Joint Committee on European Union Affairs debate -
Thursday, 13 Nov 2014

No Main Heading

Chairman

On behalf of the committee I welcome Mr. Erwan Fouéré from the Centre for European Policy Studies.

I remind members of the long standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should criticise or make charges against a person either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. By virtue of section 17(2)(l ) of the 2009 Defamation Act, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. If witnesses are asked to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and they continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. Witnesses are asked to respect the parliamentary privilege to the effect that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity, inside or outside the House, by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

I am delighted to welcome Mr. Erwan Fouéré, who will speak on behalf of the Centre for European Policy Studies and specifically on EU enlargement strategy. The committee has had a number of meetings on this subject. Members of the committee visited the Balkans region last year and two years ago. We are interested in hearing an update on the situation.

I know from Mr. Fouéré's curriculum vitae that he has extensive experience in the Moldova-Transnistria issue. Perhaps we can hear about that topic during questions. I am also interested in hearing his views and perspective on the current situation in Ukraine.

Mr. Erwan Fouéré

I thank the Chairman for the invitation. I warmly welcome the initiative to focus on the enlargement policy of the European Union precisely at a time when the policy is under quite considerable criticism, mostly for the wrong reasons. In past reports and in the European Parliament elections, a lot of criticism has been voiced against enlargement. In a sense it became a victim of the very toxic debate on immigration levels in a number of EU member countries, not least in the United Kingdom.

The new President of the European Commission, Mr. Juncker, has stated that there will be no further enlargement of the EU during his mandate. He is technically correct, because none of the countries currently negotiating accession - Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey - are anywhere near conclusion. Nevertheless, his comment sent a very negative signal about the EU's continued commitment on enlargement. The situation was redressed thanks to the initiative of Chancellor Merkel at the end of August in convening a summit meeting of all the western Balkan leaders. The initiative also emphasised the EU's continued commitment, particularly towards the western Balkans - a commitment which was solemnly entered into in 2003 at the summit in Thessaloniki, conducted under the then Greek Presidency, that the future of the western Balkans lies in the European Union, subject to all the necessary reforms being carried out.

It was also important that Chancellor Merkel's initiative emphasised what a grave mistake it would be for the European Union to reduce its focus on the western Balkans. There are a number of reasons for that. First, it would serve the interest of precisely those people we are trying to ensure are involved and active in the reforms, which will improve the entire situation - for example, the people who benefit from the current status quo. I refer to the oligarchs and the organised criminal groups that are still active in a number of western Balkan countries in human trafficking, etc., who have a vested interest in ensuring that there is no change in the process.

Second, the EU is not the only player in the western Balkans at the moment. Russia is increasingly active. Its increasingly assertive foreign policy is making itself felt, as witnessed in the recent visit of President Putin to Serbia just a few weeks ago. Of course the energy interests are very much involved there.

Third, it is vital that the EU maintain its focus on the Balkans, if only because major reform efforts are still required in those countries. The level of corruption is still very high and there is a lot of political interference in the judiciary. Political dialogue remains weak, which means that parliamentary institutions do not function as they should. For example, a number of parties have boycotted parliament because they feel their rights are not being respected, etc.

Perhaps even more worrying is the increasing pressure on the media. All the international watchdogs and organisations, including the OSCE's representative on freedom of the media, have highlighted their growing concern at the worsening situation for the media, as well as the harassment to which civil society organisations are being subjected and the impact this is having on minority rights, not least lesbian and gay rights, which have been affected in a number of these countries.

Another critical area is unemployment. The statistics show that the levels of unemployment for Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina hover around 30%, of which over 50% is youth unemployment. Therefore, a major effort is required in all these aspects.

The countries that have the greatest problems at the moment, as reflected in the progress reports presented by the European Commission last month, are Bosnia, Herzegovina and Macedonia. In these countries there is a lack of political will to move the reform process forward, which has affected their overall performance in their efforts to at least start the accession process for the European Union.

It is difficult to see the main solutions. Definitely, the European Union needs to be much more determined in its approach towards the enlargement strategy, and much more prescriptive. It must clearly set out what is required in all areas, such as independence of judiciary and political dialogue.

