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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC REGULATORY AFFAIRS debate -
Tuesday, 19 Jan 2010

Report on Regulatory Environment: Discussion.

The next item on the agenda is the consideration of the recent report on the regulatory environment in Ireland, carried out by the Economist Intelligence Unit and commissioned by the Department of the Taoiseach. We will also consider the Government's statement on economic regulation, published last October. Members of the interdepartmental senior officials' group on economic regulation, which was responsible for overseeing the review, are present to discuss the findings and recommendations of the report. I welcome the following: Mr. Philip Kelly, Department of the Taoiseach and chairman of the group; Mr. John Murphy, Department of Transport; Ms Breda Power, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment; Mr. Éamonn Molloy, Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources; and Mr. David Moloney, Department of Finance.

Before beginning, I draw witnesses' attention to the fact that, while members of the committee have absolute privilege, it does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I call on Mr. Kelly to make his presentation.

Mr. Philip Kelly

I have supplied the committee with a note so I will speak to some overhead slides for now. The genesis of the review of the economic environment was the programme for Government commitment of June 2007 which stated that the entire economic regulatory environment would be reviewed. The programme included proposals for the establishment of this committee and the undertaking of an international benchmarking study. The study was put out to tender in December 2007 and by March 2008 we had awarded the contract to a consortium of the Economist Intelligence Unit and Compecon Ltd., which began work in May 2008. The study was completed in March 2009.

We wanted to have a look at the entire economic regulatory environment and chose four of the traditional economic regulators, and included the HSA and the Financial Regulator, as case studies so that a comprehensive range of economic regulators came within the scope of the review. The review was to compare each of these regulators with their counterparts in other relevant EU and OECD countries. Working with the consultants we developed criteria by which the review would be carried out, which included effectiveness, value for money, governance and accountability. We selected a range of countries based on their reputation, the size of their markets and their common law or EU legislative frameworks for the purpose of comparison. The detailed findings of the EIU report are set out in the paper I have presented to the committee.

I will summarise the main findings. The EIU report underlined the continued importance of regulation in the economy, arguing that regulation was required as it was not sufficient to simply allow competition policy to play out. It noted that, in some key areas such as energy and telecommunications, the regulatory regime had been pulling back from positions where effective competition had been established.

The report also suggested that independent sectoral regulators were the best model, as distinct from Government Departments, and these are an EU requirement in some instances. On the scope and mandate of regulators the report suggested it was better to have sectoral rather than industry regulators. For example, an energy regulator was better than an individual gas or electricity regulator. It considered the issue of a super-regulator but did not find any evidence favouring the formation of such an entity. However, it did propose some mergers of our domestic regulators. It suggested there was cause for concern over the cost of individual regulators, based on comparisons with international counterparts, but it was not entirely clear whether the costs were comparable in terms of the exact functions performed by our regulators or whether there was a linear relationship between the costs of regulation and the size of an economy.

The report suggested there be an increased focus on performance on the part of regulators and recommended the development of specific performance targets. It also stressed the need for clarity on regulatory mandates and suggested a five-yearly review of the fundamental rationale for each regulator. It also suggested stress-testing of regulatory structures so that where there were particular shocks in a market we could examine the robustness of the regulatory regime. ComReg currently enjoys simultaneous powers with the Competition Authority in the area of competition and the EIU was asked whether there should be any extension of those powers. However, it did not recommend such an extension. It favoured the model of multi-member commissions as opposed to single member commissions or regulators and recommended the establishment of a single appeals body to deal with regulatory judgments. It also recommended increased resourcing of Oireachtas committees to support the scrutiny role of the Houses and suggested the upskilling of Departments. Members will see the countries with whose regulators each of our individual regulators was compared. The full EIU report gives details of each of the regulators and countries concerned.

The Government received the EIU report in March 2009 and published its own statement in October 2009 responding to the key recommendations. In the area of governance and accountability the Government proposed to legislate for statements of strategy, integrated annual reports, output statements and public interest statements and for mandatory requirements for all regulators. It also proposed that Departments would work with individual regulators to agree annual performance indicators and establish an annual regulatory forum where the Taoiseach and key economic Ministers would meet with regulators to discuss key issues of importance for competitiveness in the economy.

