AN AMENDMENT.

I sent in notice to you to say that I propose to move an amendment to this resolution that the Dáil approves of the action the Government has taken and is taking to assert and vindicate the authority of Parliament. The amendment I want to move to that resolution is:—

"That the resolution be and is hereby amended by the addition of the following words:—

"But regrets, in view of the grave economic perils that confront the nation alike in matters industrial and agricultural, in matters of credit and local government, and in every department of the national life, and especially in view of the problem of unemployment, which is at the root of much of the present discontent, that the President should not, on behalf of the Ministry, have outlined a definite constructive policy which it could commend to the earnest and instant attention of this Dáil."

I propose now to move that amendment to the resolution. The resolution itself is one that I imagine the terms of which are such that there are very few in this Dáil who would not support it. The trouble is not, to my mind, what the resolution says, but what it does not say. The speeches which we have just heard so eloquently by the Proposer and Seconder of this resolution I had hoped we would not have heard in this Dáil, because they smack too much of matters which we had hoped had been closed, matters pertaining to the last Dáil. That is equally true of a great deal said by the President and by the Minister of Home Affairs. We had a good deal of discussion as to whether people had a right to do wrong and had not a right to do wrong, and Mr. Hogan went over the ground which had been carefully covered before. These matters, which had been finally settled by the electorate, were matters before previous Dáils, and all these matters might very well have been allowed to rest where they had been placed by the decision of the electorate. Nor are we very deeply concerned with other matters we have heard so much of in the past. I don't think it is very much to the benefit of this nation to hear what one man says to another in a cab, and whatever Robert Barton may or may not have said in that cab, we know that he is the man who put his signature to a bond and repudiated it afterwards, and he might be left with that reputation before history. I respectfully suggest that the speeches which were made might be suitable at a hustings, but not in a Parliament. What we have to do here is to do some definite constructive work as the country is suffering from economic distress arising out of certain conditions, and not from the Treaty at all. I think this Document might be left in the atmosphere of history, so that we might be free to move on to new work. The points, I think, that do affect us are closely to the point at which the President's statement of policy might truly be stated to begin. The real point is the beginning of these hostilities. We heard a great deal of history with regard to these hostilities yesterday. I wish we had them all frankly in the Dáil, because I have it from the late President that on the Sunday before this Dáil was to meet an Irregular Convention was held.

On a point of order, has this anything more to do with the resolution than what Mr. Barton said to someone else in a cab?

We had a reference to the Convention in March. I am referring to the second Convention in June. At the second Convention a decision was taken to open hostilities with war upon the English forces in this country before the Dáil would meet. It was in furtherance of the Ultimatum sent to the English Government of that decision that Ferguson's garage was raided. There was nothing except the decision to open hostilities. The only reason that I mention that matter now here is this. A great deal of the unrest in the country is being charged to the fact that the Government irregularly opened hostilities. I wish it to be known that I am in entire support of the Government in the action which has been taken by them in this matter. But I am so far in agreement with the criticism that has been made, that we now want to have some definite information as to what this Country is going to do for the future. I am sorry that we have not the Debates of yesterday available, and I hope I quote the President correctly, and if I don't, he will put me right. He stated it was obviously impossible to undertake constructive work until hostilities end. The Minister for Home Affairs went on further to say it was impossible to deal with unemployment because war made unemployment. I would like to remind him while it is perfectly true that war makes unemployment, it is also true that unemployment makes war, and a great deal of the hostilities now raging in different parts of the Country are due, purely and simply, to the fact that there are men without work and that men are hungry.

They do not want work.

The Minister for Local Government says they do not want work. I think it is quite possible some of them don't want work, but I am perfectly convinced the majority of them, if they were provided with work, would work, and they would not be amongst the ranks of the Irregulars to-day.

The Deputy says it is rot. We have a kind of opinion that this Irregularism that is spreading in Ireland is a symptom that is peculiar to Ireland. It is not peculiar to Ireland. It has been the result after every war in every country, and in every country it has been due to the fact that men have not been able to get the employment they desire. It was so quite recently in Belfast. A great deal of the peace that has come has simply come because there is greater employment available for the citizens of Belfast. The unrest was caused by unemployment, and by causing employment that unrest was dispersed. I suggest to this Dáil we have got into a position in this country where we are chasing in a vicious circle. There is unemployment, and it has created Irregularism. It is not merely that people are fighting for or against a Republic, or people are fighting for or against Document No. 2. Such issues have been cleared, but they are fighting at the present moment because if a nation has once got into a position after war that its citizens are accustomed to the use of arms, and that is followed by a period of unemployment, you at once get these arms used for an irregular purpose. It was so in other countries; it is so in this country. And because that situation is created, what is the result? The Government takes action; it is necessary the Government should take action. No one is questioning that for one moment. The immediate result is in the course of these hostilities unemployment itself has increased, and inasmuch as that itself had increased, irregularism has gone on increasing, and so this country is landed in the position that by dealing directly with the effect we are automatically increasing the cause. It is not until the Dáil decides to deal directly with the cause as well as with the effect that we will be able to diminish unemployment and so ultimately be able to control irregularism. The position at the present moment is as I have put it down in the terms of this amendment. In the matter of industry there is increasing unemployment every month. In the matter of Agriculture there is also increasing unemployment. There is not only increasing unemployment, but at the present moment there is not a single agricultural product that can be produced at the price at which it can be sold, and while that continues unemployment on the agricultural field must automatically increase. And yet, with so grave a problem as this, we are not told on behalf of the Executive what is going to be done to deal with this state of affairs, or when the Board of Agriculture is to meet, as it has not met for a long time. We have nothing of this kind indicated to us. We have had an answer with regard to the position of Local Government. We have nothing suggested as to what is being done to construct and rebuild the devastated areas in this country. I am not suggesting that that rebuilding and that that reconstruction should begin to-morrow morning. What I do say is that the plans for it, and the thinking for it, might begin, not only to-morrow morning, but instantly, and it is not until we begin to deal with these plans that there will be any prospect of getting that stability in the country which, as it automatically increases, will also automatically diminish the whole field of the present fighting. All these things, ultimately, no matter what political shapes and forms they may take—all these things ultimately come back to a question of the economics of the Nation. A well-known English economist stated once there was no agency of destruction known to chemistry that was half so formidable as the T.N.T. of bad economics. And in this question before the country at the present moment, that we speak of as irregular strife, if it is going finally to be solved, it is going finally to be solved by drawing away from those who are fighting in the country to-day—those who are raising the standard of revolt,—the support they are getting from men up and down the country who have nothing else to do, because there is no work for them to do. I will be told by some that they can join the Army. Some of them have joined the Army. I wish to say nothing here against those who are fighting as National soldiers to-day, and undertaking hard work, and undertaking very considerable risk. But I will say this, and it requires to be said: there is grave need in the country at this juncture that there should be a discipline maintained in the Army—in some parts of the Army—that is not being maintained at the present moment, and will never be maintained if outside that Army there is not at least some security and stability, because conditions of unrest outside an Army naturally and automatically create conditions of unrest within the Army, and some of those who have recently been conducting the very strife I complained of in South County Dublin are men who left the Army—the National Forces—to undertake irregularism because it paid them better. And these men will never be brought to a sense of discipline until the general conditions in the country are such that those who are in the Army can be brought to a sense of discipline because outside the Army there is no irregularism to draw them from their allegiance. Then there is the question, the big question the country will sooner or later have to face, and which I believe we ought to attempt to do at once, and I had confidently expected the President would have made some reference to it, and that is the entire question of credit. Now we have learned to-day that the financial powers of this country are limited. The financial powers of this Dáil, being itself a provisional Dáil, are limited. I am not sure that we should accept any statement on that head by English Ministers. If this Dáil is sitting here as the Sovereign Parliament of Ireland and is competent to bestow on Ireland a Constitution, this Dáil is competent to undertake control over the taxation of this country—over the entire course of the finance of this country, from beginning to end. I believe one of the most immediate reasons for that, apart from the general principle that this is the Parliament of Ireland and therefore should be entrusted with all the business of this country,—there is one grave reason why this Dáil should at once turn to this matter,—and that reason is, because a great deal of the unrest at the present moment is arising from the question of currency and the value of credit. These are matters this country ought to attend to without any further delay. It is really at the bottom of the entire Postal strike that is holding up the business of the country. And so we have the position in the country to-day that, instead of the Ministry outlining a definite policy by which it proposes to decrease this unemployment, we have it putting forward a policy by which this unemployment is definitely being increased, because the Post Office strike has definitely led to the increase of unemployment. Yesterday a debate occurred in which a certain statement issued by the Government—issued by the Minister of Home Affairs in the name of the Government—was challenged. Strife is actually being created at the present moment where there should not be strife. The area of hostilities is being increased where it need not have been increased because of the statement of the Minister of Home Affairs. I would like to take this opportunity of asking—the matter was thrashed out here yesterday, and I am not going into the discussion that then reigned—I am asking this further question: On what authority was this statement issued. This Government yesterday defended its course of action. This Government a few months ago issued a Draft Constitution. In that Draft Constitution—in Article 9 of that Constitution—it conceded as part of its deliberate opinion the very right which the Minister of Home Affairs withdrew in his proclamation of Sunday night. Article 9 of the Constitution reads——

Is it the Constitution we are discussing now?

Surely this is out of order after the discussion yesterday evening. It is out of order to discuss this question now.

If that is your rule, Mr. Speaker, I understood that all the matters covered by the early part of the debate yesterday come up to-day, and in the early part of the debate yesterday the question of the unemployment created in respect of the Post Office arose also. I am now discussing the whole question of unemployment.

The question before the Dáil is the Resolution and the Amendment. Would it not be better if we got on with that, and not be giving us that which happened within the last three or four months?

I am dealing with the question of unemployment to-day, and my turning to the Post Office strike at the present moment is because the Government failed to state what it was going to do in order to cure and heal unemployment; at the moment it is actually increasing that unemployment by a course of action that I think will lead to further disorder instead of the diminishing of disorder, and will also very largely impair the prestige that is necessary for the maintenance and establishment of the Free State and the Treaty. I would like Just to tell this Dáil a thing that occurred yesterday, and which came to my knowledge last night. It is involved in the matter of the general policy of this; Government—of this Ministry. Yesterday there was a procession of Post Office workers and they met a lorry load of National Troops here in Dawson Street, and the lorry load of National Troops stood aside while the procession passed, and as the procession passed the whole procession from beginning to the end boohed the National Troops. Now the Minister of Local Government is rather amused at that. I consider that a deplorable thing to have occurred, and it is all the more deplorable when one considers that these very men who were marching in the procession would on another occasion probably have regarded the soldiers with pride as the guardians and the custodians who had helped to establish this Parliament.

My information in this matter is that there was not boohing of the National Troops, but that there was boohing of an individual passing at the time.

If we can get a discussion on this particular amendment without history or anecdotes, it would surely expedite the business of the Dáil.

Let me refer them to a letter read here yesterday by Deputy O'Higgins. He read the letter—I think it was from a prisoner in Galway Jail. This prisoner had sent out a request for what he called B.G's., and he wanted the B.G's in order to conduct a man-hunt for Bank Clerks and Railway Officials. I was very glad that letter was read here yesterday, and for this reason: it was a letter, agreed, of a criminal—a man who deserved to be treated as a criminal. But what caused him to have this peculiar desire to hunt, of all persons, Bank Clerks and Railway Officials?

Bank Managers.

