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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 12 Jun 1925

Vol. 12 No. 8

DAIL IN COMMITTEE. - BEET SUGAR (SUBSIDY) BILL—SECOND STAGE (resumed).

When the adjournment hour was reached on the previous occasion I had just opened the argument with regard to the second of the three tenders mentioned by the Minister for Finance, and, indeed, the second of the two of which he spoke favourably, because the third, as the House will recollect, he put on one side as of no account. I had supported the Minister on the board principle of the Bill. I had contended that not only was the subsidy necessary, but that the subsidy is the wisest proposal that could be made in aid of the object to be effected, and that the object to be effected is a great national object. The more I study the matter the more completely convinced I am of the truth of what I said, that in regard to the rejuvenation of Irish agriculture, this is, in its own way, quite as important as the Shannon scheme. It was argued both by Deputy Johnson, and since the introduction of the Bill, in certain newspapers, that the subsidy is too great. It was also argued that the method by which the Government proceeded was wrong. It was further argued, not by Deputy Johnson for the moment, that there should be more than one factory.

So far as I had proceeded, I had defended the methods of the Ministry. The procedure taken was that of setting up an inter-Departmental Committee, because the provision of public money in aid of the stimulation of tillage in the way of growing beet and in aid of industry and the removal of unemployment, by assisting the setting up of a sugar factory in connection with the growing of beet, affected not merely the Ministry of Agriculture, although it affected the Department of Agriculture primarily, but, as is obvious, it was a matter of concern for the Department of Industry and Commerce, and as it involved the expenditure of public money, with equal obviousness, it affected the Minister for Finance. So that an inter-Departmental Committee was set up, very properly, and the whole question was investigated. The next stage was the receiving of tenders.

There is a great deal of confused thinking going on in the public mind with regard to this and similar propositions of the Government. I welcome it, of course, as a healthy sign that there is any thinking at all in the country, even though it be confused and obscure, but the thought with regard to this takes the form that sometime the Minister for Finance ought to have advertised and invited applications. Now, the real fact is that this production of sugar from sugar-beet is a very highly specialised kind of industry, and what the Minister was obliged to take account of was, who were the great pioneers and who were the great successful workers in this particular sphere?

The tenders came. Notably the two best tenders came from the countries of two small nations that have made this thing a success. So far, I had already argued on behalf of the procedure followed by the Government. My next point was that the Minister for Finance regarded the offer made by Monsieur Lippens, who is associated with Belgian enterprises of this type, as the best offer in contrast with the actual arithmetic of Mr. Van Rossum.

Undoubtedly it would appear at first blush that the Lippens' offer was the better one. I was directing myself to that though, I am afraid, I tried to run two arguments concurrently. I was using the criticisms of Mr. Van Rossum on the inter-Departmental Committee's propositions to show that the Minister's offer of a subsidy was not too high, but I was using it also to show that, if we consider not the difference of mere figures in regard to how much Van Rossum offers the farmers per cwt. for beet or what exact amount he asks for by way of a subsidy as compared with the corresponding items of M. Lippens, that while the Lippens' offer appears the better, when we take into account the special character of the experience of Van Rossum, more particularly in relation to the setting up of an absolutely new industry in this country, that the Van Rossum advantage outweighed anything that might exist contra because of the difference in the amount to be paid to the farmer per cwt. for beet, or in the amount of a few pence in regard to the subsidy.

In that connection it was necessary to go into the history of the attempt to establish a beet sugar industry in Great Britain. I will not weary the House with more detail than is necessary, but I might briefly recapitulate the references as to what the Minister said about one of the factories in England, that known as the Kelham factory. I might remind the Minister that before the Kelham factory was brought into being at all, and before the attention of the British Government had been drawn favourably to the necessity for State aid to the sugar beet industry, there had been a Van Rossum factory established at Cantley, in Norfolk. I dwelt on that before, but it is necessary to return to it. The Van Rossum enterprise in England has now some 20 years' experience. The English people are not a people who throw bouquets, more particularly to foreigners. At one of some official interviews the question of the subsidy, or relief from taxation, was before the British Ministers, and a special tribute of praise was given to Mr. Van Rossum in regard to his standing in the sugar world, and more particularly with regard to the value of the magnificent services that he had rendered to the British industry at a very difficult period in the history of its foundation.

Now, this is the special claim that I make with regard to the Van Rossum tender. Dutch capital was put into that factory practically 20 years ago. One of the group tendering on the present occasion for our subsidy was among the group which provided the capital—a man who was for 20 years was the leading professor in the State Technical School of Holland, which turns out technical experts for the sugar industry. He is regarded in Europe as, if not the pre-eminent specialist, at least, one of the small group of noted specialists in this matter. Well, they brought over their group of skilled workers, skilled chemists and engineers, and trained the British, until now at the end of 20 years there are skilled Englishmen. Now the group can do that for us. It is very far from my purpose to say anything against M. Lippens or his capacity or the capacity of any group that will work with him. I am not arguing against his tender or against the acceptance of his tender. I am, as I hope to make clear as I proceed, on a different line. My case—to anticipate—is that for the best to be got out of the present move of the Minister for Finance, there should be (in fact, I would say there must be), at least two factories set up concurrently. I am seeking to show that these two factories are available now, and that at a later period it is possible they may not be forthcoming, and that a chance of incalculable value would have been lost to the nation. It was in that connection that I quoted the very wise remark of the Minister for Finance, that so often the history of Ireland has been a history of lost opportunities, opportunities not seized.

To return to the Van Rossum experience, one of the difficulties of beet growing, as I understand it, is that unless the tillage is of the proper sort the best results, as in the case of every other crop, cannot be expected. There is one critical stage in its culture, and that is the stage of "thinning." It has been established beyond all doubt that according as the thinning is postponed, one day, two days or three days, the yield of sugar from the beet in question is diminished proportionately. Therefore, if I may use the language of medicine with regard to certain diseases, there is a time of crisis in the condition of the patient, and at that crisis he needs special attention if he is to recover. Similarly, in the growing of this crop, this is the critical period at which highly specialised attention has to be given. In the first few years it is not to be expected that the Irish farmer growing beet will be thoroughly expert, and it would be in the interests of the factory which is looking to receive his beets for manufacture, to give help and advice in co-operation, no doubt, with what our Department of Agriculture would naturally provide in the way of instruction. Now, a very important element in the consideration is the skilled worker. In the figures that I read out to the House—and the House, I must say, was very indulgent in allowing me to proceed in reading out such a host of details—one of the heaviest items of expenditure was in connection with expert labour. It amounted to a huge figure, and it was the same in the two estimates—the estimate for dealing with 100,000 tons of beet and the estimate dealing merely with 50,000 tons of beet, for the production of four or five thousand tons of sugar. In comparison with that the cost of unskilled labour was trivial. So that to make this a success, and a success it must be made, and I share the confidence of the Minister for Finance that it will be made a success, it would be very necessary that in addition to the provision of capital and all the other requisites that this skilled labour should be forthcoming. I need not dwell upon what is so apparent, that those who have organised British labour will be better able to do so again in Ireland. Unfortunately our people are not great linguists but no difficulty would be experienced in this matter. The men who learned to speak these things to English farmers, to train them, and to give them the requisite knowledge, will be able to do so in English here. That is an enormous asset which the Van Rossum group are able to provide. I lay great stress upon that.

I ask the Minister for Finance who compares 24/6 per cwt. subsidy required by M. Lippens, or, at any rate, given under the Bill to M. Lippens, with 25/6 per cwt. asked for initially by Van Rossum, and compares 54/- for three-year contract beets, as provided in the Bill, with 53/- and some pence odd as in the tender of Van Rossum, to note that though arithmetically the differences are slightly in favour of M. Lippens, the balance, on the whole, is very much in favour of the Van Rossum tender. In any case it is unnecessary for me to labour that as regards price, because I am in a position to say that the Van Rossum group, at the instance of the patriotic Irishman of whom I spoke before, are quite willing to work their factory—to put up a factory, and put in their capital, and to work upon the terms of the Bill, so there is no difference in terms at this stage. It is merely difference of prestige, greater experience, and I believe the State ought to secure both of these factories.

The Minister very rightly said the other day that it is idle to talk of six or seven factories. Of course it is: it is ludicrous. But the Minister, I am afraid, was persuaded, at any rate for the time, that it is equally idle to talk of two, because of what it would cost to the revenue. Now I admit it would cost a good deal to the revenue, —it is absurd to say, "I admit," because it would be manifestly imbecile and idiotic to deny it, for a subsidy is a grant of public money. But if the Minister would allow me I would ask him to consider it in this light. Year by year, so long as the subsidy lasts, there is a loss to the revenue, but is there not likewise a gain to the wealth of the nation? There appears to be a loss to the revenue, and it is, in fact, a diminution of revenue. In this connection, I used a phrase the other evening that some people profess to regard as merely a rhetorical flourish on my part—namely, that I prefer to regard this as a great national investment paid in instalments. I take this opportunity to explain what I meant, namely, that instead of talking of a loss of revenue I call it a contribution from revenue. That contribution, by subsidy, is made year by year for a limited period, and I say this is State money invested in an enterprise which is going to fructify most bountifully, and I call it payment by instalments because it is a contribution annually. I say again, and this is not rhetoric, if it is regarded as a great national investment, what are to be the dividends? You look for dividends in regard to investments.

