Skip to main content
Normal View

Seanad Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 4 Feb 2003

Vol. 171 No. 3

Immigration Bill 2002: Report Stage (Resumed) and Final Stage.

Debate resumed on amendment No. 6:
In page 6, line 24, to delete "both, or" and substitute "both.".
– (Ms Tuffy).

The effect of the Senator's amendment would be to put the position of an employer who employs someone unlawfully without a work permit on exactly the same basis in terms of potential punishment as an employee who works illegally without such a permit. It would prevent any of these offences from being tried on indictment, in the case of an employer, and it would limit the maximum fine that could be imposed on, for example, a company to €3,000.

There is a radical distinction between the position of an employer who knowingly employs someone in breach of the law, potentially speaking, and that of an employee. I will give the Senator an example. First, there is a possibility that a sizeable corporation would deliberately decide to employ someone on a substantial salary, perhaps €200,000 per annum, knowing that it cannot be sent to jail and the most it can suffer, if discovered, is to pay a €3,000 penalty. To fix that as the maximum penalty in those circumstances would be to make a mockery of the law.

On Committee Stage the Senator expressed the view that the possibility of trial on indictment for employers is over the top. I could imagine a set of circumstances where it would come to light that an employer in, for example, the horticultural area or in mushroom production – I am not pointing the finger at particular areas of business – would decide to employ illegal immigrants at knock-down wages and threaten that they would be exposed to the Garda national immigration bureau if they did not behave and continue to work. When negotiations about conditions of work took place, the employers would be able to use the constant threat that the type of employees to whom I refer could face deportation if they did not behave and continue to work in exploitative circumstances. This may not be something that happens every day – I hope it does not happen at all in future – but, in light of human nature, the situation of an employee who is working illegally is essentially vulnerable.

The situation of an employer who consciously takes on employees in these circumstances is essentially one of temptation to exploit the illegal status of those employees. I am saying, by way of two examples, that a conscious and deliberate violation by a corporation, which might not even be physically located in this country, to employ someone here in breach of the work permit law should be capable of being visited with more than a €3,000 penalty. In the final analysis, we could be referring to people whose salaries amount to ten or 20 times that amount in a given year and for whom there would be no deterrent.

Second, I do not doubt that the fact that people are smuggled into Ireland in the backs of containers, to be exploited for many months or years, will come to light in the fullness of time. Such people may almost become slaves as a result of being exploited by ruthless employers. Therefore, a fine of €3,000 for a body corporate found to have been involved in such exploitation would be a laughable deterrent. It would not be a suitable punishment for those who have perpetuated such iniquity. A receiver of stolen property is often more guilty than a thief, as a thief would not steal if he or she was not confident of a ready market for his or her stolen goods. Similarly, those proffering themselves as illegal employees appeal, in effect, to the worst instincts in employers. I refer to employers who know that persons are here illegally and not entitled to work but employ such persons nonetheless.

Senators may point to illegal employees who persuade employers to take them on in casual employment, against employers' better judgment, for example, in circumstances which would not lead to much moral guilt on the part of employers. I can imagine such circumstances but the House should bear in mind that this will be a triable offence when the Bill is enacted. It is fanciful to think that anybody would be put through the ordeal of a trial by jury or exposed to harsher penalties in such circumstances as the Director of Public Prosecutions would, in his wisdom, opt for summary trial and the lesser penalties provided.

The Senator will, on reflection, take a certain view of the potential culpability of an employer who employed many employees in circumstances of grave exploitation. Employers may be tempted to deliberately breach the law if they knew that the only summary penalty capable of being imposed by a District Court was a fine of €3,000. I am sticking by the severe penalties, where the offence is prosecuted on indictment, provided for in the Bill. I want Irish companies to understand they should never knowingly employ somebody who is not authorised to work in the State as to do so would be to commit an offence. Employers should be aware that in certain circumstances, if the subtending facts of the case are serious enough, they will be subjected to a serious prosecution and expose themselves to very serious penalties.

I would like the Minister to reconsider the matter.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 7 not moved.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 8, line 33, to delete "5" and substitute "25".

My party has brought forward this amendment in an attempt to change the period of time allowed for the submission of a contact address from five working days to 25. It is likely that immigrants would be unable to secure such an address within five days despite administrative procedures aimed at ensuring they do. This amendment represents a compromise with the Minister's position and I ask that he accept it.

I second amendment No. 8. I agree with Senator Tuffy's remarks. Five days is too short a timeframe to provide a reasonable opportunity for individuals to seek accommodation and a permanent address.

I oppose this amendment which relates to the period of time given to applicants for asylum status to notify the Refugee Applications Commissioner of a permanent address where he or she can be contacted, for example, if notices need to be sent out. If I accede to the amendment and it is accepted by the House, applicants will have 25 working days – five full weeks, or over one month – in which to provide the information. Somebody who comes to the State will have over one month in which to log on, if I may use that phrase, to the refugee applications system. Such a situation would be unacceptable as it could mean that we would have a large floating population whose address for the purpose of serving notices would be unknown.

