I wish to oppose subsection (2) of this section and suggest to the Seanad that it be deleted because I think it marks a very dangerous trend in our recent legislation. It shows where bureaucracy is stretching out its strong hand to try to make the Houses of the Oireachtas more insignificant by putting obstacles in the way of some semi-State categories becoming members of either House of the Oireachtas. I should like to suggest to the Seanad that this is in no way a party policy decision. It is just one of those processes of bureaucracy, a tidying up, as it were, but at all times increasing its own powers.
We need only go back over some of the legislation enacted to provide an example of the type of thing I have in mind. I can take three bodies comparable in magnitude to the Central Bank setup in our national life. In 1958 the Agricultural Institute was established and elaborate precautions were taken in regard to setting up the Board of that Institute. There was no restriction in any way put on the activities of the members of the Board or the Directors of the Institute itself. They are quite free to be nominated to membership of either House of the Oireachtas. In fact, they are quite free to sit in either House. At the moment we are privileged in having a member of the Board of the Agricultural Institute sitting in the Seanad. I refer to Senator Prendergast. That was the attitude seven years ago.
I do not intend to take too long on this matter. Three very important measures were passed in the early part of 1961. We had, first of all, the Dairy Produce Marketing Act under which Bord Bainne was set up. We know the care and attention exercised by this House, and all bodies, in fashioning the statutes governing Bord Bainne. I refer particularly to section 21 which sets out the disqualification of a member of either House of the Oireachtas for membership of the Board. Subsection (1) of section 21 states that where a member of the Board becomes a member of either House of the Oireachtas then he has to retire from being a member of the Board. That is an advance in relation to a restriction which existed in 1957. I think a member of the Board is free to seek election and it is only on being elected that he then has to resign from the House.
We might under great pressure go so far, but subsection (1) of the Bill sets out that a member, upon being nominated, has to cease to be a member of Seanad Éireann. The House knows the hazards of nomination to the panels of Seanad Éireann and it knows the many exceptionally talented people, ranging from the President of the Royal Irish Academy down to distinguished ambassadors, and so on, who had sought membership of Seanad Éireann and failed to get the necessary votes for election. Why should it be insisted on that a person has to retire from the Board before even seeking election? I think that is going much too far.
We can go back to 1961 and cite another very important Act—the Pigs and Bacon Act. Again, the same provision applies there. We know, too, of a third important Act in 1961 which established the Institute for Industrial Research and Standards. Again, the same provision is there—that it is on election that the choice has to be made. There was a departure in relation to the Industrial Research and Standards Act. It was one of the few Acts which sought to put obstacles in the way of employees of the board. They had to be seconded if they became members of either House of the Oireachtas, but the secondment had not to begin from the moment they were nominated. As far as I can see, there is no restriction on the members of the Central Bank, from the Secretary down, to seek election to either House. Why then should that restriction be placed on the Directors of the Central Bank?
Why should there be that change of policy between 1958, with no restriction, 1961, with fairly stringent restrictions, and today with its prohibitions, especially designed to keep from the Oireachtas men who might have independent views, while, on the other hand, we note the growing tendency of the State to put its own officials on boards as actual members of them? In the Dairy Produce Marketing Act the Minister has the duty to nominate one of his own Department as a member of that board. We are all familiar with the fact that there is a distinguished civil servant acting as Director of the Central Bank. I am not objecting to this. I think you may say it is quite good to link up in that way, though from that point of view, there is far more objection to civil servants sitting on semi-State boards than to members of semi-State boards sitting in the Oireachtas. You cannot have it both ways. Unless we put in restrictions which will make it absolutely taboo for any members of the Civil Service to sit on semi-State boards, which I would not advocate for one moment, we cannot consistently and logically rule in the other direction and insist that members of the Governors of the Bank should be ineligible even to seek to become candidates for Seanad Éireann.
As a concession, perhaps, we might leave in the second part of this section where it says that a person who is for the time being entitled under the Standing Orders of either House of the Oireachtas to sit in the House shall be disqualified from being, or becoming, the Governor or a Director of the Central Bank of Ireland. Such a provision making it impossible for those in the House to become members of the board might be useful in so far as it would free Ministers from any suggestions of political pressure when seeking that members of either Seanad Éireann or Dáil Éireann be nominated to new boards. That provision may be a practical one, and we can leave it in, but I suggest that the first one is totally impracticable. Consequently, I believe if it were gone into carefully it would be found unconstitutional.
