JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION AFFAIRS debate -
Thursday, 29 Sep 2011

Accession of Serbia to the European Union: Discussion

Vice Chairman

I remind members to ensure their mobile telephones are off so as to avoid problems for broadcasting, editorial and sound staff. Apologies have been received from the Chairman and Deputies Mick Wallace and Timmy Dooley. Do we have any other apologies? No.

The first item on our agenda is a discussion on the stabilisation and association agreement with Serbia and the accession of Serbia to the European Union. Our guest speaker is Ms Jelena Milic, who is representing the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies. On behalf of all of us I welcome her to the committee. She will address us on the stabilisation and association agreement with Serbia and the accession of same to the European Union.

Before we begin I must read a note on privilege with which all of my colleagues are very familiar and could recite in their sleep but I need to make everyone aware of it. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. By virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to this committee. If they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence in relation to a particular matter and continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and they are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that where possible they should not criticise or make charges against any person, persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

I thank Ms Jelena Milic for attending and invite her to make her opening remarks.

Ms Jelena Milic

I thank the Chairman, members of the joint committee and its staff for inviting me to speak today on Serbia and its preparedness for EU candidate status. I thank the ad hoc international coalition for the arrest of Ratko Mladic for recommending me to the committee. Its persistence in demanding that Serbia adhere to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, condition of full co-operation with the Hague tribunal, along with the persistence of the Dutch Government and the understanding of this, significantly contributed to the fact that the remaining two fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadžic, were recently arrested and handed over to the tribunal. The arrests are good news in many respects, in addition to being an opportunity for Serbia to put in order its overall security sector, including its judiciary, army, police, intelligence agencies, customs and private security sector, so as to be in compliance with good EU practice.

Thus far, Serbia has adopted almost all laws indicated in the 2010 EU Commission progress report on Serbia. The European Commission will give its opinion on the Serbian candidacy bid next month, and the Council will announce its decision in December 2011. I hope it will be positive. Unfortunately, the news I hear today is not very promising. The latest developments in north Kosovo are not working in Serbia's favour. Unfortunately, Serbia is responsible for that set of events. Nevertheless, I must draw attention to four interrelated areas I closely follow and believe should be taken into consideration during the deliberative period and later if Serbia obtains candidacy status.

First, is the willingness and capability of the Serbian authorities to investigate, disclose and prosecute all those who have been supporting Mladic and other ICTY fugitives for so long, the means by which they have done so and the cost, as a prerequisite for more comprehensive security sector reform. Second, is the level of commitment of the Serbian authorities to regional reconciliation, as demonstrated by their actual policies and behaviour on the ground. There is frequently a disceprency between those two.

Third, is the readiness of Serbian authorities to close comprehensively the gaps in Serbian security sector reform, both structurally and in its personnel, and to continue to improve democratic control of the armed forces, police forces and intelligence agencies. Fourth, is the Serbian Government's willingness to change its policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The need for a comprehensive EU approach in evaluation and assistance to Serbia to complete its security sector reform, including of the Judiciary, is the main topic of my presentation. Without security sector reform, all other reform attempts, including those related to Serbian preparedness for EU candidacy status will be severely impeded. Oddly, this program of reform is rarely mentioned in the context of Serbian EU integration.

I deeply believe that current gaps in security sector reform seriously affect other internal policies in Serbia and its foreign orientation and relations. Unfortunately, the current EU approach to this subject is ad hoc, occasionally self-contradictory and sometimes based on wishful thinking. I will not go into details on other important fields related to Serbian progress towards the EU as I find that EC progress reports present very well the topics they cover. This is why I recommend the above-mentioned comprehensive EU approach for overall security sector reform. The EU has at its disposal tools to assume this approach. By combining its common foreign, security and defence policy and enlargement policy, the EU can better connect its technical and political conditions and make it easier for Serbia to understand and meet them.

