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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 17 Jan 1924

Vol. 6 No. 5

QUESTION OF RULINGS.

I want to raise a matter which, I think, calls for some consideration, and it arises out of the discussion which took place yesterday and two rulings that were given from the Chair. I am not now asking you to alter your ruling in any way, and I am not challenging your ruling with any view of affecting the proceedings on the Bill which was passed in the Dáil yesterday. I want to draw attention to the circumstances under which those rulings were given. The first case deals with the requirements of Standing Order 123, which says: "In cases of urgent necessity, of which the Ceann Comhairle shall be the judge, any Standing Order or Orders of the Dáil may be suspended for the day's sitting, on motion, duly made and seconded, with or without notice: Provided that such motion has the support of a majority of the Teachtaí of the Dáil who are qualified to vote." You ruled that a decision which was taken by a majority of those members present was a decision of the Dáil in accordance with that Standing Order. I am asking you and the Dáil to refer to the discussion which took place when that Standing Order was passed by the Dáil on the 8th March, 1923. The Standing Order was introduced by a Committee which sat on this matter, and the form of the Standing Order as introduced was as follows: "Provided that such motion has the support of a majority of the whole Teachtaí of Dáil Eireann." The Ceann Comhairle said in explanation: "I think 81 (c) would benefit by the deletion of the word `whole.' It seems absurd. `The whole Teachtaí' is a peculiar phrase. I would suggest that you put down `the total number of Teachtaí.'" Professor Magennis intervened and said "present and voting; otherwise it might mean the total number altogether." An Ceann Comhairle then said "That is what is meant." Professor Magennis said: "Present and voting." Mr. Blythe: "No, it means members of the Dáil who have taken the oath." The Ceann Comhairle replied: "The Committee understood those were the members of the Dáil." Mr. Fitzgibbon, who was in charge of this motion, said: "The object of this proposal is that it should not be open for a chance majority at the commencement of a sitting to suspend the Standing Orders, and that these Standing Orders, which have been passed by all of us, should not be done away with, except the majority of the whole body were in favour of suspending them for the time being." Mr. Blythe then said: "We could say `members of the Dáil who have taken their seats.' " An Ceann Comhairle replied: "It is proposed to amend this Order in this way—from the word `provided' read `that such motion has the support of a majority of the total number of Teachtaí who have taken their seats.' "

Professor Magennis and other speakers, including Mr. Hughes, who was a member of the Committee, go on to confirm that, and it is quite clear from that discussion that the intention of the Dáil at the time was the intention of the Section, as I urged yesterday, that it was a majority of those who had qualified themselves to vote by taking their seats, having taken the oath. That is point number one.

I want also to draw attention to the other point which touches on the Constitutional provision. The Minister for Home Affairs quoted Article 22 of the Constitution, which says: "All matters in each House shall, save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present other than the Chairman or presiding member, who shall have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes." That is as far as the Minister for Home Affairs read this article, and I am asking the Dáil to note the proviso, "save as otherwise provided by this Constitution." Following the quotations, which I have repeated, there comes this sentence: "The number of members necessary to constitute a meeting of either House for the exercise of its powers shall be determined by its Standing Orders." Thus the same article, which declares that the matters were to be determined by a majority of the members present, also says that the proceedings of the House are to be ruled according to Standing Orders decided by a majority of the House. I submit, therefore, that the ruling that has been given should not stand as a precedent for this reason, that if a majority of the Dáil at any time is empowered to abolish, for the time being, its Standing Orders, it may abolish even the quorum, and any four or five members of the Dáil who may be got together can put into the Chair a Chairman who may be complacent, and they may pass any resolution of a financial character, or any Bill to the extent that the Dáil can carry it, imposing or removing taxation. Such a chance majority can do anything if you have no Standing Orders. I, therefore, submit that it is impossible for any minority in the Dáil to remain in that position under Standing Orders if the decisions of yesterday are to be taken as the law of the Dáil, that is, as a precedent.

I might intervene for a moment before the Leas-Cheann Comhairle expresses any opinion or gives any judgment on this matter. I would say, first of all, that Deputy Johnson has dealt with this matter in what will be accepted generally as a very fair exposition of the general procedure carried on here since we first met. Apart from the Constitution and the Standing Orders, I think it will be admitted generally that there has been no attempt at sharp practice in the Dáil, and that every party in it and every member of it, no matter how small or how large the party, was considered, and that there was due and fair consideration given, not only to the business, but to every detail of the business as it came before the Dáil. Before going along to deal with the question the Deputy put to the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, I would say this: that I think there has been general agreement that the suspension of Standing Orders is a drastic measure, that it ought to be possible to suspend Standing Orders in certain cases, and that it ought to be possible also to do whatever is necessary to suspend Standing Orders, and at the same time to keep within the Constitution. I do not accept the Deputy's interpretation exactly of the second part of the 22nd Article of the Constitution. I would say that I find it impossible to read into the latter part of Article 22 any other construction than one; that is, that if this Standing Order were correct, if it were to stand, it would be necessary, in order to suspend Standing Orders, to have the quorum fixed at the full number of members qualified to vote. I think we can admit on all sides that that would be a physical impossibility. A single member objecting to the suspension of Standing Orders might walk out. If there were 100 members qualified to vote there might be 99 members in favour of a suspension of Standing Orders, and one member, in order to prevent Standing Orders being suspended, could walk out of the House and prevent it.

