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JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS debate -
Wednesday, 2 Mar 2005

Constitutional Treaty: Presentation.

The first item on the agenda is a discussion with Professor Richard Sinnott. On behalf of the committee, I thank Professor Sinnott for taking the time to come here today. We have planned a number of meetings with regard to the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. We have had discussions with the Minister, and with Mr. Alan Dukes from the Institute of European Affairs. A number of members expressed the view that they would like to have an analysis of public opinion with regard to Irish attitudes towards the EU, and the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe in particular.

I would like a critical analysis of errors of past governments, and suggestions on what we need to do approaching the referendum in October. I would also like you to outline any ideas that you have on how things can be done better. You mentioned previously that it is not merely a question of giving information on Europe to people but also getting them to assimilate it. That would be very helpful. A number of us have just come from a meeting with French representatives. They are hopeful and confident that they will be successful and are putting much work into the referendum campaign in France. We shall see what happens. If you would like to make your presentation, I will then open it up to the floor for questions and reaction.

Professor Richard Sinnott

Thank you very much, Chairman. My presentation will be more of an elaboration on the nature of the problem rather than providing answers, but I will do my best to meet the requirements you have suggested. What I propose to do, with your permission, is to devote half my time to the presentation. The strength of what I say is in the evidence I have brought along. Then we can have a discussion.

Initially, I will put certain evidence before you. I apologise, the screen is small. This room is not ideal for a visual presentation of this sort. It may be an eye test for someone sitting in Deputy Quinn's chair. I will do my best.

I will start with something familiar to committee members, that is the comparison of Irish attitudes to EU membership to the European average. The European average is on the blue line in the graph. Attitudes in Ireland are very positive, and have been for a long time. The left-hand side of the graph describes the early 1980s. Ireland and Europe tracked in parallel but while a fall occurred in the European average in 1992 from which it did not recover, the Irish figure climbed. More recently, the Irish figure faltered on two occasions, in 2000 and 2001. The latest Eurobarometer data indicates that it has gone back up to 77%, a very high level of support for membership of the European Union in Ireland.

To assist those in the Visitors Gallery, could you colour-code the three charts you have?

Professor Sinnott

I apologise, I should have been more explicit. The two lines on the graph I am discussing now are the green and blue lines. I will discuss the yellow line in a moment. The green line is the Irish measure, and the blue line is the EU average of support for membership of the European Union. The yellow line is interesting. It is the belief, with regard to Ireland, that the country has benefited from membership of the European Union. The Irish people are not ungrateful. More than 80% of Irish people believe Ireland has benefited from EU membership. This is a stark comparison to the situation in the mid 1980s. The results of the six referenda we have had on European treaty changes, including the original accession referendum, provide harder data and evidence of people's attitudes to Europe. This is a way of portraying the results of the six referendums held in Ireland on European treaty changes, including the original accession referendum. The extent of opposition as a percentage of the entire electorate is visible at the bottom of the graph. Opposition has grown. Between 1973 and the Maastricht treaty it grew from 12% to 18%, as indicated by the red area on the graph. Opposition has remained more or less steady from that point on, only fluctuating by two or three percentage points, which is not dramatic. However, the extent to which the level of abstention has expanded and contracted in Ireland is dramatic, as indicated by the grey area on the graph. The blue section of the graph demonstrates that the collapse of the turnout in the first Nice referendum drove the "Yes" percentage below the "No" percentage and resulted in the enormous shock to the political system. The rates of abstention in the two most recent referendums were 66% in the first Nice referendum and 51% in the second. Society in general and the political system in particular, was right to congratulate itself on what it achieved in the second Nice referendum, but a cautionary note must be struck in that the turnout was only approximately 50%.

Why is there a very high level of Irish support for European integration and at the same a tentativeness and a lower level of support when it comes to actual referendums? Why does the very high level of general support not translate into "Yes" votes? There are a number of factors involved here. The column on the left of the graph indicates that 80% of Irish people have a very high sense of attachment to their country, compared with only 56% in the European Union. This is confirmed when one examines pride in national identity, with 78% of Irish people professing such pride, compared to 45% of Europeans. That is part of the cultural background against which European referendums are considered and fought. I am not saying that pride in national identity is incompatible with favourable attitudes to European integration or voting "Yes" in the referendums, because that is obviously not the case. However, it is a factor that sensitises Irish people to European integration issues and makes them more hesitant about translating their overall approval into "Yes" votes in referendums.

I should perhaps clarify that I am drawing on Eurobarometer data in this discussion. The Eurobarometer is a survey conducted on a regular basis by the European Commission.

