There is an amendment in my name to delete sub-Section 1 of Section 8, and my object in putting it down was more or less to get information. As it only means the deletion of the sub-section, and as that sub-section was discussed rather fully, and, to a certain extent, rather acrimoniously yesterday, I think it would be advisable to withdraw the amendment. I, therefore, ask leave of the Dáil to withdraw it.
DÁIL IN COMMITTEE. - MINISTERS AND SECRETARIES BILL—THIRD STAGE (RESUMED).
SECTION 8.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move the following amendment:—
"In sub-Section (1), lines 56 and 57, to delete the words `there shall be and there is hereby constituted a Council of Defence to assist the Minister for Defence,' and to substitute therefor the words `it shall be lawful for the Minister for Defence to establish a Council of Defence to assist him.' "
The amendment is more or less to give the Minister the option of setting up whatever Council or body that he, in his capacity as Minister, may deem advisable, and not, like the section as it stands, compel him to do so, and give the Council a statutory basis, as it gets in the Bill. While it gives the Minister the option of setting up this Council, it does not relieve him of his rightful responsibility to discharge whatever administrative duties may fall to him as Minister for Defence. While it gives him an option to set up the Council, responsibility will rest with him for any Council set up in his name.
We are not accepting this amendment. I do not know how it will affect the civil member who, it is proposed, is to be attached to the Council. In opposing the amendment the principal strength of my opposition would come from the fact that our own experience has suggested to us to have the Council of Defence set up in this particular manner. The experience in other countries has made them adopt this particular type of Council as a systematic piece of organisation in connection with their Defence Department. I mentioned yesterday that the Defence Department is liable to be put under a strain in a time of national emergency that comes to the lot of no other Department to be put under. The foresight in connection with the making of plans, as well as matters of policy, is a matter that requires most careful and systematic consideration. The Defence Department will consist of the heads of a number of administrative departments which are separate from the point of view that they are administered by different heads, and yet they all have to come together for a common purpose. The three military sections will have to come together for the common purpose of armed operations. The fourth member coming in with the Minister gives you a body of five, who have to come together from the point of view of general administration, and all those matters that concern policy, both from the point of view of administration and of action at any particular time. It is a safeguard to the country; it is a safeguard to the Dáil; and it is a safeguard to the Executive Council that they would clearly understand the machinery by which the Minister coordinated his policy and his plans for the future of the Department, and that it would not be left to a haphazard Council that might be selected in one way or in another. It should not be left to the Minister at any particular time, as it were, to say to himself that he was of such a nature that he could do all the co-ordinating himself. That would be putting too great a strain, in my opinion, on any particular man, and it would be putting too great a strain on the faith, perhaps, of the Dáil and of the Executive Council in the capacity of one single man. You require the headship to the Army of that particular type of Council of Defence from many points of view. It does not in any way derogate from the responsibility of the Minister, or derogate from the power that it is necessary for him to have because of that responsibility.
The different members of the Council will be men who are selected for their fitness for a particular position. They will change from time to time, but the heads of those Departments will occupy, as well as being heads of their Departments, a statutory position, and will be required to co-ordinate in a systematic way the work of their different Departments for the general and prime function of the Ministry. It would be wrong, therefore, not to say systematically that this Council of Defence will be created in this particular way, and I would urge very strongly that the amendment would not be for the general good of the Ministry or the general security of the State.
Without trespassing too far on the indulgence of the Committee, I would add this. It is really repeating what I said last night in answering a question of Deputy Johnson, that a difficulty of this amendment of Deputy Davin's, is that the persons without a statutory constitution in the Council of Defence would be really without any proper definite status. One of the great advantages from the Civil and Parliamentary end in the scheme proposed, is that there will be a Civil member of this body, member of this Dáil who will have statutory position. Without the Clause, as it has been inserted in the Bill, such a person would be a mere volunteer invited by the Minister to act on the body. While the Minister will, it is assumed, have more of his time taken up with considering broad questions of policy, the civil member will be charged with authority for watch over the finance, that is to say, the handling of the money voted by the Dáil for Army purposes, and it is the virtue of the Clause that it gives the civil members, as well as the others, a Statutory position on the body.
