The Bill now before the House provides a framework for the improved conduct of industrial relations and for the resolution of trade disputes, with the aim of maintaining a stable and orderly industrial relations climate. The Bill provides for major reform of the law on industrial relations, trade dispute and trade union law and for the establishment of a new Labour Relations Commission.
The measures contained in this Bill have their immediate origin in the Programme for National Recovery. This committed me to holding discussions with the social partners about changes in industrial relations to provide a better framework for collective bargaining and dispute settlement and help to create conditions for employment-generating investment.
In entering these discussions I was aware that many unsuccessful attempts had been made in the past to secure agreement on fundamental changes in trade dispute and industrial relations law. It was my view that any further attempt to secure complete agreement was unlikely to lead anywhere, given the respective positions and interests of employer and worker representatives. I decided instead to identify a number of key areas which I considered needed attention. On that basis I developed a package of proposals. These addressed the major issues and were designed to improve the collective bargaining environment with a view to minimising conflict and maximising co-operation. The detailed discussions which I subsequently held on the proposals with the social partners confirmed my view that this was the only way in which progress was likely to be achieved.
The Bill before this House is the product of an exhaustive consultation process with both the Federation of Irish Employers and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. It is an amalgam of proposals which I put to both sides and suggestions by the parties. The Bill has been the subject of very lengthy and in-depth debate in the Dáil over the past six months with Deputies from all parties acknowledging the importance of this legislation. As would be expected in the case of legislation in this area there were, of course, differences of opinion on various aspects of the Bill. I gave careful consideration to the views expressed and the Bill in its present form incorporates a number of amendments and suggestions made during the debate in the Dáil.
I would like to turn now to the specific provisions of the Bill. These range over a number of areas and can be divided broadly between trade union and industrial relations law. Under the broad heading of trade union law there are provisions to reform trade dispute law; to introduce pre-strike secret ballots and restrict the use of injunctions in trade disputes, and to facilitate the further rationalisation of the trade union movement.
Under the broad heading of industrial relations law I propose to establish a new Labour Relations Commission which will have responsibility for a wide range of functions, including the provision of conciliation and advisory services and the drawing up of codes of practice.
There are also provisions to amend and improve the procedures governing the establishment and operation of joint labour committees and technical provisions to enable more effective enforcement of employment regulation orders and registered employment agreements. I will now deal with each of these areas in turn.
The statute law in relation to striking and picketing is primarily contained in the five section Trade Disputes Act, 1906, with a number of further provisions in the Trade Union Act, 1941 and the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982. The law in this area is not as simple, however, as a reading of the Acts might suggest. Since 1906 there has been a considerable volume of case law arising from the interpretation by the courts of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act.
As a result the law in this area has become extraordinarily complex and its precise limits vague and confusing. The usefulness of the statute law in providing a guide to conduct is diminishing and it is increasingly necessary to look to case law. I feel, however, that as far as possible, it is statute law rather than case law which should provide a clear indicator as to the boundaries of what is permissible and what is not permissible in trade dispute situations and it is my intention that the Bill should resolve this position.
My approach in the area of trade dispute law is to repeal the Trade Disputes Acts of 1906 and 1982 and to reintroduce the main provisions of these acts with amendments. An important by-product of this approach is to give the legislation a clear presumption of constitutionality.
Taken in the order in which they appear in the Bill the main features of the provisions relating to trade disputes are that: the definition of trade dispute is being amended to exclude worker versus worker disputes; the immunities will no longer apply to disputes involving one worker where procedures have not been followed; picketing will be confined to an employer's place of business and the present wording whereby picketing can take place "at or near" a particular location will be changed to "at or where that is not practicable at the approaches to"; secondary picketing will be permissible only in situations where workers have a reasonable belief that the second employer has acted in a way likely to frustrate a strike or other industrial action by directly assisting their employer; an anomaly whereby organising a strike is protected by the immunities but threatening to organise or take part in a strike would appear not to be protected is being cleared up; in future the immunity enjoyed by trade unions in respect of tortious acts shall apply only in the case of acts committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; unions will be required to have a rule in their rule books providing for the holding of secret ballots before engaging in or supporting a strike or other industrial action; in trade dispute situations where a secret ballot has been held and notice given the granting of injunctions, particularly ex parte injunctions, will be restricted.
