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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC REGULATORY AFFAIRS debate -
Tuesday, 10 Mar 2009

Financial Regulation: Discussion with Central Bank.

I welcome Mr. John Hurley, Governor, Mr. Tony Grimes, director general, and Mr. Tom O'Connell, assistant director general of the Central Bank. I draw the witnesses' attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against any person outside the House or an official, by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I invite Mr. Hurley to make a presentation, which will be followed by questions from members. As is the practice of the committee, members' questions will be answered individually. They will not be grouped.

Mr. John Hurley

Good morning, Chairman, and members of the joint committee. Thank you for your invitation to speak to the committee. I am accompanied by Mr. Tony Grimes, director general of the Central Bank and Mr. Tom O'Connell, assistant director, economics.

I am aware that the chairman and senior officers of the Financial Regulator's office were before this committee recently, dealing with their own area of responsibility. In my opening remarks, I will update the committee on our current economic assessment and outline briefly the ongoing role of the Central Bank in dealing with the various issues that confront our financial system. I will refer to the international debate concerning how central banks and financial supervisors can work better together to reduce the chances of events like this happening again. In this context, the Taoiseach announced recently the Government's intention to incorporate central banking functions and prudential supervision in a unitary organisation.

The disruption to global financial markets which was triggered in August 2007 has evolved into the most severe systemic crisis in almost a century. The extent of the turmoil has been far worse than was envisaged and it is still very unclear when the crisis will end and what its ultimate effects will be. The financial crisis has fed directly into developments in the global economy. Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, it remained unclear how big an impact the financial turmoil would have on real economic activity. The subsequent broadening and intensification of the financial crisis has led to a rapid deterioration in confidence, a development encapsulated in the substantial and persistent downward revisions to global growth forecasts that have taken place. For example, in July last year the International Monetary Fund expected global growth of 3.9% in 2009, a development described as a pronounced slowdown. Since then, the fund has issued three new forecasts as it became increasingly obvious that the financial turmoil would have a significant effect on real economic activity and its impact would not be limited to the advanced economies. This included taking the unprecedented step of issuing two forecasts in the final quarter of 2008. In October the global growth projection was revised down to 3%, in November to 2.2% and, most recently, in January to 0.5%. This latter revision was particularly sharp and, if correct, would represent the slowest global growth since World War II. The situation in advanced economies is actually worse as, within these global growth projections, the significant downward revisions to growth in the advanced economies, which are expected to contract this year by 2%, are balanced by relatively better performance in emerging markets.

These exceptionally unfavourable global economic and financial conditions are making our own already very difficult domestic economic situation worse. Ireland is now experiencing an unprecedented contraction in output, which is set to persist this year and next. While the initial downturn in activity was driven by the sharp decline in the Irish property and construction sectors, this has now broadened out into a marked weakening of domestic demand, which is being significantly amplified by the contraction in export demand as a result of the movement into recession of all our main trading partners. Reflecting the scale and speed of developments, Irish economic performance has deteriorated markedly — the contraction in activity has deepened significantly, there has been a sharp rise in unemployment and a rapid deterioration in the fiscal position. With the global recession deepening and domestic demand exceptionally weak, the overall outlook for growth has continued to deteriorate in recent months. Based on what is currently known, our latest unpublished estimates suggest that GDP will fall by more than 6% this year, with a broadly similar fall likely in the level of employment. This is likely to result in an unemployment rate averaging more than 11% for the year. However, risks to this outlook remain on the down side.

No one should be in any doubt about the seriousness of the global situation, which is not easing, and the seriousness of our own difficulties. We face significant challenges and it is critical for present and future generations that we work together now to confront them. If we do so, our economy will recover and has the potential to grow solidly again in the medium term. Our economy's strengths are important in this respect. We still have favourable demographic trends, there is the capacity for a rebound in productivity growth, the Irish labour market continues to be more flexible than most and at the start of the crisis public debt as a percentage of GDP was low. However, the achievement of this potential is not inevitable and is contingent on sound economic management. This calls for timely and inevitably unpalatable measures in the short run to ensure that the public finances remain sustainable, as well as pursuing policies that help restore competitiveness and, over the medium term, provide the platform for realising growth potential. The significant measures already announced regarding the public finances, in addition to those to be adopted over the coming weeks, signal our determination to make this difficult adjustment.

Against this general background, the pressures on the Irish financial system have intensified significantly. Irish banks continue to face very difficult conditions. Their share prices have declined dramatically over the past year. The impact of the marked deterioration in the wider economy on the banking sector is a key concern. However, recent Government actions with respect to the banking system demonstrate a commitment to take whatever measures are necessary to stand behind the financial system. Most recently in this context, the Government, in a similar fashion to those in many other countries, announced details of its recapitalisation scheme for the two major domestic banks. This increases the main banks' core tier one capital ratios, which are regarded as a key indicator of financial soundness. In addition, under the terms of the recapitalisation package, there is provision for a greater supply of credit to the real economy. The two main banks have confirmed their commitment to increase lending capacity to small and medium-sized enterprises by 10% and to provide an additional 30% capacity for lending to first-time home buyers in 2009.

As part of the recapitalisation package the Government announced that it is looking at other possible measures to enhance the stability of the overall financial system. Discussions are under way with the other domestic financial institutions covered by the guarantee concerning their respective capital positions. In the context of the six-month review of the guarantee scheme, consideration is being given to adapting the scheme to facilitate long-term bond issuance. In addition, the Government has announced its intention to examine proposals to mitigate the impact of risks related to specific exposures on the assets side of balance sheets, in line with ongoing work on this issue at European level.

The Central Bank has responded to the unfolding crisis in several ways. Since it became evident in August 2007 that there was major financial stress, the Irish Central Bank and the Eurosystem, with central banks globally, have been providing significant volumes of liquidity for the banking sector. The system entered the crisis with a relatively broad collateral framework for supplying liquidity to banks. It has made liquidity more easily accessible for banks by widening its list of eligible collateral, providing funds on a full allotment basis and extending the maturity of its operations, which has been of significant benefit to our banks and others throughout the system.

In response to the turmoil and the associated impact on the real economy central banks in all major economies, including the Eurosystem, have eased monetary policy, in many cases to levels not previously seen. In this regard, the governing council of the ECB has cut its policy interest rate by 2.75% since the beginning of last October. Despite tensions in financial markets, this has had a significant impact on interest rates at retail level. Uncertainty concerning the economic outlook remains very high and, as always, the governing council will continue to monitor all developments closely. Members will be aware that some central banks have commenced engagement in more non-standard monetary policy operations, including outright purchase of private and public assets. The ECB is studying possible non-standard monetary policy measures.

Through the formulation and publication of financial stability assessments, central banks in the major industrial countries draw attention to the risks in the financial system. In its annual financial stability reports, quarterly bulletins and other public statements the Central Bank has highlighted risks to financial stability. The major risk was identified as the interaction of a significant international shock with certain vulnerabilities in the domestic economy relating, for instance, to property prices, credit growth and the extent of banking sector reliance on wholesale funding. However, our financial stability reports and the warnings contained therein, no less than those in similar reports issued by other central banks, were not as effective as they might have been in that they did not lead to a sufficient or timely change in behaviour. Were it not for the massive deterioration in the external environment, these risks would have been more manageable, albeit with difficulty.

In the light of the crisis during the past two years, there is recognition that the architecture of financial regulation and supervision here and internationally needs broad-ranging review and reform. Within the European Union the European Commission high level group on cross-border banking and financial supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosière has completed an urgent review of financial supervision in the European Union and reported its findings two weeks ago. The group was mandated to consider the future of European supervision and regulation in the light of the financial crisis. The report which summarises the serious situation we are fall facing states:

...since July 2007, the world has faced, and continues to face, the most serious and disruptive financial crisis since 1929. Originating primarily in the United States, the crisis is now global, deep, even worsening. It has proved to be highly contagious and complex, rippling rapidly through different market segments and countries. Many parts of the financial system remain under severe strain. Some markets and institutions have stopped functioning. This, in turn, has negatively affected the real economy. Financial markets depend on trust. But much of this trust has evaporated.

