JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HERITAGE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT debate -
Tuesday, 23 Feb 2010

Management of Severe Weather Events: Discussion with ESB.

Chairman

We are dealing with item 4 on our agenda which is a continuation of the management of severe weather events in Ireland. As part of our proposed report into this issue, we have invited a delegation from the Electricity Supply Board to discuss with us their experiences in managing water levels at their hydro stations around the country. This presentation will complement a briefing given to some members of the committee at their recent visit to Inniscarra Dam in Cork.

I welcome the delegation from the ESB, Mr. Padraig McManus, chief executive officer, Mr. Pat O'Doherty, executive director, ESB Energy International, Mr. Nicholas Tarrant, manager, ESB operations and maintenance business, Mr. Glenn Pope, hydro power manager, and Mr. Tom Browne, engineering and technical risk manager.

Before commencing, I draw witnesses' attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute legal privilege but this same legal privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official by name in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I invite Mr. McManus to proceed.

Mr. Padraig McManus

I thank the Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss the flood events of November 2009 as an input to the committee's wider deliberations on the severe weather of the past few months. As we are all aware serious flooding took place throughout the country and nobody can begin to describe the hardship people have had to suffer as a result.

We for our part, and I have insisted on this, through all of the public interaction and media coverage down through that period, that we would restrict ourselves to giving factual information. We are happy to have the opportunity to appear before the committee today and give all the detail we have and to put it on the record.

Our concentration is going to be on the flooding events of November 2009, in which the committee is interested. There are many other issues related to the severe weather in January and if the committee wishes to discuss those at any particular time we would be happy to do that.

The role of the ESB in dam management is laid down in statute. Our operating procedures and practices derive from this statutory role and we cannot exceed this role. During the events under discussion we followed established good practice and we had all the available expertise on duty. Since 1986 we have provided numerous reports on flooding on the River Lee for the purpose of flood risk assessment and management, showing the general pattern of events which actually occurred on 19 and 20 November. One of the issues raised many times and which we will address is the adequacy of warnings. The only time I spoke publicly on the issue was to make certain that adequate warnings were given and I will come back to that.

The ESB is not the lead agency in assessing or managing severe weather related or major flooding events. It is one input into this system which should have full oversight of the serious situation as it is unfolding and which should have the capability to take appropriate actions based on all inputs.

I want to state at the outset — it did not happen adequately over time, although the Chairman and the committee had the opportunity to visit the station — that there was never any risk to the structure of the dam. Many people have been complimented on their role in dealing with the emergency as it unfolded. I wish to record the efforts of ESB staff in Inniscarra in ensuring that was actually the case. That is what we are required to do in a very rapidly changing environment and that is what we did.

The Chairman has taken the opportunity to introduce the members of our delegation. In case any member cannot see the signs they are Mr. Nicholas Tarrant, Mr. Pat O'Doherty, Mr. Glenn Pope and Mr. Tom Browne. I invite Mr. Nicholas Tarrant to make the presentation.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

I thank the Chair and the joint committee. We have provided copies of our presentation to the committee together with some supplementary information because obviously not all the detail can be included in the presentation. I will take the committee through our established good practice in hydro electricity generation and dam management, the inundation studies we provided to the local authorities that showed the general pattern of danger and risk associated with potential downstream flooding and the ESB's statutory mandate which it cannot exceed.

During the course of the presentation I will elaborate further on the statutory mandate of the ESB. I will speak about the role of the ESB, summarise the flooding events across the country where the ESB has an involvement, the River Lee, the catchment and weather, flood risk and emergency management, the ESB regulations for operating the dams levels, the events of November 2009, warnings and communication and the issue of dam safety. In this presentation we have also included details on the River Shannon, the River Erne, the River Liffey and we have a concluding slide.

The mandate of the ESB is defined in statute. It covers hydroelectric generation of electricity and dam management, defines levels and the power to change levels. A summary of the relevant legislation is set out in the slide. This forms the basis of the management of the dams under normal and flood conditions.

The next slide shows the ESB hydroelectric power stations which are as follows: the River Shannon — Ardnacrusha — 85 MW; the River Liffey — Poulaphuca, Golden Falls, Leixlip — 38 MW; the River Lee — Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid — 27 MW; River Erne — Cliff, Cathaleen's Fall — 65 MW; and Clady which is a 5 MW scheme.

Overall the flooding events which we will speak about, with some concentration on the River Lee, are 19 and 20 November 2009 when there was major flooding in Cork city and county; the River Shannon in November 2009 which had its highest flood levels on record, similarly on the River Erne the flood levels were the highest on record during November. There was also a flood event on the River Liffey on 28 and 29 November following heavy rainfall in that catchment.

The next slide deals with the River Lee. The western part of the catchment of Cork city fluvial and tidal system is shown in the drawing. Cork city is shown in the middle of the slide. It is fed by the tidal impact on the right hand side and by the Inniscarra discharge, the rivers Shournagh, Bride, Curragheen and Glasheen on the left. Overall this is a complex system where all these factors need to be taken into account. In order to assess the risk at Cork City all of these inputs must be considered and the ESB is one input into that system.

The next slide deals with the River Lee catchment and weather. The rivers Bridge, Shournagh, Curragheen and Glasheen are downstream of Inniscarra and make up approximately 30% of the catchment. The tidal impact is below the Waterworks weir on both the north and south channels. It is important to note that it takes approximately four hours for discharges from Inniscarra to reach the Waterworks weir at flood peak. It takes longer than that as the flood develops as water spreads out in the area and before the Waterworks weir. The topography of the River Lee catchment results in a very flashy river system where floods rise and fall quickly. In the context of the flooding, the rainfall during the month of November was up to three times the average for the month. During 18-19 November approximately 100 mm of rain was recorded in the upper catchment and during the five-day period between 15-19 November approximately 158 mm of rain was recorded, which is approximately equal to the long-term average for the month for the upper catchment area.

Forecasts, by their nature, are dynamic. We have included in appendix 3 to the supplementary information document the weather forecasts as we received them from Met Éireann. We have also included in the documentation provided today details of the rainfall for the month of November.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

We do not have that appendix; all we have is the slide projection presentation.

Chairman

We have this document. Is there also an appendix as well?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The supplementary information is contained in a document.

Chairman

I ask members to bear with us while we sort this out. The appendix is contained at the back of the document. Mr. Tarrant will note that people are listening to his every word. He may continue.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

I will resummarise my reference to appendix 3 to the supplementary information document which we have given to the committee. Appendix 3 sets out the Lee catchment rainfall records for the period 30 October to 27 November 2009 based on the ESB rain gauges in the catchment area. Appendix 4 sets out the rainfall forecast for ESB Inniscarra, as issued by Met Éireann, for the week leading up to 19 November, the first one being issued at 12.30 a.m. on Sunday, 15 November.

I will return to the presentation. The next slide shows the ESB dams on the River Lee and it explains, in summary, the geography of them. The dam at Inniscarra is approximately 13 km from Cork city and the distance between the Carrigadrohid dam and the Inniscarra dam is approximately 14 km. The electricity output is shown on the drawing; it is 8 MW in Carrigadrohid and 15 MW and 4 MW at Inniscarra.

Chairman

What do the 15 MW and 4 MW represent?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

They are two units, one is 15 MW and the other is 4 MW.

The next slide shows a picture of Inniscarra dam and I draw members' attention to the spillway gates shown in the middle of the dam because I will be referring to discharges. There are sluice gates at Carrigadrohid dam.

The next slide shows a history of selected major floods on the River Lee showing peak inflows and discharges starting from 1986, which is on the left-hand side of the graph, running through up to 2009. The 2009 event was a major one and is the biggest on record on the Lee scheme. Comparing the peak inflows and discharges for each flood, members will note that there has been significant alleviation of flood impact of the floods shown on the graph, including the 2009 event.

The next slide shows a picture from 1986 of flooding in Cork. This was a major flood that resulted in a design review in the ESB and the construction of a new spillway in Carrigadrohid that was completed in 1991. That spillway was put into service for the first time during the events of 19 to 20 November 2009.

Moving on to the area of flood risk and emergency management, I will deal first with emergency management. The ESB forms one input into local authority major emergency plans. It has provided inundation studies to local authorities to allow downstream risk to be assessed. Other contributors to flooding must be added to assess the overall risk and the OPW, through its CFRAMS project, has produced flood risk maps for Cork city and surrounding areas. A framework for major emergency management is in place since 2006 and local authorities developed plans under this new framework during the period 2006 to 2008. The ESB had no knowledge of the development of this framework. The major emergency management framework has a guide for flooding emergencies, which was produced in 2008, that defines roles, responsibilities and content of local authority emergency plans.

On the area of flood risk management, the OPW is the lead agency for flood risk management in Ireland. Overall, this is a multi-agency system where the ESB is not the lead agency in either flood risk management or emergency response and clear indications had been given to local authorities of the potential risk downstream of discharges from the ESB hydroelectric power stations. We have included in appendices in the supplementary information document some information related to those inundation studies.

The ESB regulations set out operating procedures for dams. A copy of the regulations and guidelines for the control of the River Lee was submitted to the committee. These regulations set out the operating procedure for normal operation, flood conditions, dam safety, levels and low flow situations. They are revised and updated regulations based on operating experience. They are written on the principle of not causing a flood, in other words, not discharging more than inflow during a flood situation, and that is consistent with our statutory mandate.

On the area of levels, reservoirs are operated within a band. It is a dynamic system and levels vary. They are operated between a maximum and a target level in winter. This is dependent on weather forecasts. We receive five-day or four and a half-day weather forecasts from Met Éireann. Data on inflows comes into the control room in Inniscarra on a real-time basis and there is required generation. Overall, it is a dynamic system that needs ongoing management by the staff in the power station. Above the maximum operating level, defined additional spilling is required, and that is set out in detail in the regulations.

Moving on to the events of November 2009, there was a flood event at the end of October on the River Lee. We spilled additional water from 2 to 5 November, and we also spilled additional water between 13 to 15 November based on previous rainfall. There was significant rainfall during 15 to 16 November. We discharged at the maximum rate of 150 m3/s from Monday, 16 November to Thursday, 19 November based on the forecast we had received for Thursday, 19 November.

I will explain what is shown on the next slide. At the top of the drawing there is an indication of hourly rainfall in millimetres from our gauges. The left-hand side axis of the main graph shows levels in metres above datum and the right-hand side of the graph shows discharges and inflows. The graph shows that we were hit by a number of events in quick succession leading up to the events of 19 to 20 November. This is the graph for Carrigadrohid and it covers the period from 10 to 30 November.

The next slide shows the Inniscarra levels, inflows and discharges over the same period, 10 to 30 November, in a similar format. Members will note in the middle of the graph the peak inflow for the period 19 to 20 November and the peak discharge.

The next slide shows a picture that was taken at approximately 11 a.m. on the morning of 20 November. The picture shows the Lee waterworks and its location adjacent to the river, County Hall and the Kingsley Hotel. These are locations that will arise later in the presentation. It is also, in some ways, an update of the picture we showed from the 1986 flood. The next slide shows an extract from an inundation study that was done for Cork city by the ESB in 1992, which formed an input into local authority major emergency plans. This is just one picture, or segment, that shows the south channel area. We modelled a number of scenarios downstream of Inniscarra and one can see there are a couple of areas that were prone to flooding as a result of that modelling. In the supplementary information that we have included for the committee, there is an overall map which shows the extent of the flooding scenarios and the areas that would have been impacted downstream. In the middle of the picture one can see the area around UCC and the area where the Glucksman Gallery was built since this study was completed.

The next slide shows one of the drawings that has been produced by the Office of Public Works, OPW, as part of the CFRAMS project. The OPW over the past number of years has developed the first fully integrated flood model that combines the entire catchment of the Lee and the tidal situation. Those maps show areas that are prone to flooding and this particular sample, which was out for consultation from early 2009, shows the area around the Lee waterworks. This shows there was a 10% chance in any year that the area would be flooded. These maps were available throughout the city in draft form for use leading up to the flooding events of 19 to 20 November.