I am not yet convinced that it is a good thing to set up this Council in this way in this Bill. The Minister has defended it on the ground that it is necessary to give the various nominated members of the Council a statutory position, and rather suggests that it is too much of a responsibility to put upon the Minister, for the time being, the nomination of such a Council—the nomination of the persons to fill the offices, the holding of which offices is to be by statutory authority. The Council is in the hands of the Minister, so the responsibility he says should not be imposed upon him, is in fact imposed upon him. And there is this further consideration, that in a time of war it might be thought well to bring into a Council of Defence some other person who has not been an administrator of an Army Department, and who is deemed to be specially qualified for the purpose of acting on the Council of Defence during a time of war.
That has been the experience in more countries than one, and perhaps even the Minister will recollect something of the kind happening in this country. If you constitute this Council in this way you will be limited to these members named, and you cannot very well go beyond that. You could not, for instance, call in any Minister who might be specially qualified to act as a member of this Council in a time of stress. You might desire to call in, say, the Minister in charge of Industry and Commerce; it might be found desirable to mobilise all the industrial resources of the country, and that that Minister should be a member of this Council, but you are preventing that possibility, except you adopt other statutes or go outside the law altogether. I contend that the appointment of a Council of Defence should be a matter for the Executive Council and the Minister for Defence, and that such a Council should not be set up, especially in this manner, and placed in a position of authority which, I believe, notwithstanding the desire of the Ministry, would dissipate somewhat the Minister's responsibility to the Dáil. The Council of Defence, which is a Council mainly of military men, might well be tempted to say: "We have authority from the Dáil; we are a majority, and notwithstanding the fact that the Minister is the head of this Council, the Oireachtas has placed on us the responsibility, and we will submit our case to them." I contend that while placing this Council in the position in this statutory way, you are inviting them to take a position such as I have suggested, and that the authority of the Minister for Defence is weakened. Therefore, I support the amendment.
The work of the Council of Defence is preparation, and as such it ought not to be confused with what you might have in time of war, and which it would be better, perhaps, to call a Council of War. As far as co-operation with the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and other Departments, is concerned, naturally, in considering the development of our Department of Defence, where you are going to rely on the mainspring of our country's resistance to any emergency, you will review the whole of your Departments of State, but the responsibility for having reviewed them and the preparation of your military weapon will be on the Minister for Defence. So that we must not confuse that preparation with the Council of War, and the work of the Council of Defence is work of preparation. The fact that from that particular point of view it is a statutory body would not preclude, in time of emergency, a Council of War of a very different type being specially set up.
May I point out, in answer to the suggestion of Deputy Johnson as to any danger of the majority assertion and domination, that if my amendment Number 12, to Sub-Section 5, is adopted, that position would become impossible.
Amendment put and declared lost.
Amendment by Mr. Davin:—
To delete Sub-Section (2) and to substitute therefor as follows:—
"The Minister for Defence shall be Chairman of any Council of Defence established under the next preceding sub-section and shall assign to the Council of Defence and to the several members thereof such of the business of the Department of Defence as he thinks fit and may at any time withdraw, enlarge or redistribute any of his powers so assigned."
This is consequential.
Amendment not moved.
