COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate

Chairman

The matter on the agenda is the 2004 annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts, Vote 38 — Department of Social and Family Affairs, chapter 15.1 — personal public service numbers; chapter 15.2 — agency services — encashments; chapter 15.3 — overpayments; and chapter 15.4 — prosecutions.

Witnesses should be made aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege before the committee and should be apprised as follows. Members' and witnesses' attention is drawn to the fact that, as and from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons who are identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence, produce or send documents to the committee, appear before the committee, either in person or through a representative, make a written and oral submission, request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part these rights may be exercised only with the consent of the committee. Persons invited before the committee are made aware of these rights and any persons identified in the course of proceedings who are not present may need to be made aware of them and be provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers this appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in the legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded of the provisions under Standing Order 156 that the committee shall also refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister of the Government or the merits of the objectives of such policies.

I invite Mr. John Hynes, Secretary General of the Department of Social and Family Affairs to introduce his officials.

Mr. John Hynes

I am accompanied by Ms Bernadette Lacey, director general of social welfare services with overall responsibility for delivery of services and Mr. John Doyle who is in charge of the Department's accounts branch. I am also accompanied by Eoin Ó Broin, director, who is responsible for regional operations of the Department and for the control programme, Ms Patricia Murphy who is the principal officer in charge of the client identity services branch with responsibility for the management of the PPS number and Mr. Niall Barry, director, who is in charge of information systems and identity services in the Department.

Chairman

Would the Department of Finance officials introduce themselves?

Mr. Dermot Quigley

I am a principal officer in the social welfare Vote section in the public expenditure division. I am accompanied by Mr. Jim O'Farrell, principal officer in the section dealing with organisation management and training.

Chairman

I invite the Comptroller and Auditor General to introduce Vote 38 and chapters 15.1, 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4.

Paragraphs 51.1 to 15.4, inclusive, of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General read:

Personal Public Service Numbers

The PPS Number is a unique client identifier used by Departments and Agencies for accessing Government Services. PPS numbers are issued by the Department of Social and Family Affairs (the Department) and up to 1991 had also been issued by the Revenue Commissioners (as the Revenue and Social Insurance number — RSI).

The Department's Central Records System (CRS) currently holds about 5.9 million records and is the core of the Department's client oriented functions. It is the source database for the new Public Service Identity (PSI) system provided for in the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002.

The Department set up the Client Identity Service (CIS) in 2000 to manage the PPS number registration system.

Issue of PPS Numbers

Table 1 gives details of PPS numbers issued in the last 4 years.

**Table 1**
Source	2001	2002	2003	2004
Newborns	56,000	71,000	63,000	69,000
Local Offices	111,000	92,000	78,000	123,000
Asylum Seekers	10,000	11,000	8,000	4,000
Other	45,000	45,000	44,000	25,000
Total	222,000	219,000	193,000	221,000

Table 2 shows a breakdown of applications in 2004 by EU and non-EU nationals.

**Table 2**
Nationality	Number
Ireland	87,000
EU States excluding Accession States	38,000
EU Accession States	58,000
Other Countries	36,000
Total	221,000

Registrations at Birth

PPS numbers now issue automatically following communication of birth registration from the General Register Office's recently developed computerised civil registration service. All major hospitals provide inputs to the system.

Local Office Applications

General applications for PPS numbers are mainly processed by 125 local and branch offices. Applications must be supported by birth certificate and/or valid photographic identity e.g. Passport or National Identity Card and evidence of residence in the State. Applicants are also required to state the reason for their application.

Staff are required to check the authenticity of supporting documents and refer doubtful cases for checking by document fraud experts. Suspect documents cannot be held if applicants insist on their return. From August 2004, local office staff were instructed to refuse applications only where there was proof of identity fraud. A tolerance is allowed where some non-nationals may not be able to produce certain documents.

Asylum Seekers

PPS number applications by asylum seekers who have obtained identity cards from the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner are processed by a dedicated unit in liaison with that office.

Other Applications

Community Welfare Officers employed by Health Boards allocate PPS numbers to applicants for Supplementary Welfare Allowance who do not have a PPS number.

The Pension Services Office allocates PPS numbers to pension applicants who have not previously got a PPS number, mostly non-resident cases with pension entitlements in Ireland including pre-1953 cases.

PPS numbers are allocated by individual scheme units to persons who make application for a welfare scheme but who are not previously registered.

Client Identity Service also issues PPS numbers, mainly to solicitors in respect of estate cases.

Recent Reviews of the CRS System

Reviews and audits have been carried out on the system for processing and registering applications for PPS numbers in the past five years as follows

·Internal Evaluation of Identity Fraud — 2000

·Internal Audit Review — 2003

·Southern Region Identity Project — 2004

·External Data Quality Audit — 2004.

The reviews indicated that

System Issues

·More than one PPS number could be allocated to a client when processing was completed on the same day by different members of staff. In a test 41 duplicates were found in one month.

·The system name check facility to establish that a PPS number had not already been allocated to the client was not applied to non-nationals because the system did not recognise foreign names.

·Fraudulently obtained PPS numbers could not be deleted, flagged or rendered unusable.

Processing Issues

·32,000 PRSI contribution records forwarded by Revenue could not be traced.

·Source documents were not being requested or verified where exceptional or one-off applications e.g. estate cases, were being made. There were no checks on further activity in these cases.

·Key fields on client records were not always completed or accurate. An external audit of data consistency and completeness in 2004 found an overall level of quality of 88%. 10,000 invalid PPS numbers needed to be corrected or purged and 35,000 — 50,000 cases needed address amendments.

·Acceptance of asylum seekers' identity cards conflicted with the rigid demands made of other applicants.

Consequences

·Many bogus applicants already had PPS numbers and frequently were asylum seekers in receipt of state benefits.

·The use of bogus PPS numbers was giving their holders entitlements to welfare benefits.

·The internal evaluation in 2000 tested a random sample of 1,593 PPS numbers issued to purported EU applicants (deemed high risk). 10% of these turned out to have been fraudulently obtained. There was also a significant number of ‘suspicious' other cases.

·The internal evaluation in 2000 estimated losses at €25 million to €50 million per annum.

·PPS numbers could be used to help open bank accounts, obtain credit cards etc. The system might be discredited.