To move on to the issue of warnings and communication, flood warnings issued to all relevant authorities on the morning of 19 November. The ESB issued flood warnings to local radio and AA Roadwatch. We issued further flood warnings to all relevant authorities in the afternoon, saying that we would be increasing the discharge from Inniscarra on numerous occasions throughout the evening and that this was a large flood. We have included further details on the warnings in an appendix in the supplementary information. We never previously issued two warnings on the same day from Inniscarra. This is the first time that happened. The tone and content of our warnings was that the situation was escalating.

The next slide summarises the warnings and communications on the day and the relevant bodies. They were Cork City Council, Cork County Council, residents, the Garda, the city fire brigade, the Bon Secours Hospital and the city waterworks, which is also a defined contact point on our list of people we notify in the event of a flood situation. We contacted UCC, local radio, the Kingsley Hotel, AA Roadwatch and RTE. Cork City Council issued a flood alert during the afternoon of 19 November and indicated the areas that were at risk in the course of that evening. It mentioned that there was a risk before and after high tide. This is evidence of the warnings we issued.

To move to the issue of dam safety, in 1978 the Institution of Civil Engineers in the UK produced a report on floods and reservoir safety. It defined dam categories A, B, C and D, and the main ESB dams are category A. This basically means that a breach of the dam could endanger lives in a community. ESB dams are maintained to the highest standards. All dams under ESB ownership are managed in such a way as to ensure that they operate safely at all times. The ESB represents Ireland at the International Commission of Large Dams, ICOLD, and has had an external dam safety committee since 1998. This provides an independent evaluation of the safety of ESB dams. The annual sign-off by this external committee is reported to the ESB board. At no stage during the period of the November 2009 flood was the safety or integrity of our dams at risk because our regulations were followed throughout that period.

I will now discuss the River Shannon. The River Shannon is 256 km long between Cavan and Limerick. It is a very low gradient river and numerous tributaries feed into it. It drains a total area of approximately 10,500 km. In contrast to the Lee, floods rise and fall slowly on the Shannon. Previous significant floods have occurred in 1990, 1995, 1999 and 2006. We have included in the presentation a number of graphs which show the levels during the period October, November and December 2009. The first relates to Lough Allen, where one can see the level rising and tapering off over a number of weeks. The next relates to Lough Ree, where there is a defined minimum level. Again, one can see how there were levels in excess of 39.5 metres OD. As mentioned earlier, these were the highest on record for the Shannon.

The next graph shows Lough Derg. There was a large increase in the level in Lough Derg over the course of the flooding events. Lough Derg is the closest lake to the Ardnacrusha scheme and we have a discharge at Parteen Weir, which is shown on the next slide. It goes down the old Shannon channel. The Parteen Weir divides the flow and sends water to the Ardnacrusha power station through the Ardnacrusha headrace which is shown in the top half of the picture. The original Shannon route is shown in the bottom half of the picture. The graph shows the other rivers that feed into the original Shannon as it makes its way down to Limerick city. Ardnacrusha power station is shown on the left hand side of the drawing. The next slide shows a picture of Parteen Weir and one can see the volumes of water that were going through the weir during the flooding events in November.

The next slide shows the discharges from Parteen during the period, both the discharge through the station in Ardnacrusha where we had all four units generating electricity during the period and the increasing discharge that we discharged through Parteen down the old original Shannon channel as the flood events developed. The graph also shows the total discharge. Because the Ardnacrusha power station was operating throughout the period, it resulted in significant flows going through the station and avoiding the original channel of the Shannon.

In summary, on the River Shannon, water levels reached new record levels during the flood. At the peak, approximately 80 million to 90 million cubic metres of water per day entered Lough Derg. This resulted in the highest ever discharges through Parteen Weir. Floods in tributaries had a significant effect on the overall level of flooding downstream of Parteen Weir. The ESB discharged the maximum possible amount of flood water down the headrace to Ardnacrusha to alleviate the worst effects of the flood. Local co-ordination of emergency response worked well through an inter-agency group throughout the period.

Moving on to the River Erne, this picture shows our station at Cathleen's Falls, Ballyshannon. To summarise, there is no downstream flooding risk on the Erne system. All flood waters are passed through the dams at Cliff and Cathleen's Falls. There are restrictions in the system at Inter Lough and Belleek channels. The Rivers Agency in Northern Ireland has already conducted a preliminary review of flooding on the Erne. It has estimated the cost of channel widening at approximately £20 million.

To set the flooding in context, 336mm of rain fell between mid-October and November. It was classified as greater than a one in 100-year event. The level in the upper lough peaked at 48.27 m., which is about 0.5 m. higher than the previous record. Water control was exercised in line with current legislation. The Northern Ireland Rivers Agency and the ESB are recommending a joint examination of lough levels, but within existing legislation and taking account of special areas of conservation and navigation. I will not talk through this graph in detail. It outlines the change in levels during the period.

Moving on to the Liffey system, we had a flooding event over the weekend of 28-29 November. Flooding warnings were issued following heavy rain. The ESB stopped discharging from Poulaphouca-Golden Falls in the early morning. This protected the Liffey area between Ballymore Eustace and Leixlip. Media warnings were issued and we had ongoing liaison with the relevant local authorities throughout that day. Since that event, we have met Kildare, Fingal, South Dublin and Dublin City councils for a review on 14 December.

The floods on the Lee, Shannon and Erne were the highest on record. The ESB managed hydroelectric stations and dams with established good practice. The ESB has a statutory mandate that it cannot exceed. It does not have a lead role in flood risk management or emergency response. The ESB had provided inundation studies for all the river systems to local authorities that showed potential risks. Appropriate warnings were issued to the relevant authorities. We see the future in the work the OPW is doing across the country on flood-risk management, and we will contribute to that process.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Tarrant for his presentation. Before I call Deputy Ciarán Lynch, I wish to ask some brief questions. Mr. Tarrant said he met Kildare, Fingal, South Dublin and Dublin City councils on 14 December to review the issue in respect of the River Liffey. Has he had similar meetings with Cork city and county councils?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

We had a meeting with Cork City Council. We have had contact with them over the period since November.

Chairman

Essentially, Mr. Tarrant is saying that there was three times the average rainfall in the month of November in the Lee catchment area. He said that because there are very steep mountains, it hits the river very quickly. Is he saying that if we had three times the average rainfall again in a particular month we would see a similar situation, or would the ESB do something different on that occasion? If the ESB could see three times the monthly rainfall next month, could we expect the same response or would the ESB do something different?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

We said in the presentation that rainfall of up to three times the average for the month fell and that, over 18-19 November, 100mm of rain was recorded in the upper catchment. We operate on five-day forecasts from Met Éireann and that is the basis of the decisions we make in conjunction with our regulations. By virtue of the fact that the event has happened, and it was the biggest event we have seen on this scheme, it could happen again. In the meantime, the OPW has published the CFRAMS report, which is out in draft for consultation. We have met the OPW to talk about the recommendations in the CFRAMS report. We plan to work with the OPW in progressing those recommendations. That is the vehicle we see for moving forward on the flooding on the Lee.

Chairman

Mr. Tarrant may wish to comment on communications and warnings. He said that further flood warnings were issued to all relevant authorities in the afternoon. He also referred to the increasing discharge from Inniscarra dam on numerous occasions throughout the evening. This is a large flood. He prefaced everything he said by stating that this was the biggest flood since the dam was built, but that warning does not convey that to me. It does not tell me that this is unlike anything that had happened since the dam was built. Yes, it was a severe warning but warnings are made on a regular basis and it did not convey that this was the worst flood since the dam was built. Since the flooding was so extreme, there may not have been time to take preventative measures given the water levels, but did the ESB think of putting advertisements on local radio so that people would know this is the worst flood since the dam was built? People need to hear something like that before they could comprehend that this was such a flood. Mr. Tarrant might comment on that.

Mr. Padraig McManus

Perhaps I could take that question, Chairman, because I have answered that point before on radio. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to say that it was the largest flood. However, by its own admission, Cork City Council acknowledged from early morning that it knew the flood level was going to get to 300, and 150 is the maximum level we can spill without flooding. Therefore from early morning it was well known that we were going to get double the flood level. Later in the day, we said we were going to continue beyond that level; we had already reached that level and were going to continue spilling. It is easy to see exactly what it was afterwards, when one reviews it and has all the measurements. However, there was no doubt from 11 a.m. that we were going to be spilling at double flood level. From 5 p.m., we said that we had already reached that level and would continue to spill — to increase the level of discharge — because unprecedented levels of water were entering the system. I do not think there could be any doubt as to the level of the water.

Chairman

I have no doubt that the ESB understood the significance of that warning and the volume of cubic metres of water involved, but did the people receiving that communication understand it to the same extent? I do not think they understood it to the same extent, as Mr. McManus appears to have done. It is a communications issue.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

In the context of risk assessment in the Cork city area, the ESB is one input. As we showed in the slides, there are other inputs. We understand that Cork city had also received a weather warning from Met Éireann in the lead-up to it. Based on analysis after the events, we are aware that the other tributaries we mentioned during the presentation were in extreme flood during that time. We indicated that the situation was escalating. We believe there was sufficient information, together with the inundation studies and the information available from the OPW——

Chairman

Can Mr. Tarrant explain the term "inundation" in layman's terms?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

It is a flood; areas that would be covered in flood water during a flood event. We believe there was sufficient information to enable an assessment to be made that the situation was escalating and that this was a major event.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I welcome the ESB. I have a number of questions, as I am sure other members have. In preparation for this meeting, I sent approximately 30 questions to the ESB via its media correspondent. Some of them have been touched on today, while others have not been. I had hoped to get a response to some of these questions before the meeting but unfortunately, I did not. Some of the questions related to a meeting the ESB had with residents of the Middle Parish a number of weeks ago.

The ESB's presentation stated that the Carrigadrohid waterline, in terms of inflows and outflows, touched on 65.4 m and that the Inniscarra dam touched on just below 58.8 m. Are the top lines, 65.4 m for Carrigadrohid and 51 m for Inniscarra, the maximum operational levels or is there more space above these lines?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The 50.9 m is the limit for operation at Inniscarra. The figure we reached on 19 November was 50.86 m.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

What is the maximum operational level of water that one can have behind either of those two dams?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

That is the maximum.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The top lines of each of these are the maximum.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The 50.9 m. that we reached is the top operating level defined in our regulations.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Has that ever been exceeded?

Mr. Tom Browne

In regard to Carrigadrohid specifically, it has a spillway which, as Mr. Tarrant pointed out, was installed in the early 1990s to ensure the dam could pass the 10,000 year flood. That spillway is set at 65.2 m. Effectively, it means that once the level in Carrigadrohid reservoir exceeds 65.2 m, whatever comes into the reservoir at that stage, flows over the spillway, regardless of what we have done with the sluice gates. Effectively, one can say that once Carrigadrohid is above 65.2 m, whatever comes in above that, flows into the Inniscarra reservoir.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

A certain amount of water was falling from the sky and flowing in from tributaries and a certain amount of water was being released through the Carrigadrohid dam. Ultimately, an unprecedented amount of water was released, which flooded Cork city. That is basically what happened that afternoon. In 1986, in excess of 300 cu. m. per second went through the Inniscarra dam. Is it correct that at no point since 1986 was this sum exceeded? That was one of the questions I put to the ESB.

Mr. Tom Browne

That would be correct.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The only time we ever came close to 300 cu. m. of water per second being released through the Inniscarra dam was in 2006. What was the sum of water going through at the maximum point on 19 November?

Mr. Tom Browne

Is that the sum of water going through the Inniscarra dam?

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Yes.

Mr. Tom Browne

That is also covered in our documentation. The maximum throughflow from the Inniscarra dam on 19 November was 546 cu. m. per second.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Was that the maximum?

Mr. Tom Browne

That is correct and that is as shown in the graph provided.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Almost twice the volume of water — perhaps 75% — that went through in 1986, which was the last time we had a major fluvial flood — that means a flood coming down river as opposed to one going up river — went through on 19 November.

The regulations report mentions a number of issues. I refer to the issue of risk assessment. On the night of 19 November, how many staff were working at the dam?

Mr. Glen Pope

Four staff were directly involved in the management of the flood. There would have been additional maintenance staff on the site to cover any other eventualities that may have arisen with equipment.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

That is four people at the Inniscarra dam.

