Joint Committee on European Union Affairs debate -
Wednesday, 22 Mar 2023

EU Strategic Autonomy: Discussion

An Cathaoirleach

Today's meeting is an engagement on EU strategic autonomy, including its implications for EU co-operation on defence and security. I welcome Professor Andrew Cottey from University College Cork, UCC, and Dr. Kenneth McDonagh from Dublin City University, DCU.

Before we begin, I must attend to some housekeeping. All witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of any person or entity. Therefore, if a statement is potentially defamatory in relation to any identifiable person or entity, the witness will be directed to discontinue his or her remarks and must comply with that direction.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on or make charges against a person outside of the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I remind members of the constitutional requirement that members participating must be physically present on the campus of Leinster House. Any members wishing to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting. I ask any member partaking via MS Teams to confirm they are on the campus prior to making a contribution to the meeting.

There is also a line I am supposed to read about wearing masks. I presume that is left in as a test. I again thank the witnesses for attending. I will open up the meeting. I call Professor Cottey to make his opening statement.

Professor Andrew Cottey

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to the committee. I will examine the concept of EU strategic autonomy and recent developments relating to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, including the impact of the Ukraine war on these issues.

I will start with EU strategic autonomy. Recent debate on this issue emerged in the context of the 2016 EU global strategy, which declared strategic autonomy to be an objective of the EU. In broad terms, strategic autonomy can be defined as independence in security and defence. In particular, in the European context, this means independence from the United States, which most EU member states have long depended on for defence through NATO. There is, however, no formal or agreed EU definition of "strategic autonomy" and this reflects divisions among EU member states. Some member states, such as France, place a strong emphasis on developing EU security and defence co-operation as a means of achieving autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Others, such as Poland, are wary of undermining ties with the US or NATO and are thus more cautious with regard to EU security and defence co-operation. Member states, such as Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, take a middle position that seeks to strengthen EU security and defence co-operation and maintain strong ties with the United States. As a result, below the level of broad rhetorical support for EU strategic autonomy, there are important differences between member states on this issue.

Initially, debate on EU strategic autonomy focused on defence and on autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Over the past decade, however, the debate on European strategic autonomy has widened to encompass economics and technology, and to consider Europe’s relations with other states. The logic here is that dependence on other states, in particular for key resources, materials or technologies, can create problems, for example, if supplies or access are cut off or if other states seek to manipulate control of resources, materials or technologies for political ends. EU policymakers thus argue that the EU needs to strengthen its autonomy or sovereignty in various areas of economics, resources, critical materials and technologies. A range of policy initiatives have been taken at the European level to reduce dependence on other states, diversify suppliers of key resources and technologies and strengthen Europe’s ability to develop and produce its own technologies. China has been a particular focus of concern. More recently, in the context of the Ukraine war, ending energy dependence on Russia fits within this logic.

Irish Governments have not felt it necessary to lay out a strong national position in this debate on European strategic autonomy, perhaps because Ireland’s position does not neatly fit into the European-Atlanticist spectrum. One could argue that the Government needs to do more thinking about problems of dependence on external trade, resources and technology, and how this can be addressed at the European, as well as national, level.

I now turn to the CSDP. They policy is more than 20 years old, having been established in 1999-2000. A number of features of the CSDP can be noted. It is largely intergovernmental, rather than supranational, with decisions made by member states on the basis of consensus. Decisions on whether to contribute forces to operations and on whether to be involved in particular projects remain sovereign national decisions. As a result, the CSDP has enabled considerable flexibility in how member states engage with and participate in EU defence co-operation. Additionally, although the CSDP involves co-operation on defence, the EU has not taken on the role of collective defence of member states’ territory, where NATO remains the core institution for the majority of member states that are also NATO members.

The most recent doctrinal statement of policy in this area is the EU Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022. The Strategic Compass identifies four areas in which it argues the EU needs to do more: acting in response to crises; securing the Union and its citizens; investing to enhance security and defence capabilities; and strengthening co-operation with partners towards common ends.

The biggest headline item included in the strategic compass is the planned development of a rapid deployment capacity, RDC, of 5,000 troops to be operational by 2025. As with other EU defence formations and operations, the RDC will be based on military contributions provided by member states. The Irish Government has indicated it will contribute a company of about 100 to 120 troops to the RDC. Overall, the strategic compass can be viewed as a step forward, but not a game changer, in terms of EU defence co-operation.

I will now briefly comment on the impact of the Ukraine war on all of this. In terms of EU strategic autonomy, for most EU member states the Ukraine war has reinforced the view that the US is central to European security and that NATO is vital for their defence. As a consequence, the argument for strategic autonomy as independence from the US has been weakened. Although European states are increasing defence spending, this is primarily in the context of collective defence within NATO, also pointing away from EU strategic autonomy in defence.

The Ukraine war has also shifted the EU defence debate in other ways. In terms of capability development via various EU institutions and processes, the Ukraine war has shifted attention towards those capabilities likely to be needed for collective defence and, consequently, away from those forces that might be needed for crisis management or expeditionary operations. Attention has shifted to using EU institutions and processes to provide Ukraine with the military capabilities to defend itself. This includes EU European Peace Facility, EPF, funding to Ukraine, which is now up to €3.6 billion, and the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, EUMAM Ukraine, which is helping to train that country’s armed forces. These are likely to be long-term changes. In future, EU capability development activities are likely to focus on those weapons, technologies and structures which member states need for national and collective self-defence. EU military support for Ukraine is also likely to be a long-term project, designed to help Ukraine defeat Russia in the short term and deter Russia in the longer term.

