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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON CHILDREN debate -
Wednesday, 5 Mar 2008

Constitutional Amendment: Discussion with Barnardos.

I welcome members of the committee to this meeting. I am pleased that so many of them have turned out when other meetings are taking place. Apologies have been received from Deputies Gogarty, Shatter and Woods, whom I understand are in Palestine. We cannot compete with such an attraction.

I welcome Mr. Fergus Finlay, the chief executive of Barnardos. He is joined by Ms Norah Gibbons, Barnardos' director of advocacy and central services; Ms June Tinsley, the organisation's policy officer; and Ms Fiona Ryan, its campaign manager. As we know, Barnardos' mission is to "challenge and support families, communities, society and government to make Ireland the best place in the world to be a child, focusing specifically on children and young people whose well-being is under threat". Barnardos has furnished the committee with a beautiful discussion paper on its activities. I invite Mr. Finlay and Ms Gibbons to make a presentation to the committee.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I will not introduce my colleagues, as the Chairman has already done so. I thank the committee for giving the representatives of Barnardos this opportunity to express our views on the vital issues it is discussing. As we recognise the complexity of the important task the committee is undertaking, we wish it well in its work. We have already made a submission to it. We will be happy to answer any questions members may wish to ask.

Last year Barnardos worked with 5,000 children and families in 42 centres. It works with children and families who have been battered by life and for whom the idea of the "best start" is often a distant one. I refer to children who may not make it without additional support. Our work involves helping them to develop the skills and confidence they need to get the most from the education system. It involves supporting families as they try to do the best they can, day in, day out. While such work is sometimes painstaking, it is often rewarding. In addition to the work we do in our projects, we offer extensive support and service to children who have been bereaved and families involved in adoption. We are involved on a daily basis, through our guardian ad litem service, the largest in the country, in helping the courts to determine where the best interests of specific children in difficult situations lie.

Barnardos has developed a number of convictions on the basis of its practical and theoretical work. We strongly believe childhood works best when families work well. The best place in which a child can develop is at the heart of a nurturing and caring family. For such purposes, we define a family as any combination of children and parents or parent where there is love and mutual support. Therefore, the best possible way for the State to recognise and nurture childhood is to support families.

Many of the families with which we work are beset by the problems poverty brings in its wake. We work daily with people who struggle with drugs, alcohol and domestic violence — people who have been overburdened by the circumstances of their lives. The development of children often suffers when their parents love them but lack the skills and capacity to translate that love into effective parenting. For that reason, the capacity to intervene early and seek to prevent things from going wrong is one of the most critical supports Barnardos offers. It is a tragedy and a scandal that the State spends millions of euro every year on picking up the pieces of broken lives and broken families but spends little on prevention and early intervention. A school principal in Dublin recently told me that when he looked at the new cohort of six year olds entering his school each year, he could almost tell at a glance which of them were bound for Mountjoy Prison. He added that it was almost too late to do anything about it by then, even if the resources were available.

If I thought it was within the remit of this committee, I would be urging it to frame a referendum to put a model of family support based on principles of prevention and early intervention into the Constitution. The growing crisis in this area is all the more tragic because it is unnecessary. One of the great ironies of investing in prevention and early intervention is that it yields dramatic savings for the Exchequer over time. The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Professor Jim Heckman, who now does some of his work in Dublin has estimated that every $1 spent on good quality early childhood development can yield up to $17 in savings. These savings come from better educational attainment, less involvement in gangs and juvenile trouble, less social welfare dependence, greater likelihood of being a taxpayer, less family separation and greatly reduced expenditure on prisons.

I would like to speak about the principle of putting a reference to children into the Constitution before I consider the express terms of reference of the committee. Having campaigned for such a provision for a number of years, we welcomed the Taoiseach's initial statement that it was under consideration. The subject should be approached without fear. We urge that all legislation relating to and arising from the amendment should be published, at least in draft form, before the people are asked to vote in the referendum. That would generate as much certainty as possible about the long-term intentions of the Government and the Oireachtas. Some will argue that any measure that enhances the rights of children will, in some sense, diminish the rights of families. We work with people all the time whose only wish in life is to see the right of their children to a decent future vindicated. I have yet to meet a mother or father who believes his or her rights should take precedence over the rights and needs of his or her children. The work of this committee is about both rights and needs. In urging members to adopt a provision which recognises the natural and imprescriptible rights of children, a provision to which we know they are already committed, we urge them also to recognise childhood as a unique time that needs to be safeguarded, both for the good of individual children and the benefit of society.

Barnardos believes four general principles should inform the work of the joint committee and be included in the proposed amendment to the Constitution as follows: the principle of ensuring a child's voice is heard; the principle of the best interests of the child being of paramount importance; the right to non-discrimination; and the principle that each child should be entitled to support to achieve his or her developmental potential. Every organisation representing children which appears before the committee will share our view on this issue.

One of the rights children should have is the right to be cared for by their parents. Rather than this being expressed as an obligation on parents, it would be better expressed as a right which resided with the child. This means that where a child needs it, the right to be cared for should be extended to include the right of the child to the intervention of the State and-or provision of alternative care when care breaks down within the family. In the Constitution the bar is set too high to enable effective intervention in time. However, we would never wish circumstances to arise in which the Constitution was used to ride roughshod over families. Hence, Barnardos supports the principle of proportionality. However, the protection afforded to children and the need to put the best interests of the child first must be strengthened.

As we have stated, children need to grow up in a safe and stable environment if they are to achieve their full developmental potential. While the rights of children and the best interests of the child are usually achieved within the family, children who require it should be entitled to have their welfare protected through the provision of alternative care such as fostering and adoption. I do not wish to recite the law in this matter, as members know it better than I do.