In its review the group concluded that there had been real and important supervisory and regulatory failures and suggested two initiatives to repair the supervisory and regulatory system within the European Union. First, there is a recognition that while financial stability reports produced by central banks made a significant contribution to the analyses of risks and seemed to influence financial market participants to moral suasion, there is a need to add operational effectiveness to the reports to ensure the risks identified therein can be acted upon in more specific and timely ways. This is the weakness in existing arrangements highlighted by the current crisis. At European level the Larosière group recommends that a European systemic risk council be established under the auspices of the European Central Bank and chaired by its president. Its role would be to gather information on risks to the wider financial system, commonly labelled macro-prudential risks. However, of crucial importance is the group's proposal for a mechanism to ensure follow-up action on these issues by supervisors across the European Union.

Second, the group proposes a new European system of financial supervision, essentially an integrated network of European financial supervisors. Existing national supervisors closest to the markets and institutions they supervise would continue to carry out day-to-day supervision. However, a European centre would co-ordinate the application of common high level supervisory standards and guarantee strong co-operation with other supervisors. Furthermore, supervisors will operate in a changed international regulatory environment. The group pointed to weaknesses in many international regulations such as capital requirements and accounting standards, which they recommend should be reflected upon and revised.

The Government's recently announced plans to reform the regulatory structure here dovetails with these international developments. The proposed arrangements envisage a much more explicit link to be put in place between financial stability and prudential supervision. While the specific details have yet to be announced, we look forward to working closely with the Government and other relevant parties on the full implementation of those reforms, to ensure that our arrangements evolve in line with best international standards and that the new approach is implemented rigorously.

Both myself and my colleagues are available to take the committee's questions.

I welcome Mr. Hurley. I appreciate his coming before the committee to give us that analysis and also to answer a few questions.

Who is in charge of prudential supervision? Is it the regulator or the Governor of the Central Bank? We had before us in previous years various Governors of the Central Bank. The one matter of which they were so proud was their prudential supervision of the banks and the strength of the banks, and how those banks remained strong because of that prudential supervision. Was there a dereliction in duty by whoever was in charge of prudential supervision of the banks in this case? That is the number one question on the past. I will be going on to the present and the future. Effectively, was Mr. Hurley derelict in his duty as Governor of the Central Bank in prudential supervision of the banks?

Mr. John Hurley

The arrangements put in place in 2003 were clear. It was the intention to establish a separate and independent regulatory authority for prudential supervision. That was the clear intention in the Act.

It is linked to the Central Bank in that there are flows of information which the Central Bank gets from the Financial Regulator to enable the Central Bank to complete its financial stability report. There are flows of information during the period to enable me to assess financial stability risks and this has been done in the context of the financial stability reports. However, the Governor and the board of the Central Bank are not responsible for supervision. There is an independent authority to deal with that, and that was the intention at the time although the links were clear.

I mentioned the de Larosière report and what is happening across Europe. It is quite clear that the regulatory architecture internationally has proved to be inadequate and within that, regulators must regulate. Therefore, regulation here operated within the international regulatory architecture.

The Financial Regulator was before this committee and made clear that regulation would have to change, that the rules-based regulation, which was applied and which was based on an assessment of risks by financial institutions themselves, has not stood the test of time internationally and this now must change to a much more detailed level of regulation. He also indicated that had he been aware of the very significant downturn that would take place in global economies, regulation here would have been different.

I am looking to ask Mr. Hurley what was his, not the Financial Regulator's, responsibility in prudential supervision. We had the Financial Regulator before the committee.

I note in the comments of Mr. Hurley that he has produced annual reports on financial stability, quarterly bulletins and other public statements, and he has highlighted the risks to financial stability. Was nobody listening to Mr. Hurley? Was there any point in having a Central Bank dealing with financial stability when nobody was listening to Mr. Hurley? That would be implied from what happened and from what Mr. Hurley is saying.

Mr. John Hurley

This is the point I made in my opening statement and the same point is in the de Larosière report. Financial stability reports have to be operational. I mentioned in my opening statement that they were not as effective as they might have been because they did not change behaviour significantly. The reality is operational ability and the ability to ensure certain decisions are taken at particular moments in time on those risks are critical going forward and this is precisely what the de Larosière report has identified as a weakness internationally in many countries within the EU and also here. It seems, therefore, going forward that we have to have a system where financial stability reports can change behaviour and this is central to the announcement recently by the Taoiseach that, in any new arrangements that are put in place, the risks outlined in financial stability reports have to be acted upon. We have to have appropriate levers to enable that to happen, whether it is prudential supervision or directly with the banks when we speak to them. It is clear we did not convince the banks of these risks in our discussions with them, even though that was done on many occasions. Their own risk analysis was different and this has clearly turned out to be faulty. Going forward we have to have a situation where if financial risks are outlined in financial stability reports, appropriate levers can be put in place to deal with them.

This also has to take into account the fact that the Government governs and the Central Bank or any new organisation cannot interfere with the prerogative of Government. This is a complex situation that needs to be worked through and the details of these need to be carefully assessed.

The Canadian banking system has operated quite well with prudential supervision of a high standard. Was the standard of prudential supervision at fault in any way in the Irish banking system not being as strong as the Canadian system?

Mr. John Hurley

In the international assessments that are being carried out here, it is said that failures in regulation and supervision did not cause the crisis but they undoubtedly aggravated the crisis. The de Larosière report is very explicit on this and it is a good analysis. In our own situation, the Financial Regulator, in his comments to the committee, made it clear that the principles-based system of regulation relied heavily on the responsibility of banks' boards of management and their assessment of risks.

Is Mr. Hurley passing the buck to the banks' boards?

Mr. John Hurley

No, in hindsight what the regulator said is that principles-based supervision is not adequate going forward and it must be much more tightly aligned with some rules. Clearly, in a situation where the Government is now a significant stakeholder in banks and a supporter of the banking sector, principles-based regulation is not appropriate going forward.

I refer to the carousel of billions of euro around annual report time in Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Life & Permanent. Was this the practice in other institutions? When did Mr. Hurley become aware of money being transferred back and forth between Anglo Irish Bank and IL&P to window dress the former's annual report?

Mr. John Hurley

The Central Bank became aware of that as a consequence of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report. We were not aware of that before that time.

Was Mr. Hurley aware that it may have happened in another bank, even anecdotally?

Mr. John Hurley

No, there were serious liquidity concerns as we were going through 2008. All central banks, particularly all regulators, not alone in this jurisdiction but in other jurisdictions, would have tried to ensure that banks operated in the normal interbank way to assist each other. The situation here is quite different. I should not go into it further because it is currently being investigated in a different forum and I do not want to prejudice that. The first the Central Bank was aware of this was as a consequence of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report.

I would like to move to the next item. On Friday last JP Morgan suggested that Ireland was remarkably strong and that the maximum exposure of all of the banks to the losses on impaired loans would be €26.9 billion. Does Mr. Hurley agree with that assessment?

Mr. John Hurley

Some of the international assessments are incorrect. I would not put a figure of €26.9 billion on it because we are still going through a deep recession. However, it seems that the order of magnitude is much less than is being portrayed internationally. In the international debate the exposure of this country sometimes includes the IFSC exposure and this clearly changes the figures. Were one to do that in respect of other countries they would be shown as having very heavy exposure as well. In our case the JP Morgan clarification is trying to correct a clear error in presentation.

There is much talk right across all of the European countries at the moment about asset support schemes, bad banks and insurance for loans. What is Mr. Hurley's analysis of asset support schemes and assistance to banks with regard to impaired loans?

Mr. John Hurley

As has been announced, this issue is being examined at present. It is right that it should be looked at. We need to reflect carefully on it and look at the asset side of balance sheets. Guarantees and so on go so far, but we must reflect on it. It is being reflected on and the Minister has indicated this in recent times. No decisions have been made, but careful consideration is being given to the matter and significant study is currently being done.

It seems a number of aspects were referred to by the Minister taking the matter forward. He referred to longer term bonds, which emanates from the Paris Declaration which came after our guarantee. He also referred to the asset side of balance sheets. These matters are being examined.

Is it likely the banks will work their way through this or will there be a solution from Europe or the Government along the lines mentioned by Mr. Hurley?