I will very briefly comment on Ireland's position. Successive Irish governments have argued that engagement with EU defence co-operation is compatible with Ireland’s policy of neutrality because, as noted, engagement with the Commons Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, is flexible, remains a sovereign national decision and does not commit Ireland to collective defence. Additionally, the various EU and Irish Government declarations agreed during the debates on the Nice and Lisbon treaties in the 2000s provide further guarantees relating to Irish neutrality. In the foreseeable future, radical changes to the CSDP, such as truly supranational integration or the EU taking on responsibility for collective defence of its member states, are unlikely. As a consequence, involvement in EU defence co-operation and the CSDP is likely to remain compatible with Ireland’s policy of neutrality.

Irish governments have been cautious, arguably excessively cautious, in engaging with EU defence co-operation. Ireland could do more to shape and contribute to EU defence co-operation. If one examines the permanent structured cooperation, PESCO, for example, Irish involvement has been limited. The decision in 2022 to join four additional PESCO projects beyond the one Ireland was then involved in was welcome. More active engagement with EU defence co-operation and the CSDP could enable Ireland to shape that co-operation, be seen as a contributor rather than a free rider and help the Defence Forces develop the capabilities they need.

Dr. Kenneth McDonagh

I thank the committee for the invitation to speak to it on the subject of EU strategic autonomy. I am an associate professor of international relations and the head of the school of law and government at Dublin City University. I have been engaged in research on EU security and defence policy for the past decade, including a focus on Ireland's engagement in Common Security and Defence Policy missions, the European Parliament’s role in oversight of CSDP missions, and the gendered impact of CSDP missions in the western Balkans. My comments today will focus on the opportunities European security and defence co-operation provide to Ireland to address key gaps in our own capabilities and to address key threats to our national interests.

Addressing a meeting of EU ambassadors, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, argued that the EU is facing the consequences of a world where "we have decoupled the sources of our prosperity from the sources of our security". He argued that, on the one hand, European prosperity has benefited from low-cost energy from Russia and cheap manufactured goods from China while, on the other hand, it has outsourced responsibility for its security to the United States. Although the response to the Russian escalation of its war with Ukraine has mobilised more European military support than many thought possible, this support remains fundamentally underwritten by US capabilities and enablers, both practical and political.

Moving to a point where the EU has the capacity to act independently in the face of external threat or crisis is the essence of strategic autonomy. This involves a defence industry capable of independent production of armaments and munitions; member state militaries with key capabilities as fighting forces and key enablers of conducting modern warfare; and a political and diplomatic system fit for purpose that allows the EU to have a clear vision of the threats it faces, a co-ordinated voice in international affairs, and an ability to match its capabilities to its political objectives in a coherent manner. The strategic compass, published a year ago, is the latest attempt to articulate this at a political level.

To achieve these objectives, over recent years the EU has put in place a set of key initiatives and institutions to empower member states to develop their military capabilities in a co-ordinated way. The European Defence Agency, PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, CARD, and the European Defence Fund each represent opportunities for member states to identify defence procurement, investment and development opportunities and to work with other member states to achieve these in a cost-effective and co-ordinated manner.

Separate to these, as part of the programme for Government, the Commission on the Defence Forces was established. This reported in February of last year. The commission outlined three levels of ambition. Level of ambition 1, business as usual, would leave Ireland without any effective defence capability. Level of ambition 2, the option currently being pursued, allows for a significant increase in defence spending, an increase in the established strength of the Defence Forces and the purchase of basic equipment that will, for the first time, provide a picture of what is in our skies and seas. These are necessary and welcome steps. Level of ambition 3 outlines the steps required to bring Ireland's defence capabilities in line with comparable European countries.

It is important that Ireland considers carefully how we can leverage EU structures to develop our own defence capabilities. In July 2022, the Dáil approved the Government's decision to become full participants in four further PESCO projects in the areas of cyber threats, disaster relief capability, special operations forces medical training and mine counter-measures. This is in addition to an ongoing project on maritime surveillance in which Ireland participates. There was an earlier project involving training for peacekeeping missions that has since ended. Ireland is also an observer on a further five projects, which may develop into full participation in time.

Out of a total of 60 PESCO projects, Ireland is participating in less than 10%. The Commission on the Defence Forces recommended that Ireland should exploit to a greater degree the opportunities provided by PESCO. Such an approach makes sense as Ireland seeks to rebuild its defence capabilities. Involvement in further PESCO projects, such as those on a European patrol corvette, a future midsize tactical cargo aircraft and an armoured infantry fighting vehicle, would represent steps towards some of the level of ambition 3 goals outlined in the commission's report.