In the case of children in long-term foster care where both foster parents and child want an adoption, it is often necessary to wait until the child is nearly 18 years, as otherwise it may be possible for birth parents to resume parental duties. The effect on the child is that he or she is effectively denied alternative family stability which would benefit him or her most at a time when he or she most needs it. Provision should be made by law and in the Constitution for the voluntary placement for adoption and adoption of any child and that in all such circumstances the determining factor should be the best interests of the child. Barnardos strongly advocates that the voice of the child should be heard on any matter that affects the child in any proceedings involving the child and that the State should give the child's views due weight according to age and maturity.

On the issue of so-called soft information, Barnardos strongly believes in the simple proposition that if one wants to be an engineer or doctor, one must be appropriately qualified. If one wants to work with children, one must accept as a basic qualification for the job that one can be trusted with the safety and protection of children. This means that one must be prepared to submit oneself to appropriate vetting. In turn, this means that the current vetting system must be extended to include relevant matters such as cautions and serious allegations, rather than dealing solely with convictions, as another vital step towards protecting children from those who would seek to harm them. In saying this, Barnardos does not wish to be considered in any sense critical of the vetting procedure in place. The vetting unit does a fantastic job and we have direct experience of it.

A delegation from the unit appeared before the joint committee.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I am aware of that. Its staff are extremely good, professional and committed. However, the unit is limited in what it can do by current legislation.

Barnardos wants legislation to be drafted to accompany the amendment, outlining the processes involved. Such legislation should be clear, concise, limited in application and contain procedural safeguards so as to operate in a harmonious manner with all current constitutional provisions and laws. A mechanism should be in place that provides for judicial oversight to build confidence in the impartiality and accountability of the system.

Barnardos advocates that a model similar to that operating in Northern Ireland under the Protection of Children and Vulnerable Adults Order (NI) 2003 should be operational in the Republic. This comprehensive system checks against convictions and other relevant matters and while the focus is on protecting children and vulnerable adults, it provides safeguards and due processes for those being vetted, including the right of appeal.

On the issue of absolute and strict liability, a fundamental principle arises in this context. Children must be off limits to adults when it comes to sexual activity. Without wishing to make a trivial comparison, if one makes an illegal right turn or breaks the speed limit by 5 mph, one is guilty of an offence and no amount of pleading that one made an honest mistake will do any good. It is absurd in that context that an adult can have sex with a 14 or 15 year old girl, plead that he thought she was older and then compound the long-term damage and trauma by reducing the child to the status of a defendant in the witness box. The Constitution must copperfasten the protection of children from those who would seek to harm them, regardless of the age of the perpetrator. Such protection in both constitutional and legislative terms must supersede any plea of honest mistake. Taking advantage of the pressures under which many young people find themselves in terms of dress, make up and so forth should never be capable of being proffered as an excuse.

Barnardos accepts that finding the balance between protecting children from those seeking to exploit or abuse them and not penalising teenagers engaged in consensual sexual experimentation is difficult. In our daily work Barnardos has active programmes which seek to encourage young people not to engage in sexual relationships at an early age because of the impact that such activity can have on their health, physically and psychologically, and due to the risk of exposure to sexually transmitted infections and unplanned pregnancies. However, in cases of consensual sex between young people and, more important, teenage pregnancies, we would not support the possible prosecution of young parents. The State should not make it more difficult for young parents to provide a stable and caring environment for their child.

It is important to realise that relationships among teenagers can also be exploitative, with one in four abusers identified in the sexual abuse and violence in Ireland report as being under 17 years of age. For that reason, while a distinction based purely on age is too simplistic, it is possible for the Legislature to address the issue. The constitutional amendment should ensure protection from abuse by enabling the provision for absolute and strict liability to be enshrined in law. The recommendation of the Joint Committee on Child Protection in 2006 providing for absolute criminal liability in respect of sexual activity with children under 16 years, or 18 years where the alleged abuser is a person in authority, is a good starting point when finalising legislation in this area.

I thank Mr. Finlay for his presentation. I welcome the Minister of State at the Department of Health and Children, Deputy Brendan Smith. Mr. Finlay will be familiar with members of the joint committee. He will also be aware that while members of the committee have absolute privilege, this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. I should have pointed this out at the start of the meeting. The Vice Chairman, Deputy Noonan, will commence the question and answer session.

I thank Mr. Finlay for his clear presentation. As he will be aware, in politics one is often not sure what people want after one meets them. Mr. Finlay has been explicit in stating what Barnardos wants and few would disagree with its general position. Its objective as regards soft information appears to be achievable under law. The vetting process should include an examination of strong allegations, summonses and other matters, rather than relying solely on convictions recorded on the PULSE system. The joint committee will not have a difficulty in arriving at a formula to achieve this objective.

Barnardos agrees with the work done on the issue of strict liability by the committee chaired by Deputy Howlin. The outcome desired by Barnardos is also easily achievable. However, on the substantive issue of children's rights, Mr. Finlay stated the best guarantee of the rights of children would be to be members of protected families. He subsequently referred to the rights of children as individuals. This issue concerns me. Our legal advisers informed the joint committee last week that the primary rights children now possess — explicit and unenumerated — derive from being members of a family.

I approach this without having much background in the area, on the understanding that the approach of the committee is to produce an appropriate wording to enshrine rights for children in the Constitution based on the fact that they are citizens and human beings. How does Barnardos view the issue in terms of the work of the committee? Would Barnardos be happy with a formulation that modified the existing rights of children which derive from their membership of families and, consequently, from that protected position or is its approach that the rights of children should be explicitly stated and that they should derive in the Constitution from the rights we all have as individual citizens and human beings?