People have certain fears associated with European integration. One fear shared generally in Ireland and Europe, is that jobs will transfer to other member countries that have lower production costs. Ireland, for the most part, tends to have lower fears than other European countries. However, Irish people are specifically concerned with drug trafficking, loss of national identity and culture, loss of power for smaller member states and loss of the Irish language. There are certain aspects of national identity that trigger a concern among Irish people. This does not automatically translate into "No" votes, but it is a concern that is part of the political culture of European integration in Ireland, which must be taken into account in any attempt to persuade Irish citizens to vote in a particular way in a referendum.

The Eurobarometer data make it clear that economic concerns are not negatively affecting Ireland's support for EU treaties. The right hand side of the chart indicates that Irish people are substantially less likely to fear an economic crisis as a result of involvement in the EU than other Europeans. Likewise, as is clear from the columns in the centre of the chart, Irish people are much less likely to fear additional difficulties for farmers as a result of involvement with the European Union.

On a point of clarification, does the maroon bar on the graph represent the European average?

Professor Sinnott

Yes. The maroon is the EU 25 average. The light blue section of the graph refers to Ireland.

Thank you.

Professor Sinnott

On the policy areas of immigration, accepting refugees and defence, Irish people have a much greater unwillingness to allow such issues to be decided at European level. The bars on the graph represent the Irish and the European averages. A number of other issues are also relevant here, including the fight against drugs, the fight against organised crime and juvenile crime prevention. The data indicates that there are very specific areas where Irish people have reservations about the transfer of power to Brussels. This needs to be addressed by proponents of a "Yes" vote in order to bring the people with them.

So far I have been dealing with people's feelings and attitudes towards various aspects of European integration. However, a fundamental aspect of political culture that is particularly important in countries that hold referendums on European issues, is knowledge. On the knowledge scale graph, where Ireland is blue and the EU 25 maroon, there are two issues marked, both relating to European Parliament elections. The Irish level of knowledge here is above average. However, on the other items on the knowledge scale graph, the Irish are either only at the European average or are significantly below it. For example, only 49% of Irish people gave the correct answer when asked whether it was true or false that the citizens of the EU directly elect the President of the European Commission. This is worth dwelling on because the data was collected in October and November of 2004. In May and June of the same year, a major political debate was ensuing and considerable media attention was given to the issue of whether the Taoiseach might be transferred to Brussels and become President of the European Commission. Despite the debate and media coverage, only half of the Irish people retained the information that the position of President of the Commission is not an elected one.

I think that illustrates a disjuncture between the information that political elites share — the media they read and the attention they give to politics — and the attention that a large segment of the population gives to politics. That particularly applies to European politics but also to politics in general, as I am sure active politicians such as those in attendance today will be aware.

I will now discuss the findings of the most recent poll in this area. Each column represents an EU member state, with succinct abbreviations because it is difficult to fit the names of all 25 member states on a graph. In the Irish case, it is slightly shocking that 28% of people approve of the draft constitution, 5% are opposed but 67% have not made a decision. This reflects the implications of the problem of low levels of knowledge. We will not digress by examining findings in some other member states. In charts displaying the 25 EU member states, Ireland is usually placed alongside countries with favourable attitudes, if that is being measured. However, in this case it is on the other side of the chart alongside the United Kingdom, Sweden, Cyprus, Malta and Estonia. It is not there because of the high levels of opposition in some of the other countries mentioned but because of very high levels of uncertainty.

I now turn to a second set of data on aspects of knowledge, consisting of a quiz that made a series of true or false statements about propositions or elements of the treaty. The results should not be taken literally but as an indication of the extent of people's knowledge of the treaty. I have circled the main contrasts between the Irish figure and the EU average. It is apparent that there is a very substantial discrepancy in the answers to fundamental propositions. On the proposition that national citizenship will disappear, there is a 20% gap between the proportions of European citizens and Irish citizens who answered correctly, which is not a creditable reflection on Irish citizens. Each of the propositions I have circled illustrates the same issue. We have a society with very high levels of approval but distinctly lower than average levels of general knowledge and understanding of the treaty.

This must be qualified by a recognition that a campaign has not yet started. To the best of my knowledge the date for the referendum has not been decided. The chart reveals, however, that when the referendum campaign begins, people will have a very low level of knowledge. As our first referendum on the Nice treaty demonstrated, the major factor in abstentions and in votes against ratifying the treaty was the belief that voters were not adequately informed about the issues.

I have used two surveys to illustrate the relationship between knowledge and attitudes — Eurobarometer 62, which was completed in October and November of last year, and Eurobarometer 62.1, completed in November which contained the specific questions on the constitution. What is striking about the sets of data from the former is the extent to which favourable attitudes towards the EU constitution depend on people's levels of knowledge.