The Senior Deputy for Leix will not have a great deal of sympathy with regard to this hunt for Railway Officials. But what made this man desire to follow this course? While we brand this man as a criminal, here we have a definite document, a human document. What was bringing one particular man into the forces of the Irregulars? If we can get to the bottom of one incident like this, it is of more importance than a great deal of generalities, because if we can cure the coming into being of this type of criminal, we are doing a great deal to end irregular warfare in this country. I venture to say if this man's course of action were discovered, and if his sentiments were to be probed to the bottom, you would inevitably find that he was a man who was out of employment and had received discourteous treatment from just this type of person. I am not saying this as an excuse. The Minister for Local Government still seems to be very amused.

Now, the man who is unemployed and has searched for work and has not found work, and feels the pangs of hunger, when he is brought to that pass, that man is going to undertake just the kind of action that the Irregulars up and down the country are doing. I am not standing in defence of these men. What I am urging the Government to do is to put forward a definite constructive programme by which unemployment in this country can be decreased, and when it is decreased then we will be able to bring down what is definitely a criminal revolt against the Government. It is not until then we will be able to claim that we have brought the Irregular forces to the true recognition of the political limits of their contest, and I believe if a definite constructive programme was put up before this Dáil, such as this Dáil could support, we would then have brought this warfare within a definite limit.

I second the Amendment.

I rise to support the original resolution. I do not know how you can at this stage take on the amendment in view of the limitations of the power of this Dáil. I think this matter ought to be discussed, if it is discussed at all, in the form of a separate resolution, and let it stand on its own merits, and not tack it on and make it a rather unsightly child to the original resolution. I listened yesterday to the President's address. I was not much interested in the past history which we all know, except some very small matters he mentioned, but the whole history of this transaction for the past six months is in everybody's mind. I was interested and pleased, and my people were pleased, in the stand he has indicated that the Government was prepared to take to uphold and give effect to the voice of the people. I heard addresses yesterday. Some of them came from benches on our left which rather surprised me. I listened to Deputy Davin's address very carefully, and it is the address of an honest man; a man who meant to do the most to assert the authority of the people and reconstruct this Nation as it ought to be constructed. In listening to Deputy O'Shannon I was struck by the absence in it of anything about democracy and the will of the people. He struck me as a man who had got a huge tar brush and tried to tar the Government and the Ministry as a very black institution indeed. He raised a lot of side issues about details of administration, but the main issue before the Nation at the moment is, whether the voice of the people should prevail or that guns are going to be the authority in this country. There is not one of us but wants Peace, there is not one of us that does not want reconstruction. To listen to some people yesterday and to listen to some people to-day you would imagine that the writ and the voice of this Dáil ran uninterruptedly all over the country. If some of these gentlemen were living in the South of Ireland they would know very well that it is absolutely impossible. There is no law there except the law of the gun, whichever can fire the straightest and whichever can draw the first. Peace, to my mind, must be Peace on one condition only, that is—that the majority of this Nation must be the Government of the Nation. Deputy Johnson yesterday said that we cannot get in the guns, that it would be grinding the faces of the people in the dust. If the armies of Ireland are not in the control and custody of the Government there cannot be a settlement, and you cannot have peace. It is only asking the Nation to sit on the edge of a volcano. While there are arms indiscriminately all over the country, mostly in the hands of irresponsible men, there is no use coming to talk about peace in this Assembly or anywhere else. If the arms are not surrendered it is only throwing a wet blanket over the fire to keep it smouldering. We do not want a settlement to-day this country is going to go back again to war. Let it be finished one way or the other. I say the people of the country do not want to go back to it, they want to have it ended one way or the other. Peace with arms is impossible; it is asking something from human nature that human nature is not prepared to give. We heard Mr. Figgis to-day talking about unemployment or something else being the cause of driving men into the Army because they cannot get work. The great cause of the war going on is that the present generation of arms amuse them. I think there must be another, and it may be a greater, cause, and that is well under the head of jobs; and the third cause, I should say, is this —and I speak from experience—that any amount of our young men—90 or 95 per cent. of them—do not want work at all. The trouble is ever to get them back to work. I move among the people, I belong to the people, and most of these young men have been offered jobs time and again, better jobs than those already held by them, but they have no intention of going back to them if they can. No section has any monopoly of that. It is a common thing amongst young men in the military service on one side or the other. Why, you see children around the streets with toy guns. Now, if this Assembly or Government sanction an agreement or peace settlement, where the arms of the nation are not under responsible control you will have no peace. It will be a repetition of the old story over again. I am sure Deputy O'Shannon did not mean to strike the death-knell of democracy; but I was surprised that he did not encourage a demand that the will of the people shall prevail. That is the cardinal principle of democracy. Without it the sheet-anchor, the will of the people, will be gone. My people, the farmers of the country, have not talked very much up to now; but we have suffered. Every man knows that it is the man with the large valuation that pays the rates, and suffers from every upheaval in the country. It is he that will have to find the finances and keep the purse of the people filled. Deputy Davin yesterday alluded to the condition of the outstanding rates. I think that is the condition of most of the counties. It should give you something to think about. I hope the Government, if they get a chance of an honourable peace, will lose no chance of having an honourable peace, but it must be a peace that will mean the end of war and no going back.

I want to support the original Resolution, and I want to draw-attention to a few remarks made on the other side of the Dáil. I think it was Deputy Johnson on Saturday last, after the President-elect had briefly stated his policy, said in view of the unsatisfactory statement of the President-elect he and his party would vote against it. Now, I want to know from the other side what is unsatisfactory in the statement—in what particular it is unsatisfactory. "It is my intention to implement this Treaty as sanctioned by the vote of the Dáil and the electorate in so far as it was free to express that opinion...." I want to know is that unsatisfactory. I want to know is it unsatisfactory to enact the Constitution. That is the second statement of the President. "To assert the authority and supremacy of Parliament...." I want to know if that is unsatisfactory; if so, in what respect? "To support and assist the National Army in asserting the people's rights...." I want to know is it unsatisfactory to assert the people's rights? "To ask Parliament, if necessary, for such powers as may be deemed necessary for the purpose of restoring order and repressing crime...." Is it unsatisfactory to restore order and repress crime? Is it unsatisfactory "to expedite, as far as lies in the power of the Government, the return to normal conditions"? That summarises the outlook and attitude and the policy of the present Government. I want to know what it is that is unsatisfactory; and if no answer can be given, then I think that this Motion for the support of the Government in this policy ought to receive the unanimous support of this Dáil.

The Presidential statement made yesterday was, of course, not so much a statement of policy as a statement of the position of the Government, but if there is one thing I think that the country wants to know to-day—if there is one thing the country has been wanting to know for the past few months— it has been: what has been the position in which the Government stands; whether it really means to see safety and security restored or any more shilly-shally or coquetting with disorder? No man in this Assembly can divest himself of the responsibility for the immediate future of Ireland. Never in all Ireland's history probably were a body of men called together to meet and deliberate with a greater and more serious and more solemn responsibility than those of this Assembly. We have to-day a chance to give the Irish people an opportunity of making their will articulate, and if we fail to do that, to insist that the Government shall through its instrument, the Army, achieve that, then we fail in our duty to the people, and fail in the trust imposed on us when sent-here. I was very glad to hear Deputy Johnson say at long last that he and his Party accept the will of the people, because it has been very difficult to know for months past whether he stood for the Treaty or on the side of the Irregulars. I am very glad to know at long last that they recognise what the will of the people is; that they are prepared to bow to it and recognise that rule, because I think, like ourselves, they are elected to this Assembly to implement the Treaty and not for any sectional reason whatever. One Deputy spoke in a very able and refreshing and vigorous and frank speech about the lack of moral courage. Yes, and I think, and I say it without any intention of being offensive, that that particular commodity was not particularly conspicuous for the past few months in the Party in which he speaks. When the Treaty was hanging in the balance was there a single leading man in the Labour Party to say whether they stood publicly or fearlessly for the Treaty or not? Men that talk about moral courage let them show an example of it before they preach it. Now I come to the Demosthenes of the Labour Party, Deputy O'Shannon, whose address reminded me more of a peevish school girl than of a statesman. His real grievance seemed to be that the Government had left him no grievance and he raced over the whole gamut of the development of departmental affairs as if it were possible for the head of the Government to cover all. One thing I did not think it in the best of taste he referred to was, compared with the modesty and restraint of those who preceded, was his reference to the two great men who have passed away. I think—and I regretted to hear it—the Deputy referred to them as "rattling the bones of the dead. " I was also surprised to hear him say, "just as the people are behind you now, so they were also behind John Redmond." Was he trying to pay a compliment to the people, and he is supposed to be one of the representatives of the Labour Party. Was he paying a compliment to the people when he made that jibe of changing with the different winds of public opinion or thought? Now, the immediate task, and I want to be very brief, and I want to concentrate on the essential things. I am not satisfied that the Presidential statement was an expression of National policy. As I said before it was not an expression of National policy. We had more National policy expressed in a few sentences on Saturday than in the whole statement of yesterday, and I intend to be as critical as I can in dealing with the lack of National policy. But you must realise that the great and vital thing Ireland wants to-day is not academic discussions about theoretical terms. Ireland is fighting for its very life, and is on the edge of a precipice, in my opinion, and the duty of this Government and Dáil is to get the Nation back from the precipice before it goes over— and to irretrievable disaster. That is the task I presume that the Government is engaged in. The Government is not engaged in a war of vendetta, or in attempts to humiliate political opponents. I remember Deputy Johnson stating that propaganda had been issued in support of the Government about "dying in the last ditch,""no peace until the last man and the last gun and the last cartridge is surrendered." I do not believe that that statement was issued by any supporter of the Government.

I can bring you chapter and verse.

You astonish me. It is entirely opposed to my view, and I have taken as strong and vigorous an attitude as it is possible for any man to take in support of the Government, and I for one will fight hard against any war or vendetta or any attempt to humiliate political opponents as hard as I fought, in such a way as I have been able, to save the Treaty from disaster. I am prepared to go any length that it is humanely possible to go to make it easy for those who are warring against the Government to lay down their arms and make peace with the rest of their fellow-countrymen. I will not consent to anything which jeopardises the future of the country and which gives the country the danger, the peril, the awful prospect of having again inflicted on it the anguish, terror and horror of the last eight or nine months. We want peace, and Ireland can get peace, and we will have peace if those who really want it have sufficient moral courage to stand by the men and Government that is trying to bring peace to this troubled land. "The Minister of Defense in proposing the name of Mr. Cosgrave for the Presidency used the phrase—and I think it was exceedingly appropriate—referred on the late President as great sower and the late Commander-in-Chief as a great reaper. Never, I think, were truer words spoken than those dealing with that, sad disaster and great tragedy for Ireland when the end of that great reaper was purchased by death before he could garner the harvest which was the fruits of the long, tireless years of his great colleague. But the fact is that that great harvest of National liberty still remains to be reaped, and in my opinion if the policy and attitude of the Government in this matter can be defined in a sentence it would be that they are determined that that harvest shall not rot in the fields; that the people shall not be prevented by armed politicians from reaping the harvest to the fullest degree. One other thing I want to say and which I almost forgot is, let no man, no Party, either in Ireland or outside of Ireland, imagine for a moment that the operations undertaken by the Government, and which are being continued now by this Government, are undertaken for the convenience of England. If any man, or any body of men in England, imagine that it was either at the dictation or for the convenience of England this was done, then I do think they will get a rude awakening some day. These steps, so far as I understand them, are being taken, for the convenience of the Irish nation, to restore peace and security, and to give to the people a chance to live a normal life, to enable the resources of the nation to he are the disposal of the people, so that there can be then a real national reconstruction, and a real chance of bringing about that prosperity and social wellbeing which I am sure is the earnest desire of every man in this Dáil, no matter what section he belongs to. But the fact has been that what has taken place in Ireland has been a sort of nightmare, of terrorism and outrage and disorder. It has not only overshadowed the prospects of national freedom which seemed imminent, but it has almost extinguished the very moral principles that should be the basis of civilised society. I did not believe there could he any real dissentients from this motion of confidence in the Government. Remember it is not for play-acting we are here At least, my outlook is that we are a body of men entrusted with the safety of the future of the Nation, and it Is not a question of trying to snatch Party advantages, but it is a question of trying to give our country a chance, give our Nation a chance, and the best and most immediate means, I think, of achieving that is to give the Government a chance in its struggle against overwhelming odds to make possible the realisation of the promises, the hopes, and the struggle of centuries of our people.