Mr. Fergus Finlay

My colleagues will answer this in whatever way they wish also. I am not capable of giving an answer as a lawyer and I will not attempt to do that.

I am not questioning Mr. Finlay as a lawyer as I am not capable of asking the question as a lawyer.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I understand that. If I was King of Ireland for a day and I could write the constitutional provision I want to write where children are concerned, I would be perfectly happy to settle for a simple line that put the interests of children first in all considerations of public policy that affected them. I recognise that it is not as simple or as easy as that. What I do not want is to say to the committee that we should put down a set of specific rights that in some sense set aside the rights of the family. Like members of this committee we have much experience to know that the best interests of children are served best when families are working well.

As things stand currently, there are very specific barriers in the Constitution that must be crossed before the State can intervene in the lives of children within the family. Those barriers all relate to terrible failure on the part of families. We work with families around the country where there is failure but there is not fault. There are families that are completely overwhelmed by the circumstances in which they live that are struggling to do their best and that would welcome any support or intervention. As a non-governmental organisation we cannot intervene in the life of a family without the consent of that family. To the maximum possible extent that is the way we would wish to see it unless a child is in imminent danger of harm or at serious risk.

There are so many instances one comes across all the time where the rights of children, even the right to have their welfare protected, are placed in a secondary position as a matter of public policy. There are very serious financial pressures within a number of the agencies that work on behalf of the State with children. These pressures are pushing children who are not in a life threatening situation or who are not immediately at risk of abuse or neglect way down the priority list. I suspect every member knows of such cases through their clinics where children and families that need help and support are not getting it or are on waiting lists, even for social work intervention, that are getting longer and longer because there is nothing that says children should matter in terms of public policy.

I recognise that is not the most specific possible answer to the question but if one works at the coalface, as members do and as we do, it is inevitable when debating the issue of children and their rights and needs that one will touch in some tangential way on the issue of resources.

Both Deputies Peter Power and Howlin were members of the previous committee. Deputy Peter Power chaired it.

I welcome the delegation from Barnardos, a group I have known and worked with for a very long time and for which I have great regard. The submissions made to us come from a wealth of real experience. There is something tangible about people who do not talk in either legal or theoretical terms but in real terms that lends weight to the presentations.

Although I was privileged to work on the previous committee, which was very hardworking and focused under the very able chairmanship of Deputy Peter Power, I have reflected a great deal even on the recommendations here. These are recommendations that came from consensus discussion but this is a very difficult area. While general principles are wonderful, crafting constitutional amendments is a different matter. I wish to go through the specifics because a number of groups that came before us indicated in regard to the published constitutional amendment that they would not agree with it but would like some other principle to be incorporated without presenting what they would like to see incorporated. Every word in a constitution has ramifications.

The proposed Article 42(A) states: "The State acknowledges and affirms the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children". There is a view that this would change nothing. It would merely lift out an existing right and place it in a more prominent position. Mr. Finlay's recommendation is that he supports the explicit statement of children's rights in the Constitution which recognise children as individuals with rights of their own as well as those rights accorded to children as members of a family. As Deputy Noonan indicated, many of the rights are ascribed in the current constitutional framework by way of membership of a family.

In essence, I am not sure whether Barnardos thinks that the form of words proposed in the amendment does achieve what it recommends or whether it would propose an addition to rebalance, if that is not an unfortunate word, the rights of the child as opposed to the child as a member of a family. From the submissions we received we know that any rebalancing is fraught and anything we have to put to the people by way of explanation on these matters is equally fraught. I am not clear whether Barnardos thinks what is proposed in the published constitutional amendment meets its requirements.

The next proposed amendment is 42(A)1. Barnardos recommended that the Constitution would include the right of children to be cared for by their parents, and that such a right would reside with the child. How does one get a constitutional right to be cared for by one's parents? Should that be explicitly stated?

As practising politicians we all deal with dysfunctional families in our weekly clinics. There is no blame attached to it. Often they are loving families but entirely dysfunctional and sometimes extraordinarily harmed individuals emerge as a result. It is a case of setting a form of words that meets Barnardos' requirement that gives the State the adequate right to ensure that the child does not come to harm and yet, as far as practicable, leaves him or her in the environment of the family. How does one achieve that in legal terms?

The issue of soft information is one on which I thought I had a clear view when I was a member of the committee that reported in November 2006. Perhaps that is because I am from Wexford and I read the Ferns Report in some detail and one of the big issues that came out of that was the inability of State institutions to share information which prima facie seems scandalous. However, when crafting proposals it is necessary to consider a simple proposition that anybody who works with children needs vetting, but of what should the vetting consist? One is entitled to one’s good name, as Mr. Finlay rightly says.

What is the position regarding a serious allegation? I dealt with the Nora Wall case, with which some of the present company will be familiar. Not only was there a serious allegation but there was also a very serious criminal conviction. Lives are turned upside down by malicious perjury, as in the case to which I have referred. A malicious accusation would be even worse, but on an even lower level. I have had two meetings with individuals who endured the consequences of such allegations since the Ferns Report was published. Obtaining the right in question has worked on my conscience.

I do not know whether Deputy Noonan intended to say the right would be secured better through legislation rather than with a constitutional amendment. Whether this can be done is another kettle of fish. It is interesting that the advices the Garda central vetting unit received from the Attorney General were such that the issue could be addressed in legislation. At the time, we understood it was a matter of making an amendment to the Constitution.