I move: In Sub-Section (2), lines 4 and 5 page 7, to delete the words ("under the style of Commander-in-Chief.") In doing so, I do not propose to refer to the discussion that we had yesterday. I accept absolutely the President's statement on the constitutional position. It is quite clear to me that if we have, as we have, power under the Treaty to raise an Army, we must have power to control and command it, and that no amount of special pleading can alter that fact. I propose solely to address myself to the question of whether it is desirable that the offices of Minister for Defence and Commander-in-Chief should be combined in the same person, and I shall address myself to that mainly in considering how such an arrangement has worked in other countries and on the verdict of history, because I think it has been generally held that the functions of Commander-in-Chief and the functions of Minister for Defence are essentially separate. In England the Commander-in-Chief functions under the Secretary of State for War. He existed long before the Secretary of State for War, and it is a peculiar fact that when the Commander-in-Chief in England was not a Royal personage he was invariably an Irishman. It was found after the Secretary of State for War was established that his functions and the functions of the Commander-in-Chief clashed. How was that difficulty met? It was not met by uniting these functions in the same person; it was met by passing the War Office Act of 1870, which definitely subordinated the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War. I know that the Attorney-General would like to know my authority. It is Erskine May's Constitutional History of England in this case. He mentioned yesterday that Lord Kitchener held the two posts, but overlooked two facts. The first was that this was an experiment. It produced enormous confusion, and had Lord Kitchener lived he would have been removed from his post, and although he was a soldier and Minister for War, he did not have the sole Command-in-Chief as is proposed in this section. In France the Minister for War is almost invariably a soldier, but he was never called Commander-in-Chief, and none of the four Commanders-in-Chief the French had during the Great War—Marshal Joffre, General Nivelle, Marshal Foch and General Petain—were Ministers for War. There was always an entirely separate Minister for War, carrying on separate functions.
In the United States, the President is nominally the Commander-in-Chief, but in war they found it in practice desirable to have a Commander-in-Chief, such as Generals Scott, McClelland, and Grant. Both McClelland and Grant had executive functions in the War Office, which were entirely distinct executive functions from that of the Commander-in-Chief. In Canada, according to Constitutional precedent, there is no Commander-in-Chief, but there is a Chief of General Staff, General MacBrien, who is an Irishman, Everywhere we go outside this country I do not think there is a single precedent for combining the functions of Commander-in-Chief and Parliamentary Minister in charge of the Department of War in the same person. As far as I know, there is not, and except for one reason which I shall state later, there is no reason why they should be combined, and there is one very strong reason against it, because, generally speaking, the same kind of man cannot fill the two posts. If the term Commander-in-Chief means anything, it means that the man who will command in time of war will have as high and heavy responsibility as could be placed on the shoulders of any soldier. The qualities necessary in the command of an army are instant decision, readiness to take responsibility, and fearlessness of criticism; and these are not necessarily those that qualify a man to come to the Dáil, answer questions, defend his department, and submit to the give and take of Parliamentary debate. Looking at history, how many famous soldiers could have combined these functions? Julius Caesar could have possibly. He was a party leader, almost a Labour leader, until he was forty years of age, and then he took to soldiering as a second string. Napoleon would preside occasionally at Councils of State, which more or less corresponded to the Seanad, but he always made it clear that he was presiding, and he generally finished the sittings by calling the other members imbeciles. That, perhaps, is not a desirable precedent. The qualities of a great commanding soldier are not usually those of a Parliamentary tactician——
A DEPUTY-
What about Wellington?
Wellington was about the worst Prime Minister England ever had. He sat in the House of Lords and did not ordinarily have the give and take of Parliamentary debate. The qualities that fit a man for command in the field are not the qualities that fit a man for control in the House; there may be exceptions, and one argument is that there is an exception, and that the exceptional qualities of the present Minister are such. I have no intimate knowledge of his work as a soldier, but results speak for themselves. I have knowledge of his ability in the Dáil, but I think we would be making a mistake if on the exceptional qualities of the present Minister we make a rule which will bind us for ever in the future. When our army becomes smaller it may be necessary, and certainly will be desirable, to combine Ministries, and it may be necessary to combine the Ministry of Defence with some other Department. In Southern Rhodesia the same person, I believe, combines the offices of Minister for Defence and Attorney-General. It may be the Attorney-General would not be the most convincing Commander-in-Chief that the Army would require, at all events on mounted occasions, so I think it is a mistake. If my amendment is carried there is nothing to prevent the present Minister for Defence being given the title of Commander-in-Chief by the Executive Council, but I think, unless I hear reasons to the contrary, it would be a mistake to bind ourselves absolutely, that every Minister for Defence in future shall have the title of Commander-in-Chief. That would limit us too closely in selection for that office.