Mr. Glen Pope

That is four people directly managing the flood situation as opposed to any other maintenance issues which may have arisen.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

At any time, was anybody from Ardnacrusha involved in overseeing the emergency situation or was there communication between the dam and Ardnacrusha?

Mr. Glen Pope

There would have been communication directly with me as the hydro manager.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Mr. Pope would have been in Ardnacrusha.

Mr. Glen Pope

I was in Ardnacrusha that day. The Deputy is correct.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Was that at the time all this was happening?

Mr. Glen Pope

Yes.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

According to the ESB's document, regulations and guidelines for the control of the River Lee, in cases of emergency, the responsible engineer is fully independent of the ESB organisational structures and he or she has the duty and power to give all necessary orders. Who was giving the orders that night?

Mr. Glen Pope

The plant manager on the evening in question would have been directly managing the flood situation.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The document states that the available local staff have to decide when an emergency exists and what measures have to be taken immediately and that the supervising engineer is the highest local arbiter in deciding that an emergency exists. On that evening, did Mr. Pope decide an emergency existed? Was it an emergency situation?

Mr. Glen Pope

Any flood situation would warrant——

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Is there a protocol to state that this is an emergency?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

That page in the regulations refers to dam safety. From the point of view of dam safety, there was not an emergency because we followed our regulations.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Okay.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

We have a chief civil engineer, who is mentioned in that paragraph. The chief civil engineer was also involved, or available, and was contacted on the day. That clause is written in the context of dam safety and as long as our regulations are followed, it is not an emergency situation from our point of view, and once we follow our regulations. That was what was done.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

According to the ESB's report, the dam will never be at risk because it states that during a flood, the top priority is the proper management of the flood to avoid any risk to dam safety and that all other factors such as efficiency of generation, system requirements and environmental, social, legal or economic considerations are secondary. Flooding Cork city centre is a secondary consideration as far as the ESB is concerned in regard to dam safety. Is that interpretation correct?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

If dam safety is not managed, one is putting Cork city at greater risk.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The document states that in a flood, the top priority is the proper management of the flood to avoid any risk to dam safety and that all other factors such as efficiency of generation, which means the generation of electricity, system requirements and environmental, social, legal and economic considerations are secondary. On that evening, the moving of more than 540 cu. m. of water per second was the priority in terms of protecting the dam. The consequences of what would happen down river were secondary.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Water must never come over the top of the dam and our regulations are designed to ensure that does not happen. If water comes over the top of the dam, the potential consequences are catastrophic.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Am I correct in what I am saying that the release of a volume of water, never released by the Inniscarra dam before and almost twice what was released in 1986, was a secondary consideration to the protection of the dam?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

If one takes it that water can never come over the top of the dam and compromise the integrity of the dam, then we did everything we feasibly could do in terms of protecting the dam structure and averting a major catastrophe.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

It continues that the guideline may be applied, even if it results in the inundation of land, car parks and roads, if, in the judgment of the hydrometric officer, it reduces the effect of subsequent flooding. It states discharges likely to cause flooding of dwellings shall occur when the level of the reservoir dictates that such discharges are necessary and in accordance with regulations. This document tells me that if one releases unprecedented volumes of water through the dam, one is aware one is creating risk further down the river.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

That is correct but the authority with responsibility for flood risk assessment and management is also aware of it from information we have given to it in the past and which we gave to it as events were unfolding. It is the lead authority in managing an unfolding potential emergency.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

There was scope that evening for staff at the dam to step outside the regulations, as there is a level of autonomy. These are not legally binding regulations, rather they are protocols.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

The regulations are based on good engineering practice.

Chairman

They are not statutory regulations; they are not included in legislation we have passed.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Correct.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

If we are in a situation where the protection of the integrity of the dam is the overriding concern and one starts to release unprecedented volumes of water down the river, surely there must be a protocol for communicating with Cork City Council and Cork County Council. There must be a proper risk assessment to determine what should be done. The emergency plan drawn up by the councils should take account of the risk factors.

What scenarios have been considered in a risk assessment with in excess of 300 cubic metric tonnes of water per second going down the River Lee? It has been stated there will be a four hour delay before the water reaches the city centre. I cannot understand how there was a flood at low water in Cork city. It is my understanding that at 7 a.m. those at Inniscarra dam informed that the discharge level would reach 300 cubic litres per second. At 5 p.m. Cork City Council was informed of this and at 5.30 p.m. it was contacted again to say discharge levels would be greater than 300 cubic metric tonnes per second. At any point when the figure rose to 350, 400, 500 and almost 550 cubic metric tonnes were any more calls made to Cork City Council or Cork County Council to inform them that volumes were way in excess of the 300 cubic metric tonnes notified earlier?

There is an article in today's edition of the Irish Examiner in which it is claimed the ESB issued a number of notices to residents downstream of the Inniscarra dam, including one to Francis O’Callaghan at 4.15 p.m., stating approximately 500 cubic metric tonnes of water would be released at the dam. That is 45 minutes before Cork City Council was told that the figure could exceed 300 cubic metric tonnes. Someone seemed to have the information that 500 cubic metric tonnes would be released, while Cork City Council was being told that 300 cubic metric tonnes would be released.

The last official communication of which Mr. Joe Gavin, Cork city manager, is aware was received at 5.30 p.m. At the time the volume of water coming down the river by Mr. O'Doherty's reckoning was 300 or 350 cubic metric tonnes. Later that evening the figure was approaching twice that volume. Was there any further communication with the city council?

Last Saturday a documentary was shown about the sinking of the Titanic. The engineer went down to the engine room, looked at the bulkheads, saw that three or four chambers were broken, measured the quantity of water coming in and said that in two hours the ship would sink. He was able to do this because he used an engineering formula for inflow and was able to determine an outcome. On 19 November was the ESB able to determine an outcome when it was releasing the water that Cork city centre would be flooded and that UCC, the Middle Parish, businesses and residences in the Mardyke would be inundated with water? If there is a four hour delay in water coming down the river, was there time for UCC to protect the Glucksman Gallery and residents of the Middle Parish to place sandbags at their doors? Was there a period in which the risk assessment would have influenced the emergency plan and allowed it to kick in and in which damage limitation measures could have been taken? In the circumstances this might have been unavoidable but was there a window when action could have been taken?

I have two questions for Mr. Tarrant. He mentioned flood risk and emergency management. He also stated the ESB had no knowledge of the development of this framework. Can he tell us more about the framework about which he is talking? Is it the risk assessment or the emergency plan? He also talked the multi-agency system and said the ESB was not the lead agency either in flood risk management or an emergency response and had given clear indications to local authorities of the potential risk downstream of discharges from ESB hydroelectric power stations. I do not see how he can make that statement, given that Mr. Gavin has stated the last warning he received was at 5.30 p.m. when a figure of 300 cubic metric tonnes per second was being talked about and that later the figure was around 500 cubic metric tonnes. Will he clarify that comment? He said the ESB gave clear indications. Was it in contact with the city council after 5.30 p.m.?

On 25 November 2009 when Mr. Glen Pope was interviewed on "Drivetime", he stated there was an external panel safety committee made up of external experts from all over the world. They come here regularly to vet procedures, protocols and structural maintenance works and make recommendations. They report directly to the board of the ESB. He continued by saying there were no Irish standards for the maintenance and operation of dams but that we operated to British standards, with the assistance of the external committee to evaluate everything done in maintaining and operating the dam, as well the water control and flood mitigation procedures. Is there a single committee or are there two? Has the external group met since 19 November to examine what happened?

The 2006 CFRAMS report mentions that there was an opportunity for the ESB to incorporate additional operational rules based on the rainfall forecast and measurement thresholds. These rules could operate for reservoirs operating at the maximum normal levels and provide for a lowering of reservoir levels prior to a flood event. Such rules would be constrained by limitations on reservoir drawdown rates and reasonable electricity generation interests but could take precedence over seasonal operational rules providing, for instance, for the covering of tree stumps in Grenagh during the summer. It is obvious that there is a concern with regard to how much water is stored behind the dam at any given time.

The report to which I refer was published in April 2006. According to Mr. Pope, a group is brought in from abroad to examine what is happening behind the dam. Were our guests and the group in question aware of the contents of the report? Were any changes made in respect of what should have been the water levels behind the dam? Were changes made to the way in which inflows and outflows are dealt with at the Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid dams? Did any changes arise on foot of the report in question?

Mr. Padraig McManus

Does the Chairman wish to take more questions from members or should we proceed with our responses?

Chairman

If our guests respond to the questions that have been posed, we will then take questions from other members.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

I will deal with the issue of risk assessment and the co-ordination of emergencies. Risk assessment can only be carried out at the point at which the risk arises. The risk in this instance arises in Cork city. In that context, it is necessary to take into account all of the factors involved and the fact that Cork city is, as already indicated, at the heart of a complex system and assess all of the risks that arise and the totality of the risks that impinge at that point. We have standing risk assessments around our dams, which all relate to safety and operating procedures. The information that has been handed over by way of inundation studies covers certain levels of release from the dams. These result, in particular situations, in certain flood levels in the city. The city council is aware of that.

Risk assessments are carried out and then there is the dynamic that attaches to any operational situation. On the day in question, warnings were given. There was one agency that had sight of all of the inputs into the system by means of which it could determine the risk to the city centre. Those inputs included ours and those from the tributaries lower down. Tides would also have to have been taken into account. All of those aspects can only be assessed at the point at which the risk arises, not at the dam. Information relating to the through-flows at the dam and other information which could and should have been assessed by a single, all-seeing agency in charge of the entire situation, could have been used to assess the level of risk at that point.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Is Mr. O'Doherty stating that responsibility for risk assessment was not that of the ESB but rather of some other agency?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Responsibility for risk assessment in Cork city does not rest with the ESB. It rests with another agency.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Which agency is responsible?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Responsibility for risk assessment rests with the OPW. Responsibility for operational risk assessment in an unfolding situation rests with the city council.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Does the ESB feed its information in respect of water levels into the system?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Yes.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Mr. O'Doherty stated that risk assessment happens as the need arises. That is not the case. According to the information and reports provided by the ESB, risk assessment is based upon modelling exercises carried out by the ESB. The company runs a number different scenarios in this regard. Risk assessment did not happen on 19 November. The ESB had already modelled particular scenarios in the past. Did it model a scenario based upon releasing a flow of water in excess of 500 cu. m. tonnes per second?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Yes. Risk assessment is done in a number of ways. The emergency co-ordination group of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government produced an emergency plan at the heart of which is dynamic operational risk assessment. Therefore, risk assessment is carried out at a number of levels. It is done on a standing or static basis in anticipation of what might occur and forms the basis of the flood inundation studies we carry out. We have compiled studies which showed water in excess of the levels that were released on 19 November last being released through the dam. That is the standing risk assessment.

Dynamic risk assessment — in any unfolding situation and in accordance with emergency planning and procedures — is a matter for the agency with responsibility, in an operational sense, for emergency co-ordination and planning. Risk assessment for emergency planning is carried out by the OPW. In an operational scenario, however, local authorities are the designated agencies responsible for carrying out dynamic risk assessment in emergency situations.

What we are saying is that we gave warnings. In the warnings we gave we were raising as many questions as we were answering. We want to know what consideration was given to those warnings and the information they contained and to the situation that was evolving during the day in question, particularly in the context of the downstream tributaries and the position regarding tides. What consideration was given to all of this in the context of decisions and actions that were either taken or not taken? We are hoping the review that is being carried out by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, through the emergency planning committee, will uncover the position in this regard.

In terms of examining the entire picture in Cork on the day, it was a risk assessment as the situation was unfolding. There was also continual risk assessment during the incident. The declaration of an emergency was neither required nor declared. However, there was a need to fall back on emergency procedures. It is not necessary to declare an emergency to be in an emergency situation. Local authorities are responsible, in an operational sense, for emergency management in the event of floods.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I wish to ask——

Chairman

I will come back to the Deputy.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

With respect, I have been e-mailing the ESB since last Tuesday.

Chairman

Yes, but the Deputy has been asking questions for 27 minutes.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I appreciate that. However, I asked a series of questions but only received a reply in respect of one of them.