People may want to change their address from time to time but the Reception and Integration Agency provides all asylum seekers with accommodation, upon request. Therefore, there is no basis on which somebody could be without an address. An applicant might move from one place to another, within the direct provision system, and might, therefore, have some time to log on to the system between two addresses. Given that everybody is offered accommodation by the RIA, the system provided for in the Bill, whereby applicants must provide within one week an address to which subsequent documentation such as notices of interviews or other meetings related to applications can be sent and will be capable of being received, is not particularly strict. Acceptance of the amendment would simply create another dysfunctional area in the system as it would provide for a time period during which people would be at large and nobody would know where they were. As there is no good reason for such problems, I am strongly opposed to the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Government amendment No. 9:
In page 9, line 10, to delete "this subsection" and substitute "that obligation".

This amendment is necessary to modify the language of the proposed section 11(8)(f). I refer to the phrase “non-compliance with this subsection”, which I propose to replace with “non-compliance with that obligation”. While the original wording may seem more clear, I understand the Department thinks that a certain infelicity of expression has crept into the section. I propose in the amendment to introduce felicity where otherwise there would be infelicity.

Amendment agreed to.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

As amendments Nos. 10 and 17 are cognate, they may be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 9, line 28, to delete "3" and substitute "21".

This section of the Bill gives persons who do not show up for a meeting with the commissioner three working days to explain the reasons for their non-attendance. If the amendment is accepted, however, such people will have 21 working days to provide an explanation. I wish to change the rule under which a person who does not show up for an interview is not entitled to a second interview. Three working days is too short a time for applicants to take the initiative to provide an explanation. A period of 21 days would be far more reasonable. Similarly, the applicant should be allowed a reasonable period of time to provide an explanation for non-attendance without his or her application being withdrawn. We ask the Minister to accept the amendments.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Is the amendment being seconded?

I second the amendment.

This amendment, like the previous amendment, proposes to extend the length of time to 21 days, which could be four working weeks. Given that we are surely not expecting people to make excuses about Saturdays and Sundays, I take it the Senator means four working weeks. Again, I cannot understand why somebody would have to wait that length of time to furnish an excuse. If the person is invoking asylum status from the State, the onus should be on him or her to give the required information as speedily as possible. The provision also places an onus on the State to accept a reason within three days. The provisions in the Bill, in contrast to what Senator Tuffy is trying to achieve, are intended to shorten the period in which this process is completed. I ask her to withdraw the amendment.

I agree with Senator Morrissey. I explained to the House on Committee Stage that in order for an interview to be conducted, a series of events must happen: first, the officer conducting the interview must arrange, in many cases, for an interpreter to be present; second, in most cases, lawyers, or at any rate one lawyer, may be in attendance; and third, the would-be asylum seeker will have to be satisfied that someone has read his or her file in advance and is familiar with its contents.

The officer will need to have investigated the position vis-à-vis the country of origin. For example, he or she may have done some research on whether the state in question is one in which the type of persecution in question has happened, is still happening or is likely to recur. In addition, a number of hours will normally be set aside for such an asylum seeker to be interviewed. We are, therefore, discussing a significant commitment of State resources.

The Bill provides that somebody may indicate, at any time before an interview and for a good reason, that he or she cannot attend. In those circumstances, non-attendance will not result in a withdrawal of the application for asylum. Somebody who misses the interview may contact the commissioner and outline the reason for their absence within the following three working days. The latter period excludes weekends. He or she can even arrange for another person to do that on his or her behalf. The person in question may explain, for example, that his or her brother or sister or good friend from Nigeria missed their interview for a good reason. I refer, for example, to a medical reason which could not have been anticipated or some serious domestic event. In those circumstances, a person's not attending on the relevant day will not be deemed to be a withdrawal of their asylum application.

Senator Tuffy is now suggesting that instead of those three days, I should allow 21 working days. This means that an asylum seeker can effectively, and without providing an explanation, avoid meeting the refugee applications commissioner for an entire month. It would still be open to the applicant to return four weeks later and state that they had a reasonable excuse for not attending but that they were not in a position to provide it. This would send out all the wrong signals.

I ask the Senator to remember that in respect of a process in which at least 90% of people are found not to be refugees, €47 million is being spent annually by the State on processing and related immigration functions. As a Minister with daily expenditure commitments – many other members of the Government have more heart-rending stories to relate about the resources they need – I am aware that this money could well be spent on hospitals, education, welfare, etc. The money, by virtue of our obligations under the 1951 convention, is there to fund a super-sophisticated system of asylum applications and appeals.