Mr. John Hurley

These issues are still being assessed. I referred in my introductory comments to the length and depth of the recession and the fact that recovery has been very slow. We had great expectations at the beginning of this year but they have not been met. We have seen significant reductions in interest rates, lower oil prices and massive injections of cash by governments, but we still have not seen a recovery. Yesterday evening, as a consequence of the G10 meeting in Basel, a view was taken that we should see some improvement soon, but we have not seen that yet. The contraction in the economy this year is expected to be greater than 6%, which is very serious for this economy. We are certainly facing a very difficult year or two manoeuvring our way through the most serious crisis I have ever seen in my official career of 45 years. We really must pull together to get through this very difficult minefield. We can do this, if we are determined and take the right decisions now. There is good potential for growth if we do this but it is not guaranteed. We have critical decisions to take.

The Government is suggesting it will take a minimum of five years to achieve the deficit of less than 3% required by the Stability and Growth Pact and that there will be significant hardship with the imposition of taxation and-or spending cuts in each of those five years. Does Mr. Hurley believe that is still the case? Is the timescale increasing or decreasing? While we believe there will be fiscal hardship for five years, can we expect the economic growth about which Mr. Hurley has spoken? By 2011, can we expect a decrease in the rate of unemployment? Is there hope for those leaving school and facing unemployment that things will have turned around by then?

Mr. John Hurley

With regard to the timescale, this will take time. Our fiscal situation is very serious. It is not something that can be dealt with overnight. We must take action and at the same time ensure the economy continues to develop. This is a very difficult situation but we have no choice but to take action. It will take a number of years; it cannot be done overnight. I will not be surprised if it takes that length of time. Our European partners would like it to take less. It is important that we show that we will take this action over a period of time and are seen internationally as credible in that regard.

Between last year, this year and next year I expect the economy to contract by 10%. After that, I would expect some improvement. I think the economy will contract by at least 10% and the decisions we must take, fiscally and economically, must bear this in mind. That contraction is significant and our adjustments will have to be commensurate with it. After that period, I expect to see an improvement in the economy. The positive elements I mentioned should kick in and there will be some improvement in employment.

I mentioned our dependence on global trade. This is the first crisis in the last 100 years where the entire globe is down. Previous crises affected some parts of the world only. The current crisis is a global phenomenon and spreading rather than narrowing. It is reaching into emerging markets. This is a small open economy and we must trade in that environment. We are more open than most. The two economies with which we have significant links, the United States and the United Kingdom, are in a difficult situation. Therefore, we can expect to be more affected by the downturn than most.

Our future is tied up with an improvement in the global economic trading environment. The current data show export charts plummeting. We face difficult fiscal and economic times ahead but have gained much in the past ten to 15 years that we should not lose. I mentioned positive elements; therefore, we must make determined adjustments, although they will be painful and unpalatable. These adjustments require political decisions and it is very difficult to say everything will be fully equitable. We do not have much time and must do our best to be equitable, although there may be things to tidy up subsequently. This matter is urgent and important. We must make the necessary adjustments to arrest the decline in employment.

Ireland lost its competitiveness over a period of time. We cannot continue to pay ourselves far in excess of what our competitors in Europe pay themselves. The adjustments must be made because even last year we were still losing competitiveness. Ireland is a small, open economy trading in an environment that is currently very negative; therefore, we must make a correction. However, we have come a long way and there are still positive elements. If we take the necessary action, we will see the turnaround of which the Deputy spoke in the coming years.

I thank Mr. Hurley.

I welcome the Governor. Part of the role of the committee is to consider the operational efficiency, value for money achieved and accountability procedures of regulatory bodies, including the Central Bank. Part of the role of the Central Bank is to contribute to the maintenance of a stable financial system. Page 5 of Mr. Hurley's report reads: "...our financial stability reports were not as effective as they might have been". Is this the closest we will get to an apology? What is the use of a report if it does not change behaviour? Mr. Hurley touched on this topic. Are we getting enough information into the public domain?

The Act under which Mr. Hurley operates provides that, for the purpose of verifying compliance with his duties, the regulatory authority will provide the Governor or the board with such information as the Governor or the board reasonably requires, or is considered appropriate. There is a close link between the Central Bank and the regulator. Will Mr. Hurley comment on the information the regulator provided and continues to provide? It seems the regulator did not shout "Stop." Mr. Hurley and his predecessor made comments but was he concerned by the regulator's lack of concern and, if so, did he express this concern?

Mr. John Hurley

On the first point, financial stability reports were not as effective as they should have been and did not change behaviour in the necessary way. Such reports have grown in the recent past for many reasons; one reason being the fact that in some cases responsibility for regulation was moved from central banks to independent authorities. Financial stability reports were very important because they outlined the risks. International reports show the same weaknesses were apparent in other jurisdictions; they were instruments of moral suasion but not put into operation.

This issue relates not only to regulators and supervisors but also to the community at large. The behaviour of banks did not change as a consequence of the significant warnings issued by the Central Bank. Time and again I pointed out that the interaction between an international and a domestic shock could have serious consequences for the economy. Time and again we indicated that debt levels were growing too fast and too strongly and that we could not continue building 70,000 to 90,000 houses. Our financial stability reports received a great deal of publicity. They were prepared jointly with the regulator and published. There was no hiding the message in the financial stability reports: they were public documents. I regularly gave press conferences, speeches and interviews in regard to these risks but behaviour did not change.

This means that certain levers, requirements or directions are needed going forward to enable the risks set out in financial stability reports to be implemented. This is exactly the point made in the de Larosière review wherein it states that a macro-prudential risk committee, chaired by the governor of the ECB, should be established and that a mechanism which takes the risks identified and ensures that action is taken to deal with them, be put in place. A mechanism, including through the EFC and through Governments is suggested. Undoubtedly, this is the fundamental in any change that would take place in this or any other jurisdiction.

One of the reasons for the linkage in 2003 between the Central Bank and Financial Regulator was to allow for a flow of information. There was a desire to have an independent regulator and to allow information to flow to enable financial stability reports to be compiled and risks to be assessed. This has happened. For example, when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September of last year, I was in a position, because there was a risk to financial stability, to get full information from the regulator to enable us to assess the liquidity position. In that crisis situation, where financial stability became predominant and where it was at risk, the flow of information outlined and suggested in the 2003 legislation worked effectively. It also worked in the context of preparing financial stability reports. That liaison did work. What was not effective was the change in behaviour which would have been essential to enable that to happen.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, this reflected a number of issues, including that the international regulatory environment, the regulations under which supervisors function, failed. It is clear from the study undertaken on behalf of the Commission that significant change in relation to those regulations is required. I am speaking in this regard about the procyclicality of Basel, provisioning, dynamic provision, accounting standards and the fact that directives are introduced and that there exists options to implement them in different ways in different jurisdictions.

The architecture needs to be put right. Within that, supervision also needs to be put right.

Does Mr. Hurley believe that he and the regulator were spending too much time on the detail rather than the bigger picture? It is extraordinary that despite the fact that there are hundreds of people working for the Governor and the Financial Regulator, the big picture is not being recognised. Perhaps Mr. Hurley will comment on the legislative framework under which he operates. The 2003 Act has been described as a fudge. Does Mr. Hurley agree it is imperfect legislation? I am uncomfortable with this separation and yet complete attachment. The Central Bank and financial regulatory authority share the same communications facilities and, perhaps, the same back office facilities, yet to the outsider they are separate.

Mr. John Hurley

The intention at the time was to have an independent regulator. The critical point is that the levers to enable financial stability reports and risks to be implemented — I am not speaking in this regard of supervisors but of the Community at large — need to be reflected upon and put in place. That is the critical factor.

There is a view emerging globally, especially on the supervision of banks, that there must be much closer linkages between supervisors and central banks. There is a liquidity crisis. What is needed is a full understanding of what is happening in terms of supervision, liquidity and collateral. The Central Bank has not recommended any model to the Government but we are clear on the matters that need to be fixed and have advised that certain key changes need to be made, including the ones mentioned. My feeling is that it will be very difficult, given the way the world and risks have evolved, to establish how one can clearly separate banking supervision and central banks. The links must be closer than they were. However, it is for the Government to decide on the appropriate model to be used.

