I welcome Dr. Claudia Heppner, head of unit of the scientific panel for contaminants in the food chain, European Food Safety Authority, and Mr. Christophe Wolff. Before I call Dr. Heppner I remind witnesses that while members of the committee enjoy absolute privilege, the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it. I remind members of the parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against an individual outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.
Contamination of Meat Products: Discussion with EFSA and FSAI.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I am very pleased to be here. As head of the unit on contaminants in the food chain at the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA, I am grateful to have this opportunity to address the committee on the recent dioxin contamination of Irish pork. The unit supports the scientific panel on contaminants in the food chain which provides independent scientific advice on contaminants in the food and feed chain.
The EFSA was established by the European Union in 2002 as a result of the series of food crises that characterised the 1990s, such as BSE and dioxins, with a remit of strengthening consumer protection and increasing the credibility of the EU food supply both for the internal market and for trading partners. It produces scientific opinions and advice that form a robust science-based foundation for European policies and legislation to support member states and the European Commission in taking effective and timely risk management decisions.
One of the key principles underpinning the establishment of EFSA is the functional separation of risk assessment and risk management. European food law clearly states that risk management decisions must have a sound scientific basis and its role is clearly defined as the EU's risk assessor. Therefore, risk management decisions are outside its remit.
In drawing up EFSA's founding regulation the legislators rightly identified the importance of the independence and quality of the scientific advice underpinning food law, the openness and transparency of the organisation developing this advice and the need for the organisation to communicate coherently, accurately and in a timely manner.
Guided by those principles of independence, transparency and scientific excellence EFSA calls on the expertise available in member states to assist it in exercising its mandate. In doing so, it has built networks comprising more than 1,200 scientific experts, 30 national agencies and 250 scientific organisations, supported by a staff of almost 400 in Parma, Italy.
As recent events regarding pork in Ireland have demonstrated, responsiveness is a key element when dealing with urgent situations. That is why in 2007 EFSA's management board adopted fast-track procedures for providing scientific advice and has already put those procedures into practice on three occasions in 2008, in the cases of sunflower oil contamination, melamine in composite foods and now with the pork contamination issue.
The challenges risk assessors and managers face today and into the future focus our attention on the need for effective cooperation. As risk assessment becomes more complex for a variety of reasons, such as the increasingly globalised food supply and technological advances in food production and processing systems, it is crucial that all actors and stakeholders in the food chain work together.
EFSA's advisory forum, which brings together representatives of all 27 national food safety authorities and observers from Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and the European Commission, is a crucial platform for co-operation. It facilitates information exchange, better co-ordination of work programmes, early identification and analysis of emerging risks, increased coherence in scientific risk assessment and communication and avoidance of duplication of activities. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland is Ireland's representative on the advisory forum.
To support the work of the advisory forum focal points have been established in all member states. They act as interfaces between the authority and different national food safety authorities, research institutes, consumers and other EFSA related stakeholders. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland is the focal point in Ireland.
To be able to deliver the best risk assessments, EFSA must have access to scientific expertise, information and data at national and international level. It has a specific directorate dedicated to scientific co-operation which also provides expertise in data collection, exposure assessment, emerging risks and assessment methodology. It works closely with international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation and the World Organisation for Animal Health, and has had an agreement on information sharing in place with the US Food and Drug Administration since 2007.
Regarding EFSA's statement on dioxins in Irish pork, on the afternoon of Sunday 7 December it was informed by the European Commission and colleagues in FSAI that data available from routine monitoring of foods by the Irish authorities indicated levels of dioxins up to 200 times those permitted by European legislation. Dioxins are persistent man-made chemical contaminants usually formed by industrial combustion and chemical processes that are resistant to breakdown and can enter the food chain. High levels of dioxins can be a risk to public health and their toxicity is related to the amount accumulated in the body over many years, the so-called body burden.
On 8 December, the European Commission organised a video conference involving EFSA, FSAI, and authorities of other affected member states to share information and analyse the situation. Immediately afterwards the Commission requested urgent scientific advice on the risks to public health related to dioxins in pork and the presence of contaminated pork products in composite foods and EFSA delivered a statement on December 10. Supporting scientific information was provided by the FSAI. EFSA based its statement on a limited dataset, assuming that an average person had an exposure at a tolerable weekly intake corresponding to a body burden of 4,000 picograms WHO-TEQ per kilogram body weight.
In the statement it was also assumed that the exposure to the raised levels began in September 2008 and that effective measures had been taken in December to remove this excessive exposure, that is, the contaminated product had been removed from the market. EFSA calculated several exposure scenarios for both average and high consumers, assuming different levels of contamination and proportions of contaminated meat.
It concluded that in very extreme cases, assuming a daily consumption of 100% contaminated Irish pork, for a high consumer of pork fat between September and December 2008, at the highest recorded concentration of dioxins, 200 picograms WHO-TEQ per gram of fat, the uncertainty factor embedded in the tolerable weekly intake is considerably eroded.
However, given that it is set by exposure over many years and has a tenfold uncertainty factor built in, this would reduce protection but not necessarily cause adverse health effects. In the more likely event of average consumption levels of 10% contaminated pork, the body burden would increase by approximately 10%. EFSA considered this increase in body burden was of no concern for the single event.
Due to the rapid delivery of the scientific advice, risk managers, who are the European Commission and member states, could discuss and agree on guidelines for measures to be taken on the same day as the release of the EFSA statement. This facilitated the work of the risk managers in protecting public health and maintaining confidence in third countries.
Our second pillar is risk communication. Our objective in respect of the pork contamination was always to provide appropriate, consistent, accurate and timely communications. We were transparent in publishing requests from the Commission on 8 December and when the statement was finalised on 10 December, it was published immediately with a press release explaining the key conclusions to lay audiences. This work was undertaken in close co-operation with the European Commission and member states. We liaised closely with communication colleagues to ensure coherence across the different players in the European food safety system.
The EFSA was careful not to make statements on risk management matters and to inform consumers in a comprehensible way about the level of risk they were likely to face from this contamination incident. I reiterate the EFSA's commitment to providing high quality, timely advice for European risk managers and clear and coherent risk communications. In the areas in which the EFSA operates, risk assessment and risk communication, I stress that this incident provided us with both an opportunity and a challenge, to provide urgent scientific advice to inform risk management decisions. It also demonstrates the importance of close collaboration between the EFSA and national agencies and emphasises the importance of work done to provide the tools and the databases to enable us to respond in urgent cases.
I thank the committee for the invitation to address it. I am willing to respond to any questions members may have.
I welcome Dr. Heppner and Mr. Wolff. Is it fair to say the decision to have a total recall of the product from a public health point of view was unnecessary, given that the assessment indicated that there was no real risk to public health? Does the EFSA consider it a failure in the systems under which it operates that there is no legal obligation on member states to notify it when they detect dioxins in order that it can notify other member states of the problem, enabling them to doublecheck their standards and identify the source? The Dutch or Belgian authorities detected dioxins in pork fats in September. We identified the source in December but the dioxins were in the food chain from September. That information was available to one member state. Should it not have contacted the EFSA?
What is the EFSA's assessment of the levels of dioxin contamination in the various samples taken here from beef when compared with the decision made on pork products?
I welcome Dr. Heppner and Mr. Wolff and, on behalf of my party, thank them for the time they have taken to address us. We are trying to understand the anatomy of the crisis as it developed and the response to it, to learn from this and ensure it does not happen again. The restoration of public confidence in pork products before Christmas was largely due to the EFSA's statement on the absence of a risk to public health. Without that statement there would probably still be a crisis.
I understand the distinction made between risk assessment and management. Last week we had a detailed discussion on food hygiene legislation and food business operators and their obligations under the legislation. Where does implementation of the HACCP legislation begin and end? Is it solely a function of national parliaments or does the EFSA have a role? Why was the type of fuel used here not governed by a legislative framework? The HACCP principles determine risk and outline a reporting procedure. Was there a failure of regulation? Does the EFSA have competence in framing the legislation or advising the Commission or national governments on its interpretation?
Does the EFSA have a view on how we can learn from this event to enhance best practice among suppliers of food ingredients, how national legislatures can tighten their practices and how the Commission can ensure this does not happen again?
I, too, welcome the representatives of the EFSA and thank them for coming and sharing their knowledge. I thank them most sincerely for their strong support when the crisis occurred here in December which kept alive our pork and bacon industry that is so important to us and around the world.
We want to learn from the mistakes we made and ensure they do not recur. Was the Irish Government and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland right to recall all products from shelves here, across Europe and throughout the world? Was that the right approach in terms of consumer confidence, with which I am sure Dr. Heppner agrees? We believe it was the right approach and because of that sharp reaction we had the business up and running again within ten days.
PCBs were found in samples in Belgium or another European country but they were unable to identify the country from which they came. I am concerned about the time lapse, from a European perspective, between September and 19 November, when our Department found contamination in Irish pork during a routine check. I am concerned there was not a faster reaction to the discovery of PCBs and that we were unable to identify where they came from. In any event, we found them in time.
Regarding the fallout from this episode and future consumer confidence, is Dr. Heppner satisfied the system in place both here and in Europe is foolproof and that if contamination occurs we will be able to identify it and try to do something about it as quickly as possible?
We do not know the full facts, and we must be careful about what we say here, but it appears the contamination of Irish pork arose from contaminated oil. Those are the preliminary findings, although the case is sub judice and therefore we cannot say much about it. Is the legislation covering the use of oils in drying recycled food that is put into feed for animals such as cattle and pigs sufficiently strong? Do we need to examine that to ensure pure oil is used for the first time rather than waste oil, which appears to be the problem in this case, that contains dioxins?
If it is okay with Dr. Heppner we will hear from one more Deputy. We might get them done in two groups. I ask members to be brief and ask questions.
Does Dr. Heppner believe the once a year monitoring by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland is sufficient? The contaminated pork fat was found in a conglomerate sample outside this country in a mixed product. If we had country of origin labelling would that have made the job of identifying where it had come from easier?
Deputy Sherlock asked a question about hazard analysis critical control point, HACCP. There is a question mark over that in terms of the way the use of the oil product can be brought under the HACCP programme because it had not been identified as a critical control point in the entire list. Does Dr. Heppner believe it is acceptable that it took seven days between the test being taken and the results being produced? In hindsight, does she believe the recall was proportional to the risk?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I thank the members for the questions. Some questions were similar and if members do not mind I will combine them.