Deputy Sears, in introducing this Motion, said that, before the conflict was embarked upon, every possible step was taken to avert a fight. I think there was at least one step—and one very obvious step—that was not taken, and that was a meeting of this Dáil and a full report presented as to what steps had been taken, and why these steps were not successful in averting this conflict. We have never had that report, and I suggest that the least we ought to expect from the Ministry is a full, a clear, and comprehensive statement of the various negotiations that took place between the political leaders and the Army leaders to secure peace and a unified Army, and to prevent this conflict that has taken place. I suggest there is some reason not yet explained why this fight was embarked upon within three days of the Dáil being due to meet on the 1st of July. I think we are entitled to ask for that statement. We were entitled to have it long ago. I think, as we were not given it long ago, we are entitled to have it now. Deputy Milroy, who spoke with characteristic eloquence, talked about lack of moral courage, the rights of the people, the powers of the Parliament, and all the rest of it; but if Deputy Milroy's Party had their way in conjunction with their late colleagues, there would be nobody in this Parliament except his Party and their late colleagues, and the people would be given no opportunity of expressing any view except to return to power the two wings of the old Party.

I may say I was opposed to the Pact, except to Clause 4.

But your Party, in conjunction with the Anti-Treaty Party, tried to nullify Clause 4. The President, in his comprehensive statement yesterday, covered a great deal of ground, but, so far as we are concerned, it was largely non-controversial. It dealt very largely with the history of the negotiations that had gone on since the truce last year, and with that we are only incidentally concerned so as to get a proper perspective. As to what has gone on in recent months, we would like to hear a great deal more of what went on in the past two or three months, and we can afford to pass over with very little consideration the various affairs he referred to, and which have become a matter of history, concerning the negotiations with England. In the first place, we should, in order to view properly the present state of affairs, bring our minds back to the unique state of affairs thai existed in this country for some years—up to the split that has recently taken place. Nobody, I think, will deny that at any previous period in Irish history was any popular Party given the same measure of support as was the Party which was united up to January last. We read—and we have had experience—of the Redmondite Party and of the Parnellite Party. We read of O'Connell and the other leaders who claimed to speak on behalf of the people of this country, but none of these had any measure of the support that was given without stint to the Sinn Fein Party who ruled this country up to recently. Some of that support was given through love; more of it was given through fear, but, at any rate, up to quite recently the National solidarity was preserved in a manner that no Party at any previous period of Irish history could claim to have had. I remember a year or two ago speaking to a very prominent leader of the late Parliamentary Party. He was expressing his admiration of the support the Sinn Fein Party had got in a certain county. He was speaking about the question of funds, and he said that he knew that in the heyday of the Parnellite movement there was not as much got in the entire county as was got for the Dáil loan in one parish in that particular county. That, I think, is perfectly true. The financial test is not, perhaps, the best one, but it is a fairly good one, and it is one indication of the remarkable support which the Sinn Fein Party got. Other and greater tests, of course, were made and support was given unstintingly. The movement that I speak for can claim without boasting to have done its part. We can afford to pass over the cheap gibes and sneers of people who praised us in the past and now condemn us because we will not harness ourselves to the chariot wheels of their Party. We think that we made our position very clear long before the country had given its verdict in the unmistakable way it did in the past year or two. We gave our support fully and freely. Very great inducements were offered to us to do something that would break that National solidarity at many critical periods during recent years, but we resisted every such effort. I say that not for the purpose of exciting any particular praise, but just as a simple statement of fact. We of the Labour Movement believe in National freedom, but we believe in it, not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. We believe not only in National freedom, but in economic freedom and social freedom, and we believe that national freedom is incomplete unless it also means economic freedom and social freedom. Speaking for myself, I can say that I have always been a Republican. From my boyhood I have believed in an independent Irish Republic as being the only expression of national life which would give to every citizen the fullest possible freedom. In the many changes that have taken place in the public life of Ireland, I have never had any necessity to change these cardinal principles that I adopted as a boy of sixteen or seventeen years of age, and very few can say that nowadays. Now, by our own act, we of the Labour Movement have kept out of this fight all through. Right up to the General Election we were content to leave the control of affairs in the hands of the Party and the Movement that the country trusted implicitly. We did that. We submerged ourselves. We declined to use the situation for Party purposes. We joined with the rest of the country and gave our support to the Party that had set out to get National freedom. We did everything we possibly could to strengthen their hands and to assist them in the task they were engaged in. When the Truce came, when negotiations took place and when a certain settlement was arrived at, we took the view that the men who knew most about the situation knew best what ought to be done. Speaking for myself, I can say that I accepted the views of the military men who were in charge of the I.R.A. and who believed that they were not strong enough to get any better terms than were offered under the Treaty. If there was any one man whose opinion I was prepared to take before another, that man is the present Minister for Defence—not that I rank his courage and patriotism higher than others of his colleagues, but I personally place more reliance in his military judgment and capacity for recognising the hard facts of the situation, and when be (Deputy Mulcahy) took the view—and especially when that view was reinforced by almost all the other members of G.H.Q.—that, the Army was unable to secure better terms, I was prepared to accept that as conclusive so far as I was concerned. Now, in discussing a certain question yesterday, one of the Ministers —I think it was the Minister for Agriculture—said that we were doing a certain thing here because every other country did the same. But I remember many of the gentlemen on the opposite benches—when speaking on public platforms—always contending that Ireland would be different when Ireland got its freedom. I had a suspicion that Ireland would not be, and that the Labour Movement in Ireland would have to put up the same fight as the Labour Movements in every other country. This, of course, was always a debatable question. I remember in another Assembly hearing ihe question discussed many years ago. A friend of mine was putting the view that Home Rule was desirable; another friend cotended that Home Rule was no use at all, because he said it was just the same whether we were ruled by capitalists at Westminster or College Green. The friend who was in favour of Homo Rule said: " Well, at any rate, wouldn't it be an advantage-even if we are to be ruled by Capitalists —to have them in College Green, where we would have them. under our eye?"" On our backs, you mean," said the other friend. And it looks as if it is on our backs we will have them. We will have to put up the same fight in Ireland that the Labour Movement has had to put up elsewhere. We will have to fight for our rights and the fight will do us good. Rights which are secured without a fight are not appreciated, and rights that are given without a fight generally turn out to be wrongs in disguise. Now, that is so far as the Labour members and the Treaty are concerned. Since the Treaty the Labour Movement has done everything it could to avert the war that has taken place. Every step that we could take, both publicly and privately, has been tried, and when we hear our friend, Deputy Milroy, and others condemning us now, we can put the praises, if not of himself, of his colleagues, on other occasions against the condemnation at the present time. During the conference called by His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin and the Lord Mayor of Dublin we took part in it. The first proposal we made was that the Army Executive of the Four Courts should be invited to that conference, because it seemed to us that if anything was to be done it was essential that those men should be brought into conference. We were told authoritatively on behalf of the Government that under no possible circumstances should these men be brought in or would the representatives of the Governmeut consent to meet them. Yet, within forty-eight hours, these men were brought into conference, were met by representatives of the Government. Then during these negotiations we were asked by one side, and then by the other side, would we not consent in certain circumstances to join a Coalition Government. We put forward our view that on principle we were opposed as Labour men to join any Government, that we were an independent Movement, and desired to remain as such. We were pressed very strongly by one side and urged by the other also to consent to waive this point in the event of an agreement being arrived at. That was their view at that particular juncture. As the scene changed their point of view and criticism changed also. Then we had the Pact. Notwithstanding that Clause 4 of the Pact made it clear that any and every interest was free to go up, there was not a Labour man or an Independent candidate who came forward that was not subject, more or less, to intimidation to try and drive him out of the field. Now I do not personally worship majority rule, but I accept it. It is not possible to get on with the business unless we do accept it. As far as this country has been given an opportunity of deciding for the Treaty, it has decided. Nobody who knows the country would doubt what the verdict would be if it were put to it. We accept the situation, and whether we like it or dislike it we should make the best of it. In the course of another discussion, in a more or less casual fashion, I think it was the Minister for Home Affairs (Mr. O'Higgins) said yesterday that the reason they embarked upon this fight was that they had information that the Army Authorities in the Four Courts had prepared a coup d'tat, and they had only got in front of them by a matter of hours. That is a very important statement.

On a point of personal explanation may I say that I named a series of incidents and pointed out that the effect of these was cumulative and that in addition there was information.

I have no desire to misrepresent the Minister. At any rate if it was fact that such a coup was prepared by those in the Four Courts, the Members of this Dáil and the country generally should be made aware of all the circumstances connected with it. So far as we know no convincing reason has been given why Parliament did not meet on July 1st. You may be in possession of convincing reasons. You may be able to convince us that you were justified, but so far you have not done so. Reasons have been given from time to time as to why Parliament did not meet and why Parliament was postponed, but that reason mentioned by the Minister for Home Affairs has never been given before, and was, as I said, only mentioned more or less in a casual fashion yesterday. I think we are entitled to expect from the Head of the Government a full and complete statement as to why Parliament did not met on 1st July, and why the President did not bring down aud lay before us a full and complete record of all negotiations that went on, so as to put the responsibility on the right shoulders, aud then we might be in a position of agreeing that every possible expedient had been exhausted, and that nothing was left except the loosing of the dogs of war. It is just possible that if the Government had met Parliament, that the facts of the situation and the results of the election might have made a difference. I have been told that many of the anti-Treaty Members would not have taken the attitude that they had taken had that been done. You can accept that statement or not, just as you please. At any rate, it was worth trying, and there was no adequate reason that we know of why Parliament should not have met on the 1st July. There must have been some reason, not yet disclosed, as to why, within three days of Parliament meeting, this war was embarked upon.