We should bear in mind that in 999 out of 1000 cases, a refugee has the option of going anywhere else, but if he or she chooses to come to Ireland – a country that invests a huge amount of resources into giving asylum seekers fair play, makes direct provision for them while their cases are being considered and looks after them and their dependants during that period – the least he or she could do is co-operate with the system in this one way. He or she is free to either provide notification in advance that he or she will not attend the hearing, for a good reason, or, within a couple of days of the scheduled date, notify the commissioner that his or her non-appearance was for a bona fide reason and that the commissioner was not being made a fool of in terms of arranging this legal panoply to no purpose.

If I was to give people a month to come up with an excuse, I would be making the system unworkable. I made the point on Committee Stage that this is a serious business. Some €300 million is spent in various forms every year as a result of asylum seeking in Ireland. There are moral issues here, but morality does not go all one way. Some people believe they are girded with the garments of rectitude because they publicly stand for the rights of asylum seekers. However, there are other people who are not getting the resources to which I refer because they are being invested in this area.

I make no apology for saying that if one comes to this country and invokes our asylum law, one must take it seriously, because there are moral considerations at play. People cannot have it both ways. They cannot say that it is a one way street and that all the obligations lie with the State. People who enter the system and who are cavalier about their obligations are free to walk away and leave the financial penalties to be paid by the State.

I ask Senators to remember that it is not a question of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform being hard-hearted or a skinflint. I am dealing with an area – this includes the consequences of asylum seeking – that absorbs €300 million every year. That is a massive sum and there are moral choices involved. As long as that money is not being invested into other areas, many socially deserving projects that Senators would like to see funded will have to go without.

Asylum seekers have a moral and legal duty to co-operate with the State. One of the things that really saddens me is that this year, as a result of financial constraints, although the amount of resources the State invested in overseas development assistance rose substantially it did not rise by the amount we would have wished. Of the sum of €300 million to which I referred, 90% is spent on people who are not entitled to the protection of the State. I often think that if a substantial amount of that went to overseas development assistance, the interests of morality would be better served.

I ask people who get hot under the collar about the asylum system to think about the moral implications of what is going on. This is not a game of legal cat and mouse. It is a moral issue. These are real resources being diverted away from many deserving causes to this other deserving cause. Those who think it should be open to asylum seekers to come to Ireland and engage with the asylum system as if it were not serious business and there were no implications for the State in terms of resources are short-changing themselves in terms of moral judgment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Amendments Nos. 11 and 18 are cognate and may be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 11:

In page 9, line 39, after "declaration" to insert "to such an extent as to warrant the application of this subsection".

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that only significant breaches of the duty to co-operate will result in the application being deemed withdrawn. I recognise what the Minister says about the need to ensure the asylum-seeking provisions are not abused and that people are not time-wasting but on the other hand we must have some latitude in our system.

The new duty to co-operate and the provisions for failure to co-operate are vague. There are situations where people could be caught up in unforeseen circumstances which the Minister does not recognise. For example, what would the position be if a person was involved in an accident? They might not be in a position to comply with the provisions under the legislation. There are cavalier people, but there are also those who are not and we must allow for that. In addition to the moral duty of the applicant to co-operate, we have a duty of fairness and a moral obligation to provide for asylum-seekers.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Is the amendment being seconded?

I second the amendment.

We have a mandate to enact laws only on foot of our position under the Constitution. The first canon of construction of any law promulgated by the President after being passed by these two Houses is that it should be construed in a constitutional way. Throughout the Constitution, from the preamble on, are values of reasonableness, constitutional justice and charity. The fundamental rule of construction in any perusal by any court or an administrator of a law is that they must interpret it in a constitutional way. If they give any Act a construction which flouts people's constitutional rights or is at variance with constitutional values, the courts are there to correct them. In those circumstances, this subsection provides:

Where–

(a) it appears to the Commissioner that an applicant is failing in his or her duty to co-operate with the Commissioner or to furnish information relevant to his or her application for declaration, or

(b) the Minister notifies the Commissioner that he or she is of opinion that the applicant is in breach of subsection 4, (4A) or (5) of section 9 the Commissioner shall send to the applicant a notice in writing inviting the applicant to indicate (within ten working days of the sending of the notice) whether he or she wishes to continue with his or her application and, if an applicant does not furnish an indication with in the time specified in the notice, his or her application for declaration shall be deemed to be withdrawn.

For that section to come into the effect, the pre-conditions, as far as the amendment is concerned, are that there has to be a failure to co-operate or comply with the provisions of section 9, which are specified in the section. This amendment proposes to insert the words "to such an extent as to warrant the application of this subsection". That is to exclude minor or totally insignificant failures to co-operate but I do not know what they might be. It seems implicit in the subsection that only those, which could be reasonably and fairly relied upon, can constitute grounds for the sending of a letter under the subsection.

All we are saying is that, in those circumstances, the applicant is put in the position of indicating whether or not he or she proposes to proceed with the matter. It seems, from ordinary rules of constitutional construction, that the words which the Senator's amendment proposes to insert are entirely surplusage because anything which is so insignificant as to fall within the de minimis non courat lex rule – the law is not concerned with tiny things – is already excluded by a constitutional interpretation of this section.