The first question asked whether the recall was necessary and appropriate. That is risk management action. What we are doing in EFSA is risk assessment. What we try to do is make certain assumptions, lay out those assumptions, provide different exposures as we have done here in the Irish case, assume different concentrations of contaminated Irish pork, different levels of pork consumed and so forth. We outline the different scenarios that could happen and present those to the risk manager, who is the legislator. The legislator, the risk manager, must choose the proportion of the population he wants to protect whether it is a median consumer, what we call the average consumer, what we call in risk assessment terms a high level consumer, which is a person who may eat a lot of pork, or a sub-group of the population such as pregnant women or women of child bearing age. It is a decision of the risk manager. We provide the platform and he must choose in that regard. It is outside my remit to say if the measures Ireland has taken, together with the Commission, were appropriate. I cannot address that point.
We thought Dr. Heppner would say that.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
The other question asked if the period between when the contamination was discovered and when the first results were presented was too long and if it could have been done quicker. The European Food Safety Authority, EFSA, only works with data we receive from our requester, which is the European Commission, the European Parliament or the member state stating that this is something on which we need to have our scientific advice. From then onwards we start to work.
From a chemistry point of view one must take into consideration that an analysis of dioxin takes time. It is quite expensive and therefore we have in legislation what we call indicator PCBs. The dioxin chemistry is quite complicated. It is like a family. There are different members who are bigger or smaller and all have different personalities. It is the same with dioxins. We have the PCBs and the dioxins. They carry different toxicological properties.
As an indicator for contamination, we have in Europe legislation to monitor for indicator PCBs. If there are elevated levels that may indicate increasing dioxin levels and then the dioxin analysis would be done. What must be borne in mind is that it takes some time. We have modern instruments and technologies but it is not something that can be done very quickly. Regarding when the data were available and how long it took, it is outside my remit to comment. I can only explain that from a process point of view it is a lengthy and expensive procedure.
Was the EFSA aware in September?
If we have time at the end of the meeting I will take supplementary questions from the Deputy.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
The next question concerned dioxin contamination of beef samples. We have heard about this data but so far we have not got any request from the European Commission to look into this data. If we get a request from the European Commission we would address that but in the meantime I cannot comment on the beef contamination.
The other question concerned whether the system was working and if we had legislation on this area. We have legislation on dioxins in place in Europe. We were the first worldwide to have legislation on dioxins. There are maximum levels for foodstuffs which are set down in regulation 1881/2006. There are many different contaminants, including dioxins. There are also regulations on dioxins in pigs, cattle or whatever. There are different food commodities. For pigmeat the level is 1 picogram WHO-TEQ/kg and for dioxins and dioxin like PCBs the level is 1.5 picogram. Clearly, legislation is in place and if the standard of food produced does not comply with the provisions of it and producers are non-compliant, people have to take actions.
The Deputy also asked do we need to introduce legislation in this area. I would like to use this opportunity to outline how our organisation works. Legislation on a given area may or may not be in place. We need to get an official request from our requester, which is the European Commission, with terms of reference and some background information on the reasons specific questions are asked in regard to legislation. We then commence work on that. The kind of advice we have given here is exceptional because a potential risk to public health was posed and we had to quickly provide an answer. However, in normal circumstances, we would examine what kind of scientific panel is best to address the question posed. We would then establish a working group to gather experts from different member states and work on this issue to a certain deadline. The deadline may be six months or a year, as determining good risk assessment requires a great deal of discussion, which takes time.
In the area of contaminants we do not have a dossier for, say, a pesticide in respect of which a company would like to register and it would give all the data and indicate that legislation in that regard is in place. It would advise that we have to provide it with toxicological studies in the short term. Contaminants are freely available and nobody will give us a dossier in that respect. This means we need to research the literature and compile the relevant data. That takes time. Once we have formulated the risk assessment we bring it back to the Commission and it is up to the member states and the Commission to discuss the consequences and follow up procedures. As regards whether we need to take that into consideration, risk managers not only examine the scientific evidence, they also have to examine economical aspects when they finally draw up the legislation and it is put in place.
This outline illustrates how we normally work. In terms of the lessons learned from this incident, I understand that members would like to learn from it, as would everybody. We also have learned lessons from it and we have to continue to improve. I am sure that the European Commission, the risk managers and member states will take on board the lessons learned from this incident and examine how the system can be improved. However, that is outside our remit and I cannot comment on that or give members advice on it. They would need to talk to the respective people from that side.
My colleague have updated me on the questions raised as I could not read my notes. A question was asked on food labelling and the country of origin of products and if it would be helpful if legislation covering those aspects were put in place. That is an issue the members need to discuss with the risk managers. I am not able to answer that aspect.
My question is a repeat of one posed to Dr. Heppner to which she has not yet responded. My question concerns the possibility that the issue of the dioxins was known among some of our European colleagues in the period from September until December. The EFSA received a request from the European Commission in a letter of 8 December following concerns in this regard in Ireland. If some of our European colleagues were aware or concerned about such a problem during September, October and November, was there an obligation on them to inform the European Commission office or Dr. Heppner of such fears or if there was no such obligation, should there have been one?
I welcome Dr. Heppner to the committee. I have a few brief questions for her. Will she advise us of all incidents of PCBs entering the food chain in Europe that have occurred, of which she is aware, during the past ten years? Is she aware of the cause of those incidents, the measures taken at the time to protect the food chain, the measures taken subsequently to prevent a recurrence and the lessons learned from these events? Is she aware of any incident involving fuel oil or an energy source of heat being transferred into the food chain previously?
At the time of this incident it was stated that if consumers had eaten the affected products from September to December, such products would have caused the same amount of damage as the smoking of one cigarette. I understand from previous witnesses that in the period from 1 September traces of this PCB contaminant were under investigation in France, Belgium and Holland. Were any of these test results reported to the European Food Safety Authority during the period from 1 September to 6 December and, if not, does Dr. Heppner believe they should have been? Does she believe that the European Food Safety Authority should now be given much more regulatory authority in view of this and other incidents?
Dr. Heppner has answered or at least addressed most of the questions I had intended to ask. We are dealing with the issues of risk management and risk assessment, but I had thought we would have got more specific answers to some of the queries raised.
Dr. Heppner depends completely on the scientific information and data supplied by the risk management people in other countries to make her assessments. That is how the system appears to operate. Is she satisfied she has received full co-operation from the risk management people here, namely, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, in dealing with and other matters over the years? Is she is satisfied that the system is operating as well and correctly as it should be? Has she any suggestions as to how it could be better operated?
Dr. Heppner has made a very clear distinction between risk assessment and risk management, but she said that communication is the second pillar of EFSA's remit. As Deputy Sherlock said, the role of this exercise is to try to make sure that such an incident does not happen again and that we learn from it. Is Dr. Heppner satisfied with the protocols currently in place? Deputy Sheehan made the point that if such a contaminant was known to be in the system, that the first flagging of it was from the FSAI and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in November, even though there was an awareness prior to that in the European system that there were contaminants in products. Had that information been made available earlier to the EFSA, could a more measured response have been given? It must be concluded that if the EFSA had such knowledge at the time of the initial outbreak, it could have then carried out the assessment it concluded later on 10 December before the second incident became apparent. Such an assessment could have been prepared in tandem with rooting out the cause of the outbreak. On the day the outbreak occurred here, the EFSA could have circulated its report — of 10 December which it could have completed earlier — and the response from the FSAI and the Irish Government could have reflected the EFSA's best advice.
Another member commented on the general protocols for the testing of all providers and everybody operating in the food chain and that dioxin testing should take place. I note with interest Dr. Heppner's point about such testing being expensive. We do not have a laboratory that carries out dioxin testing so samples have to be sent to England. That is expensive and may have been a prohibiting factor but the resulting cost has been immense. The EFSA has a communication remit so, with a view to getting across the difference between risk assessment and risk management, could Dr. Heppner communicate that information to the risk managers?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I forgot to reply to the question as to whether there was an obligation on member states to report data. It is not for me to say who had access to what when an incident occurred. I can only give the data we had on 8 December, when we started working on the case. We received good co-operation from the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. Everybody was waiting for the dioxin analysis from England and details of the levels involved.
In Europe the rapid alert system for food and feed is handled by the risk managers and member states have the obligation to report incidents to them. If members have any further questions on that issue they should ask the European Commission and the member states which use it. The tool is available for everything which has been reported as non-compliant. It could be questioned whether the tool could be improved but that is up to the people who run it.
I was asked if we were happy with the data, if we had everything we needed and if we relied on data from risk managers. As regards contaminants, we rely on normal risk assessments on data produced within the legislative framework. Member states have to fulfil an obligation to ensure food is compliant with current European legislation. We, as risk assessors, would like much better data, such as different samples relating to different food commodities, but we do not have them so we need to take what we have. If we did not do so, we would not be able to give any risk assessments and that is not helpful to risk managers. We work closely together on the concise European food consumption database because it is important for the exposure assessment to contain not only current data but details of how much a certain food commodity, such as pigmeat, is eaten by people in Europe. The role of the EFSA was to set up the concise food consumption database and we are actively working with member states to give us the data.
Every member state has its own system for recording such data and each is reluctant to change to a single system but we are working on that and have enjoyed great success. It would be nice to have a high level of information, such as on meat consumption in Austria, the Netherlands or Ireland, but for that we would need detailed data on pork so in this case we have made assumptions. For example, we assume 50% is pork but we do not have a database that allows us to push a button to find out how much fat is in a sausage or in the ham on a pizza. These data are important to enable us to be more precise in our risk assessment. We are working with member states to improve that aspect of our operation.
I am happy with what we did. We had access to information and received help from member states. We also heavily relied on the expertise of scientists in different member states because, even though we have 400 people, outside expertise is necessary. In this case we exchanged advice with the vice chairman of the CONTAM panel, Rolaf van Leeuwen, and the chair of the ANS panel, John Christian Larsen, because they had particular expertise in dioxins, having been involved in previous risk assessments on dioxins for the scientific committee on food. In a crisis situation, where there is limited time, we cannot gain that expertise by reading 500-page documents. We have demonstrated that risk managers can respond quickly to urgent matters and produce the necessary advice. One can always improve and I would like to have better data on food consumption and about the composition of food in Europe.
A question was asked about risk communication, which involves communicating on our scientific outputs. We try to make what we produce more understandable for the lay audience. We do not communicate on risk management matters but say, in a clear and consistent manner, what we have done, how and why we have did it. Have I answered all the points?
No, Dr. Heppner did not cover any point I raised. I asked if she would let us know of all the incidences of PCBs entering the food chain in Europe in the past ten years. Is she aware of the causes and the measures taken at the time to protect the food chain and afterwards to prevent recurrence? What lessons were learned from those events?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I am sorry, Deputy.
That is only one question.
Dr. Heppner, please respond.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I apologise for not having touched on the Deputy's questions. This is not the first time PCBs have entered the food chain because it happened in 1999 during the Belgian crisis. We did not even have legislation at that time and the European Food Safety Authority did not exist, having only come into being in 2002. The lessons learned from the first incidence were that it was necessary for the scientific committee on food to carry out a risk assessment. That committee delivered a good risk assessment, in which the tolerable weekly intake of the 40 picograms was laid down. Based on that, risk managers have put measures in place so we should be proud because Europe has the best legislation on dioxins in the world.