Belgrade's current policies, including those towards Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region are severely affected by three problems with the current state of affairs in the country's security sector. The decision-making process on crucial issues is still made outside the legal institutions that just serve to give them "democratic" cover-up. The decision-making process, if it occurs within the institutions, is often influenced by persons, still employed therein, who are compromised by their activities in the 1990s and afterwards. An overall problem is a lack of harmonisation of legislation throughout the security sector and poor law enforcement in Serbia in general.

In its conclusion, the European Commission's Serbia 2010 Progress Report states:

Overall, there was further progress towards completing the legislation providing for a civilian oversight of security forces and implementing constitutionally guaranteed rights. However, civilian oversight, including the work of the relevant parliamentary committee, needs to be reinforced.

The European Union, in the Commission's annual progress reports, covers many segments of security sector reform, such as reform of the Judiciary and the role of the Parliament in democratic oversight. It also covers many aspects through the questionnaire it prepares for an applicant country. Nevertheless, in the case of Serbia, it should map out and analyse the achievements of the security sector reform process overall. Based on these findings, the EU should shape and present its expectations regarding the future steps that Serbia should undertake, as it does in the other fields of primary concern such as the fight against corruption and organised crime. Without this additional effort, the EU risks significantly undermining all material and political support provided to Serbia and the region to date.

In the days prior to this presentation, Serbian authorities made a significant step toward the further cleansing of its ranks in the security sector. Several former members of the notorious Unit for Special Operations - known for its participation in numerous war crimes during the 1990s - who participated in the unit's upheaval in 2001 that led to the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Ðindic in 2003 were arrested. It is alarming that some of those arrested remained active employees of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior and the Security Intelligence Agency until last week. It is extremely important for Serbia to continue seeking answers regarding those who ordered Prime Minister Dindic's assassination.

It is also crucial that Serbia arrest and prosecute those who were assisting and protecting Mladic and other ICTY fugitives, and obtain clarification of all the circumstances that led to the violent deaths of five Serbian conscript soldiers in the period 2004 to 2005. There are suspicions that these violent deaths were related to the hiding of Ratko Mladic in military facilities. Action on the aforementioned fronts would finally create an environment in which the Serbian security sector could undergo thorough and comprehensive reform.

It is my deep conviction that these issues constitute a knot that genuine pro-EU forces in Serbia cannot untangle without much stronger EU support and involvement, with clear requirements and rewards for achieving them. The EU has demonstrated its capacity to have the enlargement process tailor made, recognising the specific circumstances of the applicant countries by, for example, including full co-operation with the ICTY for western Balkan countries, while maintaining its own standards. Similar logic should be applied in the case of Serbia and the need for security sector reform.

In my written presentation to the committee, I highlighted some circumstances in which Serbian security sector reform is taking place and outlined the main reforms and achievements to date. The incompleteness of the process of security sector reform related to democratic oversight of military security and intelligence agencies, and regulation in defence industry exports that is not in compliance with EU expectations and recommendations, is confirmed by the Serbian Government itself in its answers to the EU questionnaire.

There are two possible explanations for Serbia's failure to push for more comprehensive security sector reform and to reinforce oversight referred to by itself. First, Serbian authorities wish to do it but do not control the full security apparatus. Alternatively, they wish to control, but not reform, the sector and are, therefore, acting to strengthen informal political parties' instruments of control, making unacceptable compromises along the road. Serbian policy towards Kosovo, which overarches and dictates the scope of all other policies, also significantly reduces Serbian capability to complete security sector reform. The lack of successful judiciary reform indicated in the EU Commission's progress report for 2010 - we shall see how the EU will evaluate it this year - has an ongoing impact on the security sector that has been rarely analysed.

While co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, and domestic prosecution for war crimes has been slow in coming, it has contributed significantly to security sector reform in Serbia. ICTY co-operation, which resulted in the transfer of some active staff, as well of those retired but well connected and still influential, in the ICTY detention and its external scrutiny, has been the greatest single contributor to one extremely important track of security sector reform, namely, the transfer of compromised personnel from the ranks of the Serbian security sector.

