I thank the joint committee for inviting me and giving of its precious time to discuss this issue. I represent the organisation Breaking the Silence and thank Christian Aid and Trócaire for arranging this meeting and their support on the tour and back home.
I served in the Israeli army for five years until 2003. I spent three of those years as an officer in the Palestinian territories, including Gaza and the West Bank. I joined Breaking the Silence in 2004. For the past seven years we have been collecting testimonies from comrades and soldiers who served in almost all of the units of the army which control Palestinian civil society. We have released several reports so far, but this is the first time we have added a short analysis of the testimonies which are included in the book, copies of which I am presenting to the committee. It is more than 450 pages long, but fewer than 20 contain our analysis and view of the military occupation in the past ten years. I recommend these pages to the committee, as members may not have time to read the full book.
The book does not refer to the secret service, the military courts or other aspects of the occupation of the Palestinian territories, rather it includes a broad analysis of how the army controls the people. This is done through soldiers from different units in different years describing the same sets of actions. We understand we speak about policy. This book does not have extreme cases that can be called rotten apples or dismissed as a specific incident. It has what we recognise as norms within the Israeli army and norms of the occupation.
The book contains testimony from 101 soldiers and if there is one conclusion to all of this project, it is that there is a feeling that with the linear improvement of Israeli security in the last seven or eight years and improvement on the ground in the humanitarian Palestinian situation, one may think that there is also an improvement in the political situation, meaning more political space for Palestinians to take over and control their people. This is absolutely not the case. There is even stricter control by the army of Palestinian civil life.
When we as Israelis come to analyse these data, we seek to search for security policies. It does not matter whether they secure the settlements or the state of Israel. When we analyse what these 750 soldiers are saying, what we see as the main goal of the army today is to maintain the military control over the people and to maintain the occupation as if there was no end to it.
Owing to time limitations, I will provide a brief presentation of the first chapter of the book, which is called "Prevention". We tried to explain what the word "prevention" means within the army code. It has an obvious connotation outside of the army. It is a very defensive mechanism. We conclude that all the defensive actions can come under the definition of "prevention", but unfortunately almost all the offensive mechanism can come under this title as well. I will explain with a few examples.
What do we prevent? The notion is that we prevent terror and this sounds very defensive. The first connotation of the word "prevention" in Hebrew is literally "targeted prevention", which means "targeted killing" or assassination. Whom do we kill? Do we kill a terrorist on the way to attack or what we call a ticking bomb? We have no way to arrest the guy and so we kill him. That makes perfect sense to me as a military officer. In the first chapter, however, we ask the guy who gives the testimony whether we could have arrested such a person, and we can see that it is not that clear if there could have been an arrest operation or whether it had to have been a killing operation. When we ask why he did not arrest him, we are told that was not the mission.
When this concept is widened, we get revenge attacks. The Israeli Defence Forces, IDF, launched revenge attacks. Of course one branch of the army was after those who committed the attacks on the checkpoints, but some special forces were sent to kill random Palestinian police, whether armed or unarmed.
Whom do we arrest? Of course we arrest terrorists, but sometimes when we undertake an arrest operation, the target is not at home, so we might arrest his brother or his cousin and send him to the secret service. When we broaden this, we get to the mass arrest in which we were sent to arrest all the males within a specific area between the age of 15 and 50, or 16 and 55. We arrest hundreds of people, put them on trucks and send them to the secret service. From there, some are released in a few hours and some are released in a few days. We do not have records for that.
Perhaps the best example to show how the Israeli army controls the daily life of the Palestinians is with the title of "Making our presence felt". The concept is a concept of security, under the title of "prevention". If they feel that we are everywhere at all times, then they will be afraid to attack and they will not attack us. The idea is to create a feeling of being pursued. This is not my analysis, but the testimony from the soldiers who were sent to create a feeling of being pursued and being chased. I am not exaggerating about my company - I was deputy commander of an infantry company, which contains roughly 100 soldiers - when I say that 50% to 60% of our efforts were under this title of "making our presence felt". These are violent patrols entering Palestinian neighbourhoods and villages, throwing tear gas and stun grenades in the middle of the night, waking people up and causing a lot of noise to make our military presence felt.
An example of what we have been hearing more recently in Breaking the Silence is what we call "mock arrests". In these cases, a platoon is sent to arrest a guy but after five minutes or 24 hours, they release him. Before we send the platoon to a house, we make sure that the house is clean. Each Palestinian house has a location number on the map and through the brigade, we get an OK from the secret service, which means that the people in this house are not members of an organisation, so we know that the guy inside is innocent, and then we go and arrest him. When we ask the soldiers why they do that, we get two answers. First, we are told that there is less tension today and we want to keep the soldier trained and the best place to do it is on real people. We are told that the army does not want to send young soldiers to arrest terrorists the first time they leave the base. Second, we are told that it is done to confuse them. People in a Palestinian village or town wake up the next morning and they start to ask questions. Why was this guy arrested? We know that he is not a member of any military organisation, so why was he arrested? Why was he released? Perhaps a member of his family works for the Palestinian Authority and this is the collaborator who released him. This comes from the obvious question of why he was released so quickly. At this stage, the soldier can see that this makes no sense, and so it makes perfect sense. The idea is to confuse and to cause this arbitrariness in the daily Palestinian life, and that goes for arbitrary random checkpoints on the roads and these arrests.
To conclude on the concept of prevention and the creation of a feeling of being pursued, the subject of the feeling is always the Palestinian. This is where we lose the differentiation between militants and civil people that we control. That is why we call the first chapter "Intimidation of the Palestinian population - Prevention". It is prevention by intimidation.
If we move into human rights jargon and not speak only in clear-cut army codes, we can talk about collective punishments. I am not talking about a specific incident, say where on my company's way to arrest a guy we ran over a few Palestinian cars in a rally. I would not define that as a collective punishment. We say here that collective punishment becomes the mission in order to cause confusion and fear so that they will lose the will to fight back. That is the concept of prevention.
The next chapter speaks about separation, which is also used in many ways as prevention. Random checkpoints create the same feeling. Theoretically speaking, if occupation is not a prolonged occupation, the idea of the army should be about winning the hearts and minds of the local people. That is what one learns in theory. In the first chapter of the book, I show that we are doing exactly the opposite. We think the army is doing it because it does not see a way out. To give another example and to underline the fact that I am not speaking about security, the last Palestinian attack in the city of Hebron was in 2003, but until 2008 - I am translating literally from the book - the day-to-day routine of people living in the neighbourhood was disrupted to create a feeling of being pursued. In my time, in 2003, we called it "searing the consciousness" with the aim of persuading people that terrorism does not pay, so it is a different wording. Still, in 2011, there are sterile streets that Palestinians are not allowed to walk on, some roads that Palestinians are not allowed to drive on, and more than 1,000 shops that were closed in reaction to attacks at the beginning of the last decade. We are asking whether this is security. If there is an end in sight, why does the army act in these ways?