LABOUR DEPUTIES

No, that is not the case.

I am dealing with the argumentative side of the question. If the 53, that is a majority of the persons qualified to vote, be fixed as the number necessary to act within the Constitution, you must, to carry out the first part of the article, have a House and have a quorum fixed with the number of those qualified to vote. I think I have made it clear now. We agreed upon this, that Standing Orders ought not to be suspended on a mere snatch-vote, that some protection should be afforded to the House in the matter of suspension. I would undertake that there will not be moved by the Government any motion to suspend Standing Orders, except by consent, until we have had the matter dealt with either by the Committee on Standing Orders or the Committee on Procedure.

If that will meet the Deputy's point and get over this difficulty just now, when we come to solve it I am sure our minds will move in the same direction. While we do not wish to prevent the suspension of Standing Orders, we are all agreed that the suspension of Standing Orders is an extraordinary measure and ought to be safeguarded in such a way that it could not be done by a mere snatch vote.

May I just raise one point with regard to that? I did not know the matter was coming up to-day, and I am now speaking from my recollection, as I have not had an opportunity to turn to the Debates when this matter was raised once before. It will be within the recollection of Deputy Johnson, the President and yourself, that this suspension was sought on a previous occasion—if I remember rightly, about the third week of July last. On that occasion the Ceann Comhairle, who was in the Chair, found when the question was raised that the exact majority of all Deputies entitled to vote had been obtained. If my recollection serves me correctly, he said that on those grounds he allowed the motion to pass. If that is a correct recollection, and I think I have it fairly correctly, then surely that is the standing precedent: that a majority of all Deputies entitled to vote is required; the first precedent and the standing precedent; a precedent of greater value, with all deference to yourself, Sir, because of priority in time, to the precedent you established yesterday.

I agree with Deputy Johnson that we cannot very well leave this matter as it stands. I do not think the President contests that in the least. The apparent inconsistency between Article 22 of the Constitution and Standing Order 123 must be resolved, or else the position of whoever occupies your Chair will be an impossible one. I can only move by the general consent of the Dáil, but if I am in order I would like to move:

That the procedure to be adopted under Standing Order 123 be referred to the Committee on Procedure and Privileges, and that the Committee be instructed to report to the Dáil before February 1st.

I have named a comparatively late date for two reasons: (1) That a number of members on the Committee on Procedure are also members of the Committee on Wireless Broadcasting— at least four of them. (2) That it would be very desirable in this matter to have the assistance and the advice of the Ceann Comhairle, and I gather he will not be fit for work before next week. If I am in order in moving this motion, I do not know if the Dáil will give me leave to move it, but I think it would be desirable to have it definitely placed on the Order Paper. In the meantime the President's undertaking will operate.

About an hour ago Deputy Johnson very kindly sent me a note saying that he was going to raise this matter after questions. I agree with him that it is very important that no precedent should be established except on definite and defined lines. I based my ruling yesterday, not on Standing Order 123, but on Article 22 of the Constitution. Unfortunately I was not here when a question, not of the same nature, but of a somewhat similar kind, came up here in March last. I intend to bring this whole question under the notice of the Ceann Comhairle and find out from him what his suggestions about the matter are. As Deputy Cooper said, it would be far easier for An Ceann Comhairle to give a decision if he had clearly defined rules to go by. I shall see the Ceann Comhairle at the earliest possible moment and bring this whole question before him.

If I am in order, I would like to second the motion of Deputy Cooper. I think it is a reasonable way out of this difficulty, and it would give the Committee on Procedure an opportunity to go into the whole matter and a considered judgment can be delivered upon it.

Before you put that I would like to ask if Deputy Cooper would agree to leave the resolution over for the return of An Ceann Comhairle. I endeavoured to get into touch with him to-day, but was unable to do so. I intended to consult with him on the matter and see whether the Committee on Privileges or the Standing Orders Committee would be the better Committee to discuss the matter. If the Deputy were agreeable I may say that there will be no unnecessary delay, immediately on An Ceann Comhairle's return, in dealing with it.

It is quite obvious that I cannot press my resolution if anyone objects, much less the President. I am, of course, quite willing to respond to the President's appeal. He has given an undertaking that the position of minorities will not be prejudiced in the meantime.

I would like to say that when yesterday I quoted Article 22 of the Constitution, as against Standing Order No. 123, I read as much of that Article, as seemed to me, by simply glancing at it, was relevant. I did not deliberately refrain from reading the latter portion of the Article, and I did not see then, and I do not see now in the latter portion of the Article a contradiction of what precedes it.

I am satisfied with the President's suggestion, if it is made clear to the Dáil and myself that the law under which we are acting as members of the Dáil is not prejudged. That is all I want to secure, so that we shall know on this matter, at any rate, that our position is as we have considered it hitherto to be, whether we are for or against—that we may consider it subjudice—and that no precedent has been established.

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