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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS debate -
Tuesday, 6 Dec 2005

Non-Proliferation Treaty: Presentation.

I welcome the officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Rory Montgomery is political director and accompanied by Mr. Adrian McDaid who is director of the disarmament and non-proliferation section. The Minister addressed the committee on this issue in June and subsequently attended and addressed the NPT review meeting in New York in September. The purpose of this meeting is to update the committee on progress since the review and to discuss the current position in Iran and North Korea, as well as other states which have yet to sign up to the treaty.

I invite Mr. Montgomery to begin by making a brief presentation, following which I will open the discussion to the floor.

Mr. Rory Montgomery

I am very glad to have the opportunity today to participate in a briefing on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to seek to answer any questions committee members may have.

I would like to clarify the reference in the documentation to a review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in September. There was no such review in September. The five yearly review conference was held in May and the Minister for Foreign Affairs briefed the committee in June on what had transpired. The next review conference will be held in 2010. However, there were discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation treaty issues in the run-up to the UN world summit in September. Some of the matters covered by the NPT were examined at the time. The focus of those discussions was much broader than the NPT and the countries involved included states which were not a party to the treaty.

It was the Government's hope the summit would send a strong political signal which would help break the deadlock on the most pressing challenges in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Such an outcome would have assisted in the identification of ways to strengthen the global regime and in laying the foundations for concrete steps to be taken to revitalise the NPT between now and the next review cycle due to begin in 2007. Unfortunately, it was not possible to make progress in New York. Ireland worked actively within the European Union in the run-up to the summit to support and strengthen draft texts on disarmament proposed by the President of the General Assembly. Norway also led a small cross-regional group which proposed the use of some positive language. Despite intensive discussions, all of these proposals failed to achieve consensus as the deep divisions evident at the NPT conference once more came to the surface. The Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs both made clear in their addresses to the United Nations General Assembly in New York their deep disappointment in this respect.

As the Minister indicated to this committee in June, support for the NPT is the Government's highest priority in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We have a proud history and strong track record in this area for nearly 50 years, from the days of Frank Aiken's early initiative in the late 1950s. In his address to the NPT review conference in May the Minister noted that our support for the treaty was rooted in the firm conviction that a strong multilateral system and a rules-based international order was the best approach in seeking to preserve international peace and security. For a small country like Ireland, it is the only approach to adopt. However, no rules-based system can be truly effective if the rules are not respected by all.

When he came before the committee in June, the Minister recalled the importance we attached to the fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament obligations set out in Article VI of the NPT and reaffirmed and developed at subsequent NPT conferences. At times there is a tendency in some quarters to place greater emphasis on the non-proliferation obligations of the treaty, as if they should be given greater priority or validity. We have never accepted such an approach. We see disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing processes requiring irreversible progress on both fronts. Ultimately, what does not exist cannot proliferate. We have always insisted that the legally binding obligations on states to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons were undertaken in the context of equally legally binding obligations to reduce and eliminate such weapons. Without such agreement, it is doubtful whether the NPT could ever have been negotiated.

In respect of the non-proliferation obligations under the treaty, all non-nuclear weapons state parties are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, which has an inspectorate to verify the accuracy of information supplied and a board of governors which reviews the operation of agreements. There are no such detailed arrangements in respect of the nuclear disarmament obligations, although examination of the implementation of these obligations forms an integral part of the regular review process and is discussed in depth at NPT preparatory committees and review conferences.

Article VI of the NPT reads, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". This article is the essential foundation for the pursuit of the important objective of nuclear disarmament and we have managed to build on it so as to be more specific on what is a very general statement in the treaty. In 1995, for example, parties agreed at the NPT review conference on a work programme which included the negotiation of treaties banning nuclear testing and the production of fissile material which could be used in nuclear weapons. It also included a commitment that nuclear weapons states would pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. This outcome enabled state parties to agree to the indefinite extension of the treaty.

At the review conference in 2000 — until now regarded as the high water mark of efforts in this area — state parties agreed to the most substantive and comprehensive final declaration ever agreed at such a conference. The most critical achievement was the incorporation in the outcome document of a set of 13 practical steps which provide a benchmark for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement the disarmament commitment made in Article VI. A central element was the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament.