To circle back to the point made by Josep Borrell which I quoted earlier, Ireland, like its European partners, is now facing the consequences of decoupling our security from our prosperity. We are rightly proud to be an island with global reach and with an economy that has built its prosperity on international investment in areas where cyber security is key. Ireland has benefited from living in a geopolitically stable part of the world with no immediate enemies, but the realities of the modern world have reduced the buffer zone provided by geography, bringing once distant threats to our door or placing our people in harm's way abroad.

For example, the evacuation of Irish citizens from Afghanistan relied on help from our friends. France and Finland provided space on their aircraft to enable this. We need to ask ourselves difficult questions about whether our global ambitions can be underwritten by the kindness of strangers or if we are willing to take the serious steps necessary to develop the types of capabilities that will help Ireland to be safe, prosperous and influential for decades to come. The EU initiatives towards achieving strategic autonomy present one avenue for pursuing these goals.

An Cathaoirleach

Those were two useful contributions. I will now open the debate to members for questions.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

This is my first opportunity to publicly welcome the Chair to his position. I hope he will allow me plenty of free rein, as the previous Chair did.

(Interruptions).

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

I thank Professor Cottey and Dr. McDonagh. We are in a changed geopolitical set-up. We probably had a certain element of consistency over many years that Vladimir Putin has turned on its head. Some will say we could look back at what he said and did previously and that perhaps there were lessons, but sometimes these things can be missed.

When strategic autonomy is discussed at a European level, it has almost been decoupled from the security aspect. The whole idea of globalisation also got thrown on its head. During the Covid-19 pandemic, we had the problem that due to changes in what people were using semi-conductors for, we found ourselves in a situation where we did not have enough semi-conductors for new cars and so on. That was something that needed to happen. When some legislation was going through the Oireachtas, such as the ComReg legislation, suddenly question marks were raised about certain communications technology and whether it would be acceptable in the future to use some of it without any protection in our network and communication infrastructure. Everyone sees that part. Never mind the necessity to move to renewables, especially wind power, it is fair to say we can see that is vital from an energy security point of view, never mind anything else. We all know we can be a superpower and change the whole energy map for Europe. With respect to that and strategic autonomy and so on, very few will refuse to buy into that issue.

This is the matter I would like the witnesses to respond to. I will be honest. At times I would have seen cybersecurity as almost a stalking or Trojan horse scenario to get us to a place where we were moving away from our position of non-alignment, but we have learned that cybersecurity and non-linear or hybrid warfare is simply a reality we are dealing with. We have had to put more money and resources into the National Cyber Security Centre, NCSC, and there will be other actions. It is vital we use our own know-how, particularly in the institutes of education and so on, but it is also vital we deal with our European partners and so forth in that field.

I do not see any real need for us to move from what people call neutrality or non-alignment. The previous Taoiseach pointed out that no one expects us to be a military superpower. The witnesses have already spoken about the commission and that we need to look at what non-alignment or neutrality mean. We must be able to wash our face in that sphere. We are aware of the issues as regards staff retention in the Defence Forces. Those issues all need to be addressed properly. The witnesses talked about the strategic compass and some of the conversations that happen from citizens through to parliamentarians and commissioners, even conversations on qualified majority voting, QMV, versus unanimity. Europe has shown that when people want to and when it is in their interest, we are able to operate on an opt-in scenario, of making determinations there and then. That can relate to anything, such as dealing with buying vaccines during the Covid-19 crisis. We were able to do it in health where we did not have a competence. There is room for manoeuvre and sometimes we can overplay the worry that we are dealing with some players who are not necessarily straight players at a European level. I am talking about Viktor Orbán and Hungary. I probably did not need to point that out. That is where we are.

I am aware of an argument at European level in which some say there is no element of finding a means of Europe shaping things. As regards security and defence, that can only happen on the basis of agreement across the board about whatever moves may be necessary at certain times. A considerable number of us would not like to be hitching our wagon to NATO on the basis that we could not stand over a significant amount of what NATO has done over many years, especially American foreign policy. I will mention Iraq, never mind any other issue, such as South and Central America.

I accept a conversation is happening.

An Cathaoirleach

Will the Deputy move to a conclusion?

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

I did say something about leeway, did I not?

An Cathaoirleach

We have covered the globe.

Deputy Seán Haughey

Was there a question?

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

In fairness, when dealing with bright people, they know where the questions are in the middle of this.

An Cathaoirleach

I am going to let both of the bright people come back in and reflect on some of the issues they have heard and if there is any aspect they would like to pick up on.

Deputy Ruairí Ó Murchú

The last thing I will throw out is that when I am talking about strategic autonomy, the fear and danger are that we must ensure we are not talking about European protectionism or a certain element of madness that puts further pressure on the Third World, given the issues it has and we have, such as climate change and so on.

An Cathaoirleach

With that additional bit thrown in, I will allow whoever would like to contribute first.

Professor Andrew Cottey

I can go first. I will respond on three issues. It is interesting that the Deputy uses the language of non-alignment, which as the Deputy will be aware, the Government would not use. Non-alignment and neutrality or not necessarily the same thing. One comment I will make is that neutrality is extremely difficult to define. There is no clear or agreed definition in Ireland or internationally. As a consequence, what is or is not neutrality and what elements of EU security and defence co-operation are and are not compatible with neutrality is a difficult question to answer because we do not have a clear definition of neutrality. That is a general comment.