Perhaps, for the sake of logical order, I should consider first, what is the amount in question. The Minister spoke of one factory as involving, in ten years, £2,000,000. That sounds a staggering amount. But it occurred to me, at the time, that if I were to put in statistical form the sum total of meat consumed by the average man in ten years, it would sound staggering. Let me make a calculation. The average man eats a pound of meat per day; that is half-a-stone a week; 26 stone a year; 260 stone in ten years; that is to say, a ton and a half of meat. People would say, "What? Does John Jones, or Harry Smith propose to consume nearly one ton and three-quarters of meat, not to talk of other foods, in ten years?" Or suppose we take the salary paid to some men in high place, and, instead of considering it yearly, multiply it by ten. The Treaty pledges us to pay the Governor-General a salary of £10,000 per year, that is £100,000 in ten years. That appears appalling. Now, instead of calling it £2,000,000, let us begin at the opposite end. It is only in 1924, after 20 years' operation, that the Cantley factory has been able to get 124,000 tons of beet. Its average for the first nine years was 37,000 tons. Now we should be doing exceedingly well, and far more than I, who take a roseate and optimistic view of the matter, would expect, if we were able to have a yield of more than three or four thousand tons of sugar. I will put it bigger, and make the case against myself stronger. I will say there are five thousand tons of sugar. The subsidy upon that, at £24 10s. a ton, is under £130,000, and in the first three years it will not be improved upon. So the annual contribution to this investment for an additional factory is £130,000. That is not so very much, considering the huge sums that we expend, and rightly expend, upon relief schemes, and this will be a relief scheme.

Whom will it employ?

It will employ the farmer and the farmer's family and it will employ labourers. I will deal with that in a moment and in its own place. It is a subsidy primarily to agriculture. It is a subsidy to the industries that are allied to agriculture.

Deputy Gorey, of course, unrepentantly, repeats "bosh." This is not the first thing to which Deputy Gorey has exclaimed "bosh," and his own people have been very glad that they disregarded his "bosh." I am referring to the Land Purchase Bill, as he, doubtless, will recognise—£130,000 is on the computation I have made, the annual contribution for another factory. That is the investment. What are the dividends? For fear I should forget about it, I name out of its natural order one of the dividends: the reduction of the adverse balance of trade. We are importing our sugar. Suppose we have two factories in full blast and each of them is producing its five thousand tons— that would be ten thousand tons—at any rate they might produce eight thousand—I do not know at this particular moment what the price of sugar in the market is. It is round about £20 per ton. There is a reduction of imports by ten thousand tons of sugar, and ten thousand multiplied by twenty makes £200,000. There is, of course, to be deducted from that, the importation of coal. For every ton of sugar there will be a ton of coal, but the ton of coal is to be calculated in shillings where the sugar is calculated in pounds. As regards the main dividend, it is, in the case of agriculture. I pointed out already—I will not repeat it in detail, but merely glance at it, draw it in broad outline—thanks to the artificial nursing conditions set up by the subsidy, instead of the insecurity and uncertainty of his market, you provide for the small farmer who is growing beet in the neighbourhood of a central factory, a certain market and a price certain. He knows that what he has put into the ground will be bought. He knows where it will be bought, who is waiting for its delivery, and he knows the price he will get as a minimum price.

A DEPUTY

For three years.

Someone says for three years. I will deal with that. The case is already sufficiently complex and, in the interests of simplification, I am trying to deal with each point in its own immediate relation. Whether the farmer will let the factory down, or the factory let the farmer down, is an issue which can be dealt with by itself. For the moment, I wish the Dáil to be clear upon one point, namely, I am trying to establish that this investment is worth while, that when the Government set aside so much of the annual revenue of the State to pay it out by way of subsidy, they are not doing something that can be condemned as folly, or reckless, or a blind experiment, but they are doing a very wise thing, a thoroughly constructive thing, and the only improvement desirable is that they do it on a bigger scale ab initio.

If the Irish farmer, as alleged by Deputies on other benches, is going to be so blind to his own interests, that when he has got a fixed market and a fixed price, during a period of tutelage in which he will be learning to see how beet helps the rotation of crops; how it helps him in his farming, how it provides work for all those in his vicinity, how it makes greater transport—if when he is learning all that, he will turn round and say: "Give me more grass so that I may grow more beef for the English market," we can do nothing, and we have achieved our freedom in vain. I admit that contingency is possible—there is always that contingency. But who could stop building a great ship because great ships have gone out to sea and have gone down in the sea? Thank God, the human spirit is more indomitable than that, and because enterprises have failed, and because people have been blind and foolish, we do not stop all effort. Of the advantages accruing to the nation at large there is, first of all, this immediate advantage to the agricultural community: improved methods of farming and better yield. It has been found in Germany, where the beet-sugar growing is the basis of agriculture, that in the rotation of crops the very fact of having beet improves the succeeding crop from ten to fifteen per cent. These are not artificial statistics. These are quoted from Government returns in the country affected.

I said in answer to Deputy Johnson on another point previously, that it has been found in those countries where beet is extensively grown that it would be quite remunerative to the farmer to get at the factory only the price of production of his beet for the sake of what is returned. What is returned? He is entitled to buy at a certain fixed price the pulp which is the residue. I am allowing for about two and a half per cent of sugar still remaining in the pulp. The process of extraction in the factory is not able to take out all the sucrose that the beet has stored after manufacturing it from light and air. Pulp is a valuable feeding stuff. For every ton of sugar there is a quarter ton of molasses as a by-product. Molasses has its price in the market, too. By the way, the British Government allow a subsidy on molasses, and there is no subsidy being asked for here with regard to molasses. Molasses is also material for feeding stuff for calves. So that, apart altogether from what the sugar is worth, or may ultimately be worth in the days when the subsidy is ended, no matter what its value may be because of competition in the world market, at any rate, agriculture in this regard will have been put upon a firm foundation, and something that provides the farmer with a valuable additional element will have been secured.

There is also among the dividends I calculate, the dividend of education. I mentioned the history of the Napoleonic contribution to French agriculture. I said that the first step he took was to create six technical schools, highly specialised with regard to sugar. In 1812 he followed that up by forcibly putting one hundred students of chemistry, pharmacy and medicine into those schools, and, by a decree, arranged that 150,000 acres should be put under beet cultivation. All the countries in Europe, in which the growing of beet is an integral part of the agricultural system, and the production of beet-sugar is one of the great industries, have set up these schools, just as Germany, on its way to capturing, as it did at one period capture, the light beer trade of the world, set up colleges for brewers that were a model to the rest of the world. Similarly those beet-sugar countries have highly-specialised technical schools. In proportion as our beet sugar industry grows here, and becomes part and parcel of our agricultural system, we, too, should have those schools. The education leading up to them would benefit, and the knowledge assimilated through the country that education has a value and is an asset would also have a reaction, upon education all round, of a very beneficial kind.

There is another asset as regards unemployment. I quoted what Lord Milner said: "All subsidies are bad, but I should prefer to subsidise industries to subsidising idleness." We have to give a lot of money in doles. I again characterise the grant in aid of agricultural rates as, under analysis, revealing itself to be a gigantic dole. It is a species of outdoor relief. With the sugar factories we subsidise industry, not idleness—I withdraw that, because I might be taken to refer to the agriculturists as idlers, and I have no such intention—but this subsidy is a positive, constructive thing which will relieve unemployment. It has done so in other countries. I mentioned a subsidiary industry.

Would the Deputy, not for the purpose of captious criticism, go into details as to the amount of unemployment that will be relieved?

Yes, I will. The next dividend I have on my list is transport. I will take the two together. So many thousand tons of beet going to the factory; so many thousand tons of coal. For every ton of coal there is a half ton of limestone needed. You must quarry your limestone and carry it to your factory. During those fateful hundred days of the sugar campaign, in which the sucrose is being extracted from the beet, there are so many tons of coal and limestone and sugar and pulp being transported per day. The pulps have to be transported away; the molasses have to be transported away. The sugar has to be put into sacks. The sacks will have to be manufactured. There is sacking and sack-making besides that huge impetus to transport. There is employment in the fields, particularly in this period of thinning, singling, as it is called, on the Continent. No doubt Deputy Johnson's point—insinuated—is that it is very little relief as regards unemployment if you measure it over against the contribution to the farmer. I have admitted that the farmer gets the lion's share.

I do not want that inference to be drawn from my intervention. I want rather to compare the effect upon employment by growing, say, potatoes or turnips, in contrast with the effect on employment of the growing of beets.

Yes, I, in fact, answered the question as if that had been stated explicity. I appeared to run away from Deputy Johnson's question when I said my next item of dividend is transport. I admit, as compared with the growing of potatoes, or mangolds, for instance, or any other root crop, that there would not be so very much difference in amount of agricultural labour. There is a difference, however, in the way of heavier tillage, in the year the beet crop is being put in, in favour of the beet. It is in collateral matters—transport especially—that the increase in the relief to unemployment displays itself.

I have mentioned as dividends so far what can be measured in terms of pounds, shillings and pence: the reduction of the adverse balance of trade, the yield in crop, the yield in by-products, the gain in regard to increased transport and the gain in regard to the impetus provided for subsidiary and allied industries. I may dwell once again upon an advantage that cannot be measured in those terms, and is not the less valuable on that account. That is the heart, spirit and life put into the country. I shall not dwell any longer on that aspect of it. My contention is that though this is a loss in revenue from one point of view, it is a gain in wealth to the nation, and that is the proper view. In close conjunction with the Minister's statement that when we have made this experiment we can then proceed to set up factories on better terms is the statement which I have already commented on as a wise one, that it is absurd to talk of half-a-dozen, seven or eight factories. Even now, after twenty years' experience of the factory at Cantley, later at Kelham, and with the recently set up factory at Ely, with the growing demand in England for more factories and the proposition to have six in addition, England has only three. If England, with its large resources and capital and with the enormous sums the British Government are able to contribute and are willing to contribute in aid, in twenty years is only able to provide three, I think it is an easy argument to make that we are not likely to begin our operations with six or seven. Could you, I ask, have sugar factories ad libitum? When I put myself that question a few moments ago here I wrote down the answer as it presented itself to me. The first item is: Has Great Britain been able? The second: Let us see what conditions must be satisfied in order to have a sugar factory at all. When we examine into those conditions it will be seen that it is a great boon to be able to get two. First of all, to stimulate tillage you have got to have the factory, and in the initial stages that factory must be in the centre where tillage is. It was made an objection by Deputy Johnson that the Government proposals would not stimulate tillage where tillage is not. Ultimately I suggest that will be the effect, but in the immediate future it is most desirable to give every chance to this in so far as it partakes of the nature of an experiment, and so the factory should be set up in a centre where tillage is already practised.