There are other aspects that need to be taken into account. There is what is called the twin peaks approach to deal separately with fitness, codes of conduct and probity. It seems that with such an approach that aspect can receive more attention. This is something that could be done in a reorganisation. In addition, the consumer functions within the Financial Regulator have worked well, but the Taoiseach has announced that he sees these functions being combined with other such functions performed elsewhere. There are different models. However, I would not concentrate on the model as much as on the key outcomes we need to achieve. We need to ensure where systemic risks are identified something can be done about them. It is not good enough that the risks can be ignored by the financial sector; in the regulatory system risks could have been taken on board more. There are also macro prudential issues. All of these matters must dovetail together. This will be critical in the future.

The other critical element, made clear here by the chairman of the Office of the Financial Regulator, is that principles based regulation did not work in an environment in which the financial sector did not assess the risk properly and, in many cases, did not understand the risks in terms of that in which it was engaged, given the instruments being put in place. It is essential that such regulation changes. It has been indicated by the Financial Regulator that it will change and that more detailed rules are necessary to deal with the international financial markets that have evolved. There are two or three matters that need to be dealt with.

On the international regulatory framework, I mentioned the Basel process and pro-cyclicality — the fact that it is possible to build up risks when the opposite should be happening. Dynamic positioning — it is common sense to provide in good times for risks that may emerge in bad times — was not permitted under the accounting standards.

Let me ask Mr. Hurley a more philosophical question. Does the conventional economic model of significant growth year on year continue to be appropriate? Is the model of significant employment activity in the financial services sector in the IFSC and elsewhere appropriate or is it broken, flawed and in need of a significant rethink?

Mr. John Hurley

It seems the market model is a good one but undoubtedly there are elements in the way it functions which we must take on board. No doubt there will always be cycles. The difficulty in the current environment is people seem to forget that we had cycles.

Looking more broadly at the role of monetary authorities over a period of years, the analysis being done here will show perhaps that interest rates at particular moments in time were too low and facilitated and aggravated the liquidity wall across the world. It seems, therefore, that what has been termed as "leaning against the wind" needs to be carefully assessed in monetary policy. It has been argued that pricking an asset price bubble is difficult but leaning against a wind and taking into account——

Surely that is crucial to Mr. Hurley's role. It is part of the Central Bank's role to maintain a stable financial system.

Mr. John Hurley

Yes, of course.

I wonder about the mechanism the Central Bank used to do this. In the past few months I have found that I have obtained more clear information on the irisheconomy website than the Central Bank’s. It is difficult to get to the heart of the concerns expressed by Mr. Hurley.

Mr. John Hurley

I had hoped what we had said in our reports and bulletins would be quite clear. With regard to monetary policy, there is a debate internationally about the extent to which one can deal with an asset price bubble as it is increasing or whether one leans against wind taking into account monetary aggregates as they are increasing. That debate is not over but it has to be held now. This is an important element of the debate because, apart altogether from the fact that there were failures in regulation and supervision, de Larosière would say interest rates at particular moments in time, particularly in the United States, were too low. We have to look at all these elements to ensure a better system is in place to try to resist these pressures. He has indicated clearly there were other reasons for the development of the problems in the global economy but, undoubtedly, the problems I mentioned aggravated the matter.

Mr. Hurley has referred to central banks which have started to engage in non-standard monetary policy operations such as the outright purchase of private and public assets. That raises more questions than it answers. Does Mr. Hurley have anything in mind?

Mr. John Hurley

In the United States and the United Kingdom quantitative easing has started.

Is Mr. Hurley suggesting printing money?

Mr. John Hurley

What happens under quantitative easing is that the reserves of central banks start printing money and purchasing assets to stimulate the economy. It is a legitimate operation, depending on the level of interest.

That would have to happen centrally.

Mr. John Hurley

Yes, in our case it would be a euro area function.

Has Mr. Hurley expressed a view?

Mr. John Hurley

I am certainly very much in favour of the examination of non-standard policy operations.

I have to admit to a certain nervousness. Zimbabwe was the first country to go down that route.

Mr. John Hurley

This is difficult.

I appreciate that.

Mr. John Hurley

It is more difficult in the euro area, given the structure of the area, but it must be examined. Clearly, if events do not recover and the recession continues to deepen, the impact on the private sector and jobs will be critical. Every effort must be made to try to stimulate the real economy. We have taken no decisions on non-standard measures. There is no predetermination but there is an examination to see whether these can be useful in current circumstances.

May I ask one final question in the interests of transparency?

On a point of order, it is midday and Government members have spent the past hour questioning the Governor of the Central Bank. I ask for equity. Will the Chairman allow for the fact that the committee has other members?

Will Mr. Hurley outline his basic salary last year, as well as any bonuses paid?

Mr. John Hurley

The last published salary was €368,000. To that would be added the normal standard increases granted last year. I do not have the up-to-date figure for that. It will be published shortly.

Could Mr. Hurley forecast what it will be?

Mr. John Hurley

They are the normal standard increases. The Governor and staff of the Central Bank get the increases that civil and public servants get. There is a linkage.

Are there any bonuses involved?

Mr. John Hurley

No. This is determined independently by the board. There is no involvement by executives in the bank. It is a public service norm.

Does the board of the Central Bank determine bonuses?

Mr. John Hurley

Bonuses do not apply to the Governor of the Central Bank.

What about the salaries?

Mr. John Hurley

There is a salary. No bonus applies. In other jurisdictions there are different additions but in my case that is the total remuneration. It would have been increased in the course of last year by the normal standard increases. Any reductions that take place in public service salaries apply to the Governor. The 10% contribution applies as does the adjustment in pension or any other adjustments taking place. I have indicated that we must make an adjustment given the level of contraction taking place in the Irish economy. The Governor and staff of the Central Bank and everybody else must do the same.

I thank the Governor.

I welcome the Governor and his colleagues. I have a couple of questions. I mean nothing personal but I believe the Central Bank did not shout loud enough in terms of the problems in the Irish economy.

There are two references in the report with which I want to deal. First, it is stated that the sharp decline arose because of difficulties in the property and construction sector. The Governor stated that funds were being given to the banks in Ireland by the Central Bank as far back as autumn 2007. He also said that the financial stability report was not as effective as it should have been.

In the last report I saw it was stated that the Irish economy was robust. At that stage the Governor would have known that funds were being given to the financial institutions in Ireland by the Central Bank. Furthermore, my understanding is that the Central Bank in Ireland has certain powers within Ireland. No one expects it to cater for what happens outside of Ireland. One of the reasons we have a problem with the banking sector is because of toxic debts within the construction sector. The Central Bank could have issued a directive in terms of weightings, in terms of the reserves to loans ratio that banks should have been required to maintain. That would have restricted the granting of 100% mortgages. Why was that not done?

It is also stated in the financial stability report that there is interaction between the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. If there is already interaction between the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator on various areas and the Central Bank has full access to any information the Financial Regulator has when it involves a risk to financial stability, what benefit would there be in incorporating Central Bank functions and prudential supervision into one organisation? I would like the Governor to address that point.

Why did the Central Bank not issue instructions as the central bank in Spain did when it instructed that higher weightings be applied in giving out loans and mortgages? The main reason our banking sector is in difficulty at the moment — and we spoke about good banks and bad banks — is that moneys were lent to developers and to people for houses they could not afford and the market was not sustainable.

When will the next financial stability report be published? I would have expected regular interim reports to issue, considering the financial state we are in. Does Mr. Hurley believe we are in an economic war? What measures need to be taken to facilitate job retention and creation? What measures would Mr. Hurley like to see in the forthcoming budget to stabilise the public finances? Will €3.5 billion bring stability to the two main banks or will they require extra funding? The president of the European Investment Bank stated today that any state funding to banks should be conditional on finance being given to small businesses and mortgage holders. Can such conditions be attached to the current scheme to finance AIB and Bank of Ireland, ensuring that money flows into the economy?

Mr. John Hurley

Given what is happening in the world and the extraordinary changes which have taken place — witness the revisions of the IMF forecasts — one cannot make a static assessment of what is happening.

I ask, specifically, about the construction sector. That is the one area where the Central Bank would have had control.

Mr. John Hurley

We made clear that one could not continue to build as many as 90,000 houses in our economy. We pointed out that the natural demand was for approximately 50,000.

Did the Central Bank have the power to direct the banks with regard to weighting?

Mr. John Hurley

We do not have that power.

Who has that power?

Mr. John Hurley

The Government and the Financial Regulator have the power. The Central Bank certainly does not. The Central Bank pointed out the risks and made it clear, time and again, that we could not continue to build at that level. Deputy O'Donnell will find those warnings in our reports and in several statements of my own.