While the Minister for Defence is recovering from his blushes, may I assume the office of Section Commander. I want to point out one or two facts in relation to the parenthesis in this section. In the first place, the Minister for Defence must be a member of the Dáil. If the Deputy will refer to our Electoral Act he will find that a member of the Dáil cannot be a soldier on active service or on full pay. Consequently, we have it that the Minister for Defence cannot be actually a soldier. If the Deputy refers to the Defence Forces Act, the temporary provisions of which will probably be retained, he will find that the Minister for Defence cannot hold any executive command. He will find that the Command-in-Chief is given under Section 5 of the Defence Forces Act, as follows:—"The Command-in-Chief of and all executive and administrative powers in relation to the forces... shall be vested in the Executive Council." The position is that the Command-in-Chief is vested in the Executive Council; but just as the Executive Council is not called collectively Minister for Finance, or is not called collectively Minister for Home Affairs—individuals wear these titles while the body bears a collective responsibility—so the Command-in-Chief is given a personality in the person of the Minister for Defence. His functions as Commander-in-Chief are practically confined, in that capacity, to acting as Chairman of the Defence Council. Consequently, the criticism, which arises from the analogy of actual soldiers holding the combined offices of Secretary for War and Commander-in-Chief, really does not apply. Even should a state of war arise, I take it that the executive command in the field would be vested by the Executive Council in some outstanding officer on the active list of the army, who would be chosen for the purpose, as is the case in Switzerland. Therefore, I submit this is no more than rendering personally to an individual, in the same way as is rendered to other Ministers, functions which are vested in the Executive Council, as a whole. In so far, it is only a style, and his functions are limited to Presidency of the Defence Council.
I think the statement of the Lawyer-in-Chief helps us to understand what was the intention of the Ministry in inserting this phrase in the Section. I believed, up to yesterday, it was very desirable that this should be deleted, and I was prepared to support in full the amendments put down for the deletion of this parenthesis ("under the style of Commander-in-Chief") but I am of opinion now that the Dáil should quite definitely, by the defeat of this amendment, assert its will in this matter. It should show that it has the right and authority to appoint any person to any office in the army under any title that it may wish to give. The question has been raised and, whether we like it or not, an answer has to be given to that question. It has been given by reference to the Defence Forces Act. But I believe that it is desirable that we should give the answer in a much more emphatic way by deliberately deciding to retain those words in the Sub-section. I hope that the matter will be pressed to a division so that the vote of the Dáil will be clear on it.
I shall not follow Deputy Cooper in taking up the historical side of this matter. I appreciate the opening statement of Deputy Cooper, and I am sure we all appreciate the Deputy's speech. After what occurred yesterday, does he think it practically possible to dissociate what we do to-day with what occurred yesterday? On several occasions Deputy Cooper has put it up to the Government that they are too little inclined to consult public opinion. I would ask him now to consult the views of the ordinary person outside. I think those who were present at yesterday's debate will be convinced that a great deal of it was intended more for the people outside the Dáil than for the people inside. Consequently, I will ask Deputy Cooper to consult public opinion outside so far as not to press this amendment. I do not think it is possible to dissociate this amendment from yesterday's debate. The only other point that I should desire to make is that I think in Deputy Cooper's speech there is noticeable an attempt that I have noticed in other sections of this Bill in connection with Parliamentary Secretaries, to assume that the principal duty of the Secretary to a Minister is to be present at debates and to make clever answers. Personally I think that is only portion of the work of a Minister or Secretary. I will, therefore, ask Deputy Cooper not to press the amendment.