There has been progress during the years in the direction of the requirements set by Article VI, as has been acknowledged on occasion. There have been reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, has estimated that there were about 38,000 nuclear weapons in global arsenals in 1970, the year in which the treaty came into force. It estimated that the numbers had increased to a peak of 65,000 worldwide by 1986. The number was estimated at approximately 27,000 last year. This is 27,000 too many from our perspective, yet it is a smaller number than the peak number. A treaty banning nuclear testing — the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT — was negotiated in 1996. This treaty has been signed by the five nuclear weapons states, three of which, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, have ratified it so far. We have also welcomed the continuing moratorium on nuclear testing which has been observed by all states, as well as the voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

As the Minister made clear in New York, we are concerned, some 15 years after the end of the Cold War, that nuclear weapons are still reaffirmed as central to strategic doctrine for the foreseeable future. There are up to 30,000 nuclear weapons in existence. When we hear reports of plans to develop new nuclear weapons or new rationales for their use, we fear that the taboo on using such weapons will be weakened. These developments are not compatible with the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons, nor are they helpful in promoting full implementation of the other provisions of the treaty, that is, the non-proliferation side of the bargain. While voluntary moratoriums are welcome, they cannot be a substitute for legally binding obligations in a treaty.

It was in the context of concern that the opportunities provided by the end of the Cold War were not being seized adequately by the nuclear weapons states that Ireland worked with like-minded countries to form, in 1998, a new grouping, the New Agenda Coalition. In addition to Ireland, its members include Sweden, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt, Mexico and Brazil. This is a geographically and otherwise diverse group of countries. The New Agenda Coalition has a particular focus on nuclear disarmament and sought to give a lead in injecting fresh thinking and new momentum in this area. It played a pivotal role and was the driving force at the 2000 NPT review conference in respect of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament. Unfortunately, it did not have the same impact last May at the unsuccessful review conference. We are reflecting together on how best to make progress.

Within the European Union Ireland has worked hard to focus attention on the need for implementation of all provisions of the NPT. For the last review conference in May the European Union developed a detailed and positive common position which drew favourable comment from the NGO community and others. It was important because two nuclear weapons states are members of the European Union. Unfortunately, as the Minister stated to members in June, two and a half weeks of the four weeks of the conference were taken up by wrangling over the agenda and organisation of work. There was no agreement on a single substantive recommendation or conclusion.

Most recently, with our partners in the coalition, we submitted a resolution to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in October and lobbied actively for support. The resolution was passed by a large majority of member states, including a majority of EU member states and several NATO members. Later this week it will be dealt with at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly where we hope it will be passed by a large margin and attract further support. Among its key elements is a reaffirmation of the outcome of the 2000 review conference as the framework for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The resolution calls on nuclear weapons states to accelerate implementation of the 13 steps.

Another of the New Agenda Coalition's key objectives, the universalisation of the treaty, is also addressed in the resolution. It is the most universal of all the multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Only three of the 91 members of the United Nations, India, Israel and Pakistan, have not signed it. This is a matter of serious concern and the Minister has urged all three to accede unconditionally at an early date. The European Union is also committed to this objective under a common position agreed in November 2003 and for the review conference in May.

The New Agenda Coalition's resolution makes it clear that we are not satisfied with the current position on non-proliferation. While we are concerned at the very slow rate of progress made in the elimination of nuclear weapons, we do not believe this can ever serve as a pretext or justification for others to seek to acquire them. It is for this reason that we share the widespread international concern in respect of the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran, both of which have signed and ratified the NPT.

As members know, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in December 2002 and in January 2003 announced its withdrawal from the treaty, the first country ever to do so. It has since claimed it possesses nuclear weapons. The best hope for securing a peaceful solution to this problem lies in the six party talks process involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea, the Russian Federation, Japan, China and the United States. China has played a leading role, having initiated the process and chaired the rounds of talks that have taken place. On 19 September the parties agreed a joint statement setting out a number of commitments, including the abandonment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We look forward to the early implementation of these commitments and the establishment of verification arrangements in which the International Atomic Energy Agency could play a useful role.

The position on Iran's nuclear programme has been under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency in recent years and there have been 12 written reports by the agency's director general and several resolutions of its board of governors. The last such resolution, dating from September, found that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations in regard to its NPT safeguards agreement had constituted non-compliance with its obligations under the agency's statute. This creates a prima facie basis for referring the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations but the board has not yet exercised this option pending further investigation by the agency.