I would like to go into a number of these proposed changes in some more detail. In any discussion of trade dispute law, picketing is likely to be a central issue. This is not surprising. From the worker's point of view the picket represents the most formidable and effective means at his or her disposal to bring pressure to bear on the employer. Similarly in the case of the employer, the picket represents the most fundamental threat to the continuation and operation of his other business.
The picketing provisions of this Bill seek to strike a balance between the rights and interests of both sides. In the case of primary picketing, I am moving away from the present definition which permits picketing "at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be"— which I am sure Senators will agree is extremely broad — to the revised definition, "at or where this is not practicable at the approaches to a place where their employer carried on business". The intention is to ensure that in future picketing will be at the employer's place of business.
However, because of the position in relation to private property rights and the need to avoid trespass on private property, there may be circumstances where it will not be possible to picket directly at the employer's premises. For example, where a dispute arises affecting one employer in a shopping centre, industrial complex et cetera it should be possible to secure agreement that the picket be placed at the individual employer's business rather than at the entry to the complex. It is necessary, however, to provide a saver for situations where this turns out not to be practicable or possible.
As far as secondary picketing is concerned, the Bill will regulate such picketing more closely and define secondary picketing in clearly understood industrial relations terms. Secondary picketing, that is, picketing at the place of business of an employer other than an employer involved in a trade dispute, will be lawful only where the workers in dispute have a reasonable belief that the second employer has directly assisted the employer who is party to the dispute for the purpose of frustrating the strike or other industrial action. There have been strong demands from the employers side for the total outlawing of secondary picketing but I believe that to do so would tilt the balance unfairly in favour of employers.
The secret ballot provisions which I consider to be among the most important in the Bill will require every union to have a pre-strike secret ballot rule in its rule book within two years of the passing of the Bill. Among other things, the rule will require that all union members, whom it is reasonable at the time of the ballot for the union concerned to believe will be called on to engage in a strike or other industrial action, be entitled to vote on whether or not to engage in industrial action. Failure to include the secret ballot rule in the union rules within the two year period specified will lead to loss of a union's negotiating licence. It should be remembered that many unions already have pre-strike ballot rules and the holding of secret ballots is normal good practice. The provisions in the Bill are designed to ensure that this good practice is extended to all unions, thus promoting greater order in the conduct of industrial relations.
The provisions on injunctions are closely linked to those on secret ballots. Where a secret ballot has been held and at least one week's notice of industrial action has been given, the employer will not be entitled to seek an injunction without giving notice to the union and the workers concerned. This is to remedy the abuse of injunctions by some employers in trade disputes. The granting of ex parte injunctions, often in a judge's home outside court hours, has been a matter of considerable concern to trade unions for a long time. The Bill also provides that interlocutory injunctions will not be granted where in addition to having a secret ballot and giving notice, the union establishes a fair case that it was acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. These restrictions on the granting of injunctions will not apply in the case of trespass, damage to property or action likely to cause death or personal injury.
Injunctions are often sought by employers as a bargaining tool and not for the purpose for which they were intended, namely, to maintain the status quo until a full court hearing can be arranged. Trade dispute cases rarely come to a full hearing. The changes being provided for are designed to reduce recourse to the law courts in industrial relations disputes, while permitting injunctive relief in cases involving trespass, obstruction and so on, thus ensuring that injunctions are stil available in genuinely serious situations. The new arrangements will also provide a strong incentive to trade unions to hold secret ballots and give appropriate notice of proposed industrial action to employers.
In the period since the publication of the Bill there has been a considerable amount of comment about the position of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions all-out picket under the new balloting arrangements. Some commentators have suggested that under the new provisions it would no longer be possible for the ICTU to operate the all-out picket. This is not the case. The ICTU all-out picket mechanism has been a source of order and restraint and has been conducive to the resolution of a number of disputes. It would, I believe, be a retrograde step if this mechanism was lost. The all-out picket arrangements can continue to operate subject only to the union involved balloting their members. I think it is a fundamental right that workers would be entitled to a say in whether they wish to be involved in a dispute. To clear up any doubts which may have existed, the Bill now contains a provision which makes direct reference to the position of the ICTU and the all-out picket.
I would like to turn now to the provisions in relation to trade union rationalisation. It has long been a policy of Ministers for Labour to encourage the rationalisation of the trade union movement. Some progress has been made in reducing the number of unions from 95 in 1970 to 68 today. Despite the rationalisation which has taken place in recent years there are still far too many unions in Ireland. This is bad for industrial relations as it gives rise to inter-union rivalry, a multiplicity of bargaining units and demarcation disputes. The multiplicity of small unions is also bad for members as such unions cannot provide the wide range of services required in today's working environment.