The latter survey illustrates the same pattern in knowledge of the constitution. As knowledge increases favourable attitudes increase, occuring mainly at the expense of the undecideds. It is interesting that opposition also rises alongside increasing levels of knowledge, reflecting that significant numbers in society are very knowledgeable about the EU while opposing it. I am not suggesting that knowledge is the central factor or that, as some people say about the EU, to know it is to love it. That is not necessarily the case in Irish or any other public opinion. However, it is clear that as knowledge increases so does support for the EU in general and support for the treaty. That effect of knowledge on support is substantial, although it might also be said that knowledge increases because of support. Policy-makers and politicians must acknowledge these effects. It is necessary to increase people's knowledge as well as persuade them to vote for or against the treaty.

It is striking that the relationship is similar in these two different measures of knowledge. The demographic of knowledge is another important aspect. Finally to illustrate my point about low levels of knowledge, as the numbers of correct answers to questions on the European constitution increased, the proportion opposed to the constitution saw a corresponding increase. From a "Yes" point of view, knowledge is not an absolute panacea but if one examines the strength of the relationship in the previous one, the degree to which support increases is greater than the degree to which opposition increases as people become more informed. I might stop at this point. I have another of this type of chart which shows the demographic breakdown of knowledge but——

We can come back to that. Members may have questions about the presentation, and I will start that process.

The presentation is fairly easy to understand. Most members would probably agree that one of the reasons the Nice referendum failed — I certainly got this reaction — was that people did not have enough information to vote for it. Does Professor Sinnott have any idea how we can raise the level of knowledge with the electorate? Senator Ormonde made a good point some weeks ago when we had one of these hearings. She said there is little point in putting a booklet through every letter-box, and I agree that is a futile exercise to a great extent. Are there ways with which Professor Sinnott would recommend the Government should proceed that it has not previously tried?

Professor Sinnott

That is what I had in mind when I said I might be more able to explain the nature of the problem than provide the answers. The Chairman is right. The evidence from the first Nice treaty referendum is clear, which is that lack of knowledge about it had a fundamental effect on people's behaviour. In terms of how we can increase people's level of knowledge, I am inclined to think we should put leaflets and explanatory material in the letter-boxes, in part because if that is not done, people will accuse us of not bothering to tell them what it is about.

Senator Ormonde's point was that we cannot just do that, and I agree with her.

Professor Sinnott

That is right. Political science does not have clear answers to this problem but in so far as it has answers as to how we increase levels of knowledge and get people to behave in a particular way, whether it is to vote for a party or a particular issue in a referendum, it is through engagement through debate and the important debate is the debate among public figures people know and either trust or mistrust as the case may be, depending on what side of the political spectrum they are on.

My reading of the evidence and the interpretation of that evidence is that debate cannot be conducted in a kind of neutral anodyne fashion. One of the problems that arose in the recent series of Irish referendums was that the role given to the Referendum Commission was over ambitious. The result of asking the Referendum Commission to give arguments for and against was a debate that was not engaging and that in a sense was no different from an information leaflet. It may even have been more confusing than an information leaflet because an information leaflet is just an explanation whereas the point about the equality of the "Yes" and "No" statements was a confusing factor for many people, and there is some evidence of that in the surveys done after those two referendums.

To come back the basic question, my belief is that ways have to be found to engage the public through public debate and a substantial part of that public debate is debate in which public representatives are the crucial players and are ultimately responsible.

Professor Sinnott said the challenge is to increase people's knowledge of the treaty but how do we get people interested? As Professor Sinnott said, we can put a booklet through every door but it will be fodder for the stove. We can also engage people in public debate with public figures but that would be a turn-off for the public. I travelled throughout the country in the last referendum campaign and only 25 people showed up one night in Tralee who were there mainly to engage us in a neutrality discussion because that issue had arisen. If the debate centres on people's fears about immigration, erosion of our neutrality and so on, there is a danger that the debate on the structures of the Union will be put aside.

The media has a role in projecting a balanced approach to the debate. One of the dangers in the debate on our forthcoming referendum is that if we do not decide on a date sooner rather than later, we will run into the period after the British general election, the British debate will commence and the people who have the least knowledge who read the British tabloids and watch the tabloid-type Sky News will form their opinions from the British media about British issues rather than issues affecting Ireland. The major challenge for us is to decide the legislation, publish it and decide on a date for the referendum because that will concentrate minds on the important issues and we will not be influenced by Sky News and The Mirror type newspapers. We will have a debate on the issues affecting Ireland. Our challenge is to get people to expand their knowledge of the Union but how do we get their interest? They will not expand their knowledge unless they have an interest in the broader issues rather than the keen political issues that may be put forward by marginal groups and play on people’s fears.

Professor Sinnott

I have made a note of several of the interesting points the Deputy made. There is a real problem with meetings. If we ask in a survey if people turn up to meetings, either in an election, a referendum campaign or at any stage, we find that the numbers who do so are tiny — 2% or 3%. They are overwhelmingly likely to vote but the problem is the way they will vote will probably not be a function of what is said at the meeting because they are the people who have strong convictions.