The Government endorsed the proposal for the testing of regulatory frameworks against asymmetric shocks and the development of stronger capacity, both within the regulators and Government Departments, to deal with regulatory matters. The Government adopted a recommendation for multi-member commissions, and legislation dealing with individual regulators will ensure that, as individual employment contracts change and new commissioners are appointed, it will be to multiple regulators. The requirement for regulators to produce public interest statements, which is to be introduced by statute, was seen as a way of enhancing the potential for Oireachtas scrutiny of the activities of regulators.

The Government's statement encourages regulators to look for opportunities for shared services. The Government did not accept the EIU recommendation for the establishment of a single appeals body. Instead, and in light of the development of the Commercial Court and the sophistication and speed with which it deals with cases, it believed the case for a single standing body was not proven.

The final set of recommendations deals with the appropriateness of the regulatory structures and the mandates of regulators. The Government endorsed the proposal that it would provide in statute for five-yearly reviews of regulators. That obligation would rest on Ministers and their Departments. It was agreed that Government would not extend the concurrent powers in the competition area to the regulators, instead those powers still rest with the Competition Authority.

On the issue of scrutiny of budgets and levies, responding to the findings of the Economist Intelligence Unit that some of the domestic regulators were at least as costly and, on occasion under some comparisons, more costly than their international counterparts, the Government had recommended that by statute, Ministers and relevant consumer or industry panels would have a role in the approval and scrutiny of regulators' budgets. I mentioned cost levels. One factor to be considered in relation to cost is the issue of structure and potential amalgamation of regulators. While the EIU had suggested some areas for consideration for amalgamation, so too had Mr. McCarthy in the report of the special group on public service numbers and expenditure programmes, the Government decided in the first instance that the aviation regulator, part of the functions of the Irish Aviation Authority, IAA, should be amalgamated with the National Transport Authority, NTA, to form a single transport regulator.

In regard to consumer interests and consultation with the consumer, it was noted in the EIU report that in some instances regulators appoint their own consumer panels. It was felt it would be better to have relevant Ministers or the National Consumer Agency appointing consumer panels and these panels might be given a statutory function in the scrutiny of the annual budgets of regulators.

I have gone through the recommendations quickly and my colleagues and I are happy to take questions on both the EIU report and on the Government statement.

I thank Mr. Kelly for his presentation.

I thank Mr Kelly for giving the background to the review and what has happened since then. Will Mr. Kelly give his opinion on the refusal of the Economist Intelligence Unit to accept an invitation to appear before the joint committee? Did Mr. Kelly recommend that the EIU be awarded the contract to undertake the review? Is it inappropriate that the EIU did not respond positively to the committee's invitation?

Mr. Philip Kelly

We recommended that the Economist Intelligence Unit conduct this study. We advertised the tender to conduct this study in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EIU was among a number of companies who tendered for it. It tendered with an Irish partner, Compecon Ltd., and was judged under a range of criteria to be the most cost-effective and competent firm, particularly because of its international reach into other markets as this was a comparative study. I was surprised to learn that the EIU was unwilling to attend the committee meeting. It is not something we would support and we contacted the EIU when we learned of this to encourage it to attend, but we did not get a positive response. Many of the people who were engaged in this study are no longer employed by the EIU and that might explain some of its reluctance. We would have and still strongly encourage the EIU to come before the joint committee.

How much did the report cost?

Mr. Philip Kelly

The report cost €408,000 and the company was chosen on its being the second lowest in cost of about five or six short-listed firms.

There was no recommendation favouring a super-regulator.

Will Mr. Kelly expand on the concept of a super-regulator and if he thinks it is appropriate to have a super-regulator?

Mr. Philip Kelly

There has been a proposal that instead of having individual regulators of public utilities or whatever, there should be a single regulator, because of economies of scale, the husbandry of scarce resources in terms of specialist economic skills and it reduces the administrative support requirement for a single regulator. There are advantages in that but the EIU's examination of countries where a substantial number of regulatory functions had been combined in a single organisation did not find any evidence to suggest that better regulatory determinations were the outcome of a single institution. The EIU was not convinced that there were very substantial cost savings.