Unfortunately, this is not enough. Only a fraction of those personnel in the Serbian security services who were involved in committing crimes in the 1990s have been charged, much less convicted, by the ICTY or domestic courts. The continued presence of remaining perpetrators, their accomplices, commanders and allies in Serbian security sector units, including the Judiciary and other parts of the Serbian administration, in political and business life, in the poorly regulated private security sector and in the media, significantly influences the overall political landscape within Serbia, including the scope of the security sector reform and policies towards Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about.

Against this background, let me draw the attention of members once again to four interrelated key issues that I closely follow and believe should have an impact on the Commission, Council, and member states' decisions on the Serbian candidacy bid. The first is the willingness and capability of the Serbian authorities to investigate, disclose, and prosecute those who have been supporting Mladic and other ICTY fugitives for so long, by what means they have done so and at what cost, as a precondition for more comprehensive security sector reform. Another is the level of Serbian authorities' commitment to regional reconciliation as demonstrated by their actual policies and behaviour on the ground. The next is the readiness of Serbian authorities to close comprehensively the gaps in Serbian security sector reform, both structurally and in its personnel, and to continue to improve democratic control of the armed forces and intelligence services. The fourth is the Serbian Government's willingness to change its policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In my written presentation, all four points are covered in more detail, including suggestions for further action, and I ask members to take them into consideration.

In conclusion, despite all the above-mentioned open issues, if Serbia meets other EU expectations from last year's progress report, which will be evaluated in the Commission's findings the recommendations of which are to be announced on 12 October, and if the situation in Kosovo does not deteriorate and dialogue with Pristina resumes and if the state demonstrates it can provide for the protection of the constitutionally-granted rights of the participants in the forthcoming pride parade, Serbia should be given candidacy status. I ask members to allow me to justify the reason I suggest this approach. This will provide some support for genuine pro-EU forces within Serbia and pre-empt a drop in public support for the EU integration process in advance of the 2012 general election in Serbia. At present, public support for EU integration is slightly above 50% but there has been a downward trend over the past year from approximately 65%. The date of the EU negotiations should then be announced and organised as quickly as possible but should be firmly and clearly conditional.

Continued Serbian progress towards EU membership, if predicated on the strengthening of institutions and regulatory bodies within Serbia, would weaken the principal opponents of the pro-EU agenda. These opponents are beneficiaries of the status quo, including lax control of the security services, often possess unregulated monopolies and influence current policies towards Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further progress would both be a setback for them and provide a new set of tools for the genuine pro-EU forces to reduce or eliminate their influence.

I now wish to give a few suggestions on where Ireland can help Serbia on this tough and demanding road. Ireland has been a role model for many in Serbia regarding its own successful EU integration. It also can have a role in supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions in Serbia. Ireland, which like Serbia is not a member of NATO, will assume the presidency of the OSCE in 2012. It also will assume the EU Presidency in 2015. These are additional channels through which it is to be hoped Ireland can increasingly support crucial areas of reform necessary for my country. In addition, Ireland has one of the best developed and coherent systems regarding the protection of the human rights of the members of its Defence Forces. This can also serve as a role model for Serbia, as the current structure in this regard is poor in mandate, coherence and resources.

I am firmly convinced the approach I have recommended, namely, a combination of clear conditions and support for their fulfilment, would be in the mutual interests of both Serbia and the EU. A similar approach has delivered thus far, significantly helping genuine pro-EU forces in Serbia in their support for Serbia's bid for candidacy. I believe this approach would also have a positive impact on the further democratisation of the region as a whole. Bearing in mind the very dynamic period in the Middle East and North Africa, I dare say the EU needs practical confirmation that it is evolving from regional payer to global player and that it still is a significant influence for good on the world stage. I sincerely hope its further involvement in the region of the western Balkans and Serbia will prove it has both the willingness and the capabilities to do so. I look forward to questions raised by members and I thank the Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman

I thank Ms Jelena Milic and now invite questions and comments from my colleagues.