Chairman

The Deputy will have ample opportunity to pose further questions. I call Deputy O'Flynn.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

My first question relates to the early warning system and the point of contact with the emergency bodies. Will Mr. O'Doherty provide the names of those in the city council which the ESB actually contacted? I understand that there is a list of people to contact. How does the ESB contact these people? Does it do so by telephone or e-mail? How does it communicate with them in circumstances such as those which obtained on 19 November last? Did any meetings take place on the morning of 19 November with the emergency services or the lead agencies involved, namely, the fire brigade and the city and county councils? Were they informed that problems would arrive at 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. that evening?

I am somewhat concerned with regard to how the city council communicated the message with regard to the serious flood alert on the day in question. I do not know how the message was put out. Was it sent by e-mail or listed on the websites of the two councils? Are there individuals with either council who are responsible for communicating the seriousness nature of such emergencies?

Will Mr. McManus indicate whether the ESB has any responsibility to the victims of the flood? Does it have any responsibility, in the context of the release of water through the dam, for the damage caused to houses on the Western Road, Middle Parish and along the Lee Valley and also for that done to the university, Mercy Hospital and various businesses? I understand insurance companies are refusing to reinsure people whose properties were affected by flooding on the night of 19 November.

Is there a need for the ESB to reconsider the way it operates the dams, particularly in the context of the way in which overflows are released? Should the level of water in the reservoirs be maintained at a lower level all year round? Is there a need to update statutory regulations and primary legislation in respect of the operation of dams nationwide?

What is the nature of the ESB's relationship with both local authorities? Mr. McManus says in his presentation that the ESB was not consulted by the local authorities about the new framework that was put in place between 2006 and 2008. That suggests a serious communications breakdown between a semi-State body and the statutory bodies, Cork City Council and Cork County Council. Does he agree with the report of the city manager in November, which was forwarded to us and to the members of the council? I understand he took issue with parts of the report. It sets out the sequence of events on the day of the flooding.

I have a question for Mr. O'Doherty. Is it the view of the ESB that the local authorities did not take the flood risk warnings seriously enough on the day in question? People in Middle Parish have made several suggestions regarding flood risk management and perhaps it is time this function was carried out by an independent body rather than a specific agency such as the ESB or a local authority. I would like answers to those questions before I leave for another meeting.

Chairman

The Deputy asked who was contacted in the city council. Is he seeking names? It is not fair to officials who are not present to name them in public.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

For example, was it a junior clerk in City Hall, a senior engineer, the assistant city manager or city manager?

Chairman

That is fine. The Deputy is looking for the titles of those who were contacted.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

We have a log of all calls made. We have operational logs as part of our arrangements and we know we made the calls, to whom they were made and the number they were contacted on. These people are familiar with the operation of the dams. They are part of the arrangements in place between ourselves and local authorities.

That leads to the other question the Deputy asked about the new framework. I understand the framework has been led by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and over a two-year period all local authorities revised their emergency procedures and arrangements for a range of emergencies. We did not know about the framework but perhaps that is a different issue. We were operating to a set of procedures and protocols which we had agreed with the city council. These were the points of contact we had agreed. We did not know anything about the emerging or unfolding protocols but we were operating to a set of procedures that were in place.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Is Mr. O'Doherty saying a framework was introduced and the ESB was not consulted or did not even know it was going on?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Yes. We did not know. We were not in on the development of this.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Did Mr. O'Doherty know it was being done?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

The issue is that the framework was being developed. We have asked Cork City Council for its emergency procedures for flooding; we do not have them. Until we see that, we cannot comment on the procedures it has in place. We can comment on and talk about what we did. What we did was more than adequate in terms of the warnings given. They were adequate for somebody with sight of the overall picture that was emerging in Cork and for people to make an assessment of what was happening at the time. I cannot answer whether our warnings were taken seriously. A warning is only as serious as it is taken. I cannot answer that until such time as we see the total picture as it emerged in terms of the risk that was being assessed by the lead agency as the situation unfolded.

Chairman

I have a document, Major Emergency Plan — Cork City Council 2008. It is a 76-page document and the only blank page in it is under the heading, "Severe Weather Plans". That was signed off by the city manager and lord mayor.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Has that document never been seen by the ESB?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

I am sure there is a procedure of some type but that is the one that is on public display. In appendix 8 of the supplementary information we gave the committee, under the national framework of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, there is a draft document for a guide to flood emergencies that was produced in 2008. It is a long document and we have included some extracts. It sets out the procedures and the guidance for developing local authority flood emergency plans and many of the questions being asked by members may be addressed in the Cork city major emergency plan but we have not seen it. It talks about, for example, categories of warnings and things we were not aware of. It talks about a flood assessment team, different area, lead agency and responsibilities.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Can the Chairman advise on the report of the city manager? Does the ESB concur with the report?

Mr. Padraig McManus

The Deputy asked a couple of questions. The report issued by the city manager contains a number of inaccuracies.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

That was sent to Oireachtas Members and council members. Is Mr. McManus saying this is inaccurate?

Mr. Padraig McManus

I am not sure which report the Deputy is referring to.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

The report of 20 November.

Mr. Padraig McManus

It is the report of the city council. The most unfortunate part about the report from the city manager was an effort to try to move the whole issue to the ESB, between agencies. That was sad. A number of issues have been referred to about warnings and let us be absolutely clear in this regard. We issued a warning in the morning — above 150 tonnes means flooding — that we were going to get more than 300 tonnes. By 5 p.m. we said we were already at that level, which was close of the level of the 1986 flooding, that unprecedented levels of water were entering the system and we would continue to flood and increase the level of flooding during the night. No warning could have been any more explicit.

With regard to telephone calls, we never got any telephone call from the city council. No telephone call came in the opposite direction. The document records that a call was made from the waterworks once they were flooding at approximately 10 p.m. and we acknowledge that. Let us be absolutely clear about the warnings. By 11 a.m. we made it clear there would be a serious flood in Cork and by 5 p.m. we said we were spilling at that level with unprecedented levels of water entering the system and we would continue to increase the level of discharge through the night. No warning could have been more explicit. Nobody can come back and say we did not give warnings. I find it interesting in whatever the city council was doing, it did not think once to call the ESB about the issue after 5 p.m.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Mr. McManus has stunned me because the question I asked was whether there was a series of meetings during the day with the emergency services.

Mr. Padraig McManus

There were telephone calls but no contact after 5 p.m.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

Is Mr. McManus aware of the millions of euro worth of damage to property in Cork?

Mr. Padraig McManus

Yes.

Deputy Noel O’Flynn

I accept that 30% of the water entered the River Lee below the dam through different tributaries. As a State body, does the ESB feel any responsibility towards the victims, be they residents of private homes or the universities, the Mercy Hospital or even Cork County Council, which suffered severe damage? Does it feel any responsibility towards the institutions, businesses and people affected?

Mr. Padraig McManus

We operated at all times within the procedures and do not have responsibilities in that regard. We have great sympathy for people who have suffered seriously. However, looking at the manner in which we managed the flood, at all times we were releasing far less water than was coming into the system. We were in fact inhibiting flooding and mitigating the impact of what was happening. Regrettably, I must tell the Deputy that the ESB has no responsibility in that regard.

Deputy Phil Hogan

I apologise for coming in before Deputy Bannon, who might want to raise some questions about the River Shannon but I have two or three brief questions relating to Cork city.

Nobody is here other than for the purpose of trying to ensure that whatever went wrong, these things will never happen again. Something went wrong because the level of water that arrived into Cork city was far greater than expected or than the city authorities had been warned about. What was the highest level of water reached at Carrigadrohid dam on the 19 and 20 November? Have we been provided with any figure on that?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The spillway was in operation. We gave a figure of 65.2 m.

Deputy Phil Hogan

Was there spare capacity in the dam on those days?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

Once the spillway, which is an open spillway, is in service, we have reached the top level. Water just spills out over the spillway.

Deputy Phil Hogan

There is one thing I find curious. At our last committee meeting we had delegates from Met Éireann telling us about rainfall levels. In August 1986, the rainfall in the upper catchment area was 92 mm in one day. The Cork Airport record for that day was 60.9 mm. The maximum discharge at that time was 331 cubic metres. In November 2009, the records show 93 mm of rain over two days in the catchment area and the record for those two days at Cork Airport was 58 mm. The maximum discharge from Inniscarra dam at that time was 535 cu. m. Therefore, there was a huge increase in the amount of water that emanated from the lnniscarra dam, even though there was not a significant difference with regard to the amount of water that came into the dam. The figures reported for one day in 1986 and for two days in 2009 were much the same, but there was massive flooding in 2009 and no flooding at all, practically speaking, in 1986. How can that be explained?

Mr. Tom Browne

We refer in the supplementary information we provided to the comparison between 1986 and 2009. It can be seen that in 1986, the maximum inflow into the catchment was approximately 570 cu. m. per second, whereas in 2009 the maximum inflow into the catchment was approximately 809 cu. m. per second. Therefore, even though it may look as if the rainfall was similar, the 1986 rainfall happened in summer time and there were different hydrological conditions. The fact is that the inflow into the catchment was substantially different for the two floods. The inflow into the catchment in November 2009 was substantially greater than in August 1986.

Deputy Phil Hogan

I was informed, by figures I received last week, that we had significant rainfall in July 2009. We had 240 mm of rain with no flooding whatsoever as a result. Cork Airport had a measurement of 270 mm of rain in November and we had significant flooding. As a lay person who is not up to speed on these issues, I find it difficult to fathom why we had so much flooding in November when there is such an insignificant difference between the amount of rainfall between July and November.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

One needs to look at the sequencing of the rainfall, the days on which it happened and the number of days between heavy bouts of rain. One could look at the average rainfall across November and say there should, on average, have been no problem with being able to accommodate that rainfall behind the dams. The issue is the way rain occurs in the catchment and the length of time between large bouts of rain. That is where November was different from any other month.

Chairman

Is Deputy Bannon going to ask a question about Cork?

Deputy James Bannon

I am not. I am moving up to the River Shannon catchment area. There was huge devastation caused in the midlands and further downstream by flooding from the River Shannon. I welcome our visitors from the ESB, but with no disrespect, I have heard the same history and geography lessons in previous presentations relating to rainfall, etc. What the people in the midlands and people in Cork and throughout the country want is not history lessons but a solution to the problem.

Have the ESB authorities met all the local authorities in the midlands region since the devastation that was caused to the midlands? It is heartbreaking to see what families had to go through. Businesses, farmers and others are still counting the costs of the unnecessary flood damage caused in November and later. Would the ESB support the establishment of a River Shannon authority? I believe this would provide a structure that could deal once and for all with the causes and extent of flooding in the Shannon catchment area and the impact of flooding on different sectors, particularly householders, businesses and farmers. It would also have greater powers to respond to the different categories of flooding. A River Shannon authority would make good business sense in terms of both efficiency and cost. It would provide us with a unified authority that would carry more weight than the conglomeration of various agencies, semi-State and voluntary bodies involved in managing the Shannon currently. On my last count, there were over 40 bodies with a vested interest in the River Shannon.

If a River Shannon authority was established and given the necessary legislative measures to manage and develop the River Shannon, it might attract EU funds to develop and erect the protection barriers necessary in towns such as Athlone. There has been devastation in Athlone and I have visited many of the areas affected. The Minister of State with responsibility for the OPW also visited Athlone. There has been much talk since then, but little action. The situation that occurred in 2009 was not a first. We have had a lesson from the ESB on the history of flooding. Throughout my lifetime I have listened to stories of flooding and have attended flood meetings in Athlone. I am aware Mr. Browne was at a meeting with the IFA in Ballinasloe recently. We have heard it all before. People are fed up of all the talk and no action. The Dutch had a serious problem with flooding, but they dealt with it comprehensively over the years. We do not hear much about serious flooding in the Netherlands and they do not seem to have a problem to the same extent as we have here, although I am sure they have as much or more rainfall than us.

I hope I can get a positive response to my questions. Will the ESB support the establishment of a River Shannon authority, will it engage with local authorities and what concern has it for the people on the ground in the midland region?

