Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 19 Mar 1924

Vol. 6 No. 28

PRIVATE BUSINESS. - THE ADJOURNMENT—ARMY POSITION.

MINISTER for HOME AFFAIRS (Mr. O'Higgins)

I move the adjournment of the Dáil until 3 p.m. to-morrow. This morning Deputy Johnson asked me a question, on private notice, as to certain military activities in the northern portion of the city last night, and I promised to make a statement on the adjournment. One cannot deal with last night's incidents simply as isolated incidents. For a proper understanding of them and of the action that has been taken by the Executive Council as a result of them, it is necessary to bring the minds of Deputies back at least some days. I have here a time-table of events in connection with the troubles within the army. I find that on the 6th of March a document, purporting to be an ultimatum, and calling itself an ultimatum, signed by Major-General Liam Tobin and Colonel Charles Dalton, was handed to the President; that on Friday, the 7th, that document was considered by the Executive Council, and that an order was issued by the Executive Council for the arrest of Messrs. Tobin and Dalton. On that date also, Mr. Joseph McGrath, Minister for Industry and Commerce, tendered to the President his resignation. On Saturday several houses, including the house of Mr. McGrath, were visited by the military in search of wanted men—that would be on the Friday-Saturday night. On Saturday, 8th March, the Executive Council decided to place Eoin O'Duffy in Executive Command of the Army. On the 10th March that position became operative, and General Eoin O'Duffy was appointed Officer Commanding the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann. On Tuesday, 11th March, the President read a statement, regarding the situation, in the Dáil. He read the document which he had received, signed by the two officers. Mr. McGrath, on that date announced his resignation as a Member of the Executive Council, said that he would make a statement to the Dáil, and made a charge that the situation which had arisen in the Army was brought about by "absolute muddling, mishandling and incompetence on the part of a particular Department of State." The President named the following day, after Question Time, to allow Mr. McGrath to state the reasons for his resignation.

On the 12th March the President announced: "The Government is satisfied that the events which have happened call for an inquiry, which the Government will cause to be held into the administration of the Army. The Government is prepared to consult with the Minister for Industry and Commerce, in view of his statement, with regard to how this inquiry is to be carried out," Deputy McGrath expressed himself satisfied with the President's announcement, and did not propose to make any further statement until the inquiry takes place. On resuming at 7.30 p.m., the President read a second document dated that day— namely, 12th March—received from Messrs. Tobin and Dalton. On the 14th March General Eoin O'Duffy was appointed, in addition to his appointment as General Officer Commanding the Forces, Inspector-General of the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann. On the 15th of March the Cabinet considered the personnel of the Committee of Inquiry into the mutiny, and, subject to the consent of the persons selected, arrived at the following decision:—

Professor Eoin Mac Neill, T.D., Minister for Education (Chairman).

Mr. Commissioner James Creed Meredith, K.C.

Mr. P. McGilligan, B.L., T.D.

Notification of consent from these persons reached the Government on the 18th instant. On Tuesday, 18th March, the functions of the Inspector-General of the Forces were approved by the Executive Council and gazetted. The terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry were drafted and approved by the Executive Council. A copy of a letter written by the Minister for Defence to the Members of the Council of Defence, setting out the attitude to be adopted towards the officers implicated in the mutiny, was read and approved by the Executive Council. On the night of the 18th of March you had a raid on certain premises in Parnell Square for wanted men, and the arrest of several officers. That is the time-table leading up to the situation which now confronts us.

There is an item which does not appear on that time table and to which I propose to refer. The following letter was sent by the President to Mr. McGrath on Monday evening last, 17th instant:—

"I have been in consultation with the Minister for Defence and General O'Duffy on the matters which you raised with me this morning. I regret that we had not arrived at this decision before now:—

(1) By Thursday, 20th March, at 6 p.m., all arms and equipment removed from barracks to be returned to the place or places from which they were taken:

(2) Persons concerned in the removal of such material to surrender at the place from which such material was taken to the officer now in charge of such place;

(3) On presenting, after such surrender, parole to the officer in charge, such parole will be accepted, and the persons concerned allowed out under open arrest;

(4) Absentees from duty shall surrender by 6 p.m. on Thursday. Their parole being presented will be accepted, and they also will be allowed out under open arrest.

Thursday has been mentioned as a convenient date to give time. It is desirable, however, that no delay should be occasioned in giving effect to paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4)."

That was the President's letter to Mr. McGrath.

Yesterday, the Minister for Defence, at a meeting of the Executive Council, presented the following document: It is headed, "Copies to the Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General; memo. 18th March, 1924.

"The President has instructed that all persons who left their posts, or unlawfully took away military stores during the recent mutiny, be dealt with, from the point of view of arrest, on the lines indicated in the following paragraphs 1 to 5:

(1) By Thursday, 20th instant, at 6 p.m., all arms and equipment removed from barracks to be returned to the place or places from which they were taken;

(2) Persons concerned in the removal of such material to surrender at the place from which such material was taken to the officer now in charge of that place;

(3) After such surrender, on presenting parole to the officer in charge, such parole will be accepted and the persons concerned allowed out under open arrest;

(4) Absentees from duty shall also surrender by 6 p.m. on Thursday, the 20th instant, and on their parole being presented it will be accepted. They also will be allowed out under open arrest.

(5) Thursday is only mentioned as a convenient day to allow a certain amount of time, but it is desirable no delay should be occasioned in giving effect to the terms of paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4). Suitable instructions should be wired immediately to all G.O.C.'s, and by them to their officers concerned, to secure that effect is given to the terms of these instructions so far as they are concerned.

(Signed) AIRE COSANTA."

It will be noted that this document from the Minister for Defence to the other members of the Council of Defence is couched in terms identical to those used by the President in his communication to Mr. McGrath of Monday evening last. There is a matter which I have mentioned and to which I wish to refer again in some detail. That is the position of General Eoin O'Duffy with regard to the Army. General Eoin O'Duffy, as Deputies are aware, was appointed General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces. Speaking as one member of the Executive Council, when that appointment was made my conception of it was—it was a wrong conception—that the appointment placed General O'Duffy in supreme executive authority over the Army and over every man in Army uniform.

I visualised it as placing him in the same position with regard to the Army, as he recently occupied with regard to the Civic Guard. I visualised his relations with the Minister for Defence and his responsibilities to the Minister for Defence for the Army, as the relations which existed towards me with regard to the Civic Guard when General O'Duffy was Commissioner of that Force. That was wrong, and the fact that it was wrong transpired later, when it became clear that the Departments of the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Chief of Staff are regarded as Military Departments of the Ministry of Defence, and by a general routine order, of which I have not at the moment got the exact number or date, but which I think was issued in December last, the functions of each one of these three officers were defined and their responsibility to the Minister was defined.