Second, the EIU was not convinced that there was sufficient overlap in terms of content and expertise between an aviation economist and somebody who might be an engineer working on offshore platforms or electricity and so on. While some of the skill sets would be transferable and there are common approaches that should be shared among regulators, having all regulatory functions vested in a single body was not recommended by the EIU. It suggests also that there would be governance issues. If from time to time there is commentary that suggests that economic regulators are insufficiently accountable, there will be a question of giving any single one regulatory body powers in all sectors of the economy. For a variety of reasons the EIU was not supportive of that approach. It is an approach that Government has not endorsed in its statement, but what is made clear in the statement is that it is something that should be addressed on a sectoral basis. One might have a single transport regulator as the Government now proposes rather than a taxi regulator, a Dublin Transport Authority, an aviation regulator and an Irish Aviation Authority. A sectoral approach is an interim measure towards the super-regulator approach.

That sounds reasonable. The EIU proposes some mergers and there is some concern over costs. What mergers were proposed in the report? Relative to the regulators in the other comparator countries, how does Ireland stack up across the range of regulators?

Mr. Philip Kelly

The report suggests that there is a case for some amalgamation between the aviation regulator, CAR, and some of the functions of the Irish Aviation Authority. That is now comprehended in the Government's wider plan for a transport regulator. Second, the report calls for consideration in the longer term of the amalgamation of the energy regulator and ComReg, the communications and postal regulator. It also suggests that some of the broadcasting regulatory powers might in time be amalgamated with ComReg because of a convergence of technology and interests between broadcasting and electronic communications. As it had not studied the IAA and, in particular, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, as it now is, the EIU did not make definitive recommendations but suggested those of lines of inquiry for the Government.

Before moving on to costs let us stay with that issue for a moment. How far has the Government contemplated the amalgamation of energy and broadcasting into ComReg?

Mr. Philip Kelly

The Government has not decided to proceed with that recommendation.

Did it decide not to proceed with it?

Mr. Philip Kelly

That is a recommendation that came from EIU as something the Government should consider in the longer term. I am just saying that for now, in the context of the Government statement, it has not decided to proceed with that. There are a variety of recommendations in the——

Does the group think there is merit in amalgamation of those three regulators? Is there anybody else in the panel who might feel that there is?

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

Speaking as the representative of the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, I say that the immediate advantages of a merger between the energy and the communications regulator do not strike us as being immediately apparent. Obviously, it is an issue which in line with the report, we are prepared to look at. I was surprised to see it and it is not something that had struck us. It would not be first in our priorities.

Is it the electromagnetic spectrum?

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

There is much work to be done. The idea of merging, particularly in view of the state of development on the energy side and the amount of work done there, came as a surprise and it did not strike us as being immediately apparent. There would have been other candidates I presume well ahead of the energy communications area.

Certainly broadcasting and ComReg would seem to be very much suited to coming together.

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

There is a political discussion around those issues. My Minister has spoken on that matter. I would not like to add anything at this stage.

These are policy matters about which the representatives——

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

These are policy matters.

——can sometimes be constrained in talking. It is nice to have it discussed occasionally. What is the position so far as cost controls are concerned across the countries and across the spectrum?

Mr. Philip Kelly

On costs, many caveats were entered in the report by EIU for the reason that it was not always possible to find a regulator with exactly the same set of functions. In fact, it was very difficult to find a taxi regulator with a national remit. They are mostly regulators with local government authorities in other jurisdictions. Trying to find somebody with exactly the same remit was slightly difficult. Staying with that example, other taxi regulators regulate the quality but not the charges in some instances. Depending on the complexity of the task, how does one compare like with like? I give that as an example.