I dislike very much being a person who has to go back to a little history, particularly as I feel so grateful for those indications of the various assurances that we have got from what we call different groups in the Dáil that they are definitely going to see that the Treaty is secured, and that on that particular point this Parliament, as fully representing all people, is simply one great group. There are one or two points that I have to go back to. I hope that I can go back to them without prejudice and without being any great drawback to the fact that we have to get forward quickly, realising without any great delay that we are in a dangerous situation. The point has been raised that a very considerable amount of responsibility lies on the people who split the Army, and Just in connection with that particular point it perhaps is worth saying what the policy of the Government with regard to the Army was after the passing of the Treaty, and after the setting up of a Ministry committed to seeing that Treaty through. Differences arose in the Army. Hot-headed men wanted to pull this way and that way and the other way, and the great solidarity that was in the Army up to that particular point was imperilled. This is the attitude that as Minister for Defence at the time I put forward to them, and I think that it certainly represented the attitude that the whole Government adopted towards the Army, although they might consider as I express the policy now that it was finessing a little too much with honour. The position was that the English were clearing out of this country. They were evacuating their barracks. We had an opportunity of coming from those camps in the country, and little corners in the hills where during the period of truce we trained for any danger which may again, come over the country. We had a chance of leaving those places and coming into proper military barracks, strengthening ourselves within the greater and more ordered association we could have got in these barracks, arming ourselves in the way in which we were in a position to arm ourselves, and finding ourselves, if we got any particular length of time in these places, very much better militarily equipped and very much better militarily orgianized than we were at any time, even at any time after the period of truce training which we made such full use of. The Army was appealed to not to raise questions on which we could split in this particular atmosphere; to wait until there is something definite to decide for or against; to wait until the Constitution is definitely produced, as it will be in 3 or 4 months, then when you see the actual fact of the Constitution, then you have something before you, something on which you can say "We will not have this," or "Under all circumstances we will have this." Keeping that policy before you you will arrive at a particular position with a strength that will be a very great strength, and with heads that will be clearer. If there is any head or number of heads clear enough, and a number of hearts strong enough to say there are the elements of dishonour in that Constitution and we will not have them, then you will have with you as much military strength as you have in this war, and if there is a voice strong enough to speak they will have a weapon, if they speak straight and strong and clear. It may be said that that is finessing with honour, but I was perfectly satisfied that the situation was not, a military situation alone. I was perfectly satisfied that given months to face the circumstances and face the position—I was satisfied that those who had led the Army would not be blind or mad enough to say, no matter what better military position they were in, "We will not have this Constitution, which can and should be got out of that Treaty, and we will put the people to war," and I felt absolutely justified that the putting of that policy before the Army was correct, and if men split the Army it was men who took a different attitude. If men could toke a more reasonable attitude, well then, let us hear what that attitude could have been. The point then is raised that we entered into those conversations taken place between what became two different sets of the Army, and naturally it was wanted to he known what transpired at these meetings. The President in a statement read a document which it is worth reading again in this connection. It was the final note, let us say, on which these negotiations broke down. The following memorandum was handed to the Minister of Defence on Thursday, the 15th June, by Mr. Rory O'Connor and Mr. Ernest O Maillie:—

RESOLUTION PASSED AT EXECUTIVE MEETING HELD 14TH JUNE, 1922.

That we instruct the Officers deputed to meet the Beggar's Bush Officers to inform them that:

For the purpose of maintaining the Irish Republic, the Executive has decided that:

(a) Negotiations on Army unification with Beggar's Bush must cease.

(b) We take whatever action may be necessary to maintain the Republic against British aggression.

(c) No offensive will be taken by our troops against the Beggar's Bush forces.

Now the question arose as to what was the general position on the day on which that Notice was served after the final breaking off of negotiations by the Four Courts people. Generally, the position with regard to the Army and the results and endeavours to bring about unification therein, were that five members agreed out of seven (this Army Council consiste of seven members). The Army were in favour of the unification indicated in the following memorandum. Now I will read the memorandum first before I will comment on it. There were first general points of agreement, and with regard to these general points of agreement let me say that the document which formed the basis of them and became this memorandum with very little changes, was a document prepared by Commandant Sean Moylan. And it was so very difficult to get something in writing from the other side, that, personally, I gripped very much on to it. We went over it word for word and made a few changes, and in order to have something of agreement we agreed on these as general points of agreement:—

1. All ranks and positions to be as on 1st December, 1921, except where objection is held to any appointment on the grounds of:

(a) Inefficiency.

(b) The Officer being so unacceptable to his Command that he cannot reasonably be expected to make a success of it.

(c) Re-organisation proposals.

(d) Bad record.

Special cases and appeals to be gone into by the Director of Organisation and recommendations submitted to the Staff.

2. Ex-soldiers of other armies to be employed ordinarily only in the training or advisory capacity; only those whose record and character stand scrutiny to be so employed (this rule not to apply to men who fought with us).

3. Re-organisation Staff to be appointed under L.L. as D.C.S. to re-organise the Army, with instructions that all inefficient officers be dispensed with.

4. Divisions shall be recruited and controlled locally.

5. APPOINTMENTS. Promotions shall he based on War record, personal character and ability, and individual records be compiled forthwith under a scheme to be outlined by G.H.Q. Staff.

6. No man to be victimised because of honest political views.

7. The Army ideal to be looked for shall be the training militarily of the youth of Ireland. All men of military age to have an opportunity to be trained as soldiers. The standing Army to be as small as possible.

8. The training syllabus shall be drafted as much with a view to giving men a Gaelic outlook as to making them efficient soldiers. A mercenary Army must be avoided.

9. Members of the Army shall not ordinarily be concerned with the maintenance of law and order, except in so far as all good citizens should be.

10. The Committee engaged in finding a settlement basis must take cognisance of the fact that an extremely bitter feeling obtains between both sides in many areas, and that it may be found impossible to get either side to work under the Command of Officers from the other side. This may be got over by drafting in Officers native to the area who are at present serving in other districts.

11. In some. of the much-disturbed districts, there seems to be no Volunteer organisation. An effort should be made at once to get a number of men from these districts into barracks for a severe course of training. Those elements which make disorder might, if properly handled, develop into first-class Volunteers.

These, as I say, were the general points on agreement, and they indicated something of what was in the minds of both sides. The next are general Army proposals submitted by us to the Four Courts people. They are:—

1. With regard to the Army, a periodical Convention to elect an Army Council of say, 7.

2. Both the Minister for Defence who shall be appointed in the ordinary way by the Government, and the Chief of Staff, who shall be appointed by the Minister for Defence, shall require the approval by a majority vote of the Army Council.

3. Each member of the Army Council to full-time senior military appointments. attached to G.H.Q. Staff or to be O/C's of a Division.

4. After a certain period when our Military Schools of Instruction have been properly set up, no person to be eligible for election to a membership of the Army Council without possession of certain defined military and general educational qualifications.

5. All appointments to commissioned ranks shall be recommended by the Chief of Staff and confirmed by the Minister for Defence.

6. Divisional areas to be enlarged and number of Divisions reduced. Both troops in barracks and ordinary Volunteer units to come under the Divisional Command, with the exception of the Curragh Training Establishment, or any of its adjuncts.

And immediate proposals with regard to the control of the Army were to create an Army Council, an agreed Army Council, to be composed of R. J. Mulcahy, E. O'Duffy, G.O'Sullivan, F. O'Donoghue, Liam Lynch, Sean Moylan, Liam Mellowes, and Rory O'Connor. That was the temporary Army Council. The Chief Executive Officers of the G.H.Q. Staff were:

Chief of Staff D.C.S (in charge of organisation)

E. O'Duffy. Liam Lynch,

D.C.S. (in charge of Training).

L. Deasy.

A.-General

G. O'Sullivan.

Q.-M. General

S. McMahon.

Director of Intelligence.

F. O'Donoghue.

A Convention to be held when the Director of Organisation has satisfied the Staff that the re-organisation of the Army is fairly satisfactorily complete, that is, that a fairly stable condition has been restored in the Army.

Now I would not recommend to any new Government setting up as a new State to organise its Army on these lines, but considering the circumstances in which we were and considering what we were faced with and to get agreement with men who wanted to set up a dictatorship, we allowed ourselves to be dragged from what would be the line of organisation of an Army properly subject to Government to lines that would not commend themselves to us if we were not forced by pressure that wa.s brought to bear on us. Now on the general agreement five out of the seven—five of the seven on the Army Council agreed to that. The Army Council as I have indicated had agreed at once. One of the eight, F. O'Donoghue, hadn't acted as a member of the Army Council up to this time, and his name being added to the five it would mean that six out of eight would have agreed to these proposals. They came before the Executive meeting that was held on the 14th June and were turned down for this reason—that the remaining two members of this Council and I take it some following in the Executive and in the Convention decided that the man who would be placed in charge in complete Executive control of the Army from the Military point of view would be a man who had a very short time before recommended the idea of a dictatorship. And that it should be introduced gradually and that he was out for the suppression of the press at once and for the stopping of elections and that that could be done before anything about it would leak out ; and the man also who time after time had assured us in very close and intimate conversation that he would not allow the Treaty to be worked. Now whatever affection we might have for this man due to our long association with him and due to our appreciation of his very sterling character, as people with responsibility placed on us before the people and as people in the eyes of the English people with whom we had made a pact as a Government we could not possibly have turned round in the condition that existed and put as Chief head of the Army a man who had publicly taken up that stand and we could not recommend it to the Government and in accepting or going as far as those documents show we were going to go, the Government at the time with very many misgivings on their part simply gave in to myself and the late Commander-in-Chief as knowing more perhaps about the people we were dealing with and as having more influence with them than the average person might have. As a matter of fact we were dealing with little bits of mercury that slipped to this side and that side whenever we came to anything like grips with them. Following immediately on the result of that breakdown I addressed a letter in answer to a letter in which I stated that on the matter of the general proposals—" We have gone into this matter as far as it is possible to go. The extent to which we have gone has been dictated by the wish to realise that those to whom we are making proposals do not fall short of those we represent either in ability or patriotism, and these proposals have been inspired by a hope that we would be met in a spirit not less generous than our own: our proposals go beyond what I personally would consider we were entitled to go to in the absence of such a spirit and considering the very great national responsibility that rests upon us. Responsibility for dealing further with the situation must now be left to the Coalition Government which is being formed." Before the new Government was being formed and before Parliament met on the following Saturday the Government took action against the people in the Four Courts and they took action against them because a coup was meditated and because as far as it was possible for human people to foresee, we foresaw that if we didn't take the move we did, that this Parliament would never meet. It has been stated that the Executive people planned an attack against the English. Well this is the document in the handwriting of one of the members of the Executive, and it reads: "that this Executive Council of the I.R.A. hereby decide that as in our opinion the only means of maintaining the Republic is by giving the English seventy-two hours notice to evacuate the country, in view of this fact we hereby decide that the G.H.Q. of the Army Council be directed to carry out the suggestions contained in the sub-committee's report."

This report is headed "Report of the Executive Sub-Committee." and reads: "In accordance with the decision of the Executive requesting a report on the general situation as affected by the impending war with the English forces in the country, we wish to place the following statistics and suggestions before the Executive under the following headings." And then follow detailed accounts of the comparative strength of the British and Irish forces. And then we find in this document under the heading of "Activities in the twenty-six Counties.""The destruction of all barracks occupied by our troops, the attacking of present port positions held by English troops. The striking at English forces should be made whenever possible in areas where pro-Treaty troops occupy so that they may be brought into collision with English troops. The clearing out of the English Government Officials (Dublin Castle, etc.); the immediate resumption of hostilities in England, especially against English General Staff and members of the Cabinet; reprisals in England for shelling."

And then it says about activities in the six county area, "Boycott, destruction of warehouses, activities against Orange Lodges; as much activity against the English as possible, but we do not suggest sending any reinforcements from Southern Ireland inasmuch as the strength of our forces will not allow it."