Let that tillage be extended. According to Mr. Von Rossum's experience—and that is the experience, in fact, of the sugar industry everywhere —there is no use in investing capital in a factory unless there is at least 5,000 acres of tillage, as a minimum, devoted to beet. That, in the rotation of crops, involves from 15,000 to 20,000 acres of land in cultivation—arable land. If there be more than one factory a moment's consideration will show that unless competition be controlled it will knock one factory out. You must secure for each factory the beets from a fixed area. Again, experience has worked this out to be a radius of 25 to 30 miles, so that between factory "A" and factory "B" it is desirable to have a distance of something like 50 or 60 miles—25 plus 25 or 30 plus 30. These are two of the conditions. Now, what about your factory? Suppose you have got your 5,000 acres. On these 5,000 acres, in the initial stages, when the tiller or the producer is inexperienced, the most that can be expected is about 8 tons of beet to the acre. That, of course, compared with mangolds or potatoes, is very small. The case for beet is not a victory all along the line. Let that be admitted in the interest of truth. I have already dealt with that. When there is a glut in potato production down comes the price of potatoes. In fact, they may become unsaleable. In this case, for 10 years, at all events, no such thing can happen, because by no possibility could there be a case of overproduction of beet. A properly set-up factory would, from the beginning, be able to deal with more beet than there would be beet forthcoming.

On this calculation of 8 tons per acre, on 5,000 acres you have 40,000 tons of beet. Again, you could not expect more than 4,000 or 5,000 tons of sugar from that. Yet you must instal a factory in the beginning for a much larger production and for a much greater output. Therefore, just as there is a minimum acreage, there is a minimum also for the installation. The calculation for building and equipment is from £250,000 to £300,000. Over and above that, there is requisite the working capital. Part of it will be devoted to assisting the farmer, because in this case—I do not think it exists in many other cases, if it exists at all—the factory that is looking for the beet will advance money to the grower once its inspector has seen that the crop is in the ground and at a fair stage of growth. So that the farmer has not to wait to realise. It is said in favour of the tobacco crop that it is a cash product, that within six months the farmer is able to get paid for it. But beet is more eminently a cash crop, because before it has come to maturity—long before it has been reaped—the farmer is receiving money for it.

For the installation of machinery and equipment and so on, there is needed a capital of £400,000. Will you get, every day of the week, men who have so much faith, founded upon experience and upon intimate knowledge of its capabilities, as to put up £400,000 for a factory. I would beg the Minister's special attention to that consideration. Here and now, alongside this bargain or project with Messrs. Lippens, which the Government is entering into or has entered into, is an offer on behalf of the Von Rossum group, of a factory of these dimensions, with the investment of capital up to £400,000, with the provision of expert labour, with the sums paid to the farmer that have been stipulated for in the schedule to this Bill. Shall we turn that down on the grounds that it would cost too much to the revenue?

I hope the Minister will not think that I am chopping logic when I press this argument on him: either he has confidence in the future of this sugar venture or he has not. I know he has confidence in it. Of all the men I know, the Minister is the one who is most frank, most candid, and most explicit in his statement about every proposition that he makes. If he says that A is B, I never ask the question does he really and genuinely believe that A is B. I am satisfied he does. He declared in his capacity as Minister for Finance, in introducing this Bill, that he had the utmost confidence in this sugar-beet industry. How much is being ventured on behalf of the State for the realisation of the hopes which he is confident will be realised? Something like £130,000 a year. What is required to double that realisation? Another £130,000 a year. Is that a gamble? Most obviously not. Could the State revenue afford it? I repeat that if the revenue can afford grants in-aid to relief schemes, surely it can for this, a better application of the State funds.

What did we do with regard to electricity? Future ages will echo the opinion of the Dáil that we did right with regard to electricity. There were before the public three admirable schemes for exploiting the water power of the Liffey. The water power of the Liffey was easily exploitable and easily convertible into electrical energy, and it has its market at its door, so to speak. We put that on one side for the bigger and more colossal scheme, because this is a national scheme. And the delay involved in taking the small one—which, though small, was highly commendable and excellent— would have prejudiced the national scheme. I say that, mutatis mutandis, the case is the same with regard to this beet-sugar industry. I say “beet-sugar” because the difference is like the difference between a horse-chestnut and a chestnut horse. One must be careful to say “beet-sugar” and not “sugar-beet” when it is a question of a factory. For the moment what is in question is the subsidy, in return for which this capital of £400,000 and this application to development of Ireland's capacities of Dutch brain and experience, are available. I would appeal to the Minister— I will not say to take his courage, because it requires no courage, in both hands—to survey the whole field that is before him and the Dáil of the expenditure of money for relief of unemployment, for relief of the various departments of labour that are in need of assistance, to look at all his plans for employment, to look at all those great constructive schemes of road-making, and, considering them all in relation to this proposition about sugar, realise that this is not by any means the least of them—that it is one of the most constructive and positive of them all, above all as it is not a case of going round to ask for capital from someone.

It is not a case of issuing those seductive appeals to the investing public; it is not a case of issuing appeals founded upon the setting out of "handsome profits" and handsome subsidies and all the rest of it. The capital is forthcoming—capital not of hazy-minded enthusiasts nor of speculative adventurers, but capital of men of experience and men who, at the very moment, are being appealed to by the British not to come here but to go on building more factories in England. Surely if that is their status in the world and if this capital is an assured thing, it ought to be secured for Ireland. I am sorry to note from indication you have given, A Chinn Comhairle, that I have detained the House too long. My excuse is that I have not spoken very frequently during the past two years. This is a matter in which I am very keenly interested. I am anxious that those who have not given the same attention or study to it that I have had the opportunity of doing, should have their interest awakened. That is my excuse.

This is the Second Reading of a Bill. The Second Reading is devoted to the principle embodied in the Bill. This is one of those Bills in which it is very hard to discover what the principle is. Listening to Deputy Magennis, I am bound to say that wonder crossed my mind two or three times. But it is inherent in the subject. Are we discussing the rights or wrongs of establishing a sugar beet factory in Ireland or are we discussing the particular proposal the Government suggests, and seeks authority by this Bill to make to Messrs. Lippens? Or are we discussing this proposal, together with some other proposal, such as that which has been put before the Dáil by Deputy Magennis from Von Rossum?

On a point of explanation, may I point out to the Deputy that the principle I was discussing was the manifest principle in the Bill— namely, are the Government to subsidise this agricultural enterprise and, if so, are they to subsidise it in a particular form; in other words, the form set out in the Bill, particularly in the schedule? The only difference between the proposal I was advocating and that in the Bill was that the word in the Bill is "factory" and I had thought of "factories." The principle is obvious to anyone who is not scoring logical points.

I am not endeavouring to score logical points. I am endeavouring to get the doubt that exists in my own mind clarified. If Deputy Magennis had listened, he would have noticed that I was coming to the point he has touched upon. Are we discussing the starting of one factory or two factories, or are we discussing the actual nature of the finance of the proposal that is put before the Dáil by the Minister for Finance? So far as the first of these things is concerned, I am bound to say that I was myself in favour, having given some inquiry to the matter, not only immediately but at an earlier time, of the starting of a sugar beet industry in Ireland. I would like to see that experiment tried to see whether it can or cannot justify itself.

So far as the immediate scheme is concerned—that is to say, the agreement that the Government has made with Messrs. Lippens—we are informed by the Minister for Finance that he has come to this conclusion, having established an inter-Departmental Committee. But the information that was before that inter-Departmental Committee is not before this Dáil. However, I, for one, am prepared to accept its conclusion that, let us say, the Von Rossum scheme is the best of the schemes that have been offered. Even then, the point made by Deputy Magennis still remains— whether we should confine ourselves to one scheme, or whether we should undertake more than one scheme. So far as that is concerned, I am convinced by the arguments brought forward by Deputy Magennis that if it be right to take the proposal of one syndicate, then it is better to have two in order that they may be in competition with each other.

That still leaves me outside what I consider to be the main business before the Dáil. Let us take it as agreed that it is right to start the sugar beet industry in Ireland. Let us take it as agreed, after coming to that decision, that it is right that we should confine our attention to those who have had experience in the matter and that, preferably, we should put two rival projects into some degree of competition with each other. One of the advantages that would be gained by that would be that, at the end of the ten-year period, the State would be in a very much stronger position if the two existed than if only one existed, in regard to actual continuation of the experiment or the justification of it as an economic proposition. Assuming all that, and taking all that as agreed, we come back to what I believe is the main proposition before the Dáil at present—whether the finance of the present suggestion is the correct way in which this thing should be done if it is to be done at all. There, I am bound to say that I feel that we have not had that justification that the Dáil was entitled to receive.