Mr. Tom Browne

I will deal with those questions. I was at the meeting with the IFA in Ballinasloe, where various parties spoke about the River Shannon and flooding in the area. The ESB does not have an issue with regard to whether there is a single authority for the River Shannon. The Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh, spoke at the meeting referred to about the OPW's co-ordinating role with regard to the River Shannon. Just as the OPW has carried out a catchment flood risk management assessment in the River Lee, work is also starting on that type of initiative with regard to the River Shannon. The ESB does not have an issue with working with whatever agency the Government decides to set up.

In reply to the other comment about the ESB's involvement with the local authorities in the River Shannon region, the main area where the ESB has an impact is the lower Shannon — as shown in the slide presentation — and particularly south of Parteen. During the period of the flooding in November, an inter-agency group was established which comprised of the various local authorities of counties Clare, Limerick and Tipperary. This group worked together throughout that period and the ESB was involved in dealing with that agency and liaising with the group as to what was happening in Parteen and on the lower Shannon.

The Shannon is a very slow-moving river with only 15 metres difference in height between Drumshanbo on Lough Allen and Lough Derg. It is very flat. When a lot of rainfall comes into that catchment it takes a long time to come out of it. There is nothing that ESB can do to improve that situation or to speed up that process. I can understand the frustration of people living in that area but from our perspective, there is not a lot we can do. In the lower Shannon we do what we can to alleviate flooding by moving as much water through Ardnacrusha as we can and diverting it away from the lower Shannon during the flooding.

Deputy James Bannon

The ESB has acknowledged there is a serious problem and there has been a problem with a build-up of silt over the years, particularly from the tributaries of the Shannon and from bushes and debris flowing down the Shannon. It is all about management. Several Ministers and leaders of political parties promised in the past that they would drain the Shannon — which is not possible. Proper maintenance of the Shannon is very necessary. If there was a concerted and genuine effort to carry out the management and the cleaning of the river, this would resolve many of the problems encountered by people during the very heavy floods. I am not saying it would be the complete solution but at least the seriousness of the situation would not have been as devastating for families.

With regard to meeting all the local authorities, I do not think that question was answered in the Shannon catchment area.

Mr. Tom Browne

We dealt with the interagency group which was comprised of the various local authorities in the lower Shannon area.

Deputy James Bannon

Mr. Browne has mentioned the interagency group comprising the mid-west local authorities, Clare County Council, Limerick City Council, Limerick County Council, North Tipperary County Council and the emergency services. There is no mention in this document of the Laois-Offaly, Longford-Westmeath, Cavan or Roscommon local authorities. Those are the local authorities that concern me and I would appreciate if Mr. Browne could arrange meetings with those local authorities as soon as possible to discuss the seriousness of the situation. I visited homes that were flooded to a depth of eight feet. They are still counting the cost of the floods which happened in the Christmas period and people are not yet back in their homes. As some of my colleagues said, those people will have serious problems with acquiring insurance in the future. I am disappointed that the local authorities in the upper Shannon catchment area were not consulted nor is there any mention of them here in this report.

Mr. Tom Browne

I know there was some interaction and discussions at the time with people in Galway County Council and also people in Leitrim County Council. The ESB has not had any involvement in managing flood waters in the upper Shannon area.

Deputy James Bannon

What about in Athlone, south Longford, in and around Longford town? The local authority meeting included a discussion. My brother is a councillor and he is here in the Visitors Gallery. He was at that meeting. The people in the upper Shannon catchment area feel they have been ignored by the ESB and by other bodies who are responsible for the seriousness of the flooding. Much of this flooding could have been avoided and it caused unnecessary damage. If proper management and structure had been in place, businesses and farmers and householders would not have suffered as much as they did at Christmas.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

In the flood situation, ESB has no real control over levels upstream of Lough Derg. The sluice gates at Lough Allen come into the equation at a certain point but there was unprecedented water coming into Lough Ree around Athlone and there was no control that ESB could exercise in that situation. We will note the Deputy's comments.

During the course of the flooding events on the Shannon, while the national emergency co-ordination committee was meeting, information was being exchanged between all areas along the Shannon and ESB had an input into that process during November.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

I welcome the ESB delegation. I wish to record my appreciation to Mr. Tarrant in particular for his courtesy and his willingness to meet with us and to impart information. I also welcome residents from the Middle Parish who are here in the Visitors Gallery. They are the victims who have suffered. When I hear words such as, "understand and sheer frustration", I smile cynically. I am not interested in the blame game. I have said this publicly and privately at meetings. I am interested in finding out how to avoid what happened in Cork.

Five eminent people from the ESB are here today and we have been given a first-class episode of spin for which I congratulate them. I am making a serious point. The spin is over. The reality is there are people in the Visitors Gallery and at home in Cork and in other parts of Ireland who are not back in their homes, who are waking up in the middle of the night afraid of being flooded. There are others who do not know if they will ever get back into their homes and then they are faced with the cost of the insurance bill.

I am very impressed with the line, "We are but one input into this system". Can somebody tell me why did Cork city flood on 19 and 20 November? Has the ESB any responsibility for what happened in Cork? I have heard no apology to the people of Cork from anybody here today. Nobody has said, "Sorry". Cork City Council, through the city manager, issued a report on 7 December.

I will not get into the technicalities like Deputies Ciarán Lynch, Coveney or Hogan. I am interested in getting to the bottom line. I have great respect for Mr. McManus and he is a very good chief executive of the ESB. I have seen what he had done. He might be at odds with my party about our NewERA document but I think he has done a good job. He made a very interesting comment today. What inaccuracies does he see between the report given by Mr. Joe Gavin to Cork City Council and to us?

I am not a genius by any stretch of the imagination. Frances O'Callaghan received a telephone call from the ESB and she called them back. If she can receive a telephone call at a particular time in the afternoon, how is it that a situation was allowed to develop where residents a couple of miles down the road could not be notified? I accept the point about the issue of the warning in terms of it being taken seriously but surely there is a code red system or a code green or a code amber. Code red means it is time to take action. Is this system not in place? Are we still in the situation where the boy sticks his finger in the dyke? Deputy Ciarán Lynch made a good point. If the residents in Middle Parish had been notified they could have had sandbags in place. However, it took until 4 a.m. before anything was mobilised. Why is the page on severe weather plans in the document, Major Emergency Plan — Cork City Council 2008, blank? I get the impression that there was no relationship between the ESB and Cork City Council. Is there any joined-up thinking? We are dealing with human lives. This is not about money but about people. My primary job as a politician is to advocate on behalf of the people. I am not an engineer and cannot debate it on that level. However, as a layperson I believe we made a monumental error regarding the water management, release and spillage. The representatives of the ESB have given me one story here. I have documentation from an independent engineer that gives me another story. It is high time we had an independent investigation, not to lay the blame — I am not interested in blame — but to make sure in so far as we can that this does not happen again. Does the ESB accept that the early warning system failed? As a consequence there was a monumental communication failure between the ESB, the OPW, Cork City Council and Cork County Council.

The representatives of Met Éireann who appeared before the committee last week told us that the level of rainfall in itself would not necessarily have yielded the flooding that happened. The ESB's documentation refers to the 1986 and 1987 reports. What have we learnt from them? Considering what is shown on the graph for the area around the Kingsley Hotel in Cork, where it flooded in 1986, it happened further in again in 2009. Why did that happen? If we have all these reports we should have learnt from them. Is it time to have one agency to manage water in Cork or in Ireland? I know the staff in the ESB dam, who are good honourable people who do a good job. While I do not want to blame anybody, we need to learn lessons from this. This is about people in the Visitors' Gallery who are still suffering trauma, which is the fundamental point.

This committee met representatives of UCC and got a briefing on the flooding. Their report is at variance with the warnings and phone calls they got, which is of concern to me. The damage done is horrific. We can go into the issue regarding the costs and so on. Deputy O'Flynn specifically asked Mr. McManus about responsibility for the flood victims and I was disappointed with the response. The ESB owes an apology to the people of Cork and should look after them in some way regarding costs in their ESB bills in the period following the flooding. That should be done as a humanitarian gesture. I know the representatives of the ESB would probably say that would be an admission of guilt or liability. However, this is about people.

On the city manager's report, I am concerned about the breakdown of communications indicated in his report on Thursday, 19 November, which is completely at odds with what representatives of the ESB told us today. I do not want to spare the city council. If it is guilty and had a role to play in this matter, let us call its representatives before the committee to get the answers. The report of the city manager states:

11.30 a.m. Inniscarra Dam contacts Council and advises that the discharge level would be 150 cubic metres per second increasing to 200 cubic metres per second over the next few hours with the possibility that it would reach 250 to 300 cubic metres per second later in the day.

It further states:

15.00 Inniscarra Dam informed Council that discharge levels had risen to 225 cubic metres per second, were expected to reach 250 cubic metres per second by 17.00 hours and could reach 275 cubic metres per second by 19.00 hours.

17.00 Inniscarra Dam informed Council that the discharge level would now reach 300 cubic metres per second.

It went from the possibility that it could, to being expected, to then reaching. The report further states: "17.30 Inniscarra Dam informs Council that discharge levels would be greater than previously anticipated". There was no further communication between the two parties according to the report as I read it. We can have all the manuals in the world to prepare us for an emergency, but if we do not have communication and dialogue, where are we going?

I apologise if I missed this in the ESB presentation. Did it have spare capacity at Carrigadrohid on 19 and 20 November? I believe Mr. Doherty stated that if the water spilled over the dam, it would be catastrophic. He said there was no risk to the dam at any stage, but there was risk to the people as a consequence of what happened. Could this have been averted? We need accountability and acceptance of responsibility by everybody. I have heard no acceptance of responsibility form anybody regarding the issue of the flooding.

I appreciate all the work Mr. Tarrant did for us. However, we have an obligation to the people of Cork, in particular those in the Mardyke and Middle parish. I have not heard anybody say today that they would do anything differently? Would they do it exactly the same again, line by line and play by play? I look forward to the reply and will come back in again later, if I may, after Deputy Ciarán Lynch.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

The Senator asked many questions which I will answer as best I can. Regarding spin and the document being spin, what we are putting out are facts. They are out for everybody to see now. When those facts are put with other facts that have yet to emerge then we will be able to get the full picture of what happened. We need to assess all the information that was available as the situation was unfolding and what decisions were made or were not made by the lead authority. We have made our information available. A review is being carried out which is being co-ordinated by the emergency management people in the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. When other people's facts are put with our facts, including those from UCC, the city council, the county council or anybody else, we will then be able to answer the question as to what actually happened. We know what happened regarding water. The real issue is to ascertain what happened regarding systems and emergency management.

The Senator touched on the relationship between the ESB and Cork County Council.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

Cork City Council.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Cork City Council, rather. We do not believe and did not believe there was a poor relationship. We had a relationship and we were operating to that relationship. We have shared information in the past and made our calls in accordance with the protocols we had established. Up to the time of the incident we did not believe there was any issue with the relationship. The relationship was fine in that regard.

The Senator asked about having one agency. There was discussion about having one water agency for the Shannon and one for Cork. That is all there for discussion.

The Senator talked about error. It is important for me to stress that on the night of the flooding there was no error by the ESB in terms of the operation of the dam. So there was no error.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

I refer to the days preceding the flooding and the day of the flooding. I refer to the management and release of water, and the spillage ESB allowed.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

The manner in which we operate the dam at any given time is a function of the amount of water in the dam. We have to consider the position in which we find ourselves in terms of the amount of water in the dam, the forecast and the actual rainfall. In that regard, there was no error. There was no error in the days leading up to the release of water either.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

Is Mr. O'Doherty saying the ESB did nothing wrong?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

We did nothing wrong.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

Okay.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

I thank Senator for the comments he made earlier. I would like to speak about the ESB's relationship with Cork City Council and Cork County Council. We have spoken about various aspects of the events that happened. I emphasise the importance of that relationship, from our point of view, for the future. We have been meeting the OPW on issues relating to Cork and the rest of the country. Our relationship with Cork City Council and Cork County Council is very important for the integrated management of flood risk.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

In terms of the apology, can I ask about the ESB's responsibility to residents?