How could the Central Bank determine in financial stability reports that the economy was robust when there were major problems in the construction sector?

Mr. John Hurley

In answering Deputy O'Donnell's first question, I said one cannot make a static assessment. One can only use the information one has at any one time. In financial stability reports, we said that if some of the risks materialised there would be significant complications for the economy. The key risk, which was outlined in my introductory statement, was the interaction between an international risk and the domestic vulnerabilities. It was clear that there were domestic vulnerabilities and that we could not continue to build 90,000 houses per year and increase our debt levels by the percentage we were doing.

The banks were giving out 100% mortgages at the same time.

Mr. John Hurley

Time and again, on television and in statements, I indicated that we were becoming one of the most indebted countries in Europe and I was criticised for that.

Did the regulatory system not fail the economy and the people? Did the banks not continue to lend at irresponsible levels to people who could not afford to make repayments? That is the bottom line.

Mr. John Hurley

If the banks had known that we were going to have an international liquidity crisis, behaviour would have been different. No one expected an international liquidity crisis to unfold. An international liquidity crisis means that the banking system is broken. We now have that impairment in our banking system with serious liquidity problems all over the globe. That changes everything. No one expected that crisis to unfold. That is a key element.

It is not within the compass of the Governor to issue directions. It was decided at the time that the Governor would not have that power. The Governor can issue guidelines on those aspects of the operation which interfere with the Governor's functions. Here and in every other country financial stability reports were issued and risks were outlined. The same model was used here as was used internationally and it was a public document.

To respond to earlier questions, it is true that financial stability reports were not as effective as they should have been because they did not change behaviour. We must now find out what key changes are required to ensure changes in behaviour occur. The Deputy mentioned small business. Credit is essential to the economy. We have seen credit growth levels reduce significantly and there is anecdotal evidence that credit is not available to small and medium-sized business.

It is not only anecdotal evidence; interest rates are being increased.

Mr. John Hurley

This is absolutely critical and it was part of the Minister's negotiations with the banks on recapitalisation. It was set out that this matter should be addressed and clearly that is the intention; however, progress should be monitored to ensure that this happens.

How would that happen? I do not wish to interrupt but we have heard much talk of funds flowing. Funds are not flowing from the banks; banks are looking after their primary responsibilities — shareholders and creditors. How can the Governor of the Central Bank, the Government and the Financial Regulator ensure these funds flow? Some €7 billion of taxpayers' money is going into the two main banks.

Mr. John Hurley

I referred earlier to the 6% economic contraction that is likely this year. A 10% economic contraction is likely between last year, this year and next year. Demand is on the floor. Some propositions before the banks clearly merit credit but in many cases demand is extremely low due to economic conditions. We must remember that the international banking system is very challenged, particularly since last September. Our banking sector is no different and faces significant difficulties in a complicated environment; this should be borne in mind.

To get the economy going we must get credit flowing and this must be a key part of discussions with the financial institutions.

How can the Governor ensure that happens?

Mr. John Hurley

Commitments have been given by the banks and the Minister has indicated the area will be monitored. The regulator will monitor progress in this regard also so it seems to me that this will be followed up. In a deep recession, with demand on the floor, one cannot simply turn on the lights straight away.

That is due to a lack of confidence. There is no confidence.

Mr. John Hurley

There is no confidence and confidence and trust are the key to all of this, including in the international environment. Having listened to the G10 statements last night, I hope that, as a result of injections into the global economy and the reduction in commodity prices, we will begin to see a change in confidence and trust in international markets. The international banking system is impaired and is a drag on the real economy. It is affecting the credit growth levels of which the Deputy has spoken, which are essential to economic growth.

Will the banks require further funding?

Mr. John Hurley

The assessment being made has gone on for some months and has involved PricewaterhouseCoopers, Jones Lang LaSalle and due diligence. This process has found that the two main banks each require €3.5 billion, which is a greater figure than was originally envisaged. So much will depend on the length and depth of the recession. Clearly, the profitability of banks, the assets side of balance sheets, is affected by the depth and length of recessions. This is an assessment of the current situation taking account of some very significant scenarios set out by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Jones Lang LaSalle on top of the bank's assessments. It is the best we have right now. It seems to me, on the basis of the information we have, that it should be sufficient. However, I do not have a crystal ball. This is a difficult and deep recession. I indicated earlier just how long it might last.

The Government is examining other potential measures that may be required in these and other banks. The extent of the support will be determined by the length and depth of the recession. The State has made abundantly clear, domestically and internationally, that it will stand behind our financial sector.

On the public finances, what measures does Mr. Hurley believe the Government should introduce in the forthcoming budget to stabilise government finances and to support job retention and creation?

Mr. John Hurley

I will make one point following which I will ask Mr. O'Connell to respond further to the Deputy's question. What is necessary is that the Government stabilise government finances over a period. It must be seen by international markets to be credible in so doing. This means that serious and unpalatable decisions are required and required soon. Undoubtedly, if we are seen to be taking strong action, as we did previously albeit in a downturn that was not as severe as this one, the markets will respond. It is vital that we are seen to be taking the action necessary.

I referred to the journey we are on; we are going through a minefield. We must work together to get through this minefield so that at the end of the day we have the potential for growth that is possible in this economy. This requires the banking sector to work efficiently and to provide credit to the real economy, and that the fiscal position is dealt with and seen to be dealt with by those who invest in our country.

Mr. Tom O’Connell

Economic war was mentioned. Obviously, we are in great economic difficulties not only here but elsewhere. One of the major factors is the collapse across the world in consumer and business demand, which links to the Governor's comment on credit. On what business would one expect to invest in fixed capital in the current climate? The only demand — I heard this at the EFC in Brussels — coming from business is to finance inventories. Obviously, that cannot go on for very long. If they cannot sell their products, they are getting working capital to finance inventories. Consumer and business demand is very weak and exports worldwide have collapsed as exports depend on consumer demand in different countries.

The only component of demand that is conceivably expanding is Government. To some degree, Government demand is expanding because of automatic stabilisers. Tax revenues have fallen away and unemployment outlay here and elsewhere is up. Members may have read in yesterday's The Financial Times the point made by Larry Summers, the eminent US economist and former US Secretary of the Treasury, that lowering interest rates and the non-standard injection of liquidity may not be enough. Basically, he said that we need global demand to increase.

We need confidence.

Mr. Tom O’Connell

Confidence will not recover spontaneously. Government demand worldwide will need to expand to generate confidence in private demand. Members may have heard of the European economic recovery plan put together in Brussels which recommends that Governments expand their demand by 1.5% of GDP, where scope for doing so exists. Some countries, such as Ireland, do not have scope for doing so. If one removes those countries wherein such scope does not exist, the recommendation from Brussels is for a 1% increase in Government demand which would spill over to GDP.

Members may have noted that last Thursday Mr. Trichet pointed out that growth prospects for the euro area are close to minus 3%. What is happening spontaneously in the economy is totally dwarfing this expansion in demand and to take up Summers's point, unless something crops up for spontaneous reasons on the part of consumers or businesses — one does not want to over-dramatise it — one could be in a cumulative downward spiral. That is why these exceptional monetary measures such as printing money, if one wants to put it like that, are being done, but there is certainly no guarantee that such will generate an increase in demand. In fact, Mervyn King has been quoted, I think in the Sunday Times, to that effect that one cannot guarantee anything. Even if one is printing money, the money is just floating around the economy and people are not spending.

In this country — it is linked to the tax revenues — household saving has increased by 50%. One might see the retail figures are well down. That is what has happened, nobody is spending anything. In speaking to an Italian colleague last week, he made the point that the trouble with consumers is they need spend only 20% of their income on food or necessities. The other 80% is discretionary and if people do not spend, one has big problems.

Mr. John Hurley

I was asked about the financial stability reports and the publication of the financial stability reports. The financial stability reports should have been published a little earlier but the situation is so fluid, and events are overtaking the positions so quickly, that it was decided to defer the publication of the report for the moment. We hope to come back to that. We have not yet put a timescale on that. In this fluid situation, with events taking place so rapidly, any assessment would be overtaken very quickly. This is a fast-moving crisis and we must take cognisance of that in making our assessment. That said, I will give up-to-date statements and assessments, either before this committee or publicly, as the opportunity arises.