The question has been put here, both to-day and on a previous occasion, as to what return for the public money was going to be received. Certain figures have been worked out here and circulated by Deputy Johnson. Being much more clear, I accept them in substitution for certain figures that I had myself endeavoured to work out. According to these figures, it appears that the result of the Government subsidy to this particular syndicate will be that the people who embark their capital on this enterprise will receive 15 per cent. profit on their money. Deputy Magennis said that there was another syndicate prepared to come in and start a second factory upon these terms. I have not the least doubt about it. I do not see why they should not, on the figures that have been put before us. I accept these figures as being just figures. I do not merely accept them because they are put before us by Deputy Johnson, although I have reliance on the conservatism of his working out of any calculations of this kind. But they do more or less confirm certain figures that I endeavoured to work out, having proceeded with my calculations on an entirely different basis.

I say, then, that I have not the least doubt that other combinations and syndicates would be prepared to come in and embark capital on an enterprise where there was a prospect of earning a profit of fifteen per cent.—and hardly likely to be less than fifteen per cent.— and leaving still a surplus. From the point of view of M. Lippen, I think the project has been made a very satisfactory one for him by the State. We have put in certain money to ensure for certain persons, who will not be citizens of this country, a very handsome and adequate return on their money. That is exactly the position we have to face. The Free State incurs certain losses in revenue, and the losses which it incurs yield to certain persons who are not citizens of this country a pretty handsome return on the money they embark on this venture. I do not think that is a conclusion that is avoidable. What benefits go to this State? I am not talking of the subsidiary benefits that the Minister referred to. I admit them. Deputy Magennis went into this in some considerable detail, and I admit that there are these benefits. What actual return is there for the State— apart from these subsidiary benefits— to embark its finances on? What financial quid pro quo does it receive?

Mr. EGAN

Extra employment.

Extra employment, says Deputy Egan. I agree. I say it is one of these subsidiary benefits that have been already enumerated. That is not disputed. What I want to know is, if any Deputy in this State were called upon, or had a proposal put before him, that he should embark his money in any undertaking, there are two things he would insist upon getting, apart altogether from any other benefits, one of which would be control of the undertaking in proportion to the money he put into it. Has the State got that control? I do not see where that control is. The fact is the Saorstát is being committed to part of the financing of this undertaking, and in respect of embarking its finances on this venture it has not insisted upon getting adequate control in proportion to its share of the capital. I do not see why the principle that would be held good for a private investor should not equally hold good for the State investor. Certainly we have not got that financial benefit. Another thing the private investor would insist upon would be that he would ask, and justifiably ask, if that enterprise showed a profit that his money should show a profit in proportion to his holding. Where does the State get for money embarked on this enterprise any direct return for its capital?

Mr. EGAN

Would the Deputy suggest that the State should share the losses?

I am coming to that. I used the word direct. I agree that the indirect benefits are very considerable. What I am saying is that these indirect benefits might be achieved, but yet there are direct benefits to be achieved by a form of financing sugar beet. I agree that is desirable in one or more factories. But the State should get for the money it puts in direct representation in the control in the first instance, and in the second instance a direct return for the capital it has invested. Now comes the point that Deputy Egan put: should the State incur any risks if the enterprise fails? I agree that that follows. But the proposition that is being put before the Dáil to-day is being justified on the grounds that the chance of success is overwhelmingly greater than the chance of failure. I do not say it is or is not so. All I am dealing with is the simple fact that if that were not the case we would not have this Bill before us. The very existence of the Bill is proof that the Government believe that the chances of financial success are overwhelmingly greater than the chances of financial loss.

Mr. EGAN

It may not be certain.

There is no such thing as certainty in this world. Deputy Egan knows that. The very fact that we have this Bill before us, the First Reading accomplished, and the Second Reading under discussion, is proof that the Government has come to the decision that the chances of financial success are overwhelmingly greater than the chances of financial loss. The Minister stated that it would take a considerable period of years before there would be results to make the industry a purely economic one. His suggestion is that financially and economically the scheme now before the Dáil is a sound one, and because of that the State is asked to embark its finances in it. The financing may be called a subsidy, but ultimately it comes to this, that whether defined as a subsidy or any other form the State is becoming committed to a financial share in this project. What I am now saying is, that the scheme is not one that should be supported by the Dáil for the reason that that financial share does not carry its measure of control in the first instance, and that it does not, in the second instance, carry a benefit in the financial profits. I say it is not right that the Dáil should be asked to put State money into a project by which it will have denied itself all participation in those two essentials which are considered necessary to sound investment. This is being justified before us as an investment. It has not got the essentials.

The Deputy is now making my case.

Deputy Magennis would like me to repeat that the Von Rossum project gives all these benefits which the Government project does not confer.

My point is really raised by way of explanation. The Deputy, under cover of making an argument that has not been heard in this House, is repeating an argument which I have put forward already once to-day and once on a previous occasion. It was a repetition of an earlier argument, to wit, that this is really an investment of Government money and the Government ought to get some return. I said it ought to begin to earn. I read, from a letter, on a former occasion, the proposal to make the Government owners, without payment, of founders' shares, carrying with them the distribution of a proportion of the dividends in excess of a certain figure. That ought to be within the recollection of Deputy Figgis. He is merely using an argument of mine in another form of words, and giving it the appearance of a discovery of his own, and investing it with an air of novelty.

Is it in order for a Deputy who spoke for two hours and ten minutes to make a second speech?

How many speeches do you make?

I am frank to admit that I had not clearly understood that that was Deputy Professor Magennis's case. Perhaps, during the two hours and ten minutes speech, I missed the particular sentences in which this point was made. I might be forgiven.

You are reading from the Official Report.

I am reading now from the proposal of the Minister for Finance. I do not want to conduct a duologue. If Deputy Professor Magennis has made the particular case that I am now making, then all I have to say is that the case is doubly reinforced. The fact remains that we are dealing with the Lippens proposal that is now before the Dáil. In that proposal the essential fact is that the Government suggests the Dáil should agree to the commitment of State monies in a definite project without getting the two assurances that the commitment of money should always carry, the first being control, and the second, participation in the profits. Now, I am not in favour of a violent or wide extension of State enterprise, especially at this particular stage of the progress of the State. While I am not in favour of any considerable extension of State enterprise, in this matter, where the State monies are to be employed, we touch upon a different question altogether. We are here going to the aid and assistance of private enterprise in a way that would enable that private enterprise, it is suggested, to justify itself, where it could not justify itself on purely economic, financial or commercial grounds. Having given that aid, and given a considerable amount of money in subsidies that will total, for three years, £441,000, we have not made a contract by which we will protect those two matters to which I have referred—even let it be agreed that the Lippens' proposal is the best proposal.

As I have already stated, we have not got before us the information that was before the Inter-Departmental Committee. I am quite prepared to accept the conclusions of that Inter-Departmental Committee, in that particular, for that reason. If it is agreed that sugar-beet is to be the industry to be started in this country, and of all the projects the Government have had laid before them Lippens' proposal is the best, and if it is decided to stick to one or undertake two, then, if the State monies are to be committed in the project, let them be committed in the only justifiable way, by the State becoming owners of the enterprise to the proportion of its capital, owners in control, owners in responsibility if there be any loss, and if there be profits, participation in those profits. Someone may reply that it would be a very nice thing, if there were to be profits made, that the State should participate in the profits; but the possibility of loss will make us pause. If we are to regard this question responsibly at this moment, as we are regarding it responsibly, we have to think of it as being liable to loss, just as much as if we were committed to it. Our degree of responsibility would not be increased one per cent. by the fact that the loss would be one to be felt by our own Exchequer.

It is not on those grounds the justification is put before us. It is put on the grounds that, apart from the subsidiary benefits and value that will be received, such as the employment and other things that will be available, as well as an extension of tillage and other matters which have been gone into, the scheme is one that can be financially justified. It is on that basis that we are being asked to agree to the putting of State money into the project. It is upon that ground I suggest the Dáil ought to insist, and I suggest that the Minister would be wise to agree to let this matter go to a Private Committee of the Dáil.

Hear, hear.

Mr. EGAN

Then hang it up.

Deputy Egan says hang it up. Why should he put that gloss on it? I do not desire that it should be hung up. If the Deputy does mean hanging it up for a few weeks, better that than to make a mistake now. I suggest the proposal be sent to a Private Committee of the Dáil which should be charged with responsibility and power.

A Special Committee?

A Special Committee, with power to call for documents and persons, and to examine into the whole matter. Let the committee accept that the principle of the Bill is no more than the principle of starting a sugar-beet industry and make such changes and revisions in the Bill as may be necessary to put the sugar-beet industry into a financial form by which the State will have adequate control and a share in any profits it may give.

Like Deputy Magennis, such knowledge as I have in this matter is derived from books. Therefore, I do not want to lay down anything too conclusively because, though there is much value in knowledge gained from books, their arguments are sometimes stated in a one-sided way. If we rely solely on books, we may mislead ourselves and others. We must rely on books in this instance, because I think there are very few people in the State who have any practical experience of the growing of beet, and who have hardly any experience of the manufacture of beet sugar. Nevertheless, books may mislead us. I think one instance Deputy Magennis quoted was calculated to mislead us, when he quoted the experience of Napoleon in creating a beet sugar industry in France. What were the circumstances under which Napoleon created that industry? It was not an act of his own free will. He was the ruler of an empire at war, and by a blockade his country had been cut off from its normal sugar supply from the West Indies. He found the people grumbling that they could not get sugar and he had to create something that would take the place of the former sugar industry. It was a military necessity and not an economic expediency.

The Berlin Decrees.

The Berlin Decrees were part of the scheme to cut off trade from England. They were answered by a British Order in Council which cut off the French overseas trade. These were dated in the year 1806, and it was not until 1811 that the grumbling at the absence of sugar compelled Napoleon to set up this industry. He also, at the same time, tried to create an industry to manufacture coffee from acorns. I do not know if Deputy Magennis suggests that we should follow Napoleon in that respect. I say that by way of illustration, because there is a danger in giving these arguments derived from books that we may be one-sided or disproportionate. I want to say that as a caution before I lay down any definite principle on this matter.