The structure of the constitutional amendment is the final item. In may ways, the reversing of the zone of absolute protection was to be the most straightforward aspect. Mr. Finlay is recommending that a specific age not be set in the Constitution and therefore it would be open-ended for the Oireachtas to set the age. Whether the people would buy that pig in a poke, I do not know. Some of us who worked on referenda in the past were of the view that issues would arise if there were no specific legislation. Even where there is specific legislation, some will state very readily that it can be changed. I would be interested in hearing Mr. Finlay's view on this.

Mr. Finlay stated, "Our Constitution must copper-fasten the protection of children from those who would seek to harm them [that is clear enough], regardless of the age of the perpetrator". He also referred to proximity and age and the desire not to criminalise consensual sex. This is a considerable issue. One could have a swimming instructor or scout leader only three years older than a pupil but in a position of power such that he or she could be very abusive. These are very difficult matters.

Mr. Finlay indicated that according to the approach of the last committee, which was to have a zone of absolute protection, one could make no defence of an honest mistake above a certain age. The age pertaining to a person in authority would be higher again, namely, 18. I was unhappy with the age of 18 in this regard but I liked the idea of having two different thresholds. However, I made a point on the information gleaned by the former Minister of State responsible for children to the effect that the actual knowledge of most young people of the law in this area is very scant. Most believe the age of consent in Ireland is 16 because that is the age they see listed in the media for every other jurisdiction, except Northern Ireland and Malta. The more thresholds we have, the more complicated the system will be if people do not know about them. One could break the law through ignorance. I would like to hear the response on the specific wording with which we will have to grapple.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I will try to answer the first questions on the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children. We are very grateful for having had the opportunity to engage in much consultation when the previous wording was being formulated. On the publication of the wording, we decided to support it, bearing in mind that we may have liked or disliked certain parts. This seemed to us to be the correct approach. We believed the replacement of a concept we considered to be implicit in the Constitution, that is, the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children, with a more explicit concept represented an improvement. It probably did not go as far as it would have done had we been left to our own devices, but we believed it was an improvement nevertheless. We argued at the time, and would always argue, that the wording would be strengthened further by references to childhood as opposed to children, which references would recognise explicitly both the importance and fragility of childhood, and of the safeguarding of children in the interest of society. Having said that, we would certainly have supported and campaigned for the published wording.

I recognise the difficulty regarding the proposed Article 42(A) and the business of intervening in a family. I, who am not a lawyer, have always believed one of the advantages of placing the right to be protected and nurtured in the hands of the child rather than obliging the parents to guarantee this right, means it becomes more possible to be supportive and intervene early without ascribing blame or trying to find some kind of collapse in the family. The reality is that, as the law stands, it is very difficult to intervene unless there is some kind of moral collapse within the family or unless the child is at serious risk.

I would argue for including an explicit constitutional provision that the child should have a right to be cared for. This is in the constitutions of jurisdictions that are not nearly as wealthy as ours, including South Africa, for example. It may not always be honoured.

There are many provisions in the South African constitution, including the right to housing.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

It may not always be honoured but the provision is included nevertheless. It should be argued that children have a right to be nurtured within the family. This raises all sorts of issues, on which I will not elaborate, regarding what constitutes a family. Some of the most loving and caring families with which we work — the experience of members will be the same — comprise a mother and two children. A suburban house and two cars are not needed to constitute a family. Children need to have a right to be nurtured.

Ms Norah Gibbons will deal with soft information.

Ms Norah Gibbons

Barnardos does not really use the term "soft information"; rather, it uses the term "relevant matters". There are arguments over whether there should be a constitutional or legislative provision in this regard. The legal advice of the vetting unit of the Garda Síochána is such that the matter could be dealt with legislatively. However, we look back on the Barr judgment, which arose in respect of the HSE passing on very significant information, with no ensuing prosecution, to an employing authority. Mr. Justice Barr believed a constitutional amendment was needed.

We recognise the difficulties but when we must come down on one side, we will come down on the side of children. We also state that, in order for one to have faith in the system, it must be seen to be independently guarded and established, such that there would be independent oversight and that malicious gossip or information circulated in the context of a family breakdown, for example, would not be included.

I am very aware of the Nora Wall case, to which Deputy Howlin referred. In that case, a conviction was recorded, and this would have come up on the PULSE system had it been in place and the conviction would have been overturned at that point. The conviction was rightly overturned. When I was considering the various systems in operation, I looked at the protection of children and vulnerable adults, POCVA, system, as operated in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. It is a good model because people know if they are to be on the list disqualifying them from working with children. They are given an opportunity to query their inclusion and to have their rights vindicated. They also have the right to appeal against their inclusion. In this jurisdiction, it would be very important for the public to have confidence in such a system. For Barnardos, working with very vulnerable children, the notion that someone could apply to work for us who had been involved in serious allegations of physical violence against children but in which a conviction was not recorded or a prosecution was not taken, is very difficult. That information may not come to us when checking the person's background. It would be difficult for our organisation to stand over a case of a child in our care suffering abuse from a person working with us.

We have no difficulty with a clear system where people would be entitled to their good name, be informed about it, have confidence in it and feel they could not be stitched up by it. We have always recommended such a system should have a judicial oversight.

Strict and absolute liability is a legal minefield. There must be a clear and simple message to children, their parents and all of us in society — children are children. At their stage of development, they cannot give informed consent and do not understand either the short or long-term consequences. There is total confusion and understanding among children about the age of consent. That is a failure of us adults who did not keep them informed. This is one place where a line must be drawn in the sand.

