unfortunately there have been two cases in south-east Hungary in January this year, although not in the same province as last year. My colleague will deal with some of the other questions.

Ms Sally Gaynor

I will deal with the issue of a ban on the importation of poultry meat from third countries affected by avian influenza. There is ban on live birds and unprocessed meat that is not heat treated. Meat that is heat treated is not considered to represent a risk, so it is permitted.

A consignment coming in from a country such as Thailand would have to come with a health certificate and statement of proof of the heat treatment. It would come into a border inspection post where the documentation and identity would be checked. For 50% of the consignments there is a requirement to open up containers, take everything out and check a certain proportion of boxes. Heat treatment would be verified in this way.

The risk with part-processing would be with birds not detected as infected in an area which has infection. Normally, the highest risk area is that closest to the outbreak and there are certain precautions in terms of allowing movement of live birds to go for slaughter. Such birds could only go if the competent authority had carried out a risk assessment and was of the view that it did not represent a risk to transport the birds to the plant in the first place.

The flock would have to be tested for avian influenza and be negative before it could be moved, and the transport would have to be sealed. The official veterinarian in the destination plant would have to be informed and he or she would have to agree to the product coming in. He or she would have to supervise the ante mortem and post mortem inspection in the plant and would have to verify to the person who had licensed the product that the birds had arrived.

The birds would have to be slaughtered separately from any other birds coming from any other area. From slaughter to processing to storage to transport, the product would have to be kept separate. Birds from an infected area could only go for heat treatment and cannot be traded. If they are heat treated and receive a special stamp they can then go on the national market in that country.

With regard to processing, the birds will clearly arrive at the plant whole-bird. They may be cut up or go to another plant for that processing. The cutting up may not necessarily take place on that same premises. If the birds are cut up but nothing more is done, they are still considered as chilled or frozen, depending on the temperature at which they are kept. My colleague has referred to the possibility of adding crumbs, for example, to the outside of the meat, or it may be cut up or minced to make burgers. The meat may also be cooked.

There is a difference in the processes with regard to the risk. If the product is fully cooked to over 70° Celcius at core temperature, it does not represent a risk. If it is partially cooked or not cooked at all it still represents an animal health risk.

The real risk regarding what went from Hungary to the plant in the UK would be if a product that was not fully heat treated had something done to it, with waste generated. Currently we do not have the details of where the live birds were sourced, where they were slaughtered and what process was carried out before or after they arrived in the UK.

There is also the issue of survival of the virus and the cleaning and disinfection of the plant. The virus is not difficult to kill and even soap and water is sufficient to do it. It is therefore not an issue. The plants are much easier to clean and disinfect than poultry houses. Therefore, the time between cleaning and disinfection until the plant can slaughter again would be relatively minimal. The plants are designed with this in mind, so it is not an issue for the plant to have started slaughtering again.

From an ornithological perspective, there is a list of high risk species, with 24 species specific to Ireland. We have a poster of the listed species and we are in the process of sending those to local authorities and district veterinary offices. We will be getting more of those out to a much wider audience.

Certain times of year will bring more migratory birds, the autumn and winter in particular in the case of water fowl, the species of particular interest. We need up-to-date data on weather conditions in different areas so rather than getting one source of advice we update advice depending on the situation and affected countries.

We have identified certain locations as being at particular risk. The problem with Ireland is that it has many wetlands and birds will not go to a specific area, tending instead to move around the country. The highest risk would be where there are high concentrations of migratory water fowl and of poultry. We have identified such areas and mapped them. We were planning to go to a more targeted wild bird surveillance, as up until now we have taken samples from all over the country.

Deputy Wilkinson

I am sure most of the important points have already been made. I compliment Mr. Ryan and his team for the information given to us today and their speed off the mark when news of this infection broke. A couple of days were lost in Britain before the news broke but perhaps that is understandable.

I wish to return to the issue of a foot and mouth disease outbreak. I have every confidence in the Department in so far as it can to handle any given scenario in the event of an outbreak. I would not have been pleased with the response on the British side at the time of the last outbreak. Aspects of the British response to the outbreak of avian flu were a little careless and this allowed matters to go a little out of control. I have, however, great confidence in the Department of Agriculture and Food. The poultry industry plays an important role in County Waterford and was a source of employment to farmers and others at a time when there were few other opportunities.