The media undoubtedly play an extremely important role. One of the striking aspects about the public opinion evidence that was collected after the first and second Nice referendums is that people gave a much more positive evaluation of what they had learned from the media in those referendums. They expressed an appreciation of the greater utility of the media in the second referendum. That may partly have been an extra effort by the media but I suspect it was the media reporting on the higher level of activity and effort both by politicians and political groups outside the representative process in that there was much more to talk about in the media and therefore the public learned more and were willing to say after the referendum that they had learned much more.

That is not an answer to the Deputy's fundamental question because I do not have an answer on how we can interest people but the lessons of the first and second Nice referendums have still to be distilled. The members will know better than I do what was different about the campaigning in the first and second Nice referendums. Looking at it from a public opinion perspective, people learned much more from the process in the first Nice referendum than they did in the second. It is difficult to determine what the factors are but people are looking in the right direction when they say that interest must come before knowledge.

You are saying, in effect, that it is entirely in our hands and the activity levels we produce might spur the media to give a greater level of coverage to a constitutional referendum.

Professor Sinnott

Yes, definitely.

I thank the professor for his presentation and the accompanying documentation. I get the impression, on the basis of what the professor has presented and the research that informs it, that the more information people have and comprehend, the more they will participate in the activity of voting. Is that a fair assessment?

Professor Sinnott

It is a fair assessment.

The professor has indicated in one of the charts that the better informed people are, the higher their participation rates. The progression in favour of the "Yes" vote with more information seems to be higher in exponential terms than that of "No". However, that is a subjective evaluation. Nevertheless, the graph goes in the same direction for both constituencies. The more the "Yes" and "No" constituencies knew about the facts or felt well informed about the issues, the more they turned out and voted.

What is the role of the commission? It is likely the Referendum Commission will be established before the summer recess. In the past we have said that the commission should present both sides of the argument in the classic, legal sense of an adversarial set of arguments in favour and against and a rebuttal of both. That is classic court-room style intellectual engagement. However, the gladiators in such contests know the rules. Somebody who is advocating in an adversarial manner the best legal case for their client or position is not necessarily putting all the facts on the table but using the best facts available to reinforce their argument. Does the adversarial method, if I can use that as shorthand, confuse or inform people?

People were told that if they voted for the Nice treaty, we would be swamped by immigrants, lose our neutrality and our children would be conscripted into a European army. That is what we saw on the posters on lamp posts. These arguments were then written down formally on one side of the paper and rebutted on the other side. However, people I encountered on the canvass said: "I saw it in the paper; the commission said that if I voted for Nice, my children would be conscripted, so it must be true." That is because it was presented in a written objective format.

Is there a message, based on this research, that the role of the commission should be like that of the National Forum on Europe? It is rated highest, according to page 28 of the briefing document, and is seen as the most credible and effective communicator of information, which will be a pleasant surprise to the forum. Should the commission be charged not with adversarial arguments for and against the proposition, which is what we and others should do, but to intensify, make more accessible and improve the perception of information? Would that be a fair conclusion to draw from the data and research?

Professor Sinnott

It would. The evidence is fairly specific on that. In the second Nice referendum, if I understand the situation correctly, the terms of reference of the commission had been altered to move away from the equal statement of a series of ten points for "Yes" and a series of ten points for "No". Interestingly, the evaluation of the role of the commission by the public was more positive in the second referendum. That might have been partly due to an overall feel good factor about the referendum but it did not apply to all forms of campaigning in the two referenda.

It bears out the point that the relationship to the direction of what people say in a campaign must be identifiable with that person. The Deputy gave the example of the adversarial procedure in a court room where the views are not identified with the individual but are putting the best set of arguments on each side. If one attributes both sets of views to a Government commission, there is a real danger, as the Deputy said, of even the partly well informed public saying: "I read it in an official document." The evidence is quite conclusive that the appropriate role for the Referendum Commission is explanation rather than balanced advocacy.

I carefully read the information about the two Nice referenda and the various factors that influenced people in changing their vote. In some ways it was quite a depressing presentation. The professor can correct me if I am wrong but my interpretation of it was that, subjectively, a significant number of people thought they knew more at the second referendum. It was not a huge number but enough to make a difference.

However, there was objective evidence that they did not know a great deal more and that the forum, the changes that were made and the Seville declaration had not had an impact on a huge number of people. The conclusion I was inclined to draw was that because there was more adversarial debate on television and radio, in particular, and to some extent in the newspapers, it engaged enough people, although still less than 50%, who were willing to give vent to their basic prejudices, which have historically been essentially pro-European integration. That is all well and good; there is nothing negative in it if one has a pro-European perspective.

However, as somebody who comes from that perspective, I am concerned that the numbers Professor Sinnott has shown appear to suggest a significant erosion in the pro-European prejudices of the Irish people, certainly where support for the constitution is concerned. I support the constitution but I am not sure that even just engaging people and getting them out to vote will necessarily guarantee that they will vote "Yes". Do the numbers presented to the committee by the professor suggest a significant shift in the historical support Irish people have given to the basic idea of European integration?