Deputy Magennis engaged in an argument that we were undertaking this matter on too small a scale, and that we should have at least two factories, if not more. A great deal of the success, or failure, of this attempt to establish the industry will depend on the place where the factory is set up. Deputy Magennis gave us some conditions that must be fulfilled in the establishment of this factory. There are at least, to my mind, two things to remember. First, there is the question of transport. You are going to import a considerable quantity of coal for this industry, and you are also going to move large quantities of sugar beet when manufactured. Therefore, you must have the factory where there is good railway and, if possible, good canal communication. I do not agree with Deputy Magennis when he says that this is not a crop which takes a good deal out of the soil. If my information is accurate this is a crop which exhausts the soil to a remarkable extent. That exhaustion can, perhaps, be remedied to a great extent by feeding the cattle on the leaves and pulp of the beet and by manuring with the manure you obtain that way, but that feeding has got to be done practically between September and the New Year. Therefore, it follows that you must have the industry in a district where the cattle are tied up between September and the New Year; in other words, where there is a considerable amount of stall-feeding and winter dairying. Are such districts numerous, and also large tillage areas, where five thousand acres of beet can be grown? I do not think that there can be many.

On the whole, I think that the Government proposal to start one factory is sound. I think that they are wise in limiting themselves, and we all welcome this scheme in so far as it tends to increase employment and tillage. We were moved by Deputy Magennis's picture of a brighter countryside, and our hearts leaped in ecstasy at the vision of a brighter Ballaghadereen. Still, when giving a subsidy we must examine it carefully. Deputy Magennis said that it was a subsidy to the agricultural industry as well as one to M. Lippens. When I give a subsidy I always examine it very carefully, and I examine it even more carefully when another person offers to give me a subsidy, because when people offer me a subsidy it generally means being let down. The last time I was offered large sums of money for the use of my name was in a case with which the Minister for Fisheries is acquainted, and I am now glad that I kept out of it. What are the terms of the subsidy and how far are they calculated to satisfy farmers who will grow beet? It is not quite correct to say that in every district where sugar beet is grown the farmers are completely satisfied. About three months ago I was visiting an old city in Italy, a city which 500 years ago was the seat of a Viceroy, who ruled the whole peninsula. That city has now shrunk to little more than the size of a small market town. More than the tombs, more than the mosaics, more than the churches, and more than the historical memories of that city, I was interested in certain placards on the wall, signed by the local equivalents to Deputy Wilson and Deputy Gorey, addressed to the growers of sugar-beet in that district. The purport of these local placards, issued by the Farmers' Union, was "Beet growers, because of the very unsatisfactory terms offered by the factories, bind yourselves not to plant another crop of beet, and do not enter into any contract with any factory until we have got proper terms." That is practically trade unionism. There is a district where the farmers are not satisfied with the terms.

Can the Deputy say what the price was?

The Deputy's knowledge of Italian is not sufficient for that. The Deputy might have discovered a little more about the dispute, but the only one who could speak English or French in the town was a lady who had been in the hotel at Recess, Co. Galway. I found it hard to get accurate information, and in any case the price would have to be translated from lira to shillings. I have examined the terms of the contracts set out in the schedule and have come to the conclusion that, on the whole, it is one-sided and is of more advantage to M. Lippens than to the farmers or the State. The first thing that aroused my suspicion was a remark of the Minister for Finance, who said that though the terms might be favourable to M. Lippens anything might happen to reduce the amount of profit looked for. That is a very reasonable claim to be put forward by the representative of one of the parties, but I think the Minister should have said that it is also true that anything might happen to increase the profits, such as a series of tornadoes in the West Indies, disease attacking the sugar cane; and an alteration in ocean freights might place beet sugar in a preferential position over sugar cane. These would be of advantage to M. Lippens. I think M. Lippens has made the best bargain he could. The second schedule makes provision for the reduction in price of any beet that has a sugar value below 15½ per cent., but it makes no provision where the sugar content is over 15½ per cent.

I am sorry I am wrong there. That weakens my argument to that extent. Another point on which I have serious doubts is that it has not been worked out, except by Deputy Johnson, what proportion the total amount of the subsidy bears to the amount to be paid to the beet grower. Deputy Johnson gave figures, and these may not be accurate.

These figures were wholly deduced from the speeches of the Minister for Finance and Deputy Magennis.

They are not the figures which I gave.

On one side they are and on the other side they are not.

For example, the first figure was 6,000 tons. I gave 5,000.

The figures which Deputy Magennis gave were the expense of production and sale of beet pulp. My object in recording these is to endeavour to induce the Ministry to give their figures.

I am coming to the aid of Deputy Johnson because his case is made better. His receipts are 6,000 tons of sugar at an estimated price of 20/4 per ton. My figure is 5,000, as will be shown in the next item given by Deputy Johnson—sale of sugar, 2,500 at £5 a ton. That was arrived at because of the proportion which the beet pulp bore to my 5,000 tons of sugar.

Quite right; it was the only figure I had.

Capital £300,000.

The Deputy cannot go into these figures now.

With all respect, the argument is being based on figures which I am alleged to have given.

The Minister for Finance gave a figure of £300,000.

I will not base my argument on any figures. I ask the Government: is it the case that the amount estimated to be paid to the farmers will be less than the subsidy to be paid to M. Lippens? If that is the case we might consider whether we should not use that subsidy to encourage tillage all over the country rather than encourage beet-growing in one area. There must be figures, and I hope that the Government will give them. Whereas the subsidy is guaranteed to the factory for ten years the price to the farmer is only guaranteed for three. It is quite true, of course, that the factory owner, if he wishes to get the subsidy, will have to give prices more or less satisfactory to the farmers, but when Deputy Magennis says that the farmer is sure of a guaranteed price it is only guaranteed for a limited period, and, if the farmer insists on getting what he considers to be the full value, the factory may shut down.

It is a contract for three years.

There is no contract giving any price for a period of three years.

I think not for three years.

Mr. EGAN

If you start in 1928 it would be three years from that on.

If you start a three years' contract in 1928, but I do not know that there is anything to compel them to enter into a contract in 1928. They may enter into a contract for only one year. My knowledge on the matter is not as great, perhaps, as that of Deputy Egan, who probably knows more about the subject than I do, and if he does I hope he will tell the Dáil. One thing I prophesy: Before the time in which the subsidy is to end, that is before ten years is up, we should have the Farmers' Party in the Dáil making as bitter complaints against the sugar factory as the barley growers are making against Guinness. I am certain that they are not going to be completely satisfied with the bargain they will get. I think we should have more knowledge and more figures on this matter.

The House will have to bear with me, as there are a number of points I have to cover. The Government interested themselves in this question about last September. A committee was constituted, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Since September up to April that Committee has been constantly in negotiations in connection with this particular question. It was advertised in every reputable trade journal in Europe that the Irish Government were anxious to receive proposals with a view to starting a sugar-beet industry in this country. In that way it became known in every country where sugar-beet is grown. The Government, through that Committee, got into touch with about half-a-dozen firms during that period, and I am glad to say that these firms were probably the biggest in Europe. We made up our minds, as this would be pionner work, that it would be false economy to undertake this enterprise with second-class firms.

I say without hesitation that the half-dozen firms with whom we got in touch were the biggest firms in the world in this business. When it came down to business we found there were about three firms willing to do what we required. The others were not particularly anxious to do pioneer work. These three firms were Von Rossum, at Holland; Lippens, of Belgium; and Began Freres, of France—all outstanding people in the sugar-beet world. They had the same standing in the sugar-beet world as Lord Leverhulme had, or Guinness, or Ford, or Siemens have in their respective spheres. In view of the fact that this was to be pioneer work, and that we were going to be very much in the hands of the firm with whom we were going to do business, we thought it right to make certain that the firms we were dealing with were men whose technical competence to do the work was beyond doubt, and upon whose ability we could rely.

Negotiations have been going on since September. These firms have been visited on the Continent, and their representatives also have come here. They had put in a great many offers. The Committee discussed practically every item of costs with them last February. After that discussion, and after we had reduced the number of firms with whom we were willing to do business, the number that remained was three. At that time the representatives of Began Freres were in Ireland, and we discussed the matter with them. Members of the Committee went to Holland to interview Von Rossum, and they visited M. Lippens in Belgium. After entering into and discussing every aspect of this question with members of the Committee, they were requested to put in a final proposal setting out what subsidies they would require in order to start the sugar-beet industry in this country. They got an undertaking which they asked for that their offers would not be revealed to any rival until all the offers were in. It was under these circumstances that we received, after about four months' negotiation, what we regarded as final offers from these firms. They were—Von Rossums, 24/2, and 48/- to farmers; Began Freres, 24/1¾, and Lippens, 23/11. I may say that immediately after that offer Began Freres withdrew, and we were left then with the other two firms, Von Rossum and Lippens.

The farmers' price was 48/- from Von Rossum, and 50/- from Lippens. We were particularly fortunate in the fact that these two were the premier firms in Europe. We have been in touch with them the whole time. We had to sum them up as far as we could, not only from a financial point of view, but from the point of view of general stability. We came to the conclusion if we could get good terms we would deal with Lippens. We had made up our mind as to what we were going to do. We decided in these circumstances, in the light of their offer, that we could deal with Lippens. We told them that, subject to changing their offer, we were willing to do business with them. After many discussions they came down to the figure of 23/-. That is the best we could do. This particular subject has got as much attention as any other project, I do not care how big, that the Government has had on hands for the last year. That is the best we could do having regard to special reasons which I will detail, and to the reason that we considered it would be anything but economy to deal with any but a really first-class firm. Let us see what that offer amounts to. It is 24/6 for the first three years, 22/6 for the first five years, and 22/1 for the last two years.