The focus of the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation is largely on past activities and trying to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of Iran's current nuclear programme. Some aspects of the past programme are far from clear. Efforts are also under way to engage Iran on the future direction of the programme. The so-called E3, that is, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, supported by Javier Solana, have played a leading role and their efforts have been supported by the European Union as a whole and the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors. Negotiations with Iran are suspended following its decision in August to recommence the conversion of uranium, contrary to commitments given to the E3 in the Paris agreement last year.

Last month the General Affairs and External Relations Council reiterated its grave concern at Iran's resumption of uranium conversion activity and urged Iran to implement all measures requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors. The Council underlined the European Union's continued support for a diplomatic solution to international concerns at Iran's nuclear programme and agreed to keep the matter under close review.

One new element which has emerged in recent weeks is a Russian idea that all uranium enrichments in respect of lran's nuclear programme be carried out in Russia and to a lower than weapons grade standard. This is an interesting and potentially fruitful concept. So far Iran has given no signal that such an idea would be acceptable to it but we understand it is still being explored. We welcome all efforts to find a diplomatic solution.

In all of these areas we are motivated by a determination to move towards the world envisaged by the NPT, a world where nuclear weapons have no role and no future. The failure of the last NPT review conference in May to agree a substantive outcome which was underscored by the failure of the summit in September undeniably represents a set-back to this ambition. We need to ensure, however, that we do not give way to the counsels of despair. The challenges we failed to address successfully in May and September remain and will not vanish of their own accord.

We should not forget in these difficult times what the NPT has been able to achieve in the 35 years of its existence. As I stated, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has reported that there is now less than half the number of many nuclear weapons than there was 20 years ago. Perhaps more importantly, since the NPT was signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970, many more countries have given up rather than begun nuclear weapons programmes. In particular, an example was set by South Africa and Ukraine in this regard.

I strongly argue that we do not need a new treaty to address the challenges that confront us. What we need is full implementation of the treaty. As the Minister noted in his meeting with the committee in June, we are firmly of the view that the NPT is now more than ever of tremendous importance to the achievement of international peace and security.

I thank Mr. Montgomery for his contribution. I was present at the United Nations talks for a few days and found it hard to comprehend how an agenda could not even be agreed for the meeting.

India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories to the treaty. A head of steam is building up with regard to Iran and its attitude to its nuclear programme. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are negotiating on behalf of the European Union. One of the reasons agreement was not possible in May was double standards and hypocrisy. Threats of action against Iran have been made, while a group of countries representing the European Union are negotiating with it. More suitable parties could be found to negotiate on our behalf than those with their own chequered histories.

I am worried about the development of nuclear technology and the enrichment of nuclear fuels for the development of nuclear weapons. However, for my simple mind, will Mr. Montgomery explain why such a head of steam has built up with regard to implied threats of sanctions against Iran? Will he explain the double standards vis-a-vis Iran, India, Pakistan and Israel which are not even signatories to the convention? India is seeking a seat on the Security Council and the United Nations turns a blind eye to the ongoing development and threat in that country. Although Israel has not admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, the fact that everybody knows it has them is destabilising the Middle East. Will Mr.Montgomery respond to my comments and provide an explanation?

Before Mr. Montgomery responds, I call Deputy Mulcahy.

Members will be aware that I drafted a motion on this issue which was not passed at the instigation of the Chairman. However, I have been raising the issue for a number of months. I thank the two officials who are experts in this area for attending. I enjoyed Mr. Montgomery's paper and will keep it on file.

While agreeing with all Deputy Allen said, the bottom line is that the NPT is in trouble. At the United Nations the Minister stated:

We do not believe that the continued retention of nuclear weapons, or the unsatisfactory rate of progress in their elimination, can ever serve as a justification for proliferation by other States [I agree with this point]. It is clear, nonetheless, that the legally binding obligations to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons, which the vast majority of States Parties to this Treaty have honoured, were undertaken in the context of equally legally binding obligations by the Nuclear Weapons States to eliminate their nuclear weapons. That is the underlying bargain in the Treaty. It is doubtful whether the NPT could ever have been achieved without such agreement. . . . That concern is all the more heightened when we hear reports of plans to develop new nuclear weapons or modify such weapons for new uses.