As a consequence of the fears generated during a previous outbreak of avian flu in Britain, sales of poultry collapsed for a couple of months. Farmers and processors faced a drop of 30% in the market and suffered heavily financially. It appears that our neighbours are not as quick off the mark and I therefore ask the officials from the Department of Agriculture and Food to keep a close eye on the situation in Britain.

Mr. Ryan

The most likely source of the introduction of avian flu to Ireland continues to be wild birds. There are limitations on what we can do. We are working very closely, particularly with our colleagues in Northern Ireland and we have absolute confidence in them. We are conscious of the risks posed to the industry, which is concentrated in a number of areas, including Deputy Wilkinson's constituency. We were in touch early last week with the range of agencies involved in dealing with a case or outbreak of disease, namely, the Garda Síochána, the Defence Forces, Civil Defence and the farm relief service. We were very pleased by their attitude. If we had not been in touch with them, they would have been in touch with us because they are very conscious of the prospective role they would play in support of the Department in the event of any outbreak.

Based on the risk, as we have assessed it, we are satisfied we have the wherewithal to deal effectively and expeditiously with an outbreak of disease.

Ms Theresa Cody

The Department of Health and Children and the Health Service Executive welcome this opportunity to update the committee on human health issues regarding avian flu. Our colleagues from the Department of Agriculture and Food have outlined the situation in Britain. As already stated, investigations have not found anything that raises a risk to public health.

The health sector's role in relation to avian flu relates to the human health implications arising from an outbreak of avian flu in this country. There are two categories of human health implications: exposure risk for those in direct contact with infected birds; and theoretical risk that avian flu mutation might trigger the next pandemic. We worked with the Department of Agriculture and Food and appropriate protocols are in place to ensure protection of those at risk from exposure.

The statement circulated to members last week gave a brief outline regarding pandemic planning. I now wish to give further information on the public health actions to be taken in the event of an outbreak of avian flu. Considerable effort has gone into agreeing combined veterinary and public health working protocols for the public health management of an outbreak of avian flu in Ireland. Updated guidance on public health actions to be taken on notification of avian flu in animals in Ireland was published on 15 January 2007 as a supplement to Pandemic Influenza Preparedness for Ireland: Advice of the Pandemic Influenza Expert Group. This is available at www.hpsc.ie.

This guidance is based on international guidance from World Health Organisation, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the organisations in the US and Canada. The guidance includes the agreed notification procedure between the Department of Agriculture and Food and bodies responsible for public health, management of contacts, guidance for those involved in avian flu outbreak control activities, surveillance protocols, and public health advice leaflets for those affected and for the general public. These protocols have been tested in multi-agency exercises and are subject to ongoing review.

As avian flu is mainly an animal health issue, the risk to the human population is confined to those who have been in close contact with infected birds or their droppings, or to those involved in outbreak control activities. In the event of an outbreak of the disease the Health Service Executive will work closely with the Department of Agriculture and Food in the protection of these groups.

The Department of Agriculture and Food will identify all those potentially exposed to infected poultry or droppings. Only those persons authorised by that Department will be allowed to have continued contact with potentially infected poultry or droppings. Those potentially exposed to infected wild birds will also be identified by the Department of Agriculture and Food. Movement of workers and families between farms under investigation and non-infected farms will be restricted and close collaboration between local veterinary personnel and public health will be required to ensure that protective measures are put in place and that surveillance of workers is undertaken.

The assessment of the level of exposure of contacts will be done by public health personnel in conjunction with local veterinary personnel. Detailed guidance on the public health management of persons considered to have significant exposure has been prepared. This includes guidance for the management of persons with acute febrile respiratory illness who may have avian flu and guidance for doctors on prescribing Tamiflu. In the management of persons involved in outbreak control activity such as culling and disposal of carcasses, three aspects are involved, namely, occupational surveillance, administration of antiviral prophylaxis, and ensuring mechanisms are in place for the administration of seasonal flu vaccine.

The Department of Agriculture and Food has already identified personnel who may be involved in control activities and they have been offered seasonal flu vaccine. In addition, all poultry workers are offered seasonal flu vaccine. This measure was first introduced for the 2005-06 flu season. Its purpose is to prevent the possibility of an individual being infected by both avian and human flu at the same time. Arrangements have been made for the provision of antivirals and we have sufficient stock in Ireland. If an outbreak of avian flu occurs in birds in Ireland, antivirals will be used in the prevention and control of avian flu in occupational groups and other contacts exposed to dead or diseased birds.