At this stage let me compare this with the present British terms. Deputy Johnson made a point, which perhaps is arguable, that it is hardly fair to compare our terms with the terms which the firms got in England in 1911, when sugar-beet was started there. That is arguable; there is a good deal to be said on both sides. But admitting that, let us compare these terms with the terms that the English are giving at least half-a-dozen factories after ten years' experience in England. Last year the terms were: for the first four years, 19/6, plus 1/11 Colonial preference, a total of 21/5; 14/- for three years, and 8/5 for three years, an average of 15/7. What are they to-day? After fifteen years' experience they have improved. The first year is the same as it was last year, 21/5; the next three years, not 21/5, but 21/5 plus 2/4, which is the difference between the old Colonial preference and the Colonial preference as it is now of 4/3.

Is that fixed? Supposing the Colonial preference arrangement is altered by next year?

Mr. HOGAN

No. As the present taxation stands this year they are getting the full advantage of Colonial preference, and that is all the information we have on the question.

Is the 2/4 for this year in addition to the 21/5?

Mr. HOGAN

It is.

So that in the following three years you are also adding 2/4, on the assumption that the Colonial preference will remain as at present?

Mr. HOGAN

Quite so, and I think that in all the circumstances of the case it is rather likely that it will remain.

Is it in the contract that supposing the Colonial preference is altered the subsidy will rise accordingly?

Mr. HOGAN

No. I am dealing now with the present terms in England. The present terms, which, I believe, will continue, are 21/5 for the first year, 23/9 for the next year, 17/3 for the next, and 10/9 for the last three years.

Will the Minister make that clear? He says the first year 21/5, the second year 21/5, plus the Colonial preference. I understood him to say that the Colonial preference applies also to the first year.

Mr. HOGAN

No, it does not apply to the year that is past.

I would like the Minister to make it clear, because the series of figures he is giving now is the series from now.

Mr. HOGAN

I agree with Deputy Johnson that it would hardly be fair, that at least it was arguable that we ought not to compare our terms with the terms that were given to the first two factories in England, and that we should compare our terms only with the factories now in existence in England, built last year and this year as a result of the experience since 1911. I am now comparing the terms we are getting with the terms which the factories that were built last year in England have got and are getting, so far as they are settled. I am not comparing it with the terms that the first factories, started in England in the years 1911, 1912 and 1913, were getting.

A factory built last year will not receive it, because it was not making sugar?

Mr. HOGAN

No; that is correct. I mean a factory operating last year.

Any factory that begins operations now during the continuation of Colonial preference will receive the 2/4, or rather will receive whatever advantage the Colonial preference gives over foreign importation?

Mr. HOGAN

That is the position, and that advantage is an advantage of the full 2/4. The Deputy is making the point that this is only an advantage for non-colonial sugar. That is the real advantage. Last year it was 21/5; for the next three years it will be 23/9. The Deputy will notice that of the figures I quoted previously the first four years is 21/5; now they are: last year, 21/5; this year and the next two years, 23/9; for the next three years, 17/3, and for the next three years, 10/9—an average of 17/8. Then, in addition to that, they get a figure which works out at an average for the ten years period of 2/1 per cwt. of sugar in respect of molasses, so that the average works out at 19/9. That is the British subsidy. I am not comparing the Irish factory that is to be started with the factories which were started in 1911 and 1912, which got big loans, and for which the British Government gave two years' subsidies at 25/8. Deputy Johnson says that this was due to inefficiency. In the factories, to a certain extent, it was due to that. It was due to inexperience; it was due to things which I am perfectly certain the British will take advantage of in connection with their new factories. I am comparing the subsidies which we are giving in connection with this one experimental factory with the subsidies which are in existence in England for the factories that have been started recently. Compare these terms with the first three years of the 5,000 tons factory. For the first three years in Ireland it will be 24/6. That works out at £147,000 per annum, on a 6,000 tons factory, and I should say that is what we hope to work up to. In England for the current three years period, leaving out last year, it works out at £160,000 per annum. The subsidy in England for this year and the next two years will be more than the subsidy here for the first three years after the factory has started.

On a 6,000 tons factory?

Mr. HOGAN

Yes. It is quite simple. It is 23/9 plus 2/11, not 2/1. Let me explain why that is so. I said that the subsidy on molasses worked out at 2/1 per cwt. of sugar. That would be the subsidy over the ten years' period, but for three years it works out at 2/11. The subsidy in England is 26/8 as against our 24/8 for a three years' period. But it is not fair to take the first three years' period. The first three years' period covers a tremendous number of contingencies of all kinds, and it is much fairer to deal with the average of the ten years. If you are dealing with averages it works out like this: The English average is 17/7 for sugar, plus 2/1 in respect of molasses. It would be 8/10 per cwt. for the first three years on the molasses themselves, and that would work out at one-third of 8/10 for each hundredweight of sugar. For every hundredweight of sugar there is about one-third of molasses. It would work out at 2/11. But, as I explained, when you are dealing with a ten years' period, in view of the fact that the subsidy falls, it is 2/1. Therefore, in so far as averages are concerned, the English average for the ten years' period is 17/8, plus 2/1, which is 19/9, and the Irish is 23/-. On an 8,000 ton factory, which I hope we will reach, the figures would be on an average, England £158,000 per annum, Ireland £184,000.

That is the position, and there is only one "if" about it, that is, the continuance of Colonial preference in England. Just remember the sequence. The factory, started very optimistically in England twelve years ago, encountered a tremendous number of difficulties. It encountered a tremendous number of difficulties in a county like Norfolk, where it is as rare to see an acre of pasture as it is to see an acre of tillage in Meath, and where you have highly efficient and highly organised farmers, a place that has given a lesson in rotation to the world—Norfolk, Suffolk and Ipswich. They met with tremendous difficulties, both in the field and in the factory, and the British Government had to come to the rescue again and again. The British Government has been in touch with the industry since and up to the present. With all the knowledge they have gained and all the experience that they have had of three or four factories over that period, they made up their minds that there was a good thing in sugar-beet for the British farmer, and they made a definite arrangement last year. We had a shrewd suspicion that that arrangement would be an improvement, and events have proved it. I have my own views as to exactly what influence sugar beet had on changing Colonial preference in England. I think that it had a tremendous effect on it, and I have no doubt that that subsidy is going to stay in England.

The bigger the proportion of Colonial sugar that is grown, in comparison with the non-Colonial sugar, the bigger the loss will be.

Mr. HOGAN

Of course the number of factories is likely to remain stationary for five years, and the output will remain stationary. That factor will not enter into it very much, I think, but, personally, having followed this closely, from my knowledge of the matter, I have very little doubt that that subsidy is going to remain. In any case there is the difference between 19/9 and 23/-. That is a difference of £27,000 a year on a factory of 8,000 tons. It is a difference of about £15,000 a year on a factory of 5,000 tons. Perhaps Deputy Johnson would work that out.

I am not concerned with that argument.

Mr. HOGAN

Having made that point—I hope Deputies have got it clearly—let me come back to the question of costings. I said we had gone into this question of costings very carefully. We found immediately, dealing not only with Messrs. Lippens, but dealing with Von Rossum and practically every firm with whom we dealt, that it was extremely hard to do business on that line. In fact the English factories refused to reveal their costings for the British Parliament on the ground that it would be revealing them to their rivals. They were pressed to do so, but the British Government had to be content in the end with getting what we had got for publication to the Dáil, namely, the balance sheet and profit and loss account, with the right to ask any questions and demand any explanations which we might wish. The very same point which we were up against, they were up against.

They were extremely reticent first of all about the costings for the same reason, and we found, secondly, that the costings were vitiated by the belief and the point of view that there was nothing very certain about prices in Ireland. When we went into the question of prices of coal, coke, transit, and limestone the first figures which we got from all of them were absurd. We went into the figures with them. We pointed out they were wrong, not once, not twice, not only by correspondence, but by meeting them here, in Belgium and Holland, and all the time it was perfectly clear to us that there was fixed in the minds of these people that costings in Ireland were not as defined as in England or any other country, and that they must add something considerable to each item to provide for contingencies. At least we should be able to understand that point of view, having regard to everything that has happened in the eyes of the foreigner, who knows nothing about the country but what he reads in the papers. We were faced with that difficulty. We examined the costings with them from the point of view of the price of coal, coke, transit, limestone and the cost of labour. I have here certain figures, under these items. We have got certain costings from which I have taken certain figures, which I have from these various firms, and they all work out rather like this. The expenses of production which we got ranged from £90,000 to £130,000 and £140,000.

That is on a 6,000 tons production?

Mr. HOGAN

Yes. What is more, they were not given under the same headings. The costings, presented always fairly roughly by Messrs. Von Rossum were not under quite the same headings as the costings presented by other firms. The costings which we worked down to in the end vary between £80,000 and £120,000 or £130,000. These costings were made up under items, as I say, like coal, coke, limestone, labour, administrative expenses, and so on. They were never in quite the same form from anyone, but all of them were vitiated, in spite of anything we could do, as I say, by this belief that there was no real certainty about prices in this country, at least that there was not the same certainty about prices in this country, apart from security and experience, as obtained in England. I have tried to get some idea as to costings and to work out a specimen of percentages. Taking the case of coal, it varied from 15 to 25 per cent.

Mr. HOGAN

On costings, less beet, less depreciation. The costings actually varied from about 15 to 25 per cent. of the total cost—that is, defining the total cost as all costs of production except the price of beet and depreciation. Limestone worked out at from 2 to 5 per cent.; coke from 1 to 5 per cent.; labour, skilled and unskilled, from 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. Stores varied in an extraordinary way, and it was very difficult to get two offers which meant exactly the same in that regard. These are the important ones.