Deputy Pádraig Mac Lochlainn

I thank Ms Milic for her comprehensive overview of the position in Serbia. People in Ireland have followed the devastating events of the 1990s there from the initial failure to intervene by the international community, which resulted in a disastrous outcome on the ground. Huge work remains to be done in terms of reconciliation and respect for the rights of people in the various regions of what was Yugoslavia to take their own direction. The present concern pertains to Kosovo and the recent upsurge in hostilities around the border between northern Kosovo and southern Serbia. I note what appears to be the encouragement of this by some Serbian politicians, which is tantamount to almost teasing people for their passivity and stating they should be rising up. There appears to be major challenges in this regard.

I seek more information on the dynamic there at present, as well as Ms Milic's sense of what has caused it and what the solutions could be. I note Ms Milic pointed out clearly that one condition for the progress of Serbia's application is dialogue with Pristina and conciliation in this regard.

Ms Milic stated that new states normally apply for membership of the EU and NATO in tandem. Not everyone is a great fan of the role of NATO in the international community. My view, and that of my party, is that the United Nations is the appropriate body to enforce the will of the international community. NATO has not always played a helpful role and often has been selective. It has not been consistent in its interventions and in my view and that of my party, its interventions have been in the strategic and financial interests of NATO's member states, rather than through the consistent application of international law. One could point to the position in Palestine as a good example of inconsistency and the recent failure to intervene in Bahrain and Syria also is worrying. Consequently, I am unsure whether NATO is the best benchmark.

As for Ms Milic's overall assessment, it is clear people who were part of the regime in the 1990s, who were part of the horrors of what happened and who have protected Mladic and the others cannot remain in positions within the security apparatus of Serbia. Neither can one have paramilitary outfits that prevent gay rights. Serbia cannot enter the EU if it does not genuinely share those values .

I appreciate the fact that Ms Milic has provided a clear analysis of the challenges facing Serbia and what steps she advocates for the country. I absolutely agree that the best way to steer people from the path of racism, intolerance and bigotry is to take them into the fold and embrace them, rather than isolating them further. The latter way only encourages those who would promote the status quo.

I thank Ms Milic for her presentation. Perhaps she could deal with where the security apparatus would fit in and to what standards we should hold them. I would also like some analysis of the current situation in northern Kosovo.

Ms Jelena Milic

The situation regarding north Kosovo is changing as we speak. In the written remarks I submitted to the committee, I described the chain of events prior to the escalation of tension that occurred this summer, which I think is not known to the Serbian public. The Serbian authorities and media deliberately decided not to focus on those events. There are many debates these days in Belgrade among western diplomats and representatives of various international organisations as to what extent Belgrade controls groups in north Kosovo. There is also an ongoing debate as to what extent Belgrade controls Dodic as well. These are tough questions and I think the answers to them have several layers. These layers are interconnected and change as we speak, particularly in north Kosovo.

It is clear that, unfortunately, the Government of Serbia intends to heighten tensions as much as possible, hoping that the NATO and EU missions - for the imposition of the rule of law in Kosovo - will not react and will withdraw. That is not the case, however. That, along with the messages we heard from the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, are very welcome. This tough love approach is what Serbia needs because when something big like that happens one cannot just put it aside and put one's interpretation of the events on it.

Only yesterday, the German, UK and French Governments, and EU officials, clearly stated that Serbia is to blame for the halt in dialogue with Kosovo. The Serbian public do not know, however, that this dialogue is embedded as a condition in the European Commission's 2010 report. Our officials, unfortunately, tend to refer just to the technical conditions related to laws we have to adopt in order to meet these conditions.