·A Client Identity Service Control (CIS Control) investigation into employers' recruitment practices confirmed that considerable numbers of PPS numbers had been obtained on foot of false documentation or were being used by persons to whom they did not belong.

·The work permit system was being circumvented by identity fraud.

Review Recommendations

Key recommendations made arising from these reviews were to

·Implement procedures for notifying and flagging misused numbers.

·Notify employers of the requirements for employing non-nationals.

·Establish a multi-agency task force to recommend action on identity fraud.

How these findings were addressed by the Department

The main actions taken by the Department in response to these findings were to

·Put in place a training programme to create an awareness of identity fraud and control needs.

·Introduce more rigorous processing at public counters.

·Install ultra-violet scanning equipment.

·Ask suspect applicants to apply in the language of their declared nationality.

·Refer suspect cases to CIS Control for investigation.

In 2003, the Department established a liaison with the Garda National Immigration Bureau. This liaison has resulted in estimated monthly savings of approximately €300,000 mainly from asylum seekers involved in identity and welfare fraud.

Revenue Internal Audit — 2004

An internal audit carried out by the Revenue Internal Audit Unit confirmed that improperly obtained PPS numbers were used to access State services and benefits and that non-nationals, in particular, presented a serious risk. The absence of tax record details on such persons was a problem. It also found that passports and driving licences could no longer be relied on as means of identity. Checks over a 2-week period at the public counter of the Central Revenue Information Office cast doubts on the validity of the identity of 70 callers who presented a PPS number at the counter. Revenue Internal Audit was of the view that there was a low level of awareness of identity fraud issues and related abuses among Revenue staff.

The audit unit recommended formalising communications with the Department to ensure appropriate action is taken by Revenue in identity fraud cases. It also recommended a working group to counter the risks to Revenue posed by such fraud.

Client Identity Service Control (CIS Control)

Referral Activity

The Department's CIS Control monitors identity fraud issues, assists in drawing up procedures for processing applications, investigates suspect documents and provides document recognition training to Local Offices. Table 3 provides details of Local Office referrals to CIS Control for 2002 to 2004.

Table 3
Year	2002	2003	2004
Number of referrals	635	466	752
Number of referrals found fraudulent	204	142	324
Arrests	12	44	69

An analysis of the fraudulent cases for 2004 shows that 303 of the applications were from non-nationals who presented false/forged documents purporting to be from EU States, 20 were other non-national documents and 1 was Irish documentation.

Monitoring Activity

CIS Control monitors the issue of PPS numbers in Local/Branch offices for unusual trends, mainly the targeting of offices by human traffickers.

·An examination of the PPS Number application process at a Branch Office revealed extensive non-compliance with Departmental procedures between 2001 and 2003.

·Branch Office Inspections carried out in 2004 revealed risk patterns in 4 Branch Offices during 2004. 95 bogus applications were found at 3 offices with a smaller number in the other.

·An inspection of ‘hijacked' PPS numbers at an employment agency, found 35 cases where false/forged documentation had been supplied in support of applications for employment. A data matching exercise with the agency's records revealed up to 20 cases of double identity where Supplementary Welfare Allowance was claimed under one of the identities.

·314 compromised PPS numbers were identified in extended tests, including cases claiming welfare under an alternative PPS Number.

Audit Assessment

My review of the processing and control systems in place indicates that the detection of identity fraud and the prevention of issue of PPS numbers to bogus applicants or the issue of duplicate PPS numbers to persons already in possession of a valid PPS number is very much dependent on the vigilance of counter staff. It is vitally important that these staff have sufficient back up available to them and the support of a tried and tested quality assurance system.

The completeness and accuracy of data on CRS is vital to ensure the reliability of client identification available to the Department. This is even more crucial since the database is to be the foundation of the proposed new Public Service Identity System. It is clear that the principle of a unique identifying number for each client is fundamental to the success of that project. At the same time the Department's welfare and social insurance schemes, and the Revenue Commissioners' tax collection systems are dependent on the integrity of the data underpinning the CRS.

My review of the operation of the CIS Control unit found that

·Investigation work has been beneficial in identifying bogus registrations.

·The Unit is also beneficial in detecting abuses of the welfare system.

·There are difficulties in establishing the real identities of some suspect cases.

·There is need for adequate resources to ensure bogus cases are promptly dealt with.

·There is need for feedback on cases referred to other sections and agencies for follow up.

·There is also need for a structured approach to tackling identity fraud among potentially affected agencies.

In the light of the importance of the system for allocating PPS numbers, I sought the Accounting Officer's views on the findings of my examination.

Accounting Officer's Response

The Accounting Officer agreed that the history of the issuance of RSI/PPS numbers reveals considerable shortcomings. As a general comment, he was of the view that the position overall was better than the audit assessment appeared to indicate. As well as putting in place and continuously improving operational structures, the Department had taken a strategic approach to improving the functions of the PPS number and this had led to the development of a number of strategic projects.

When the Department took over the PPS number registration process in 2000, it was recognised from the outset that the CRS database had been in existence from 1979. It was not at that time envisaged that the RSI Number (now the PPS Number) and related data would be used for the purpose of supporting all public services. His Department recognised that the system required improvement. An external audit, commissioned by the Department in 1996 found that, where the Department held data, it tended to be accurate but did note areas where data was incomplete. He is of the view that considerable improvement in the integrity of the data has been achieved. This is evidenced by improvements shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Trends in Data Quality 1998 to 2004
Date	January 1998	February 2002	February 2004	December 2004
Total Clients	5,336,795	4,823,257	5,187,193	5,298,078
With Date of Birth	86.89%	94.03%	94.83%	95.3%
With a Verified Date of Birth	34%	64%	68%	70.0%
Mother’s Birth Surname	42%	65%	68.3%	70.0%

The CIS policy on data cleanup has been that direct contact with the client has not been considered necessary, efficient or optimal from the client service perspective when other areas of the Department are already in contact. However, CIS is examining situations where a number of agencies have had difficulty establishing the correct data for a client and is considering contacting the client in these instances.

He said that significant measures have been and are being taken to deal with both the results of the historical shortcomings and with future challenges in this area. He pointed out that, while the Department has taken a lead in implementing several measures of importance within the overall ‘eGovernment' area, the topic cannot be considered solely as being one within its area of responsibility. Proposals in connection with the development of a framework for a public service card, known as the Standard Authentication Framework Environment or SAFE, and based on the PPS number, are currently being worked on under the aegis of an interdepartmental group and, associated with this, proposals are being developed for a national identity management and privacy protection policy. It is expected that this programme of work will be completed within the next 18 months.

