The Courts Bill, 1986, which has been passed by the Dáil, contains important procedural reforms in relation to the hearing of personal and fatal injury cases in the High Court. These cases comprise the vast majority of civil jury actions in the High Court — perhaps as much as 95 per cent of such actions. They are cases that involve many ordinary people as plaintiffs in actions for damages for personal injury or fatal injury caused through the negligence of others and most of these cases arise from traffic accidents.
As a matter of policy, we should be concerned that the administration of justice in these cases can provide compensation that is fair to plaintiffs having regard to the injuries and the other relevant circumstances that are involved; that the injured plaintiffs receive compensation with the minimum of delay, and that the legal costs involved in disposing of these cases — many of which are simple and straightforward — are reduced as far as possible.
It is also important that the courts should be as consistent and predictable as is possible in the award of damages. It is desirable that litigants who receive similar injuries, and whose personal circumstances are also similar, should be compensated in a consistent manner. Also the prospects of settling cases at an early stage, before heavy costs are incurred, is greatly enhanced if the manner in which the courts deal with cases that come to trial, and the compensation that is awarded, is as consistent and predictable as possible.
These are the principal policy objectives that provide the background to the proposals in the Bill which are designed to improve the position for litigants who are involved in personal and fatal injury actions. If these objectives can be achieved other benefits will follow. One aspect that has been highlighted is the area of liability insurance. I am confident that the new procedures proposed in this Bill will reduce the legal costs incurred by insurers in the area of motor, employer and public liability insurance. This should be reflected in reduced premium costs for such insurance. The Government are committed, in the Programme for National Recovery, to taking certain measures to reduce the cost of liability insurance to industry. That includes the Government's commitment to proceed with this legislation.
The Bill has been substantially amended and strengthened during its passage through the Dáil and I will return to this matter later on in my speech.
The Bill contains two main provisions. It provides that actions in the High Court for damages for personal injuries and in fatal accident cases will in future be tried by a judge sitting alone rather than by a judge and a jury as at present. The other main provision proposes to give the Minister for Justice power to make regulations to limit costs of legal counsel that may be recovered by a successful party in these actions against the unsuccessful party. I will refer to this matter later. A further provision will enable personal or fatal injury cases which are awaiting trial in the High Court to be remitted for trial to the Circuit Court if the proceedings could have been commenced in that court.
The first thing that I want to emphasise is that this Bill does not propose to abolish jury trials for all civil actions in the High Court.
The Bill is concerned with only one category of High Court action — claims for damages for personal and fatal injuries. Although these cases comprise the vast majority of civil jury trials in the High Court at present, juries will continue to be available in High Court actions involving claims for damages for defamation, for false imprisonment, for intentional trespass to the person — these are assault cases — and in some other actions for which juries are sometimes sought.
It goes without saying that the Bill will not affect juries in criminal cases. There is a constitutional right to trial by jury on a serious criminal charge which is subject only to the exceptions set out in Article 38 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not contain any reference to trial by jury in civil cases.
Another preliminary point I would like to make is that the main proposal in the Bill is part of a long-term trend, under way for over 100 years, to dispense with the use of juries to try civil actions. In the early days of the State the right to jury trial in actions for liquidated sums, for damages for breach of contract, or for the recovery of land was withdrawn by the Courts Act, 1924. The right to civil jury trial in cases in the Circuit Court, including personal injuries actions, was abolished by the Courts Act, 1971.
The Courts Bill, 1986, was initiated by the previous Administration. The original Bill contained one proposal only. It provided for the abolition of juries in personal and fatal injury cases. When my party were in Opposition we were not enthusiastic about the original Bill. Generally, we felt that the Bill, as initiated, was inadequate. In particular, it did nothing about the problem of over-representation by lawyers in personal injury cases — which had become a matter of acute public concern — or the related problem of excessive legal costs associated with these cases. These were factors that were contributing to the escalating cost of liability insurance for the public generally and for industry and through this to job losses in industry, the closure of businesses and the viability of many sporting and leisure activities.