Mr. Padraig McManus

Nobody could look at what has happened without being sorry. As I said to Deputy O'Flynn and say again now, we do not have any responsibility in relation to the way we behaved and operated. We will stand by that. That is exactly the case. On the point made about bills, I assure the committee that we have always dealt with people with respect in that regard. We have dealt with agencies and deal with individuals on an individual basis. We are prepared to do so again, as we always have. On the issue of responsibility, we have none.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

I would like to ask Mr. McManus a specific question about his comments on the city manager's report. What inaccuracies does he see in the report?

Mr. Padraig McManus

There are some around timing. I can ask my colleague to go through them with the Senator.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

Yes.

Mr. Padraig McManus

The unfortunate thing was that the city manager attempted to shift so much of his trouble onto the ESB. I felt that was very sad. Mr. Tarrant's comments were very important. We deal with all city and county councils. Those relationships are very important to us. We want to try to rebuild our relationship with Cork County Council and Cork City Council.

As I confused some of my colleagues earlier, I would like to clarify something. When I said Cork City Council did not contact us, I was talking about the period after 5 p.m. The Cork city manager said in his report that there had been a call at 10 p.m. We accept this, although we do not have a record of it. If the Cork city manager said it happened, I am not saying it did not. I wanted to clarify that I was talking about the time when people were looking at whether there would be trouble, or what it might involve. Cork City Council did not call us back during that time.

Deputy Michael Fitzpatrick

I will be brief, as it is getting late.

I thank the officials from the ESB. I am delighted that the chief executive, Mr. McManus, is present, as I have had previous dealings with him. I find him to be a good and excellent chief executive. It is very easy to be wise after the event. Our function is to get the facts. We need to get a clear picture from the different parties. We should ascertain their perspective on what happened on the date in question. We will have to provide a report at that stage. It does not make any difference on whose side we come down. We will compile a report based on the facts.

When I went to Cork I met the people of Middle Parish. I must say they are very angry with the ESB. They are extremely angry about the lack of information. They believe something as simple as a leaflet on the evening of the flooding would have been helpful. It was fortunate that there was no loss of life. Having spoken to the residents of the locality, I can see from where their anger is coming. Perhaps they should focus their anger on the city council, as well as the ESB. They are extremely angry. This is justified in so far as they did not receive sufficient warning before the whole community, including their homes, was flooded. I do not know who is to blame for not providing a warning, but the people should have received some warning.

The ESB is stating it followed its regulations and carried out its mandate. The officials have argued that if the dam had overflowed, a greater disaster could have happened. Nobody would deny that fact. Everyone concerned, including this committee and the ESB, must endeavour to ensure what happened in Cork never happens again. We must find a way forward for the ESB which controls many of our rivers, including the Liffey, the Shannon and the Lee in Cork. I am sure it wants to find a better means of operating. There may be such a means. I hope flooding that occurred all over the country will become a thing of the past.

Chairman

I will ask a couple of questions before I invite Deputy Ciarán Lynch to speak.

I have examined the charts provided by the ESB. As a lay person, I see a difficulty. The ESB has given us details of the water levels at Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid dams on each of the ten days before the events of 19-20 November. The average water level at Inniscarra, the nearest of the two dams to Cork city, was approximately 49.5 m. If the level exceeds 50.8 m, there will be a catastrophe that we do not want. The dam was consistently 98% full in the weeks running up to these events. Carrigadrohid Dam was operating at an average level of 63.8 m, although it went up to 64 m. The disaster level is 65.2 m. In that case, the ESB was operating at close to 99% capacity on an ongoing basis in the run-up to these severe weather conditions. When heavy rain fell over a couple of days, there was no space in the dam.

The issue is not what happened in the two or three days before the flood. I am concerned about the fact that the ESB was operating the dam at 99% capacity in the middle of the wet month of November. I want it to provide similar charts for November in each of the previous five years. Has it always operated at 99% of the dam's capacity? As a lay person, it is a high level at which to operate. We might have to get an opinion on this. The officials can understand my point. As the winter approached, I would have thought that the dam should have been operating at 60% or 70% of its capacity. I can understand why the ESB would want to maintain high water levels during the summer, when it is possible there might not be much rain for a while. The decision to keep the dams at 99% capacity in the middle of winter gave the ESB no scope to deal with a couple of bad days of rain. That is my first question. I want to see the figures for previous years, as without them we cannot draw any conclusions from the figures for the week running up to the floods. We would like the see the ESB's charts for equivalent months in previous years.

The charts we were given also contained some supplementary information. We need to deal with the facts. People will find this very interesting. In appendix 5 to the document, the ESB gave the discharge figures for the Inniscarra Dam. Without wishing to bore those present, we have been given the figures at 5 p.m., 5.25 p.m., 5.50 p.m., 6.40 p.m., 6.50 p.m., 7.15 p.m., 7.30 p.m., 8 p.m., 8.30 p.m., 9.45 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. on the Thursday evening. The water level was recorded almost every half an hour. A six-hour gap in the information is then evident. That was when the disaster happened. The next reading we have been given details what was taken at 3.40 a.m. We have been given figures for each half-hour period until the time when the crisis occurred. We have not been given any indication of the discharge levels in these hours. Perhaps the officials have these figures to hand. It is extraordinary that there is such a gap in the figures. I would have thought the hours which appear to have been omitted were the critical ones.

The city manager has suggested the persistence of the rainfall meant that water at 800 cu. m. per second flowed into the dam structure. Page 11 of the ESB's documentation states that when the water level reaches 50.85 m, or the disaster point, the discharge level is the same as the inflow level. When that level is reached, everything that comes in is left out. Given that water at 800 cu. m. per second was arriving into the dam and in the light of the fact that the manual states that when a certain level is reached, one has to discharge whatever is coming in, is it possible that the amount being discharged was far in excess of that suggested in these figures? Could it have been close to 800 cu. m. per second at certain stages?

I would like the ESB officials to respond to a final point. I understand those who received warnings may have been told that 300 cu. m., 400 cu. m. or 500 cu. m. of water would be discharged each second. It was discharging at more than 500 cu. m. per second from 8.30 p.m. until 4 a.m., an eight hour period. Did the ESB inform Cork City Council that it was discharging from the reservoir at such a high rate for such a long period? While it would be possible to cope with that level of discharge for one or two hours, based on the information available to us, water was discharged at a rate of 500 cu. m for eight hours. The decision to do this generated the high volume of water in the city. I have examined the information provided, although I am not an engineer. I ask Mr. Tarrant to address the reason capacity in the reservoir was at 99% in the middle of November.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The first issue to clarify is that appendix 5 shows the changes which were made on 19 and 20 November. There is not, as such, a gap between 9.50 p.m. and 3.40 a.m. This shows the level of discharge was constant during the relevant period and did not change. This brings us to the Chairman's point that the discharge was sustained in that period, between the two times to which I referred, at 546 cu. m. per second. That is what is indicated in the table.

Chairman

In other words, the ESB discharged water at a rate of 546 cu. m. per second for four hours.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

It was discharged at that rate between 9.50 p.m. and 3.40 a.m.

Chairman

That is a substantial volume of water over such an extended period. I do not believe people appreciate the quantity involved. While everyone understands the discharge was large and rapid, no one understands that this unprecedented level of discharge took place over such an extended period. It was this that give rise to the large volume of water in the city. What was the inflow to the dam?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The maximum inflow to the entire part of our catchment was 809 cu. m. per second.

Chairman

Where was the inflow going during the hours in question?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

There was storage capacity available. The chart in the presentation featuring the history of peak inflows and discharges shows that in any flood event the peak discharge should be less than the inflow. This reflects that under the regulations storage is used up until one reaches a point where additional water must be discharged.

On the Chairman's question as to whether it was possible that the rate of discharge was 800 cu. m. per second at a time when the ESB has indicated the rate was 546 cu. m. per second, staff follow specific actions and procedures to ensure gate openings reflect a particular flow rate. I can categorically state that those actions were followed on the day in question and were based on the details in our guidelines and procedures. The discharge rate was definitely not 800 cu. m. per second.

Chairman

To return to the question, for many hours was the discharge rate higher than 300 cu. m. per second in the 1986 case? We know the rate was higher than that for several hours on the most recent occasion. Why was the dam 99% full heading into the winter season? Why had the ESB not reduced the level? Why was it necessary to have the level so high?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

As set out in our regulations, the levels operate between particular limits. There is dead storage below a certain quantity that is set out in the regulations. The reservoir was not 99% full.

Chairman

The figure was 98%.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

There was rainfall in advance which was being managed. In between the maximum operating level on the dam and the target level in winter, the levels vary based on generational requirements, inflows and five day rainfall forecasts. There are times when levels are between the target and maximum operating levels.

Chairman

What was the lowest level recorded in the reservoir last year?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

A chart in the regulations shows that if the water level falls below 46 m in Inniscarra we must hold a meeting with the local authorities because they have a water take off that supplies local authorities when the level is below 45.7 m. We have a target level which varies between summer and winter. The target and maximum levels vary because water flows in and is pushed through the turbines to produce electricity. It is a dynamic process.

As members will note, in response to the flood events taking place, with the water flowing into the catchment and in advance of 19 November, the ESB was, in so far as it could, discharging additional water to make room for the inflow of water.

Chairman

Mr. Tarrant has not yet convinced me of the reason the reservoir was at 98% capacity in the middle of November and before the wet weather commenced. I understand the variables. Is it normal to operate at a level that is within approximately 1 m of the catastrophic point, to use the words of Mr. Tarrant? This does not leave much margin for error in events such as occurred on the dates in question. What is the current level of the reservoir? What was the latest reading? I hope it was not 99% because it could rain tomorrow.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I have a simple question

Chairman

We will move on. I hope the delegation understands my concerns. I need to obtain historical information. Perhaps the levels were exceptionally high or perhaps the standard operating levels do not leave a sufficient margin of comfort in the event of severe weather conditions occurring, as appear to be increasingly the case in recent times. The Meteorological Service indicates that heavy rainfall will be a fact of life in future. I hope the ESB takes that into account.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

To follow on from the Chairman's points, the regulations and guidelines for the control of the River Lee state that the inflow to Carrigadrohid reservoir shall be calculated hourly and the peak discharge shall not be allowed to exceed the peak inflow during the rising flood. In the days leading up to 19 November, was the reservoir in flood? If it was in flood, the ESB was prohibited from releasing more water than was entering the reservoir.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

When we discharge additional water we are effectively in flood.The presentation provides dates as to when we discharged additional water in the lead-up to 16 November. Between 16 November and 19 November, we discharged the maximum amount permitted in advance of the forecast for 19 November.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The regulation booklet states that before spilling at Inniscarra the local plant controller shall notify downstream residents and interested parties of the intention to spill and a list shall be kept in the control room at Inniscarra station and updated from time to time. The names of those who feature on the list were indicated earlier. The booklet states that when the total discharge from Inniscarra is such that the roads are likely to be flooded, that is, greater than a spill of 150 cu. m. per second, a more general public warning shall be given through the relevant authorities and media, and a separate list of up-to-date contact numbers shall be kept in the control room at Inniscarra station for this purpose.

The vast majority of the questions I put earlier have not been answered. Specific criteria set down state that when a rate of 150 cu. m per second is exceeded, the earlier warning system is superseded by another warning system. The ESB released more than 500 cu. m. per second, an unbelievable rate. The report presented to the joint committee states that from 9.50 p.m. on 19 November until 3.40 a.m. on 20 November, the ESB managed to maintain the water level behind Inniscarra dam but to do so released 546 cu. m. of water per second over a period of five hours. Perhaps Mr. McManus was expecting a telephone call from Mr. Gavin informing him of what was taking place at the dam. Does Mr. McManus not believe that releasing unprecedented volumes of water for five hours warrants him making a telephone call to Mr. Gavin?

Mr. Padraig McManus

I could spend a long time restating that the warnings we gave, including the warning we gave at 5 p.m., were perfectly adequate and it was clear we were already well in advance of the original forecast. These are dynamic circumstances. At 5.15 p.m., we stated we would continue to increase the level of discharge through the night. We were already at a level that was equivalent to the 1986 level. The issue of whether Cork City Council had any doubt as to whether there would be severe flooding is absolutely clear to us. If the council had responsibility for minding the city then one telephone call would have helped.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

With respect, Mr. McManus, at 5 p.m. the ESB was releasing 275 tonnes per second. At 5.50 p.m. it was releasing 325 tonnes per second. At 7.50 p.m. it was releasing 403 tonnes per second. Is it correct to say that the last communication the ESB had with Cork City Council on the discharges was at approximately 5.30 p.m.?