We believe 16 years is the proper age for consent. We do not believe it should be put into the Constitution because mores change. There could be a constitutional amendment on lowering the age of consent in 2009 and then another one in 2016. The legislation must be published before putting such an amendment before the people. The people must know the intentions of the Oireachtas. It is elected to provide leadership in this area.

I thank Fergus Finlay and the delegation for attending the committee. I compliment them for their work as advocates for children's rights. Mr. Finlay outlined his agenda if he was king of Ireland for a day. When he was involved in government, many members of the press thought he was the king of Ireland.

Mr. Finlay argued public policy should have a child-centred focus. Would that be similar to the Constitution, a guiding principle of social policy? Would Mr. Finlay be in favour of going one step further by putting socioeconomic rights in the Constitution?

On the question of soft information, touches on by Deputies Noonan and Howlin, where does Barnardos stand on the legislation versus the Constitution? I appreciate the delegation is approaching it from the pure child-centred focus approach. Does it believe information looser than mere convictions ought to be disseminated and available to organisations of the State such as the HSE? The understanding up to now, is that only convictions and perhaps to a lesser extent prosecutions that did not fail. Is Barnardos proposing that serious allegations ought to be known to relevant authorities, provided there is judicial oversight? Would Barnardos be in favour of a constitutional amendment in favour of such a system?

I welcome Mr. Finlay's comments on strict liability. It brought much clarity to it. The approach comes first and the law second. Barnardos is arguing that the obligation, be it a moral or legal one, ought to be on the adult; that the adult male, primarily, must have an absolute obligation to satisfy himself that he is not having sexual intercourse with a child. If that requires constitutional protection, so be it. Is that the position taken by Barnardos?

Ms Norah Gibbons

On soft information, the current system only considers convictions and successful or unsuccessful prosecutions. The Garda vetting unit has explained that it often is aware of information on individuals that did not lead to a prosecution. We would consider this as relevant matters, rather than soft information. The term "soft information" brings to mind the notion of gossip or information based on malicious gossip. Barnardos prefers relevant matter.

We are in favour of a system, set out in legislation, that will allow people to keep their good names. The Northern Ireland protection of children and vulnerable adults order is an example of such a system that the committee should consider. The Department is well aware of the system, as it co-operates with it. It would need to be tailored to meet an individual's constitutional rights.

There have been some serious allegations concerning people working with children. We refer the committee to the Barr judgment in 1998. It was information that Mr. Justice Barr was happy that should be known to the person considering employing the individual but for which there was no cover. The health board was so concerned that it took the case to the High Court. We are in favour of its inclusion in the Constitution. That was the legal advice available to the previous Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform when he put forward the idea of a constitutional amendment. However, lawyers do differ.

We are very clear on strict and absolute liability and are not too keen it should be put into the Constitution. We would refer the committee to Finbar McCauley's report in which he examined this issue in the criminal context and the concept of honest mistake. His arguments on this are compelling.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I can remember many a day when I felt like the court jester rather than the king. I would love to speak about socioeconomic rights in the Constitution, not just for children. Along with a great many other people, I battled to enshrine real rights in law for people with a disability. Every time we got close to it, the dreaded public service division of the Department of Finance raised its head. Whatever about the legal profession tut-tutting when one talks about children's right, I should not want to visit the public expenditure division of the Department of Finance on this committee.

We are arguing for what we believe is achievable in practical terms. I passionately and honestly believe that a statement in the Constitution, which said on behalf of the people that childhood is both important and fragile, would, over time — not immediately — be profoundly influential in terms of bettering the lives of children and all of us. Not even the public expenditure division of the Department of Finance could find fault with it.

I join my colleagues in welcoming the team from Barnardos here today and I thank them for their time and presentation. Some of my questions have been answered. I shall start by commenting on some of the witnesses' assertions as regards soft information and also on the presentation. The point was made that reliance should not be put solely on convictions, and it was emphasised that cautions and allegations should be included. This was prefaced by conceding that everyone has a right to his or her good name. It is a very complex issue and perhaps even the word "allegations" may be too simplistic. We might have to be even tighter than that.

I was struck by the fact that the system in place for Northern Ireland was mentioned because we have spoken about that previously and it could be a good starting point. It might not be for us, but we do not necessarily have to reinvent the wheel here. There are systems in place in other countries that might, perhaps, provide a starting point — or lay the foundation, should they not be precisely what we are looking for.

From the work being done by this committee, particularly as regards the meeting with the Garda vetting unit, it has emerged that at the moment we have information that has some established foundation to it, but we are not allowed to use it. The established foundation could refer to somebody who had previously worked in an area against whom there was an allegation, which on investigation was found to have sufficient substance that merited some form of punitive action against the individual — the punitive action being upheld through the processes available. One would expect we should have access to that information because it is very pertinent to the area, but we do not, under the present system, and neither do the Garda.

Children could be removed from their parents on grounds of alleged neglect or abuse. While the parents no longer have care of the children they could, nonetheless, present themselves for interview to work with children, and again the Garda does not necessarily have access or the right to report on that information. Another example would be any of the issues at present coming before the Residential Institutions Redress Board, but where no prosecutions are being taken as a result. One thing that has emerged is that information is available, which goes beyond the allegation stage, and which has an established foundation to it — but we are not in a position to use it. That is just a comment as regards soft information.

As regards my specific questions, I will start at the end of the presentation which referred to absolute or strict liability. Mr. Finlay made the point well that we need to avoid the criminalisation of young people and said that in an ideal situation we should discourage young people from engaging in sexual acts. This is the ideal, while it is probably not something we shall be able to control, certainly not in the amendment. Nonetheless, it touches on a point — and he was very clear that people should have responsibility for their behaviour — that a sexual relationship is a very significant relationship that carries with it responsibilities and consequences. If an adult is about to engage in a sexual relationship, there is a certain responsibility on him or her to ascertain the capability of the proposed partner.