Accordingly, in Government we decided that the Bill would need to be strengthened considerably before we could proceed with it. The Bill which was passed in the Dáil contains additional provisions to deal with the particular problems that I have mentioned and contains a new commencement provision which will have the effect of bringing the new arrangements for trying these cases into force as from 1 August of this year. The original Bill would not have taken effect for some considerable time.
There is no doubt that the growth in personal injury cases coming before the High Court in recent years has focused greater attention on the awards being made by juries in those cases. The high level of some awards attracted much publicity and a growing belief in some quarters that the incidence of excessive awards had become unacceptable. In 1982 the "McLiam Committee", which examined the problem of motor insurance costs, found evidence that awards given by juries were sometimes remarkably unpredictable, varying widely between cases where the circumstances appeared to be similar. It emphasised the unfairness of such a situation to litigants and the difficulties which this unpredictability created for the insurance industry. It concluded that it would be in the interest of justice if a greater degree of consistency could be achieved in the assessment of damages, bearing in mind the overriding requirement of doing justice between the parties.
The Supreme Court was also concerned about excessive jury awards and, in three important judgments delivered between 1983 and 1984, brought about substantial changes in the basis for assessing the quantum of damages in personal injury cases. In the last of these cases it indicated that a limit of £150,000 should apply generally to awards of general damages for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of life in the most extreme cases of personal injuries, unless particular circumstances suggest otherwise. The then Chief Justice had remarked in that case that in attempting to compensate for very serious injury "All sense of reality may be lost" and he considered that "A yardstick of a reasonable nature must be applied if reality is to be retained in the assessment of such compensation". These cases show a concern on the part of the Supreme Court at what it regarded as clearly excessive awards by juries.
The excessive level of damages awarded in the courts in such cases have had a major bearing on the amounts for which insurers will settle personal injuries claims outside the courts. Insurance companies point out that such claims are settled under the shadow of a court hearing and that the unpredictability of jury awards has had a destabilising effect on the settlement process, reflected ultimately in the high cost of liability insurance.
I understand that, although upwards of 85 per cent of personal injury cases set down for trial in the High Court are settled without going all the way to judgment, this proportion is much smaller than the comparable statistics for neighbouring jurisdictions where these cases are heard by a judge alone. In Britain, for example, up to 95 per cent of personal injury cases are settled without going to trial. We still have a relatively high volume of personal injury cases going to trial, and I am sure that this is due mainly to the availability of jury trial. The elimination of juries is likely to produce a corresponding reduction in cases going to trial and will enhance the prospect of settling many more personal injury cases at an earlier stage. Injured plaintiffs will benefit by receiving compensation for their injuries more quickly. As a result there should be a reduction generally in the tension of worry that long drawn-out proceedings create for many injured parties.
Now, I want to make it very clear that the object of the proposal to abolish the right to a jury trial for personal and fatal injury cases is not to reduce the level of damages generally that the High Court will award in this type of case. The object is to avoid excessive awards as far as possible and to bring consistency and predictability into the awards given. I think it is necessary to be very cautious in speculating what effect the measure might have on the general level of damages awarded, apart from the expected effect that it will obviate excessive awards. For one thing, the recent Supreme Court decisions will have had an effect on the general level of damages. Moreover, although the incidence of personal injuries cases heard to date in the High Court by a judge sitting alone, with the consent of the parties, has not been great, what indications there are show that a judge can be no less generous than a jury when it comes to assessing damages in serious cases. Furthermore, judges sitting alone have been deciding personal injuries cases in the Circuit Court since 1972 and there has been no public reaction, as far as I am aware, against the level of damages awarded in the Circuit Court. Since the jurisdiction of that court to hear tort actions was increased to £150,000 in 1982, more serious cases are now being decided in the Circuit Court and I am not aware of any claim that Circuit Court judges are making inadequate awards, even in cases where minor injuries are involved.