I assure Deputy O'Sullivan that I put down this amendment three weeks ago, and I had no idea that any such arguments as were used yesterday would be made. I was thinking much more of the army than I was thinking of the Dáil. I thought it was a bad thing to say to a young officer who was beginning his career: "You shall work hard at your profession and attend courses and study the way of foreign armies, but you shall never, under any circumstances, become Commander-in-Chief. The most you can rise to is Chief of the General Staff. If you forsake your vocation, and come into the Dáil and speak here only when you are told to speak, then you may become Commander-in-Chief of the Army." I am personally, as regards this amendment, in the hands of the Dáil. I stand between Deputy O'Sullivan, who wishes me to withdraw, and Deputy Johnson, who asks me to press the amendment to a division. I am willing to take Deputy O'Sullivan's advice, and I will not press it to a division. I am not going to put the Dáil to the pain of registering a foregone conclusion. What I propose to do is to allow the question to be put. I personally would prefer to withdraw it, but if it is thought desirable that the Dáil should have an opportunity of definitely expressing its opinion, after what took place yesterday, I am prepared to afford that opportunity.
My name is down for a similar amendment. I should like to say that when I put down that amendment I had no idea that an amendment of a similar type would provoke the acrimonious discussion that took place yesterday. I was not animated by the ideas that animated some of the Deputies who spoke yesterday. I was a little bit puzzled as to the intentions of the clause. I could not quite understand why the Minister for Defence could not preside at the Council of Defence as Minister for Defence, and I could not understand why he was asked to preside under the title of Commander-in-Chief.
Having heard the lucid explanations of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Defence, I am quite prepared to follow Deputy Cooper's lead, or any other lead which would have the effect of removing any ill-feeling which may result from the debate of yesterday.
Amendment put.
The amendment is lost by the unanimous vote of the Committee.
Amendment 6, which is in my name, reads: "In Sub-Section (2), page 7, line 6, to delete the word `four' and to substitute therefor `three.' " Both that and the following amendment are really bound together. They were put down because at the time I had not seen the Attorney-General's amendment, and I thought it very undesirable to stereotype a Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence as part of our Constitutional system. The time may come when the Army will be only ten or twelve thousand strong. The Attorney-General has an amendment later on which meets the case. If he gives me some explanation which will allow me to withdraw my amendment, I shall be very glad to do so.
My amendment is intended to provide that there shall be a civil member of the Defence Council and if circumstances require—but not of necessity—he may be Parliamentary Secretary. It may be that at the moment it would be, as the President has said, an economy to have a paid Parliamentary Secretary as a civil member of that Council, charged with looking after the very large amount of money which is handled by the Army Department. It may that in a year or so that responsibility will have so far contracted that a member of the Dáil will be happy to attend to the matter without a stipend. The effect of my amendment is to provide that a member of the Dáil shall be added to the Council, and that he may be Parliamentary Secretary.
That, I think, meets my case, and I am agreeable to withdrawing the amendment. I should like to point out that the arrangements for dealing with correspondence in the Ministry of Defence very urgently need the attention of somebody. I would be prepared to agree to the appointment of a Parliamentary Secretary for a year or three years, but I do not want him as a sterotyped part of our constitutional machinery.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment: "In Sub-Section (2), page 7, lines 8 to 13, to delete the words `that is to say, a civil member being the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence who shall be responsible to the Ministry of Defence for the finance of the Military Defence Forces and for so much of the other business of the Council of Defence as may be from time to time allotted to him by the Minister for Defence, and ' "(Deputy Cooper), not moved.
I move the following amendment, which has the effect that I have just stated:—
In Sub-Section (2), page 7, line 9, to delete the words "the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence and insert in lieu thereof "a member of Dáil Eireann," and in line 10 to delete the words "Ministry of" and to substitute therefor the words "Minister for" and in line 13, after the word "Defence" to insert the words "and who shall act as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence."
Amendment put and agreed to.
I move:
After sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
"The military members of the Council of Defence shall not by virtue of their office as members of the Council of Defence receive any special remuneration in addition to the salaries attached to their rank."
My object in putting down this amendment was for the purpose of gaining information. I notice there is no specific reference to remuneration for members of the Council of Defence. I would like to hear from the Minister or the Attorney-General if there will be any special remuneration in addition to the ordinary pay which will go with the rank of the officers constituting the Council.