My original motion questioned the extent to which nuclear powers were in compliance or otherwise with their obligations under the NPT. I do not expect a full technical answer today but, unfortunately, I did not get that answer in the briefing provided. I want the question answered.

Solemn obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons are contained in the treaty. States have signed on the dotted line. I want to know if they are complying with their obligations and, if not, to what extent. I want to know in black and white how many missiles or otherwise they possess. I am no longer prepared to have a discussion on Iran in a vacuum. I have visited Iran and toured the country. The issue, as mentioned, may well go before the Security Council and the General Assembly if the IAEA finally becomes fed up issuing reports. Ireland will have to cast a vote as to whether Iran should be sanctioned. This committee will have an input in that regard. We will question the Minister on the position of other countries such as Israel, India and Pakistan, which is also intolerable.

As I noted previously, some of the countries mentioned sought membership of the Security Council. Imagine a nuclear state seeking membership of the Security Council not having signed up to the NPT. I will table a motion in this regard if required. It is unacceptable that any country should be a member of the Security Council while illegally possessing nuclear weapons. I would like to know the Minister's view on this issue. I am not sure whether he has expressed a view on it but I have outlined mine. I hope nobody will act like Sir Humphrey and telephone me to tell me my view on this issue. It is completely unacceptable.

I want to know what efforts, if any, are being made to get Israel, India and Pakistan to sign up to the NPT. What is the international community doing in this regard? Have these countries been threatened with sanctions or in any other way? Deputy Allen is correct that the Israeli nuclear position is destabilising the Middle East and is like a lure to Iran to develop a similar facility. It is unacceptable.

We do not have much time to discuss the matter. I will be pressing for this issue to be included — I hope my colleagues will agree — as a major plank of our work programme for 2006. We must be fully briefed and know what we are talking about. We should call in the US, Chinese and Israeli ambassadors and ask the hard questions. Since Frank Aiken's time in office, the Irish involvement in the NPT has been strong and positive. The New Agenda Coalition was a very positive and courageous development. I hope this point is brought to the Minister's attention. Ireland can hold its head high. It seems, however, that the 13 practical steps proposed in the New Agenda Coalition motion are falling on deaf ears. I want to know just how deaf those ears are. If that requires bringing over specialists from the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London or from the Carnegie Endowment, I want that done because I want to know. Unfortunately, I am not yet in a position where I have full information. I want to be fully briefed. This should be a major part of our work for next year.

I strongly support Deputy Mulcahy in what he seeks and has said. I agree the NPT is in trouble. The point I would add is that it is in trouble in an appalling context. The treaty came into existence in 1970 and the review discussed here was the seventh review. When the public hears about the issue of Iran it asks the reasonable question of whether the treaty was not just about proliferation but about the elimination of weapons by those who have them. That is a lay opinion, but it is important.

It is not just a lay opinion because it is an opinion lodged in Article 6, which is the core founding principle of the NPT. To prosecute the non-proliferation side of Article 6 is an exercise in bad faith, particularly by some of the most powerful. Therefore, the language of the treaty is being defeated on the basis of force.

In looking at the seventh review, which covers to April-May 2005, it is useful to reflect on the previous reviews. Although it is controversial to say this, I put it that the reviews that took place prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union were more positive in terms of verification. If one looks at the history of the NPT in the context of the talks during the Reagan Presidency with the then Soviet Union, the possession of what was perceived to be a significant and increasing capacity led to significant movement in verification. One might also hypothesise that the later reviews have revealed that as we entered an atmosphere of a single superpower, the impulse to verification practically eroded.

This brings us to a practical point for this committee and the European Union, namely, the difficulty in retaining a position that is faithful to Article 6 in the common position of the Union. I suggest the common position taken before the May review was overwhelmingly skewed towards non-proliferation and hardly dealt with the erosion of any movement towards verification. It was certainly weak on its language on elimination. That common position was itself distorted by the facts of the abuse of Article 6. With regard to the context in which this happens, it is one where new elements have been added to geopolitics, in particular a major fissure no longer based on the possession of the balance of armaments, but on the perceived rise of Islam and the resulting debate on what was called international terrorism.