Ireland is a small state and small states need partners and friends to address their security challenges. In that context, the EU and the EU's member states are Ireland's key partners and friends. Two areas illustrate that clearly. Cybersecurity is one. Purely national cyber defences are not adequate and Ireland probably needs to do more as regards partnering and working with others who can enhance cyber defences. Another issue I will draw the committee's attention to is the issue of seabed cables that carry the transatlantic Internet connections and so on. How are we to monitor and protect those? There is no easy answer to that question but the one matter that is clear in my head is that Ireland cannot address its responsibilities in that area alone. I would argue as a small state providing for its security and defence, Ireland needs partners, and the EU is the key framework for that.

On the Deputy's point about strategic autonomy, he had it spot-on at the end when he said we need to avoid a retreat into protectionism. The balance has not been worked out.

The EU, the US and others are struggling with this issue day by day and month by month and with how, on the one hand, to protect themselves from vulnerabilities in economics, trade, technologies and raw materials, while, on the other, maintaining a reasonably open, free trade and globalised set of policies. There is no easy or simple answer to this question. The big minds in Brussels and, equally, the people in the government in Washington D.C. are struggling to work out the answers to this question. As I said in my opening remarks, though, this is something the Government could do more thinking on to work out what is the specific Irish position and approach and how this will link into the wider European approach on this issue.

Dr. Kenneth McDonagh

Returning to the idea of whether this co-operation is a stalking horse and how it might relate to our strategic orientation, we are all familiar with the old joke of tourists travelling on the Wild Atlantic Way asking for directions to Dublin and being told, "I would not start from here". The question of what is our strategic orientation is quite separate from the kinds of capabilities we need to deal with the threats we are all aware of now. Bringing that into what these processes are that I spoke about, they are very much driven by member states. It is about what Ireland thinks it can get out of its engagement with PESCO and these are other mechanisms. It is not a case of the Commission or someone in Brussels dictating what we need to do. This concerns us identifying a capability we need and asking if this is the most appropriate way for us to develop it. We can certainly explore these options without in any way compromising our strategic orientation.

Turning to protectionism, I will put my international relations theory hat back on and say that the danger of that kind of closing off is exactly what we are seeing now concerning Russia and the limited effect our sanctions are having. Outside of energy resources, the Russian economy had decoupled itself to a greater or lesser degree from the global economy, at least as it flowed to Europe and North America. In some cases, this can increase the likelihood of potential conflict because there is not the shared bed of interests on which co-operation can be based. I would, therefore, likewise caution against going too far in that direction, while recognising prudent steps can be taken regarding pieces of infrastructure and technology in the context of which we want to ensure the security of supply chains.

An Cathaoirleach

I call Deputy Haughey.

Deputy Seán Haughey

I thank the witnesses for their presentations. They were very balanced and they explained the position in so far as it is possible for them to do so at this stage. I will concentrate on the CSDP as well. I was taken by what Professor Cottey said. He suggested there is considerable flexibility for nation states in respect of the policy. I think this suits member states. As he said as well, most member states are happy to rely on NATO, particularly those in central and eastern Europe. I believe the Government has the balance right in respect of the CSDP, despite the urgings of Dr. McDonagh in the context of perhaps needing to define and expand this aspect more. I am sure we could probably do so. Undoubtedly, what happened in Ukraine changed everything and the mindset relating to security and defence matters. For example, as the witnesses will be aware, under the European Peace Facility, EPF, we have given €77 million, but this was provided in the form of non-lethal equipment. As was also mentioned, we are involved in the EU military assistance mission to Ukraine. These are new developments for Ireland and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is responsible for this.

I ask the witnesses to comment on the legal position regarding Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality. This is what I call it rather than non-alignment. If the Cathaoirleach does not mind, I will read out one or two things. From a legal perspective, we need to examine the EU treaties. I refer specifically to the Lisbon treaty. We must also examine the Constitution. As the witnesses will be aware, a protocol to the Lisbon treaty states it "does not affect or prejudice Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality". Article 29.4.9° of Bunreacht na hÉireann, which was added following the defeat of the first referendum on the Lisbon treaty, states: "The State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union where that common defence would include the State." We can make what we will of that. It is interesting to note that the word "neutrality" does not appear in the Constitution. Equally, there is also Article 42 of the Lisbon treaty, which makes provision for a mutual defence clause. These are the legalities I can find concerning military neutrality. What would the witnesses say is the legal position in respect of Ireland if, for example, consideration were given to joining a military alliance? This is not something I am advocating. There is talk, though, of having a referendum on neutrality. This is a complex question, and I would welcome hearing the views of the witnesses on the subject.

My second question concerns the triple lock, and I know this does not specifically relate to the EU. What are the witnesses' views on this mechanism, whereby for a foreign mission to be undertaken there needs to be a UN mandate, a Government decision and a vote of the Oireachtas? The Minister for Foreign Affairs has said this needs to be examined and that Russia has a veto over Ireland's UN agenda. This is something that needs to be looked at.

Regarding cybersecurity, will the witnesses briefly outline, if they can, what exactly is now being done at an EU level on this topic? I thank them very much.

An Cathaoirleach

Who would like to take those questions?

Dr. Kenneth McDonagh

I might pass the cybersecurity question over to Professor Cottey, and I will take the easy ones.