Departmental Role

It is the Department's view that its responsibilities centres around the registration process, leading to the allocation of a PPS Number, and subsequent authentication and eligibility checking in respect of its own services. While the Department is aware of the value of possession of the PPS Number it would not be practicable for the Department to pursue the eligibility aspect of the use of the PPS Number for all these other users' purposes or to pursue written confirmation of their clients' reason for obtaining the PPS number.

He stated that the Department supports other agencies in their establishment and use of the PPS Number. Agencies have been issued with a Code of Practice on the PPS Number, which lists the documents that can link the PPS Number to the individual. Likewise, an information leaflet on the PPS number also addresses this. Employers have been advised by Revenue to seek back up confirmation that the quoted PPS Number belongs to the individual using it.

Identity Fraud

The Department has always been aware of identity fraud in the context of persons claiming social welfare benefits. There are legitimate concerns about ‘identity fraud' and a need for a robust control system to address these concerns. The Department has an ongoing operational strategy under development for furtherimprovement in identity fraud controls. Since 2000, considerable progress has been made in advancing and improving this area of work although there is, undoubtedly, scope for further improvement. Allocation of the PPS Number as an identity reference number needs to focus on the production of sufficient evidence to establish the uniqueness and integrity of the identity. Procedures at registration, and supporting structures e.g. CIS Control, have concentrated on supporting the detection of bogus identities at registration.

The Accounting Officer pointed out that Internal Evaluation of Identity Fraud in 2000, which estimated potential losses from identity fraud of between €25 million to €50 million, was carried out soon after the Department had taken sole control of the registration process. The estimate was highly speculative and based on the possibility of fraudulent claiming rather than on actual experience.

Operational Structures

He informed me that the Department is satisfied that counter staff in local offices are fully competent to perform the PPS number registration function with appropriate back-up services and this is the approach which is being taken.

A planned reduction of the number of offices allocating PPS Numbers to one per county will allow for increased co-ordination and the dissemination of document expertise. CIS Control will be able to support an increased co-ordination and training role. It is not proposed that a back office function will be established, as this would not support the face-to-face process.

The Department also plans to incorporate its inspectorate more closely in this work, in order to increase its focus on the issue of hijacked and bogus identities, as well as improving the support to local offices at registration.

The Accounting Officer indicated that major improvement plans included flagging temporary and inactive PPS numbers, highlighting numbers requiring an identity recheck and the possible publication of suspect numbers. In this regard the Department is engaged in a process of flagging inactive or dormant records and to date 600,000 have been flagged.

Legal advice has been obtained which states that the Department can retain documentation for checking and the introduction of a specific supportive legislative provision is also under consideration.

The Department plans to remove the PPS number allocation function from Branch offices and negotiations have already commenced on this.

In relation to "recent arrivals in the country", the Department has data sharing arrangements with the Garda National Immigration Bureau and Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner for increased cross-departmental co-operation on identity procedures for those with limited identity documentation. The Department considered an Internal Audit recommendation for an alternative numbering system for asylum seekers but rejected the recommendation as being contrary to the policy of a single unique identifier for all public services.

Fraud and Error Surveys/Identity checks

Since 2004, a client identity check has been included as an integral part of the fraud and error survey process. Inspectors are asked specifically to confirm identity as part of their investigations. Surveys have been undertaken and completed on the Child Benefit and Family Income Supplement Schemes, with resulting fraud and error rates of 2.3% and 3.2% respectively. Identity was not a significant issue for either of these schemes. A survey on the Disability Allowance scheme, which commenced in early 2005, is almost completed; the initial indications are that identity is also not a significant issue for this scheme.

15.1 Agency Services — Encashments

The Department of Social and Family Affairs makes payments to its customers by means of cheques, electronic fund transfers (EFT), personalised payable orders (PPOs), post drafts and postal vouchers. Up to 59 million payment instruments are issued annually.

Charges to the accounting records of the Department are based on statements of encashment received from An Post and on payment issue records from the bank. A fundamental control in the preparation of the financial statements is the reconciliation of An Post/Bank statements to the accounting records involving the matching of payments issued to encashments. A number of matters were identified on audit as follows

An Post

·The service agreement with An Post requires it to supply to the Minister — before the 31st day of March in each year — statements, certified by An Post's statutory auditors, of the volume and value of transactions processed by it in the preceding year. None have been provided in recent years.

·Over a period of three and a half years, An Post claimed almost €2 million in respect of encashment documentation categorised as ‘Lost in Transit' but no details were provided.

·The matching of the Department's record of issues to claims for their encashment by An Post revealed unreconciled items totalling in excess of €800,000. The types of unreconciled items were; no apparent issue; wrong amount; cashed after it had already been cashed; cashed after stopped. An Post applied stop payment notifications in only 40% of cases.

·The full value of An Post claims including items in dispute was charged to the accounting records as scheme expenditure.

Banks

The reconciliation of bank balances to the accounting records for old Punt accounts and recently opened euro accounts revealed unexplained differences. The differences on four of the Punt accounts were charged to scheme expenditure. The Department could not provide listings of outstanding cheques.

I sought the views of the Accounting Officer on these matters.

Accounting Officer's Response

Payment and Agency Reconciliation Project

The Accounting Officer informed me that work on a new Payment and Agency Reconciliation Project (PARP) commenced in autumn 2002 following a detailed internal review which highlighted a number of issues including difficulties in reconciling some of the Department's bank and An Post accounts.

The objective of PARP is to provide an integrated reconciliation solution, which will reconcile all the Department's payment instruments and the associated agency accounts. The systems to be replaced have been in operation since 1986 and are not linked to the Department's main financial recording system. The project is now proceeding to tender and implementation stages. It is envisaged that a new system will be in place by end 2007.

An Post

Reconciliation of Claims

The Accounting Officer stated that An Post provides the Department with monthly claims. The procedures used to reconcile these claims have been in existence since the introduction of the service agreement with An Post.

The Department has identified some changes that are necessary to the existing accounting arrangements and is consulting with An Post with a view to having these changes effected.

While the majority of the encashments reported by An Post can be verified, there are always small numbers of exceptions. An Post is notified of these exceptions. The current systems and accounting arrangements do not provide the Department with an independent means of verifying whether these exceptions have been reflected in amendments to the claims submitted to it by An Post.