I was here in Ireland when all that started to happen and I am really disappointed with the Serbian behaviour. I frankly do not know what to say to the committee. It is of course better that Belgrade should control some of the events there. There are several aspects of life that have never been controlled by UNMIK, the Kosovo authorities or the EU. I used to work in the UNMIK-EU pillar and I know very well that, at the time, we tolerated this power structure simply because there was nobody else around to provide services. Nobody even dares to open the subject of cutting parallel institutions related to health and education. However, Chancellor Merkel said that one must cut these parallel structures in the judiciary, customs and police because one cannot have one territory with two different sets of law enforcement agencies. This is where Serbia is not willing to step back.

Luckily we have a Minister for defence who has clearly said that Serbia will not intervene militarily. That is good news but the fact is that some members of the Kosovo police service, of Serbian ethnicity, are in line with our Ministry of the interior. This is something we have to cut down. The opposition party leaders have a strong influence in Mitrovica and elsewhere. It is, however, embarrassing that these road blocks of sand and pebbles were made by a Serbian public company.

Deputy Pádraig MacLochlainn

To what standards is the security apparatus structure held to account within Serbia? I expressed my reservations about NATO, which is not necessarily the standard I would accept. Will Ms Milic clarify that point? Do they operate within European security structures or the UN's? What standards would be applied to the security apparatus there?

Ms Jelena Milic

Wherever possible, the standards are those of good practice in EU member states, regardless of how they vary. As I mentioned in my written remarks, the EU covered many aspects of security sector reform, including monitors for example and the judiciary which is part of the security apparatus. Without a functional judiciary one cannot impose all the constitutional guarantees and laws that are adopted. The EU also covers and strengthens the role of parliament in Serbian political life. Nevertheless, it does not have a comprehensive approach as in other policies such as consumer protection. This is where the EU can step in more directly.

Several independent countries have provided assistance in that respect, which is welcome and it has produced some results so far. Nevertheless, as long as there are several players, one increases the chance of having cracks through which some important issues may fall.

As for the personnel in our ranks, the problem is that culprits can be arrested and may be indicted. The notion of a command authority is misunderstood and is even beyond my comprehension to discuss it. The political leadership of the 1990s, whch was severely put aside by prime minister Djindjic, has now all been restored. We have a Minister of the interior who was a spokesman for Milosevic. The problem is that western diplomats in Belgrade gave them carte blanche. Only a few years ago, they declared them as newborn democrats for no good reason. They have their portion of power in parliament and were elected through democratic electoral procedures. We must accept that reality but we do not have to give them carte blanche and immediately declare them as being democratic EU forces. In that regard, part of the responsibility lies with western diplomats in Belgrade, and particularly those from EU member states.

Deputy Bernard J. Durkan

I congratulate Ms Milic for her comprehensive presentation to the committee. Her comments clearly emanate from a thorough analysis of the background to the situation there. We have discussed this matter on numerous occasions in this committee. Ms Milic has illustrated the complexity of the situation; there is nothing simple about it. The impetus has to be to advance and make progress, while trying not to repeat the mistakes that were made in the past. We must also try not to trip over some of the issues that may still be buried in the sub-soil. It is dangerous to do so, as we know from our own experiences in Ireland. That is not to take a swipe at any political organisation but it is a fact of life. Where violence is based on a combination of ethnic prejudice, religion, history, hatred and politics, it constitutes a potent time-bomb whose effects will not readily dissipate for some time. There is a necessity to examine those matters pointed out by Ms Milic and those individuals who pop up again after several years in a different guise but with the same ideals and objectives.

The western Balkans is fundamental to Europe's stability. Any destabilising of that region will have a long-lasting impact on Europe and could well arrest the evolution of modern Europe. I do not agree with my colleague that NATO was the wrong mechanism to use to stabilise the area in the past. At the time, the UN, as was seen in Srebrenica, failed. Safe havens created by the UN were assaulted and overrun. Due to several reasons including historical and political baggage, no country in the region was prepared to intervene in a positive way and stop the killings and human rights abuses. Another reason the UN failed was because its forces lacked firepower on the ground and the logistical ability to shift large forces to danger areas quickly. The UN deployments in the region were isolated, under equipped and incapable of competing with other military forces.