I was concerned that while we want to avoid the criminalisation of young people and have absolute liability, Mr. Finlay made the point that there can be an exploitative aspect to young people engaging in sexual relationships. Therefore to seek to protect such young people on the grounds of age may be too simplistic. Perhaps he could tease that out somewhat and say whether he had any wording in mind. Maybe the committee is moving towards a point where we can say the age should be 15, 16 or whatever. Then perhaps we could think in the context of two people under that age, but within a two year range, say, one being 12 and the other 14, where we would ensure that we did not criminalise their behaviour. I was struck by the fact that he said age might be too simplistic, because there could be an exploitative aspect. I wonder, then, what the grounds can be based on, if not on age, if we are to take into account the potential for exploitation.

Point 5.1 of the presentation relates to the provision made in law for the collection and exchange of information. Concern was raised that perhaps reference was only to sexual behaviour and this should be expanded to include all forms of harm or abuse. Looking at the wording again, on the exchange of information relating to the endangerment, do the delegates believe the term "endangerment" is sufficient to cover what they are referring to. I agree, absolutely, it should not just be about sexualised harm, but should include other abuses, whether emotional or physical. Is "endangerment" sufficient or have they got some additional wording in mind?

On page 4, there is a recommendation on the right of children to be cared for by their parents. I am just trying to follow the recommendations and the comments. Is it proposed we change the wording of the amendment for that section? If so, has any thought been given to the amended wording? My final question relates to page 5 and the recommendations made around adoption. What is the impact of the recommendations on the proposed wording of the amendment? That we are focusing so much on the proposed wording perhaps reflects the fact that we are becoming quite concentrated as regards the work in hand. Does the proposed wording meet the recommendation, as set out? Does Barnardos want to change the order of the proposed wording, or just alter it? I am just trying to tease out whether we are being asked to amend the proposed wording — and if so, what form is it hoped this might take?

Ms Norah Gibbons

I shall take the issue of adoption first, because we have not had too much discussion about it. As regards 42(a), as proposed — the adoption of any child where parents have failed for a particular period of time — we believe that should be prescribed in law before it is voted on. For example, there was some public concern when this was discussed before that if somebody placed a child in voluntary care — a good thing for parents to do if they cannot cope for a period — he or she might find the child being placed for adoption in six months' time. International research over many years has shown that the longer a child is away from its family, the lower the chance that it will be rehabilitated. Where children are living away from their families, the first duty accepted by our 1991 Act is for the HSE to work actively to put things right and support the family so that the child goes home. If the child does not go home to its immediate family, then it should at least go home to a member of its family.

However, if a period of time has passed — we suggest around five years — where there has been continuous good efforts made at rehabilitation, we feel it should be prescribed in law that adoption should be considered where a child is settled with a family and it is the wish of the child to remain with the family. This is particularly the case for children in long-term foster care. It is so important for the development of children that they are happy and secure where they are. Changes in law and a change in social workers should not mean a change in a child's family. The child should not be buffeted by the changes that happen.

We think that section 2(3) is fine, where provision may be made by law for the voluntary placement for adoption and the adoption of any child. The yardstick in all of this must be the best interests of the child. We recognise that this is a judgment call and that each case is different. When a case comes before the courts, a judgment call must be made. Our emphasis is that the best interests of the child are taken into account when that judgment call is made.

We do not want to criminalise young people who are having consensual sex. We do not think that is sensible because criminalising them sends out the wrong message. However, there are references to the prevalence of sexual offending in the SAVI report, which is the only piece of good research we have on the issue in this country. The report found that one in four offenders were under the age of 17. If the sex is non-consensual, society needs to take a most serious view. From our own work, we know that young sexual offenders require prevention and adequate education systems in the first place, but they also require treatment. They respond well to treatment because of their young and developmental age. However, there is very little treatment available in Ireland. There are two projects in Dublin, a very good one in Donegal and another project in Waterford. Sexual offenders do not only live in these counties. We want treatment for young sexual offenders because it works. We should all be protecting our children through prevention. The question of consensual sex and non-consensual sex are very different issues. In the latter situation, age also cannot be the determining factor.

At the moment, any form of non-consensual sex can be dealt with under the law, regardless of age. Ms Gibbons seems to be saying that if a provision is put in place that ensures underage sex is not decriminalised where it happens between peers, such a provision does not provide a protection for somebody who engages in non-consensual sex.

Ms Norah Gibbons

Yes. We would think that if a child of 13 has been forced to have sex by somebody aged 17, there needs to be a clear statement from society that such an act is not right. People must accept full responsibility for their actions in such cases.

There was never a suggestion that would be the case.

Ms Norah Gibbons

I am not suggesting that there was, but we were just teasing out the idea that age is not the only determining factor.

The word "endangerment" may well define our concerns, particularly when we think of the neglect of children. The neglect of children is difficult to talk about, but the 1991 Act contains good definitions of abuse in all its forms. The impact that neglect has on children over a number of years cannot be underestimated. It is equally as serious as sexual abuse and gross physical abuse. Where neglect is the problem with children coming into care, these issues may never have gone to the Garda Síochána. Whether prosecutions are successful or not, these are the type of relevant matters which would never have come to attention of the Garda. That information is within the system and we would not want to find ourselves explaining to another parent why we placed in a position of authority a child of somebody who had their children taken because of their actions.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

We have heard about the importance of protecting everybody's good name, something which I do not dispute for a second. We are an organisation that tries to behave as responsibly and as professionally as we can. There are 320 people who work in Barnardos and another 250 who volunteer for Barnardos and everyone has been vetted. However, because we are a professional organisation, we try to manage our risks as an organisation. The worst thing that can happen to us as an organisation is that a child would be hurt or damaged in our care. We will do anything in our power to prevent that from happening.