Deputy Mulcahy is correct to raise this issue. We have not had sufficient or adequate debate on the NPT. Instead, we hear language used about rogue states as if they were our problem. They are not the problem. We have a far more serious problem with regard to verification and elimination. If I look back and ask whether the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes that took place were seen as an opportunity for elimination on the other side of the equation which had prevailed earlier, the answer is no. The position is that in many cases the failure and stalling on verification and the refusal of elimination led precisely to the creation of conditions into which materials would begin to flow to an uncontrolled international system. Therefore amidst that we get a discussion on Iran that is entirely unreal.

In every interpretation and examination of the NPT by the IAEA we now leave aside half of its job undone. We now move over on the use of nuclear capacity for non-military purposes. There is no prohibition in the NPT or in any other treaty on this. I happen to disagree with nuclear energy. It is very difficult to point to international law on it and state the situation. We are now entitled to take the treaty, in its weak and declining days, and operate on the basis of suspicion. If these issues return to the Security Council, we better get agreement on what we favour.

I do not impute anything to the current Minister. He has made strong statements about the importance of the NPT as our departure point on this. However, there is no point in fooling us. I am concerned about the disastrously weak, skewed and unreasonable statements issuing as the common position from Europe. They are issued under the influence of countries with a bad record in this regard, countries that are not committed to the NPT in the way we are. Some of these countries, underhandedly, have been involved in trafficking in capacity.

Mr. Montgomery

It is clear from what the three committee members have said that there is a wide political consensus on this question, a consensus that includes the Government. We agree the issue of disarmament should be pursued as vigorously as possible. We also agree the NPT is in difficulty. There is no doubt about that and I can, I think, speak for the Minister in saying he would very much welcome efforts to give this issue a higher profile in the period ahead.

In terms of timing, the next step on the way is 2007, when we have the first preparatory conference for the 2010 review. However there are a number of events scheduled for the coming year into which this committee could feed. A group of NGOs has launched an Article 6 forum to examine new and creative ways of taking this forward. There will be a meeting to discuss this in the Hague in March and we would be happy to report to the committee on it. Ireland and Canada will co-sponsor a seminar on the future of the NPT in Geneva next May and perhaps the committee would be interested in that. A weapons of mass destruction commission was established by Anna Lindh, the former Swedish Foreign Minister, before she died. It is headed by Hans Blix and will bring forward a report on a range of WMD issues, including the NPT. The committee could follow this range of events in the coming years.

Deputy Allen spoke about how an agenda could take two weeks to agree. The agenda, as can happen on these occasions, is a proxy for the substance. One of the key issues was how to refer to what had been agreed in 2000. I recall taking part in the Northern Ireland negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement, where it took six to seven weeks to agree an agenda. All too often agendas are proxies for substance and that is what happened in May. On the general point made by three members of the committee as regards double standards, there is no doubt the task we face on Iran would be a good deal easier if the other three countries mentioned by the Deputy, India, Pakistan and Israel, were members of the NPT. This issue of the double standard arises many times in debate, particularly with members of the G77 or the non-aligned movement, NAM. Equally, as I hope was made clear in my statement, if the nuclear powers were engaged more actively in disarmament, that too would send a very positive signal. There is no dispute between us on that.

On the question of Iran, specifically, it should be remembered that it was not originally an EU initiative. The E3, namely, Britain, France and Germany got together separately. It was largely after the debacle over Iran that we saw the divisions within the Union on that question and the E3 countries were looking for an issue on which to find common ground. It was very much the initiative of Mr. Joschka Fischer, the former foreign minister. They began, privately, outside the EU framework and then brought it inside. From a pragmatic viewpoint they probably are as well placed as any group of members of the EU in this area, not least because they have the technology and other expertise that is required and, to be frank, the political weight, vis-à-vis the Americans. One of the important aspects of the E3 issue was precisely the fact that the Americans held off pursuing an individual policy of their own on this question.

In addition, while the initiative was originally conceived independently outside the EU framework, to be honest, over a substantial period the E3 countries have been pretty good and open about sharing information with the rest of us. There have been regular debates in the Council. My political director colleagues and I have had lengthy discussions about this matter. In the margins at the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, meetings in Vienna, there is much co-ordination and consultation as regards EU positions and so on. I believe the policy is broadly supported by the EU. However, it would be easier if more progress had been made on those other matters which the Deputy mentioned.