Their pay will be the pay which goes with their offices as Administrative Officials such as Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General. They do not receive any additional remuneration because of the fact that they will be persons who will act on the Defence Council.
In view of that explanation, I withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment: "to delete sub-section (3)" (Liam O'Daimhim) not moved.
I move: "In sub-section (5), lines 29 and 30, to delete the words "military" and "respectively."
This raises the question of at whose pleasure will the non-military members of this Council hold office. The sub-section reads: "The military members of the Council of Defence shall respectively hold that office at the pleasure of the Minister for Defence." We are asked to say that the members shall respectively hold that office at the pleasure of the Minister. Does that mean that the holders of this office may be dismissed from being members of the Council for Defence? If so, then we are arriving at a position in which the Minister shall be responsible for appointing members of the Council, irrespective of the offices that they hold.
If I may be allowed to interrupt, I would direct attention to the next amendment, which I would urge the Minister to accept. If it were accepted, the sub-section would then read: "The military members of the Council for Defence shall respectively hold that office at the pleasure of the Executive Council, acting upon the recommendation of the Minister for Defence."
That would meet my point.
The term "respectively" seems to have no meaning there, and to be superfluous.
If the deletion of it makes better English, in that respect, I humbly defer to the University Deputies.
I feel that we will have to treat amendments 11 and 12 as not moved, and allow somebody to delete sub-section (5) and insert a new sub-section.
I move that sub-section 5 be deleted and a new sub-section be inserted as follows
"Each of the Members of the Council of Defence shall hold that office at the pleasure of the Executive Council acting upon the recommendation of the Minister."
Question put and agreed to.
That disposes of Amendment 13 as well.
It practically does, except my amendment does not contain the words "on the recommendation of the Minister." I do not think, however, it makes any vital difference, so I shall not move it.
Amendment 13 not moved.
My amendment No. 14, is to delete Sub-section (6); but Amendment No. 12 has made a change, and this and the promise of the Minister for Defence, made, I think, yesterday, to insert after the word "responsible" in line 33, the words "collectively responsible to the Minister for Defence for all matters entrusted to it," meets my point, and I shall not, therefore, move the amendment.
Amendment No. 14 not moved.
I move in Sub-section (6), line 33, after the word "responsible" to insert the words "to the Minister for Defence."
The Sub-section would then read: "The Council for Defence shall meet and act as a collective body and shall be collectively responsible to the Minister for Defence for all matters entrusted to it in its collective capacity whether by an Act of the Oireachtas or otherwise."
Amendment agreed to.
I move that the Section, as amended, be added to the Bill. In making that motion I have to take into consideration the suggestion made by Deputy Johnson that we might defer the Section to a later date, but I have also to take into consideration the fact that the Section was the subject of an amendment which would delete the whole of it. That amendment was defeated, and, generally speaking, I might say, there has been substantial agreement in the House with regard to the acceptance, not alone of the spirit, but of the letter, of the Section. I do not think that if it were postponed we would receive further amendments with regard to it, or that any amendment proposed would materially alter the substance or matter of the Section, and perhaps the Deputy would reconsider his attitude and allow it to pass now.
I do not press the matter at all. It occurred to me, when I made the suggestion, that there may be a grievance because of the understanding late last night, and while I take note of that, and it ought to be taken note of, I recognise again that we are now in the Committee Stage and that the whole work of the Committee will have to be reported to the Dáil and can be dealt with on that occasion.
I think the Deputy who moved to delete the Section could not now speak on the question "that the Section as amended stand part of the Bill" without repeating himself; and the amendments passed, I think, if I recollect the discussion aright, go towards satisfying some of the difficulties the Deputy found to the Section itself, so I do not think there is any injustice. I will take the motion "that the Section as amended stand part of the Bill."
Question put and agreed to.
I move to report progress, and ask leave to sit again.
Agreed.