Ms Milic rightly identified second and third armies with different allegiances as a means of destabilising the region in the future. She also identified that it is important to ensure people recognise these armies' existence as not being consistent with what is required. She has done a tremendous job in her report.

Ireland is a neutral country. We often hear about a long tradition of neutrality in Ireland. There was never a tradition of neutrality in Ireland. The Irish fought in every war over the past 500 years across Europe and left dead in their thousands behind them. We became neutral in 1939 for a very good reason, one of the few decisions made by the then Administration with which I agree. It is easy to be wise after the event.

Ms Milic has identified various issues in the western Balkans that need to be addressed. We in the rest of Europe cannot afford to ignore what happens in the region and must avoid making that past mistake. Reconciliation in the region will take a while as people need time to forget. People also need to assuage their hurt and feelings rather than seeking retribution. Reprisal killings only create a vicious cycle that is hard to break. We know all about that in this country.

I sincerely hope this country will provide constructive support to the region. It is necessary to encourage Serbia through membership of the European Union. If standards and rule are not observed, we will fail.

We were all witnesses to what happened in the western Balkans in the 1990s. History has an awful habit of repeating itself unless we take the measures to ensure it does not.

Deputy Joe O’Reilly

I join with my colleagues in welcoming Ms Milic to the committee and thank her for her excellent presentation. I hope we achieve normality in the western Balkans as quickly as possible. Reconciliation, which as Deputy Durkan said is inherently a slow process, must be worked towards. It is incumbent on all of us to work through reconciliation through direct aid and involvement and to achieve a level of institutional reform that will allow Balkan states to be active participants in the EU.

I agree with Deputy Durkan that NATO was the correct channel within which to deal with events there in the 1990s.

Ms Jelena Milic

Regarding Irish neutrality, I do not want to get into a debate whether it is good for Ireland. I come from an institution which heavily advocates for full and active Serbian membership not only of the EU but also of NATO. NATO has done tremendous work in eastern European countries, completing one very important part of the reform process and being in harmony with the EU on that.

There are circumstances, some of which I referred to in my report, which inform us NATO membership for Serbia will not happen soon, however. We must examine what other means of assistance we have at our disposal to help Serbia complete its reform of its security sector. Serbian citizens still feel strongly against NATO and oppose membership. However, 36% would not object to NATO membership which is impressive considering all political parties, including the leading one, have anti-NATO policies because it suits their policies towards Kosovo. Until we resolve the situation with Kosovo, we will not be able to discuss our security and defence needs properly.

I see a position for Ireland in this because the Serbian public will accept guidance from a militarily neutral country. This year Serbia professionalised its army, a good development. However, if not all structures of democratic control are imposed on it, it could become a praetorian guard that cannot be controlled. This is why I advocate strongly for a democratic oversight of the army.

Human rights in the army must also be protected. This area is unregulated in Serbia and raising grievances in the army is not well developed. This area has to be developed. Some argue this area should fall under the remit of a general ombudsman while others call for a separate defence ombudsman. I just wanted to see Serbia as a state that has a well developed structure of ombudsmen. I leave the question of whether we have one ombudsman for everyone or two or three separate ombudsmen to those who are much more expert in this field than I am. I see that there is a huge gap right now. We have just one ombudsman for everything, with an unclear mandate over the defence forces, and particularly over the intelligence agencies, and we have unclear and non-transparent grievance procedure within the forces themselves. This is not the position in Ireland. I participated a few months ago at the broad conference of ombudsmen held in Belgrade and I can tell the committee that Ireland's Ombudsman for the Defence Forces left a significant impression on everyone there not only because of her commitment, but also because she was capable of presenting a well-founded structure, in other words, the office was well founded. I hope that maybe through the OSCE presidency and through the EU, Ireland can get itself more involved in that field. That would be welcomed by the Serbian public because, as I mentioned, and this is the reason I highlighted that, Ireland is a neutral country and a non-NATO country. This is what is important for the Serbian public and there would be an easy way to become more involved because of that fact.