I thank the Chairman and the members of the committee for the opportunity to make this presentation. As stated earlier, the health sector's role in regard to avian flu relates to the human health implications. The Department of Health and Children and the Health Service Executive are continuing to work closely with the Department of Agriculture and Food in this context. Contingency plans are kept under constant review.

Senator Coonan

I welcome the delegation from the Health Service Executive, particularly Dr. Kevin Kelleher whom I know from the Mid-Western Health Board. Earlier in the morning we had a meeting with officials from the HSE west which did not inspire confidence in them. Due to ongoing problems in the health services, people are generally concerned as to how it would respond if there were a major outbreak of avian flu. Would the HSE be able to provide treatment and if necessary beds in hospital?

Will the delegates outline how an individual could contract avian flu? Is it correct to say that one would have had to have direct contact with a bird or a feathered animal? Does the importation of part-processed poultry pose a risk? I understand from Ms Gaynor if the product is cooked at a temperature of 70° Celsius it is safe, but what is the position if the product does not reach that temperature? I understand that 2,600 turkeys died in the two days prior to the announcement of this outbreak of avian flu which have reportedly entered the foodchain. This has given rise to concern in the community.

Deputy Upton

I thank the delegates from the HSE, Dr. Kelleher and Ms Cody, for appearing before the committee. In the course of her presentation Ms Cody referred specifically to birds and-or their droppings. How long can the virus survive in droppings and how significant are they in the spread of avian flu? As I recall, the majority of those affected by previous outbreaks of avian flu were young people. Am I correct? Is there any reason for younger people being, apparently, more vulnerable or are there statistics to show that more young people have had contact with bird flu, particularly in developing countries? Perhaps the delegation would comment.

I am curious to know if the delegation has any statistics on milder versions of bird flu. What we hear about are the fatalities of which there have not been many worldwide. We have had 164 fatalities internationally. Do we know how many people have been infected and have recovered? Is it possible that there are much milder versions of the flu which are never tracked and which nobody reports?

In terms of ingestion of the virus, am I correct in saying it can be killed by gastric juices and, perhaps, saliva? If it were to survive that kind of hostile environment would it have the facility to attach itself and become infective?

Deputy Ferris

The important issue for me is that the origins of the disease are associated with underdeveloped nations where poultry is kept in small numbers and on open farms. Given that it can be quite organic, the instance we have been speaking about involves 160,000 birds which were kept in one small area, living among their own ammonia and their own waste. Such conditions have been proven in the past to be conducive to the spread of diseases such as e.coli, Newcastle disease and salmonella. I remain to be convinced that such conditions would not also be breeding grounds for bird flu.

We are speaking about a huge industry. Obviously small producers in South-East Asia who depend on a couple of dozen birds to make an income could easily become the fall guys for this disease. How satisfied is the delegation that more developed industries involving huge consignments of birds are not contributing to the spread of the disease?

Deputy Ó Fearghaíl

I thank Ms Cody for her presentation and compliment those involved in the initiative of introducing the vaccination programme for those working in the sector. What has been the response of producers and processors to the offer of vaccination and what has been the uptake by those working in the sector? What strategies are in place to maximise the use of the vaccinations?

Chairman

Earlier Mr. Ryan referred to an all-Ireland approach. From a health perspective what progress has been made between the two Departments?

Dr. Kevin Kelleher

I would not share Senator Coonan's concerns about the health service. Like every other health service in the world, our health service is actively planning how to deal with a pandemic. We are moving quite rapidly and on a par with most of our counterparts around the world. It will not be easy. Very few health services in the world will cope but we will cope as well as anywhere else. The preparations we have put in place, which members will have seen in the briefing notes, are on a par with what is happening in the rest of the world if not in excess of it. Stocks of antivirals are at the top end of what is happening around the world. We are making major progress in that area.

How does one acquire avian flu? Humans acquire it via direct contact with poultry. There is some evidence that there may have been some human to human transmission but that is still not definite. It is very much through direct contact with poultry or their excreta. That is the main way in which one can contract this flu.

Some of the other questions around the issue are more for our friends in the Department of Agriculture and Food. I will leave some of those aside. We do not yet know the epidemiology of this virus because there have only been about 300 cases worldwide. In approximately 50% of these cases the people have died, and they have been predominantly younger people. It is not yet clear whether this is a characteristic of the virus or, as was suggested, an environmental issue because young people have had most contact with poultry because of circumstances.