Is Dr. Heppner aware of any incident involving fuel oil or an energy or heat source being transferred into the food chain?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I only started working for the European Food Safety Authority in 2002 so I do not have great knowledge of the incidents in Belgium. I am sure reports on the cause of the contamination, and so on, will be made available. It is up to the risk managers to investigate the source of the contamination and explore the matter.
At the time of the incidents——
Is this the question the Deputy already asked?
Then we will have supplementary questions now and the Deputy will have to wait his turn. Supplementary questions must be brief because we only have five minutes.
I thank Dr. Heppner for her presentation and wish to ask her a question, in her role as a risk assessor. We have been told that food from the human food chain is being recycled into animal feed, and that is fine. We have also been told that the plastic wrapping on the human food is being allowed into the animal food chain and is being processed, as animal feed, with the waste food. Does Dr. Heppner feel this may have caused part of the problem in Ireland with PCBs and toxins in the human food chain?
We are led to believe that the Food and Veterinary Office gave a clean bill of health to the national control plan. Given the experience in Belgium and, prior to that, the dioxin contamination in Seveso, does Dr. Heppner feel it would be beneficial for us to test on a regular basis to assist in risk assessment? I am trying to frame the question so Dr. Heppner can answer, rather than say I should ask someone else. Does she feel we should test routinely for dioxin contamination?
I want to ask the same question. Dr. Heppner seems to suggest that the EFSA depends on member states for information on contamination so it can conduct investigations. Does the EFSA not carry out random spot checks on exports from countries such as England, Ireland and Germany? Are samples not taken every now and then? As I said before, when the first PCB contamination was found in September two months were allowed to elapse. This seems a long time if there were PCBs in the pork food chain before being uncovered in a random check at the end of November.
To go back to Dr. Heppner's statement on rapid alert, is there an obligation on governments and national food safety agencies to report concerns to the EFSA? Was there any such report made on the dioxin issue by another EU government or food safety agency during September, October and November?
I reiterate my earlier question. As a risk assessor, does Dr. Heppner believe it is appropriate and sufficient that a licensed premises be monitored only once a year?
At the time of the incident in Ireland it was stated that if consumers had eaten the affected products from September to December it would do about the same amount of damage as having smoked a cigarette.
Senator Bradford may have covered my final point. I understand from previous witnesses that from 1 September traces of this PCB contaminate were under investigation in France, Belgium and Holland. Were any of these test results reported to the European Food Safety Authority during that period and, if not, should they have been?
I should state for the public record that, while I welcome the fact that Dr. Heppner has come before the committee today, we could have received many of these answers by e-mail. This is all part of a learning curve that the committee is on. In terms of the questions that have been posed today, I suggest we should be speaking to representatives of DG Sanco, the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs. For the record, I thank Dr. Heppner for attending but we may have wasted her time. Perhaps she could still be sitting in an office in Brussels.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I hope the committee has not wasted its time and I will be happy to have a Guinness after the meeting. As was correctly stated, many of the questions relate to risk management and, in that respect, it would probably have been wise to invite representatives of the European Commission or DG Sanco to be present.
The rapid alert system is a tool for risk managers and I wanted to inform the committee of its existence but I cannot comment on when one should report or the measures that should be taken because it is a risk management tool.
I was asked when the information was communicated to EFSA and whether the authority had access to it early enough. As I pointed out, we start working when we are asked a question — at that point we examine a system. In the incidents with the dioxins we had access to data relating to dioxins and PCBs in 16 samples of Irish pork. This information was delivered by two member states. The Commission also had access to the information through the member states.
Which member states?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
The data related to Irish pork samples provided by two member states. I think it was reported that the member states in question were the UK and Belgium but I would have to check my files to confirm that.
Perhaps Dr. Heppner could inform the committee of that at a later stage.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
We based our risk assessment on 16 samples of Irish pork.
What date does this relate to?
Dr. Claudia Heppner
We received some data on the evening of 8 December and more on 9 December.
Deputy P. J. Sheehan mentioned the comparison to smoking but I would have to go back to my calculations to see whether that is correct.
Perhaps Dr. Heppner could let the clerk to the committee know.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I will send the calculations to the committee.
I was asked whether the materials used to wrap the food increased toxicity levels. I cannot comment on that because I do not know what investigations took place in that regard. I can only use the data I received relating to the 16 pork samples. The levels recorded in that regard were up to 200 picograms WHO-TEQ per gram of fat. In one of our scenarios we used the highest value recorded and took half and half again. These are the assumptions we made in some of our calculations. As I said earlier, we can only create different scenarios for calculations; people must then make decisions.
On behalf of the committee I thank the witnesses for their attendance and comprehensive presentation and answers. I understand a taxi is waiting for them and hope they were not delayed here so much that they might miss their flight.
Dr. Claudia Heppner
I thank the committee members for allowing me to address them this afternoon.
I welcome Mr. Alan Reilly, deputy chief executive and director of food science and standards; Mr. Raymond Ellard, director of audit and compliance; Dr. Wayne Anderson, chief specialist in food science; and Dr. Rhodri Evans, chief specialist in toxicology, from the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, FSAI. Unfortunately, Mr. O'Brien, chief executive of the FSAI, is unable to attend due to illness. As stated, this is our second day of hearings. I thank our guests for accepting our invitation to discuss the recent difficulties in the pigmeat sector.
Before calling on Mr. Reilly to make his presentation, I draw attention to the fact that while members of the committee have absolute privilege, this privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.
Mr. Alan Reilly
I thank the Chairman for inviting my colleagues and I to update the committee on the events and actions surrounding the discovery of animal feed contaminated with dioxins and the subsequent recall of all pork products manufactured from pigs slaughtered in Ireland between 1 September and 6 December 2008. In making this presentation and addressing members' queries I am joined by my colleagues, Mr. Raymond Ellard, director of audit and compliance and service contracts; Dr. Rhodri Evans, chief specialist in toxicology, and Dr. Wayne Anderson, chief specialist in food science.
With the agreement of the committee, I propose to cover four particular areas, namely, the role of the FSAI in the national food safety control system; the public health implications of dioxin contaminated foods; the actions taken following the detection of the problem; and the way forward and lessons learned. I hope to reassure members that the actions taken were appropriate, measured and proportionate, not only from the point of view of protecting consumers' health but also from a legal standpoint.
The FSAI was established in 1999 as a national body with responsibility for enforcing food law in Ireland. It is a statutory, independent and science-based agency, dedicated to protecting public health and consumer interests in the area of food safety. The authority was set up to be independent of the food industry and we operate under the aegis of the Department of Health and Children.
The FSAI's principal function is to take all reasonable steps to ensure food consumed, distributed, marketed or produced in Ireland meets the highest standards of food safety and hygiene. We are also charged with bringing about a general acceptance that the primary responsibility for food safety is borne by the food industry across the food chain. During the past ten years the FSAI has worked in partnership with all interested parties to ensure a consistent standard of enforcement of food legislation and underpin food law with science-based risk assessment.
Enforcement of food law is carried out on behalf of the FSAI in partnership with other State bodies, known as official agencies. These bodies act as agents of the FSAI under a service contract system. The main official agencies are the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, local authorities, the Health Service Executive, HSE, the Sea-Fisheries Protection Authority and the Marine Institute. These agencies are accountable to the FSAI for their food safety programmes, standards of work and actions in respect of food law enforcement. The FSAI audits the agencies with regard to their compliance with the service contract commitments. It also co-ordinates their activities to achieve the most effective and efficient use of State resources in protecting consumer health and consumer interests.
The service contract process provides a mechanism for co-ordination and harmonisation of food safety control delivery and allows the FSAI to keep under review the efficacy of the inspection services nationwide. The national residues monitoring programme which detected the recent dioxin contamination incident forms part of the service contract between the FSAI and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. I do not intend to dwell on the service contract process which is provided for in section 48 of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland Act 1998. All service contracts are published on the website of the FSAI.
As well as its food law enforcement role, the FSAI seeks to promote the highest standards of food safety and hygiene. To this end, it aspires to develop a culture of food safety in Ireland by engaging with those who can directly improve food safety practices. Stakeholders include the food industry and its representative groups, as well as consumer groups and State agencies which can positively influence food safety standards.
The FSAI's remit does not cover the entire food chain. When it was established in 1999, the FSAI was given responsibility for food safety from the farm gate forward. Animal feed and animal health controls on the farm remain the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The controls governing the approval or licensing and inspection of animal feed establishments and the marketing of animal feeds are, therefore, not included in the service contract between the FSAI and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. These are enforced under the feed hygiene regulations which require that feed business operators implement hazard analysis and critical control points, HACCP. The enforcement of regulations associated with animal welfare and animal health also does not form part of the service contract.
Apart from its role as a food law enforcement agency, the FSAI advises on scientific and technical aspects of legislation and participates in expert working groups of the European Commission in the preparation of EU food regulations. The FSAI does not have power to make food legislation. The enactment of national food regulations is the responsibility of the Ministers for Health and Children and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Oireachtas.
I wish to comment on the public health implications of dioxin contaminated foods. Dioxins, as referred to in European regulations, cover a complex group of 75 polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxin, PCDD, congeners and 135 polychlorinated dibenzofuran, PCDF, congeners. A congener is the term used to describe different configurations of similar chemical compounds. Of the 210 compounds, only 17 are of toxicological concern. Polychlorinated biphenyls, PCBs, on the other hand, are a group of 209 congeners which can be divided into two groups according to their toxicological properties. Twelve congeners exhibit toxicological properties similar to dioxins and are, therefore, often termed as "dioxin-like PCBs". The other PCBs, known as "marker PCBs", do not exhibit dioxin-like toxicity but have lower and different toxicological profile. Each congener of dioxins or dioxin-like PCBs exhibits a different level of toxicity. To be able to sum up the toxicity of these congeners, the concept of toxic equivalency factors, TEFs, has been introduced to facilitate risk assessment and regulatory control. Each congener is given a different weighting relative to its toxicity and analysed individually.
Since the Belgian dioxin crisis in 1999, there has been an increased awareness in the European Union of the dangers posed by dioxins and related PCBs in foods. These contaminants are very resistant to biological breakdown and, hence, persist and accumulate in the environment and the food chain, particularly in the fat of animals. I emphasise that approximately 90% of human exposure to these compounds results from food consumption. Hence, the most effective method of protecting consumers' health is the control of contamination in food.