I mentioned earlier, against the general background of the question asked, that the pressures on the Irish financial system have increased significantly and that Irish banks continue to face very difficult situations. The share prices have declined dramatically over the past year as there has been a deterioration in the wider economy.

I too welcome Mr. Hurley and his colleagues to the committee, especially as he is a fellow Mallow man to boot.

On what I have heard so far, it seems that the Central Bank has been a largely irrelevant institution in recent years. If the regulatory authority would have been largely feeding into the financial stability assessment reports, if those reports were being ignored, and if monetary and fiscal policy was being determined by the European Central Bank, then why did we have a Central Bank in the first instance?

Coupled with that is the question on the de Larosière report. De Larosière is being rolled out as the new John Wayne to whose train we all will hitch our wagons and somehow he will save the day. It is a little incongruous. My analysis of the situation — Mr. Hurley may correct me if I am wrong — is that where any prudential rules were sought to be put in place over the past ten years, they were fiercely resisted and we and the UK were probably the fiercest opponents of any change in the rules in favour of a more prudential system of governance vis-à-vis the banks. If a European systemic risk council — a funny-sounding name — will be set up and it will run through the individual regulatory supervisors, I question the role of any individual nation state’s central bank if it will be the regulator that will govern the behaviour of banks in such a scenario. Perhaps Mr. Hurley will comment on that.

Will €7 billion be sufficient to recapitalise AIB and the Bank of Ireland? Legislation was passed by the Oireachtas two weeks ago. What role had the Central Bank in advising the Department of Finance on the amount that would be required? In light of JP Morgan's assessment that bank liabilities in Ireland total €26.9 billion, was sufficient money put into the banks in the first instance?

With regard to credit risk, my understanding of economics is that, traditionally, banks could loan on the basis of deposits and they could loan a multiple of that amount. Historically, the cash ratio was 10% but that went out the window and new rules were introduced at Basel and so on. The Central Bank became the so-called lender of last resort. When did that model dissipate? Where did that all go wrong? The perception of ordinary people is the central bank of any country is the institution that regulates banks and they haul them over the coals if they misbehave. Credit risk has defined the crisis in which we find ourselves. No analysis was conducted on the level of credit risk and banks could lend greater multiples based on the fact they were parcelling off credit risk as a financial instrument in itself. Did the Central Bank even have the expertise to analyse what was happening with regard to credit risk? Did it have a role? Should it have a role in future? If not, does the Central Bank have a future?

Mr. John Hurley

With regard to the role of the Central Bank, since the euro system was set up, it has been part of the euro area and the bank must participate in its monetary policy. We no longer have control over interest rates in the same way but monetary policy, liquidity and collateral are all operated on a decentralised basis through the Irish Central Bank. I indicated earlier the functions, which are substantial, and we have been involved in this. However, I have also said financial stability reports did not bring about a change in behaviour and that undoubtedly has to be changed. I mentioned de Larosière only because his analysis and assessment in the report is exceptionally good in terms of bringing together the things that gave rise to this situation, what is broken and what needs to be fixed. It is as good an assessment as one will find. It is, therefore, for that reason worth referring to.

We operate in a decentralised way within the euro system. The functions are significant but we do not have supervisory functions. These are dealt with by the Financial Regulator. That was the structure we put in place. There was, therefore, independence in the flow of information to which I referred earlier.

On the two bodies suggested, one has to do with the systemic risks and the type of financial stability report outlook to which I referred and the operationalising of whatever is in the risk assessment. That could be very effective with the ECB chairing it and then making sure the risks identified are dealt with through various levers, perhaps through the European Finance Centre and so on. The point on supervision is well made. It remains to be seen how the new framework for the co-ordination of supervision and the links with national supervisors recommended by de Larosière will function. The Deputy made the point, which I tried to make earlier, that in implementing directives there are various options and because different options are chosen there may not be a harmonised system. The point, therefore, needs a fair amount of thinking through. As a consequence of the report much more work needs to be done to ensure it is effective. I agree that it needs to be dealt with.

On capitalisation, I referred earlier to the assessments made, to PricewaterhouseCoopers, to Jones Lang LaSalle, to the best assessment that could be made at this stage of the capital requirements. The reality, however, is that we are in a recession and we must continue to assess the situation as we go forward. In assessing the level of capital to be injected, there were a number of players advising the Government, including the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator, the National Treasury Management Agency and others. This was the best assessment that emerged on the basis of the reports available.

On the credit risk, one of the things that has emerged in the regulatory framework is the limiting of leverage by banks. Banks could leverage up to a certain percentage. This went too far and as a result the banks took on very significant risks. That is part and parcel of what must be changed. In terms of the assessments done on the regulatory side up to now, it was for the supervisors to deal with this in terms of their discussion with banks. Loans were made on the basis of ability to pay. That is what was assessed. However, account must also be taken of the total leverage being undertaken by banks, the level of borrowing on the wholesale markets and the vulnerability that opens up as a consequence. The reality is that under the rules not alone here but elsewhere this was not as well done as it might have been.

I hope I have addressed the points made.

Essentially we are talking about regulation. The fundamental issue is how the markets will be regulated into the future. One analysis is that we do not know where we are at the moment, that we are in the morass and nobody has been able to come up with a way to get out of it and start going again. Even if we start going again we do not know what the nature of that will be.

There has been a fundamental rethink regarding how things will be done from now on. It is fair comment to say that the system of regulation here was weak. It was weak because there may not have been an understanding of the financial instruments being used by the markets. There may not have been an expert analysis of what was happening internally within the banks. If we are to have a system of regulation, what should be the characteristics of a regulator in terms of its interrelationship with the Irish Central Bank? It seems, if I am to be honest about it, that the Central Bank is blaming the Financial Regulator or the failure of regulation, and that it is saying there is no culpability on the part of the Central Bank. What it is saying is that it warned everybody through its stability reports but was effectively powerless to act or to intervene because that was the role of the Financial Regulator or the Department of Finance. I wonder about that interaction and whether or not——

Mr. John Hurley

I mentioned earlier that principles regulation is not appropriate going forward given what has unfolded and given that the management and boards of banks were not assessing the risk properly. We did not have many of the toxic products which appeared internationally and caused great problems. There was not sufficient understanding internationally of the implications of the instruments which were giving rise to problems. That is the situation. Regulators worldwide were also behind the curve in that regard. There is, undoubtedly, a requirement for skill levels to be increased to cope with the complexities emerging in financial markets.

We are now seeing an admission by key personnel in the country's finances that there was a lack of knowledge of the financial instruments which caused the explosion in global economies.

Mr. John Hurley

I said the instruments which caused most of the difficulty are not part and parcel of the problem of the Irish banks. We have a problem with property. In fact, we have no exposure to those instruments. Internationally, the management of the banks which were writing, selling, originating and distributing those instruments do not seem to have understood the risks they were taking on board. In some cases, they thought the risks were being banished to structured investment vehicles, SIVs, and other instruments off balance sheet and would not come back. When the liquidity crisis hit, they did come back. There was a lack of understanding in the big global banking conglomerates of some of the instruments they were putting in place. Under a different system of regulation, which will now be put in place and which will not be principles-based, different skill mixes and skill levels will be required. The Financial Regulator is already taking action with regard to that.

There was a broader failure across the community in Ireland. There are, clearly, issues for the regulator, the Central Bank, the Government and the banks. The risks were pointed out but behaviour did not change. We must do something about this problem. This is the reason for the risk committee which is being put in place under the auspices of the ECB. If a serious risk is identified some action must happen. That will be critical in the new rubric. This is what is in mind in the reorganisation of central banking and regulation in Ireland. We did not recommend a particular model. It is for the Government and the Oireachtas to do that. However, we are clear as to the elements which should be within it.

I thank the Governor for that. We must learn from the mistakes made and go into the future with a new model of governance.

The United States advocates a zero interest rate policy. Does Mr. Hurley have a view on that? Should we move towards zero interest rates within the eurozone?

Mr. John Hurley

I would not comment on that. In the eurozone, we will assess the situation as we see it, look at the data as it emerges and make a decision. We do not precommit but we are monitoring the situation very closely.

Spoken like Jean-Claude Trichet.

That was very disappointing.