Professor Sinnott

If the question focuses on a general approval or a generally positive approach to the question of membership or of European integration, there is no evidence of an erosion. In comparison with Europe, where there is definite evidence of an erosion of 15% to 20% over the 1990s, Ireland has remained the same. The basic instincts of Irish people towards European integration are favourable.

With regard to the point made by the Senator about what precisely caused people to vote in greater numbers for the Nice treaty the second time, there is interesting detailed evidence of the issues that worked and did not work. By and large, the evidence is that what the Government thought beforehand would be crucial turned out not to be so. People did not change their minds because of a rational deliberation, at time A, that they did not like the treaty and, at time B, that there were certain improvements in Ireland's procedures or whatever and they now liked it.

The Senator has put his finger on it. It is a more generalised process, not a rational, deliberative process. A referendum does not approximate to a committee meeting that debates detail and makes up its mind rationally. It is a much more mysterious process but it also focuses much more on generalities. Apart from the Irish evidence, the evidence of political persuasion generally in other countries is that people use what are called cues or signals to help them make up their minds when they are aware that their level of information is not sufficient to guide them. By cues I mean if their political party takes a strong position and they feel a sense of attachment to that particular party.

One must remember that the level of attachment to parties has been declining in Ireland in the last 20 years. Therefore, the beneficial effect — looking at it from a "Yes" point of view — of party leadership is probably less now than it would have been in the 1980s. Another cue is political leadership and individual political leaders who adopt positions and are respected by people for things they stand for or things they have done. There is also, of course, a negative effect in that one may vote for the treaty because a politician or political leader one does not like is arguing for a "No" vote.

The terms of debate in a referendum are not rational, deliberative democracy in action. It is a much looser process but one which can either be less well informed, as in the first Nice referendum, or better informed, as in the second referendum. I accept the point, however, that the basic measure of knowledge in those two referenda was subjective knowledge. Did people feel better informed? As is often said in debates like this, what matters in politics is how people feel on the day — well informed or not.

I welcome Professor Sinnott and I have found the discussion stimulating. The first thing that struck me was attitude versus knowledge. He spoke about interest before knowledge but I could not get my head around that. Which comes first? Must I have knowledge to make me interested, or must I be interested in order to gain knowledge? I got bogged down in that. I then envisaged myself trying to engage in a debate on the referendum at 7.30 p.m. in the commuter belt, with children roaring and dinner under way. Here I am just about to tackle this whole issue but it is not possible because people's way of life has stultified debate. We must keep it so simple.

What was the difference between the first and second Nice referenda? In the first, the public reacted against us because we had taken them for granted. In the second referendum they got a jolt and did not want to be on an isolated island away from mainland Europe. That stimulated the view that people wanted to be part of Europe and that is why the "Yes" vote shot up the second time. I would like to hear Professor Sinnott's views on that.

We can debate this ad infinitum but how do we connect with the public? That is the big issue. As knowledge increases, does the “No” support increase as well?

Professor Sinnott

Yes.

That is interesting because I would have thought the "No" people were so entrenched that nothing would shift them. The issues that bring out the real "No" people are defence ones rather than softer issues such as immigration policy and accepting refugees. We can overcome them but people become more entrenched about defence issues. I cannot imagine us ever shifting them because that is the way they are. There is that fear and I would like to hear Professor Sinnott's views on it.

Professor Sinnott

I want to clarify the last point which is somewhat technical. The increasing level of opposition with increasing levels of knowledge simply reflect the fact that some people who are opposed to treaty changes are very well informed. They may acquire their information because they have a prior position. That may well be the case. It is not so much that people change their position with levels of knowledge, it is that people with low levels of knowledge tend to have low levels either of support or opposition, while people with high levels of knowledge tend to be either supportive or opposed, but are more likely to be supportive than opposed.

I will comment briefly on the Senator's other four points. She put her finger on a conundrum — there is no way of teasing out the relationship between interest and knowledge. It is probably easy for an academic to say it is dialectical; one gets a bit of interest and acquires some knowledge, which leads to a greater degree of interest, but that is only a formula. It is a fundamental issue, however, that if people are not interested one can push as much information as one likes at them but nothing will happen.

The Senator spoke of her experience of door-to-door canvassing. That is a little bit like the issue to which the Chairman referred in his opening remarks, namely, that door-to-door canvassing in a referendum is probably not effective in changing people's views. My experience of being canvassed door to door is that it is a pretty fleeting experience. However, it is so embedded in the Irish political culture that unless one does it, people say, "They did not come around to inform us." I suspect that door-to-door canvassing is not an efficient use of resources, with the caveat that if one does not do it, one may risk a considerable backlash or alienation of one's constituency and voters.