Visa liberalisation was a very good prescriptive approach. Benchmarks were set out and roadmaps were established, and the countries of the western Balkans fulfilled all of those requirements and thus enabled visa liberalisation to enter into force. A much more prescriptive approach by the European Union is definitely needed.

We would also advocate a much stronger voice for the EU on issues of media and civil society. We want it to make sure that civil society is, as a matter of course, involved in the formulation of policy and in the decision-making process. We are talking about countries that are still in transition and have a lot of fragile institutions that are affected by many vested interests. Institutions of government also need to show greater accountability.

Another important area is that of political parties and how to inculcate a culture of dialogue in countries where this is not a given. There is a need for compromise. National parliaments of the EU could help with this by promoting training programmes, particularly those focused on the youth or younger generation.

Another important area in which the EU needs to be more proactive is economic development. I refer to reforms in terms of promoting economic governance, ensuring public procurement is free from political interference, and creating an environment more conducive to business development and foreign investment, thus reducing the temptation for people in many countries to go abroad in order to make a life, get a job, etc. These are all important priorities on which the EU can and must help in the countries concerned.

I would like to outline one other interesting and important development from the recent progress reports.

There is a suggestion from the European Commission that dialogue on foreign policy should be enhanced with the countries of the western Balkans and, of course, with Turkey, not least because of developments in the broader region, such as Ukraine, the impact of the more assertive Russian foreign policy and the developments in the Middle East. Certainly we would wholeheartedly support greater dialogue with these countries on foreign policy issues in order to try to promote alignment with the EU approach. Serbia is a strong actor in the western Balkans. It will have the chairmanship of OSCE next year and will therefore assume a critical role, not least in relation to Ukraine.

My concluding word is that the EU needs to work much harder in order to demonstrate that its soft power - the transformative power it has had with very successful enlargements in the past decade - bears dividends and that there are a lot of advantages to be gained for both the EU and the western Balkans through continued enlargement. Both sides must work hard at this to ensure the best possible results.

Deputy Eric Byrne

I welcome Mr. Fouéré. I confess that because of the political problems witnessed in the Chamber I have been distracted and have not managed to read the bulk of the documentation, which I should and normally do. I apologise to Mr. Fouéré.

Members of this committee have travelled to countries to examine what was happening in them. I have a very fond relationship with Albania, so it sticks in my memory. When we were in Albania and Macedonia earlier this year the politicians were working extremely hard to comply with all the criteria as laid down by the EU. They were extremely anxious to move closer to Europe. In fact, we were there when they received recognition from the EU that they had passed, and they were overjoyed. There has been a change of government, which has resulted in a more progressive, stable and open form of government. In his classification of countries, Mr. Fouéré states that Albania and Serbia are the better of the four. I concur, having been in Bosnia-Herzegovina many years ago. The biggest disappointment to me as an individual citizen and as a politician is that progress has not been made there. Would Mr. Fouéré concur with me that ample warnings were given about the European Union's response to what was evolving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the three power blocs - the Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croats - dividing the authority among themselves? People felt that the peacekeeping missions were there for a long time. The theory was that, as Croatia had aspired to membership and ultimately become a member, Serbia and possibly Kosovo would follow suit. Four years ago some speakers who appeared before the committee told us that things were stagnating and going backwards. Does Mr Fouéré see grounds for us in the EU to be critical of ourselves, particularly with regard to what has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

When we were in Macedonia we got the feeling that people there wanted to move forward. Mr. Fouéré placed Macedonia alongside Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not know enough about Macedonia to know of its intent to move forward. In the case of Albania, it was fascinating that, notwithstanding the issues with regard to the rule of law and the allegations about criminality, they did mount - and it was not for our eyes - a major raid on a core of criminal gangs who were operating in the farmland. A very powerful message was sent out to criminals that the government was on board. I hope that Serbia, which is to take up the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2015, will use the role to progress development in that area.