The fact that we are primarily exposed to dioxins and PCBs through the food we eat has caused the FSAI to look closely to see if these contaminants are present in foods on the Irish market. Since 2001, the FSAI, in collaboration with its official agencies, has regularly monitored the food supply for dioxins and related compounds to ensure compliance with legislation and to follow any trends in contaminant occurrence. National surveys of high risk foods are regularly carried out and monitoring programmes implemented. The results of these surveys are published on the authority's website and complement the national residues monitoring programme. All these studies demonstrate that the environmental levels of dioxins are low; hence, the exposure of the population in Ireland to dioxins is below the European average. It is a fact that up to this incident Irish foods were among the safest in the world with respect to dioxins and related compounds. Under European regulations, Ireland is required to sample and test foods of animal origin for levels of dioxins and related contaminants in foods on the market and we do so regularly.
I would like to touch briefly on the effects of dioxins on human health, as I would like the committee to understand why we cannot allow foods containing these harmful contaminants to remain on the market and why we have stringent food regulations in place to limit human exposure. The longer a person is exposed to dioxins, the greater the chance of serious adverse health effects. Human exposure to dioxins can result in a wide range of health effects, including cancer, the disturbance of the reproductive and immune systems, and harmful effects on the skin. Long-term exposure of animals to dioxins has resulted in several types of cancer. Due to their serious health effects and their persistence in the environment, it is essential to minimise human exposure to these contaminants through foods. Every person has background exposure and a certain level of dioxins in the body, which is described as the "body burden", because dioxins persist in the environment. Toxicity is related to the build up of these toxins in the body and the focus of food safety controls is on efforts to reduce body burden. Maximum levels for dioxins and PCBs in meat, fish, eggs, milk and other foods have been set in European legislation. These levels are set to minimise exposure and ensure consumers' health is not affected. Separate legislation setting maximum levels of dioxins and PCBs applies to animal feeds, since this is another important source of contamination of the human food chain.
I would like to provide the committee with an overview of the actions taken by the FSAI when we first learned about this incident. I would also like to inform the committee that we have worked closely with officials from the Departments of Health and Children and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Health Service Executive and the local authorities in protecting consumers against adverse health effects arising from dietary exposure to dioxins and related contaminants. On the evening of Friday, 28 November, the FSAI was informed by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food that a sample of pork fat from an Irish slaughter plant, taken as part of the routine national monitoring programme, had been found to be "tentatively" positive for marker RGBs and that it was investigating this incident. Marker PCBs, while considered of low toxicity, are used in routine monitoring as indicators of possible contamination with dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs. It is more cost effective and easier to analyse marker PCBs when compared to the analysis of dioxins. This test for marker PCBs is used for routine monitoring. It is normal practice that, on the detection of non-compliance with contaminants legislation, the Department contacts the FSAI to have a risk assessment carried out and seek advice.
On Monday, 1 December, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food confirmed that the pork fat sample was positive for marker PCBs and that samples of "bread crumb" produced by a food recycling plant for use as animal feed were also likely to be positive for marker PCBs. The authority was also informed that a number of pig farms were under restriction and that pigs would only move from these farms on a positive release basis in line with European Commission guidelines on the management of a dioxin incident. A positive release basis means that representative samples of the pigs would be tested after slaughter and that pigs would only released onto the market if the herds tested negative.
The FSAI recommended that samples be tested for the presence of dioxins and this was arranged by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food with the Central Science Laboratory in the United Kingdom. Additional samples of fat from pigs were confirmed for marker PCBs on 2 December and samples sent to the United Kingdom for dioxin analysis. The Department also confirmed the presence of marker PCBs in the "bread crumb" produced by the food recycling plant and in additional pig fat samples on 2 December. The FSAI informed the Department of Health and Children of the investigation on 2 December and the evolving nature of the incident. The authority remained in close contact with the food unit of the Department of Health and Children during the incident.
On Thursday, 4 December, following discussions with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, a press statement was issued describing the investigation under way. On Friday, 5 December, the FSAI informed the European Commission that an investigation was under way and of the results to date. The authority also informed the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed, RASFF, of the European Commission about the investigation on 5 December. The authority is the national contact point in Ireland for the RASFF. The FSAI was contacted on 5 December by the Dutch Food and Product Safety Authority, VWA. The contact was triggered by the fact that the VWA had read the press statement issued by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food on 4 December, which led officials to believe they may have been investigating a similar incident connected to the Irish investigation. When the statement from the Department was issued on 4 December, it was picked up by an electronic network called the rapid system for feed which would have flashed the statement around the world. These days, if there is a problem in one country, it will be soon known in others. That is they way the Internet has developed. We would know if something was going on in Singapore, Canada or Timbuktu through these electronic networks.
The VWA, the Dutch food safety authority, informed the FSAI that a Dutch pork processing company had been notified on 24 November by one of its customers in France of the discovery of dioxins at a level of 433 picogram per gram of fat, pg/g, during routine monitoring of a pork loin product supplied by the Dutch company. The Dutch company reported these findings to the Dutch food safety authority on 25 November. The production date for this sample of pork loin was 13 October. Subsequent investigations showed that a total of 1,049 pig carcases had been processed in the Dutch plant on that date. These carcases could have originated from six European countries, including Ireland. The FSAI was also informed that the VWA had begun intensive sampling on 27 November to identify the source of the contamination and that it had identified marker PCBs in a pork carcase from Ireland. In addition, the VWA reported that a rendering plant in Belgium, owned by the same Dutch company, had identified an increase in dioxin levels in composite rendered fat from around mid-September 2008. This Belgian rendering plant used pig fat from several European countries, including Ireland. The congener profile of the dioxins and PCBs indicated a single source of contamination, most likely transformer oil.
On Saturday, 6 December, the FSAI held a teleconference with the European Commission and the VWA to discuss the incident. The VWA was expecting results of its dioxin analysis over the weekend. Risk management options were discussed with the Commission. The FSAI explained that we were awaiting the results of dioxin analysis of our own samples and appropriate action would be taken as soon as these results were available. The Irish results were reported by the UK laboratory at 3.40 p.m. on 6 December and showed dioxins in pig fat at levels of 80-200 pg/g and bread crumb at levels greater than 2,500 pg/g. As mentioned, the legal limit for dioxin in pig fat is 1 pg/g and for animal feed, 0.75 pg/g. The FSAI was aware that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had identified the source of contamination as a food recycling plant, due to the traceability systems in place in the farming and animal feed sectors.
The evidence available to the FSAI on 6 December indicated that the dioxin contamination had started around the middle of September. The indications for this date were that the first known contaminated pork product from Ireland had come from a sample taken in France in mid-October. The congener profile suggested contaminated feed had been consumed in the period shortly before slaughter. We were told this by a Dutch expert who works in one of the main laboratories for dioxin testing. The expert said the profiles of the congeners in the sample indicated that the contamination had been recent. In addition, monitoring in the rendering plant in Belgium showed an increase in dioxin levels from mid-September. Therefore, as a practical approach, the date of 1 September was chosen. Subsequent testing of pork and feed samples has since supported this decision.
Following consultation with the Taoiseach, the Ministers for Health and Children and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ministers of State and senior Government officials, the FSAI decided that all pork products from pigs slaughtered since 1 September should be removed from sale. This decision was made to stop ongoing consumer exposure, thereby removing the risk to public health.
During the past ten years the FSAI has encouraged and part-funded the development of comprehensive databases on food consumption which it has used to monitor dioxin intakes by consumers in Ireland. These data allowed the FSAI to rapidly carry out an exposure assessment and determine the level of risk posed by this dioxin incident. Complex mathematical modelling was used to calculate potential exposure of the population to dioxins from consumption of contaminated pork. These calculations were based on the known range of daily intakes of fat from pork and pork products, combined with information on the known levels of dioxins in pork fat. The regulatory limits for dioxins and related contaminants are set on lifetime exposure and considerable safety margins are built into the levels set in regulations. Our conclusion was that the safety margins had been considerably eroded and that ongoing exposure would put consumers' health at risk.
On 8 December a video conference took place between the Irish authorities, the European Commission, some member states and the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA. An outcome was a request by the European Commission to the EFSA for independent scientific advice on the risks to public health due to the contamination by dioxins of pork from Ireland. All exposure calculations performed by the FSAI were forwarded to the European Commission and the EFSA to assist in this work. A crucial factor in determining risks to public health in a dioxin incident such as this is to calculate the increase in the body burden resulting from the consumption of contaminated foods. The EFSA calculated that during the limited timescale of the incident the body burden would have increased by 10%. Dr. Heppner has given the committee those data. The EFSA considered that this increase was not of concern as regards human health. However, it was only able to reach this conclusion because exposure to these high levels was shortlived due to the effective measures taken by the Irish authorities to remove the source, thus preventing ongoing exposure.
At the request of the chief medical officer of the Department of Health and Children, the FSAI established an expert working group to consider and advise on the health implications of dioxins in pork in the context of this incident. This was a channel for advice from Ireland's top scientists in public health to the risk assessment process.
I would like to address the specific questions posed by the committee relating to this incident. First, I will deal with the procedure involved in monitoring licensed premises. The FSAI does not have a remit to oversee the approval, licensing or inspection of manufacturers and processors of animal feeds. Neither does it have a remit to oversee the controls associated with the marketing and distribution of animal feeds. These controls are the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and carried out under the hygiene regulations. However, through our close working relationship with the Department, the FSAI is kept informed of potential safety issues as and when they occur.
In relation to this incident, the responsibility of the FSAI in enforcing food law begins at the abattoir. Abattoirs and meat cutting plants, like all food businesses, must have systems in place to manage food safety and ensure only safe food is placed on the market. The law requires these food safety management systems to be based on a set of principles that are referred to as a hazard analysis and critical control point, HACCP, system. The HACCP system has been the mainstay of food safety management in the food industry since the early 1980s and is used throughout the world. It is, essentially, an approach used to identify the hazards that could affect a food, to prioritise those hazards that present a real risk to consumer health and then control those prioritised hazards by procedures that are followed in the factory, for example, chilling carcases to reduce microbiological hazards and chemical testing to control contaminants. HACCP is a preventive system which ensures actions are taken on a day-to-day basis to prevent the occurrence of food safety hazards rather than waiting for a problem to arise and then taking action to solve it.
Dioxins are known chemical hazards in food and feed. The meat industry is, therefore, expected to have identified dioxins as a hazard in their HACCP plans. HACCP plans often identify many different hazards, not all of which are likely to be real risks to consumers. Risk assessment is used to decide which hazards are realistic. This is the means by which controls of hazards in food processing systems are prioritised.
Prior to this incident, it was unlikely that a risk assessment in the context of HACCP would have identified dioxins in meat as a problem likely to affect consumer health. Ireland historically has been a country with very low dioxin levels in the environment and in food. That said, HACCP procedures require regular review. Given recent events, therefore, the risk assessment of dioxins in Ireland should now identify this hazard as a realistic risk to consumer health. From now on, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland would expect dioxins to be a hazard that is actively controlled in meat and meat products by a combination of supplier control and testing by food business operators.