On Iran, I would not go quite so far as Deputy Mulcahy on the simple principle that two wrongs do not make a right. The failure of others to adhere to their obligations, or even to sign up to them in the first place, is undoubtedly a matter of great concern and weakens the case that the rest of us have vis-à-vis Iran. However, I would not underestimate the potential threat from Iran either. We heard what its president said about the state of Israel. There are credible reports linking Iran to the sponsorship of terrorism in a number of countries throughout the world. Too many countries already have nuclear weapons. Therefore the case for doing all we can to find a solution to the Iranian situation is very strong. It would be stronger, still, if we were in a better position more generally.

As regards what Deputy Michael D. Higgins said, I would not entirely agree with the proposition that more progress was made during the Cold War. Progress was made in the latter years of the Cold War, without question, after a very substantial escalation by both sides. However, the fact that the 1995 and 2000 review conferences both came out with quite substantial commitments in this area——

I spoke about numbers and quantification.

Mr. Montgomery

Qualification and verification was principally done bilaterally between the Soviets and the Americans, outside the NPT framework, previously.

Mr. Montgomery

Even then, there was a 2002 Moscow agreement between them, which was quite important and helpful in reducing the number of nuclear weapons actually being deployed at any given time. The G8 global partnership in 2002, which assisted with the destruction of nuclear material in Russia, was a positive step. I would, therefore, not be quite so negative about developments in recent years. There was a history of good progress up to 2000. However, after that much of that progress had either stalled or gone into reverse. It would be very helpful and important if the US and China were to ratify the test ban treaty, but they have not done so.

Has there been a problem in Congress on the US side?

Mr. Montgomery

There might have been a problem in Congress, but this administration has made clear that it does not intend to pursue such a course.

Is it not obliged to, having signed it?

Mr. Montgomery

As a general principle of international law, when a country signs a treaty, it commits to ratifying it.

We need to know this type of detail.

We have only five minutes to cover the rest of the business. Then we have to adjourn at that stage and a select committee comes in to meet the Minister. There is a need for a ten minute break between the two meetings.

Mr. Montgomery

I have a couple of other things to say. To return to the point made by Deputy Mulcahy about compliance, it is difficult to assess exactly whether member states are in compliance vis-à-vis Article 6, precisely because there is a level of detail as regards the non-proliferation obligations, especially when it comes to the additional safeguard agreements. The reports of the IAEA — the resolutions board reports or the submissions to the director general — on Iran are very specific about particular episodes. Judgments about Article 6 commitments are of a broader political character. It is difficult to define matters in black and white terms. What may be said is that following a period of encouraging progress, there has been very little or no progress in that area in recent times.

One matter on which I would take some issue with Deputy Michael D. Higgins is the question of the EU's common position. We can share all of this material with the members of the committee. In fairness, while the bulk of the common position, which was adopted on 27 April 2005, before the NPT review, related to non-proliferation——

That is right.

Mr. Montgomery

——it contained a number of quite clear and specific-——

The issue was the balance. We will not argue about it now, but it is overwhelmingly balanced as regards non-proliferation.

Mr. Montgomery

That, however, relates to the nature of the treaty, where there is much more detail on the non-proliferation than on the disarmament side. However, the EU common position was not bad in that respect. It talks about a range of issues and again, commits itself to the comprehensive test ban treaty, the early inclusion of a treaty on fissile material as well as a range of other useful commitments. To be honest if what was in the EU common position had come out at the NPT review conference in May, that would not have been bad. I believe that covers most of the issues.

We are now at the outer limit of our time. I thank Mr. Montgomery. As he can see from the members' responses and reactions, his explanation of matters is very helpful.

We would welcome more technical briefings and documents if such are available.

Mr. Montgomery

I suggest that Mr. Adrian McDaid is much more of an expert on all of this than I am, and he deals with these issues on a full-time basis. If Deputy Mulcahy or the committee wants to make direct contact with him, vast amounts of briefing documents and papers in the public domain come to us, which we can share.

I thank Mr. Montgomery and Mr. McDaid, as well, for appearing before the committee today.

Mr. McDaid is the silent partner.

The committee must now go into private session.

The joint committee went into private session at 3.20 p.m. and adjourned at 3.25 p.m., sine die.

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