I do not know what the Senator has in mind but she referred to a person being the subject of a medical accident. That would not of course amount to a lack of co-operation. To co-operate means to do so in the sense that one can. Lack of co-operation is surely based on some degree of default on the part of the applicant. One cannot call it failure to co-operate if the person could not co-operate. Any fair-minded judge or administrator, if it came to that, could only operate in a constitutional interpretation of the section and would have to ignore something which was so insignificant as not to warrant the application of the section. I am opposed to the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Amendment No. 12 is a Government amendment. Amendment No. 19 is cognate and amendments Nos. 13 and 20 are alternatives. Amendments Nos. 12, 13, 19 and 20 can be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.

Government amendment No. 12:
In page 9, line 42, to delete "subsection (4)" and substitute "subsection (4)(a)”.

Senators will recall that in our debate on Committee Stage, I gave an undertaking that I would bring forward a Report Stage amendment to make it clear that the withdrawal provisions provided for in section 6 of the Bill would not apply in circumstances where an applicant is found in breach of section 9(4)(b) of the Act of 1996. Paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of that section prohibits an applicant from entering employment or carrying on a business, trade or profession during the period before the final determination of his or her application.

I said to the House that I would not regard breach of the ban on employment by applicants as ipso facto indicative of a desire to abandon the application. However, I want to make it clear I regard such breaches as a serious failure to meet the requirements of the Act of 1996. It is equally clear that breaches of that nature do not in themselves mean the person is failing to co-operate in the investigation of his or her application for asylum – although I would deprecate it. If, for example, an applicant for asylum was to be offered casual employment for one or two days at some stage, I would not regard the mere fact of that being proven or established as fair grounds for saying that, regardless of the merits of that applicant's original claim, they should be deemed to have abandoned it. The effect of the Government amendment is to provide that the mere breach of the obligation not to work, although it is a serious matter, will not be relied upon by the State as grounds for concluding that the asylum application is itself devoid of substance and has been abandoned.

I commend the amendments to the House and note that the Labour Senators seem to support the Government's text.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 13 not moved.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Amendment No. 14 is a Government amendment, amendment No. 21 is cognate, and amendments Nos. 15 and 22 are alternatives. They may all be discussed together, by agreement.

Government amendment No. 14:
In page 9, line 46, to delete "10" and substitute "15".

Government amendments Nos. 14 and 21 arise from an indication I gave on Committee Stage that I would look at the time limit of ten working days, as set out in section 6 of the Bill. This ten day limit, in effect a fortnight, would arise in a case where the Refugee Applications Commissioner or the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, as the case may be, becomes aware that the applicant is no longer at the address supplied or has demonstrated that he or she is in some other way not available to co-operate in the process of investigating the asylum claim or determining the appeal.

The applicant's personal co-operation is essential to the tasks the commissioner and the tribunal must perform. In cases where the applicant is no longer at the address supplied, the commissioner or tribunal will write asking the applicant whether he or she wishes to proceed with the application. Failure to respond within the time limit leads to the conclusion that the applicant does not wish to proceed and that the application will be treated as withdrawn.

Having given the matter some thought and having discussed it with some Members of the Houses on Committee Stage and thereafter – I thank Senator Mansergh for the thought he gave to the matter – I have decided to extend the time limit to 15 working days or three weeks rather than maintaining the ten working days which are currently provided for in the Bill as passed on Committee Stage. This is more than fair and will give an applicant adequate time to make good the absence from the address given to consider his or her position and to consult with his or her legal representation as to the undoubtedly important decision that has to be made.

I am adamantly opposed to any undue extension of the time limit. The notion, as proposed in Opposition amendments Nos. 15 and 22, that 35 working days – effectively two months – is an acceptable period in which to respond is simply not on. It is based on the misconception that leisurely time limits are in some way fairer to the applicant than clinical, crisp requirements. Overly long time limits favour only those who wish to abuse the system by dragging out the investigation process for as long as possible and who have little interest in having finality brought to their claims. Such people do a disservice to bona fide applicants whose claims for refugee status are delayed while time limits are exploited by people who are simply bent on exploiting them.

I commend the Government amendments to the House. They are not draconian but reasonable. Fifteen working days amount to three calendar weeks, which is plenty of time for an applicant to address the matter. One should bear in mind that, in many cases, the person involved will have abandoned the address where her or she was supposed to be. If the abandonment goes beyond three weeks something very strange is happening because one of the conditions upon which one claims asylum is that one remains in direct provision accommodation. I cannot imagine circumstances in which there are reasonable grounds for an applicant's moving away for three weeks.