On the effectiveness of the traceability systems in place, in line with European food regulation, Irish food business operators are required to keep records of their suppliers and customers. This is the minimum legal requirement for traceability. All businesses involved in this food incident had in place these basic requirements. It is worth emphasising that all food businesses had in place the basic legal requirements regarding traceability. This allowed the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to trace the contaminated feed from the manufacturer to the farms and to track pigs from the farms to abattoirs and cutting plants.
Pigs from the implicated farms that used the contaminated feed were supplied to ten of the main abattoirs in the country that accounted for about 98% of national production of pork. For traceability purposes, one day's production was considered by the abattoirs and pork processors to be a batch size. It was only to the date of production that products could be traced. Essentially, the main abattoirs had taken animals from many farms each day and were not able to distinguish products or cuts of pork from the contaminated farms from those that were unaffected.
The farms using contaminated feed accounted for 8% of the national kill or approximately 50,000 pigs slaughtered between 1 September and 6 December 2008. Owing to co-mingling in the abattoirs of meat from pigs from farms using contaminated feed with meat from pigs which came from farms which did not, it was not possible to distinguish between contaminated and uncontaminated products in approximately 98% of the national throughput of pork.
A reasonable question that has been asked is why it was necessary to recall all pork products from the market. There were three reasons for this. First, it was essential to limit consumer exposure to contaminated products to the shortest possible time period. To protect consumer health and to limit exposure to dioxins, the FSAI decided that all pork products manufactured from pigs slaughtered between 1 September and 6 December should be recalled from sale on a precautionary basis. This would have the immediate effect of removing contaminated foods from the market. It would also allow time possibly to identify products that were not contaminated and to return these to the market. Products were back on the market in less than one week.
Second, the level of dioxins found in the pork and in the animal feed were well in excess of the maximum legal limits. I mentioned earlier a figure of 200 and in excess of 2,500 for the animal feed. Under European regulations, these could not have remained on the market. Third and critically, as I have mentioned already, it was not possible to distinguish between contaminated and uncontaminated products in approximately 98% of the national throughput of pork. The longer contaminated products remained on the market, the greater was the risk to public health. This point was endorsed by the European Food Safety Authority in its 90-day exposure study.
Imagine had we not recommended the recall but instead left all pork on the market and attempted to track and trace only contaminated products. This would have been an impossible task and Ireland would have been subjected to safeguard measures from the European Commission and would have suffered substantial damage to its reputation. For example, during the Belgian dioxin crisis in 1999, safeguard measures imposed by the European Commission resulted in the removal from the market of all foods of animal origin produced in Belgium in the first six months of that year. I stress that all foods were removed in this instance, including, Belgian chocolates because milk from the animals would have contained dioxins. All meat products, including Belgian pâté were also removed. For example, some member states were importing liver from animals produced in Belgian and were using it to make pâté, all of which had to be recalled. A six-month supply of eggs, chickens and so on was recalled.
The Food Safety Authority of Ireland was established in January 1999 and this was one of the first big food scares we faced. I remember it well. We were facing a very similar problem, practically identical in that 2 kg of industrial oil had been added to an animal feed which had been spread right across the Belgian industry. In contrast, the European Commission and the member states welcomed the approach followed by the Irish authorities in managing this incident. I contend, therefore, that the measures taken in managing this incident were appropriate, proportionate and correct. I believe that Ireland's reputation will be enhanced internationally because we were prepared to take such decisive action.
Although not specifically requested Chairman, I would like to touch on the issue of dioxins in beef.
Yes.
Mr. Alan Reilly
The question has been asked why Irish beef was not subject to a full recall as in the case of pork. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food restricted on a precautionary basis 21 beef farms that it identified as having received contaminated feed. There are a number of reasons for this that I would like to explain.
First, the traceability requirements for beef are more stringent when compared with pork and there is greater process traceability in the beef industry. For the marketing of beef, labelling requirements are required under beef labelling regulations, EC/1760/2000, which came into effect in July 2000 and were enacted in Ireland by SI 485 of 2002. This legislation requires beef to be labelled with the reference number or code of the animal or group of animals from which beef was derived, the country of the slaughterhouse and the approval number, the country of the deboning hall and the approval number, the country of birth and all countries where fattening took place. Essentially it was possible for the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to trace and isolate beef products from farms that had received contaminated feed. Members should remember that 98% of our production of pork was mixed.
Second, the number of animals involved was only a tiny fraction of the national beef production. Some 99.98% of Irish beef was free from contamination, as demonstrated by traceability records. Carcasses and prime cuts from 0.02% of national production of beef were traced and withdrawn from the market.
Third, the FSAI carried out a risk assessment as soon as levels of dioxins in beef were known. Our food consumption data show that the fat intake from beef is about half of that from pork. The FSAI risk assessment took account of a 0.02% contamination of beef at the highest observed level of 1,300 pg/g fat. The additional body burden was calculated to be 0.035%, which was about 300 times less than the additional body burden contributed by the contaminated pork. The FSAI considered that this increase in body burden would not cause appreciable adverse health effects and was of no concern for this short-term exposure event. The fact we were able to trace it made a huge difference with regard to our decisions. The decision was made to withdraw the beef in question, which was a different case from the total recall involved with the pork.
I move now to the way forward. In spite of what I have said about the appropriateness of our actions, there are still lessons to be learned. The incident reinforces the necessity of having a national agency charged with food safety and the protection of consumers' health and interests. The FSAI has been in existence for the past ten years and in that time has built credibility and trust with consumers, the European Commission and the EFSA. We were established in January 1999 and this month are ten years in existence.
An incident such as this illustrates plainly the need to be able to communicate clear messages to the food sector, consumers, regulatory staff and the media. Over the first two days of the incident, the FSAI received 10,000 phone calls and was able to deal with these. In addition, we dealt with numerous press queries and requests for radio and television interviews. We regularly updated our website to provide up-to-date information for all concerned, especially on the agreed methods for getting safe and uncontaminated pork products back on the market. The FSAI worked very closely with officials from the Health Service Executive, the local authority veterinary service and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to ensure openness and transparency in the system for getting safe pork products back on the market.
I am aware that in light of this incident, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food will be reviewing its feed chain controls, its risk assessment and the application of HACCP by feed business operators. The FSAI will be pleased to co-operate, support and advise on this review to ensure all links in the food chain are safeguarded.
Following the food scares of the 1990s, traceability was introduced as a legal requirement in the food sector in Europe. The food business operators involved in this event complied with legal requirements in so far as they were able to identify from whom they received and to whom they supplied animals or meat products. More sophisticated traceability — process traceability — which links inputs to outputs could have prevented the need for such extensive a recall. The legislation could be amended to require process traceability but there is likely to be a substantial cost involved. I understand the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is pursuing this aspect in consultation with the European Commission.
All food business operators are required to have a food safety management system in place based on the principles of hazard analysis critical control points, HACCP. To be fair, up to this incident, dioxin would not have been seen as a hazard which was likely to present a real risk to consumers in domestic food processing and manufacture. This has now changed and all food and feed business operators should review their safety management systems to ensure the risk of dioxin contamination is controlled. Food control agencies will ensure food business operators have complied with this requirement.
Up to now, Ireland did not have a domestic facility to test for dioxins in food or feed and had to depend on the availability of such services abroad. The FSAI is pleased to acknowledge that the State Laboratory will be able to offer such a capability from next month. We need to strengthen our national reference laboratory facilities so that effective measures can be taken to protect consumer health. European legislation requires that member states have effective, accredited official controls and national reference laboratories to support food safety controls.
It is worth repeating that the primary responsibility for food safety rests with the food and feed business operator. Compliance with legal requirements is a minimum requirement. The protection of consumers and consumer confidence and the sustainability of our food sector require that the industry adopts standards well beyond the minimum.
I thank the Chairman for the opportunity to address this committee. My colleagues and I are at your disposal and will endeavour to answer any questions the committee has.
I thank Mr. Reilly for his comprehensive report.
I welcome Mr. Reilly and his colleagues and thank them for a thorough and robust presentation. There was a lot in it to digest and it is challenging to respond immediately with questions. With regard to the contract of service between the Department and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, Mr. Reilly mentioned in his presentation that he did not intend to dwell on the service contract process. He later stated that the FSAI's responsibility does not cover the entire food chain and that when the FSAI was set up in 1999, it was given responsibility for food safety from the farm gate forward, but up to that point it was the remit of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which operates on a service contract basis. I would like more information on this matter.
If there is a lesson to be learned from this, it might well be that we need a single agency with control over both the feed and food chain. The existing demarcation may not best serve consumer interests or the Irish food industry. Will Mr. Reilly comment further on this issue? He said he did not intend to dwell on the service contract but I would like to know more about it.
With regard to dioxin testing for example, until now we were not considered high risk for dioxin contamination. Given the Belgian incident of dioxin contamination, to which Mr. Reilly referred, and the significance of the feed chain in the case of the BSE problem, however, was it a serious oversight or error of judgment to consider the feed chain low risk and not test the feed ingredients for dioxin following the contamination in Belgium? Should one of the lessons we learn from this be that a single agency should have responsibility, from feed right through to the consumer end product of food ? Do the service contracts in some way hinder that line of accountability and hamper the authority to take appropriate actions?
There is a significant amount of information to be dealt with in the presentation and I compliment the FSAI on its comprehensive nature. The traceability regime in pork was referred to and the point was made that it was not possible to do what was done with regard to beef. I understand there is a cost involved in traceability and perhaps this is within the remit of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food rather than of the FSAI. Is it a once-off cost to put in place that regime or is an ongoing cost to the producer and, ultimately, the consumer envisaged? Those are my preliminary comments. I thank Mr. Reilly for his comprehensive presentation.
Regarding the feed chain as opposed to the food chain, it has been suggested that the source of the contamination may have been plastic wrapping. Mr. Reilly made reference to the PCBs, transformer oil, etc. Is it possible that the contaminant could be the plastic wrappings? I would like the issue to be confirmed or denied at this stage because it has a currency and needs to be clarified.
Would it be acceptable to group two sets of questions?
Mr. Alan Reilly
It would be better for me not to because by the time I respond to another person I will have forgotten what the first person has asked me.
In that case I ask Mr. Reilly to proceed.
Mr. Alan Reilly
On the question of the service contracts and our remit starting at the farm gate, that was a policy decision taken at the time when the Food Safety Authority of Ireland was set up. We work closely with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. As I said in my presentation, whenever there is an incident or if something happens in that area, we would learn about it. However, we do not have the legal responsibility for the on-farm controls. That is the policy decision that was taken at the time that the Food Safety Authority of Ireland was set up.
With respect to the testing for dioxins——
Does Mr. Reilly believe that policy should be reviewed now? Is it a desirable outcome and is the lesson to be learned from this that a single agency is needed?