The Department is also pursuing the introduction of new procedures to facilitate the handling of exceptions and the introduction of suspense accounts pending resolution of exceptions.

An Post has, to date, declined to make any changes to the current arrangements as its accounting systems cannot accommodate the changes proposed because of the level of detail required by the Department. The Department's proposals would require fundamental changes to An Post's systems and it is not in a position to make these changes.

The Accounting Officer said that it may not be possible to effect any change in the Department — An Post arrangements until a new service agreement comes into force. The Department is however reviewing accounting procedures for the An Post account, to determine if some changes to the existing arrangements can be effected independently of An Post.

Certified Statements

As regards the provision of certified statements, the Accounting Officer confirmed that An Post has not supplied certified statements for a number of years. It was not possible to have this certification shortcoming rectified in time for the 2003 Annual Statement. For 2004, An Post was formally notified in January 2005 that a statement certified by their Statutory Auditors would be required. This certification was to be provided before 31 March 2005, but has not been received to date.

‘Lost in Transit' Claims

The Accounting Officer informed me that claims in respect of lost encashment documentation for the period November 2000 to June 2004 arose when this documentation failed to turn up at An Post processing offices. A particular problem related to some of the 467 non-automated post offices.

Following a review by the Department's Internal Audit, An Post was requested in January 2005 to

·Consider the introduction of more secure and accountable arrangements to handle and manage encashment documentation.

·Submit claims to the Department in respect of lost documentation from post offices in a more timely fashion.

Claims made by An Post for post offices that make high value and recurring ‘lost in transit' claims were also of concern to the Department.

The Department has asked An Post

·For details of the actions taken to investigate high value and recurring claims.

·To outline measures introduced to prevent further repeat claims for lost documentation.

Reconciliation Exceptions

The Accounting Officer outlined the position in relation to each type of personalised payable order exception referred to

No Apparent Issue

These occur where there is an encashment but no corresponding issue. An Post has rejected claims made by the Department for these and has consistently maintained that they were valid encashments but, arise due to scanning errors or errors in the Department's issue records.

In January 2005, An Post disputed a claim for €167,000 made by the Department for these on the basis that they arose because of printing errors. The Department has raised the issue of print quality with its printers. The rate of exception in this instance is consistent with the print error rate of 0.003% and 0.006% considered by the printers as inevitable.

The Department is currently reviewing its options in relation to these cases. The Department may insist that An Post recovers all the relevant vouchers to physically confirm they are valid encashments. This would however incur additional costs for both the Department and An Post.

It may pursue other options to provide a better value for money solution.

Wrong amount cashed

Where the encashment amount differs from the issue amount An Post has undertaken to reimburse the Department.

Cashed after Cashed

This category arises where a payment item is cashed twice in error by the post office. An Post has not accepted this claim category and has not reimbursed the Department to date.

Wrong Amount and Cashed after Cashed claims for the period 2001 (part) — 2004 amounting to €631,542 were notified to An Post in April 2004 and January 2005.

Cashed after stopped

These cases arise when the Department requests An Post not to cash a voucher (i.e. place a stop on it) but the voucher is still paid by the post office.

The Department's systems automatically refer such cases for investigation to line sections. An Post is billed for overpayments arising due to post office error. Otherwise the matter is referred to the Department's Debt Management Section for follow-up recovery of the overpayment.

In 2004, approximately 4,250 cases were investigated by the line sections. Refunds were sought from An Post in 67 instances. An Post refunded €31,000 in respect of 47 cases.

Banks

The Accounting Officer informed me that the reconciliation differences with the banks have arisen as a result of the complex nature of current reconciliation processes.

Reconciliations were finalised on four Punt Accounts in August 2003. Any remaining balances on the bank statements were transferred to the parallel EURO bank accounts. Unreconciled balances, which relate mainly to unmatched cheque payments, were re-charged to scheme expenditure.

In parallel with the PARP project, considerable work has taken place to resolve unreconciled differences. Progress has been achieved and appropriate adjustments reflected in the accounts. Work continues to resolve the remaining unreconciled amounts. The Accounting Officer informed me that at the end of the process, Department of Finance sanction may be sought to write off or otherwise resolve any remaining unreconciled amounts.

A detailed report of outstanding cheques is not currently available. Steps have been taken to address this particular concern and it is expected that listings will be available for the audit of the 2004 Social Insurance Fund financial statements.

15.2 Overpayments

The Department of Social and Family Affairs administers some 50 welfare schemes paid through Vote 38 and the Social Insurance Fund. Expenditure on assistance and insurance schemes was €5.82bn and €5.08bn respectively in 2004.

Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 outline overall expenditure on various schemes over the period 2000 to 2004, and for the same period, the amounts recorded as overpayments, the amounts of overpayments attributed to fraud or suspected fraud and the Department's cumulative record of recovery since 2000.

Table 5. Scheme Expenditure
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	€m	€m	€m	€m	€m
Social Insurance	2,993	3,517	4,198	4,649	5,081
Social Assistance	3,425	3,983	4,940	5,460	5,821
Total	6,418	7,500	9,138	10,109	10,902

Table 6. Number and Amount of overpayments recorded for recovery (Numbers shown in brackets)
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	€m	€m	€m	€m	€m
Social Insurance	6.39 (15,252)	6.79 (15,786)	9.72 (23,723)	10.60 (26,174)	12.04 (26,131)
Social Assistance	20.59 (18,110)	19.26 (14,274)	19.41 (15,084)	28.77 (17,459)	44.23 (20,000)
Total	26.98 (33,362)	26.05 (30,060)	29.13 (38,807)	39.37 (43,633)	56.27 (46,131)

The increase in the value of Social Assistance overpayments recorded in 2004 was mainly attributable to the specific targeting in that year by the Department's Earnings Review Unit of persons in receipt of Unmarried Lone Parent and One Parent Family payments. This work had commenced in 2003. See also Table 7 below:

Table 7. Number and Amount of overpayments attributed to fraud or suspected fraud (Numbers shown in brackets)
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	€m	€m	€m	€m	€m
Social Insurance	3.39 (5,159)	3.27 (5,321)	4.43 (8,089)	5.00 (9,567)	6.19 (10,723)
Social Assistance	10.89 (7,466)	7.73 (5,350)	7.36 (5,696)	8.73 (7,114)	12.46 (8,435)
Total	14.28 (12,625)	11.00 (10,671)	11.79 (13,785)	13.73 (16,681)	18.65 (19,158)

The amount of overpayments attributed to fraud or suspected fraud compared to total overpayments since 2000 is summarised inFigure 1.