The Senator made a very interesting point about the electorate getting a jolt in the transition period between the first and second Nice referenda. What we witnessed in those two referenda was a collective learning experience. People approached the second referendum differently precisely because there had been a "No" majority in the first one. A significant number of people said that was not really what they meant, or that is not what we meant collectively. That learning carries over. I suspect that part of the 67% "Don't know" in the Eurobarometer opinion poll I quoted earlier is a function of the fact that significant numbers of people recall the Nice referenda and decide that having voted "No" and then decided to vote "Yes" they had better think hard about this one. The context in which Irish referenda occur has been significantly changed by the collective experience of having turned it down on one occasion.

Does Professor Sinnott think that canvassing in by-elections is an efficient use of resources?

Professor Sinnott

No.

I want to revert to the question posed by Senators McDowell and Ormonde concerning the knowledge and advocacy aspects. To what extent would it be fair to say the increase in support and turnout for the second Nice referendum was as much or more to do with advocacy as it was to do with knowledge? It may not necessarily have been the case that there was an increase in knowledge but that there was an increase in advocacy.

Professor Sinnott made the point about the cues. If people and organisations of the stature of Dr. Garrett FitzGerald or Brigid Laffan or IBEC say they think it is a good idea, people then form opinions, although they may not have a great deal of knowledge. However, one would hope advocacy brings a certain knowledge. I will give an example in regard to the defence issue. Some people said their child would have to serve in a European army and it did not matter what one said about the Petersberg tasks, the triple lock and so on. That idea became ingrained in some people's minds. Even with a lot of knowledge, I doubt if they would have changed their minds.

To what extent can one distil these things into the very large issues and to raise it almost to a visionary exercise, that Europe has given us peace since the Second World War, that Schuman and Spaak and so on constructed this edifice and that it would be unthinkable that it should be destroyed? Is there any legitimacy or does that have an influence?

Professor Sinnott's point about 49% of people believing the European Commission President is elected by direct election is, to some extent, encouraging in that if one asked many Irish people who is the Minister for X or who is their Deputy, there might be an even lower level of awareness.

Or who is their Senator.

Particularly who their Senator is. I am not so sure it is a bad figure. Professor Sinnott seemed to imply it was.

To what extent can one ring-fence the whole referendum debate? It could boil down to support for, or opposition to, the Government or to some extraneous matter which could dominate the debate. Is it possible to ring-fence the central issue from all those other extraneous issues impinging on it?

Professor Sinnott

That is another series of questions which, with the Chairman's indulgence, I will deal with briefly. On canvassing in the Meath or the North Kildare by-elections, I would say "Omit to do it at your peril". That would be a classic case of people saying they did not come to ask us for our vote.

The question the Senator raised about advocacy was an interesting one and it relates to this question of the relationship between people's interest or engagement and their level of knowledge. The Senator also picked up on a very important point about cues. Advocacy provides people with cues. Cues are informational shortcuts and, therefore, one does not need all the detail in the treaty. At the end of the day, one will feel better informed simply because one feels more confident in one's decision since sources, individuals or organisations which one respects have taken a position. One is then happier about one's decision and is more likely to say, "Yes, I feel reasonably well informed about these issues."

The whole point about information is that it is not discrete bits of information which then reach a certain level. It is very much a psychological and subjective thing and it is much more complicated than a mechanistic notion of simply increasing people's level of knowledge. That is why it may be necessary to provide all these brochures but they will not achieve the end result. The end result will be achieved by political leadership, whether that political leadership comes from representative politicians or from political leaders and public leaders in a broader sense.

On the big issues of European integration, as the Senator described them, it is a very difficult question to answer. Let me give one snippet of evidence. Questions along those lines were put in a Eurobarometer poll five or six years ago — around the time the debate on enlargement was increasing. My memory is that Ireland had one of the lowest levels of endorsement of a series of statements, such as "The European Union is a good thing because it has ended conflict on the European continent" or such general propositions which make up our interpretation of the origins and ultimate purposes of the European unification. Irish people, because their experience of those 50 years since the Second World War has been so different for so long, are actually less persuaded by, although I think basically less informed about, that particular aspect of the significance of European unification. One reading of that is that they are there to be persuaded and maybe the argument should be made more explicit.

On the question of confidence in Government, there is a major debate among academics and political scientists about the influence of confidence in Government on the outcome of referendums of this sort. A couple of my colleagues and I are about to publish a paper in which we prove, in relation to the two Nice referendums, that confidence in Government did not play a role in either of those referendums. In one sense, it is obvious that it did not because, as I recall, by the time of the second Nice referendum, confidence in the incumbent Government had gone way down but the vote went up. Our article claims the argument is a bit more complicated than that but it is a major source of debate. The less campaigning there is, the more likely the outcome is to be influenced by confidence in Government. In the absence of other cues, people may say they like or they do not like the people putting this forward and vote accordingly but that is in the absence of campaigning.