General O'Duffy became aware that there were limitations to his powers, and to his authority over the Army inasmuch as he had no authority over any of these three officers, and they had no responsibility to him. When that fact was represented to the Executive Council, we added to General O'Duffy's functions as General Officer Commanding the Forces the office and functions of Inspector-General. It is better to state the functions and definition of the Inspector-General clearly.

The duties of Inspector-General of the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann are: "To inspect the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann and the Administrative Offices of Defence (Chief of Staff's, Adjutant-General's and the Quartermaster-General's), the training, discipline, fitness and efficiency of their personnel of all ranks; the suitability, condition, supply and maintenance of their arms and equipment; the suitability and condition of their barracks and other posts, and generally to review the organisation and administration of the Defence Forces of the Saorstát, and to report thereon to the Executive Council through the Minister for Defence, and to offer such suggestions in relation to organisation, instruction, personnel, equipment and administration as may result from such inspection and review. He may make his inspection or review in any particular case personally or by deputy appointed by him. The Inspector-General shall have free access to all such reports, files and other information in the possession of any department or office of the said Forces as he may think fit to require, and he shall be at liberty to enter opinions or observations on any report, file or minute. The Executive Council shall provide such office staff and equipment as will be necessary for the work of the Inspector-General."

That office and those functions were conferred on General O'Duffy, not in substitution of, but in addition to, his functions as General Officer Commanding the Forces. The Departments of Supply, as they might be called, back behind him, were not subject to or responsible to him; but over this Department and in relation to this Department he had his powers and his functions as Inspector-General. With regard to the Army machine proper, he had complete executive control and authority. He stood, then, as it were, between the Ministry of Defence and its three main Military Departments and the Army proper. Over the Army proper he had his executive power and authority as General Officer Commanding the Forces. Back behind him in the Supply Department—I am not sure whether I am using that word quite accurately, as I am not very well versed in the technicality of Army matters— he had his powers of criticism and report, and his powers of Inspector-General.

Now, General O'Duffy was anxious that he and everyone else should understand clearly what his real position was, what his real powers were, what his limitations were, so that there should be no unnecessary friction, no overlapping, no chance of any countermanding of orders. On yesterday, at a meeting of the Executive Council, a memorandum from General O'Duffy raising these matters was considered, and the powers of the General Officer Commanding the Forces of Saorstát Eireann were at that meeting fully discussed, fully understood, and fully agreed upon. So that I may be fully accurate, let me say that it was also agreed that these would be drafted out and presented to General Eoin O'Duffy this morning for any final comment he might wish to make on them. It was agreed by all persons at the Executive Council meeting, and by General Eoin O'Duffy, what exactly his powers were. This is the draft. I have read the definition of the functions of the Inspector-General. This is the draft of the functions attached to the office of the General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann:—

Executive Military Command over all the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann, including all units, Corps, Services, and all ranks. He shall be responsible for (1) military policy as far as the immediate military situation is concerned; (2) the operations necessary for national security and public safety; (3) distribution of the forces; and (4) military intelligence in furtherance of the purposes aforesaid.

I do not think it will be argued—although it was agreed that this draft in its final from would come up for final approval—that last night General Eoin O'Duffy was not the General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann having the powers set out in that document. Particular action was taken last night—military action. It was not taken after consultation with General Eoin O'Duffy, and it was not taken after consultation with the Executive Council as a whole or any member thereof. It was taken on the responsibility of the Minister for Defence in consultation, I understand, with the Adjutant-General. That action was considered at a meeting of the Executive Council this morning.

It was not long under discussion before the view emerged very clearly that by the majority of the members of the Executive Council, the action that was taken was regarded as cutting across the obvious and necessary implication of the letter sent by the President to Mr. McGrath, on last Monday evening, and of the order of the Minister for Defence to the Chief of Staff, to the Adjutant-General, and the Quartermaster-General, dated the 18th March, which on yesterday received a kind of post factum approval and endorsement by the Executive Council. That was the position that emerged. The majority of the members attending this morning's meeting held the view that the action taken last night cut across Government policy as embodied yesterday in the post factum approval and endorsement of this memo. from the Minister for Defence to his colleagues on the Defence Council. When the Minister for Defence realised that the Executive Council, or those of us who were active, were not prepared to endorse and were not prepared to stand over the military operations of last night, which were entered on without consultation with the Government, which were entered on without consultation with the General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces appointed by the Government, the Minister for Defence withdrew from the meeting, expressing his opinion that it would be better that the situation should be considered by ourselves, and that he would be available if required. It was considered by ourselves and, in a personal way, I regret that it falls to my lot to announce to the Dáil, and through the Dáil to the country, the very grave and important decision which was arrived at by the Executive Council, or what was left of it. That decision was communicated to the President by Dr. MacNeill and the Minister for Finance, and regarding it the President has expressed approval. That meeting this morning decided to ask for the resignation forthwith of General Seán McMahon, Lieut-General Georóid O'Sullivan, and Lieut.-General Seán O Murthuille, their resignation not from their Army ranks—let it be understood that we were not taking or purporting to take Army action—but from the administrative positions which they have held up to date.

That meeting also decided—one was a decision which we considered we were entitled to come to ourselves: that is the decision regarding the three officers—to convey to the President its view that he ought to ask for the resignation of the Minister for Defence. That was not an action which we were entitled to take, but it was something that we conveyed to the President. Now, with regard to the resignations of the three officers, after the meeting I asked the Minister for Defence to come to see me. He came from Portobello to see me, and I communicated to him the decision of the Executive Council with regard to the three officers, General Seán McMahon, Lieut.-Gen. O'Sullivan, and Lieut.-Gen. Seán O'Murthuille. The Minister for Defence, thereupon, informed me that that would involve his resignation also, and that he would make a statement to the Dáil. I had not told the Minister for Defence, because I regarded it as something that perhaps I was not entitled to disclose in the circumstances, that that meeting which he had left had decided to recommend to the President that he should ask for the resignation of the Minister for Defence. That was something which the President would have to exercise an independent judgment about. I could not prejudice the result of the President's independent judgment of the matter by making a disclosure to the Minister for Defence. I therefore simply accepted it that because of the action of the Executive Council in calling for the resignation of these three officers, the Minister for Defence would resign, quite apart from any decision that the President might or might not come to on our message.