These particular documents were not in our hands when we took the decision we did. But that general information was in our hands and with that information in our hands and a raid for a large number of motor cars being made in a firm here in Dublin, the Government decided that the Four Courts were to be preceded against, and that decision was practically taken, if not formerly taken— it was taken before General O'Connell was arrested on the same night. Those of us who were responsible for the position, we simply feel that we were justified in it, and that we could not have run the risk which, allowing the people in the Four Courts to move against the British, would have run us into. Now that is past history, and whatever be the details here and there on one side or another, that history developed has placed this particular Parliament in a particular situation. The question has been put to the Executive as to what the Government's intentions are with regard to the war, and we have been asked is there any way in which a word may be uttered from the Ministerial Benches that would give some kind of hope to the country that nothing less than grinding into the dust is going to satisfy the powers that be. Now, there are certain essentials for peace in this country, and the first in my mind is that some body of people representing the people be allowed to work the Treaty, and the next that they be allowed to work it with the best Constitution that they can get under it. The third, that the sword must not be again thrown into the situation by anybody with a view to imposing thereby a demand to mould any particular Clause in the Constitution into any particular form against the expressed word of this Parliament. The fourth, that opposition to the Government working the Constitution framed in accordance with the Treaty must be confined to Constitutional lines. The fifth, that the Army must be the people's Army and responsible absolutely to the National Government. The sixth, that the Government shall control by its regulations all the arms held in the country. Now there are details of to-day and to-morrow that you might have difficulties about, but if you get accepted generally throughout the country, and if you have no body of people to challenge in arms any one of these six points, then you can have peace in the country and you can settle all other details in time at any rate. Now my information is that certain points of these are not unchallenged in the country by force of arms, and I have gone as deeply and as closely into the matter as it has been possible to go and here is the attitude that I find. There is opposition to these fundamental principles by three classes who are for the moment all in one hole. They are composed of people who may be classed as politicians; people who may be classed as honest soldiers, and people who may be classed as criminals. Honest soldiers have been misled. And honest soldiers are waiting for a word from the politicians that they are travelling the wrong road and the politicians are in this particular frame of mind: "We signed a pact with those who support the Treaty, and we signed it in order to avoid a terrible state of things. We were led into the signing of that pact by the light of reason and in signing it we bowed our head in the light of reason." But men of faith arose and men of faith took action, and they dropped their hands to their sides and they said to themselves through pure lack of moral courage, "After all perhaps it is better to be led by faith than by reason." Now, that is the attitude of the politicians of to-day to whom the soldiers look, and with that attitude of the politicians and with the soldiers soldiers, and with the criminals criminals, everyone of these six points which I mentioned as the fundamentals for peace in this country are challenged by force of arms. That, I say, is my interpretation of the situation, and if there is any group in this Dáil or any single person in this Dáil who says that that interpretation is, perhaps, wrong, well then they have to go to the people who can authoritatively state that that attitude is otherwise, and if they do go there and if they do bring a statement that the attitude is otherwise. well then, there is nobody who will welcome that statement more than I, or more than the Government here shall welcome it. And failing a statement to that effect, the work that is before the Government is to vindicate this authority and to stand absolutely by its authority in establishing those principles, because if we weaken in any one of these to-day, well then all the safety for the country, all the stability for the country is gone.

These points are absolutely necessary to any long-established Government, and much more is it necessary that we will have them absolutely secured to us here while we carve out the foundations of this new State of ours. I do not want at this moment to go into details of how the armed force that is opposed to us on these principles is to be met. But it is to be met vigorously, and it is to be met in a formal and legal manner, as legal as possible, but it has to be met, and whatever squeamishness we may have about taking life, we can't be squeamish with people who jeopardise the life of every single person in this country. If we can get rid of that armed force without taking life, if we can capture those people and put them into jails, we shall endeavour by every means in our power to do it, but we can't have any soft feeling in our hearts when we have to oppose that force—a force that threatens the whole life, the whole safety of our Nation.

As I say, feeling the temper of this Dáil, and being grateful for it, I dislike very much to have to go over the past, and I prefer to look forward to the future because I am perfectly satisfied that this Dáil will go forward immediately, and constructively, to the future. The point has been raised as to who is responsible at the moment, and who will be responsible in the immediate future, for keeping order in this country. Now, over the greater portion of this country at the present moment the army must be responsible for keeping order, because there is no other force there, and no other organisation there, to do it. And there is no use in challenging the army and saying that because the army is called upon to deal with law and order in any particular area, and because it does its work there in the only way in which an army can do it—there is no use in saying that is militarism, and that this is the army butting in. Any Deputy of the first Dail at any rate, and perhaps the second Dáil, will remember there were no people in this Assembly who more insisted upon the fact that the Civil Administration must take its proper place in the country, than were those who were prominent Army Officers or had authority for the administration of the army on their shoulders. And we had a very rough passage there. And if there were weaknesses in the Government that brought about a division at the time when the Treaty came, some of these weaknesses were attributable to the fact that some people responsible for the civil side were not in sympathy with the people responsible for the army side, because the army side did not feel that the civil side was working as vigorously or as constructively as it should, and that the army was weakened and the army was exposed because it had to do work that should properly be done by the Civil Administration. And not only that, but that the Civil Administration was weakening itself in the country, and prejudicing itself in the eyes of the enemy, because these people who were carrying out civil administration could not show that their hands were free from military activities. We stand for the supremacy of the civil power of the Government, and when we speak of indiscipline in the army, and cases of it crop up, I ask for some sympathetic realisation of what the position of the army is at the present moment. We have men carrying out very difficult military operations, up to their eyes in all these difficulties that arise around them, because of lack of civil administration at the present time. They have no great experience in the management of military affairs, or in the management of civil affairs, and no great sense of the tactful touch that is required, or that is only gained by experience in an authority dealing with the people. And if any young men in the army brush up against individuals here and there in a rough or in an untactful way, well it is a very great credit to the army as a whole, and to the young men of this country who form it, that there is not a greater volume of complaint along that line. We realise the danger of indiscipline in the army. We realise the danger of awkwardness in dealing with public matters on the part of army officers, and the most necessary thing and the biggest factor that will help us in getting rid of all that is to let us see arise in the country some sign of civil administration. Let us see our courts re-arise there again. Let us see our police there and then the army will very soon find its own place. The point has been raised to the Government, as to whether they do not consider that the National position is that the people only accept this Treaty because they must do it, and that they accept it as something short of their ultimate demand. I accept this Treaty as giving us a position short of what I would wish our national position to be; but I accept it as against this state of things we are emerging from. I accept it as giving us a position from which we may work forward to the highest pinnacle of our national dignity and our national honour without that nation-killing irritation between nations that we have suffered from up to the present, and that we have had very sad examples of in Europe. Work! As I say, I would prefer to be dealing with the work of construction. I do not sympathise with the spirit that at this moment puts forward the amendment that has been put to the original resolution. The state of military affairs that exists at the present moment and the split in the army has retarded dealing with the question of unemployment. Now coming to the time when this Treaty was signed and when, if it had been generally accepted, or accepted without any clash of arms in the country, the question of demobilising the men who had been withdrawn from their work over the country for military reasons, the question of the return to their homes of men who, while not on active military work were driven from their homes by military operations—these questions were engaging the attention of the heads of the army, and they thought that they might turn round when their military work was done, and give some small contribution in construction to the country in that spirit of service and co-operation that distinguished them in the army, and that spirit of service and co-operation that Deputy Johnson spoke of on Saturday. We tried to be little schemic in the thoughts or on the lines in which we were working. We proposed to put up one or two things to the Government and I just mention it here now so that if possible I may give some little scrap of constructive thought or constructive idea to those people who want now to face constructive work. I do not like to sit down without giving some small idea. Unemployment is in itself a danger to the country of itself, and it has a very bad effect on the. general development of a proper social organisation. We were going to suggest that from a number of men that would be acting not as a military people but as organised civil workers—the men who had been volunteer officers— that we would offer our services to the Government and put a few suggestions before them. We wanted to point out that you must have some kind of a dam in the country into which you can draft your unemployment in order to deal with the unemployment problem itself, and its effects on the country. There were certain public improvements which were economic improvements, that is, that money expended on them would return to the country in one way or another, and that headings to matter, as they were economic improvements, should be prepared; that the country should be put into zones, and the country treated from the unemployment point of view in zones. There were three particular matters that we thought we might offer our services on in the beginning; these were better roads, drainage and buildings. Now we require better roads in certain parts of this country; we require roads radiating from a certain number of ports in the country, and we require a certain number of trunk roads. We are convinced if roads of a proper type were set up in these districts in which they are wanted the money spent on road-making would be saved to the country in say two or three years, even if the saving only came about in the doing away of the very, very big motor repairs or motor repair bills that fall on traders in this country. Motor transport will be developing in many areas as against railway transport, and if some of the unemployed at the present moment were put working on these trunk roads and radial roads we would be dealing with the unemployment now, and we would be strengthening and enriching the country for the future. As an experiment in draining a small area, we proposed to take some river such as the Abhainn-beg which enters the Blackwater near Fermoy. It had reference to the working of a scheme that the Department of Agriculture had before it a number of years ago and had its engineers on. We proposed to offer ourselves as a gang of drainage workers to drain that particular area, and let the Government and the people profit by that little bit of drainage, and profit by the lesson that we could have taught them. And then housing arises, and we feel that better wages and greater leisure on the part of the workers with bad housing may give rise to as serious a situation of social unrest as bad hours or bad wages. We felt that the housing, tackled in a systematic and big way would be another economic improvement, and that the spending of money on it would not be wasted money. And you need not be careful of the amount of money you would put into it. You do not find in a country two or three or four men thinking in one particular direction, without having groups scattered all over the country thinking practically the same thing, and we hope that those schemes that we bad in mind for utilising the loose-end soldiers of the Anglo-Irish war—we hoped and we do hope that they will make themselves reappear very soon when either the Government has put down this armed challenging of its authority, or somebody has gone and found that what I say about its authority being challenged is not true.

I move the adjournment of the Dáil for an hour, until 7.10.

The Dáil adjourned accordingly.

On resuming at 7.10,

There are two Motions for discussion on the Orders of the Day. The Amendment could be put now.

I suggest it would be well to continue the discussion and not put the Amendment now, because if it is put now I understand there are two other Amendments.

There are two other Motions on the adjournment.

If you put that Amendment now it means directly closing the discussion, unless you are anticipating another Amendment to continue the discussion.

Before the business proceeds, would it be possible to have some indication from the Government of the business to-morrow? Some Members who cannot stay to-day would be considerably convenienced if they had an idea of what the Agenda to-morrow would consist of.

That is for the President, who is not here at the moment. We can put that question later to the President.

Arising out of that we have an arrangement made by which at the beginning of the business each day we could have an order for the business of the next day.

In the new Standing Orders that is contemplated.

The business to-morrow will deal with Finance and the Funds of the Dáil and the appointment of Trustees for the purpose of guarding the funds now in jeopardy in America.

Can the Minister state whether the Constitution will be taken this week?

The Constitution will be taken first thing on next Monday.

With re gard to that question, is it possible to let us have some indication as to the procedure that will be adopted? Other Parliaments adopt three readings including the Committee stage. We have no Standing Orders to cover this matter.

Before next Monday, we will presumably have the Standing Orders which will cover it. Very considerable progress has already been made. The discussion will now proceed upon the Amendment.