If, for some extraordinary reason, an applicant moves away for three weeks, it is open to him or her to restart the process again, with leave of the Minister. If there was some extraordinary and excusing circumstance that would justify such a course, I would be disposed to looking upon the case favourably. If the system is to work at all one cannot allow two months to elapse in such cases, thereby creating another period of uncertainty that slows up the system and prevents people in the queue from having their cases dealt with. This is because files and lines of communication have to be kept open to the detriment of genuine asylum seekers. If one genuinely came to this country looking for safety from persecution, one would want to get one's status determined as soon as possible. Delay would serve no useful purpose whatsoever.

I welcome the fact that the Minister has increased the time limit to 15 days, but it should have been extended further.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 15 not moved.

I move amendment No. 16:

In page 10, line 16, to delete "no" and substitute "in the case of an appeal withdrawn under section 9, no".

As I have already said to the Minister, the provision for failure to co-operate is very serious.While we accept that there should not be a provision for someone to appeal the withdrawal of his own application, there could be circumstances in which somebody might legitimately miss the 15 day deadline in which one must reply to the letter referred to in amendment No. 14. In such cases there should be provision for an appeal.

I second this amendment.

The effect of the amendment would be to allow an appeal in all cases except where the person fails to provide an address within five working days, as provided for in section 6(b)(ii) of the Bill, which amends section 9 of the 1996 Act, or under subsection 14(b) of section 9 of the 1996 Act, where a person in detention indicates a wish to leave the State and his or her application is deemed withdrawn as a consequence of his or her leaving.

The amendment would also allow an applicant to appeal his or her own decision to withdraw an application or his or own actions or failure to act in pursuing an application. I fail to see the point in allowing an appeal in the case of a person who has abandoned his asylum application. If a person says he does not want to pursue an application it is clearly illogical, if not to suggest a case of bureaucracy gone mad, to invite him to appeal against his own decision. In the same way, if an applicant, by his own actions or omissions, demonstrates in a way that can leave no doubt in anyone's mind that the intention is not to proceed with the asylum application, is it the case that the applicant should be allowed to appeal against his own actions or omissions or their consequences? That is the logic of the amendment.

The provisions in the Bill are fair. They give an applicant ample opportunity to demonstrate, where there is an indication otherwise, that he or she does wish to pursue the application. If the applicant, who knows from the word ‘go' of the consequences of non-co-operation, fails to avail of that ample opportunity, this is a clear and active demonstration that he or she does not wish the claim to proceed. That must inexorably be followed by a definitive conclusion in the form of a decision to withdraw the application since no other conclusion is sustainable.

Following the conclusion of a case in this or any other way, a further application by the applicant would take into account any unforeseen or egregious circumstances which are difficult to provide for in law. In that context, I reiterate what I said in relation to the last amendment. The possibility of resubmitting an application is provided for in section 17(7) of the Refugee Act and is predicated on the Minister's consent. If there were compelling grounds to conclude that someone had been short-changed by a series of events outside his or her control or that the system had been unfair, the Minister of the day would allow the applicant to restart the procedure. That is no reason to conduct any form of review of positive actions by the applicant which lead to the conclusion of the application process.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 17 and 18 not moved.
Government amendment No. 19:
In page 11, lines 9 and 10, to delete "subsection (4)" and substitute "subsection (4)(a)”.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 20 not moved.
Government amendment No. 21:
In page 11, line 13, to delete "10" and substitute "15".
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 22 not moved.

I move amendment No. 23:

In page 11, line 47, after "the" to insert "informed".

We should provide that informed consent should be obtained from a person by amending the subsection in question. I would like to hear what the Minister has to say on the matter.

I second the amendment.

I can understand the Senator's motives in moving this amendment, but I ask her to consider the practicability of the proposal. In section 6(g), the Bill amends section 19(2) of the Refugee Act, 1996, by removing the requirement to obtain the consent of the Minister prior to the publication – in a written publication available to the public – or broadcast of matters likely to lead members of the public to identify a person or an applicant for refugee status. The requirement to obtain the consent of the person will, of course, remain, but the intent of section 19(2) is to protect the identity of the asylum seeker from public exposure. It is essential that this protection be provided as confidentiality is an important consideration for the applicant. It provides the security and peace of mind that his or her identity will not be revealed in circumstances where those from whom the asylum seeker claims to be seeking persecution might be in a position to affect the applicant or his or her connections in the state of alleged persecution. This does not mean that the applicant is barred from telling his or her story to the media since there are many legitimate ways of doing so without revealing a person's identity. To date, it has been the practice for the Minister to grant his consent under section 19(2) where the person had already given his or her permission, sometimes in the form of a letter from his or her solicitor.