From time to time, we must report child protection concerns — not about our own staff — in respect of some of the children with whom we work. If a child protection concern is reported by one of our staff against, for example, the father of a three year old child, that will be investigated as it should be investigated. It may come to nothing, even if the concerns are very substantive and there are good grounds for believing them. A child of three will never be a powerful witness in such a case. If the person against whom we have child protection concerns was to apply for employment with Barnardos, the Garda would not be able to tell us that there was a red flag involved.

As the chief executive of an organisation that tries to be responsible, I do not want to know gossip about the private lives of individuals who apply for work with Barnardos, other than that they are appropriately qualified. That means that the head of an organisation I regard as unimpeachable informs me that the potential employee is safe with regard to children as far as he or she knows. I never want to be in a situation where a well meaning member of the Garda feels that he or she should be telling us that a certain person should not be working with children, but that he or she cannot do so. That is an intolerable position for children and for organisations that care about their good name.

That came across very strongly as a result of our meeting with the Garda vetting unit. Coming from the area of working with people with disabilities, I am conscious that any decisions we make on sharing this information will have implications for people who work with vulnerable adults. That is just as important.

There was a further question from Senator Corrigan about whether the witnesses had changed their mind from the time they supported the previous wording.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

Was this about the right of the carer to reside with the child?

Yes. I suppose they answered some of the question by speaking about endangerment. I think the question has been answered.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

In a general way, it would be fair to say we took the pragmatic decision that we would support the wording published, warts and all. There are parts we would like to see strengthened but we know a huge effort and good faith were put into trying to produce the best possible wording. We like to think of this as an opportunity to have another go.

I congratulate Barnardos on its submission which is particularly thoughtful but also very stimulating with regard to many of the issues with which we are wrestling. To be fair, Barnardos, like everybody else, is also wrestling with some of these questions because there are not many certainties on the matters with which we must deal.

I wish to pick up on what Mr. Finlay has just said, which I thought was very helpful and interesting, namely, that a concern he would have, as chief executive of an organisation like Barnardos, is that, God forbid, something would happen in circumstances where, had he had the information, he might have been able to stop it happening. I have been struggling with this question in the committee in the past few weeks. I understand the point very well and do not discount it as being the basis for changing the law, namely, the fear, as opposed to actual empirical knowledge, that something has gone wrong which could have been put right had the information been available. This is a matter where it is probably difficult to point to examples where one could say: "That could have been stopped had we known such and such". That said, from Mr. Finlay's experience in Barnardos, are there examples — I am not for one moment asking him to tell us what they are — where he could say hand on heart that had there been better access to so-called soft information, something dreadful or something involving a risk to a child could have been avoided? Ms Gibbons may also have a view on this. I understand what Mr. Finlay is saying about the Barr judgment and the point with regard to fear and, if one likes, the more theoretical — I am not suggesting it is not important — possibility of a risk. Are there actual examples where Mr. Finlay could say the situation could have been different if information had been known? It may be that there are not but I would be interested to know whether there are such examples, obviously without the need to explain the specifics, which Mr. Finlay would not do in any case.

I will come back to what Senator Corrigan said about the Garda. I understand Ms Gibbons's point about the law, namely, that Barnardos is not, strictly speaking, expressing a point of view on whether this should lead to constitutional change, but that it just wants to see a regime in place that works. Do I understand from this that if, for example, protocols were in place and applied throughout the State and implemented by the Garda and others — Senator Corrigan made the point about the experience in the North, for example — and these covered the problem as Barnardos sees it, that would be sufficient? Is it suggested that if that could be done and the law could be left to the lawyers and the Government, it would not matter to Barnardos whether it was in the form of a statute or a part of the Constitution, or otherwise, as long as the outcome it wanted was actually provided for? I thought I understood from it that if protocols were in place, that might solve the problem.

Listening to the Garda representatives when they came before the committee in recent weeks, it occurred to me there was a measure of flexibility with regard to how they described what they did. When pressed on the issue — to be fair, they perhaps did not want to reveal too much about individual cases and even about their practice — while they said they could not reveal soft information, there was definitely a "but". It is correct that there should be a measure of flexibility. They were inclined to say they would prefer if it was not just a question of coming back to the judgment of the Garda as to what should or should not be given out. That is why they want us to deal with it. I understand that point. However, it brings me back to the point that perhaps this could be dealt with by way of a set of protocols which would involve the expertise of the Garda, Barnardos, health professionals and other child care professionals and that it might be possible to put these in place without entering into a whole constitutional infrastructure, which would seem excessive at this stage. That is the view I hold and I remain to be convinced that I should change it. Not having been involved in the previous committee debate, I have perhaps a degree of independence, as we all do, but that is my view and I would need to be convinced as to the merit of a constitutional change.

The Barnardos submission recommends that the Constitution include the right of children to be cared for by their parents and that that right reside with the child. The delegates elaborated on this very well and in interesting terms. Without straying too far into the legalities, would it not flow from that position that such a right would have to be vindicated at the suit of the child against the parent? Establishing a right that resides in the child in respect of its parent would require that dynamic to be vidicated. If I am wrong, I would be happy to be told.

