I do not wish to enter into the merits of this report about which I have not sufficient information. The few remarks I shall make will be devoted to the procedure in respect of the regulation of restrictive practices in this country. Everybody is agreed that restrictive practices should be regulated. When I say "everybody" I mean nearly everybody, because I know some people do not agree with the principle. However, nearly everybody is agreed that restrictive practices must be regulated by law, but the question arises what type of regulation is the most effective. It seems to me that this debate illustrates very lucidly some of the advantages and some of the difficulties of the legislation adopted in this country.
There are two main types of procedure in this matter—an administrative tribunal or a judicial tribunal. In this country, we have come down on the side, temporarily, at any rate, of an administrative tribunal reporting to the Minister. In England, on the other hand, a Bill is going through the House of Commons adopting the principle of a judicial tribunal. I think there is a great deal to be said on both sides, and I think this Bill gives us an opportunity of saying a few words generally on the matter, apart from the particular report on which it is based.
The arguments against the judicial hearing of applications of this kind are, in the first place, that it is bringing the judges into politics. The judges are being asked to decide economic and social issues which are outside their proper function. It is also said that judicial proceedings are long. There well may be appeals and there may be a great deal of delay and procrastination before a decision is come to. The President of the Board of Trade, in introducing the Restrictive Practices Bill in the House of Commons, said it was his opinion that the administrative type of procedure, which we have in this country, is more dilatory and creates more procrastination, that it involves a great deal of delay and a great deal of uncertainty, and that that is why the British Government have come down on the side of a judicial tribunal in these issues.
I think that the present debate is a very good example of some of the em barrassments caused by the Irish type of procedure. But, in saying this, I want to be perfectly clear, beyond all manner of doubt, that I am not in any way casting any aspersion of any kind on the members of the tribunal. In fact, I want to say that the discussion by the public and by the Legislature is greatly aided by their very valuable report. I do not propose to delay the House for more than a few minutes; but I want to pay tribute to the excellent manner in which the tribunal has discharged its very difficult and very onerous work and to the great value of its report in these discussions.
The difficulty that I see about the Irish system of procedure is that it becomes almost impossible to avoid having the issue put before the tribunal debated at least twice—once by the Dáil and once by the Seanad. That is why I agree on the whole with the attitude of the British Government on this matter, that a judicial inquiry is more rapid, more certain and takes the matter out of current political discussion more than our procedure does.
The Act of 1953 could have adopted two different lines of procedure, and it seems to me that there is a dilemma involved. The Act could have authorised the Fair Trade Tribunal to make a report to the Minister and make an Order embodying the findings of that report, without referring the matter to the Dáil or Seanad. That, to my mind, would have been very objectionable because it would have given to the Minister entirely undue administrative power, without parliamentary responsibility. Possibly I am old-fashioned and possibly my legal training has given me more than average respect for the rule of law and for the importance of subordinating all activities to the jurisdiction of the courts; but I must say, whether it is as a result of that training or not, or as a result of my experience for a few years as chairman of the Statutory Orders Committee in this House, I feel it is very much in the public interest that discretionary Orders by the Minister and by the Government should be reduced to the narrowest possible limits.