The removal of the requirement to obtain the Minister's consent will streamline the procedure under section 19(2) while retaining the essential protections for the applicant. The person whose duty it is to protect the applicant will, primarily, be the applicant himself or herself and the Minister will no longer be the presumed protector. At the moment, there is a double lock with the Minister having to consent, as well as the applicant. People have misrepresented the provisions of the section, pointing to it and saying that it is an effort by the Minister to prevent the public knowing the full truth about the kinds of people regarding whom he is making decisions. The double lock was only intended to prevent asylum applicants from exploitation by the media, but it was frequently represented as a wholly unjustifiable gag imposed by the Minister to permit asylum seekers to be dealt with secretly and away from the glare of publicity. In practice, we gave consent as a matter of course, but as long as the provision regarding ministerial consent remains on the Statute Book, the law will be seen as unjust. As recently as a fortnight ago, I heard somebody state publicly that this law was wholly unjust while implying that it was part of a conspiracy to keep the public in the dark.

One would hope that a person would inform himself or herself fully of all potential consequences when consenting to the publication or broadcast of material likely to reveal his or her identity as an applicant for asylum. The problem with Senator Terry's amendment is in determining whether consent is informed. What is meant by that? Is it sufficient for the person to conduct an internal interrogation of his or her own reasons, or should there be overt evidence of steps taken by the person to inform his or her consent by, for example, contacting a legal representative, the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees or, indeed, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform? The latter option is provided for in the Bill in any case. If such contacts are made mandatory by requiring informed consent, they would become, in effect, a replacement for ministerial consent and remove from the applicant the independence provided for by the amendment to section 19(2) of the 1996 Act.

I accept fully that Senator Terry's amendment seeks to prevent a person from making a foolish and public statement without taking the time to reflect. It might be possible to get around this by having the Refugee Applications Commissioner, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform or the Reception and Integration Agency provide a leaflet pointing out to people that they are not obliged to encourage undue publicity which might damage them or persons connected to them. Some people would doubtless represent that amendment as an effort by me to cow asylum seekers into not talking to the media. The question is therefore where to draw the line and how to demonstrate that consent is informed.

It is not a trivial matter and it is not for the journalist or the broadcaster to be placed under a moral duty to satisfy himself or herself that the consent given is informed under pain of fine or imprisonment. That is hardly an incentive to journalists to cover these stories. If they are placed under an obligation to establish that consent is informed, journalists and broadcasters will question the nature of their duty in that case. They will ask about the nature of the duty imposed on them, for example, if they will be able to cover stories which come out quickly, they are to say they will not do anything unless a lawyer is present, or they are to recommend third party advice before being contacted. That is probably desirable but it must be asked if it is workable.

It must also be asked if people are to be fined for failure to obtain an informed consent when we will not define what it means. For example, where an applicant's good friend or somebody involved in the asylum process provides a service for asylum seekers, are they capable of giving such advice as would make consent informed consent? Unless we are willing to specify exactly what we mean, we can hardly create a criminal offence.

While I accept the amendment is well intentioned, it may create an undefined criminal offence. For example, it may implicate those involved in the publication of articles about asylum seekers, regardless of whether they had committed an offence. The legislation means that, as Minister, I will withdraw from providing a guarantee of secrecy by means of the requirement that my consent be obtained and leave it to the asylum seeker to protect his or her own interest. The amendment seeks to ensure that in such circumstances the media must not exploit a naive asylum seeker by providing for informed consent being a precondition for publicity of this kind. While I understand its purpose, unless we are willing to set out in an appendix to the legislation a workable formula that sets out for the media what can and cannot be done, the good intention of the amendment would create confusion as to whether an offence was committed.

Reluctantly, therefore, we must rely on the good sense of the applicant to make a decision, taking advice from whatever quarter he or she considers necessary. I will consider the possibility of an advisory leaflet or document to compensate for the fact that I will no longer act in loco parentis as a person who must consent. In the last analysis we are leaving it to the applicant's free will and as long as he or she is provided with some guidance, we cannot dilute or make unclear the meaning of the offence now provided for.

I will be guided by the Minister's views and ask him to act in the way he has outlined.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 24:

In page 11, between lines 47 and 48, to insert the following:

"and by the insertion after subsection (5) of:

‘(6) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Tribunal may make available to the public copies of its decisions regarding appeals under this Act subject to the deletion of any material which might identify the appellant unless he or she so requests'.".

Tribunal decisions are not available. On Committee Stage the Minister rejected my party's proposal that the tribunal would be obliged to publish its decisions. The amendment seeks to regularise the Minister's assertion that the tribunal is free to publish its decisions. The tribunal appears to think otherwise and has in the past refused to publish decisions. The amendment modifies the amendment we moved on Committee Stage and seeks a compromise to ensure there would be openness regarding the tribunal's decisions. It is generally desirable in all decision making processes.

I second the amendment.

I am advised by the Attorney General's office that the tribunal has within its discretion the power to publish decisions with sufficient details obscured to preserve the anonymity of applicants if it so wishes. That would be the appropriate way in which to release this material. However, it is right for the tribunal to select the cases of sufficient significance to merit public awareness, rather than have a bureaucratic requirement imposed on it, as provided for in the amendment, to publicise all its decisions, with the added burden of having to anonymise most of them. Although the proceedings of the District Court are held in public, it does not have to reduce to writing all its decisions. If it did so, huge bureaucratic problems could arise. On occasion reports of family law decisions made in the family law courts appear in the newspapers.