Figure 1

The Department's record of recovery of overpayments during the period 2000 to 2004 is shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Department's record of recovery of overpayments 2000 to 2004
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	€’000	€’000	€’000	€’000	€’000
Overpayments not disposed of at 1 January	60,581	64,374	65,452	70,621	85,953
Overpayments recorded for recovery	26,982	26,049	29,130	39,367	56,275
Less
Overpayments recorded in prior years cancelled	(447)	(668)	(394)	(381)	(693)
Sums recovered in cash	(7,464)	(9,873)	(8,892)	(10,397)	(11,506)
Sums withheld from current entitlements	(4,999)	(5,185)	(6,734)	(6,521)	(8,332)
Net amounts written off as irrecoverable	(10,279)	(9,245)	(7,941)	(6,736)	(6,396)
Overpayments not disposed of at 31 December	64,374	65,452	70,621	85,953	115,301

Of the €115,300,783 overpayments outstanding at 31 December 2004 — €42,531,270 dates from 2004; €24,614,415 from 2003; €14,817,063 from 2002 and €33,338,035 from earlier years.

Shortcomings in the Overpayments Recording System

In my Value for Money Report on the Evaluation of Control Activity in the Department completed in November 2003 I drew attention to shortcomings in the system for recording overpayments.

In 2004, the Department's Internal Audit also drew attention to significant limitations in the reporting and recording system for overpayments. Other recent Internal Audit reports highlighted discrepancies between the records maintained by scheme payment sections and local office records and central overpayments system records.

Matters reported were

·Revised claim decisions applied from a current date simply to avoid having to raise an overpayment.

·Overpayments and recoveries not reported or substantially in arrears.

·Recovery not pursued.

·Recoveries notified to the overpayments system for which there was no corresponding overpayment record.

In the course of an audit of the Pensions Service Office carried out by my Office in February 2005, it was found that in a sample of overpayment records with ongoing recoveries some could not be traced to the overpayments system. This finding was confirmed by a matching exercise which had been independently carried out by the Department and which had identified 1,947 such records.

In view of the importance of the overpayments data as a measure of the Department's performance in relation to the proper distribution of welfare payments and the effectiveness of control activity, I asked the Accounting Officer for his observations on issues highlighted by his Department's own reviews and those arising from my audit. In particular, I invited his comments on the accuracy of the data provided by the overpayments system.

Accounting Officer's Response

The Accounting Officer informed me that the computer system for recording overpayments and recovery details currently in use in the Department has been in place since 1987. It is essentially a stand-alone system and does not interface with the Department's other computer systems. It requires a high degree of manual inputting of data, which is a time consuming process.

The manual nature of the notifications of overpayments and recoveries as well as the number of steps to be taken means there is a time lag between the overpayment/recovery occurring and the recording of the information on the system. The result is that data on the overpayments system is not always up to date. There is an increased likelihood of incomplete or incorrect data being entered on the database as well as the omission of other data from the database. The process is both slow and labour intensive.

He added that while management in Disability Benefit Unit disputed the extent to which revised decisions were applied from a current date, additional measures were put in place following the internal audit to ensure that the correct procedures were followed. As legislative provisions require that retrospective decisions should apply in all fraud cases guidelines are being prepared to emphasise this and ensure consistent application across all schemes.

As regards the problems experienced in the Pensions Service Office, he said it was unclear whether the recovery details in question had been notified for updating onto the overpayment system. These cases are now being examined in order to establish the amount recovered and whether the details have been forwarded for updating to the overpayments system. They are time consuming to deal with and to date a total of over 600 of these cases have been dealt with.

He pointed out that the effective pursuit of overpayments on a continuous basis in respect of closed claims (customers not currently in receipt of welfare) is subject in a number of instances to the resources and other exigencies that exist in local offices. In 2004, four regions undertook projects to expedite the recovery of overpayments for closed claims. The projects have been evaluated and, as a result, guidelines are currently being drafted to develop best practice in local offices to ensure that available resources are targeted effectively with particular reference to customers who have returned to employment. In addition, procedures are being drafted to include a role for the Inspectorate in the process.

He informed me of initiatives taken recently to improve the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the data on the current overpayments system

·All payment areas were reminded of their responsibilities in relation to overpayments and their recovery.

·Cases where there have been difficulties associating recoveries with the relevant overpayments were examined and as many of these as possible were entered on the overpayments system in time to be reflected in the 2004 accounts. Unresolved cases have been sent to the relevant pay area for additional details.

·The first phase of a new overpayments system is scheduled to go live early in 2006.

15.3 Prosecutions

Cases involving abuse of the system are considered with a view to taking legal proceedings. Prosecutions are taken against employers who fail to carry out their statutory obligations and persons who defraud the social welfare payments system. Prosecutions can either be by summary or indictment proceedings. Civil proceedings are taken to facilitate the recovery of scheme overpayments or the collection of PRSI arrears. Such cases are only taken where it has been established that the debtor has sufficient means to discharge the debt.

During 2004, 476 criminal cases (2003 — 355 cases) were forwarded to the Chief State Solicitor's Office for prosecution as shown inTable 9.

Table 9. Criminal cases forwarded to the Chief State Solicitor
	2004	2003
Unemployment Assistance	191	146
Unemployment Benefit	226	158
Disability Benefit	9	29
One Parent Family Payments	23	1
Other Schemes Offences	10	7
Committed by Employers	17	14
Total	476	355

A total of 259 criminal prosecutions (2003 — 186 prosecutions) involving social welfare recipients were finalised in court in 2004. The total amount of overpayments assessed in these cases of persons who attempted to or obtained benefits/assistance fraudulently was €1,116,492 (2003 — €1,007,332). The results of these 259 court cases and the penalties imposed are given in Table 10.