On the legal position, the Deputy has highlighted the relevant parts of our Constitution and the Lisbon treaty. In an international legal sense, neutrality, at least in the context of my understanding, has a fairly limited application outside of times when there is active conflict. It really means that there is a formal role in a time of conflict. Article 42 of the Lisbon treaty does have a mutual defence clause and it was activated by France after the Bataclan theatre attack and another set of terrorist attacks there. There was some discussion about the type of response. The language in that clause allows for the support to be non-military. It allows it to be in line with other commitments. If we think of Ireland's commitment to neutrality as meaning non-membership of military alliances, it is compliant with our legal requirements in this respect. One option discussed at the time concerned Irish soldiers serving in a peacekeeping mission relieving French capabilities to allow them to return to and operate in France.

Turning to the Irish constitutional position, it is specifically a defence alliance based on a European Council decision. In theory, therefore, membership of NATO, for example, would not be covered by this mechanism, although it would be a very brave and perhaps foolhardy Government that would decide to pursue that without consulting the people, given what we know of the public support for our traditional policy of military non-alignment.

My own position, and I know there is some discussion about putting some form of definition of "neutrality" into the Constitution, is that if we have learned something from the referendum to repeal the eighth amendment, in particular, it is that putting policy choices into the Constitution on which reasonable people can disagree is not a very good idea. It can create the kind of outcomes we will not necessarily desire as a result. Having this matter dealt with at the Oireachtas level is the appropriate one for making these kinds of decisions.

This brings me to the issue of the triple lock. There is some ambiguity, and this is perhaps a legal point, in the way the triple lock is framed as to whether specifically a UN Security Council resolution is required or if a resolution passed by the UN General Assembly would be sufficient authorisation. This might be a way of thinking about how we deal with the veto players and the five permanent members of the Security Council. I agree, though, that it is certainly worthy of review in an environment where we have a permanent member of the Security Council in clear violation of the UN Charter. Are we really happy to allow this to be an ultimate decider on the kinds of actions we take in support of peace and security and international law globally?

Cybersecurity is not a space on which I have a huge amount of insight. There are several other projects within PESCO that address cybersecurity issues that might be considered. At national level as well, we have directed greater resources in this direction, but it is an ongoing project. I will leave it there and hand over to Professor Cottey.

Professor Andrew Cottey

I will address each of the three points.

On the neutrality question, international law is a tricky thing. As members will know from domestic matters, depending on which lawyer is consulted, a variety of opinions can be obtained on any given legal issue. That is the case also with issues relating to international law. The key thing differentiating neutrality from not being neutral is membership of a military alliance, and that specifically involves a security or mutual defence guarantee. Article 42.7 of the Lisbon treaty is such a guarantee but there has been recognition in the Lisbon protocols that it does not effectively apply to Ireland, so Ireland would not be bound to provide military assistance to other EU member states.

On the reference to a "common defence", in the linguistic theology of all this stuff "common defence" usually refers to deep supranational integration of armed forces in the EU. My broad logic, in line with arguments successive Irish governments have made over the past decade and more, is to the effect that Irish neutrality is protected by the existing arrangements.

On the hypothetical question of NATO membership, whatever about the legal side, it seems politically inconceivable that, if any Irish Government were to propose NATO membership, the issue would not have to go to a referendum. Whether it would also require constitutional change could be debated.

On putting a stronger or clearer definition of "neutrality" into the Constitution, I refer to my earlier point on the lack of clear or agreed meaning of "neutrality". If one tried to come up with a definition of "neutrality" to put in the Constitution, one would rapidly conclude it is not possible. I am not persuaded by the argument that a definitive definition could be written into the Constitution.

On the triple lock, I would take a broader political perspective. I am a big supporter of the UN. It is strongly preferable, if Ireland is to deploy forces overseas on peacekeeping or other missions, to have UN endorsement. However, I do not think the UN should be placed on a pedestal or considered a perfect institution. The Security Council is made up, above all, of the five permanent members and the veto. The General Assembly has often been a byword for ineffectiveness because any General Assembly resolution needs to be approved by a majority of two thirds of member states. The third element, UN approval for deployment of forces overseas, should be removed. I would be in favour of amending that element of the triple lock. People refer to Russia’s veto, which is problematic. I would also point to a Chinese veto, as well as an American or French veto. As a British citizen, I feel a little strange commenting on this but it seems strange that, 100 years after independence, Ireland would want to put itself in a position where, in some sense, the United Kingdom might have a veto on the overseas deployment of the Irish Defence Forces.

I am not hugely expert on cybersecurity but we can think in terms of two levels. The EU has a range of policies and institutions to provide cyber defences to EU institutions and elements of co-operation among member states but, in practice, cyber defences are still primarily a national matter. That is worth bearing in mind. Members will be well aware of debate on the adequacy or otherwise of Ireland’s national plans for cyber defence. Ireland needs to up its game, notwithstanding the measures taken in the last few years.

Subject to correction, I think Ireland is still not a member of the cybersecurity centre of excellence based in Tallinn, Estonia, which is a joint EU-NATO initiative. The Government should look to that because it would be one way of helping to build national cyber expertise and strengthen national cyber defence capabilities.