May I conclude with a question on the role of President Putin of Russia? I note Mr Fouéré's expertise on Macedonia, which is to hold an election at the end of this month. To what does he apportion blame for the evolution of what is almost a new cold war with Russia? In his opinion, is Europe's relationship with NATO moving at such a pace as to make President Putin more and more insecure, hence the obvious escalation that will blow any day now in eastern Ukraine, with a huge influx of military equipment and troops? Is Europe responsible in any way for the heightening of tensions and the loss of Crimea to Russia? I am sure Mr. Fouéré is familiar with these frozen conflicts because of the situation in Moldova and so on. I am trying to get a balanced understanding of the role of Russia and whether it is being provoked. Is it a case of its recognising its inferiority as a world power?

Deputy Seán Kyne

I welcome Mr. Fouéré to the committee. I wish to refer to his policy paper of 31 October. What is striking is the eloquence of the picture it paints of the issues at stake in the Balkans. He describes all that is wrong with the Balkan region, with political interference in the judiciary, a lack of political dialogue within the political parties, which is affecting the proper functioning of parliament, deep polarisation of society, which is exacerbated by heightened interactive tensions, and a level of corruption that not only has not diminished but has in many instances become worse.

Obviously we have seen a great deal of progress in the past number of decades in terms of the enlargement process, particularly with the accession of the ten countries. Notwithstanding that, does Mr. Fouéré see a heightened divide between east and west within the European Union? In his opinion, is that becoming more noticeable, particularly in view of the economic difficulties we have had in many countries in the past number of years? Is that leading to more concerns within the west? We have seen the issues that arose when the embargo on immigration from Bulgaria and Romania was lifted on 1 January this year. It was suggested that there would be an influx or a flood of migrants coming to work in the UK, in particular. I remember seeing reports that the media were at the airport waiting for the expected hordes to come off the planes, but they were lucky to find one person who had arrived. Are they feeding the frenzy or are they responding to the frenzy that already exists? Deputy Byrne has spoken about UKIP and the concerns that it is feeding into.

The referendum held before Ireland joined the EEC showed very high levels of support for accession. That high level of support has gradually dropped, for a variety of reasons. Is that level of support evident in those countries? The deputy Prime Minister of Turkey appeared before this committee a year and a half ago to generate support for Turkey's accession. When I asked him about the level of support in Turkey for accession to the EU he said it was high but dropping, mainly because of all the rejections. People were of the view that if the EU did not want Turkey to join, they should not be pursuing it. They were not as strong in their support for joining the European Union. What is the level of support evident among people in the western Balkans?

We have discussed the rule of law in Hungary and the issues facing the Prime Minister, Mr. Orbán, particularly the row-back in the past number of weeks with regard to taxing Internet access. Does he think that allowing and permitting this to continue is feeding into the problems in the accession countries? Does he think this is causing the accession countries to ask themselves questions?

Why should we change? Why should we enact any policies when other countries are going ahead anyway? That is the main issue of concern.

In many eastern countries, we see the problems the LGBT community has and the persecution that goes on, which is deeply concerning. In the West, in general, we are progressing. That is not case in those countries and I wonder, as Deputy Eric Byrne said, whether this feeding in from Russia is evident in eastern European countries.

Deputy Joe O'Reilly

I join in the welcome to Mr. Erwan Fouéré. It has always been the Irish Government's policy to support enlargement and that is what we wish for in terms of spreading the peace, increasing markets and a range of other reasons in favour of enlargement. Having said that, the report is disturbing to the extent that it cites a lack of progress in readiness in the Balkan states. We cannot have accession without the necessary internal reform. I support the initiatives set out for greater involvement, greater benchmarking and closer administrative monitoring. Is Mr. Fouéré of the view that we need the carrot and stick approach? We need benchmarking and controls.

My colleague, Deputy Seán Kyne, cites the LGBT issue. If the treatment of people is wrong, if there are inhumane practices and barbaric medieval laws and practices, it is difficult to positively intervene. Is there room for us to give practical support in terms of infrastructure or investment to try to bring these countries along? It is difficult because it is a chicken and egg situation. If we leave them as they are, nothing happens. If we invest in them while their human rights record, the rule of law and the justice systems are not in order, we are supporting something that is anathema to our core values. How does Mr. Fouéré reconcile that? Is there a practical way around it? Unless we can intervene to a greater extent in a practical way, we cannot bring people with us. However, we cannot condone the practices identified by Deputy Seán Kyne.