Table 10. Results of Court Cases involving Social Welfare Recipients
	Fines Imposed	Community Service	Imprisoned	Probation Act	Proven. No Penalty	Adjourned/ Liberty to Re-enter	Bound to peace
Unemployment Assistance	63	2	21	21	8	7	3
Unemployment Benefit	67	1	12	17	6	—	4
Disability Benefit	12	—	2	5	1	—	—
One Parent Family payments	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Other Schemes	2	—	1	—	3	—	—
Total	144	3	36	43	18	8	7

Table 11. Civil cases sent to the Chief State Solicitor's Office
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total
To CSSO	6	14	11	21	16	68
Finalised	1	5	1	2	2	11
Pending	5	9	10	19	14	57

Mr. John Purcell

Chapter 15.1 examines the way PPS numbers are issued and the relationship with identity fraud and the claiming of social welfare benefits. While there have been a number of positive developments in recent times like the automatic link with the computerised civil registration system, the change in the nature of the population consequent on the booming economy and the expansion of the EU has thrown up control risks of a kind and scale not previously encountered. Various reviews since 2000 have brought to light difficulties in preventing the use of PPS numbers for fraudulent purposes. Apart from being used to perpetrate social welfare fraud, bogus PPS numbers can also be used to circumvent the work permit system and could possibly facilitate the opening of bank accounts.

The Department has progressively been introducing counter measures through more rigorous checking of applications at the first point of contact, including installing ultraviolet scanning equipment to check the authenticity of supporting documentation and setting up a dedicated unit, which I think is called the client identity service control, to monitor activity in this area. There is evidence to suggest that the unit's work is meeting with some success judging by the increasing number of fraudulent cases being detected and the number of arrests being made for identity fraud. The Department is also moving to restrict the number of offices at which PPS numbers can be issued. Furthermore I understand that a fraud and error survey on PPS numbers is being undertaken and the results should help to inform the Department's approach to the prevention and detection of identity fraud.

As we move forward into an e-government environment the PPS number assumes an even greater importance because it will be used as the basis for the delivery of a range of public services to the people. With the Department of Finance, the Department of Social and Family Affairs has taken a lead role in developing a standard authentication framework environment in which the public service identity card can be implemented. It is, therefore, vital that the core identifying data that underpins such a system are complete and accurate. In this connection, the Department has a major task on hand in trying to validate the data on its own central records system having regard to duplicate, dormant and incomplete records. Again, there have been improvements in the quality of the data in the central records database in recent years but more needs to be done to overcome historical shortcomings in the maintenance of those records and to ensure the optimum return from the electronic delivery of public services.

Chapter 15.2 records the results of an examination carried out by my staff of the departmental controls over the encashment services provided by An Post and the banks. The provision of the services is a major operation. For example, in 2003 some 59 million payment instruments were issued. Of those, 41 million passed through An Post in the form of personalised payable orders and postal drafts, with 18 million or so going through the banks in the form of cheques or electronic funds transfers.

Taking An Post first, the audit found that An Post was claiming, and in many cases being paid, for items that had not been matched against authorised issues. The type of item included payment for cases where the cashed order or draft was not available. These were categorised as "lost in transit cases" and over a three and a half year period amounted to €2 million. Another category was payment by An Post despite notification to stop payment on the order. I recognise that in a system dealing with such volumes there is always bound to be a proportion of items that do not follow the normal pattern of encashment and that it is well nigh impossible to tie things down to the last penny. However, in this case I felt that more effort could have been made by the Department and An Post to improve co-operation and reduce the exposure to a minimum. I am glad to be able to report to the committee that the Accounting Officer agreed with me and has taken action to address this problem. This has already borne fruit as I understand that new procedures introduced by An Post at the behest of the Department have dramatically reduced the levels of lost documentation. Improvements have also been brought about in some of the other problem areas referred to in the chapter.

Going on to the banks, for some years the Department has experienced difficulty in reconciling the bank accounts through which social welfare payments are made and this has had knock-on effects for our audit. As a consequence, we have corresponded with the Department in the matter on a number of occasions in recent years. The systems currently in use date back to 1986 and while in general they have served the Department well, other developments in the meantime pointed to the need for a fully integrated system of bank and agency reconciliations. The Department has responded to this challenge by embarking on a major IT project to replace the existing system. I understand it expects to have the new system in place by the end of 2007.

Chapter 15.3 comprises two elements. The first presents standard information on the level of overpayment on social assistance and insurance schemes and how much of it is attributable to fraud or suspected fraud and the Department's performance in recovering amounts overpaid. The second element deals with continuing problems associated with the recording of overpayments and the Department's efforts to improve the situation.

The main point of note in the first part of the chapter is the increase in the overall total of recorded overpayments in 2004 — up from €39 million in the previous year to €56 million. The increase in detected overpayments is mainly down to good work on the part of the Department's earnings review unit, which specifically targeted persons in receipt of unmarried, lone parent and one-parent family payments. These categories had previously been identified as high risk by a fraud and error survey carried out by the Department.

In regard to the shortcomings in the system for recording overpayments, I am pleased to report that there is light at the end of the tunnel. Apart from operational improvements being implemented and an enhanced IT system which will be coming on stream, the Department has engaged consultants to review its strategy and policies on overpayments and debt management. This includes conducting research into best practice in other jurisdictions and comparable organisations, and applying it as appropriate.

Chapter 15.4 outlines the extent of the Department's prosecution activity in 2004 and the outcome of the ensuing court proceedings. Members will see that the number of criminal cases forwarded to the Chief State Solicitor's office increased to 476 in the year and convictions secured in the court were also up on previous years. It is to the Department's credit that prosecution action is invariably successful. In a relatively small number of cases, civil proceedings are taken to recover material overpayments, where it has been established that the recalcitrant debtor has sufficient means to discharge the debt.

There is one small change in my opening statement from the one circulated. I will draw members' attention to it when I reach the section.

Perhaps I can begin with some general comments on the year under discussion. In 2004, overall social welfare expenditure was €11.3 billion, of which €6 billion came through the Exchequer and €5.3 billion came through the social insurance fund. Just under a million people received weekly social welfare payments in that year, representing increased numbers on some of the main scheme areas accompanied by reductions in unemployment payments and some other services. The delivery of a quality service was a continuing challenge, taking account, in particular, of the growing diversity of the Department's customers, the increased complexity arising from scheme and legislative changes and pressure on resources.