On the question of whether there are milder versions of the flu, this is not clear because the vast majority of cases have been in the Far East where their ability to investigate is not as it would be in the West. Of course, there are milder versions. There are, and have been, milder versions of avian flu in the poultry population. There have been examples of that milder version coming into the human population. That happens. If they are mild versions they do not cause difficulties for us. Sometimes one will not notice it.

With every infectious disease a significant proportion of people, perhaps over 50%, are infected but do not know it. That is nature. In terms of flu generally it is estimated that 50% of people infected show signs of it. If there are 50 cases seen one would expect that another 50 people locally have been infected but have not shown symptoms of the disease. We do not have enough evidence about how this occurs and we are not absolutely certain about eating poultry. However, it would appear that the main source comes from direct contact between the poultry and lips and open sores. There is still much work to be done on that issue.

The question raised by Deputy Ferris is predominately an issue for my colleagues in the Department of Agriculture and Food.

In terms of our vaccination programme, we have worked with our colleagues in the Department of Agriculture and Food and with the industry to try to promote vaccination among the staff of the industry. In areas where there is a very high concentration of poultry, predominantly in Cavan and Monaghan, we have provided special clinics. We have made great efforts to provide clinics. In other areas we have offered such services to producers. Sometimes the offer has been taken up and sometimes it has not, but it has been publicised.

The vaccine is now formally approved by the Department of Health and Children for people working in the poultry industry, so those on low incomes can avail of it under the GMS. It is freely available to people and we promote that fact. Following on from what happened recently, we have tried to get more people to take up the vaccine. I will outline the premise behind this approach. We must prevent people getting human flu, as if they also get bird flu the viruses would combine which could lead to a pandemic.

Like our colleagues in the Department of Agriculture and Food, we work closely with our colleagues in the North and we have formal meetings with them and other small groups twice a year working on planning details. We have a number of groups working with our colleagues in the North on a number of issues. Our staff who work in the Border countries also have very strong links with people in the Border counties north of the Border. Some of the exercises we have had involved some cross-Border elements. People from the North have come to our exercises and people from the South have gone to the North for its exercises. Therefore, there is a great deal of movement between us.

Some of the other points made about bird flu are ones for colleagues in the Department of Agriculture and Food.

Chairman

I thank Dr. Kelleher. Does Mr. McAteer wish to respond?

Mr. McAteer

I would like to respond on a couple of issues and, in particular, to what Senator Coonan said. He mentioned the possibility that 2,500 turkeys may have died and got into the food chain. That is not correct. We would need to see the full epidemiological report. We attended a meeting in Brussels at which there was a full exposé of the situation on a particular holding in the United Kingdom. More information would have been made available since. There was criticism of the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It was said it had been slow to respond. As Deputy Ferris mentioned, there were 159,000 turkeys on the premises from the end of November to the start of December and none has left the site since. In any poultry enterprise there will be mortalities. In this instance the company vets were present. We have a list indicating a small number of mortalities over a number of days. Initially e.coli was identified on the premises. On 30 January, 13 were dead and on 31 January, 156 but the next day the number dead had increased to over 500. On that day the company vet called in the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. On 2 February the flock in the house that tested positive for H5N1 was culled. On 3 February the presence of H5N1 was confirmed in the lab. There was an underlying condition which may have complicated the issue. It simply was not the case that turkeys may have died and got into the food chain. There were 159,000 birds in 22 sheds and none of them has come out.

Deputy Ferris

I take it all the birds were indoors.

Mr. McAteer

They were all indoors.

Deputy Ferris

Therefore, they had no contact with wildlife.

Mr. McAteer

No.

Deputy Ferris

The point I am trying to make is that if they were indoors, they were insulated, warm, fed indoors and lived in their own waste, which means, effectively, that the disease that affected them could not have been contracted from wildlife.

Mr. McAteer

I come back to the point I made earlier that we are waiting to see the full epidemiological report. Wildlife was the first to be looked at because that was the way in which the disease was transmitted around Europe last year. Ornithological experts were baffled because there had been no movement of birds from, say, Hungary. That was factual. However, one begins to speculate about how the disease could have been transmitted. There was a difference in the ventilation system used in the shed in which clinical signs had been found. That may have facilitated transmission of the disease but we do not know. That is the reason I am reluctant to speculate until we see the final epidemiological report but it may have facilitated wild bird access to the shed. There are pathways through which the virus could have manifested itself but we are getting involved in media type speculation. I am confident that when the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs eventually produces its epidemiological report, it will be able to rule out a number of factors and point us in the direction of others. I would not rule out wild birds; let us wait and see what the outcome is.