Mr. Alan Reilly
I think the whole incident needs to be reviewed and that may be one of the issues to be reviewed. Certainly we will be looking at this and at lessons to be learned by ourselves.
With respect to the testing for dioxins, since the Food Safety Authority of Ireland was set up, we have been studying dioxins in the Irish food supply. Every two years we do a survey in which we test samples of fish, milk, eggs and plants — just about everything — for dioxins. We continually find low levels of dioxins. I was questioning why we were doing that work. Why are we continually looking for dioxins when we are finding such low levels? In recent years we have probably looked at in excess of 600 or 700 samples. At €1,200 per sample, it is expensive. Why do we continue to do it? We know we do not have an industrial source of dioxins. We do not have incinerators and so on. We do not have the sources of dioxins. It is only in imported foods. This is how we have looked at it. I was seriously considering reducing our efforts in monitoring dioxins and targeting other areas because they would be right down on the radar screen.
As part of a World Health Organisation study we have tested human breast milk for dioxins. The levels in people living Ireland and consuming Irish foods are very low in comparison with other countries. Would it be reasonable to suggest we should not have been testing for dioxins? It probably would have been an unnecessary burden with what we know about the environment and so on. Having said that, with hindsight any type of chemical contamination that would pose a hazard should be identified in a HACCP plan. We need to consider what type of risk it would pose. The answer is a very low risk. Then it would put the onus on the industry to do dioxin testing, knowing in all likelihood that negative samples would be found. That was prior to this incident.
The traceability is down to the food industry. It is up to the food industry to take the prime responsibility for food safety. To trace its products, the food industry must make the judgment call whether to put traceability in process. It could then decide that instead of having to recall a full day's production it could recall two hours' production and have a different label for each two hours' production or perhaps one hour's production or half a day's production. In this case animals were taken in from many farms without identifying them and they all went into one area. It was very similar in Belgium. This Dutch company was processing 1,046 carcasses in one day. Although these came from six countries, they left the Dutch plant with a Netherlands label. Most of the testing was by one Dutch company with subsidiaries in Belgium and France. It would have been a Dutch company, as I was trying to explain, that identified the problem initially. Regarding the Deputy's question about traceability, the responsibility is with the industry to make the judgment call. Legislating to put process control in place might discriminate against some of the smaller industries.
The Deputy's final point was about plastic wrapping. When we first heard about this we were trying to figure out where the chlorine came from. The key about these dioxins is that there is chlorine in those large structures. Where did it come from? We were wrecking our heads. We knew all they were doing was recycling bread and dough which was of human food grade. Where did the chlorine come from? We could not figure it out. Someone suggested that it could be plastic wrapping. We initially thought it was the plastic wrapping. We asked whether they had taken the wrapping off the bread before they dried it or whatever. After talking with some dioxin experts in one or two of the laboratories in Europe that were carrying out this testing we were advised that to get dioxins from plastic material it would need to be heated up to approximately 200°C. Heating the bread to that level would result in toast which would be pretty useless as an animal feed.
We then tried to ascertain the heating temperature in that recycling plant and were advised that it is approximately 70°C to 72°C. We were advised to forget about the plastic, which was not going to be the source. We came to that conclusion very early on. However, having come to that conclusion again talking with experts in RIKILT, the Dutch Institute of Food Safety, we were advised that it was some kind of transformer oil. Having looked at the congeners they could tell it was transformer oil and it was something similar to what went on in Belgium. I cannot tell the members of the committee the precise date I had that conversation, but it was in the week after 2 December. From that day onwards we focused on transformer oil. We examined the congener profile of what we had. In my presentation I mentioned what these dioxins are. They are polychlorinated dibenzofurans. It is primarily those furan-type dioxins that are in there. That essentially comes from burning the oil at a low temperature in the heating process.
Could I ask a supplementary question to tidy up that issue?
Very briefly.
I am aware that Deputy Scanlon has raised this point repeatedly. Is it reasonable to conclude from what Mr. Reilly has said that the plant in Carlow was doing all the appropriate things with regard to plastics and wrapping, etc., when it was making the animal feed component and processing the human food product? Do I understand correctly that the contamination came from the contaminated oil that included the transformer oil that has been mentioned?
Mr. Alan Reilly
I cannot really comment on what was going on in the plant because I have not been there. I am not involved in that end of the business at all. If one examines the congener profile that was found in the fat of the pigs and in the crumb, etc., one will find that it is consistent with a transformer oil.
If members do not have too many questions, I will take two of them at a time.
I welcome Mr. Reilly and his colleagues. I compliment them on the comprehensive paper they have submitted to the committee. Mr. Reilly anticipated many of the questions we planned to ask. At the outset, I welcome the decision to provide for a facility to test for dioxins in food and feed. The facility in question will open next month, which will be a positive step. Perhaps it should have been put in place before now.
Mr. Reilly said: "The evidence available to the FSAI on 6 December indicated that the dioxin contamination started around the middle of September." The evidence in question, which came to light at the end of November or early December, came from a sample of a pork product from Ireland that was taken in mid-October. It seems to me that it took a long time — more than a month — for this matter to come to the attention of the Irish authorities. It is not good enough in this day and age. If a more serious dioxin had been in the food chain since early September, it could have done tremendous damage to human health. If Mr. Reilly has any information on this aspect of the matter, he might give it to the committee.
I agree with Mr. Reilly's assertion that the strong action taken by the Department and others, which cost the national purse a great deal of money, will enhance Ireland's international reputation. As we speak, members of the press are making glib statements to the effect that our action was over the top. I emphasise that such statements are unwelcome. The proper action was taken. It seems to me that certain interests are annoyed that such strong action was taken. If it had not been, they would have had a field day by calling for tribunals to be established to investigate the matter. Mr. Reilly was quite correct to make that assertion. I would be grateful if he could respond to the questions I have asked.
I welcome the representatives of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. I would like to repeat what I said in the presence of officials from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food last week and in the presence of officials of the European Food Safety Authority today. I compliment the Food Safety Authority of Ireland and everyone concerned — processors, producers, farmers and retailers — on their prompt reaction to the crisis that developed last month. The pork and bacon industry, which is worth billions of euro, was at risk. Matters could have been much worse if the cattle sector had been affected, as was the case in Belgium in 1999. I agree with everything that was done. The relevant officials acted promptly on 6 December to handle the situation in a manner that will enhance, rather than damage, the reputation of the Irish agriculture industry.
I join Deputy Creed in asking about wrappers. If wrappers were left on the bread from the human food chain that was being dried at great heat in advance of being recycled into the pig and cattle food chain, would they have burned when the bread was being dried? I understand that they were put in together and mashed up as part of the system. They had to be burned. The wrappers are made out of plastic and contain dyes. Like all farmers, I am forbidden from burning plastic on my farm because dioxins would be produced in such circumstances. We have to recycle all plastics. If the wrappers were incinerated, would it not be fair to suggest that dioxins were produced and added to the feed? I am not convinced by the suggestion that the wrappers were removed as part of the process. They were being mixed in as part of the system. It is possible that the end product contained dioxins from the ink on the wrappers.
I would like to ask a question about transformer oil, which is the subject of some suspicion. I understand that such oil is waste oil that was previously used in transformers before being used in this process. My understanding is that there is no legislation to specify the kinds of oil that should be used in heating or incinerating as part of this system. That is very dangerous. Legislation is needed in this area.
Deputy Creed has pointed out that the Food Safety Authority of Ireland does not seem to make any input into the feed chain. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food seems to be responsible for the feed chain. The plant in Carlow was inspected just once in 2007. It was supposed to be inspected in November 2008 but that did not happen. The authority seems to do a very good job of testing processed meat for dioxins. There seems to be a breakdown in the feed chain, however. More inspections of the feed that is given to cattle and pigs are needed if more clarity is to be brought to this matter. Perhaps more money is needed at that end of it, rather than at the authority's end of it. Mr. Reilly has said that he sometimes wonders if the authority is wasting money by testing for dioxins that it never finds, or finds in very low levels. Should we focus our resources on the feed that is given to animals?
It is difficult to understand why thousands of tonnes of uncontaminated pork need to be destroyed. The reasons for the withdrawal of that pork — consumer confidence, etc. — have been explained in great detail. I am aware of a meat plant in my local area that will be rendering thousands of tonnes of pork over the next three weeks. Perhaps it will not be finished rendering the meat until March. It is difficult to understand how pork produced by 10% of farmers can be deemed to have contaminated 90% of processors. It seems that it is not possible to trace the source of pork as can be done with beef. It is a pity.
Mr. Reilly suggested that thousands of tonnes of pork could have been saved if a small-scale system of traceability, perhaps based on batches, had been put in place. Would it have been possible to test thousands of tonnes of pork quickly enough to identify the contaminated pork and separate it from the rest of the pork? In such circumstances, it might have been possible to return the uncontaminated pork to the market. It is difficult to ask questions about all aspects of the authority's detailed report. I compliment everyone involved.
Deputy Aylward is repeating himself.
I have repeated many of the questions that were asked earlier. They have to be asked. I compliment the authority on its work.
Mr. Alan Reilly
I would like to comment on the events of 13 October last. As I said in my opening presentation, a Dutch company with plants in Belgium and France initially identified the presence of dioxins. I cannot comment on their internal testing system. I am speculating, but they probably would have taken samples here and there, put them in the freezer, transported them to a laboratory and had them all done together. It is likely that the samples they took on the first of the month might not have been tested until the middle of the month. The most likely scenario is that there was a batch system for testing. It is not between October and November. One is looking at probably the guts of a month there, which is not all that unusual for a company running its own internal checks. Perhaps the products are all frozen and would not be released on to the market. It is all speculation. I simply do not know the reasons.
On that Friday we were contacted by the Dutch food safety authority. We had a number of contacts with that authority, which has been extremely helpful. Its laboratory in the Institute of Food Safety, RIKILT, has experts who have been very helpful in fingerprinting what was going on. The key issue was that the samples taken in France, in the Belgian plant and in the Dutch plant all had the same congener profile. They were identical. We knew that very early on. We knew there was just one source of contamination. A great deal of investigative work was ongoing to try to patch everything together. Looking back on it now we can be fairly glib and say, "Yes, we know what happened", but at the time we did not know what was happening.
To respond to Deputy Alyward's point about the feed and the plastics. To generate these dioxins and PCBs from the plastic, one would have to heat them up to approximately 200° plus. That is what we have been told by the experts. If one heats plastics to 200°, one is heating the breadcrumb to that level, which would result in it being burned. It would look like burnt toast, the stuff one gets at the bottom of the toaster. That would be useless as an animal feed. That is the key issue.