A first customer charter was published in 2004. We continued to invest in the modernisation of service delivery systems, particularly involving the greater use of technology to achieve more effective and more integrated delivery of services to customers and better systems of control. In regard specifically to control, a more strategic approach to control activity began to be put in place having regard to the evaluation of the Department's control programme by the Comptroller and Auditor General, which was completed at the end of 2003. This approach included, in 2004, the introduction of a formal fraud risk management process for major schemes, putting in place a programme of fraud and error surveys, a programme of targeted control initiatives, work on the development of better performance indicators of the effectiveness of control strategy and particular emphasis on identify fraud with a specific focus on applications for personal public service or PPS numbers.

The Comptroller and Auditor General raised in his report a number of specific issues in regard to the PPS number. The Department took over from the Revenue Commissioners in 2000 the process of allocating PPS numbers. A new functional area known as client identity services was established within the Department to manage the number and related data and to develop a control strategy around the registration process. There are, as the Comptroller and Auditor General pointed out, legitimate concerns about identity fraud and a need for robust control systems to protect the integrity of the number. A key focus in this regard has to be on the PPSN allocation process itself in order to ensure that procedures for the establishment of identity are robust and that staff are provided with high quality training and backup support and equipment to detect bogus identities where they are used as part of the registration process.

Among the steps that the Department has already put in place are the setting up of client identity services to manage the PPS number; the putting in place of a face-to-face process for issuing the numbers at local offices and the introduction of detailed procedures and rigorous standards for PPS number registrations; the setting up of a dedicated control unit to deal with identity fraud and to support the local office registration process; the delivery of an extensive training programme to staff; and a programme of work to improve the quality of the existing identity data which is held by the Department.

Further measures which are planned include reducing the number of offices allocating PPS numbers in order to focus expertise and target training, involving the Department's inspectors more directly in this work and introducing a number of technical improvements to support the overall strategy. The Department is undertaking a programme of fraud and error surveys of major schemes as part of the control strategy. An identity check on clients is now part of the programme of fraud and error surveys and identity fraud has not so far emerged as an issue in those surveys. However, in order to gauge the extent of any misuse of the PPS number, a separate fraud and error survey on the PPS number allocation process is under way and scheduled for completion by the end of April.

The PPS number is widely accepted by the public. In a recent customer survey, a high percentage, 81%, knew where to find or check for their PPS number. Its use has contributed to increased customer service efficiencies in Departments. For example, in the social welfare area, automated allocation of the PPS number from the General Register's office — birth registration data — has supported major improvements in the initiation of child benefit payments. The effective use of the number can also give major benefits from a control point of view and the strategy is to ensure that the infrastructure underlying the number is as secure and robust as possible.

The Comptroller and Auditor General has also raised a number of issues with regard to the processes for reconciliation of payments made by the Department in respect of pensions and other schemes. Effective reconciliation is, as his report states, a fundamental control in the preparation of financial statements. Approximately 56% of payment transactions for the Department are made via post offices and a number of issues have been raised with regard to those payments. As a result of the audit findings, the Department is in the process of putting new accounting procedures in place for the reconciliation of the An Post account in consultation with An Post.

On the matter of other payments, the Comptroller and Auditor General identified reconciliation difficulties with certain bank accounts operated by the Department. The accounts branch has undertaken further reconciliation work on these accounts and, as a result, there have been substantial reductions in the differences identified during the audit and this work is continuing.

The Department has put in place a payment and agency reconciliation project to establish the full reconciliation of the Department's payments and external agency accounts. Under this project existing reconciliation systems will be replaced with a totally integrated system which will have the ability to reconcile all DSFA payment instruments and the associated agency accounts. Following substantial preparatory work, a request for tender for an integrated reconciliation system is now being prepared. The objective is to have a completely new system in place before the end of 2007.

Chapter 15.3 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report deals with the subject of overpayments. Recorded overpayments were €56.27 million in 2004 as compared with some €39.4 million in 2003, which in turn represented a substantial increase in the 2002 figure of some €29.1 million. Overpayments account for approximately 0.5% of total expenditure for the year.

The increases in recorded overpayments in 2003 and 2004 were due largely, as noted by the Comptroller and Auditor General, to the work of a special project team looking at overpayments of one parent family payments, mainly involving working lone parents whose earnings had not been fully reported to the Department. This project, which ran from mid-2003 to April 2005, identified overpayments to the value of €24.1 million with regard to some 1,900 lone parent claims in payment.

There is a requirement on people in receipt of assistance payments to inform the Department of changes in earnings when they occur. The sooner they do this, the sooner the appropriate adjustments can be made to their payments. The setting up and recovery of overpayments in arrears is a more difficult process both for clients and for the Department. However, recovery of overpayments is governed by regulations which are designed to ensure that account is taken of the person's circumstances and ability to repay. These regulations were revised most recently in 2005. The Department takes a reasonable approach in this area having due regard to the requirement to protect public funds.

Overpayments are recovered either by repayments from the customer or by deductions from an ongoing social welfare payment. In 2004, some €11.5 million was recovered in cash and some €8.3 million by deduction from arrears or ongoing payments. We are putting increased emphasis on pursuing debtors who are no longer in receipt of payment and who may, for example, be in employment and therefore have greater financial resources from which to make repayment. The recovery of overpayments from current entitlements will continue, but this is inevitably a more difficult and a lengthier process because of the financial circumstances of many of those involved.

The Comptroller and Auditor General draws attention to shortcomings in the Department's systems for recording and reporting overpayments and overpayment recoveries. In this regard, we have taken steps to ensure the consistent application of the legislation on revised decisions and raising of overpayments and to improve the system of reporting and recording overpayments and recoveries made.

On the IT front, the current IT system of overpayment reporting and recording is a stand alone system which does not interface with the Department's other computer systems and requires a high degree of manual inputting of data. We are replacing the current IT overpayment system with one which will link to all of the Department's payment systems. This new system will integrate recording of overpayment data in a way that will provide a complete view of and up-to-date information on overpayments and recoveries across all schemes. The new system will be implemented as part of the overall service delivery modernisation programme on which the Department is engaged. The first phase is intended to be operational by the third quarter of 2006. At the same time we are engaged, with consultancy advice, on a review of current policies for overpayment and debt management generally with a view to optimising the level of recovery of overpayments and the efficiency of the collection process. This review will be completed in the next few months and we will then be in a position to consider what further practical changes are required in our present arrangements.

Chapter 15.4 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report addresses the issue of legal proceedings in cases of fraud and abuse of the social welfare system. Details of the numbers of cases forwarded to the Chief State Solicitor's office are given in the paragraph. As a rule the cases taken by the Department are by way of summary proceedings and decisions to prosecute are based on the amount involved and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. In 2004, of the cases finalised, fines were imposed in 160 cases ranging from €10 to some €5,000 in individual cases.