It is a common thing nowadays to rail at secret diplomacy, to attribute to secret diplomacy most if not all of the ills which our present-day world is suffering from. Without pronouncing in any dogmatic way upon that view, I would like to suggest to the Dáil that in a certain delicate complexity of circumstances it is not always advisable, not always in the public interest, to drag everything out for mongers of gossip, every relevant circumstance, every charge and counter-charge, every allegation, true, or half true, or not true at all. It is factors like that which weighed with the Executive Council ever since this Army pot boiled over. The Minister for Industry and Commerce was to make a statement here. From what we knew of what the Minister for Industry and Commerce was prepared to state here, and from our judgment of the situation, it would not be in the public interest that that statement should be made. As I said, speaking some time ago, charges and counter-charges would have been bandied about; statements would have been made and contradicted, statements which, whether they were true or false, or half true, could not have redounded to the credit of the State or the credit of the country as a whole. And time was spent, a long time was spent, in an endeavour to convince Deputy McGrath that such a statement ought not to be made, and an undertaking was given that an enquiry would be set up into Army administration, and that he would get every opportunity of having such charges as he might care to formulate thoroughly sifted. I think there was some slight misunderstanding on the last occasion. When we spoke of a Cabinet Committee, a Cabinet enquiry, we did not necessarily mean that the Cabinet in person would enquire, but we meant that an inquiry would be constituted by the Cabinet, which would report to the Cabinet. I have named the personnel; I have read the Terms of Reference——

Mr. JOHNSON

I do not think the Minister has read the Terms of Reference.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Excuse me. The Terms of Reference are very simple, very broad:—"To enquire into the facts and matters which have caused or led up to the indisciplined and mutinous or insubordinate conduct lately manifested in the Army." Now, on that undertaking Deputy McGrath postponed, or abandoned—I do not know which—his intention of making his promised statement in the Dáil. He was prepared to accept it, that his charges should be enquired into, should be definitely formulated and enquired into by a Cabinet Committee, and the promised statement was not made. Deputy McGrath then interested himself in seeing that the situation which had developed in the Army should be, as far as possible, righted. He, all along, was emphatic that the original document from these two officers need not be taken literally or tragically. He was emphatic on the point that these officers did not intend to challenge the basis of Parliamentary representation or the fabric of ordered, responsible Government, did not challenge the right of the people to decide their political issues, and a document was received, as I have stated, explicitly withdrawing and repudiating the original document, and signed by these two officers. It became then a question of deciding the action that should be taken with regard to those who, in varying degrees, might be said to have participated in a mutinous revolt; in varying degrees, one must classify them. In a class apart, you have two men who signed the document which was presented to the President. You have, then, men who absconded with arms, men who absconded without arms and men who sent up resignations. I take it that the letter which the President sent to Deputy McGrath on Monday last, after consultation with the Minister for Defence and General O'Duffy, was an attempt to clarify a somewhat obscure position. It was accepted by the Minister for Defence and communicated by him to the other members of the Defence Council with the intimation that suitable instructions should be wired immediately to all G.O.C.'s and by them to their officers, and so on. We regard the action taken last night as cutting across what was Government intention and Government policy with regard to an extremely dangerous and an extremely delicate national position. But I do not want any Deputy nor any member of the general public to come to the conclusion that the resignation of certain high Army Officers was demanded by the Government simply and solely as a result of last night's activities. That is not the situation. At a discussion which took place the day after this document was presented, the view was expressed at the Executive Council that this particular personnel was not the personnel to deal with a mutinous revolt.

I personally expressed that view emphatically and gave reasons, and one other member of the Executive Council stated that he, within the last few days had, as he put it, come to the decision that these men had been too long in their positions, that something in the nature of a sense of proprietorship was springing up, and that he had intended to move for a change at the top of the Army. He went on to develop the view that he regarded the document served by these officers on the President as cutting across that, and argued that because the removal of the Army Council was one of the terms of this challenging document, the removal of the Army Council was not possible in that particular set of circumstances, or at that particular time. I want that grasped, that there were those who hold, and hold strongly, that whereas, in the abstract, a change in the headship of the Army might be considered advisable, that the concrete existing circumstances were considered by some, by a majority, in fact, as constituting an obstacle to that course. Whether the decision to refuse in the concrete set of circumstances to consider a proposal for the removal of the Army Council was wise or unwise we will not pause now to consider very deeply. It was passed by, it was put aside as a thing which in the face of the mutiny, in the face of the document, in the face of the fact that their removal was one of the things called for in the document—could not then be considered. But when this personnel, or members of this personnel, without consultation with the Government, without consultation with the General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces appointed by the Government, took a particular action calculated to have, possibly, grave reactions within the Army and throughout the country, calculated perhaps to set the heather on fire, the heather we have been so assiduously attempting to quench and damp down, a different set of circumstances arises. We have decided that the public interests, the best interests of the public, of the State, of the Army itself, call for the removal from their administrative positions of these three officers.

General O'Duffy has been informed that he is now in complete Executive control and authority over every man in Army uniform. The Minister for Defence is resigning. He will make a statement. To-morrow morning somebody will be assigned the duties of Acting-Minister for Defence. Let me say here that we have not been satisfied within ourselves, and within our own counsels, that the matter of this mutiny could be dealt with simply on the assumption that 100 per cent. of wrong was on one side, and 100 per cent. of right on the other, that it could not be dealt with as a mutiny could, and should, be dealt with in countries that are more normal, by Governments that are more normal, and in armies that are more normal. Let me say here that while we never got any definite official information from the Minister for Defence that that was so, that the view was gradually borne in on the minds of some members of the Executive Council, at any rate, that there existed in the Army factions, organisations, societies— call them what you wish—but cleavages and combinations, at any rate, that do not exist and should not exist in normal, disciplined armies, that the personnel was too much in the forefront, too much in evidence, so much in evidence that it overrode discipline, for discipline to be discipline must be impersonal. Let me say, too, that we were not without evidence that that impersonal discipline does not exist in the Army, that generally, naturally with diffidence, as being Ministers in the political headships of other Departments, naturally with a certain reluctance, a certain hesitation, the view was forming in the minds of members of the Executive Council that there was danger that the Army was not unequivocably, unquestionably, without reserve, simply the instrument of the people's will, expressed constitutionally through the Dáil, and through the Executive appointed by the Dáil. If that view is right, if that half-formed view—shall I call it—is right, that it was a question of rival combinations, there was a lot to be said for the view that you could not strike at one of these combinations through the medium of another. That certainly was the factor operating in my mind when I expressed the view to my colleagues in the Executive Council that the mutiny could not be dealt with by the particular personnel that were then in control, and I would have been willing personally to face the suggestion that we were caving-in to a particular term of the challenging document that was served on the President by the two officers. I incline to the view that I have said enough about the past. Many, perhaps, listening to me will incline to the view that I have said too much about the past. I want to say this about the future, that the position now is that General O'Duffy is in complete control of the Army, of every man in military uniform, that he will expect and exact, by virtue of the powers conferred on him by the Government, absolute discipline, absolute loyalty, absolute obedience from every man in military uniform.