What percentage is allowed for contingencies?

Mr. HOGAN

From ten to about fifteen per cent. When we did come down to business, as nearly as we could, the cost of production, less beet and less depreciation, worked out at between £70,000 and £90,000. In other words, it worked out approximately and fairly accurately to the figure which Deputy Johnson deduced from the other figure. As I said already, we could not get any further on that line. We could meet these men and tell them what the price of coal was here. We could assure them that they could get limestone here, and we could give them assurances in regard to labour and in regard to plant. We could give them details of prices, and show them what the tendencies were in that regard, but we could not get any further on that line. We were faced with the dilemma which, I think, the British Government was faced with to a lesser extent, if we attempted to pursue that any further, and we had to come to this. The British—I am speaking now of present conditions, and not of what happened in England during the pioneer period—were able, after ten years, to make certain terms. These terms agreed to give a certain subsidy, and that subsidy reflected the prices of all the various items in the cost of production, such as coal, coke, limestone, transit, etc. That is a fact that we have to face here, and we may as well face it at once. Those prices are at least no higher in England than they are here. They are lower in a great many cases. So that, so far as the British subsidy reflected what I may call the normal costs of production, we could not expect to do better than that, for the simple reason that the costs of coal, coke and limestone, and transit especially, are at least as cheap in England as they are here, and in the eyes of a foreigner more available.

Could the Minister give us the relative prices for sugar and molasses in Ireland as compared with England?

Mr. HOGAN

If the Deputy will allow me to develop the point I am on I will come later to the question that he has asked. As I was saying, we could not possibly expect to do better, and we had to face that. There were at least two considerations here which did not operate in England. The first was that you could be certain in a country like England, in the eyes of a foreigner particularly, who had capital to invest, of giving absolute security so far as security could be given him. You could take it for granted that in a country like England, a country which is highly industrialised, the competition so far as the normal costs of production are concerned, would be keen. It would be as keen as it possibly could be, so keen that we could not hope to do better. Therefore, so far as the English subsidy reflects the normal cost of production we could not be expected to improve upon it.

Then there were two other items. You had the fact that there was utter inexperience here in the matter of beet-growing on a commercial scale as compared with England. England had ten years' experience behind her in beet growing, in Norfolk and in the shires surrounding it. In that part of England, as I pointed out before, practically every acre of the land is tilled. There is hardly an acre in pasture. Therefore, in addition to this ten years' experience which they had in England of this beet-growing, you had absolute security as well.

I have not the slightest doubt whatever but that the security for the investment of capital here is at least as good as it is in England. But I am an Irishman and must have a shrewder idea of conditions here than either a Belgian or a Dutchman. When it comes to a question of investing capital here or in England, the foreigner will probably come to the conclusion that there is not the same security here that there is in England. We had to face that, too, and we had to pay for these two items.

The question is, how much should we pay? Remember that the real essential point is not, can beets be grown in Ireland? They can, and we have proved that on demonstration plots. The real essential question for M. Lippens or Von Rossum was, will the Irish farmer, who is utterly inexperienced in the growing of beet, grow the requisite amount, a normal minimum of 5,000 acres, producing at least 50,000 tons a year of beets, and will he keep doing that? That is the real point, and I put it to any farmer whether that is an absolute dead certainty. That is the real "if." That is the real doubt that operates even still in England, but not to the same extent for the reasons that I have mentioned, namely: that the district in which beet growing is carried on in England is probably the most highly cultivated district in Europe. That district embraces Norfolk and the surrounding shires. The second fact is that they have actually ten years' experience in England in the growing of this particular crop. We had to pay for both of these things.

We could not hope to do better than England in the matter of the normal costs of production. We had to pay for our inexperience, and for the fact that we had not done this before. A foreigner going to invest capital in an industry of this kind in Ireland will not try to say to himself, "Because such a thing has been done in England it will also be done in Ireland." I would be sorry if he did. He will not do anything until we have proved to him that this crop will be, and can be, grown here, and until we have proved to him that there is absolute security for the investment of a sum like £300,000 in this country.

The absence of these two things, our inexperience and the question of security, had to be reflected in the difference in the subsidy. What is that difference? On a 5,000 ton factory it is about £15,000 a year. I am as satisfied as I could be of anything that, in all the circumstances, an expenditure which involves a capital of probably £300,000 and a subsidy ranging from £140,000 to £180,000, with a difference of only £15,000 per annum as between us and England, were really good terms from our point of view. I am satisfied that the committee in charge of this sugar-beet scheme has done extremely well, if we are to take any line at all from English conditions and English experience. The question for the Government and for the Dáil is this, can we hope to get better terms than they have got in England? In one respect, I am satisfied that the starting of factories in England makes it much more difficult for us to get better terms. If they had no factories in England, and that we were the pioneers, we would get better terms in respect of the normal costs of production.

The question of security might enter into it, and that might upset the calculation. Looking at it from the point of view that factories were started in England, to whom was the Continental factory owner to go? Because there was no experience of it in England, Ireland, or Scotland, that made him extremely careful in dealing with a new country like this. But I am perfectly satisfied we could not get better than England got, and we did extremely well to come so near to them in view of the two big facts I have mentioned—(1) that this crop was not grown there, and there is the question whether it will be grown in the quantities and of the right quality, and (2) that in the eyes of the Dutch man, there is not the same security for investment to get in this country as there is in England. We are told to wait. We can wait if it is worth while. If we wait three or four years we still will have to pay for our inexperience. No foreigners are going to come here and start a beet sugar factory optimistic enough only to ask the Irish farmer to grow 5,000 or 6,000 tons of beet, and to be quite satisfied that he will grow it.

Every day that passes shows that the security in this country is as good as in England, and in three or four years we could perhaps do somewhat better. How much better? He is an optimistic man who will say we can do as well as England in view of the circumstances that I have pointed out in the matter of costings. They have the experience, which we have not. We might do better than now if we had three or four years' experience, and instead of having to pay £15,000 a year we might only have to pay £5,000, or we might have to pay £7,000, and it is for the Dáil to say whether it is worth while waiting three or four years in order to have only to pay £7,000 for a proposition like this. I have my own opinion. It is quite on the cards if we start this factory now we can prove we have insured against every possible contingency; that in three or four years we will have proved that this country is very suitable for sugar beet, more suitable than England, and that will make all the difference.

In three or four years, after starting this experimental factory, and proving certain things, and proving, above all, that we can get the Irish farmer, within a limited area, to make a big change and to grow 5,000 acres of roots and deliver them year after year —if we prove that, and prove, in addition, that the beet grown here is of a better quality, from the point of view of sugar content, than in England, then you may get better terms than they get in England. But do not set up that factory, and leave these two doubts. They remain there until they are dispelled, and we have to pay for getting them dispelled. Remove these two doubts from the mind of the foreign factory owner and you might get seven or eight thousand pounds of better terms in three or four years. It is for the Dáil to decide is it worth while waiting. My own view is that to start a factory is the shorter way to get better terms, not only for this enterprise, but for every other enterprise we want to go into. The fact that a factory worth £300,000 is operating in this country will do a lot for security and for every other enterprise that the State can provide or initiate in the future.

I ask the conservative people who are advising us now to go slow—Do they think it likely that we will get better terms than the English even if we waited three or four years? I ask them is it worth our while to wait three or four years for the sake of £20,000 a year or £15,000 a year? I gave some figures the other day, and all I say is that we get advice to go slow now from people now who will be in a much bigger hurry than we are in ten years, and perhaps for very good reason. Let me take Deputy Johnson's costings. His figures are a fair specimen. Deputy Johnson has deduced them from those figures supplied by the Minister for Finance and by Deputy Magennis, and on the expenditure side they are a fair specimen of the figures we have got ourselves. The Deputy has taken 50,000 tons of beet and 6,000 tons of sugar. He is dealing with the first three years. I will not comment on the assumption that you are going to get an average of 50,000 tons of beet in the first three years. Let me assume it for the moment.

It is the assumption of the Minister for Finance.

Mr. HOGAN

When you say that that is the assumption of the Minister for Finance let me make it clear. You get ten tons to the acre in Holland some years. You may get up to 14 tons to the acre. You will get 10 tons from particular districts in England which have been growing beet for 10 or 11 years, where you have a very high degree of cultivation and where the farmers and their fathers before them were tilling the land for generations. You will do well enough with ten tons to the acre in England. But there is no use in our closing our eyes to the fact—M. Lippens did not close his eyes to the fact—that no one expects you will get 10 tons here in the first years or exactly what they get in Holland. If you did the thing would be a gift. There would be a small fortune in it. When I say a small fortune, I mean a real good thing in it. If you could get the same yield and the same sugar content as they get in Sweden, Denmark and Holland, and in England, to a lesser extent, then, of course, it would be preposterous to enter into this arrangement with M. Lippens. We are examining into the possibilities. Let us see what the possibilities are. Deputy Johnson takes 50,000 tons of beet the first year. Assuming that for the moment, and assume that instead of getting 6,000 tons of sugar you get 5,000 tons of sugar, and assuming that instead of getting 20/- he gets 19/-.

Mr. HOGAN

Over here and at the Continental ports.

It is a question of the price in Ireland, where the factory has to sell.

The London price yesterday was 19/6.

Mr. HOGAN

At present the value would be 17/6 in Ireland.

I made inquiry, and I find that the price to the trader is about 19/6 at present.

To the wholesaler?

That would not be factory price?

That is the wholesale price. This figure of 20/-, of course, is quite a chance figure. I might have said 25/-. The present price is probably 3/- or 4/- a cwt. lower than was expected six months ago. It is very much lower than it has been for a long time. So that I do not think that the 20/- is an extravagant suggestion either way. It is probably fair for it and what is expected in the trade.