In other cases energy regulators do not have the functions that, say, our energy regulator might have in relation to offshore platforms, safety, the regulation of safety standards for gas fitters, electricians and so on. Our energy regulator has both macro and somewhat micro responsibilities. One is trying to discount in a cost comparison for differences in mandate. The EIU chose, because of those type of difficulties, a range of factors it might look at, such as regulatory income relative to the size of the market; the number of people employed in the regulator relative to the number of people employed in the regulated companies and so on. Across many of those measures the Irish regulators were either at or, in some cases, above their EU and OECD counterparts. That points potentially to either their being genuinely more costly or the issue of scale being important. In other words, there may be a certain quantum of economists and other technical people one requires if one is an aviation regulator and whether one has five airports or one airport in which to regulate the charges. The costs may not be linear in respect of either the size of the market or the size of the regulated companies. It points either to a non-EIU relationship or that in some cases legal costs were very substantial elements of the costs of some of the Irish regulations, in terms of defending challenges and so on.

There is sufficient concern that many of the regulators were at or slightly above their international comparators on so many measures that the issue of costs needs to be closely looked at. It was for that reason the Government decided that in every case Ministers should now have statutory responsibility to sign off on the budgets of regulators, even though many of them are funded by industry levies. The Government also decided that industry and consumer panels, where they exist, or where they are to be established by the national consumer authority, would have a role in scrutinising the annual budgets of regulators. It is difficult to put a precise estimate on any additional cost but the meters seem to tick on to being above average rather than below average cost on so many of the measures in respect of many of the bodies. It points one towards tight surveillance and some stronger mechanisms for cost control. I mentioned the surveillance through the approval of the Minister and panels. That is in part where the recommendation came for the adoption of shared service approaches by regulators so that they might minimise the administrative costs that each require. Obviously, in the case of the new national transport regulator that is a way of centralising a Minister's support across a range of existing transport activities.

My recollection is that the Health and Safety Authority on several measures was below its EU counterparts. While on some measures the taxi regulator was far in excess, on other measures, in terms of costs per licence issued, it was way below the average. Even in regard to any one regulator, depending on the measure one chose, one could get above and below average cost comparisons with international counterparts.

That is an appalling landscape, that across all the countries and right across the spectrum regulators were at or above the costs. I do not have a great fear of departmental overview of budgets or the consumer panel looking at budgets but surely stronger action can be taken in regard to the budgets of regulators to ensure they are most cost effective. Are most of these costs passed on to the industry that is being regulated? At present, we have the highest energy costs, the highest rates, the highest insurance and now the highest regulation costs. Given that the group comprises officials from various Departments, does it have any responsibility for developing recommendations to effectively cut these costs as well as ensuring that regulation is done effectively?

Mr. Philip Kelly

A point that the EIU made was that it was best to have the best regulatory outcomes and decisions rather than cheap regulatory administration and that a balance had to be achieved between the two. I do not know that we do not have a good regulatory system in the energy area, even if it costs the same or slightly more than in other jurisdictions. It may point to differences in earnings between many of the comparator countries and it may point to higher salary costs within some of the regulators.

The Deputy asked about the origin of funding for the regulators. My colleagues might correct me if I am wrong, but in most cases they are funded by industry levies and their income comprises income from licences and other concessions so that their income might be far above the actual expenditure.

The potential benefit of an industry panel examining the budget of its regulator lies in the fact that the panel is being levied to fund it. It has one of the strongest cases for policing and scrutinising what the regulator spends money on. The formal submission of annual budgets to the Minister for approval is another vehicle for the invigilation and interrogation of what the regulator is doing. The requirement for annual output statements from regulators will mean they have to link the money they spend with specific performance indicators. The use of money, as well as the level of money involved, will now be subject to greater scrutiny. The statutory obligation to produce annual output statements and public interest statements are part of the mechanism whereby Oireachtas committees such as this one can scrutinise and hold regulators to account.

I am not as up to date on some of these regulators as are other members of the committee. People in the communications business say it takes too long for regulations to come into being or be reviewed. Having strong regulators effectively means it takes more time to get things done because there are more people to examine things.

The review was necessary and has come up with a number of findings. It is scary and all of us, from civil servants to members of the committee, industry panels and consumer associations, must ensure we get much better value and effectiveness from regulators.