Senator Sharon Keogan

I thank the witnesses for their presentation.

PESCO has 60 projects. We only tap into about 10% of those. What other projects could Ireland tap into?

I want to address the key gaps in Ireland’s defences and capabilities. Will the budget of €1.5 billion by 2028 be enough to address the glaring gaps we face? I am thinking of the big radars, the unauthorised aircraft in our skies and the secret arrangement we have with the RAF, which patrols our skies for us. The Naval Service protects our 1,400 km of seas. Illegal fishing and drug trafficking are going on. What about keeping our commercial lanes open and protecting our ports? These are things we need to do. I am sure Brexit has increased traffic on our waters as well. Underwater cabling is also important. Will the witnesses address the key gaps in Ireland’s defence mechanisms? Will that money be enough?

Professor Andrew Cottey

I will not say much about PESCO. Dr. McDonagh possibly knows more on that. PESCO projects are not only things other states can propose and Ireland join. Ireland, as an EU member state, is perfectly entitled to take the initiative on PESCO projects. Ireland could think of areas in which it could take initiative on new PESCO projects. I will give two examples. One area where the Defence Forces have long-standing expertise and a strong global reputation is in countering improvised explosive devices, IEDs. The Defence Forces have played roles and provided expertise in the Balkans and Afghanistan in relation to this. Why not a PESCO project initiated by Ireland to help strengthen counter-IED and related technologies? Likewise, maybe there is scope for PESCO projects related to undersea cables. The Government should not only think of existing projects it might join, but of areas where Ireland might take the initiative.

On the defence budget and capabilities, my broad answer is that there is a long way to go. Irish defence spending is comparatively very low. Ireland is one of the lowest spenders on defence not just in the EU but globally. The capabilities of the Defence Forces have effectively been run down and declined over decades. There is much work to do.

On the Naval Service end, the radars are a necessity. That would at least give Ireland a picture of the airspace, although it would not give it any capability to intercept foreign aircraft or whatever.

Buying a fully equipped, modern combat airforce would be extremely expensive and just may not be the sensible way to go. My own view is that at least some real transparency and real public discussion about the nature of this semi-secret, undeclared air defence agreement with the United Kingdom would be very welcome. The Irish public would be able to cope with a real adult conversation about this rather than hiding this issue.

Dr. Kenneth McDonagh

I thank the Senator for those questions. I am glad that Professor Cottey dealt with the issue of the UK veto on Irish deployments because with his accent, he can get away with it. To pick up on his point on the arrangement or non-arrangement with our neighbours in terms of air defence, these are the choices we need to make. We do not have this capability ourselves. As Professor Cottey highlighted, it would be very expensive to develop our air capability and what we could afford would be relatively limited at that. The per-hour cost of these things is really mind-boggling and means we have to make choices about how we will provide for our security in that space, in the absence of an indigenous capability. Is it about a formal contract with another country or a mini-lateral arrangement with like-minded countries within Europe? There are options we can explore that do not necessarily lead to membership of a military alliance but suggest that in specific areas, we can take advantage of co-operation.

That leads me to the question of the budget. The short answer, again echoing what Professor Cottey has said, is that it would not be enough to bring us towards level 3 of ambition, for example. It may not be quite enough even to achieve the target of increasing the established strength of the Defence Forces because if we cannot create the kind of environment where professionals want to stay and work, that is going to be a challenge as well. The benchmark that NATO uses, just as an example, is 2% of GDP as an appropriate spending level for defence, which is somewhat arbitrary. If one thinks of where Irish defence spending is, which is down between 0.3% and 0.4%, there is a long way to go before we get there. Even with the increase in defence spending we have seen, we will struggle to get to 1% by 2028. A lot more investment is needed. That might bring us to look at this through two different timelines. In the short term, we might be looking at more co-operation with partners to cover gaps in our defence, whether that is in undersea cables or in the airspace security that we require, and we might also consider a longer term spending plan for how we start to develop some of those capabilities ourselves. That is something that should be the subject of public debate, scrutiny and oversight. That is key, particularly for any arrangements we might have with other states.

In terms of PESCO projects, as Professor Cottey said, there is the capacity for us to develop our own. There are areas where we have real expertise, like in improvised explosive devices. We could be a credible leader in that space. It would provide a useful way to demonstrate our niche capabilities when it comes to security and defence. I do not want any of my comments today to be seen as being down on the Irish Defence Forces. I have had the pleasure of meeting people internationally who have worked with our soldiers abroad and who speak only in the highest terms of the professionalism and commitment they demonstrate. It is on the rest of us to provide them with the tools they need to accomplish those missions. Currently within the 60 projects, I have already mentioned the European Patrol Corvette, which would largely map on to the kinds of capabilities we are trying to acquire through the new multi-role vehicle, our vessel for the navy. There is also a project on armoured personnel carriers and the existing Mowag capability that we have is due for renewal. There is a mid-range cargo aircraft which is relevant in terms of where we are putting our soldiers deployed abroad, whether that is in Lebanon, the western Balkans or in Africa. There are key things that we could do with improving. This might be an appropriate way to get involved, if not as full participants then at least at observer level, so that we know what capabilities are coming online within the European defence industrial sphere.