General Seán McMahon is at the moment absent from town. I have received, through the medium of General Mulcahy, the resignations of Lt.-Gen. O'Sullivan and of Lt.-Gen. O Murthuille, and these resignations have been accepted. To-morrow, the Executive Council must appoint an Acting Minister for Defence, and the difficult, the admittedly difficult and the admittedly delicate situation that exists must be handled by General O'Duffy, in close consultation with the Executive Council as a whole, and the particular person who is appointed to act temporarily as Minister for Defence.

I would like to add one note. The action that has been taken has not been taken without adverting to the fact that the officers whose resignations from certain administrative positions have been asked for have done great service to this country, great service for the people of this country in the past. There is recognition of that; there will always be gratitude for that, but in national affairs one has to accept it that it is not by the water that has passed that the mill is turned, and in this whole matter, as in other matters, the country must realise that it is impossible to carry on administration on the basis of swopping records: that there can be advertence to past service in public matters only to the extent to which that past service may be considered to give promise of useful public service in the future.

In political affairs, in national affairs, from the very nature of the case there can be no such thing as gratitude, qua mere gratitude. It is all like the Coral Island that is built up by the insects coming along and doing their particular little bit of work, and of some other insects coming along and building on top of them. We have come to the conclusion—and I do not use the word insect in any derogatory or defamatory sense—that these three men in those three positions have done all the useful work that they are capable of doing and that in the set of circumstances which has arisen, and which now exists, other men must take up the lines and carry on, and build upon their work, improving it, and eliminating whatever is found to be loose or whatever is found to be bad, but recognising at the same time that a big work has been done and a big task has been undertaken, and to a very large extent achieved by those officers who went before them.

I would like the thing faced in that way, not regarded in any sense as vindictive action against these men, not regarded as in any sense throwing discredit on these men, but simply recognising that it is the view of those who have the responsibility of choice and decision in grave matters of this kind, that in a particular set of circumstances these three officers had reached the limit of their utility, and that their particular National service, and particular public work can now be better done by other men.

Situations do sometimes arise in which it is a mere waste of time to advert to merits, to go into merits as regards individuals; situations do sometimes arise when it is a case of res ipse loquitur: that whatever the merits be, whether this charge be true or that charge be true, whether such an allegation can be successfully met and countered and beaten down, or whether it cannot, that the thing speaks for itself. Men may sometimes be rendered inoperative, their future utility may be prejudiced beyond hope of recovery by what is known as incurable unpopularity. It will be said later, no doubt, that these men, with the work they had to do could not but tread on many corns, could not but raise up for themselves dislikes and prejudices running to slanderous rumours, and running to charges unkind, uncharitable, and maybe untrue charges, but we have to act simply in a grim and impersonal way, and we have formed the view that these three officers are no longer efficient in the Public Service, and have not a useful future before them in these three administrative positions.

It is clear that the Army situation has been unsound for a very considerable time back, that there was a very grave menace, what I described as an abscess reacting on the general health and the general morale of that organisation. To what extent it was there with the full knowledge of the responsible heads of the Army, and with the full knowledge of the Minister responsible for the Army, is a matter which the three gentlemen who have been appointed to this grave task must inquire into. That inquiry will proceed. Any charges that are to be formulated will be sifted, and will be reported upon, but quite apart from that inquiry or its results, we felt that if a healthy situation is to be restored within the Army, if a safe and sound situation is to be attained for this State and its people, that the action which we decided upon this morning, which we duly communicated to the President, which we now communicate to the Dáil, and through the Dáil to the people, was the right and sound and proper action in all the circumstances.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I take it that we are sitting later than 8.30.

Agreed.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I have made the extraordinary mistake of not answering the particular question that was addressed to me. I have here the two official reports, one of which the Minister for Defence presented to us at the Executive Council meeting this morning, and the other which he handed to me later in the day. The following is the first report which we received:—

"19th March, 1924.

"Information was received at 9.30 last night of a meeting of Mutinous Officers in Devlin's, Parnell St.

"Troops were despatched to the scene and the house was surrounded. Owing to the standing instructions that we have no authority to search houses, owing to the state of war ceasing to operate, the troops did not effect an entrance, but searched people as they came out of the premises. The ordinary customers having come out and there being no move on the part of the officers who were there, reinforcements and further instructions were asked for.

"Orders were given to have the house raided and the officers in the place arrested. By the time troops were in position to have this order given effect to it was 11 p.m., and it was found that the house was barricaded, and would necessitate using force, and probably fire-arms, in order to effect an entrance. This development was reported and instructions asked for, and sometime before 12 p.m. orders were given to have the house taken. Troops moved into position in the neighbouring houses and the order was gone ahead with. The troops had no difficulty in effecting an entrance, and having searched the house could find nobody. Having, however, got out on the roofs, they found the following officers:— Cols. Jas. Slattery, Chris. O'Malley, Fk. Thornton, Commdts. Pat McCrea, Jos. Shanahan, ex-Commdt. Leahy, Commdt. Joe Dolan, Bob Halpin, Pk. Griffin, Chas. Byrne, A.D.C. to the President; Lieut. Ml. Collins.

"Seven revolvers, 1 automatic, and 50 rounds of ammunition (3 rounds being dum-dum) were found on the officers. All the houses in the Parnell Street, Moore Street and Moore Lane block were searched during the night, but nobody else was arrested."

Attached to this report there is a special note.

"Mr. J. McGrath, Minister for Industry and Commerce, and Mr. Dan McCarthy, T.D., arrived on the scene at 10 o'clock, and remained there until a late hour in the morning.

"The G.O.C. Dublin mentioned that it was felt that three of those who were in the house escaped, but there is no confirmation of this. Earlier in the night, at about 11 p.m., one man was seen on the roof, and failing to halt when called upon to do so, was fired on and returned to the premises."

That is one report. It is the first which we received. There is another report which was handed to me in the course of the day by the Minister for Defence. It is signed by Major-General D. Hogan, G.O.C. Dublin Command, and is addressed to the Minister for Defence. It reads:—

"Report on Operations

"Parnell Street Area—18/19th March, 1924.