I feel some real difficulty in following the very eloquent, very candid and very helpful speech of the Minister for Defence. It has, in fact, taken much of the criticism from our lips, and the high note contained in that speech from the beginning to the end was an example which I hope will extend right through Government circles, and right through the Dáil. One cannot but feel that if the tone he adopted and the note that he struck had been prevalent in the minds of Ministers and controversialists and some especially of the Propaganda Department and those under the influence of the Propaganda Department during the last four or five months, we would not have been in the pitiable position we are in to-day. It is evident that one Minister at any rate has not forgotten the course of history of the last four years, and it has been too evident that most Ministers, most propagandists and most controversialists on the side of the Party which form the Government have never taken into account that propaganda, that advocacy, that rhetoric, and the appeals to the higher emotions which were prevalent right through the struggle between England and Ireland, and, taken literally, have inspired considerable sections of the forces who are now supporting the Republican propaganda. It is well to know that one Minister at any rate, recognises the fact that however mistaken men may be, however unreasonable men may be, they may still be honest, and not inspired by ignoble ideals and purposes. We were treated to quotations yesterday from letters taken from prisoners, I suppose, and though it was said that this was representative of a type, one would imagine from reading all that has passed in the last three or four months that that represented the dominant type of the forces in the field against the Government. I don't believe that. I believe if there had been a more general recognition of the fact that men who have taken the line that is condemned were nevertheless inspired by motives as honourable and sincere, however much mistaken they may have been, as the motives that inspired the majority of the people in the country, in the fight that raged from 1916. Just as noble motives, and if this were recognised there would be less anger, less trouble, and less heat in the country to-day. (Mr. Gavan-Duffy—Hear, hear). The Minister for Defence told us to-day what we have been asking for since the middle of June. He told us to-day what ought to have been told the country before the bombardment began. He has told us to-day what ought to have been told the country from the first of July and onwards through the meetings of the Dail, and while it may be true—we do not know—but it is surmised in the minds of the Ministers that some attempt would have been made to prevent the meeting of the Dail, members would have risked that as they have risked many things, most of all the Members who are active on the Ministerial Benches. I do not believe that that was the reason that impelled the Government in postponing the meeting of the Dail. It is not asserted that that was the reason, but it is suggested that it would have been a sufficient reason. I believe that much of the trouble could have been averted if the country had been taken into the confidence of the Ministers as they are now beginning to be taken into the confidence of the Ministers. I say a beginning has been made, but only a beginning. We would like to know, for instance, the course of negotiations with the politicals as well as with the military, and I think the good example that has now been set ought to be followed consistently by other members on the Ministerial benches. I was glad to hear the Minister for Defence indicate how the Army, under his guidance I am sure, resisted the temptations to adopt the policy or to adopt themselves to the atmosphere of militarism. But for the benefit perhaps of clarity in thinking and discussing in the future, let me say when we use the term militarism, we are not thinking of the mere establishment of armies or putting of armies to undertake certain functions. We are thinking of the idea that the army has authority from within itself, of the idea that the army is above the people, or that any little section of the army can act on its own initative, and with its own authority, because they possess arms. The spirit of militarism is still rife even within the ranks of what is called the National army. When we talk of militarism, we want to prevent as far as possible the idea spreading that developed out of the history of the last four years, that the army was the people but that when the army became detached from the people, the Army was the ruler of the people and individual members of the army, officers and privates—and particularly officers—were entitled to swagger about and order things on their own initiative, and on their own authority. I have said that the Minister of Defence has made a statement which gives one some hope of the future. I hope the spirit will permeate the country and that the implied invitation will be responded to by those to whom it is directed. But while that very eloquent, very earnest and sincere statement is all that could be desired, it does not warrant him, or those who act with him, in supporting the resolution that is before the Dáil, or the amendment which embodies the resolution, because what we are asked to do in that resolution is to approve of the action the Government has taken, and is taking, to assert and vindicate the authority of Parliament. We may approve that some action necessarily had to be taken, but we are asked to approve of the action that has been taken, the time it was taken, and the method of its pursuit. I am very sorry to have to say that the innumerable complaints that are reaching us indicate that there must be some truth at any rate in the assertions that certain ranks in the army, certain divisions, and certain officers are carrying out their duties—at least are carrying out the work that has been selected for them—in a manner which is entirely indefensible and cannot be approved of by this Dáil. The action that has been taken by the Government includes the arrest and the imprisonment without trial of many hundreds, thousands probably, of citizens who have not taken arms and never did take arms, who are arrested and imprisoned on suspicion without authority, as I believe, and detained despite the law. We are asked to approve of that, and we cannot. We would like to know— we would like to have heard—from the Minister of Defence if it would not have spoiled his eloquent speech, by what authority these things are done, under what law, and whether it is intended to place before this Dáil measures for the legalisation of these acts that are being committed by the Government in the name of the Dáil. We cannot approve of the treatment prisoners are receiving in prisons under the authority, as we are now told, of the Home Affairs Department.

Too many stories are coming to us from too many places to allow us to discount utterly the statements about the brutal treatment of prisoners; about the method of intimidation and terrorism that are being carried out by the Government or under the authority of the Government in the pursuit of the intention to vindicate the authority of Parliament. I do not pretend to believe all the stories, or the whole of the stories that are coming to me, but they are sufficiently well founded, in sufficient numbers, to justify one in saying that a very careful inquiry is required to be made into these charges and into the conduct of these prisons. And I venture to suggest to the Ministers whether they would agree to the idea—I do this on my own authority—whether they would not appoint some impartial Committee or Commission of Inquiry, not for the purpose of finding and seeking faults, but for the purpose of finding out the truth in regard to the conduct of these prisons. I would not like, the Dáil would not like, to hear of the Germans or the French, or the Australians or the Canadians or the Americans sending over Committees of Inquiry, as was done during the Black and Tan regime to find out about the truth of these charges of inhumanity. Let us prevent that by careful inquiry, by an impartial authority, appointed by ourselves. But I want to say that when my colleague, Deputy O'Shannon, yesterday indicated that we disapproved of the statement of the President, it was not of what the president had said—not because of his statement of policy in so far as it went—but because of the omission to state such a policy. Ministers seem to think only in terms of a War policy as a Ministry appointed to carry on a war, and that therefore they are not called upon to state a policy for the conduct of affairs in general. Deputy Milroy spoke about our being returned to this Dáil on the Treaty Issue. If Deputy Milroy had been conversant with the affairs that preceded the election, and the conduct of the election, he will know that from our platform on every occasion we insisted that we were going to put forward a policy of social reconstruction and administration for the present time. "Man cannot live by bread alone," and a nation cannot live on war alone. Even from the point of view of the conduct of a war you must carry on Government in a manner to ensure that the people's morale shall be maintained. You are failing to do that. Presumably it is thought that a Minister would be able to carry on, promote schemes, change methods of administration, without reference to the Dáil, because they were elected to carry on a war. I deny that they were elected to carry on a war, but certainly their duty is to carry on the Government of the country and to place before the people the policy on which they want to carry on that Government. We had a very hopeful indication of the lines on which the Defence Ministry is thinking; strange that that should have to come out of the Ministry of Defence! We ask the Ministers, if they have plans, ideas, proposals with regard to Government, to produce them, to at least give us an indication of the lines on which they are thinking. Unemployment is talked about, and when we speak about unemployment and what it is intended to do to deal with unemployment, it appears to the minds of Ministers that we are asking them to produce, fully fledged, a complete scheme which will abolish unemployment for all time. Well we are not expecting them to perform miracles within the first few months of office. We are not expecting them to do within the first few months of power what other Governments have not been able to, or willing, or attempted to do after many years, but we do wish to know in what direction their minds are running. What is the objective to which they are looking forward, and how they propose to deal, day by day, with the problems that arise. To illustrate what I mean— we contended during our election campaign that it was essential that all the resources of this country should be utilised to the full in the interest of this country—all the resources, natural, artificial and human—and we contended and we contend there that it is a waste of national wealth to allow institutions, organisations, factories, to lie idle when they can be used for the benefit of the people. We have indicated to Ministers that a factory that lies idle in Drogheda, erected at the cost of many thousands of pounds, and which because it was a bad commercial speculation is going to be allowed to waste, to be destroyed, to be dismantled and lost to this country. Because it was a bad commercial speculation the nation is going to lose it. We submit that this is not sufficient reason to allow that factory, or any such like factories, to be dismantled and to be lost to this country, when by a comparatively small effort on the part of the Government that factory could be saved, could be utilised, at any rate, even until the time when it may seem to the commercial magnates fit for their use. It is capable of producing wealth and saving wealth for this country and employing hundreds of hands. That is an indication of the kind of thing that we are thinking of when we speak of the need of dealing with immediate questions. We have also the factory at Greenmount, which is liable, very liable indeed, to be lost absolutely to this country unless the Government is willing to do something to save it for the people. You have there an illustration of what is necessary to be done, to put into actual operation some of the ideals which were preached by the late President and his followers. It is a factory engaged in the weaving of linen and union goods, established for two or three generations, and has around it just the thing the absence of which so often occurs in industrial revival circles. It has a tradition amongst the people, amongst the operatives, two or three hundred families, engaged for two or three generations in a particularly manipulative process. Because of bad commercial speculation there is a grave danger of that very valuable, wealth-producing institution being dissipated and destroyed, scattered to the winds and of the people being lost to this part of Ireland. In ten years' time, five years' time, you will be asked—the Dáil of the day will be asked—to vote money for the establishment of just such a factory, which you can save by a very little effort at the present time. These are the things that we want to deal with, and we want some indication of policy in matters which concern the daily lives of the people, even while you may be carrying on a war. It is folly for Ministers of the Dáil to be only thinking of a war. That may ruin lives. Not much remains for me to say on this particular subject. We cannot support the resolution because to do so would imply that we are supporting, not an effort to establish government, but that we are supporting the methods and the manner in which that effort is being made. We say that it is not enough. It is not satisfactory that in an effort to put down a revolt, and especially when it is alleged that that revolt carries with it brigandage and outrage of all indefensible kinds, that similar methods should be adopted by the forces that are engaged in putting down the revolt. We were told by a very eloquent, very respected leader of thought in this country, during the war in Europe, and I suppose it is a commonplace in certain philosophical circles, that the atmosphere created by one combatant in a war was imbibed and assimilated by the enemy, especially if that enemy was successful. I do not want to say—I do not believe, that in the fight with the Black and Tans there was a military success. Therefore I do not believe that it was the success of that particular fight that generated the characteristics of the Black and Tans within the successful forces. I do not want it to be said that if the success which is hoped for comes to the forces that are engaged on the side of the Government that they will imbibe and assimilate the methods and the characteristics that are ascribed to the enemy they are trying to subdue. I hope, in conclusion, that the spirit which permeated the speech of the Minister of Defence will spread itself right through the army, right through the country, and that we shall, as a result, come nearer to something like ordered government and reasonable political agitation and struggle and effort in this country.