The Economist Intelligence Unit is not present but it did a very good job and the report is one to hold onto rather than throw out. The presentation stated there would be a national transport regulator and I agree with merging the CER and ComReg. However, while I can see the case for a super-regulator I do not see any case for combining energy and communications as it seems a random combination.

The possibility of merging ComReg with the broadcasting authority makes sense, particularly as television, broadband and communications are becoming the same thing. We rarely hear of Regtel, which regulates premium telephone lines, but there is a strong case for merging that body with ComReg and the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland. If those amalgamations are not to be carried out in the short term is there not a case for amalgamating all the back-office operations, such as HR and finance? If major savings are to be made it is in those functions, while the rest can be left separate. That makes more sense than a super-regulator although, on the face of it, that is an attractive concept. I did not come across any reference to such a possibility in the Government statement so Mr. Kelly might comment on the merger involving Regtel and ComReg.

The Government statement on the cost of regulators is quite weak, as is what Mr. Kelly has said. I do not get the impression it is either Government policy or the objective of the Civil Service to bring down the cost of the regulators. The average payroll costs in ComReg on the communications side alone rose from over €70,000 per person to over €89,000 in 2007. On the postal side the costs rose from €86,000 to €96,000. I am sure the figures have been affected by the pay cuts and the pension levy but they are way out of line with public and private sector norms. If I do not get re-elected to the Dáil I will not run for the Senate but will apply for a job in ComReg because it seems to be a very lucrative place to work.

I am a real sceptic on consumer panels. This may be a generalisation and not necessarily fair but consumer panels have tended to be made up of cranks who other people wanted to get rid of and morons from the Minister's constituency. I am concerned that these panels might not be in a position to do what they are supposed to do. I would much prefer public hearings and the report refers to the fact that a public hearing is held when energy or telecommunications prices are being set. Industry and consumer representatives can come in at that stage to argue for prices to be reduced or not increased and that would be better than seven or eight punters getting together in a hotel every couple of months to talk about how much stamps cost. We had such a system before and I do not see why we should go down that road again. I can see why it would be attractive to certain Ministers but it is not in the interests of consumers.

The costs of energy and telecommunications services are the most important issue. One of the most interesting things in the presentation are the graphs on page 97. From 1980 until 2002 energy prices were more or less in line with European norms but now they are 80% higher, even though they have come down slightly. That is a huge indictment of everything that has happened in this country. The telecommunications prices for the EU19 are shown on page 117 and we are in the upper half, at least as they relate to national residential and business services. One cannot drive prices down to nothing because there must be profits to drive investment but if I was in government, my priority would be to bring costs more or less into line with European averages over a number of years. That does not seem to be the objective in this case but it would be our number one objective. Why is it not the main objective of the Government and the Civil Service? The most important thing is to bring down the costs for consumers and business without undermining the infrastructure and capital base of the utilities in question.

Mr. Philip Kelly

The Deputy asked about Regtel and ComReg and legislation is before the Seanad on their amalgamation, although that does not address the idea of an amalgamation with BAI. I apologise if I gave the wrong impression over the issue of costs. It is a complex issue and we looked at the administrative costs of the regulators. The scrutiny of Ministers and the levy on industry to fund the regulator were designed to produce two new loci of invigilation of the costs on an annual basis. We also sought to make transparent what money was spent relative to the achievements as shown in output statements. The two measures were intended to provide a systematised approach to cost reduction.

There is a proposal in the Government statement that regulators should pursue shared back-office and administrative services. An issue to be borne in mind, unfortunately is that many of those services are outsourced so it is not as if they have a standing capacity which they could pool to achieve economies of scale. On foot of the Government statement calling for a network of regulators to be established, the regulators' group has been formed and has met. We have asked them to pursue opportunities both for administrative cost reduction and for sharing expertise and staff with each other.