I share the interest of Deputy Eric Byrne on Mr. Fouéré's reflections on the Ukraine. To what extent does he think Europe was the catalyst by being overambitious? Is it that Putin is the reincarnation of an old-style tsar with insatiable militaristic and territorial ambitions? Perhaps it would not have mattered how we behaved. With regard to the Ukraine, what does Mr. Fouéré think of the chances of the current tripartite government given its eastern difficulty? Can it succeed? Other colleagues, who are not present at this meeting, went to the Ukraine to monitor the elections and came home with a level of optimism.

Senator Kathryn Reilly

I welcome Mr. Fouéré. In his recommendations, he mentions that the EU should ensure legislation should not be deemed to be adopted until funding is included for its implementation. The report mentions Macedonia and the commission on discrimination and states that the sorry list continues. Are there other notable examples in that regard? Are those Governments ticking the box by passing legislation but holding back on its implementation through practicalities like allocating insufficient funding? Are there other pressures the EU can bring to bear?

Deputy Seán Kyne referred to the rule of law, which Mr. Fouéré referred to in respect of double standards in the EU and the attacks on media and civil society in Hungary. When that happens internally, it weakens the leverage vis-à-vis the candidate countries. We discussed the rule of law with the Minister of State earlier in terms of the upcoming General Affairs Council. The proposal is that the Council will play a central role in protecting the rule of law by promoting transparent dialogue at political level among member states. Will the proposals on a transparent dialogue send a more positive message that we are upholding the rule of law internally and that the attacks will not be tolerated?

Chairman

I was disappointed to hear comments from Mr. Juncker about enlargement, particularly given the experiences referred to earlier when the committee visited the Balkans. We were delighted to see the progress made in Montenegro and Albania. There are clear signs they will end up within the European Union in the not too distant future. There has been a slowdown in support from member states for enlargement. The only difficulty is that we seem to be blaming the slowdown solely on candidate countries. We tend to say that country X is not yet ready or that country Y has not made the necessary improvements. The reality is the EU has a case to answer on why we are slowing down the process. Perhaps it is the economic situation or concerns, however unfounded, about migration. It is only fair that we face up to it and recognise it. From talking to politicians within the candidate countries, they would like us to make a statement that this is not just about the country being ready. It is also about Europe at the moment not being ready to go at the same pace as before. That might go some way to ensure there is no slippage in support for European membership to which Deputy Seán Kyne referred. We saw the slippage in support in countries such as Turkey, which sees the EU dragging its feet and blaming candidate countries. It would help if we fessed up and said it is as much to do with where Europe is as the candidate countries.

I take the point about civil society. When the committee met various civil society groups, we found a lack of capacity and a need to improve it. It is a relatively weak civil society in many of these countries and that can only be helped by mentoring and sharing experiences by NGOs and organisations within the EU. That needs funding and the pre-accession integration funds are out there for this purpose. I wonder if Mr. Fouéré shares my view that they do not go far enough. From the previous larger accession in the mid-2000s, we have learned the importance of making sure countries are ready and making sure civil society is built up in advance of integration. The way we do that is by putting in the money and making sure they are ready when the time comes.

Like Deputy Eric Byrne, I am interested in Mr. Fouéré's views on Ukraine. I was over there a number of weeks ago during the elections, looking at how the elections were panning out. My experience of the procedures was positive and transparent and I did not see anything to concern me but I would not be optimistic about where the country is at.

I would be interested in hearing Mr. Fouéré's views on this. My worry is that we are heading for another frozen conflict. Like Deputy Eric Byrne, I think the European Union made a mistake 12 months ago. I attended a presentation made by Mr. Pat Cox when I was in Vilnius during the Lithuanian Presidency last year. At the time, Mr. Cox and the former President of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwaniewski, were rapporteurs for the European Parliament in relation to the Eastern Partnership between the EU and Ukraine. As recently as October 2013, they were very positive about where this was going. They said it was absolutely on course and was going to happen. They spoke about whether Yulia Tymoshenko would be released from prison, but they completely missed what came down the line two weeks later, as did the rest of Europe.