Deputy Upton asked about the survival of the virus in faeces. It can survive for 35 days at a temperature of 4° centigrade and for six at 37° centigrade. Obviously, these figures depend on environmental conditions but as Ms Gaynor said, it is a virus that is easily killed with disinfectants, sunshine and so on.

Chairman

I thank Mr. McAteer. Deputy Upton wishes to ask a supplementary question.

Deputy Upton

Some of the questions I was going to ask have been answered. Do we know anything about the minimum infective dose? I presume it is small, as with viruses, but I am speculating.

Dr. Kelleher

I am not sure that we know what the minimum infective dose is. It depends on individuals and their immune system. I do not think we are anywhere near knowing what the minimum infective dose is.

Ms Gaynor

It is high.

Dr. Kelleher

I am informed that it is high.

Deputy Upton

Are all poultry flocks here registered? I know it can be difficult in the case of very small flocks but, perhaps, we could have an update.

I have listened to yet another television report on the position in the United Kingdom and it is my understanding that here we would have a much more effective early alert or early warning system. I took it from what I heard that if one saw poultry was not thriving, one would raise the flag and suggest something was wrong. That does not appear to have happened in the United Kingdom. How does that tie in with EU guidelines? Perhaps I misinterpreted but that was my understanding from the comments made by one of the people involved in the poultry industry.

The delegation may not have the answer to this question either which relates to the large number of outbreaks in Hungary. Do we know if the strain was the same in all cases? Is there any epidemiological information available?

On a slightly lighter note — I am still curious about it — in all of the coverage I have been watching on Sky News there is a man wearing a white coat and carrying a white bag. I wonder what he is carrying in that bag and where he is going when he gets on his bike. The same clip of film is shown each time someone speaks about bird flu on Sky News. It shows a man in a white gown carrying a slightly bulky white bag which appears to contain feathers because it seems light. It is totally bizarre from a management point of view. I am sorry, Chairman, but I am curious.

Chairman

As long as he is not in the constituency with the Deputy, it will be okay.

Deputy Upton

Perhaps he has got a big bag of votes for me.

Mr. Ryan

As I recall it, that clip is of the episode that occurred in Suffolk. As can be seen from some of the aerial shots, the enterprise is enormous. It is located at an old RAF airfield with 22 sheds and covers a huge area. While I do not know where the man concerned was going, it may be that he was travelling between sheds. It is most important that there be very strict biosecurity arrangements in place on an infected premises. The highest levels should be applied. I am satisfied that in any situation here — I am sure in that episode also — all the necessary biosecurity arrangements would be strictly applied.

We have in excess of 8,000 flocks registered. It was a requirement of the statutory instrument at the time that they register by 31 December 2005. The statutory instrument will be updated this month to make it an ongoing requirement. It is being updated to require poultry flockowners to register because there are people who will move in and out of the industry. Anybody who has become involved since has not been covered by the statutory instrument. We will be updating the legislation in that regard.

I shall make one other point in regard to the speed of the UK response. As Mr. McAteer pointed out, a significant increase in mortality occurred on 1 February. DEFRA issued a press release on 2 February, which was on the Friday, stating it was investigating an avian notifiable disease on a poultry farm in Suffolk. On the following morning, the Saturday, it confirmed the presence of H5N1. The haste with which that press release was issued on Friday suggests it acted expeditiously.

Mr. McAteer

I wish to reply to some of the other points raised. Returning to the UK response, as part of our early warning system and as provided under Community legislation, flock owners are required to notify the Department in the event of significant mortalities occurring. Such notification is a requirement in other member states of the Union. Flock owners are also required to notify the Department in the event of a drop in food consumption. Those requirements are part of our early warning system.

In the case of the outbreak in the UK, significant mortalities did not occur. A day may have elapsed when the outbreak was dealt with at local level but once DEFRA became involved it acted expeditiously.

Deputy Upton asked about the large number of cases in Hungary. The strain detected there last year was related to the strain affecting wild birds. It is H5N1 and an avian strain but it appears to be somewhat different from this strain.

Chairman

On behalf of the committee, I thank the officials from the Departments of Agriculture and Food and Health and Children and those from the Health Service Executive for attending today and responding to the queries raised. I would like to be associated with the compliments members paid to the officials on the great work they have done and will continue to do. I am sure they will keep us updated on any changes that occur in the future. On behalf of the committee, I once again thank the officials.

The joint committee adjourned at 1.05 p.m. until 11.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 21 February 2007.