Mr. Padraig McManus

Yes.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

From 5.25 p.m. in the evening the ESB's meters indicated the level was 300 tonnes of water per second. I understand a tonne of water is approximately the size of a washing machine. The equivalent of 500 of them were going through the dam per second. By 9.50 p.m. that night the ESB was releasing approximately 200 tonnes per second more than it was releasing at 5.30 p.m. The Chairman is an accountant. The ESB was releasing almost twice the amount of water at 10 p.m. than it was at 5.30 p.m. Does Mr. McManus believe that warranted a telephone call to Cork City Council and Cork County Council, given that the ESB was going to release that volume of water at a sustained level for the next five hours?

Mr. Padraig McManus

The message we gave in strong terms at 5.15 p.m. was that we were already releasing flood level waters. To return to a point that was raised by the Chairman earlier, that would have been well known to Cork City Council. We already told the council that there were large inflows into the catchment area of the reservoirs and that we would continue to increase the level of discharge. That is exactly what we did. That is the message we gave to Cork City Council.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

What time did Mr. McManus give that information? Was it at 5.30 p.m. in the day?

Mr. Padraig McManus

Yes.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

It was given on the basis of data that the ESB was running through the dam at that time, and that the level would increase but no indication was given as to what the increase would be.

Mr. Padraig McManus

How could we give an indication at that time as to what it would be? We said that it would increase beyond the level that was already causing the flood.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The point is that the data from which Mr. McManus was operating at 5.30 p.m. in the afternoon had changed quite significantly by 10 p.m. in the evening. It was a very different situation but Mr. McManus did not believe he had to contact Cork City Council.

Mr. Padraig McManus

At 5.15 p.m. when we were talking to Cork City Council we were already at serious flood level and we said it would increase continually through the night.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Was Mr. McManus predicting——

Chairman

I hope Mr. McManus will not mind me picking him up on this but that is the second time he has used the phrase "through the night". I have never heard that mentioned by anyone in regard to this issue. In the presentation we got an hour ago it is stated: "We issued further flood warnings to all relevant authorities in the afternoon, saying that we would be increasing the discharge from Inniscarra on numerous occasions throughout the evening". Until two minutes ago no one had suggested that the discharges would continue through the night.

Mr. Padraig McManus

I apologise for using "night". I am talking about the evening.

Chairman

People would have thought that use of the word "evening" would have meant that the high discharges would have finished at 8 p.m. not 12 hours later.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

When we issued our warnings between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. and said that the discharges would increase, the impact of that would not have been seen in Cork city and around the waterworks weir until 10 p.m. or later. We do not have information on what monitoring was being done at the waterworks weir and at other locations in Cork city and taking into account, for example, the stripping out of the tidal effect at areas such as Grenville Place. Because of that time delay there was an escalating situation that was visible on the ground at 10 p.m. and water levels were clearly rising during that time. We do not have information on what happened during that time and whether there were calls to the fire brigade. The city manager's report refers to a call at 10 p.m. If there was concern at the waterworks at 10 p.m. then that water level continued to rise during the evening. We believe there was sufficient information in the system in light of tributaries downstream and all other factors to enable an assessment to be made that the situation was escalating.

Chairman

I have said enough at this stage. It is about Cork.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I have just done the sums. For approximately six hours the ESB was releasing 540 tonnes per second. To return to the Titanic scenario, that ship had sunk at 9.50 p.m. The fate of Middle Parish was sealed at 9.50 p.m. that night. It takes four hours for the water to come down the river and the ESB was releasing it at an unprecedented level for approximately six hours. The ESB’s charts show that the highest volume of water it had ever released was just in excess of 300 tonnes per second, yet for six hours almost twice that volume was released. People, businesses and local authorities were based in the city centre and that would start to affect them over a period of four hours. The figures show that the flood started to develop during the night.

I accept that perhaps the ESB had to protect the dam because if the water came over it the damage could have been greater. I do not argue that but what I am at a loss to understand is that the ESB was releasing a totally unprecedented volume of water and it did not believe that a call to City Hall and Cork County Council was warranted to say that according to a risk assessment there could be random scenarios. What was the scenario? Surely the outcome was that there could be up to 2 ft. of water in the city centre but that the staff in City Hall and County Hall would know what that would mean. The ESB told them at 5.30 p.m. that it would be sending down 300 tonnes per second or probably more. It was sending down twice as much but it told them at 5.30 p.m. Is that what the ESB is expecting us to believe this afternoon?

Mr. Padraig McManus

The Deputy should address that question elsewhere.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

No, I should not.

Mr. Padraig McManus

I made it very clear as to the warnings we gave and that we would continue to increase the discharge of water through the evening. By City Hall's own admission, it knew what the rate of flow was at 10 p.m.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

No it did not.

Mr. Padraig McManus

It is stated in the report.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

What the city council was saying is that the water level at the waterworks weir had been exceeded.

Mr. Padraig McManus

It is stated in the report that the city council knew the discharge level at 10 p.m.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The discharge level at 10 p.m. was 546 tonnes.

Mr. Padraig McManus

In the city manager's report.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Did Mr. McManus inform the city council that the discharge levels would increase for the next six hours?

Mr. Padraig McManus

At what level did the city manager acknowledge that the water was flowing at 10 p.m.?

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

We can stand corrected on the city manager's records, as we are operating on his records. He stated that the ESB had contacted him at 5.30 p.m. The only reason the ESB was contacted by staff at the weir is that they were up to their necks in water and they wanted to know what was going on.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

Does the Deputy have information on whether the water level was monitored during the course of the day? We rang them that morning. We rang them again between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. Was the gauge at the waterworks weir being monitored? That was showing an increase throughout the day.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Did Mr. Tarrant put that question to Cork City Council since 19 November 2009?

Mr. Padraig McManus

We need to clarify the issue. The city manager's report states that he knew the level was 450 tonnes at 10.10 p.m. What is the difference between 450 tonnes and 500 tonnes?

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Has Mr. McManus verified that with Cork City Council? Does Mr. McManus stand over what is said in that report or has he been in contact with the city manager about his report?

Mr. Padraig McManus

What I am saying is that Deputy Lynch is talking about 10 p.m. At 10 p.m. the city manager has accepted that he knew the level was 450 tonnes. It is in his report.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

The answer will only come when we can look at what risk assessment was made in the light of that information and the levels as the tides were receding. There was no time to stop the water that was coming but there was still time to protect property. That is the issue that will come to light when all of the facts are laid out.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I thank Mr. O'Doherty. My belief is that the crux of the matter comes down to risk assessment, which is worked out on the basis of information to hand which is run through modelling scenarios to see what would happen and then applying it to a real live event as we had on 19 November 2009.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

As the real live event is unfolding, continuous risk assessments must be made by an authority that has total oversight on all the events as they are unfolding.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

What risk assessment was available on the evening of 19 November? We cannot tell for Cork City Council because we do not have its full report. However, we know the ESB has grand scenarios. We have established for a fact that risk assessment was critical for five hours on 19 November. What risk-assessment information had the ESB and the city and county halls?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

On the risk assessment, it is a question of the flood studies or inundation studies——

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I asked about the risk-assessment information available to the ESB.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

To go back to the point, we can assess risk at the dam, which primarily concerns safety, but ultimately risk can only be assessed at the point where it arises. The risk in this case arises in Cork city. It is a consequence of the discharges from the dam and all the other influences in and around Cork city, which are both fluvial and tidal.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I e-mailed the ESB last week on three occasions and my very first question sought examples of risk assessment. The delegates are not coming to this meeting unprepared. My e-mail asked the ESB to provide their own scenarios on risk assessment. They are not coming blind into this meeting.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

We have provided in the supplementary information——

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

We have just agreed this is the key and not a supplementary point. Everyone is in agreement that risk assessment is the key.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The information is in the supplementary documentation we provided. I refer to the map included in appendix No. 2, extracts from other maps provided and the headings of reports we showed to members during their visit to Inniscarra. The map shows various scenarios for Cork city and areas that would be flooded. This is the standard methodology used for indicating potential risks in the event of floods. It is similar to the methodology being used by the OPW, which was also available on the evening.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Everywhere between the two blue lines on the map would be flooded.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

It describes a one in 1,000-year flood for a certain flow rate, as indicated in the report.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

What is that flow rate?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

I will have to reconfirm the figure but I believe it is approximately 830 cu. m per second at the waterworks——

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Is that 300 cu. m per second more than at present?

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The rate of 550 cu. m. per second from Inniscarra, to which Deputy Lynch refers, would have been our discharge. There would also have been inflows from the other tributaries downstream.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The 1986 report, produced after flooding, recommended that monitors be installed for the tributaries. Were monitors operating on the night of 19 November 2009?

Mr. Tom Browne

There was a monitor operating on the River Bride.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I refer to ESB monitors and not those of the city or county councils.

Mr. Tom Browne

We have discussed monitors recently with the ESB. As the Deputy points out, some work was done in the late 1980s and 1990s to try to implement monitors on rivers. We have been talking to the EPA about this recently. At present, there is a monitor on the River Bride but it does not provide on-line information to Inniscarra with regard to the flow rate on the tributary at any particular point.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

It was a significant recommendation in the ESB's excellent report of 1986. One of the key recommendations was that monitors be installed for the tributaries flowing into the River Lee below the Inniscarra dam. Were the recommendations implemented?

Mr. Tom Browne

They were. They were put in for the rivers Bride and Shournagh.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Therefore, the data the ESB had to hand on 19 November comprised not just the data on the water flowing through the Inniscarra dam but also the data on the water in the tributaries.

Mr. Tom Browne

No, the point I am making is that the monitors do not provide on-line information on what is happening at a particular time.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Does the 1986 report state that if the monitors are not providing the information, people should be sent out to measure the flow in the tributaries? Was this done on the evening of 19 November 2009?

Mr. Tom Browne

The point I am making about 19 November is that much of the consideration on the monitors was to allow subsequent analysis of what happened in floods. When the 1986 report was produced, we were preparing to carry out a significant review of dam safety, including an analysis of floods that might occur every 1,000 or 10,000 years. That work subsequently fed into the inundation studies, extracts of which are included in the appendix.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

It was recommended in the 1986 report that monitoring of the tributaries of the River Lee below the Inniscarra dam be carried out and that, if difficulties arose with the monitors, people should be sent to examine the rivers. Mr. Browne cannot tell me whether this happened on 19 November.

Mr. Tom Browne

I do not know if that was a specific recommendation.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I believe it was.

Mr. Tom Browne

The reality is that the discharge from the dams by the ESB on 19 November was based on the level in the reservoir. On that date, it could not have been mitigated in any way by accounting for whatever flow was evident in the tributaries.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

My final question, to which I may return, concerns the ESB's release of 550 tonnes of water for more than six hours. It has some data but we are unsure what it is telling us with regard to the tributaries flowing into the river. However, we know the ESB should control these, as recommended in the 1986 report.

Mr. Tom Browne

We have no control over what happens in the tributaries.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

The 1986 report recommends that they be monitored.

Mr. Tom Browne

We have no control over what happens in them.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I am not referring to an independent report but to a very good one produced by the ESB. It recommends that the tributaries be monitored by the ESB below the Inniscarra dam. It is responsible for doing so. We do not know whether it did so on 19 November but it was recommended in the ESB's report of 1986. We know that 550 tonnes of water per second go down the River Lee over six hours. One should forget about floods that occur only once in 1,000 years because I am referring to a flood that occurred only a couple of months ago. Has the ESB data that informed it as to what the water level in Cork city would be as a result of the displacement of water from one side of the dam to the other? The answer should not refer to Cork City Council, risk assessment plans and everything else.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

The inundation studies give our best estimate. After the review carried out after the 1986 flood, we produced a series of reports. Indicated in those reports were areas in Cork city that would be affected by flooding in different scenarios based on the standard methodology available. The methodology is still used by the OPW.