When it came to trying to trace contaminated product and getting everything off the market, there was a great deal of product between the farm and the supermarket shelf still in the processing chain. We worked out systems to release that back on the market, to identify product that was not near any of the contaminated feed. That was a huge job. Colleagues at the table here were responsible for that work. We published all of that on our website to ensure that people could see the system we were using, that it was open and transparent and there was nothing underhand involved.
When we made the decision initially it was done to protect consumer health. We knew it would be costly. We also wanted to be open and transparent. When the Belgian dioxin crisis emerged in 1999, it was not admitted for probably three months or more and when people began to find out and started testing the products, that is when it all came to light. People lost faith in the food safety control system. The Belgians did not manage the crisis themselves; it was managed for them. That is when the safeguard measures were introduced by the Commission.
I have a few points to make and I will try to be as orderly as possible. Mr. Reilly stated that the main agencies, one being the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, "are accountable to the Food Safety Authority for their food safety programmes, standards of work and actions in regard to food law enforcement." He went on to say that he also wanted to bring to our attention the fact that the FSAI does not have the power to make food law, yet it is the enforcer of food law. Mr. Reilly stated also that the service contract between the FSAI and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is for "co-ordination and harmonisation of food safety control delivery and allows the FSAI to keep under review the efficacy of the inspection services nationwide." The FSAI audits the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food on an annual basis, and the next date for an audit will be 31 December 2009, when the contract is up. Will Mr. Reilly outline how the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has scored in the audits, especially in 2008 and the efficacy in the inspection service? Does Mr. Reilly believe once a year is sufficient for the residue monitoring programme for animal feed processing to take place in factories?
Today's meeting is like a job interview. Mr. Reilly outlined early on that the FSAI's remit does not cover the entire food chain. Later he suggested that the incident reinforced the necessity to have a national agency charged with food safety and the protection of consumers health and interests. On the one hand Mr. Reilly is saying the FSAI does not have that power, and on the other he is looking for that power.
How is the relationship between the FSAI and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food? Mr. Reilly outlined also that the traceabilty of pork at slaughter and afterwards is on the basis of production batch. In my former life I was a butcher and I know what we had to go through with beef and lamb. Everything but the animal's name had to be put up in the butcher's shop before the meat could be sold. Mr. Reilly admitted that there is need for traceability of pork but that it will come at a cost, but at what cost? The Department's estimate of the cost to the State so far is €180 million, which will be short by approximately €45 million by the time it is finished.
The European Food Safety Authority is a risk assessor. Does the FSAI regard itself as a risk assessor? Mr. Reilly's opening comment was that when the FSAI was set up in 1999 it was given "responsibility for food safety from the farm gate forward". How can one make a comprehensive risk assessment on food if one merely checks it from the farm gate forward? If somebody purchases a chicken or a T-bone steak, one would like to know what the animal has been fed. I refer to the risk assessment in terms of what is going on to plates. The FSAI does not have that remit.
Dioxins are chemical hazards. The HACCP procedures require regular review. HACCP is an institution in itself and it has been for years. Given recent events, the risk assessment of dioxins in Ireland should now identify the hazard as a realistic risk to consumer health. There was no inclusion of contaminated oil in any HACCP programme prior to now, so that whip cannot be used to lash anyone and claim that the producer should have identified this as a risk or a hazard when the FSAI or the Department had not identified it. I accept that it might have been an oversight, but it was an oversight on everyone's behalf.
The authority made the decision on 8 December to recall the products due to the risk to public health. However, Dr. Patrick Wall stated that there was no risk to public health and that there would have to be prolonged digestion of this product over 40 years before any risk could occur. On page seven, Mr. Reilly stated that his conclusion was that the safety margins were considerably eroded and that ongoing exposure would put consumers' health at risk. He also stated that the European Food Safety Authority was only able to reach this conclusion because exposure to these high levels was short-lived, due to the effective measures taken by the Irish authorities to remove the source and prevent ongoing exposure. Given that the recall was for food produced over a three-month period from September to December, was all this necessary? If the infected herds had been taken out in December, then what was on the market would not have had any effect on public health, according to Dr. Patrick Wall and the European Food Safety Authority. Yet it was due to the risk to public health that all products were recalled.
On page six, Mr. Reilly stated that all this first came to notice on 24 November, when it was noted by the Dutch food safety authority that contaminated dioxins at a level of 433 picograms per gram were found. In an earlier contribution, Dr. Heppner stated that EFSA had an advisory forum of 27 members, and I presume that VWA — the Dutch food safety authority — is represented on it in the same way as the FSAI. If the Dutch authority had sent that finding at that time to the EFSA for its advice on risk assessment, as a matter of protocol, and given that on 6 December the FSAI received notice from York that the levels were less than half that stated by the Dutch, at 80-200 picograms per gram, then what would have happened if the FSAI had informed the EFSA? Would this have reduced the need for a total recall of pork products? I believe that the FSAI is a hybrid of risk assessors and risk managers.
The final part of Mr. Reilly's presentation on lessons learned is helpful, as Dr. Heppner could not allude to this at all. If the Dutch had asked the EFSA for its assessment of the risk, would the FSAI have been able to make a more informed decision on 6 December? On page ten, Mr. Reilly states that removal of all pork products would allow time to possibly identify products that were not contaminated and to return these to the market. Did this happen? If it happened, did it happen to any produce from Irish pigs or just pigs from Irish processors?
Mr. Reilly made a point about a single agency and traceability, and the fact that the industry adopts standards well beyond the minimum. The FSAI's own website states that good traceability should avoid the need for a total recall. Mr. Reilly also stated that the burden might be greater on small processors. I disagree with that because smaller processors tend to have fewer suppliers and can, therefore, trace back more easily. Members of my family are involved in the abattoir business and they only have a single weekly supplier of pigs, so they would be isolate any problem straight away. It is in everybody's interest that this happens.
I thank Mr. Reilly for his presentation. There is good substance in it that we can use it to make sure that lessons are learned to prevent it happening again.
Mr. Alan Reilly
First, I would like to answer the question about our remit starting at the farm gate. That was a policy decision taken at the time and we respect that policy decision. This does not mean that the controls do not take place on the farm; of course they do. The controls on the farm enforced by the Department are similar to what is enforced along the rest of the food chain. The Department applies the same hygiene standards. The feed regulations require HACCP and are practically identical to regulations for foods. The system in which the incident came to light was the national residues monitoring programme, which is run by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The Department's laboratories discovered the problem, so I contend that the system of oversight on food control works. The Department was able to find it and trace it back to the farm. The fact that this is not part of our service contract does not in any way denigrate it. It is just the way the controls are organised in Ireland.
We carry out the specific parts of the service contract and we go in on different occasions, while Mr. Ellard's group would also go in. For example, we audit the enforcement of the BSE controls. That is a very successful programme and incidences of BSE have been reduced dramatically.
The relationship between the bodies is very professional. We have all had to pull on the green jersey during this particular crisis to work together to get ourselves out of it. Protecting the health of consumers was the main priority. The second priority for the Department was to make sure that the industry itself did not go under.
One question was on the reason we did the recall and whether it was not possible to identify some of the pork products. This was possible and some pork products never saw the aforementioned contaminated feed. When such products were identified, they were allowed on to the market. Once we could identify products from pigs that had not been fed with the contaminated feed, such material could go on to the market if it had not been co-mingled with products from pigs that had been fed with the contaminated feed. We put in place that system.
However, I am not of the view that we could have left the product on the market and simply focused on the farms. First, it was illegal. The legal limit for dioxins in pork fat is one pg/g, but this product had levels of approximately 200 pg/g. Moreover, we have learnt subsequently that there were higher levels. We could not have left such material on the market as there would be no market for it. Who would wish to buy any pork product containing dioxin levels of 200 pg/g, when our competitors, such as the Dutch and the Danes, would be selling such products containing no dioxins? I am sure all the members have children, grandchildren or whatever. It would mean saying it is fine and here are a couple of pork sausages for them for breakfast that will contain some dioxins. They will live until they are 70 and will increase their body burden through eating such a contaminated product. Moreover, children in school canteens will have sausage rolls for lunch. Are we to expose our children to levels of dioxins in such products or should we take them off the market?
The Food Safety Authority of Ireland was set up as an independent science-based agency that was dedicated to the protection of both the health and interests of consumers. That is what my presentation stated. It is not looking for anything but simply states a fact. We were set up to protect consumers' health. We protected consumers' health in the recall. Many other agencies would agree the measures taken were proportionate and were made on the grounds of consumer protection. I cannot say much more than that.
As other members wish to contribute, Deputy Sheahan should come back with a supplementary question. Mr. Reilly should continue.
Mr. Alan Reilly
I refer to the reason we did it if there was no risk to public health.
They were not my words.
Mr. Alan Reilly
Who——
Deputy Doyle also asked questions. Mr. Reilly should be allowed to continue.
Mr. Alan Reilly
The Deputy quoted something to the effect there was no risk to public health. Such products will contribute to the body burden, which is related to the toxicity. The more one has of this in one's body, the more dangerous it is. Moreover, such chemicals build up in one's body and stay there for seven to 11 years. If one states that such products are fine, young mothers should be considered. A person who is 13 at present may have her first child at the age of 20. That child will get the dioxins through the mother's milk. One decreases one's body burden through fat production and the fat in the milk will contain the dioxins. Studies by the WHO, in which we have taken part, show the first child gets the greater portion of the dioxins, while the second child receives less.
Were one to feed dioxin-contaminated feed to dairy cows, they will clear themselves within approximately 60 days. Once they are put on good rations or feed that is not contaminated, dairy cows will have cleared themselves within 60 days because they will have excreted it in the milk. Humans build up dioxin levels in the body and that is where the toxicity comes from. In the case of chemical contamination from something like cyanide, one takes it and that is the end in an instant. In the case of dioxins, however, it is insidious and simply builds up in the body. We know they are cancer-causing compounds. The entire method behind protecting consumer health is to limit exposure. I agree that had we been able to distinguish what was contaminated from what was not, we would have had a much smaller recall. However, as it stood, as my presentation noted, 98% of the national pork supply was co-mingled with the 6% that was contaminated. I contend this was the only way to do it.
May I ask a supplementary question on the issue of contamination? I have to hand a press release issued by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland on 9 December which deals with contamination in beef. It states, "the results show that eight of the 11 samples were clear and three were just above the proposed legislative limits for non-dioxin like PCBs in beef". It goes on to state, "there is no requirement for a consumer level recall of Irish beef from the market". It is difficult to discern how the same logic and science is being applied to both. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland's argument is that when levels in pork are exceeded and pose a risk, it is recalled while when levels in beef are exceeded and pose a risk, it is not. Mr. Reilly should not misinterpret me because I understand the calamitous gravity, from an economic point of view, of a decision on beef. While I do not insinuate shoddy behaviour, I am interested in whether the decision is being made to retrofit the circumstances or whether it stands up to scrutiny, which is what this investigation is about. I still do not understand the decision the food safety authority made in this regard.