Professor Andrew Cottey

I would make an additional point on the Defence Forces. As everyone here will be aware, one of the big challenges, if not the biggest, is the issue of retention and recruitment and the way that links into pay and conditions for the Defence Forces. That is a very big challenge. I would note that the Commission on the Defence Forces largely did not address that challenge because it was outside its remit. That is still a major challenge and it links into the wider issue of public sector pay and terms and conditions for gardaí, nurses and so on. There are also questions about whether the Defence Forces are a category in themselves. There is certainly a very big piece of work still to be done in terms of pay and terms and conditions in the Defence Forces in order to persuade people to stay and to persuade young people to join.

Deputy Brendan Howlin

I apologise for missing the earlier contributions but I had something else to do. I have read the written submission and I thank our guests for it. It raises some very important debating points. If I raise an issue that has already been covered, I ask our guests to say so. I will make two quick observations first. First, in terms of looking at the Irish defence spend, and I have some experience of monitoring public expenditure, obviously GDP is not a reliable comparative indicator in terms of this nation's spend vis-à-vis that of other nations because of the peculiarities of our economic system. Even GNI* can be a distortion in that regard. What one gets for one's cash is a better indicator. My second observation is on air defence. There are analogous nations, poorer nations like Czechia or Slovakia, that have leased Swedish jet fighter aircraft on a long-term basis and provided themselves with an independent air protection, or at least airspace monitoring, system. These are countries that are much poorer than Ireland.

My first question arises in the context of the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq. There have been many profound consequences of that and maybe they could be debated at another time. One of those consequences is the disconnect between the confidence of the European view of defence and security and that of the southern world, or the southern hemisphere countries. That is very evident now, even with what one would imagine is a black-and-white moral issue like the invasion of Ukraine. Many nations now are not willing to vote at the UN or other international bodies because they point back to the breach of trust in Iraq. It would seem to me that Ireland has a role to play there, rather than simply aligning ourselves, full square, as we are. Obviously in terms of Ukraine, we are 100% there. We could have a role in terms of being explainers and persuaders on issues like that because we took a different stand from that of Britain and the US on the invasion of Iraq. I would be interested in our guests' take on that.

My second question relates to the view posited on common defence and the fact that there are strata of opinion within the EU. We have France at one extreme, saying that we need an EU military. We posed questions to the ambassadors and public representatives of a number of Baltic countries and eastern member states of the EU who have a much deeper reliance on NATO. They are fearful that any strengthening of a common EU defence would diminish the engagement of the United States and weaken defence. I am interested in hearing the views of our guests on that point. Where does that leave us in the context of another Trump or Trump-like US President who may not be at all committed to European defence in the way that the USA has been since the Second World War?

My final question relates to our unique position. I am interested in our guests' views on the roles within PESCO that Ireland could take up but I am also wondering if there are roles outside of PESCO that we could be world leaders on. We have established a college of peacekeeping and we have one of the strongest historical involvements and experience in peacekeeping. To link back to my first question, would that not be a way of reaching out to the non-NATO, non-EU world, to say that there is something we can offer that is unique in terms of peacekeeping?

An Cathaoirleach

I was going to come in with questions at the end but, as they are linked with the matters raised by Deputy Howlin, I will ask them now and the witnesses can reply to both sets of questions.

In terms of security architecture and where we are gong in future, there are two things that play into the consideration. The first is the impact of Brexit. Many people forget the balancing element the UK played within the EU in terms of its key role and view on NATO, as distinct from the EU, as a security deliverer. The absence of that voice within the European family in future deliberations will be a key driver in terms of where Europe sees itself going. The other issue, which is central to what Deputy Howlin was saying, relates to looking realistically beyond the Ukraine war to where America will see its geopolitical positioning. This is relevant not just in the context of a Trumpian-style presidency. Obama pivoted towards the Pacific and the issues America faces in that arena. A glaring situation that arises, which is fascinating to see at first hand, is that we have such a eurocentric media-shaped view of how people perceive something like the conflict in Ukraine. When one steps outside that, one can see that many countries, particularly those in the southern hemisphere, such as in Africa, do not share the views of western EU members on security and co-operation or a conflict such as the Ukraine war. It is a worrying point. I return to an earlier question on how important the EU will need to be in terms of outward engagement and reach. There is a necessity to respond and proactively engage in developing a European view that is not just an adjunct view to that of the United States. Those are the issues that will begin to manifest. An interesting aspect to this will be that if the EU expands into the Balkans and Ukraine and possibly into Georgia, how will that shape the view of European co-operation and defence co-operation? That is where we will end up, perhaps in a decade or more. Where do the witnesses see such expansion fitting in with the current structures and the implications for them?

Dr. Kenneth McDonagh

On the issue of defence spending, 2% is an arbitrary figure but it is a useful way to compare what we are doing. The Deputy is right to focus on where we get good value for our investment. That is why I go back to encouraging the exploration of the potential of PESCO to deliver that good value rather than reinventing the wheel or going through more complicated supply chains.