I entirely agree with the Deputy who has just spoken in what he has said about the tone and temper of the speech of the Minister for Defence; but I think the substance of the speech of the Minister for Defence was even more important than its tone, and I hope that Deputy Johnson is as enthusiastic about the substance of that speech as about its tone and temper. It would be very helpful, and it would clear up a number of difficulties, and it would clear up a rather complex situation, if we were sure that the substance of the Minister for Defence's speech was accepted by the Party for whom Deputy Johnson speaks. I do not want the Dáil to forget the substance of his speech. I think they ought not to forget it; and as there has been so much said about its tone, I think it only right that I should remind you of the more important parts of it. We were told by the Minister for Defence, and he speaks for every one of us, that we could have peace here if the men who are now in arms against this Parliament would accept its authority in an unqualified and unequivocal manner. We were told that they must accept the Treaty. We were told that they must accept the best Constitution that can be got under that Treaty, and we were told that the arms in the country—no matter what section possesses them—must be held under the control of this Parliament and of the Government set up by this Parliament. Now, I liked the tone of the Minister for Defence's speech, but I suggest that that part of it was even more important than its tone, and I hope that Deputy Johnson—and I say this quite seriously—accepts the substance of his speech with the same enthusiasm as he has accepted the rest of it. I would ask the Dáil to remember the issues that are at stake. I was accused to-day—it was stated by Deputy O'Brien that I had said that we were doing certain things here in this country because they did them in England. I hope we are not going to slavishly copy England. I hope we have some Gaelic social and economic ideals. It strikes me that the really pathetic part of this thing that is going on at present is that we have people going about the country playing with words, without the slightest idea of any social, economic, or political ideals behind these words. That is really the tragic part of the fight that is going on. At the same time there are certain fundamental principles, common to every country and common to every democracy, that are at stake now, and if, for any material advantages—I do not care what they are—if for any opportunities to reconstruct, to build, or to develop this country, we compromised on the great issue that is at stake now, then it comes to this, that we should have met the great test—the great test of a people—and have failed in it. The issue at stake is whether Parliament shall be the supreme authority in the country to control all sections and all interests, armed or unarmed. The issue at stake is not whether Parliament should have met last July, not whether Parliament should have met last June, not whether it is right that Parliament should have met last Saturday, but whether Parliamentary institutions are to exist in this country. We may have been wrong in proroguing Parliament. I am perfectly satisfied we were not, but it doesn't matter twopence about the prorogation of parliament as compared with the other issue. This Government would not have been entitled to ask Parliament to meet until it could re-establish conditions that would have enabled the Members of Parliament to come here and discuss and decide and vote freely, and vote without intimidation, vote without a threat of arms, vote without any fear that another Cromwell could come in and turn us out. It does not matter if Parliament is adjourned, it does not matter if Parliament does not meet for the next month. What really is important is that when Parliament does meet its authority shall be finally vindicated, and we deliberately refused to allow Parliament until every Member could come in here, and without fear or favour, say his say, until every Member could Come here and speak with the authority of his own voice, and not with the authority of an armed minority behind him, and that is, what any democratic Government worthy of the name would have done. I am to take it, I suppose, that all sections of this Dáil agree with the fundamental principles which have been so excellently expressed in the speech of the Minister for Defence. I am to take it, I suppose, that the Deputies for whom Deputy Johnson speaks agree with them. And, if that is so, it seems to me extraordinary that, when the issue is accepted in substance, at the same time, for reasons which, in themselves are of no importance, for reasons connected with the manner in which certain officers carry out their duties, for allegations about prisoners and for trivialities of that sort, the Deputy finds himself unable to vote for the resolution. It is extraordinary that after swallowing the camel they should strain at the gnat. I am saying this quite frankly. I think a lot about tone, but I think straight talk is even more important. The Black aud Tans were referred to. It was not quite clear that the National Army were conducting themselves like Black and Tans. I could not follow the allusion very well. We heard that prisoners were ill-treated. We heard that officers were carrying out their duties—at least, there were allegations—in a manner that was not exactly courteous. These are the allegations. I wonder has Deputy Johnson ever made a single complaint to the Minister for Defence. Has he ever given him an instance. I wonder that he didn't give some instance to the Dáil. It is easy to make general statements. It is easy to say such and such a thing was told by somebody else. That does not carry us anywhere. No man who had a serious case to make would fall back on that sort of thing. I have no doubt that under the circumstances——

On a point of explanation, I gave in my speech yesterday a definite case of one of those complaints, which I had taken up with the Minister for Defence.

Deputy O'Shannon gave one case yesterday.

Another point of explanation,, one out of several which I had taken up with the Minister for Defence.

Deputy O'Shannon states he gave one of several cases yesterday. I am referring to the case made by Deputy Johnson to-day. He suggested that this discourtesy, that this brutal treatment of prisoners was general, but we got no proof of any case. We were not told that he had ever made written complaints that could be investigated. Everybody listening to me knows the country thought that the National Troops had been on occasions a little too courteous, and a little too ready to take prisoners. (Some Labour Members:—"Shame.") We all know what happened in Maryborough. We know that three of the best Officers in the National Army were shot dead with dum dum bullets, and that immediately after doing that the ambushing party put up their hands and walked out, and that they were led out by a gentleman who was a jailer the year before. We know that that sort of incident is happening, the country knows it, and it admires the restraint of the National Troops under those circumstances, and the complaints of ill-treatment of prisoners that are made by Deputy Johnson find no echo whatever in the country.

On a point of information, what is being done with the leader of the ambush who has been captured?

I think that question should be addressed to the Minister for Defence. Now, we are asked what is our future policy. There is a complaint made that we have not stated our policy for the future. I think we ought to look at this matter in perspective. Our first and most important policy for the future is to vindicate the authority of Parliament, and I make no secret of it.

By any method.

Our next policy, and only second importance, is to ratify the Treaty, and pass the Constitution, and lay the foundations of the State, foundations upon which something worthy can be built. That is a rather ambitious policy, and if we are able to carry through that policy with the help of the Dáil, and I hope with the help of the Labour Party, we will have done good work, we will have done as good work as was ever done by a Parliament for this country. Unemployment was mentioned—well, we have a policy for unemployment and we are putting that policy into operation. That is the cold fact. What is the cause of Unemployment, or rather what are the causes? There is unemployment all over Europe. There is unemployment as a reaction from the Great War, but what is the cause of the abnormal unemployment in Ireland, and what are the causes, which should be better known by Deputy Johnson than by me? How can you have anything else except unemployment when the whole transport system of the country is being smashed up? How can you have anything else but unemployment when the whole banking system of the country is held up? How can you open this factory in Drogheda which Deputy Johnson mentioned when every man with £5 in his pocket keeps it there, and rightly so? You cannot have industry going, you cannot Open factories when goods trains are being looted, when shops are being looted, when taxes are not being paid. Let us come down to realities.

These things prevailed before April and before June.

Let us drop the humbug; the real causes of the unemployment in this country at present are the deliberate and preconceived destruction of the economic life of the country by those now in arms against this Parliament. This is the cold fact, and nobody can deny it. We will take what ever military measures are necessary to render these men powerless for that purpose, and in doing so we are talking the only steps we can to relieve unemployment.

I move that the Motion be now put.

I second that I proposal.

Amendment put and lost.

An bhfuil cead agamsa leas rún eile do chur? Níl uaim acht fócal anso is ansud d'atharu.

Níl céad agat é sin a dhéanamh anois.

Some of the members of the Independent group would be pleased to vote on behalf of a policy so ably defended by the Minister of Defence and by the Minister of Agriculture if the wording of the Motion was slightly altered. It seems to us from the beginning it is too narrow, and the ample volume of discussion which has raged around it rather supports our view. Some of us are not able to support altogether with approval what is succinctly covered by the words "the action the Government has taken." Some of us are not aware what action the Government is taking. We have not been told. But if the resolution were made to conform to the speech of the Minister of Agriculture, it would read like this, "That the Dáil approves of the determination shown by the Government to assert the authority of the Parliament and enforce the will of the Irish people," we would support it. So I would like, on behalf of this little group, to move that as an amendment if it be acceptable. I believe, if it were adopted by the original mover, we should have the inestimable advantage in moral effect of practically an unanimous vote of the Dáil.

I think, without any question, if such a Motion was accepted, we, for our part, are prepared to support it.

I submit that you should put the amendment to the Dáil. If you dispose of one amendment, you are entitled to take another amendment. I think the Government ought to reconsider their position in this matter and accept that amendment. It is sufficiently wide, and we would have unanimity on the matter.

Surely a proposition that the Motion be now put cannot be accepted until the amendments are disposed of.

My idea was to change the Wording. I object to the term "House" in the resolution, and I object to the term "Parliament." I suggest the word "House" be changed to Dáil and the word Government be changed to Ministry, and that we assert and vindicate this policy: to assert the authority of the Dáil.

The word suggested, by Mr. De Roiste might not be applicable to them.

There has, for one thing, been a Constitutional dispute as to whether this is a House or a Dáil. We already had a painful incident at the opening of the proceedings with regard to the status of the Dáil, and I suggest it is better to keep the vaguer general word, even though it be not in consonance with the practice of the second Dáil.

This is the Dáil.

May I say, in personal explanation, I do not question any more than the President does that it is the Dáil. I merely want to point out that I want to avoid anything which militates against a practically unanimous vote on this question.

Too many schoolmasters, I think.

This is the Amendment proposed by Deputy William Magennis and seconded by Deputy Laurence O'Neill:—

"That this Dáil approves the determination of the Ministry to assert the authority of the Dáil and enforce the will of the Irish people."

There is nothing concealed behind that whatsoever. It means just what the words convey.

Is thereby attempt to escape responsibility for the action the Government has taken up to this from the 28th June last? If there be any attempt to escape that responsibility I certainly will not accept this particular Motion. Is there any attempt to evade that responsibility?

None whatever.

I certainly will not accept any responsibility for many of the actions the Government has taken since June 28th.

Let us have the point settled one way or the other. Is there any minority in this Dáil, or any Member of it, who takes exception to the action the Government took on the 28th June?

A LABOUR MEMBER:

Yes.

If there is the sooner we have it out the better. It does not mean that we have got into what may be called a mess, and that we want to escape out of it or that we expect support. We have taken a very serious responsibility in this matter, and we do not seek to evade that responsibility. When people speak of prisoners and of disadvantages, and of other sufferings, they evidently forget that our soldiers are there, cockshots for any sniper behind either a wall or a chimney or anything else. Day and night the sniper goes on with his fell work, and not alone the soldiers of the National Army, paid for out of the Treasury of the Irish people, but even the unfortunate civilians going to their work and to their rest, and even women and children at night, their lives are made a torture.

Are we to understand the President or the Ministry have accepted the amendment?

Certainly not. I was merely allowing the President to say why he will not accept it.

It is not for me to accept it. I do accept the fullest share of my responsibility for this business, right from the beginning. I may say I am a peaceable man, like the late President Arthur Griffith. He abhorred strife. I abhor strife; I do not like it. This is not a question of the Government putting its hands into the pockets of a bank, or a finance house, or into the rich people's pockets. It is not for that. That puts no stop to unemployment. The real thing that is at the root of unemployment is the shocking discredit which the whole business of this country has been reduced to by reason of the action of the Irregulars, and we have never hesitated to place the responsibilities on the proper shoulders. If there people in this Dáil who seek to evade that responsibility, that is their business. I won't do it. I have not done it from the beginning, and I am not going to do it now. What has got to be asserted in this country is not the mere term, the supremacy of Parliament. It is the supremacy of the people's right to live their lives in peace, to possess whatever little they may have, to own a security that is the security of a free people, without interruption by any armed despot with a revolver in his pocket or a bomb in his hand. I listened to-night for a very long time to a statement in connection, with a factory in Dundalk, and I did not hear a single syllable regarding the terms under which that was offered to the Government. It was all comment; it was all fine great, big dressing of a skeleton. It is time to get back to realities, and it's time to get down to business. I heard a discussion about currency. If I know anything about currency it is this—and it is as well the Dáil would have some idea of what my limitations are in regard to business. As I understand currency it comes to this, that a country can only borrow a sum of money that it can afford to Pay. If it borrows in excess of the money it is capable of paying, bang goes its currency. What are we asked to do? Evidently if we are going to deal with unemployment, we are going to borrow huge sums of money. And when we are going to borrow we must admit that our Income Tax is not being paid, that in one important centre—one very important commercial centre in this country—not one single percent, of Income Tax is paid. Are we going, to borrow on that security, and if we are, what is the percentage we are going to pay, and are we able to pay that percentage then when it is charged? I may be a child in these things. I have not read many books on the subject. I have just an ordinary business man's contemplation of the means the Government must adopt to meet its liability. What hopes have we of borrowing money and repaying it when the political atmosphere is so charged with suspicion, with unrest, and with insecurity? Can anyone tell me what a Government in a position, like that has got to offer in the shape of interest? Let us get at the very beginning of things. We know very well that it is much the same as money being put into a sieve—that any section of the community can come along with arms an burst up any works of improvement a they have done with various piers and other things. The action we have taken in this matter is not for the mere formula of the supremacy of Parliament. It is a formula for the security of the people, or the security of their lives, and the value of their money in this country Now, with regard to this resolution. It is an important matter that we should know exactly where we stand. There is no use in getting up here and making apologetic speeches for the people outside who are in arms against us. We know, the Government knows, and every Member of the Dáil knows, that he carries his life in his hands; that there is a state of woeful moral degradation abroad, that many of our people have lost all sense of moral responsibility, and that the nation is reeking with the filth of over-wrought nerves, and dope that is being handed out——

By both sides.