"Consequent on information to the effect that a meeting of the mutinous officers was being held in Devlin's, Parnell Street, Colonel McDonnell and a party of nine troops proceeded to the place, arriving at 9.30 p.m., 18th instant.

"On arrival a few troops were placed at the front and back of the premises, and Colonel McDonnell approached the front door. Inside latter Comdt. J. Dolan and ex-Comdt. J. Shanahan were standing. Colonel McDonnell told them they could consider themselves under arrest, as although he could not enter the house for them he would wait until they came out. Colonel McDonnell ascertained that there were a number of others armed inside, and consequently he 'phoned Command Headquarters for reinforcements and further instructions.

"The Adjutant-General was 'phoned for the instructions, and gave orders to enter the place, if possible without using force. These instructions and reinforcements reached Colonel McDonnell at 10.30 p.m. The latter placed a cordon of troops around the whole square in which Devlin's house is situated, and approached the shop, into which he got without obstruction. A number of civilians were in the shop. These were interrogated and ordered out. He then found that the `mutineers' had barricaded the stairs and were evidently preparing to fight, as guns were plainly discernible in the dark.

"In view of the possibility of a fight, Colonel McDonnell 'phoned for further instructions, and the Adjutant-General gave orders to force the place, and put the whole party under arrest. These instructions were confirmed verbally to Colonel MacNeill at 11.50 p.m.

"About this time a number of men were seen making their way over roofs in the rear of Devlin's, and three shots were fired at them by sentries, but apparently without effect, as the men disappeared.

"At 12.45 a.m. sentries were placed on adjacent roofs, and a party of troops were rushed up Devlin's stairs. Here they met with no opposition, and found the house empty and a window open on to the roofs. The latter, which are very extensive, were then searched, and about 2 a.m. a party of men, lying concealed between two roofs, called on one of our search parties to surrender. The latter ordered the men to surrender themselves, and Colonel F. Thornton, acting as latter's spokesman, said they would surrender if cordon of troops was withdrawn. He was told by the Officer i/c (Colonel MacNeill) that only unconditional surrender would be accepted. Thornton then asked for a guarantee that his party would not be fired on if they came out of hiding. This was agreed to, provided they came out singly and handed up their arms. They then did this, and the following were taken into custody:

Colonels—Jas. Slattery.

Patk. McCrea.

C. O'Malley.

F. Thornton.

Commandants— Patk. Griffin.

C. Byrne (A.D.C. to President).

Joseph Dolan.

Rt. Halpin.

Ex-Comdts.—Joseph Shanahan, Leahy, and

Ex-Lieut.—M. Collins.

"The following arms and ammunition were surrendered:—7 revolvers, 1 automatic pistol, and about 90 rounds. One revolver, and three newly cut `dum-dum' bullets were discovered on the roof near where the party hid. An abandoned `Overland' motor was also discovered in Moore Lane.

"The prisoners were then taken into Devlin's and searched, but nothing further was discovered. Mr. Jos. McGrath, T.D., who had arrived earlier, accompanied by Mr. D. McCarthy, T.D., asked permission to stand the prisoners a drink—permission for which was not refused, in the circumstances. Mr. McGrath stated to the prisoners that their arrest was not authorised by the Government, but was solely military action. Also, that even so, they should not have been arrested, as the troops had only warrants to arrest three of them. It was pointed out to Mr. McGrath that our instructions were to arrest the whole party, and that, in any event, a warrant was not necessary in the case of officers found committing conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

"Mr. McGrath was very disagreeable to the Officer i/c troops, and would have been detained himself were it not for the fact of his position in Government.

"The prisoners were placed on tenders for removal, and when turning at O'Connell Bridge for Collins Barracks, Colonel Slattery jumped from a tender and tried to escape. A few shots were fired at him without effect, but he was pursued and safely recaptured in a couple of minutes.

"The whole party are at present detained in Arbour Hill Barracks.

"As it was believed some others might have escaped on to the roofs, it was decided to search all the houses, etc., in the Parnell Street, Moore Street, Moore Lane area. This search was carried out and proved fruitless. The troops were withdrawn to barracks at 10.40 a.m. to-day.

"No casualties occurred and no documents were got, although a large quantity of torn paper was discovered adjacent to where the party had hidden.

"I may also mention here that while the raid was in progress Messrs. Cuddy, Cuffe and Devlin arrived in cars, but were not allowed through the cordon. I am of opinion that had our troops arrived an hour later a very interesting `bag' would have been got, as preparations for a meeting had been made in one of the rooms in Devlin's."

These are the two reports, and, naturally, the reading of them should have formed part of the statement which I made to the Dáil.

There is one matter which had better be cleared up. There seems to have existed up to last night some doubt as to whether or not the resignation of the Minister for Industry and Commerce had become effective; whether he was or was not a member of the Government. The position is that Deputy McGrath's resignation has become effective. He is continuing as a matter of convenience and as, I think, a matter of constitutional strictness, to perform the functions attaching to the political headship of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce until such time as his successor is appointed. Let me say, also, and I think it should be said, that the Government, or such members of it as are on the active list at the moment, recognise that this series of events and the resignation of two Ministers constitute for them a problem and a situation which will need very full and very grave consideration. That is not overlooked. Deputies, of course, understand the situation at the moment. The President is ill, and, under very strict orders of his professional advisers, is refraining from public duty and, so far as possible, in the circumstances from worries about public problems. We will need some little time to consider the situation amongst ourselves. Probably over the week-end it can be discussed and considered, and given the time, thought and attention which it deserves, and we will be in a position more fully to place before the Dáil next week the line of action which it is proposed to pursue in regard to this whole matter.