In the report that comprised the input into the local emergency plan, of which we have circulated extracts, there is a table indicating particular areas on the north and south channels and the levels that could be reached. I am not sure if we included that particular page in the extracts circulated to members but we can certainly provide it.

The OPW has produced the first comprehensive model of the entire catchment, including the tidal effects. It produced a number of maps, available on the Internet, that include areas of Cork city that could become flooded. We included a sample in our presentation. There are also what are known as hazard or risk maps. The information we provided initially in the early 1990s and again later has been updated by the OPW in conjunction with our partners in the city and county councils.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I will ask my question again very simply. Has the ESB carried out a modelling exercise or engineering examination on the effect of the release of 500 tonnes of water per second over six hours? If so, does it have the information to hand?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

Just as we produced a report on the floods of 1986, we are commissioning a similar report looking back at what happened and we will model that.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Mr. O'Doherty stated he modelled for up to 800 tonnes per second. Surely on the way up the ladder it passed the mark of 550 tonnes per second.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

If the Deputy is asking me if, while we were operating the dam in these types of conditions, we ran a model to ascertain the impact, the answer is, "No".

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I remind Mr. O'Doherty that this is an Oireachtas committee and everything said at it is a matter of public record. If 550 cubic tonnes of water were released through the dam in six hours, as in this case, does he have to provide information on its impact on Cork city at high and low water mark?

Mr. Tom Browne

I refer the Deputy to page 9 of the supplementary information provided to the committee. A study was carried out for River Lee levels in September 1994 to estimate the effects of Inniscarra discharge on the river flood levels. Estimates of river levels at key locations in the city are made from river flows of 100 to 500 cu. m. per second. It is not an inundation study in the normal sense but it gives likely levels at particular points in the city for these types of flows. These would include flows from the tributaries that feed into the river after Inniscarra which would not be under our control.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I am not an engineer so I do not know what Mr. Browne has just explained. All I want to know is, has the ESB run a model to determine the impact of the release of water from the Inniscarra dam at 550 cubic tonnes per second on Cork city at both high and low water mark?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

No, we have not run a scenario for the release of 545 cu. m. per second. We have run a range of scenarios for the release of certain quantities in the context of the inundation studies.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I am not going to be pedantic on whether it is 546 cu. m. per second. Has an exercise been done within the scope of 540 and 550 cu. m. per second scenario?

Mr. Tom Browne

We have carried out these studies which are within that scope.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Did they determine that Cork city centre would be flooded?

Mr. Tom Browne

They showed what the water levels would be at particular points in Cork city.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Would these indicate that Cork city would be flooded?

Mr. Tom Browne

Yes, they would indicate what areas would be flooded.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Does the ESB believe it would be in its interest that an independent investigation be carried out as to what happened on 19 November 2009, as there appear to be conflicts in the information it and Cork City Council have given to the committee? There certainly seems to be a conflict with regard to protocols on communications between the ESB and Cork City Council.

Mr. Padraig McManus

We need to sort out that relationship. The ESB is fully committed to the review being undertaken by the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

It is time there was an independent investigation into what happened in Cork on 19 November 2009. There seems to be no acceptance of responsibility for water management on the part of the ESB. How much of the inflow into the Inniscarra dam came from the Carrigadrohid dam and how much from rainfall? At what time did the ESB start releasing water from the Inniscarra dam on 19 November 2009?

If we have such a technology driven society, then I cannot comprehend why we cannot have a computer model to predict what happens when such volumes of water are released. In 1986 and 1987, prior to advances in computer modelling, there seems to have been more information on the impact of such releases.

The information provided to the committee contains a list of contacts to be notified prior to the opening of the gates at the Inniscarra dam during a flood and the log of the calls on 19 November 2009. From 11.09 p.m. there is a litany of messages left and not left. No. 35, for example, is for the Bon Secours Hospital but no message was left for it. At 11.21 p.m. no further communications are listed. There actually seems to have been a communications breakdown.

Is there spare capacity at the Inniscarra dam for water storage? Has the whole management of water storage been re-examined? We can all quote reports to suit ourselves. While the gentlemen opposite are more learned than I am, there was a fundamental difficulty with water shortage and management prior to 19 November 2009. The Chairman was correct in seeking the data for all November.

Would the ESB change its procedures if such an event were to happen again tomorrow morning? Is it really telling us there is no model on the impact of such a discharge of water on Cork city? I am led to believe the areas flooded could have been forecast as these were areas that were not flooded in the past several decades.

I am bemused the ESB said today it would not do anything differently to what it did on the night of 19 November. I welcome Mr. McManus's comments on repair of damage to the Cork City Council relationship. Who is in charge? Who will accept responsibility and who is to be held accountable for what happened? That is what this is about. We can take the reports with all the graphs, all the meter readings and all the jargon, but this is not a once-off occurrence. The period, 1986-2009, does not add up to a 1,000-year flood interval.

I know it is late, Chairman, but I am disappointed with what has happened, to be honest.

Chairman

All right, we will conclude.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

On the point the Chairman made about the reservoir being 98% full, that needs to be clarified. Mr. Tom Browne can provide some clarity on that, with the Chairman's permission.

Mr. Tom Browne

I shall try to clarify that. The 98% figure gives the impression that the reservoir starts at zero and goes to 50 m. The reality is that it does not. The lowest operating point on the reservoir is actually 45.7 m.

Chairman

What does Mr. Browne mean by "operating point"?

Mr. Tom Browne

That is the lowest point to which we can physically go without interfering for instance with the draw for Cork. It is the lowest point at which we could physically empty the reservoir in the sense that the 45.7 m. would be the sill level on the gate. In that context the operating range of the reservoir is probably of the order of 5 m. and not 50 m. Therefore when we talk about——

Chairman

I said I was not an engineer.

Mr. Tom Browne

The Chairman referred to the level being a metre below the top.

Chairman

Mr. Browne can understand the question, however.

Mr. Tom Browne

I can.

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

On the information for which the Chairman asked in relation to the previous November, but also in the run up to the days before 19 November, we will make all that information available.

Senator Buttimer

Can we just come back to the points I made with the Chairman, as regards the events leading up to it, and the water management? Has the ESB done anything wrong in water management, water storage and spillage?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

We have done nothing wrong. The situation in which we find ourselves at any given time is a function of what has happened in the preceding days, what is coming through the system, what is happening on the day and we operate in the context of that information plus the five-day forecasts. All the information we can provide will be put out there for the committee.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

I come back to the question I asked about the water in Carrigadrohid and the ESB might answer that.

Mr. Tom Browne

Specifically in relation to Carrigadrohid, there is a spillway off the reservoir there. Once the water reaches a certain level there, it automatically spills into the Iniscarra reservoir. Effectively that spillway came into operation on 19 November. This meant that no more water could have been contained in Carrigadrohid and in fact if the Senator reads some of the detail in the supporting information he will find that we throttled back on the amount of water flowing out of Carrigadrohid into Inishcarra, to a certain extent, bringing the spillway into operation, which in itself alleviated the extent of the discharge from Inishcarra later on.

Chairman

Any final comment?

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I just want to come back to something I asked Mr. Pope at the start of the meeting, but he did not get the opportunity to reply. This was in relation to his "Drivetime" interview of 27 November, where he talked about an external panel and an external dam safety committee. There was reference to an external evaluation committee as well. Was that just one committee to which he referred in that interview?

Mr. Glen Pope

It was just the one, the external dam safety committee.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

That is grand. I thank Mr. Pope for clarifying that. That is an external committee from the UK, because there are no Irish regulations on the governance of dams, so this is an expert group the ESB relies on for direction, as I understand it.

Mr. Glen Pope

That is correct.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

Mr. Pope told "Drivetime" that these experts come to Ireland regularly from all over the world to vet the procedures and protocols as well as to review the maintenance being done on the structures and make recommendations directly to the board of the ESB. He indicated that the reason for this external evaluation process was that there were no Irish standards in the maintenance and operation of dams, so the ESB operates to UK standards.

Has that committee met in Ireland since the 19 November incident, and in the event, has it made recommendations to the ESB? Another point goes back to the CFRAMS report of 2006. At that time recommendations were already being made as to what the water levels behind the dams should be. Did that committee of experts see the 2006 CFRAMS report which made that recommendation?

Mr. Glen Pope

The chairman of that committee is due to visit Ireland this week and will meet us, obviously. We will look at the flood events of November 2009.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

This will be the first meeting of that group since November 2009. Is that correct?

Mr. Glen Pope

The expert group would normally have been scheduled to come around December. Because of the events at the time and the obvious logistical issues we did not meet then. However, the chairman of the committee is due this week.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I assume the agenda will comprise the events of 19 November.

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

Perhaps we should add that the committee of experts has a role which encompasses all the dams in which we have an interest, for example, Ardnacrusha, the Liffey and the Erne and they have a rolling programme of inspections. They come at various stages during the year and do five-year and ten-year inspections on the dams. The annual sign-off visit is scheduled for this week and we shall address all the events relating to flooding and the operation of the dams as part of that.

On the issue of the OPW, while I am not familiar with the report to which Deputy Lynch referred——-

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

It is a 2006 report and is called——

Mr. Nicholas Tarrant

My understanding is that the OPW has a three-year work programme, which commenced in 2006 approximately. The risk management plan under that work programme was just published in draft in early February 2010 and is undergoing three months of consultation. One of its recommendations deals with the potential to optimise the operations at the Inishcarra and Carrigadrohid reservoirs. Part of that recommendation addresses the ESB's ability to be able to discharge in excess of what we can, currently, to give greater flexibility to the operation of the dams. It talks about bringing down levels in advance of flooding. It also talks about areas such as improving rain forecasting, water systems and so on.

We are working with the OPW and that is the context within which we foresee a silver lining for people in the future. We shall work closely with the OPW and all the authorities in that regard.

Deputy Ciarán Lynch

I am still at a loss to know how Frances O'Callaghan got a telephone call at 4.15 p.m. to tell her that approximately 560 cu. tonnes of water would be released, and how Cork City Council got a call at 5.30 p.m. that was nowhere near that figure. In the course of this afternoon the issue of risk assessment has been seen to be central to all of this. What information the ESB had that night has determined that it knew there were flood consequences for Cork city. The question now is whether Cork City and County Councils knew they were in danger of a flood to that level. It is not as if a flood is coming down the river but rather that it should be measurable in terms of the volume of water being released. Were they aware of a flood that could be determined by the volume of water actually being released? I am not convinced that this was the case. I am very concerned that an unprecedented level of water was released and somebody did not ring the city and county councils to tell them that, specifically.

If that had happened, I should be asking for the city and county managers to come in here next week to say what their risk assessments were and what preparations had been in place as regards their being alerted to the fact that a specific volume of water was flowing in their direction. I do not know the answer, but I am very perturbed that such an unprecedented volume of water was released over approximately six hours which did not trigger some protocol, mechanism or, what the ESB refers to as "regulations". It was a matter of phoning the Cork City and County Councils to inform them that about 550 cu. tonnes of water per second would be coming their way over a six-hour period. It did not happen and I am at a loss to know why.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

There is a line in the film, "Lean on Me" where Morgan Freeman is the principal of a school and he shouts to his janitor, "Code red, code red, code red". There seems to be no "code red" issued for Cork city following the events on 19 and 20 November 2009.

I thank the ESB witnesses for coming here. What caused the unprecedented flooding in Cork city? I would like Mr. Tarrant and Mr. Doherty to forget the spin, the graphs and the presentation when answering that. Was it rainfall? Was it because sewers in Cork city were not properly cleaned out? Was it a lack of communication or a failure to prepare? What caused the flooding?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

That is not a simple question, but ultimately it starts with rain.

Senator Jerry Buttimer

Does the ESB bear any responsibility for the flooding of the Mardyke, the Middle Parish and parts of Cork city in November?

Mr. Pat O’Doherty

No responsibility.

Chairman

We will conclude on that. I thank Mr. McManus and the senior members of the ESB management for attending today. It was informative and a very important topic for public representatives in Cork. We are preparing a report and we have information from the Met. Office, the OPW, the city and county managers and from the ESB. We will look at other parts of the country and we will prepare a draft report as soon as we can.

The joint committee adjourned at 7.10 p.m. until 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 2 March 2010.