By people certainly not in their sense. I know there are idealists amongst the Republicans. I know it well. I told the Dáil last December that there was at least one man, who meant what he said. I know there were fakers there—men who said what they did not mean, and who, when they put up the white flag, actually drew idealism and Republicanism in the mud. I admire the Republicans who met our troops and fought them. I have no admiration for those men who, like those at Leix, having done their fell work, screamed for mercy, when 25 of them surrendered to 6 of our troops. We were criticised because we did not hold the Parliament on the 28th June. What were the facts? A second institution in the country had a meeting called for a day or two after the 28th June, and there are Members of this Dáil members of that institution, and a resolution was there tabled criticising the Government. 128 Members of this Dáil are scattered from Donegal to Cork, and from Galway to Dublin; and the other institution has 80 members, each one of whom lives in the City of Dublin. A quorum could not turn up to that institution, at which they tabled the resolution condemning us for not collecting a quorum out of 126 Members. As there are four Members of that institution here I would like to know am I staling an untruth?

I was present at that, and I said that instead of postponing the Dáil and starting the war, they should have postponed the war and held the Dáil.

It is time, anyhow, for standing up to what we think. We have not shirked our responsibilities. We believed, and we still believe, we did right by striking. If I were to meet the Supreme Judge within 5 minutes from now I would go, Hoping every action of my life was as well justified as that action. I am not afraid of taking a vote in this Dáil on that question.

We are not dealing with the morality of the question, but the wisdom.

Well, if ever I have done a wise thing, I back on that as the wisest thing lever did. I appreciate the opinions of those who differ from us, even if they are not as wise as we are. At this moment this country is suffering from a lack of moral courage, and I was proud to hear the Member for Offaly speak of that the other night. I spoke already about Income Tax, and he spoke about the rates, and there are more things than those; there are possibly people in this Dáil who have not paid their Income Tax, and who could afford to pay it; and there are possibly people in this Dáil who could pay their rates and who have not paid them. There are rich people outside who are evading their responsibilities. And if this Dáil does not do anything else except to electrify the country into a state of moral responsibility it will have done some good, even though the Irregulars get us 5 minutes after we have done that much. Now I think I have done rather well. With regard to borrowing money, this is not the time for borrowing money. A Member of this Dáil put up a proposition to me some time ago that we should borrow money, I think at 5½ per cent. As I told ex-President De Valera, I am a trifle hard at bargaining, and I would not take money at ½ per cent. It is too much. We are not a rich country, and we are getting poorer because people seek to get reputations now by quick results. The Irregulars are doing it at this moment. The late President Arthur Griffith did not get a reputation by quick results; he was 30 years earning the name he got. The late General Michael Collins put in as much work in 5 years as an ordinary man would put in in 20. If we are going to make this country worth living in we will have to work it. It means hard work. We are doing it at this moment, 10, or 12, or 13 hours a day, and it will have to be done if there are going to be any real results out of the Treaty. We are prepared to do it, and to take the responsibility; but if the House does not agree with the action we have taken, this is the time for saying it.

This amendment has been put before me with two names attached. Is it the intention of the proposer to continue it?

Nothing that has been said has in the slightest way affected the matter.

In standing by the original resolution and putting it before the Dáil, it must not be thought that those who shared the responsibility and took upon themselves the responsibility to deal with the situation of the last couple of months want to place on the shoulders of any single person in this Dáil, or any group in this Dáil, any responsibility that properly does not belong to them. In declining to accept this amendment I take it that it is perfectly understood that it is not turning our backs or denying in any way the fact that this Dáil as a whole shoulders its responsibility for the future. It is necessary for us to give the Dáil here an opportunity of saying to what extent it does back those people, and it does take upon itself the responsibility of sharing that responsibility which some members of it, acting as the Government of the time, took upon themselves.

I now put the amendment—" That the Dáil approves the determination of the Ministry to assert the authority of Dáil and enforce the will of the Irish people."

The Dáil divided: Tá 17; Níl 53.

  • Thomás de Nógla.
  • Riobaárd Ó Deaghaidh.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Lorcan Ó Neíil.
  • Liam Ó Briain.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Tomás Ó Conaill
  • Aodh Ó Culachain.
  • Seámus Éabhróid.
  • Liam Ó Daimhin.
  • Séan Ó Laidhin.
  • Cathal Ó Seanáin.
  • Seán Ó Laidhin.
  • Nioclas O Faolain.
  • Domhnall Ó Faolain.
  • Risteard Mac Fheorais.
  • Domhnall Ó Ceallacháin.

Níl

  • Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
  • Donhadh Ó Guaire.
  • Uáitéar Mac Cumhaill.
  • Seán Ó Maolrueaidh.
  • Pádraig Ó Braonain.
  • Seán Ó Lideadha.
  • Seán Ó Duinnín.
  • Micheál Ó hAonghusa.
  • Seán Ó hAodha.
  • Liam de Róiste.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seosamh Mag Fhionnlaoich.
  • Seosamh Mac Suibhne.
  • Peadar Mac a' Bhaird.
  • Darghal Figes.
  • Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.
  • Seán Ó Ruanaidh.
  • Micheál de Duram.
  • Ailfrid Ó Broin.
  • Seán Mac Garaidh.
  • Risteard Ó Maolcatha.
  • Pilib Mac Cosgair.
  • Seosamh Mag Craith.
  • Domhnall Mac Carthaigh.
  • Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
  • Sir Seamus Craig,'Ridire, M.D.
  • Gearóid Mac Giobuin, K.C.
  • Liam Thrift.
  • Eoin Mac Neill.
  • Pádraig Ó hOgáin.
  • Pádraic Ó Máille.
  • Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Séamus Cruahlaoich.
  • Criostóir Ó Broin.
  • Ristéard Mac Liam.
  • Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.
  • Tomás Mac Artuir.
  • Séamus Ó Doláin.
  • Aindriu Ó Laimhin.
  • Ristéard Ó hAodha.
  • Proinsias Mag Aonghusa.
  • Eamon Ó Dugain.
  • PeadarÓ hAodha.
  • Séamus Ó Murchadha.
  • Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhrighde.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Tomás Ó Domhnaill.
  • Éarnán de Blaghd.
  • Uinseann de Faoite.
  • Domhnall Ó Broin.
  • Séamus de Burca.
  • Micheál Ó Dubhghaill.
Amendment declared defeated.

Tá.

Níl.

Thomás de Nógla.Riobaárd Ó Deaghaidh.Tomás Mac Eoin.Lorcan Ó Neíil.Liam Ó Briain.Liam Mag Aonghusa.Tomás Ó ConaillAodh Ó Culachain.Seámus Éabhróid.Liam Ó Daimhin.Séan Ó Laidhin.Cathal Ó Seanáin.Seán Ó Laidhin.Nioclas O Faolain.Domhnall Ó Faolain.Risteard Mac Fheorais.Domhnall Ó Ceallacháin.

Liam T. Mac Cosgair.Donhadh Ó Guaire.Uáitéar Mac Cumhaill.Seán Ó Maolrueaidh.Pádraig Ó Braonain.Seán Ó Lideadha.Seán Ó Duinnín.Micheál Ó hAonghusa.Seán Ó hAodha.Liam de Róiste.Séamus Breathnach.Seosamh Mag Fhionnlaoich.Seosamh Mac Suibhne.Peadar Mac a' Bhaird.Darghal Figes.Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.Seán Ó Ruanaidh.Micheál de Duram.Ailfrid Ó Broin.Seán Mac Garaidh.Risteard Ó Maolcatha.Pilib Mac Cosgair.Seosamh Mag Craith.Domhnall Mac Carthaigh.Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.Sir Seamus Craig,'Ridire, M.D.Gearóid Mac Giobuin, K.C.Liam Thrift.Eoin Mac Neill.Pádraig Ó hOgáin.Pádraic Ó Máille.Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.Seoirse Mac Niocaill.Séamus Cruahlaoich.Criostóir Ó Broin.Ristéard Mac Liam.Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.Tomás Mac Artuir.Séamus Ó Doláin.Aindriu Ó Laimhin.Ristéard Ó hAodha.Proinsias Mag Aonghusa.Eamon Ó Dugain.PeadarÓ hAodha.Séamus Ó Murchadha.Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhrighde.Liam Mac Sioghaird.Tomás Ó Domhnaill.Éarnán de Blaghd.Uinseann de Faoite.Domhnall Ó Broin.Séamus de Burca.Micheál Ó Dubhghaill.

The Dáil divided on the motion: Tá 54; Níl 15.

Tá.

Níl.

Liam T. Mac Cosgar.Donchadh Ó Guaire.Uaitear Mac Cumhaire.Seán Maolruaidh.Pádrag Braonain.Seán Lideadha.Seán Ó Duinnin.Micheál Ó hAonghusa.Seán Ó hAodha.Liam de Róoiste.Séamus Breathnach.Seosamh Mag Fhionniaoich.Peadar Mac a'Bhaird.Daighal Figes.Deasmhunmhain Mac Geareailt.Seán Ruanaidh.Micheál de Duram.Ailfrid Broin.Seán Mac Garaidh.Risteard Ó Maolchatha.Pilib Mac Cosgair.Seosamh Mag Craith.Domhnall Mac Carthaigh.Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.Sir Séamus Craig, Ridire, M.D.Gearoid Mac Giobuin, K.C.Liam Thrift.Eoin Mac Neill.Liam Mag Aonghusa.Pádraig Ó hOgain.Pádraig Máille.Seosamh Faoileachain.Seoirse Mac Niocaill.Súamus Cruadhlaaoich.Criostóir Ó Broin.Risteard Mac Liam.Caoimhghin Ó hUigin.Tomás Mac Artuir.Séamus Ó Dóláin.Aindriu Ó Laimhin.Risteard Ó hAodha.Liam Ó hAodha.Proinsias Mag Aonghusa.Eamon Ó Dugain.Peadar Ó hAodha.Séamus Ó Murchadha.Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhrighde.Liam Mac Sioghaird.Tomás Ó Domhnaill.Earnán de Blaghd.Uinseann de Faoite.Domhnall Ó Broin.Séamus de Burca.Micheál Ó Dubhghal.

Pádraig Mac Gamhna.Tomás de Nogla.Riobard Ó Deaghaidh.Thomás Mac Eoin.Liam Ó Briain.Tomás Ó Conaill.Aodh Ó Culachain.Séamus Eabhroid.Seán Ó Laidhin.Cathal Ó Seanáin.Seán Buitleir.Nioclas Ó Faolain.Domhnall Ó Muirgheasa.Risteard Mac Fheorais.Domhnall Ó Ceallachain.

Motion declared carried.

At the conclusion of the calling of the roll, if a Member draws attention to the fact that he has not recorded his vote, the Dáil may agree to allow him then to record his vote. Before the adjournment of the Dáil is moved, I have been asked to state nominations will be received for the Committee to deal with payments of Ministers, Speaker and Deputy-Speaker, and Members of Dáil Eireann. I have already received from two groups nominations; in one case one, and in another two. The suggestion of the President is that nominations for 10 Members of the Committee should be handed to the President of the Dáil himself immediately.

We will collect the ballot papers at 4 o'clock by agreement.

Might I ask if the P.M.G. has any statement to make in connection with the Postal Strike?

I understood there was to be a discussion on that. It is now being waived.

I intended to raise the same question, butas the hour is late I think it had better be deferred.

If it is the will of the Dáil to hear the P.M.G., provided it does not lead to a discussion——

You cannot have that.

I take it then the Dáil stands adjourned until three o'clock to-morrow.

Motion: "That the Dáil do now adjourn," put and agreed to.
The Dáil adjourned at 9 p.m.