I note the point the Deputy raised about panels. A great deal of complex regulatory determinations are advertised in draft form, calling for public submissions. Oftentimes it is only the regulated entities who respond, so there is a difficulty in getting citizen engagement with complex regulatory decisions, including the budgets of organisations. In part, that is the reason the Government suggested that the National Consumer Agency should be involved in the establishment of the panels, rather than the individual regulators appointing consumer panels. It is an attempt to strengthen the independence and objectivity of consumer panels. On the absolute level of costs, I note the comments about the energy area. I do not know if my colleagues wish to comment on it, but I recall that the EIU report states that 70% of the variation in energy costs is due to fuel mix. We do not have nuclear power that has a Government subvention and we have particular limitations in fuel mix and in how we generate energy. The EIU point to inefficiencies in the energy area and there have been some substantial improvements in energy costs even since the EIU finished its report in March 2009.

That is not to say there is no further work to be done. That almost points to the annual regulatory forum the Government has proposed whereby the Government sits down with the regulators as a group to try to look at concerted action across all regulators to address issues of competition and ultimately competitiveness. In the current climate, it is competition and cost competitiveness that is important. That first annual regulatory forum is being planned for the latter end of next month and it is intended to be a way of structuring dialogue with Government beyond what Deputy Ardagh referred to as the rather static mandates that are expressed in legislation, as the things that regulators should be concerned about. This is a more real time dialogue on economic priorities with the regulators as a group.

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

There is a great deal of interest on our side in shared services. As the person who holds the money in my Department, I know there are substantial potential savings to be made in internal costs. As my colleague, Mr. Kelly stated we are asking the regulators to come forward with proposals on what is possible on shared services. I take the point made on ComReg but when I worked on the telecom side 13 or 14 years ago, local players were in the majority but now with the liberalised market, the extent of the take-over by foreign players is remarkable. The job is substantial and it requires a certain capability. ComReg together with the energy regulator are charged under EU directives with doing a particular job and doing it independently. That said, we watch the costs and we intend to look at the figures very seriously, while respecting fully the right they have under EU regulation to do a job and to make independent decisions.

That allows Ministers to give policy directions. Certainly the Minister for Communications, Energy and Communications Deputy Eamon Ryan more or less did so on the energy front some months ago.

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

Absolutely, but those policy directions relate to general policy issues and they do not relate to the making of individual regulatory decisions. Decisions on licensing, on pricing and so on are made by individual regulators, but the Minister gives the general policy context. That has applied consistently since the time the concept of policy directions were introduced approximately seven years ago. I cannot remember off the top of my head a Minister making a policy recommendation which effectively would make individual regulatory decisions on behalf of the regulator.

If a Minister wanted to do something like that, could he not make a policy direction to the regulator asking him or her to come back within three to four months with a scheme to bring prices more into line with Eurozone norms?

Mr. Éamonn Molloy

It is eminently possible to look at setting out policy directions generally, and one of those would have to be in the area of competitiveness. One would expect that the regulatory forum that Mr. Kelly referred to will focus on issues of competitiveness and cost diversions where they happen. There is ongoing dialogue which allows for these issues to be raised with regulators and for regulators to be sensitised in these areas, as long as the political system is not making those individual decisions. However, the Deputy is correct, that it is a sensitivity, particularly now. There has been a great deal of work done particularly in terms of energy, where there have been price developments since the publication of this report. I am not arguing with the point the Deputy is making, but it must be done in a broader policy context.

Mr. John Murphy

On the question of costs, there are aspects of costs that we look at very closely, for example the staffing of the various regulators is subject to control just as staff numbers and grading in a Department is subject to control. The level of costs each regulator faces may not be entirely within his or her control. For example in the case of the aviation regulator, it makes a determination on airport charges every five years. It is then at the mercy of whether a review is required because of changes in the marketplace. That is an area that is particularly contentious because of the nature of the relationship between airlines and airports because each is working to different business planning horizons and so on. There are two consequences to that, one is a great deal more litigation than might otherwise be expected. Obviously, that will be reflected in costs to a certain extent. I am happy to say that CAR has been generally successful in litigation, if that is a performance measurement.

Does it recover its legal costs?

Mr. John Murphy

Where possible, yes.

Is that not strange? For example, the Commission on Aviation Regulation might sue the Dublin Aviation Authority or something like that. It is effectively one arm of Government suing another part of Government.