As regards the different strata of opinion on CSDP within Europe, which ties in with the Cathaoirleach's question on the influence of Brexit, that has now been compounded by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus are now, for different reasons, the countries in the European tent that are outside the NATO tent. The space that was created by larger states disagreeing has shrunk considerably. That does not mean we need to change our approach but it probably means we need to be more politically aware of how our approach is viewed by others and that it will not be entirely costless not to be seen to support our Baltic friends, for example, or Poland and so on. We need to be aware of a different political landscape when it come to CSDP. That relates to initiatives around improving the capacity for Europe to act but, because of the large overlap with NATO, it really does not matter which hat these countries are wearing, as Sven Biscop, who is an expert in this area, often points out,. An improvement in capabilities for a member state of the European Union or NATO is, in a sense, an improvement in the capabilities of both. It is not a zero sum game because of that overlap, so that tension is not a deal-breaker for some countries. That said, NATO is currently seen as the primary game in town.

That brings me to the question on the influence of things such as the Iraq war and the view from the global south. The Deputy is correct to highlight that there is a risk of alignment between an Atlanticist view of European security and how that is viewed externally. It is interesting to look at the UN votes on the conflict. There is greater support in the global south for pointing out the clear violation of international law but the counties in question will not follow on from that by supporting sanctions or punishment for that violation. That is largely because they believe Russia is doing in Ukraine what the US did in Iraq or what western countries have done in other parts of the world. There is no easy way of overcoming that cynicism, other than demonstrating by practice that we are not being selective. One of the challenges we have as a continent and as a country is our treatment of refugees in this context. The globe is watching us as we rightly provide sanctuary to Ukrainians coming to Ireland but treat Syrians, Afghans or other people fleeing equally horrific conflicts in a very different manner. That difference will be seen as putting us in one camp or the other. That may be a challenge for Ireland. We recently stepped down from a reasonably successful period on the UN Security Council, on which we were a voice for international rights and shedding light on matters beyond western concerns, but the external perspective of that may not be as clear as we believe it to be. We are very aware of our military non-alignment and unique stance on certain issues of international peace and security but that is not necessarily seen elsewhere. We are seen, perhaps, as another reasonably wealthy member of the European Union. The important distinctions and lines we draw are not necessarily recognised outside in that way. An appropriate way of dealing with that might be to advance a UN role in peacekeeping but the obvious mechanisms for Ireland to perform that role in a greater way are within the mechanisms in which we are already engaged, that is, through CSDP. We should be looking on the civilian side as much as on the military side and ensuring we get Irish people into those roles and out in the field to represent us as a country that supports international peace, security and law and is not afraid to criticise our friends as well as our foes when they overstep the mark on these issues.

Professor Andrew Cottey

There is quite a lot there. I note the point made that Finland and Sweden are on the verge of joining NATO. My view is that they will both become NATO members. An impact of that is that it will reduce the number of non-NATO member neutral states within the European Union. There is a political shift in that regard which is worth noting.

On the points relating to the Iraq war and the global south, "absolutely" is my first comment. In its work on the UN Security Council in the past two years, Ireland very much emphasised global role partnering with the south. A substantive example in that regard is that Ireland was one of the countries that led in putting Ethiopia and the appalling conflict in that country on the agenda of the UN Security Council and keeping it there.

Deputy Brendan Howlin

Perhaps the Cathaoirleach should take some credit in that regard.

An Cathaoirleach

It is important to note that the Department's staff in Ethiopia took the brunt of the result of it. It was a very important issue during our tenure, however.

Professor Andrew Cottey

What is particularly important about that is that it is substantive. It is not just rhetorically saying we care about the concerns of the global south; it is actually giving substance to that.

Ironically, one of the explaining roles Ireland could help play would be to explain to EU member states that, if the EU wants the global south, to use that somewhat ugly term, to align with or support European concerns, Europe needs to address substantively and not just rhetorically issues of concern to the global south. An explaining role may be played within the 27.

Regarding the Baltic states, central and eastern Europe and former President Trump, the irony is that, notwithstanding the former President, his Presidency did not lead to Baltic or other central and eastern Europeans recalculating and deciding that maybe they needed to think about the EU as a second option. Instead, they doubled down in a sense on NATO and the transatlantic commitment. For central and eastern European states, NATO and the US are still very much number one, notwithstanding the Trump Presidency. If we had a Trump 2 or a neo-isolationist American president who, in the most extreme case, decided to withdraw the US from NATO, that would be a radical moment, particularly for central and eastern European states.

On a possible Irish role outside permanent structured co-operation, PESCO, I agree about peacekeeping. Ireland and its Government could do more to make more of that. The proposal for a centre on peacekeeping and leadership was included in the 2015 White Paper on Defence. Nearly a decade later and it has not really been delivered on, however. The Irish Government could do more in this space. It needs to up its game.

Clearly, Brexit shifts the political balance within the EU in that the leading Atlanticist country is no longer a member of the EU. I do not believe it shifts the political balance as decisively as some people suggest, though. Germany, which is the swing country, is a strong Europeanist that supports European defence co-operation but is also very committed to NATO. NATO and the relationship with the US will remain central for Germany, which has a significant bearing on the internal politics of the EU.

An Cathaoirleach

I thank members for their questions and the witnesses for attending. It has been an informative and interesting discussion and we appreciate them giving us their time.

The joint committee adjourned at 11.23 a.m. until 9.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 29 March 2023.