Vice Chairman

I thank Ms Milic. I have a few questions on her presentation.

I suppose I should start by acknowledging that the previous committee, chaired by Deputy Durkan, held an extensive number of meetings on this topic. The Serbian Foreign Minister came and made a presentation to the committee. Individuals who were involved in the conflicts to which Ms Milic referred, and who subsequently came to Ireland as refugees in the early 1990s, came in and made an emotional presentation to that committee and I well remember them speaking of the impact of all of this on them. That committee then had advocates of varying stances on the issue come in also to make presentations to us. That committee played an active role, as Ms Milic acknowledged, on the issue and it was something that was acknowledged in commentary from some people on what then unfolded.

I am supportive of the role of the European Union and its institutions in allowing countries to move towards a destiny of being in a place where the rights of individuals are protected, the rights of minorities are protected and the institutions are democratic. The amazing success of the European Union has been that it has facilitated so many countries in doing that across the Continent of Europe. So many other countries, for example, Spain, have made that passage through the support of the European Union. Indeed, the issue about which we speak is perhaps the most contemporary example of that. At our previous meeting, we met the Deputy Speaker of the Croatian Parliament and chairman of the European Integration Committee of the Croatian Parliament, Mr. Neven Mimica. He spoke of the role of the European Union in allowing his country to go through that journey. With that in mind, there are a few points to which I would like to get Ms Milic's response.

Ms Milic describes the current EU approach as being "ad hoc, occasionally self-contradictory and sometimes based on wishful thinking”. Is that a fair assessment? When we were going through this process, we had representatives from the European Union and representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs. We had a large amount of testimony that appeared to point to a robust and detailed process for handling all of this that is at odds with Ms Milic’s description of it as being ad hoc.

Ms Jelena Milic

In this field of the need for security sector reform, unfortunately, yes. If I have a few minutes, I can answer.

Vice Chairman

I would appreciate Ms Milic's response to it, but I want to set that alongside the fact that she is acknowledging that the role of the European Union and the process has been a positive driver in the progress that has been made so far.

Ms Jelena Milic

There is no doubt about that.

Vice Chairman

How does that sit with describing it as "ad hoc"?

Ms Jelena Milic

I do not challenge the EU contribution so far. On the contrary, I cannot imagine where Serbia would be today without the EU role and without the ICTY conditions. Unfortunately, in 2006, when the new status of Kosovo became a hot topic, the EU was tiptoeing around the Serbian authorities. All they expected from those authorities was a peaceful response to the then forthcoming declaration of independence of Kosovo. This is exactly the time when Serbia entered its judiciary reform. The progress reports at that time were vague. They did not immediately highlight all flaws in this judiciary reform, which kicked back both Serbia and the EU. We found ourselves in a nightmare in 2009. I cannot stress strongly enough how important a viable and functional judiciary is for the functioning of the security sector. This is why my finding on this subject, only about the lack of even comprehensive vision and attitude on the security sector reform, is as I described.

Vice Chairman

Moving on to another point here regarding the Gay Pride events that took place, what happened last year sticks in my mind because the following day was the day the previous committee held the hearing with the Serbian Foreign Minister where he gave an impassioned contribution on it that was welcomed by many of the committee members present. On my recollection of the event, and please correct me if I am wrong here, but in the end, was the army deployed to protect?

Ms Jelena Milic

No, only police forces.

Vice Chairman

Did the police forces end up playing a role in protecting the people who were involved in the event?