Listening to the last part of Professor Sinnott's response, I wonder if the Government should deliberately slump in the polls in order to guarantee the success of the referendum. The political scene in the referendum may be that all the political parties support it. The Green Party may come down on that side. If it does not, it might be seen as a half-hearted opposition to the referendum. I think Sinn Féin is against it on the basis of militarisation and such issues. That is the possible political scene. Perhaps the Government is on a slightly upward swing. In that context, there is a strong risk of a low turnout.

Taking up what Deputy Quinn said about the Referendum Commission, I think putting forward two arguments is nonsense and confusing and against all the traditions of Irish politics and the way we discuss matters. Does Professor Sinnott agree that the Referendum Commission should inform people, let them know where the constitution can be obtained and read, provide them with summaries through the door and, in the few weeks of the campaign, encourage turnout and that the commission should not get involved in the pros and cons because it is utterly confusing for people?

Professor Sinnott

I think the Deputy is right on the first point he makes which is the danger of a low turnout. I would add to that the danger of differential turnout. If one takes it that the balance of opinion is at least two thirds to one third in favour of treaty ratification, European integration or whatever, there is the problem of a differential intensity. The one third are more likely to feel intense about their views and, therefore, are more likely to turn out to vote. The two thirds majority are not an intense majority. In politics, it is usually minorities which feel intensely about issues. The two thirds who will vote "Yes" are less intense. If turnout falls off, they are likely to fall off or to stay at home, leading to a much closer contest. I agree that the original task given to the Referendum Commission — I do not intend this as a criticism of the commission — in respect of the McKenna judgment was impossible or, more accurately, counter-productive. The more limited task given to it in respect of the second referendum on the Nice treaty was more realistic and ultimately more productive.

I wish to play devil's advocate in respect of that matter. I understand the point made by Professor Sinnott and Deputy Quinn. The Referendum Commission may have played a role in the Nice referenda but the greater issue is knowledge. I am concerned that if we begin tinkering with the role of the Referendum Commission, people will state that it is an attempt to halt any real discussion about the treaty on the constitution. I do not believe it was the major factor in terms of why the first referendum on Nice was lost. The greater issue was that people felt they had not been well enough informed. There would be danger in changing the role of the commission at this point.

People in general are apathetic towards European politics. However, I am also of the opinion that the "No" campaign is much more adept at generating discussion. It does so by raising people's fears. Having done so, it gets it spokespersons into the spotlight more quickly than the "Yes" campaign. These people are usually much better able to get their point across. In the first and second referendums on Nice, the Government and the Opposition parties in favour of a "Yes" vote did not have spokespersons capable of effectively arguing against their counterparts in the "No" campaign. Legitimate fears were created and not properly addressed. We must decide what we intend to do to address that problem on this occasion.

Has research been carried out which would indicate whether a short or a long campaign is better? Do people become fed up if the campaign lasts three months? Is it better to restrict it to an intense, six-week campaign? If the media identify a matter to which the public is reacting, it will obviously remain high on the agenda. It is important, therefore, to ensure that we have spokespersons who can address the issues.

Professor Sinnott

I do not believe that such research has been carried out. The Deputy's question is extremely interesting and it could form the basis of a good MA thesis. One could envisage measuring the outcome of referendums in a series of countries, measuring the length of the campaigns and identifying the relationship between the two.

In the Irish context and in light of the first and second referendums on Nice, the danger of a short campaign would be that the public would say the Government was trying to rush it through. Due to the fact that so much of the impact of lack of knowledge relates to a feeling thereof, one will be in big trouble if the first three weeks of a six-week campaign do not go well. The safer bet, in the Irish context, is probably a long, slow march.

This will probably be one of the longest constitutional referendum campaigns because it has already been in train for two years. The difficulty is that public opinion in respect of it has not been stimulated. Politicians have to a degree been engaging in debate on it, in the House and elsewhere.

My question relates to the analysis of whether there was a switch between "Yes" and "No" votes and vice versa. Was such an analysis carried out? Am I correct in stating that in the second referendum on the Nice treaty, one of the deciding factors was the greater co-ordination of the “Yes” side and the fact that there was a more pronounced divergence on the “No” side? In that referendum there was a greater focus and urgency among those on the “Yes” side, whereas the “No” campaign, of which I was a member, was not motivated and there was a pronounced split.

In the previous survey on the first referendum on Nice, Professor Sinnott carried out some research in respect of those who did not vote which indicated that if they had voted, more of them would have voted "No". One of the problems for the "No" campaign was that it did not manage to stimulate the "Don't knows" to vote, whereas the "Yes" side succeeded in doing so. The "No" vote remained constant between the two referenda. All the "No" side managed to do was confirm its vote, including those who were not sure on the first occasion. It did not win any new converts, whereas the "Yes" side did.