General MULCAHY

I do propose to follow the Minister for Home Affairs into some of the points and matters raised by him. I feel that, to a very large extent, the matters that have been touched on by him are matters that are sub judice owing to this inquiry that is being held, and may be sub judice in view of some other inquiry that perhaps the Dáil will find it necessary to ask for. I just wish to speak here to the question of my own resignation and the circumstances of it. I regret very much to have to tender my resignation in circumstances that are, perhaps, difficult for the Executive Council and for the Dáil as a whole. I am confident myself that there are no reasons affecting the stability either of the Government here, or the country, or the Army, that would prevent my doing so. I am strengthened in that feeling by being told now that other members of the Government were proposing that my resignation should be asked for. I have been in a difficult position for some ten days past. In an urgent and important national matter I was tempted to appeal to the Dáil over Party. I had to take into consideration that an Executive Council has its important constitutional position in our Constitution here. I was deterred, as I say, from appealing to the Dáil over Party by the fact that the Executive Council had very serious responsibilities on it from the point of view of administration, and I was not willing to interfere with the Executive Council's work even to that particular extent. My reasons for tendering my resignation now are simply that I cannot stand over condoning mutiny to such an extent as to foster it and to prejudice discipline in the Army, and that I cannot stand over ill-considered changes in Army control, from the point of view of the effectiveness of that control, particularly at the present time, when you are in the middle of a period of re-organisation that began a couple of weeks ago, and that was not due to terminate until the 25th March. The action taken last night was taken because of the law embodied in the Defence Forces Act. The disciplinary Sections of the Defence Forces Act are matters that arise out of tradition, matters that have been found traditionally necessary in order to preserve discipline in armies. The law was passed here by the Dáil last year. It is the personal responsibility of the Adjutant-General; it is the responsibility of the Minister charged with the responsibility of the Army to see that that law is put into effect, and I contend that no Minister, however great be the collective responsibility that he may feel, and no Executive Council can change the law which is passed. The letter that was framed to Deputy McGrath on Monday in my presence contains suggestions that it was thought possible would be acted upon by the officers who had committed offences recently against discipline.

It did not change our position from the point of view of putting the provisions of the Defence Forces Act into operation. It did not, and could not, be allowed to cross the path of officers, responsible for the maintenance of discipline in the Army, to the extent that they could allow officers who had committed offences, either by deserting their posts, or by taking away material belonging to the Army, or by engaging in a conspiracy that might have had disastrous results, to walk and meet openly and publicly in the streets or in the country.

On the matter of the genesis of the mutiny, a body has been set up to report on that. I may say that the three officers, whose resignations have been called for to-day by the Executive Council, addressed to me some days ago a request that the inquiry to be held into these matters should be held publicly. I had not decided in my mind to press that aspect of the matter on the Executive Council, and I am not even yet decided in my mind to do so, but I feel that a large portion of the speech of the Minister for Home Affairs to-night may have the result, when I examine the matter and think over it, that it may practically force me into the position of asking that these matters that have been referred to by him there, by suggestion and innuendo, should be made matters of inquiry, the evidence at which will, at any rate, later on, be made public.

On the matter of the spirit of the mutiny, however, I think some words are necessary. I personally, and all our Army officers that have stood loyal to their work, have been in the position of keeping our mouths shut while lying rumour and suggestions of all kinds have been spread throughout the city and the country as to what the actual position with regard to us is and what our mentality is. I think it is desirable, therefore, to make one or two remarks with regard to the spirit of the mutiny or to read one or two documents that will carry the suggestion in them as to what the spirit of the mutiny is. The resignations that were solicited in Cork ran in this form:—

"I so and so, do hereby request that you tender to President Cosgrave on my behalf my resignation from the Free State Army as a formal protest against the action of the Army Executive Council in their continued and studied neglect of the best interest of the country, as evidenced by their action in continual demobilising of officers who have endeavoured to place our country on the road to complete freedom."

That was the form in which resignations were solicited. The resignation from a prominent officer in the Waterford Command, ran:

"I hereby tender my resignation from the Army as a protest against the demobilisation of old I.R.A. men, while ex-British officers and soldiers, and men, who never during their lives gave one hour of voluntary service to Ireland are being retained as officers."

When approached subsequently by some follow officers and urged to explain his attitude in his resignation, he said he could not leave down a man like Tobin, who had been put into a "dud" job; he should have been made Commissioner of the D.M.P.; that there were at least 12 men retained in the Army who were ex-British officers, and that as long as any of those were retained no pre-truce officer should be demobilised. The matter of making nominations and selections for demobilisation were made in a way that I think it well to mention at this particular moment. In consultation with the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. I made the first nucleus of nominations to the positions on G.H.Q. staff, the Commands and the Brigades. Each G.O.C. was then given a certain number of complete battalions to nominate officer personnel for. Heads of Corps and Services were invited to send in their nominations to positions. especially on the establishment, as far as their own services were concerned.

In that way nominations were made to every position on the establishment that had been prepared in detail and to every position in the reserve. Lists for demobilisation were carefully gone over at meetings that in process of development lasted from the 12th February to the 21st February, inclusive. The officers who sat over that particular work were General McMahon, Chief of Staff; Lieut. General O'Sullivan, Adjutant-General; Lieut-General Shean O'Muirthuille, Quartermaster-General; Major-General D. Hogan, G.O.C., Dublin Command; Major-General Peader McMahon, G.O.C., Curragh; Major-General McKeon, G.O.C., Athlone; Major-General Sweeney, G.O.C., Donegal; Major-General Michael Hogan, G.O.C., Claremorris; Major-General Prout, G.O.C., Waterford; Major-General Michael Brennan, G.O.C., Limerick; and Major-General D. Reynolds, G.O.C., Cork. When the complete lists of nominations and lists of demobilisation were definitely settled there were about 90 names of officers left, whom various G.O.C.'s were anxious should be retained for the present. In order to avoid the situation of eliminating men who might be considered better than perhaps some who were actually put down on the actual reserve that was proposed as establishment, I stated I would take those 90 odd officers and accept them as an additional reserve because of the fact that it might be anticipated that a certain number of resignations would come about, and that a number of officers whom we proposed for retention might be turned down on medical grounds.

The position then arising out of these demobilisations is that certain events occurred. The Executive Council take up a particular attitude, they pursue a line of conduct that in my opinion is condoning mutiny and is fostering mutiny, and is prejudicial to the discipline of the Army. They take the extraordinary step arising out of and as an immediate sequel to the arrests made last night of officers who had committed offences, of removing the Chief-of-Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, and of doing it in such a way as to take them from their tables, dropping the pen out of their hands, planting them outside the door, and telling me when I say that the position of the reorganisation is such that their deputies have not yet reported there—when I say I have no officer that I consider suitable to take up their work, telling me that that will be their responsibility, and that it will be the responsibility of General O'Duffy—a man who has been taken from work that he was wanted pretty badly at, and placed in a most extraordinary position, in what was supposed to be a time of crisis, perhaps a time of fighting. The extraordinary position has been taken up of placing a man who was away from military work —who had not been in touch with the work of the Army, or the development of the Army for many months past; who practically had not been in touch with the Army in its definite development at all; who had applied himself to an entirely different outlook on things —of placing him in charge of the Army in a time of crisis, with the necessary reaction on the Army, that the men who, whether in high rank or low rank, were capable of dealing with the situation of the last two years, and the machine that was capable of doing it, could not give from amongst its officer personnel a man capable or trustworthy enough to be put in charge of the Army at the present time. The suggestion has been made here that certain people felt that the Army as it exists to-day, could not be relied upon to be the obedient and willing instrument of any administration carrying on as an Irish Government. I say that is an absolute mis-statement of fact, and if people were very concerned from that particular point of view, I suggest to the Dáil they would not take the extraordinary steps that the Executive Council are taking to-day in removing the three principal officers in the Army.