Ms Jelena Milic

Let me describe that situation to the committee in a little more detail. The police did protect participants but the amount of violence that was demonstrated in the streets was terrifying. Unfortunately, the police and the office of the prosecutor failed to harmonise their work after the parade and to prosecute all of those who were obviously there, all of those who were seen on television cameras committing violence, destroying property and trying to kill us - there is no other description for what they wanted to do. There were many policemen deployed and they managed to protect us. The reason we luckily got the large number of troops deployed in the street was because we had support from so many ambassadors. Unfortunately, they were protecting them, not us. The presence of the foreign-----

Vice Chairman

By "protecting them", who is meant by "them"?

Ms Jelena Milic

Believe it or not, the presence of the foreign ambassadors, who were there to provide support to the Gay Pride march, was the best guarantee for us that we would survive that parade. The reason I was exchanging and updating my presentation, for which I apologise to the committee secretariat, is that as I was preparing myself, the situation in Belgrade was heating up because the next parade is scheduled for 2 October. In the period before my arrival here, several police syndicates - Serbian police have approximately nine of them - got into co-operation with far-right tough conservative groups which are vocally, and strongly, against Serbian Gay Pride and other liberties and freedoms. It is embarrassing that there is one police committee, for example, that issued a joint statement with one of these pro-fascist groups. Then it is even more embarrassing to hear that the Minister for the Interior never condemns that kind of statement, and that he even makes jokes asking other statesmen of the region why the Serbian gay and human rights activists do not go to Podgorica in Montenegro or to Sarajevo and lobby for a gay parade there and why are they only instructed by the EU to do it in Belgrade. These are all embarrassing views and I have been playing devil's advocate for too long under all these negative circumstances. I am concerned that if Serbia is not given candidacy status we would face a similar situation to that of Macedonia. That would be the moment when the EU loses its leverage over us because we would lose our connections and communication lines. This is the main reason I was in favour of candidacy but I do not know what to say in light of the events in north Kosovo, which are not good news.

Vice Chairman

Ms Milic outlined a number of criteria under which she believes Serbia should be given candidacy status. I ask these questions because I want to be constructive and helpful. The committee also invested a lot of work on these issues in the last term. Does Ms Milic believe all these criteria should be met before candidacy status is granted? For example, does she believe Serbia should be refused candidacy status if there is further violence or a repeat of the incidents of previous years when the gay pride event takes place in October?

Ms Jelena Milic

To make myself clear on violence and the gay parade, what is important is whether the Serbian State will be able to protect participants in the parade and calm violence by using the tools and mandate available to it to respond in an adequate manner.

In regard to north Kosovo, I hoped when I was coming here that the Serbian State would start to slowly withdraw from north Kosovo. Instead, however, I hear that we withdrew from the talks with Pristina. This is bad news. What is happening these days in Serbia is tightly linked to the general election scheduled for 2012. The ruling party, from which the President of Serbia, Mr. Tadic, comes, covers a wide space from pro-right to pro-left. Its members are very different. Our Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence are from the same political party but different parts of the spectrum. They are trying to preserve power because without that they cannot rule and impose reforms. This is the catch-22 and it is another reason I may be soft on Serbia if it comes to terms with itself and returns to the table to continue the dialogue with Pristina. If I understand correctly, the problem is that Serbia would like to include the status of north Kosovo in the negotiations. This was not foreseen last year when the dialogue was seen as involving technical issues such as electricity and telephony. The good news is that the influential EU countries share a common perspective and perhaps Serbia can learn the message and step back in the coming period.

Vice Chairman

I thank Ms Milic for her helpful contribution. The committee is committed to supporting the work that is ongoing in regard to Serbia. It is one of the great successes of Europe that it can facilitate this type of journey through the use of soft power.

The joint committee went into private session at 12.45 p.m. and adjourned at 12.55 p.m. until 11.30 a.m. on Thursday, 6 October 2011.