I am not trying to blame anybody when I say Europe could have been a little more aware of the historical context and of the commitments that were given 15 or 20 years ago. If we had been more thoughtful in advance, we might not be facing the chaotic situation that prevails today. I know from being there that it is harrowing for the people who are living there at the moment. It is a very tough time for them. My sense is that there will be no military assistance from the EU, the US or any other outside agency. I have to say I do not think sanctions will work. Having visited Moscow and spoken to people there over the summer, I would be fairly sure that Mr. Putin's position is very safe. He has the support of the average Russian on this issue. There is no pressure from within Russia to change the current policy. I have to say the pressure from outside Russia, including from the EU, is limited at most. I think we are staring at potentially another frozen conflict.

I am aware that Mr. Fouéré has experience in Moldova and Transnistria. I know he was there with the OSCE as a representative during our Presidency. Could he comment on this issue? I am sure he is familiar with the term Novorossiya, which refers to the region where Mr. Putin might like to extend his country's influence. Does Mr. Fouéré share the concern that we are going to see another frozen conflict there? What is his sense of the Russian position on this? What does he think Mr. Putin's end-goal is for the Novorossiya region?

Mr. Erwan Fouéré

I thank the Chairman and the other members of the committee for their questions. I will start by responding to the most difficult question, which relates to President Putin and Russia. There is no doubt that many people in the West were taken by surprise when President Putin, with the stroke of a pen, tore up the rulebook that had been agreed by the international community after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Next year, we will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which was a remarkable achievement in the middle of the Cold War. It is a sad reflection on the times we live in that it would simply not be possible to rewrite that agreement today due to the extent of the frostiness that has seeped into East-West relations. Indeed, we are on the threshold of a new cold war. There is no doubt about it.

It is very easy to rewrite history in hindsight. Many of us in the think-tank community, if I can put it that way, believe the EU underestimated the impact of its efforts to reach out to Ukraine, especially in 2004. Perhaps there was a lack of appreciation of how this would be felt in Russia, which always saw and still sees Ukraine as being very much part of its sphere of influence, just as it does with Transnistria and Moldova. We are faced with that situation. Crimea is lost, unfortunately, even if it is important not to recognise that from a legal point of view. I doubt very much if it will ever be possible to redress that situation. We are facing a worsening crisis in eastern Ukraine, where the recent elections were not able to take place, or took place to a very limited extent, because of the security situation there. There is no doubt that we are on the threshold of a new frozen conflict. Transnistria, which is a region of 500,000 people on the border between Moldova and Ukraine, has seen a protracted frozen conflict since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1992. A process of dialogue with Transnistria is under way. Those negotiations are not working as they should because of the impact of the Ukrainian crisis. I fear that eastern Ukraine will become another Transnistria. This is extremely worrying because it would affect the future of Ukraine.

I am working with the crisis management initiative that was set up by Martti Ahtisaari to promote dialogue with different personalities in Ukraine, including members of parliament and representatives of civil society. In July, we brought people involved in the Northern Ireland peace process to talk to people in Ukraine about elements of that peace process in terms of dialogue that could be useful for the dialogue in Ukraine. There is no ongoing dialogue at all at the moment. Efforts have been made by the current Swiss chairmanship of the OECD to launch a process of dialogue. It was hoped that this might get under way after the recent elections, but the security situation is such that it has not been possible. Dialogue is the only way to find a solution that must involve constitutional issues regarding what sort of powers to delegate to the eastern province. The big problem is knowing who we should talk with. Who do the so-called elected leaders in eastern Ukraine represent? All of that is very suspect. Of course it is fuelled and supported by Russia. At the moment, the prospects are not very positive. I am afraid they will only get worse before they get better.