Civil trials by judge alone are a normal feature in the High Court already. At present civil juries are used only in cases arising out of personal injury claims in motor accident, employer's and public liability cases in the High Court and in a very limited number of other cases. All other cases have been decided by judges sitting without juries for a very long time. As I have already mentioned, juries have not been used in personal injury cases in the Circuit Court since 1972.
It has been suggested that awards of damages by judges alone will be lower because awards of damages by judges in Britain have been lower than here. Comparisons with the neighbouring jurisdictions on this score are not valid, because there are crucial differences in the way in which damages for future losses and costs are assessed here and in neighbouring jurisdictions. One important difference is the reluctance of English courts to use actuarial evidence. Also, I understand that damages awarded in serious injury cases in Britain have increased substantially in the last few years.
The crucial point is that greater consistency may be expected to prevail under the proposed new system here and excessive awards will be largely avoided. Any variations that may arise from the norm on the part of individual judges will, I am sure, be corrected by the Supreme Court. I would expect that the Supreme Court will be more ready to interfere with the reasoned decision of a judge in these cases and that in time an acceptable and more predictable pattern of awards will emerge.
This will come about when all personal and fatal injury cases are being decided continually by a body of experienced judges, compared with the present "once-off shot" system involving a jury that will have no experience of the task. That task has become even more complicated and sophisticated in recent times, involving greater reliance on technical and expert evidence.
The new arrangements for trial by judges sitting alone will also lead to wider reporting of decisions in personal and fatal injury cases. It will make possible the publication eventually of a compendium of decisions of the Superior Courts in important cases — amounting to an authoritive book of quantum of damages — for the benefit of the legal profession and bodies such as insurance companies who wish to value the claims they receive. This development would further enhance the prospect of early settlement in more cases. There is a commitment in the Programme for National Recovery to the effect that I will examine the scope of the publication of such a book of quantum. I have already asked The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting to look at the matter. I regard the removal of juries from personal and fatal injury cases as a first, essential, step towards the systematic reporting of awards.
An effect of the proposals in the Courts Bill, 1986, will be to simplify the procedure for the trial of personal and fatal injury cases and to shorten the length of these trials. This should mean that less input will be required from the barristers who appear in these cases and I also expect that there should be less need for expensive expert witnesses to appear to give oral evidence. There is a link there fore between the proposal to abolish the use of juries in these cases and the proposals in the Bill to limit the costs that can be recovered by successful parties in respect of the appearance of counsel. Already the Bar Council have agreed to discontinue, when juries go, the former practice of requiring that three counsel — two seniors and one junior — be briefed in personal injury cases. Spokesmen for the insurance industry have assured me that they will not brief more than two counsel in connection with any personal injury case when the new arrangements are in place. There is a provision in the Bill to empower me to limit the costs that can be recovered for counsel in these cases by way of regulations. But I intend to wait until the new arrangments are in place before moving on the question of regulations. I intend to assess the actual situation in the light of the disappearance of juries, and the various commitments that have been given to me, before invoking statutory powers.
Subsection (1) of section 1 of the Bill contains the substantive provision to abolish the use of juries in personal and fatal injury cases in the High Court. Subsections (2) and (4) are necessary to take account of the fact that many personal and fatal injury cases include claims for damages under other headings and may involve counterclaims. Subsection (3) contains an exemption from the main provision in the Bill for cases involving claims for false imprisonment or intentional trespass to the person — jury trials will continue to be available for such cases. Subsection (5) will enable a jury trial that has started before the commencement of the Bill to continue until the trial is disposed of. Subsection (6) is a technical provision.
Section 2 will enable cases set down and awaiting trial in the High Court to be transferred for trial to the Circuit Court on the application of any party to the action if the proceedings could have been commenced in that court.
Sections 3 and 4 contain minor technical provisions consequential on the substantive provision in section 1. Section 5 contains the proposal about counsels' costs that I have mentioned. Section 6 contains the commencement provision and the usual provisions for a Short Title, collective citation and construction with other statutes. I commend the Bill to the House.