The gist of what Mr. Hurley is saying is very disturbing, not just because of his projections for the economy, which continue to shake us every day. In his presentation, in the sort of language central bankers use, and which many of us do not understand, he said:

Our financial stability reports and the warnings they contained, no less than those in similar reports issued by other central banks, were not as effective as they might have been as they did not lead to a sufficient or timely change in behaviour.

I take it that means the Central Bank warned of the risks and nobody, including the Government, the Financial Regulator and the banks, took any notice. Is that correct?

Mr. John Hurley

Insufficient notice was taken. Our dialogue with the banks indicated that they viewed the risks differently; they did not envisage them as we had outlined. I know the Financial Regulator appeared before the committee but he took action from 2006 onwards; he indicated the actions to be taken on foot of financial stability reports. This was part and parcel of the assessment on which the reports were built; they were presented to the boards of the banks. Therefore, the Financial Regulator did take action in 2006.

One might argue action should have been taken earlier but we warned the wider community that we could not build 70,000, 80,000 and 90,000 houses each year and consider such a level of construction normal. We said the level of construction in a normal economy should be 50,000 houses each year. We now know that when an economy goes into recession, there is an overshoot; therefore, far fewer houses will be built in the next year or two. The level will be far below the potential requirements of the economy but that is normal; when one overshoots, there will always be a consequential undershoot. The impact of this on revenue and growth is very serious.

There was a feeling in Ireland that the cycle would not change but we did our best to explain that it would. We tried to explain that the country could not continue with that level of investment in the construction sector. In 2006 property prices fell a little but this reversed.

Did it reverse upwards?

Mr. John Hurley

Yes. Once it had reversed there was no doubt the soft landing would turn into a hard landing if we were not very careful. Prices went back up when everything else pointed the other way; the soft landing terminated in 2006. In our financial stability reports and statements we carefully put levels of overvaluation, from 20% to 70%, in the public domain. We did this because I was satisfied that the level of overvaluation would turn out to be significant. This move was criticised and people asked whether central banks should put matters of overvaluation in the public domain. We believed the situation was very serious, given the reversal of the soft landing in the property market and the fact that 70,000, 80,000 and 90,000 houses were being built each year — the economy only required half of that level of construction. Despite demand, prices continued to increase dramatically. Clearly, this was not sustainable and we had to say so strongly, although others contradicted us. We pointed out that this could not continue, as the economy would suffer as a result.

I accept what the Governor said which was very enlightening, but the Central Bank is possibly the most important risk monitoring agency in the nation. It issued a statement to the Government, the Financial Regulator and the banks; the Government ignored it and, if I understand Mr. Hurley correctly, the banks also told the Central Bank to jump in a lake, as they did not agree with that point of view. What is the point in having a Governor of the Central Bank who issues prescient warnings if politicians who find them inconvenient ignore him and banks continue to lend money hell for leather?

Mr. John Hurley

This is the very area that has to change; there must be a way through which risks can be operationalised.

Was the Governor redundant at that stage?

Mr. John Hurley

During that period we made the risks clear. We spoke to the banks and I made many statements on the matter. However, this is a free country and people can ignore advice.

Mr. John Hurley

On Deputy Sherlock's question, if financial stability reports are to have teeth, changes at European and domestic level are required and they must dovetail. We cannot have a situation where we identify risks only. The biggest risk is presented by interaction between an international crisis and our domestic vulnerabilities, largely in the construction sector. We must face up to and take whatever action is necessary to deal with these risks.

I am coming to the end of my career. I have served for 45 years as a public servant. I want to see this issue dealt with, as it is critical for the country. If we identify a risk, there must be in place a mechanism through which it can be operationalised. The impact on us is not the result of the current situation only. I have stated at previous committee meetings that the downturn we are experiencing has more than doubled as a result of the international recession. While we would have experienced a downturn or growth contraction, it would have been possible to manage it. What makes the current situation extraordinarily difficult to deal with is the speed of the downturn, in particular since the Lehman collapse.

As Deputy Cuffe stated, the Governor is paid €368,000 per annum. However, while what he was saying for a couple of years was accurate and precise, it was useless because nobody took any notice of it. We need to re-examine the role of the Governor of the Central Bank and ask ourselves if we need one if such enlightened warnings are issued and ignored by the banks. Perhaps Mr. Hurley will set out in more detail how often he communicates with the Minister and the banks. Also, what form of communication is involved?

Mr. John Hurley

We regularly meet the Minister.

Mr. John Hurley

In normal times we meet every couple of months. In current times we meet far more frequently. Since becoming Governor, I have had regular and frequent meetings with the Minister. Also, regular meetings are held with the banks.

With whom in the banks?

Mr. John Hurley

Since the liquidity crisis unfolded, we have been meeting regularly with top executives of the banks.

Does Mr. Hurley meet executives from all of the banks or one?

Mr. John Hurley

We meet executives from all of the main banks.

Does the Governor meet them all at the same time?

Mr. John Hurley

No, we meet them individually. In some cases, we meet executives from a number of banks. There is critical engagement with all of the banks when financial stability reports are issued. All key economic personnel in the banks attend these meetings to discuss the risks. We meet the key players, including the director general, economists and various other individuals to try to explain the risks and give our view in that regard. As I stated, these views were not always accepted.

Where they ever accepted?

Mr. John Hurley

The key risks outlined in the financial stability reports did not strike home or bring about a change in behaviour.

Therefore, the Governor's views were never accepted. Were any of the banks sympathetic with the Governor's point of view? Did any of them admit the Governor was right or were they unanimous in saying he was wrong?

Mr. John Hurley

While there was a variation in terms of behaviour between the banks, one received the response one expected.

There was a united front.

Mr. John Hurley

To be fair, there was a variation between the institutions. Some were more receptive than others. The reality is, looked at in the round, what I said in my opening statement in respect of changed behaviour is true. It is clearly an issue for the future which requires to be addressed.

Mr. Hurley attended the meeting on 29 September in Government Buildings.

Mr. John Hurley

Yes.

I am sure Mr. Hurley will not give us details of the conversations that took place. Was it his first choice that the Government should be giving a guarantee of that sort?

Mr. John Hurley

Clearly, it would have been a better situation if that was not required. In the situation in which we found ourselves, with significant haemorrhaging of liquidity in the previous period, particularly since Lehman Brothers, not just in this country but in other countries, we had a very good understanding of what was happening because a liquidity situation had been put in place by the financial regulators long ago and that was a good liquidity information system. That certainly gave us a good feel for what was happening. We also had particular situations — I do not want to go into detail — that we had to deal with and we were faced with very unpalatable options.

At the end of the day it was felt necessary to take this action because of the financial stability risk to the system. I had to come to the conclusion in the days before that, that the financial stability of our system was at risk. It was my obligation to inform the Government on that, which I did, and then to assess the options. At that particular moment in time, given the situation that faced the country, that was the option that had to be taken.

Would Mr. Hurley do the same again?

Mr. John Hurley

In the same circumstances?

Mr. John Hurley

Today we are in a different situation. Senator Ross will recall — of course it was important for us — there was no European initiative at the time. A European initiative had not developed. There was no sign of the Paris declaration. If we had a European initiative we would have been part of that initiative. However, Ireland is a small open economy on the edge of the Atlantic. We are open to the United States and to the UK, and were hit faster — maybe only days faster — than our European colleagues. In that situation with no European initiative, which came very fast and later, with many positions being changed like a somersault within 24 or 48 hours, we were in a very uncomfortable position and we had choices for our country.

What did Mr. Trichet say when Mr. Hurley rang him at 6 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. John Hurley

I rang him and informed him about what we were going to do, and he understood.

What did he say?

Mr. John Hurley

He understood we had to take action.

Was Mr. Hurley speaking French or English then?

Mr. John Hurley

We sometimes speak French but we were speaking English at the time. He understood.

Did he blow a fuse?

Mr. John Hurley

No. He understood that action had to be taken, and we had to take action in the interests of our own country. It will be the same in the future. If we come back to my opening comments, we must do the same now. If we as a country take the correct action on the fiscal and banking side then the potential for the medium term is good given the fact that we have made such progress. This is difficult. We are going through a very difficult period with things moving and changing rapidly. However, we must do this, we must face up to it and take some very difficult and unpalatable decisions. It is difficult to have everything totally equitable in the short space of time but there will be time to come back and deal with some of those issues.