The EU must maintain its support for Ukraine. When I walked around the Maidan central square in Kiev in June, I was struck by the number of EU flags everywhere. I asked myself whether the Union is capable of responding to the aspirations of those flying the EU flag. Is the EU able and willing to respond to the aspirations of the majority of the people of Ukraine who want to come closer to the EU? It is true that it took quite some time for the EU to get its act together and move forward with different programmes. A lesson was learned on both sides in terms of relations with Russia, with which we need to develop some sort of dialogue, and in terms of strengthening support for Ukraine as it moves from the current conflict situation to a post-conflict situation. There are no magic solutions, unfortunately. A great deal of energy and effort will be required on the part of the EU to deal with this matter. I have mentioned the impact that this issue has had on the western Balkans.

As I indicated, President Putin's visit to Serbia a few weeks ago was a demonstration of force by Russia and a statement that the European Union is not the only transformative power, so to speak, in the western Balkans. Russia, with its narrative on human rights issues, gets a hearing in a number of countries in the western Balkans which are much closer to authoritarian methods of government than to the western democratic systems to which we are used. It is for this reason that the European Union needs to be much more engaged and assertive in its overall relations with the western Balkans.

I will respond to the other issues raised individually. On Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is true that we have given ample warnings to Bosnia-Herzegovina that they need to maintain their commitments to reforms and the implementation of European Court of Human Rights decisions regarding minorities. There is a feeling somehow, certainly on my part but it is shared by others, that the hands-off approach of the EU in the past two or three years was not the correct one and there should have been much greater direct involvement by the European Union. If it was possible to reach a beginning of normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, there is no reason this could not also be done in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The new High Representative, Ms Mogherini, has indicated that this matter will be discussed next week at the Foreign Affairs Council and that there will be an initiative on the issue. This is important.

As members will be aware, the British Foreign Secretary and German Foreign Minister issued an open letter last week to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The letter was a gentle hint to the European Union that it must be much more proactive in the country. It is not only a question of reform. The constitutional issues that arise must also be considered because the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is dysfunctional. I suggested that one possible model for a constitutional debate would be the Irish Constitutional Convention which concluded its work recently. I suggested that the composition of the convention could provide some lessons or useful hints for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the level of support for European Union membership in the western Balkans, there is no doubt that it remains very high. This is reflective of the aspirations of the citizens in the region who view their only future and security as being within the European Union, rather than outside of it. That will remain a constant, even if a number of issues are undermining the credibility of the European Union. Developments in Hungary have without doubt affected the credibility of the European Union because they show double standards. The EU speaks of respect for civil society and the media in the candidate countries. Why is it allowing the developments taking place in Hungary? A second aspect is that some member states are hijacking the enlargement agenda to suit their own interests. I refer to bilateral disputes such as in the case of Cyprus with regard to Turkey and Greece with regard to Macedonia on the issue of the latter country's name. These disputes are also undermining the credibility of the enlargement policy and show that the EU needs to discuss them in some form to reduce these double standards.

I briefly alluded to the Russian influence. The narrative of Russia is affecting human rights issues, including human rights for the gay and lesbian community and ethnic minorities. This is a further reason for the European Union to take a proactive approach.

On the use of the carrot and stick, visa liberalisation offers a good example of this approach. Each of the countries was given a clear list of reforms on border controls, security of documents such as passports, immigration, the rule of law and so forth. They all implemented these reforms because they knew the reward would be visa free travel. It is a challenge for the European Union in the enlargement process, which is much longer. The accession of Croatia took eight years, from 2005 until last year, and the enlargement negotiations have become more complicated. When Ireland joined the European Economic Community, I believe the acquis consisted of some 10,000 pages of legislation. This has since increased to approximately 180,000 pages of legislation, which must be absorbed in the candidate countries. How to maintain the attractiveness of enlargement for western Balkan countries is part of the challenge. While the tools are available, the European Union must use them in a much more effective manner. This would also strengthen its leverage.

The issue of civil society was raised. I highlighted this matter because it is absolutely fundamental, particularly when one is dealing with societies in transition, such as those in the western Balkans, where institutions are still weak and governments are not accountable to citizens. Even if civil society organisations are relatively weak in some countries, there are a few organisations at grassroots level which can make a difference and they need to be supported. The European Union needs to be much more systematic in the support it provides for civil society and the media because this elements strengthen accountability.