Considerable efforts are made to anonymise the material in question but sometimes this is unsuccessful and it is not difficult to work out from the facts as they are reported in the newspapers who is being referred to. For example, if a newspaper considers it is obscuring detail by reporting that a father of five who is a substantial businessman in the south-east has had a given decision imposed on him in the family court, with a few more details provided about the children, for example, that one attends boarding school while another is abroad, identification becomes simple.

It would not be easy to anonymise a decision of the tribunal. For example, take the case where a decision refers to an African from Nigeria. It is reported that the ground for the asylum application was, as is frequently the case, the involvement of the person in political turmoil or an attempted coup. If a decision has to be reached on whether such an applicant is entitled to asylum, issues of credibility arise regarding the applicant's story. In many cases the asylum applicant will have given a personalised history of how he or she came to Ireland, who assisted him or her and how he or she avoided persecution. Frequently, the decision is focused on the credibility of that history and it may be found incredible for obvious reasons set out in the decision.

To understand the decision it would be necessary to know the personal detail of the applicant and to draw any reasonable conclusion one would have to understand the decision in detail. From my experience of examining such files, a frequent ground relied on is that it is incredible in the circumstances of, say, the example I have cited, that the applicant did not go to his brother who was chief of police or that he did not talk to his sister who was at that stage a high ranking official in a given department and tell them of the threat of persecution. However, as each fact in a decision is set out and even if the name of the applicant is not disclosed, the decision would contain revealing references, say, in this example, to the northern state or the federal nature of the Government. Only a fool reading the judgment would not know the state referred to. A further revealing reference, for example, that the applicant's brother was the chief of police, would make it clear.

To sanitise a decision completely and make it anonymous would take many hours of work trying to work out what someone with malign intent – I do not suggest that there are such persons in any particular state – would be able to gather from a particular published decision. In particular, when one is dealing with people whose appeals are rejected, points they made in defence of their application and accusations they made about how they were treated and the like could expose them, if sent back to their country, to prejudice of some kind or another.

It is not as easy as the Senator's amendment suggests to go through a document and put a black mark through a proper name every time one comes across it. That would not suffice. One would have to spend hours going through these decisions to make the applicant unidentifiable. One would have to do this in every case if it was mandatory. It would take hours, possibly days, out of the tribunal's working week to try to sanitise its own decisions. One would end up with documents which had so much black marker all over them, or so many deletions if the work was done on a word processor, that they would be virtually unintelligible and not simply useless but positively misleading because the grounds on which someone was disbelieved would be so personal as to identify them. Furthermore, the decision would look very strange because the tribunal member would appear to disbelieve an applicant on very flimsy grounds because he or she might have had to excise a whole paragraph which might have identified the applicant.

I see what the Senator is attempting to achieve but we are dealing with a process that must, in the interest of the applicant, remain secret. Applicants in all cases are given the reasons for the failure of applications and there is is nothing to prevent an applicant from publishing his or her decision if he or she wishes to do so and take the consequences. However, to require the State to spend hours and hours effectively falsifying the record so as to remove any identifying material would not simply be a waste of time but positively misleading and lead journalists looking at the documents to say the grounds given were flimsy because they would not be aware that material which made the decision entirely reasonable had been excised.

The Minister has referred to the amendment requiring the tribunal to publish decisions. However, the amendment states the tribunal "may make available to the public copies of its decisions".

I have made the point that the tribunal has that power already. Therefore, it is not necessary to provide it. To say the tribunal may make decisions available to the public is to state the obvious. Unless this is an appeal for publication to be done normally or as of course, the amendment proposes something which the tribunal can already do. The chairman of the tribunal could gather together important points of law or important precedents that he or she thought were necessary to publish. There is nothing to stop this happening.

The word "may" is interpreted in two ways. While sometimes it is permissive, sometimes the courts interpret it as being equivalent to the word "shall" in circumstances where a power is being given to a body.

I informed the chairperson of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal as late as yesterday of the Attorney General's advice that the tribunal believes it has the discretion to publish decisions. That is as good as I can do for the Senator.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 25:

In page 14, between lines 8 and 9, to insert the following:

"7.–The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 is amended in section 5(3)(a) by the insertion after the third and fourth references to the ‘High Court' of ‘or the Supreme Court',”.

My colleagues and I have tabled this amendment because we believe it important that an applicant should have the right to appeal a refusal by the High Court of leave to appeal. This leave relates to a fundamental human right. When the Bill was introduced in 2000, the Labour Party spokesperson, Deputy Howlin, withdrew his amendment because he was told that such an appeal would lie. Since then, however, the Supreme Court has held that no such appeal lies. Therefore, I ask the Minister to rectify the position by accepting this amendment.