Mr. John Murphy

No, it has not been CAR, suing the DAA. Generally, there have been judicial reviews, not so much by State parties but by other parties. Another consequence of that kind of regulatory environment is that the regulator is forced to have a more complex economic regulation model over time to address several different concerns and to protect itself against the charge that it did not take X, Y or Z fully into account. If our policy goal was to have a lighter touch and a more strategic approach by regulators, one can only do that if one has the full co-operation of everybody affected by the regulator's decisions. Our experience over time with aviation regulation is that when the Act was originally passed, the intention was that there would be a highly strategic approach, the approach taken by the UK Civil Aviation Authority, which is the only direct comparator to CAR in Europe. However, it has not worked out that way because of the fairly contentious nature of the environment it is regulating.

In regard to the safety regulation costs, because the IAA was not directly covered in that study, the IAA safety regulation costs compare very favourably with those across Europe. They are frozen this year as against last year. We would have a strong interest in ensuring that remains the case. Apart from anything else, civil aviation is fairly mobile so people could choose to put their aircraft on another register. There is a significant interest in the aviation leasing industry. Many of those aircraft are maintained on the Irish register because that provides greater assurance to the leasing industry that the safety regulation will be well carried out by a reputable regulator. We have that interest in ensuring that costs are kept competitive.

Have the witnesses looked at the means by which litigation could be limited?

Mr. John Murphy

As one of the consequences of this review, the issue of what kind of appeals processes might be put in place was looked at. The view was taken that the most appropriate form of appeal is judicial review to the Commercial Court. That has proved to be most effective over time. We want to protect the principle of independent regulation where there is a sector with potential for monopoly-type abuse. If too many appeals processes are provided for, one risks the possibility of undermining that independent regulation.

Mr. Philip Kelly

A public consultation took place a couple of years ago on the appeals issue that fed into the considerations of the EIU. It considered whether the appeals mechanisms would be just a stage on the way to the court and whether it would prolong procedures. As Mr. Murphy has said, the litigation over the years has led to an elaboration of procedure by regulators to try to limit judicial review on the basis of flawed procedure. Everything gets published. All submissions they receive under a particular topic from all of the regulated companies are published. They give notice of their intent in many areas. When they finally publish a decision they often do so in a draft form, allowing further observations within a set period. To delimit challenge, one has to elaborate procedure and make everything transparent, which is costly in terms of time and procedure. If people are going to end up in the courts why put in the interstitial stop of the appeals mechanism? That was one of the factors considered.

There were some forms of appeals boards in place before. Have they gone?

Mr. Philip Kelly

There was one in place in the telecommunications area for about two years but it was abolished in favour of direct access to the courts. There are some ad hoc appeals mechanisms which are convened from time to time for particular purposes in the aviation regulation area. The number of appeals generally across the regulators has been low and falling over the years from the early heady days of telecommunications regulation when there were many appeals.

Is that as a result of the improved sophistication of the process? Mr. Kelly said earlier that everything is put on the Internet and all submissions are immediately published. Is that the reason the litigation has reduced?

Mr. Philip Kelly

I think——

So it is a cut off between the extra length of time it will take to make a regulation as against the potential for litigation.

Mr. Philip Kelly

It is a combination of that and an accretion of previous decisions in the area. People now understand the territory and what is likely to be successful at appeal and perhaps there are less big questions to be regulated on as time goes by.

Was there any draft of the report on the review of the regulatory environment in Ireland or was there just the finished document? If there are any drafts, could they be made available to the committee?

Mr. Philip Kelly

There were lots of papers produced by the EIU on an interim basis for discussion as they progressed. It would have had to produce documents in order to satisfy the completion of certain portions of the review. There is only the final report from the EIU and there are no interim drafts available.

Perhaps a copy of the papers that were circulated between the witnesses and the Economist Intelligence Unit could be forwarded to the committee?

Mr. Philip Kelly

I will have to check the answer to that question. I am not sure about that. It may be a matter on which we have to confer with the EIU.

Okay. It would be appreciated if the witnesses would revert back to us.

Mr. Philip Kelly

I thank the Chairman.

I thank Mr. Kelly and his colleagues for appearing before the committee.

The joint committee adjourned at 5.05 p.m. until 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 2 February 2010.
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