The amendments to trade union law provided for in the Bill are designed to encourage mergers between unions and discourage the formation of new or breakaway unions. The Trade Union Acts, 1975, permitted the introduction of a system of grants towards expenses incurred by unions in a successful merger. The prospect of a merger attempt being unsuccessful and the associated expenses can deter smaller unions from attempting mergers. I am providing that unions which attempt a merger, but which fail in the attempt, may claim expenses relating to the two year period prior to the failure. This will, I hope, help to accelerate the trend towards union rationalisation.
A further proposed change involves the doubling of the membership requirement for a new union seeking a negotiation licence from 500 to 1,000 members and a substantial increase in the level of the High Court deposit required by such a union. While the present membership and deposit requirements which were provided for in the Trade Unions Act, 1971, have worked well to forestall the establishment of small, poorly financed or breakaway unions in areas already serviced or capable of being serviced by existing unions, experience in recent years suggests that some tightening of the requirements is necessary. The changes in the Bill are aimed at strengthening the trade union movement and improving the effectiveness of collective bargaining for union members.
On industrial relations law and institutional reform I would now like to turn my attention to the other major part of this Bill, and particularly to the provisions dealing with the machinery for the resolution of disputes. The major institution in this area is the Labour Court which was established by Seán Lemass in 1946. While the court has served Irish industrial relations well there is now a clear need for a change in the structure and approach of our official dispute setting services. All structures need to be assessed and re-examined from time to time and to say that there is a need for change in the dispute resolution structures is not to take from the major contribution which the court has made. What are provided for in the Bill are measures designed to enhance the contribution which the State machinery can make to the resolution of disputes and to the overall improvement of industrial relations. In particular, the proposals recognise the great contribution which the Labour Court has made and aim at improving and enhancing its status.
The changes proposed shift the main responsibility for dispute prevention and resolution back where it properly belongs, that is, with the parties themselves. The Labour Court has become a court of first resort rather than the final, authoritative tribunal in industrial relations matters which it should be and which it was always intended that it should be.
The changes which the Bill provides for in relation to the dispute resolution machinery have four principal objectives: to give a new general responsibility for the promotion of better industrial relations to an appropriate body; to encourage and facilitate a more active approach to dispute prevention and resolution; to restore the original purpose and status of Labour Court investigation and recommendations; and to make provision for a number of new functions and services.
The major change provided for is the establishment of a new Labour Relations Commission guided by a tripartite council, with employer, trade union and independent representation. In addition to the overall responsibility for the promotion of good industrial relations, the commission will have a wide range of functions including the provision of conciliation and advisory services and the development of codes of practice. The Equality Service and the Rights Commissioner Service will in future act as independent units of the commission.
One of the main reasons for establishing the commission is to have a body specifically charged with the primary responsibility for the promotion of better industrial relations. The commission will be well placed to make public pronouncements on industrial relations practices and procedures which need to be changed and to call for legislative or other changes if necessary. The commission will also be able to highlight examples of good practice and encourage others to adopt similar practices.
Its pronouncements will carry the authority of a tripartite body and the collective experience of respected experts drawn from the industrial relations field. This promotion of good industrial relations will also be advanced through many of the commission's activities, such as the provision of an advisory service, the preparation of codes of practice and the offering of guidance on such codes, conducting and commissioning research and reviewing and monitoring developments.
A second major objective in establishing the commission is to encourage and facilitate a more active approach to dispute prevention and resolution. A previous attempt to broaden the role of the conciliation service within the Labour Court structure had little effect.
The commission will attempt to bring about a change in attitudes so that the responsibility for dispute resolution is shifted back to the parties themselves where it primarily belongs. The attainment of this end will entail a reappraisal by trade unions and employers, especially those who are still attracted to the option of adjudication, of their attitude towards dispute resolution. If a dispute cannot be resolved at the workplace then an industrial relations officer of the commission will facilitate the parties to reach a settlement on their own terms. The parties should be more committed to an agreement that they have worked out together through negotiation than to an adjudication handed down by a third party. The advisory service of the commission will also have an important role to play in the prevention of disputes but I will return to this point later.
As I mentioned earlier, one major objective in establishing the commission is to restore the original purpose and status of Labour Court investigation and recommendations.