I second the amendment.

The amendment proposes to remove the restriction on the right of appeal from a decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court in judicial review proceedings under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. Currently, under that Act, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court can only be granted where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. The provision does not apply to a determination of the High Court as to the validity of any law having regard to the Constitution. The Constitution provides that not every decision of the High Court is appealable to the Supreme Court. Only some are. It is a matter to provide by law whether there should be an appeal.

If I was to remove the obligation on an unsuccessful asylum seeker seeking judicial review to obtain the leave of the High Court and point to some legal point of exceptional public importance, I would be saying to someone legally aided by the refugee legal service that he or she could not merely apply to the High Court within the time limit provided for in the Act of 2000 but, when dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court refusing him or her judicial review, bring that same case to the Supreme Court.

In nearly every one of these cases, legal aid is granted. Where the legal system can be invoked, effectively free of charge, and the evil day postponed, and where, on experience, nine out of ten applications are found not to be well founded, the sad fact is that those who want to exploit delay within the system would, as a matter of course, ask their lawyers to bring a judicial review for them in the High Court, even though, in the minds of their lawyers, the case was probably doomed. These cases would then go to the Supreme Court without any exposure to costs, because they have no assets, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court invoked. If this was to happen, a pattern would emerge that every asylum seeker faced with deportation would decide to get another six months out of High Court and Supreme Court appeals, hoping something might turn up in those six months. In those circumstances I have no doubt the Supreme Court would be flooded with appeals by those who merely wanted to put off the evil day.

The Supreme Court has upheld the statutory judicial review system as fair, constitutional and consistent with the principles of natural justice and in compliance with Ireland's international obligations on the human rights sphere. The court also recognised these provisions as being in pursuance of the legitimate policy objectives of ensuring that the delay in removing a person from the State, which is necessarily occasioned by the institution of judicial review proceedings, should arise only where there are substantial reasons which warrant that delay. The legitimate policy objective still stands and, accordingly, I see absolutely no justification for interfering with the system which carries that objective into effect. I do not want to open a stable door we have already closed in order to provide a system of legally aided delay. I have no doubt that the latter would arise.

If any legal point of genuine public importance arose in the High Court, I have no doubt that a judge – because High Court justices are humane and decent people – will refer it to the Supreme Court for resolution. To put it in the gift of the applicant to decide whether the Supreme Court should reserve a full day, half a day or whatever to decide these matters – I say this in the context that we receive 12,000 applications for asylum per annum – would make the Supreme Court a target for incessant appeal. It is all very well to say the court is there to hear appeals, but if there are 400 appeals does that not bring the judicial system into disrepute? If the Supreme Court sets aside a half day, an hour or half an hour to try to discover what each case involves, this would effectively wipe out its capacity to function as a court for an entire legal year. I will not go down that road.

On reflection, the stance I am taking is reasonable. The law is working well. Nobody of whom I am aware has made a substantial complaint that it has operated in an unfair or arbitrary way.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill reported with amendments and received for final consideration.
Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass."

I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for spending so much time here dealing with the amendments and for his patience and commitment to the Bill. I also thank Senators for their contributions.

It is customary to acknowledge the usefulness of the Bill and the reasonable manner with which the Minister accommodated various amendments put forward. Our hope is that an important Bill such as this will have the effect of speeding up the process for the genuine asylum seekers who are disadvantaged because of abuses of the system.

I thank the Minister for the time he has spent here and for the lengthy explanations he gave on many of the amendments tabled. All we want is a fair system. I agree with much of what the Minister has said. There have to be rules and regulations and they must be applied in the interests of all concerned. It is important to treat applicants in a fair and transparent way. I thank everyone, particularly the Minister, who assisted with the debate.

I thank the Minister for giving of his time to this debate. I also thank him for accepting amendments tabled by the Labour Party and also the amendments he has made in light of issues we have raised. I agree with Senator Terry that the purpose of our amendments is to ensure the system in place is fair and humane and that asylum seekers are not deterred from coming to Ireland. I hope the issues I have raised in the debate will be addressed by the Minister.

I sincerely thank the Minister for the time he has invested in the debate on the Bill and Opposition Members for the amendments they tabled, which allowed the House discuss a broad range of issues. In light of the amendments that have been accepted, the system will be streamlined and not as costly as heretofore.

I thank Senators for their participation in the debate, for the time they invested in preparing amendments and considering the text of the Bill and all the useful amendments tabled, particularly those I was in a position to accept. I hope this legislation will improve the law. I sound one note of warning that I do not think Senators have seen the back of me in respect of this legislation because I imagine there will be further amendment in the Dáil and that I will return to the House at a later stage.

Acting Chairman

The Minister is always welcome here.

Question put and agreed to.

Acting Chairman

When is it proposed to sit again?

At 10.30 a.m. tomorrow.

Top
Share