There is a willingness in the community. People are going through the anger and the hurt, and it is very natural. We experienced this when I was involved in the same process in the 1980s. There is always an initial period when we must internalise what is happening. We are coming to the stage where that is happening, where we are on to a new stage where we can take the action. There will be support for taking this action because if we do it, we will limit the loss of jobs and we will certainly be faster getting back on a track to recovery.

I welcome the Governor and his colleagues. From what I have heard, and from the line of questioning from Deputies O'Donnell and Sherlock and Senator Ross, it is fair to say that the Governor recognises and accepts that there has been a problem with financial regulation in Ireland, and that it was fundamentally flawed because he spoke of the need for a broad-ranging review and reform, which we all accept.

Does Mr. Hurley think the problem was we had a cosy regulatory community populated by people who largely spent their careers in the Department of Finance and the Central Bank and, perhaps, the regulated entities were smarter and able to run rings around the regulators with dire consequences for the economy generally? What gives former Secretaries General of the Department of Finance the right to seamlessly move to the role of Governor of the Central Bank? Is part of the problem the lack of proper independence in the relationships involved? In recent months we have had a succession of resignations from financial institutions and the Financial Regulator. In the light of what was happened, will other positions become untenable?

As Senator Ross said, Mr. Hurley has been widely signalled as the party who recommended that Anglo Irish Bank should not be allowed to fail before the Government rescued it last September with the State guarantee scheme. Does Mr. Hurley think the advice was well founded? With regard to the PwC report on Anglo Irish Bank, we were all shocked by the allegation regarding balancing transfers between the bank and IL&P. Does the full report contain more serious and equally disturbing allegations, about which we do not yet know?

Mr. John Hurley

With regard to the question on Secretaries General of the Department of Finance, it is a matter for the Minister for Finance and the Government to decide who should be the Governor of the Central Bank. That is their prerogative. There is not a right of passage. Presumably, the Government at a particular moment in time made the best decision it could. As far as I am concerned, it was a ministerial decision. I was asked to do this job.

As a right of passage.

Mr. John Hurley

I do not see that is correct. There was a debate on each occasion. The Government made a decision but there is no right of passage. It is for the Minister and the Government to make such a decision and the President to appoint. Recently, I was asked to stay on in my position. I am doing so for a short period because I have been asked to do so, precisely because we are going through a difficult situation and I am happy to assist in trying to get us out of the minefield in which we find ourselves. However, this is a matter for the Government and I do not intend to stay on for too long. It is the Government's prerogative and the President makes the appointment.

With regard to resignations, we have seen significant changes in the management of the banks and I expect to see further changes but it is important that adjustments of this nature are made in an orderly way. We cannot run a banking system in a small country such as this with a wholesale overnight clearout of managements and boards. There have been serious failures in the running of some of our institutions but it is important that change is brought about in an orderly fashion.

I have referred to the way the Government came to a decision on the guarantee. Clearly, one of the banks was more stressed than most but the real question was: would there be a contagion that would affect other banks? Would it be necessary in the case of other banks to have the guarantee? The overall view was it was not certain that we could stop the contagion and, as a consequence, we had to protect the system. That is a judgment call and at the time, on the basis of the information we had and the liquidity losses which were not confined to one bank, it was the only decision that could have been made in the circumstances. There was no European initiative or Paris declaration. There was no help at that time. We were on our own. That said, we benefit enormously from being in the euro system, from the collateral system that is available, through liquidity provision and the support we get through that system. It has been of significant benefit to our financial institutions and the financial institutions generally. We lose certain powers, but even countries that have their own monetary policy and the freedom to have their own interest rate increases still have significant problems with assets and asset prices and property.

In terms of the last question, my understanding is that this is being handled primarily on the regulatory side. I have no knowledge of further serious breaches or allegations at this stage. The matters referred to by the Financial Regulator are matters both it and the Central Bank are aware of at this time. I have no information beyond that.

Many questions have been asked and answered. I have one final question. Mr. O'Connell put forward a very persuasive argument that world-wide demand for goods and services is falling rapidly and that is obviously allied to a lack of confidence. Can the Governor tell me how increasing taxation and reducing pay will lead to an increase in demand for goods and services? Are we not descending into a vicious circle, a deflationary spiral and that neither the Governor nor anybody else is in a position to assure the people that this strategy will not make matters worse instead of better? Is that not the evidence that has already been presented here? What is the Governor's answer to the worries and concerns of ordinary people who face real reductions in their disposable income?

Mr. John Hurley

I will ask my colleague to reply in a moment. I would say initially that the level of fiscal adjustment required is truly extraordinary. The gap that has opened up between our expenditure and taxation has never been seen before in the history of the State. We simply cannot do nothing about this. We must take action to try to address this situation. If we do not, financial markets will come to their own conclusions about our country and that will affect the liquidity of the financial institutions and it will affect investment in the country. In the past we had a very good reputation for managing our finances well and, if we got into difficulty, the reputation of taking strong corrective action. We must maintain that reputation now for the sake of this and future generations.

Mr. Tom O’Connell

As the Governor said earlier, cumulatively we will have a fall of approximately 10% in GDP. That means a fall of 10% in living standards. We cannot deny that. That looks pretty horrendous. However, if one thinks of it, we have a great deal of froth in GDP if one goes back to 2006 and 2007 when, as the Governor said, we were building two or three times more houses than was sustainable. That could not continue. That froth had to come off. One way or the other we were going to get some fall in GDP, even without the international recession. It will be roughly 10%. I have heard other experts talk about this too. The community in the round must take on average a 10% fall in living standards. If some groups in the community say they will not take that; that they will take only 5%, other groups must take 15%. We are all in this together. We are talking about 10% for the most part.

The Deputy is right in saying that taking taxes out of the system is, on the face of it, additionally deflationary. In one sense that is the case but if one recollects the 1980s when we made an adjustment, people said the fiscal correction in 1987 would crucify the economy but confidence was so low at the time that — and people have written about in the academic journals — we had expansionary fiscal contraction, which seems a paradox. The reasoning was that if the Government tightened things, demand would fall. The effect was offset by the positive effect on confidence. In 1986-87 private individuals were not spending. By the same token, as Deputy O'Donnell said, confidence is on the floor and no one is spending. If we take fiscal action which has the effect of restoring confidence, we could be on the right path. As the Governor implied, we do not have an option. Financial markets have closed down to companies and governments. We are looking at a deficit of between 9.5% and 10%, even if we take very considerable restraining actions. There will be a very large borrowing requirement. In the current climate it will not be easy to finance these borrowing requirements.

The same point applies across the world. We are on watch, internationally. That is why the credit default swap spreads are very high for Ireland. The interest rate spread over German bunds is also very high. People are looking at us and asking if we have the capacity and the will to take these decisions. They will make their own judgments if we do not do it. We are already paying over the odds for international finance. If we do not take these decisions voluntarily, others will impose them on us.

Has the capitalist system which operated throughout the world in the last 30 years collapsed? In the run-up to the 1929 Wall Street crash, there was overproduction throughout the world. This seems to be one of the causes of the current collapse. Is it time for a fundamental shift from the capitalist system?

Mr. John Hurley

It is still the best system. However, weaknesses in it have been identified. These weaknesses started a number of years ago, with imbalances caused by oil-exporting and Asian countries, particularly China, funding the United States and facilitating that country to have a significant deficit and in continuing to borrow. As a consequence, there were very low interest rates. This meant funds went elsewhere to seek a return, risk was mispriced and problems arose as a consequence. This must be fixed. The discussions taking place among the G10 and G20 countries are about what the new arrangements will be to enable the point the Chairman is making to be dealt with. That is at the heart of the problems which have arisen in the world. It gave rise, initially, to a very significant flow of liquidity which pushed very fast asset prices, whether stocks, property or other assets. As confidence was lost, liquidity was drained and debts were left. This problem which came about initially as a result of the imbalances must be tackled. The discussions between the IMF and the larger countries in the Financial Stability Forum and the Basel committee will have to take this into account. There are elements of the capitalist system which need adjustment.

I thank our guests for attending. The joint committee will discuss the legal issues later in the week.

The joint committee adjourned at 1.10 p.m. until 12.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 24 March 2009.
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