Professor Sinnott

The Deputy is correct that, when pressed afterward, a substantial majority of those who said they did not know how they would have voted in the first referendum on Nice indicated that they would have voted "No". However, the greatest majority of the non-voters still stated that they did not know. It is a complex situation. If one focuses on those who gave an opinion, a majority of two thirds indicated that they would have voted "No". If one considers the entire picture, however, the outcome is much more nuanced. It is tempting to state, when looking at the chart, that it was a simple story, namely, that a certain number of people who remained home in the first referendum voted in the second, while the other proportion remained the same and that one of the numbers grew substantially. However, that would be an oversimplification.

The Deputy's second question related to switching between the two referendums. It is difficult to obtain precise estimates in respect of such switching because of the nature of the data involved. We would have had to carry out a panel survey and interviewed the same people after both referenda because we would then have been in a position to know how they acted in each. The evidence indicates that there were people who switched from "Yes" to "No" in the second referendum. In that context, therefore, the situation is not as black and white as the chart suggests and it would be a mistake to make inferences from that kind of data.

The Deputy's other point related to the co-ordination of the second referendum campaign. I am also of the impression that whereas the edge was with the "No" campaign in the first referendum, the momentum swung towards the "Yes" campaign in the second. We now face a third referendum. From the point of view of the problem the committee has been addressing here, the scene may be well set for a debate and a referendum campaign that will be quite vigorous. Both sides will be aware of what they did or failed to do in the two referenda on Nice and will, I presume, act on what they have learnt. There may be a more vigorous campaign and a higher turnout but that depends on how involved politicians, political parties and civic society, which comprises other groups and campaigners, become. Ultimately, the message from our studies is that it depends on that.

Does Professor Sinnott accept the referendum will represent a consolidation of treaties, unlike those on the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties under which decisions were taken that affected us substantially, and therefore it should be more acceptable to people?

Deputy Quinn referred to the Referendum Commission. It has terms of reference but some of the information produced by the commission to justify its existence during past campaigns was off the wall and totally irrelevant. People were confused. Should the commission's terms of reference be examined?

Professor Sinnott

I concur with the Deputy on that issue, despite the devil's advocacy by the Chairman, given the risks of putting down in black and white statements that push the limits of logic because another few are needed to achieve numerical balance. A substantial segment of the population is not attuned to politics and political scientists as well as politicians and journalists need to keep reminding themselves of this. This is not a high priority for a large segment of the population but if they see grey faces passing across their screens, each making opposing comments to achieve the balance required by the original terms of reference for the Referendum Commission, the danger is they will say that it was said by the Referendum Commission in a television advertisement. They remember the striking advertisement and act accordingly.

I am not an expert on the EU constitution. The Deputy is correct that it is a matter of consolidation and simplification. Interestingly, one of the motivations was to make it more transparent, accessible and understandable by the public. That is one of the arguments made by the "Yes" campaign as they point out that nothing enormously drastic is happening in this case.

One of the most significant issues emerging from this meeting is members' attitudes towards the Referendum Commission. However, limiting the commission's role would be a bad way to start the campaign. One of the issues that emerged following the defeat of the first referendum on the Nice treaty was that people felt their vote was taken for granted and that they did not have enough knowledge. The commission is not the most significant issue as far as the constitutional treaty is concerned. People did not have enough knowledge the last time. To focus attention on limiting the commission would not be a good way to start the campaign. I acknowledge the issue raised but there is a danger that people could use that to put a question mark over the constitutional treaty.

I acknowledge the Chairman is playing devil's advocate and is providing balance. Professor Sinnott has more research that he was not able to present and it is difficult to access the data because of the amount involved. However, whether one is on the "No" or "Yes" side, the conclusion I draw from his comments is that the more information one has, the more likely one is to vote.

Professor Sinnott

The evidence on that is clear.

This is scientific data similar to opinion polls and it is used to reach fair, objective conclusions. It should be conveyed to the Government, which decides the terms of reference of the commission with the consent of the Oireachtas. We are more knowledgeable about referenda and we have always urged the need for a commission to ensure increased democratic participation. Objective scientific research suggests the presentation of information enhances participation without prejudice to either side of the debate. Our collective political experience was that the adversarial nature of commission information confused rather than informed people and, consequently, they were less likely to vote or did not vote in an informed way.

I am sorry Professor Sinnott cannot complete his presentation but he will have had a flavour of how interested members are in the constitutional treaty. We plan to extend the hearings for as long as is necessary and to ensure information is being disseminated to the public. The committee invited the Minister for Defence to appear at his convenience to answer questions on issues such as militarisation. This process will continue and we appreciate Professor Sinnott's appearance.

Professor Sinnott

I thank the committee. We are working on a basic presentation of the socio-demographic contrasts for the forum. If there had been more time, that would have come out but it may help the committee.

Sitting suspended at 3.55 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.
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