I am perfectly confident that General O'Duffy in his new and very difficult position will get absolute and scrupulous service from every officer in the Army who is untouched by the mutiny which we have been speaking about for some days, and you may thank the men who have been turned down so ungraciously as they have been in the speech of the Minister for Home Affairs for the spirit of the Army. It is such that it will serve any administration the people will set up and will conduct itself in circumstances as difficult as the circumstances which the Executive Council to-day are making for a body which has only grown into an Army in the last few years. You have discipline in the Army in spite of many things, in spite of the interference of Ministers with individuals in the Army. I should like to say with regard to suggestions made regarding the Chief of Staff that I do not know what the decision is in the minds of other members of the Executive Council. I would like to say that the members of the Executive Council have allowed themselves to be impressed by story and rumour with regard to those persons. It has been suggested to you that men may become unuseful by their considerable unpopularity. The Adjutant-General is a person responsible for discipline in the Army, and can very well be regarded as having run great risks of unpopularity. The Quartermaster-General is looked upon as ultra political. We were all ultra-political when we came on the threshold of the independence of our country, and if there is one outstanding fact for the last two years, it is how completely and how scrupulously politicians who took upon themselves the duty of soldiers have kept themselves from political action and talking. They have left the arena of politics entirely to those who are the elected representatives of the people and have effaced themselves in the uniforms of soldiers in a way that is one of the outstanding facts of the last eighteen months in the country. It has been suggested here that those men look for gratitude. Those men look simply to do the duty that comes their way.

Some days ago the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General tendered me their resignations, and I told them my outlook on the matter was that they should carry on. They accepted my judgment and withdrew their resignations. They tender their resignations now asked without any cause stated, and tender with them their commissions because they might at least have expected when their resignations were asked for that they would be informed of the reason why, and they might—I put it as my own opinion —be more ceremoniously dealt with than told to drop their pens and clear out. As I say, I do not want to go into the suggestions and implications that have been made here to-night. I simply want to be very definite in my expressions of opinion with regard to last night's action, that the action was taken in carrying out the law passed in Dáil Eireann last year, that the Adjutant-General was commissioned to carry out that law, and he did it. He had my consent by telephone in doing it. I consider the Executive Council is not in a position to alter the law to any extent, except according as it is altered here. They can interfere with any sentence passed and exercise their discretion with regard to that particular sentence. Taking up the attitude apart altogether from calling for the resignation of the three officers, my position this morning was that the attitude adopted by the other members of the Executive Council with regard to the raid last night was such that I could not retain my responsible position as Minister for Defence. The attitude taken up with regard to that was, that in carrying out the law in relation to the law passed here we were cutting across the path of policy supposed to be adopted by the Executive Council. That is a thing I could not stand over, particularly in circumstances that have since arisen, and in the greater and graver tendencies on the part of the Executive Council to condone the mutiny there has been, and which, as a result of their condonement, has been fostered. It was only carrying out the law to go and arrest those officers last night. The suggestion was made that it was done irregularly without the knowledge of General O'Duffy. General O'Duffy has not yet taken up duty because his position was not defined to him. His position as Inspector-General was defined to him in words yesterday. His position as G.O.C., in Executive charge of the Army proper, as distinct from the military portions of the Ministry, was only framed in words last night by the Attorney-General in consultation with myself. It was communicated over the telephone this morning to General O'Duffy by me in order that he might think over it and see what, if anything, had to be added to it in order that he might take up his responsibility, because his attitude was that he could not take up his responsibilities unless his position was defined, and he could not be expected to take up his responsibilities or issue orders until this was done. The action that was taken last night was an action that was putting the law into effect; refusing to put the law into effect is condoning mutiny and fostering it, and my resignation is tendered because I could not stand over that.

Mr. J. McGRATH

I had no intention to intervene in this matter this evening, nor am I going to make any explanation except with regard to some statements made here, particularly the one which the Minister for Home Affairs read. I am not going into the merits of the case at all, but I want to make my position clear. I want to let the Dáil and the country know of what I call a miserable, dirty attempt to try and mix up matters and to try and place me in the false position of being one of those responsible for bringing about this most unfortunate position. The Minister for Home Affairs referred to the raid on my house. I had made up my mind not to make any reference to that. I refused to tell the Press that such a raid did take place, but since it has been mentioned, I may say I believe that the raid took place for one reason, and one reason only. Coupled with that, the statement that has been made here to-night and the report of a raid that took place last night, I must make my position clear. At 10 o'clock on Friday week last, I left the Council Chamber where the Executive Council meeting had taken place, at which I tendered my resignation. Within eight hours my house was raided for the two officers, Major-General Tobin and Colonel Dalton. I asked the officer had he instructions to search the house, and he said "No." That he was told to accept my word. I told him that there were no officers there. A ring on the telephone would have just done the same thing. If I was considered sufficiently bad, sufficiently foolish, to harbour these men, knowing what I did know, surely my word should not have been accepted. A definite instruction was given to the officer that my word was to be accepted. I made up my mind—I may be wrong—that that raid was made to connect me and link me up definitely with the trouble, and put me in a false position before the country.

Last night I arrived home at 12 o'clock. I received information that this place was surrounded, and I got into touch with the Vice-President and told him of the situation. I then left my house and came back into town. I tried to get into touch with Mr. McCarthy, the Chief Whip, for one reason only, and that was because he was aware of the arrangements that had been entered into, and which I considered had been broken. I failed to get in touch with him. I arrived on the spot myself and saw the officer in charge, and asked him what was the position. I asked him whom he was looking for and how many, and I got very little information. I quite understand the position, as his orders were secret. While I was speaking to him Mr. McCarthy arrived. This was not 10 o'clock, as stated in the report, as it was after 12 o'clock before I left my home. I consulted with Mr. McCarthy, and I suggested that I should go into the house where the officers were supposed to be, and if possible to get them, if they were there, to go away. I approached the officer, with the proprietor of the house, and asked his permission to go in, telling him my reason for going, and he agreed. I went into the house and found it empty. The proprietor went a little further than I did and got on to the roof and was nearly shot. That was his own look-out, and perhaps it was his own fault for so doing. I came out and told the officer in charge that I could find nobody. He then told me that he was awaiting instructions from headquarters before taking the premises. I then asked him to allow me back, and I rang up another Minister to tell him the seriousness of the position. I tried to get in touch with the officers with the one object of stopping any firing which might occur, and I am satisfied that the one sole object of the raid was to create trouble. My effort to try and get in touch was to stop any shooting, no matter who was there, and to try and get them if possible to surrender. Some of you must know some of the men who surrendered, and I am more proud of them to-day than I ever was, because of their action. The Minister for Home Affairs read out a report, but he did not read all that was in it. Some of it is struck out.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Pardon me. I read all the report except one sentence. I asked the Minister for Defence whether it was his view that it should be treated as an official report and read in its entirety. He drew his pencil through one sentence which he did not think should be read.