To pick up on the discussion with Senator Corrigan, I refer to absolute and strict liability. The delegation should not think I am pressing it on the issue or trying to pick holes, which is not the case, as I am struggling with the issue just as much as others are. Do I understand Barnardos to suggest as an overarching principle that, as is stated in the last line of the submission, that it recommends that adolescents engaging in consensual sexual activity should not be criminalised? As far as it is concerned, is it an immutable principle and the bottom line that adolescents engaging in consensual sexual activity should not be criminalised? We can come back to the question of the definition of an adolescent.

Would it be helpful to add a brief addendum and then conclude because I do not want to repeat earlier questions?

I welcome the representatives of Barnardos. In the last part of its submission dealing with Article 42 it is stated Barnardos recommends that the amendment should not set a specific age in the Constitution — the amendment arising from the previous committee's work refers to children under 18 years. Barnardos indicates in the closing paragraph that absolute criminal liability in respect of sexual activity with children under 16 years, or under 18 years where the alleged abuser is a person in authority, should be a starting point. To add to Senator White's questions on whether this issue should be addressed through legislation, does Barnardos have a specific view on the age to be specified? Has it gone further than its presentation suggests? Does it have a view on what the age should be and whether there are differentiations in the starting point suggested in the closing sentences of its submission?

Ms Norah Gibbons

In response to Senator White, we recognise that while there are not many certainties, some clear principles should be set down by the committee and in the Constitution. With regard to protocols between the Garda and perhaps the HSE, we believe protocols would not be strong enough and that — I accept this is a legal argument — either a constitutional amendment is needed to allow the Houses of the Oireachtas to put laws in place to allow for this or that a legal provision should be put in place if the constitutional amendment is not required as regards relevant matters such as that of soft information. Protocols can change and shift and do not have the strength of the law.

In the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, this issue was examined in the wake of a significant case that caused everybody involved to catch their breath. It raised many questions for all of us involved in this area. This was the Soham case, in which a young man who did not have any convictions applied to work as a caretaker in a school. However, allegations were recorded against him in three areas in respect of risky and dangerous behaviour with young girls but no prosecutions were made. The vetting was done and would have included hard information. It was this case which caused the United Kingdom authorities to look closely at their systems and pull them together via an Act that has the force of the law.

That is what we seek as a minimum. Legislation is necessary rather than relying on protocols that may not always be followed in exactly the way the Oireachtas intended. There must, at the very least, be a law. The legislation in the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, provides that persons with a conviction or a serious matter outstanding against them who apply to work in an organisation such as Barnardos are guilty of an offence. This sends a strong message from Parliament that the law will come down on the side of protecting children.

Thankfully, there has been no case in Barnardos of which I am aware — both Mr. Finlay and I would be aware of such a case — which might lead to a serious incident with a child. However, we have had people come to work for us — perhaps people who joined us other than through direct employment — and somebody else has felt the need to provide us with information about them which would not otherwise have come our way. We are pleased that all our volunteers, social workers and child care workers — everybody in the organisation from Mr. Finlay down — are vetted by the Garda. This has been the case for some time.

The information can sometimes be available. Everybody gets hung up about sexual offences but there are other serious offences against children, the perpetrators of which we do not want in our organisation. Nobody wants such persons involved in any organisations working with children. In the case of swimming coaches, scout leaders and so on, there are many issues, of which we are now fully aware but may not have been in the past. There must be clear principles that we can apply. Reference was made at a previous meeting to the need for protocols that would be more widely applicable, to include countries from which people come here to work with children. Currently, all any of us can rely on is that such persons must obtain police clearance in their own country, which may or may not have the same standing as the Garda clearance we are lucky to enjoy.

On absolute liability, we are not in favour of the age being written into the Constitution. We do not want to have to return to this issue some years hence when the argument may be made that times have changed and that being 16 years old is not what it used to be. However, provision should be made for this in law. Sixteen years seems to us to be a reasonable age below which absolute liability should apply. We are not telling the committee what to do. Members will make up their own minds and obtain advice from many sources. That is why we said it was a good place to start, to examine the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Child Protection which were produced after much deliberation.

I join other members in welcoming the delegates from Barnardos. I compliment them on their excellent oral contribution and their written submission. The exchange of views indicates once again the complexity of every aspect of the composite referendum proposal.

Ms Gibbons outlined lucidly the issues in regard to the exchange of soft information or, as she would say, relevant matters. The protocol system would not work. As Ms Gibbons rightly stated, the strong advice available to the then Minister of State with responsibility for children, Deputy Brian Lenihan, and the former Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Mr. Michael McDowell, at the time the referendum proposals were drafted was that a constitutional amendment was needed to give effect to legislative provision. That is the position from which we are working.

I concur strongly with Deputy Howlin that when we put a proposal before the electorate, we must also make available the detailed legislative proposals.

That point comes up regularly.

There is no way that we can offer merely an outline of legislative proposals. It is the Government's view that we must put all our cards on the table for the public to examine and, I hope, endorse.

I thank the delegates again for their excellent presentation. Barnardos has had a particular interest for many years in strengthening the protections for children in the Constitution. I have no doubt we will have another opportunity to exchange views. The presentation was exceptionally helpful.

I thank the delegates for the bliss of listening to a presentation delivered in plain language. It is wonderful. Some members have legal knowledge but most do not. From my own experience of Barnardos in Athlone, it is a wonderful organisation which is doing good work. I thank the delegates for the commitment they have shown for many years and attending today's meeting. They have given us plenty to mull over.

Mr. Fergus Finlay

I thank the Chairman and members for their courtesy and time.

The joint committee went into private session at 6.25 p.m. and adjourned at 6.55 p.m. until 5 p.m. on Wednesday, 12 March 2008.
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