I agree that the European Union must accept its internal weaknesses. It would be to our credit if we were to do that. However, the more we allow the disrespect of basic democratic principles to go unsanctioned within the EU, for example, in the case of Hungary, the more we give reasons to small nationalist groups, minorities and oligarchs in the Balkan countries to do whatever they want because they see what is happening in member states. It behoves the European Union to be much more consistent in our approach in order that the aspiration in the western Balkans to join the European Union is viable and succeeds. People in the western Balkans realise that there is no future other than as members of the European Union. We must take advantage of this and work as diligently as possible to ensure their aspirations are eventually realised, even if it takes longer than we would have liked. I hope I have responded to all the questions.

Deputy Eric Byrne

I thank Mr. Fouéré for his fascinating contribution. I thank him and the Chairman for vindicating me in so far as my analytical position on Ukraine was not shared before now. I had rows with Mr. Pat Cox who, based on conversations he had in Ukraine, concluded that everything was hunky-dory in that country. Based on my limited experience of working in Luhansk and Donetsk, I knew we had not fully understood the position of people in east Ukraine who have an affiliation to Russia and speak the Russian language. Mistakes were made in Kiev, for example, in banning the Russian language. Having ploughed a lonely furrow on this issue, I am pleased the Chairman, following his visit to the country, concurs with my view, as I believe does Mr. Fouéré.

I am trying to apportion blame. It is a major disappointment to learn that the former Soviet President, Mr. Gorbachev, stated only the other day that Europe had lost its way.

In view of all Mr. Gorbachev did in restructuring the Soviet Union, does Mr. Fouéré concur with him?

I have the height of respect for the OSCE, not just as an election monitoring machine but also as a more substantive organisation. My reading of the role of the OSCE in Ukraine is that it is playing a very important role in monitoring missions and its engagement in the peace process. It is able to communicate far more and in an easier way than the EU representatives. I have two questions, the first of which relates to Mr. Gorbachev and his analysis of the role and significance of Europe; and second, the role of the OSCE and whether it can be strengthened to become a flag for peace?

Mr. Erwan Fouéré

Mr. Gorbachev is a person whom I admire greatly, but I was a little disappointed by his statement. I felt he could have been a little more balanced and said the blame lay on both sides. Obviously, he may be under pressure in his own country because there is a lot of pressure exerted on those who even remotely criticise President Putin's policies in general. Mr. Gorbachev's statement was too easy. While the European Union certainly could have done things in a better way, there is no other way but for the Union and Russia to engage in substantive dialogue and Ukraine to demonstrate that the future does require a more courageous approach in terms of the recognition of language rights and so on. This can only be done through dialogue. The major problem is to whom does one talk in the east. That is why we believe there needs to be an effort to identify those moderate elements whose voices have been drowned out by the self-elected so-called leaders. This is where the OSCE plays such a critical role.

I was one of those asked to engage in some mediation coaching for the OSCE special monitoring mission when it was established in April and one of the elements we highlighted was that the OSCE's role was not just to provide objective information on the position on the ground but also to facilitate dialogue between all of the different groups involved. I agree wholeheartedly that the OSCE, as the only international actor on the ground up to July when the European Union set up its own civilian security sector reform mission which is under way, provides the best possible avenue for promoting the dialogue process and involves Russia. Russia is part of the OSCE and it is absolutely vital that the efforts of the current chairmanship continue under the next chairmanship, to be held by Serbia. Ireland, during its chairmanship of the OSCE, placed particular emphasis on the importance of mediation and dialogue - we pushed very hard in the transnistria settlement process - and also the role of civil society. Ireland has a lot of experience in that field from its history and the Northern Ireland peace process. Our example was very useful in that respect. I hope the OSCE will be given sufficient resources to fulfil its functions in Ukraine because it will be through that process that we can ensure more effective dialogue between all of the different groups there.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Fouéré very much for coming. Members will be aware that he addressed the COSAC plenary session in Dublin in June last year. It is great to see him back and I look forward to his continued engagement with the committee.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.05 p.m. until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, 18 November 2014.