Mr. Alan Reilly
I thought I had dealt with this issue in the presentation. There were a number of reasons we did not go for a full recall of beef from consumers. First, 99.98% of the beef was uncontaminated and was safe because the beef animals concerned had never seen any of the contaminated feed. We were able to track and trace the 0.2% that did receive the feed on the farm. Consequently, we had corralled the beef that would have received the feed.
There were two dates for test results.
This is unfair to other members.
The initial test was conducted on 9 December and a subsequent one took place a week later.
Mr. Alan Reilly
May I carry on, because this is an important point? The first issue pertained to the quantity. The actual level of dioxin and the contribution of the body burden was such that it was 300 times less than in the pork. However it still was illegal and we did withdraw such beef. The beef from those farms, namely, the carcass beef, the boxed beef and so on that still was within the trade did not go on the market. Moreover, given the nature of the trade, we were assured that whatever had been put on the market, such as the carcasses that would be hung and so on, was no longer there because of the system of processing beef. Our information was that it was not in the trade. It was established that no carcass beef or primal cuts directly associated with the restricted herds on the market had been identified. They were still in store and did not go on the market. What had been on the market was already gone.
It is evident that the cause of the problem was inferior oil or, as one may call it, transformer oil. Is it not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food could carry out spot checks on manufacturing plants more frequently than once per year? Would it be possible for the Department to sample the oil being used in those plants to ensure there is no contamination of animal food? I am sure there is an ample number of people in the Department to carry out the checks. We could be here until the cows come home without reaching the end of the problem unless we carry out spot checks instead of notified checks. Were they carried out in the 78 manufacturing plants, which is not a large number, the problem of contaminated food would end.
I thank Mr. Reilly for attending and making an informative contribution, but he is the deputy chief executive of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. It is not his business to carry out the checks. Rather, it is the business of the Department and the Minister, who will be present here in two weeks' time, when we will be able to raise this matter with him to clarify the situation.
While Deputy Tom Sheahan will be the final speaker, there are two or three supplementary questions to be asked. Deputy Creed will be first, followed by Deputies Sheahan and Doyle.
I have a brief supplementary question.
Mr. Reilly made the sweeping statement that the system worked, but I would put it to him that we were lucky. If the dioxin contamination had been identified in a pork product, such as a side of bacon or a ham for consumption, other than via the national residue monitoring programme, we would have had no way of tracing the source of the contamination. The system from the farm gate backwards does not work, whereas the farm gate forwards is the area covered by the remit of the FSAI. We were lucky, for which reason we need a more rigorous system of testing and traceability. It was fortunate that the Dutch authorities identified the problem at the same time as our testing regime. Had it been identified further down the food chain, we would have been in trouble.
Would the FSAI call itself a risk assessor?
Mr. Alan Reilly
Manager.
Does Mr. Reilly believe that the annual notified check of the premises is sufficient? How did the Department score in the FSAI's audits in recent years?
I have two quick questions. Reverting to the last section of the contribution on lessons learned, we are going through a process. Who will the FSAI inform or, without being asked, will it make recommendations on some of the statements made today concerning the lessons learned? As has been mentioned, no one envisaged a problem stemming from the source in question. While we can now deal with the issue, who is to say that there will be no other unforeseen source of a problem?
Everything stated so far points to traceability. It does not disadvantage smaller processors. Had we had 200 pig abattoirs, a lower percentage recall would have been involved unless each had been supplied by the ingredient manufacturer in question. To whom else within the system will the FSAI make its recommendations?
Given the fact that PCVs were found in the Dutch processing plant in September, should the European Food Safety Authority have a better system of notifying member states that are meat suppliers? Instead of taking a random sample on 19 November and finding PCVs therein, we could have checked earlier. Had we not taken that random sample and notified the EFSA before the European authorities did, there would have been serious consequences for us. It was a matter of days.
Mr. Alan Reilly
I contend that the system and food controls worked. We found the contamination and took proportionate action. This fact stands. The responsibility for putting controls in place lies with the feed business operator so as to ensure that only safe products go on the market. The authority has an oversight role in terms of ensuring that food business operators comply with the regulations.
One inspection per year is sufficient for low-risk premises that have food safety management systems in place. Ireland has more than 44,000 food premises, but we do not have an army of inspectors to inspect them every day. We are relying on the 44,000 business premises to have food safety management systems in place so as to continuously oversee their controls and to ensure the supply of safe food to the market. This is the basis of the system that we operate.
The FSAI has classified food businesses according to risk, in which respect we have a schedule of inspections. We work with the HSE's environmental health officers in this regard. The guidance notes, codes of practice, interpretation of legislation in respect of inspection according to risk and so on are published on our website for food premises.
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food scored well. We work in partnership with State bodies. The agenda is the protection of consumer health. We are both risk managers and risk assessors. The groups within the authority taking care of the service contract process and the risk management side of the business have a separate chain of command from the risk assessment side. Where will the next food scare or risk come from? We are part of a wider network with the European Food Safety Authority. Specific groups under the umbrella of the European Food Safety Authority examine emerging risks. We are constantly looking at new risks and a range of different risks, including chemical and microbiological risks. This is the job we do. We scan the horizon but we would need a crystal ball to see when the next one will come. If someone had said to us in November that we would have to manage a home grown dioxin crisis, we would not have believed it. However, our food controls picked up on this and we were able to trace and manage this. Pork products were back on the shelf within a week. There were very high economic losses. If we look at a similar event in 1999 in Belgium, we managed this very differently.
I did not suggest that we would adopt the Belgian approach by burying our heads in the sand and burying the information, lest Mr. Reilly thinks I did, in teasing this out.
On the response to the question of whether Mr. Reilly believed that one notified check per year is sufficient, have we not learned anything from this debacle? Considering what this has cost the State, is Mr. Reilly saying that one notified check per year is sufficient?
Mr. Alan Reilly
I was talking about food business operators and food premises. When one classifies food premises, some food premises, such as delicatessens selling ready to eat food, pose a high risk because the consumer will eat the food straight off the shelf without cooking it. If someone in a food business is packing potatoes in a shed, will we inspect the operation three or four times per year? The person is taking potatoes, washing them and putting them in bags. That is a low risk activity. The FSAI bases the inspection regime on that. With respect to animal feed, it is not within the remit of the FSAI. Control of this is operated outside our remit. That was the policy decision taken by the Government at the time.
The last part of Mr. Reilly's contribution concerned the lessons to be learned. Is the authority engaging with any body, Department or ministry on this matter?
Mr. Alan Reilly
Of course. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food will review the feed chain controls and we will engage with the Department on that. We will also engage with the Department of Health and Children and there will be a complete review to see the lessons learned and how we can improve. This is the way forward. Crises will happen and depending on what one learns, one comes out stronger.
Would it be the same submission?
Mr. Reilly stated that, for example, during the Belgian dioxin crisis in 1999 safeguard measures imposed by the Commission resulted in the removal of all foods of animal origin produced in Belgium from the market for six months. Mr. Reilly referred to chocolate, which is made from milk. Were all other milk products, such as cheese and yoghurt, removed as well?
Mr. Alan Reilly
Yes.
We can count ourselves very lucky in how we ended up with the pork situation.
Mr. Alan Reilly
Yes, but the State has invested considerable money in the controls we have at present. I am probably like a stuck record saying that things worked, but they really did. One might say that they could have worked better but they worked. We are not in the position referred to by the Chairman. Not alone did the Belgians have to withdraw food, all other member states had to do the same. The nature of the Single Market is such that there are no checks. At the moment, there is a Polish company withdrawing pâté made from the livers of contaminated pigs. Those pâtés went all over and the company is withdrawing them at the moment. We are the national contact point for the rapid food alert system. The activity that has gone on in Europe to get these products, which were made with high levels of contaminated pork in some cases, off the market is enormous. All that activity is taking place behind the scenes.
Does Mr. Reilly know the cost to the Belgian Government or the effect on the markets?
Mr. Alan Reilly
Again, I am working from memory so I may not get it right. It was something in the region of €2.5 billion. In a sense, they are still suffering. The ministers with responsibility for health and agriculture had to resign quickly and the Belgian Government fell as well. On the back of that, we have the European Food Safety Authority. That episode was one of the main reasons we have the European Food Safety Authority. We have the FSAI as a result of the crises here, such as BSE. This matter goes back 10 years.
I want to ask about the assertion that the system worked. If the dioxin contamination had been identified further down the food chain, not carcase assessments under the national residue program, where would we be in terms of how the system worked? We could not have had the same level of traceability as quickly as we had it.
Mr. Alan Reilly
We try to test at different stages of the food chain. If one tests carcases and carcase meat one will pick it up. It is not necessary to test cuts of meat. That is where the control regime is because one can pick it up much quicker.
That is a random sample. Not every carcase is tested.
Mr. Alan Reilly
Yes. If one looks at what happened in that Dutch company, they also had a random sample and picked it up. The way food law is enforced across the EU is fairly similar. Random samples are used and the number of samples we are supposed to take for a dioxin analysis is laid down in legislation, Regulation (EC) 1883/2006. We are supposed to take 57 samples and the legislation lays down how many samples should be from pork, egg and milk. Other member states are doing the same, proportionate to the size of their industries. Eventually, we will have a large database to identify high-risk products.
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food said that when it carried out inspections on the plant in Carlow it did not take any samples. It inspected for cleanliness and how the plant handled loading systems. Do we not need to change the regime now? For example, when there is an inspection at Carlow where human food is being processed, a sample should be taken of the meal that is provided. One must examine cleanliness and how the plant handles bagging and unloading. A sample of meal should be taken and tested, the same as the FSAI does with the finished product, the meat.
I understand from the departmental officials last week that they take samples of meal although they did not do so there.
Mr. Alan Reilly
Although it is not our remit, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food takes feed samples and the presentation made before the committee laid out the number of feed samples taken. Quite a number of feed samples are taken, although I am not that familiar with the numbers. When we inspect a food premises we want to inspect its food safety management system. After inspection once or twice a year, we want to have some confidence that its food safety management system works. That is the principle behind all the legislation, the new hygiene package, building the principles of HACCP into the legislation and getting businesses to comply. The Food Safety Authority has put a great deal of effort into trying to raise the standards for the application of HACCP in food premises. Next month we will launch a safe catering pack for caterers to try to simplify how to put HACCP in place because it is very complicated. It is not an easy process to put it in place and get it all right. We have tried to simplify the principles of HACCP and make it easy for people to apply them so they can ensure the food they produce is safe.
I thank Mr. Reilly and his colleagues for coming before the committee today, for their comprehensive presentation and for answering the questions raised.
The joint committee adjourned at 4.50 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Thursday, 15 January 2009.