Up to the end of the 1960s the Labour Court issued about 100 recommendations each year. Over the years since then there has been a dramatic rise in the number of recommendations issued. The figure reached a peak of 1,045 in 1983, declining to 708 in 1988 and 646 in 1989. Part of the explanation for the large increase in the number of recommendations issued by the Labour Court particularly during the 1970s can be attributed to the central role provided for the court in the resolution of issues which arose in the context of the various national wage agreements.
It would appear that having developed the habit of referring matters to the court for adjudication the parties to disputes have found it difficult to revert to settling their own problems. While the decline in the number of issues being referred to the court in recent years is to be welcomed, there are still too many recommendations being issued by the court on relatively trivial matters. This can only damage the status and ultimately the acceptability of Labour Court recommendations.
The increased emphasis given to conciliation through the establishment of the Labour Relations Commission should ensure that more cases are settled at conciliation and that fewer cases are heard by the court. Untimately, as the parties take more responsibility for their own disputes, there should be a decline in the number of conciliation cases too.
The Bill provides that the court will not normally investigate a dispute unless it receives a report from the commission to the effect that the commission is satisfied that no further efforts on its part will advance the resolution of the dispute. The court should as a result become a genuine court of last resort in industrial relations rather than a court of almost automatic recourse as at the moment.
On new functions and services and particularly the advisory service, I have referred already to the fact that the commission will undertake research and will review and monoitor developments in the industrial relations area. The commission will also provide an advisory service. There is an important role for a small strategic State provided advisory service concentrating on areas giving rise to recurring industrial relations unrest where impartial advice from a third party acceptable to management and unions could help to resolve deep seated industrial relations problems.
Too easy access to the Labour Court has in the past meant that in some cases there has been no examination of underlying problems at workplace level which can give rise to frequent disputes. It is the intention that where organisations with industrial relations problems come to the notice of an industrial relations officer the officer will be able to suggest that the parties seek the help of the advisory service to be provided by the commission. The advisory service will be in a position to help management and unions in individual employments to examine and review some or all of their industrial relations practices.
The commission will also be charged with drawing up codes of practice in consultation with interested parties. I see this as being a very important task for the commission and it is my intention that codes of practice should provide a valuable source of guidance for employers and trade unions on particular issues. The preparation of codes is closely related to the commission's function of promoting good industrial relations and improving industrial relations practices. Failure to observe a code will not render anyone liable to proceedings, but provisions of a code will be admissible in evidence to a court or industrial relations agency.
The commission will be able to prepare codes on subjects chosen by itself or at my request. It is my intention as soon as the commission is established to suggest priority issues on which codes should be prepared. These issues include: a dispute procedure setting out the procedural stages to be followed before industrial action is taken; provision of information to and consultation with employees on the activities of the undertaking and on decisions likely to affect employees; levels of cover to be provided in the case of disputes in essential services; and protection and facilities for workers' representatives in the company.
Other issues on which codes might be successfully prepared are individual grievance procedures, and disciplinary procedures. The list is not exhaustive and the commission will no doubt have its own proposals in relation to codes of practice.
When a code has been drawn up I will be empowered to promulgate it in a statutory instrument thus underlying its status and importance but without creating new legal obligations for employers and trade unions.
As regards joint labour committees the Bill contains provisions to improve the procedures governing their operation and establishment. There are also a number of technical provisions to improve the enforcement of the terms of employment regulation orders and registered employment agreements. I would hope that the improvements in relation to joint labour committees and employment regulation orders will make the committees more effective. They will also make it easier and more attractive for low paid workers to seek to have new committees established or to seek the registration of agreements.
I am confident that the range of measures provided for in this Bill will make an important contribution to industrial relations in this country. A stable industrial relations environment is crucial if the country is to realise its full economic and employment potential. The creation of new employment and the preservation of existing jobs remains the number one priority. The success of the Programme for National Recovery demonstrates the advantages of a consensual approach to the attainment of common goals. I am confident that with the commitment and goodwill of all sides a further programme can be put in place which together with the measures provided for in this Bill will ensure the development and maintenance of industrial relations peace for the foreseeable future.
Industrial relations peace is vital for a sustained improvement in economic activity and employment creation. It enhances Ireland's reputation as a good location for inward investment. The Programme for National Recovery has made a positive contribution to the economic and social well being of the country. The Industrial Relations Bill, when enacted, will be another important element in ensuring a better industrial relations environment. Its contribution will be all the more important and necessary with the advent of the Single European Market and the opportunities and challenges which this will present
I commend this Bill to the House.