Mr. McGRATH

I am not going to say what it is, but I say that if the Report is as true as that statement, which was not read, and which a pencil has been drawn through, very little reliance can be placed on it. Mr. McCarthy was present, and I ask that nobody speaks before him now. He was present when I asked the officer to allow me to see the prisoners before he took any away, and again I did so, with a view to saving any possible trouble; because I had actually to get between some of the prisoners and one of the officers who took their surrender. I wanted to see things properly and smoothly carried out all the time without one shot being fired, because I knew what one shot would mean. He told me that they were ready, and that I could go and speak to them. The officer in charge and the second officer in charge were present. I asked had he any warrants. He said "Yes," that he had warrants for three. I asked how and why he was arresting the others. I had very good reasons for asking those questions—very, very good reasons. He told me "No," that he had written instructions, written orders from the Adjutant-General, to do so. That is all I said. I did not say to the prisoners that the Government were not behind this action. I said no such thing. It is quite apparent that some of this report that was read here this evening is taken from the Press. I did say to the Press that I understood—and I do say now— that it was purely a military action, and that the Government had not been consulted. At that time it was merely an expression of opinion, and I think it has been confirmed by the statement of the Minister for Home Affairs last night.

Now, the night that my house was raided, the houses of several of my friends were raided. And, strange to say, in this report to-night some of my friends are mentioned as having turned up on that spot last night who were not there at all. That, also, I can prove to the satisfaction of everybody. They were not there at all last night, and they are mentioned there as turning up at ten o'clock or some hour last night. The raid on my house and this statement and the innuendoes contained in it are with one object, and one object alone—to place me in a false position.

My efforts to settle this thing extend over 15 or 16 months. I tried everything that was humanly possible to bring about a settlement, without result. It came to this point: I took certain action. I am satisfied I took the right action. I did promise to make a statement. I was prevailed on not to do so. I am prepared, and will make that statement, and give all the facts and details to the tribunal that is suggested. As I said in the beginning. I had no intention of speaking on this matter. I am satisfied that the Minister for Home Affairs put the facts clearly before you. I do not want to go into the merits or demerits. I say it is shameful, it is disgusting, and I do hope it will never happen to another Minister or member of the Free State Government that when he takes action with honest motives, this method will be used to try and place him in a false position before the country.

Mr. D. McCARTHY

I only rise to endorse what Deputy McGrath has said. I was at a theatre last night. The performance did not end until 11 o'clock, and I had to go a good journey with some friends, so that I could not get to Parnell Street at 10 o'clock last night. The other statement in the report, that Mr. McGrath was impertinent to the officers, is also untrue. I simply rise for the purpose of endorsing what he said.

Major COOPER

When I asked the Minister at Question Time whether we would have an opportunity to debate this issue, I did not realise the very serious situation which had arisen—a situation that may endanger the fabric of the State. We have now a third of the Executive Council resigned, and I feel that further debate of this kind, until we have more time for thought, may be very injurious. I would suggest, if the Vice-President is agreeable, that the Dáil should adjourn now, and that an opportunity should be given for discussion—I think it will have to be earlier than next week. We shall have, I think, to discuss this matter to-morrow. If the Vice-President would move the adjournment of the Dáil until to-morrow we could go on with this discussion then, having considered and thought the matter out. I think it is very wise to refrain from any rash statement, and if the Minister would take the course I suggest it would give us an opportunity of debating the matter to-morrow.

Mr. JOHNSON

I agree generally with what Deputy Bryan Copper has said on this matter. One does not want to be tempted into saying things one would be sorry for. I will say this: having heard the lamentable stories we have heard as to the situation that has been created within the Executive, notwithstanding the fact that it is apparent that both the Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister for Defence—and I am sure every other member—seem at one in the intention of insisting upon discipline in the Army and loyalty to the Civil Authority, notwithstanding that fundamental agreement, they have been existing for months apparently without having been able to arrive at the means of insisting upon that discipline and that loyalty to the Civil Authority. I have said all that was necessary to be said about the conduct of those members of the Army who sent in the ultimatum. I have not said all I would like to say, and all I have thought, about the events subsequent to the discussion of yesterday week. I think it is, as I said at first, lamentable that this state of affairs should have arisen amongst men who seem to be at one absolutely in the desire to insist that political influence from within the Army shall not be sought to be imposed upon the political Executive of this country.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I appreciate very much the spirit of Deputy Cooper's suggestion and the restraint exercised by both himself and Deputy Johnson in dealing with this matter. It is an entirely new matter to Deputies. It is naturally a blow and a shock to Deputies, and, unlike ourselves, they have not had the opportunity during the day of, at any rate, some kind of reflection upon it and upon its possible and probable reactions. I think it would be a good thing to postpone further discussion until the adjournment is moved to-morrow evening. While I say that, let it be well understood that if there is a desire in any part of the House to prolong this present debate, that, equally, would meet with the approval and consent of the present Executive Council. But if there is a general feeling that we should adjourn now and that such discussion as might follow would take place to-morrow night on the adjournment, we are agreeable.

Mr. JOHNSON

I think the Minister's suggestion of adjourning this matter until to-morrow night on the adjournment, is not satisfactory. I think it should be the first business.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

When we meet to-morrow I could move the adjournment and allow the debate to continue in that way.

Mr. JOHNSON

I think we should take the discussion on this matter as the first business.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

After questions?

Mr. JOHNSON

Yes.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

It can be debated on the motion for adjournment.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

Is there any necessity for a motion on the adjournment if this matter is to be adjourned now?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The motion now before us is for the adjournment. I take it that it is the desire of the Dáil that that motion be now taken, and that this debate be continued to-morrow after Questions.

Agreed.

The Dail adjourned at 9.5 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Thursday.