The Department can also take civil proceedings to facilitate recovery of scheme overpayments, the collection of PRSI arrears or the enforcement of maintenance recovery orders against liable relatives. Over the past five years, a total of 76 cases were sent to the Chief State Solicitor's office for the pursuit of civil proceedings and 66 cases were finalised.

That may be so, but some people are extremely concerned about it.

How many of the overpayments are deliberate? What are the concerns regarding overpayments and in which area are they made?

Mr. Hynes

In every overpayment case, a revised decision must be made by a deciding officer. If the overpayment arises because somebody deliberately withholds information or gives false information to the Department when lodging a claim, we call this a fraud overpayment. Approximately 30% of overpayments are classified in that way on an ongoing basis. It involves a person deliberately withholding information. Such cases are obviously more serious and prosecution is considered.

Mr. Purcell

Historically there was a different problem in regard to the old PRSI numbers which then became PPS numbers in many cases. They have a legacy which does not necessarily have to do with fraud. People may have forgotten their number and were given a new one but we must also deal with that.

In a time when we are talking about e-government and e-services, it is important to have such identifying numbers and the data associated with them. Their integrity is paramount. It is impossible to put a figure on the scale of the potential contingent liability on the Exchequer from the incorrect use of these numbers. To be fair to the Department, the Department of Finance and others, much work is being done under the structured authentication framework environment, SAFE, programme. That leads into a different debate on how to identify people, whether by biometrics or other personal characteristics, photographs and so on, which, in turn, leads on to identity cards, with all the attendant data protection implications. If the risk is assessed in terms of having a false PPS or public service identity number, it is being addressed. There is no complacency at departmental level about the implications in this brave new world of e-government and the delivery of services by electronic means to the taxpayer.

Chairman

Will Mr. Hynes forward the report on the fraud and error survey to the committee?

Mr. Hynes

Yes.

If people are working and can qualify for a payment while still earning up to a certain amount, as earnings change, which can happen from week to week, one frequently finds, when one investigates a case, that there has been a change of which the Department has not been aware. Technically, the payment level is incorrect. I do not have any information on the extent of error or fraud. However, the survey indicated that 29% of cases required some change in payment.

Perhaps I might return to an earlier question regarding PPS numbers issued to nationals of countries outside the EU. There is a large number of countries represented but I can give the numbers for the major ones. In 2005, there were 2,100 cases from Australia, 2,200 from Brazil, 1,700 from China, 3,400 from India, 2,100 from Nigeria, approximately 1,500 from the Philippines, 1,000 from South Africa and 3,800 from the USA. As I said, there is a large number of other countries with smaller totals.

Chairman

That gives us a good insight into the multiracial nature of our developing society.

I do not know if anyone else sees the irony in this. Construction bosses who were in breach of their pension obligations can, by utilising the High Court, have a few workers sent to Mountjoy Prison within days for staging a simple protest. The bosses never appear to pay the price for the much more serious neglect of workers' rights.

Deputy Boyle

I think the Chairman is right. It was one of the 15 or 16 proposed cuts at the time. Each cut carried a price tag. It would be useful if we reacquainted ourselves with that information.

Deputy Boyle

Has it not been reported that the take-up is as low as 30% of the potential users of the scheme? Is Mr. Hynes stating that the Department budgets on the basis of having that low a take-up or on the basis of 100% take-up?

Mr. Hynes

Our budget is based on what we spent in the previous year. This issue has been ongoing since the family income supplement scheme was introduced in 1984. Our estimates for 2006 will be based on what we expended in 2004 and 2005.

Deputy Boyle

If the information campaign upon which the Department is about to embark is successful, a Supplementary Estimate would be needed.

Mr. Hynes

That is possible. If there is a significant surge in applications and a sizeable increase in expenditure, that is how we would have to deal with it. However, it is a demand-led scheme so if there is a latent demand which must be met, we must meet it because people have legal entitlements.

Chairman

Given the briefing from the Comptroller and Auditor General's office, I understand there are 5.9 million numbers but that 900,000 are inactive. The Department's explanations regarding a woman having her husband's number with a W at the end and persons who are deceased having extant numbers must relate to these 900,000 inactive numbers. However, the Department will need to explain further why there are 5 million active numbers compared to a population base of approximately 4 million.

Ms Murphy

The database has been in existence since 1979. As the Secretary General stated, we do not delete records when individuals become deceased. Neither would we have information on people who have been in the country but who have since left. We mark records we believe to be dormant or inactive and it is these which bring the overall figure on the database to 5.9 million.

Chairman

Mr. Purcell

Only €60,000 worth of lost in transit cases occurred in the first six months of 2005 and this improvement came about once the Department began to play hardball with An Post. This shows that proactive management of the services can have an effect.

Deputy Curran referred to repeat offenders. We carried out a report, which was referred to in passing by the Accounting Officer, on the control activity of the Department. We found that 12% of those who committed fraud would reoffend at a later date.

Deputy Burton asked about the incidence of cohabitation and the extent to which this would affect one-parent family benefit claims. A survey carried out by the Department of Social and Family Affairs in 2002 estimated that when the rate of payment had to be changed, 22% of those changes related to cases of cohabitation or marriage where the benefit would reduce to zero. In other words, one in five of those cases where change was required arose by reason of cohabitation or marriage. This information may be useful to the Deputies who asked these questions.

Chairman

We will ask representatives of the Department to come before the committee again to discuss the audited accounts of the social insurance fund. For this reason, we will not note the Vote today but keep it open. I propose that we dispose of chapters 15.1 to 15.4, inclusive. Is that agreed? Agreed.

The agenda for the next meeting is the 2004 annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts, National Treasury Management Agency — chapter 16.1, national debt, and chapter 16.2, savings bank fund; the National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission accounts 2004 and the Pensions Board accounts 2004.

The witnesses withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 2.10 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Thursday, 9 March 2006.

COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate - Thursday, 2 Mar 2006

Chapter 15.4 — Prosecutions.

Mr. John Hynes

Mr. Dermot Quigley

Mr. John Purcell

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Ms Patricia Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Ms Murphy

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

Mr. Hynes

COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate -
Thursday, 2 Mar 2006