That would be against M. Lippens.

If it falls.

If there is less grown, will there not have to be a setoff on the expenditure side?

Mr. HOGAN

I am coming to that. Yesterday's price was 28/9 per cwt. Of that 9/4 is duty. That is 19/5. That is the wholesale price. You have to deduct from that certain expenses which the wholesaler charges to the manufacturer, and at present sugar is rather high—19/- would be rather high. It was down to 15/- in October.

Mr. HOGAN

Not here. It has varied between 16/- and £1 since last October. Let us put it this way. Take 19/6 as the price. You have to deduct from that certain expenses which the wholesaler charges to the manufacturer. My figure of 19/-, I suggest, in all the circumstances, is a fair figure for present conditions. Take 5,000 tons at £19 per ton and you get £95,000, as against £120,000. All I wish to show is that it is easy to show a big profit if you produce all the figures that would apply to Holland or Belgium. You are not in Holland or Belgium, hence we have to pay a big subsidy. Take it that instead of getting 6,000 tons they get only 5,000, at £19 per ton. That immediately changes your profits from £54,000 to £25,000.

On the other hand, you must take into consideration the high cost of sugar, relatively, is in favour of the factory if sold locally.

Mr. HOGAN

I am taking the price here. I will take any figure you like. I put it at 19s., as being about the present price wholesale, deducting expenses. It is higher than it was. What I am saying is, and I hope the farmers will listen to it, that we are assuming that 5,000 acres will be grown and delivered the first year.

That is a tall assumption.

Is not that at £10 per acre?

Mr. HOGAN

Yes. I am assuming that we get 50,000 tons. He thinks he will get 10,000 tons and he only gets 5,000 tons of sugar from it—the content is not up to the mark. That immediately reduces it by £25,000. Let us say that he gets 4,000 acres grown the first year, and that he gets ten tons to the acre—40,000 tons—and he gets 4,000 tons of sugar. You have the difference immediately that the £54,000 is reduced to £44,000. If, during the first year, there are only 4,000 acres of beets grown, and they only get ten tons per acre, which they get on an average in Holland——

Only on an average?

Mr. HOGAN

That they only get 10 tons to the acre, and that they are only able to make what they are making on an average in England, and even in continental countries, 4,000 tons of sugar out of it, then the profit is reduced immediately from £54,000. It is reduced by £9,000 per year for the first three years.

I suggest to the Minister when he is dealing with the sums brought out that there are certain items, particularly the item of molasses —2,000 tons—which are not included.

Mr. HOGAN

They are reduced also. I want to show that any figures based on getting the full acreage grown, or the right sugar content delivered in this country during the first three years, are not in touch with the realities of the situation; that it is exactly because of that very grave doubt that we pay a big subsidy. I wish to show that only a very small difference makes a very big difference in the profits. If instead of growing 5,000 you grow 4,000 acres, you have an immediate difference in the profits of £44,000. It is for that reason that the big subsidy is given the first year. That is the vital point.

Deputy Johnson thinks that this was rather an expensive way to find out whether this climate is suitable for beets. We have found that out. We have experimental plots, and we know that with good efficient cultivation and suitable land you can get an average of 10 or 12 tons to the acre, and a sugar content up to 15½ per cent. That is not answering the question which the factory owner will immediately ask: Can you, in this country, get a minimum of five thousand acres, producing, at least, 50,000 tons of beets, or a sugar content which averages 15½ per cent., in a limited area? Can you get the farmers to do that and to keep doing it? If that can be done, then there is a good profit in this. If it cannot be done, there is a big loss. Even if only half our anticipations were reached—and a great many farmers will say our anticipations are optimistic—there is a big loss. If the farmers can start off here, and do as well in the first year as they are doing in Holland and Belgium, as well even as in England, then M. Lippens has a good profit.

It would help us to form some estimate if the Minister would say what is the recognised area around the factory from which beets can be brought to the factory economically?

Mr. HOGAN

It would depend on transport conditions—railways, canals and so on. We will say a radius of 40 miles. That might apply in some cases; it might not in this.

A radius of 40 miles!

Mr. HOGAN

That would be very wide.

I think so.

Mr. HOGAN

That is a question you could not answer here. You can only answer that question with reference to a defined, given factory, after examining the transport facilities round you.

The reason I ask that is that the 5,000 acres becomes a very small matter, indeed, if you can increase the area to which the 5,000 acres applies.

Mr. HOGAN

You cannot increase the area anything like indefinitely. That is the whole question. That is what is going to regulate whether M. Lippens is going to make a good profit or not. It is going to prove more. I hope he will make a good profit, because if he does it means that we have succeeded. I ask Deputies to remember that the sequence in nearly every country towards the development of a national beet industry is something like this: first, you have the purely experimental stage, not quite with one factory, but something approximate to the purely experimental stage; next you have to subsidise the factories—a number of factories subsidised somewhat on a commercial scale; finally, there is the stage which we hope to reach—namely, the time when you can have free trade in sugar—when factories are able to pay for themselves. When we are considering this factory, we are considering it entirely from the wrong point of view if we are thinking of increasing tillage; if we are thinking of the amount of labour it will give. No one could justify this amount of money from the point of view of increasing tillage, or of the amount of labour this particular factory will give employment to. No one does.

We are justifying this particular expenditure as an expenditure on one purely experimental factory—a factory to prove above all that in a limited area Irish farmers will, in fact, grow the requisite quantity of beets of the requisite quality for a minimum sized factory. That is what we have to prove by this particular factory. We have to prove that to the people with technical competence in these matters, the people who are to run these factories here as they run similar factories in other countries. The success of this factory will demonstrate that, and demonstrate the one hundred and one technical details exactly—what sort of beets we can produce commercially, what sort of transit conditions we can arrange. It will demonstrate also how labour comes into the picture. It will demonstrate all those things in Ireland. The men whom we shall have to bring in for many years must be foreigners, because they are the only people who know the business. The foreign factory owner will realise that these things can be done in Ireland, and he knows no experiments in England or elsewhere would suffice for him to prove those things, so far as Ireland is concerned.

The question does not arise whether it is in one part of Ireland or the other. The important thing to prove is that in Ireland you can grow those beets—that the farmer can grow them of the required amount and quality. After this factory has been operating for some years we will be fair judges of whether or not the game is worth the candle, or whether there is anything in this, whether we ought to subsidise seven or eight factories, and what chances there are of those factories ultimately paying for themselves. We cannot do that without the experience gained from this factory. Then we shall have increased tillage and increased employment. We must make a beginning. In this scheme, so far as the factory is concerned, we do not claim any merit on the grounds that it is a good investment, that it will increase employment or bring increased tillage.

We only hope it will be the beginning of a scheme that will have these possibilities, and, in addition, provide a lucrative crop for the farmer. That is the claim we make for it. What is the farmers' position ? The terms offered are 54/- per ton. That is £27 per acre, assuming ten tons to the acre.

That is the Holland average.

Mr. HOGAN

The Holland average is a little higher. Let us assume that. We can know then what allowance to make. That would give a direct profit of about £7 per statute acre or £11 per Irish acre. That is direct profit, not speaking of the indirect profits, and not taking into account the profits he gets by being able to buy beet or the indirect profits due to better cultivation.

I want to indicate, if I can, how we hope that this business may become self-supporting in the long run. Assume that he is able to work up after seven or eight years; assume that this country is suitable for sugar beet; assume that that is true, and that the farmer is able to get thirteen and a half tons —I only give those figures with great reserve to show the direction our minds are taking—that the country is suitable for beet. No one knows yet whether the country is suitable for beet. Assume he is able to get that profit at the same cost of production, and that he is content with the same profit of £7. That means that the price of beets would be £2 instead of 54/-. If he gets £2 for thirteen and a half tons he would get the same profit, gross, per acre.

It would be more expensive to deliver.

Mr. HOGAN

I am saying, assume that experience shows that we can work up to thirteen and a half tons at the same cost of production and that the transport is improved and so on. That is not a big assumption, because I think the initial cost of production would be the highest. The factory owner can afford then to take £2 a ton. That is a difference of 14/-, and of 7/- in the subsidy. Supposing the farmer found it would pay to take a profit of £4 per statute acre, the price would be £24, or 35/- a ton. At the same cost of production let us assume he is satisfied with £4 profit per acre. 35/- from 54/- comes to 19/-. That would be 9/6 per cwt. of sugar. That reduces the subsidy by 9/6. Supposing a little time proves that, so far as factory owners are concerned, we can afford to take ten or twelve shillings off the subsidy. Remember, I tried to indicate here what possible reductions in the subsidy would come from better cultivation and from the farmer being content with the smaller profit, with a view to putting this industry on its legs.

I showed that if we got thirteen and a half tons of beet, and that if the farmer were willing to take a profit of £4 per statute acre, you could reduce the subsidy by 9/6. There is a big sum in that for insecurity and inexperience. Supposing it is eight shillings, the difference between ours and—I was going to say the English, but the English is altered—it is not a large assumption to say that there must be seven or eight shillings of that for the insecurity of this pioneer factory. Add that to the 9/6 and you get 16/6. We hope to work at that rate until we come to a time when this industry will be self-supporting here. It all depends on whether experience will show that the soil and climate are particularly suitable for the growing and production of sugar beet of the right quality. If it is, these figures can be verified and we can work up to thirteen and a half or fourteen tons. We can work up in this like Holland; actually we do not know. If the farmer is content to take a direct profit of £4 per statute acre we are reaching the time when this particular industry can stand on its own feet and no subsidy is required. Is £4 a statute acre a good profit? Let me say this: sugar-beet can only be made a success by first class farmers who are willing to take small direct profits and who realise all the advantages and indirect profits that come from better cultivation and having the land in better heart. The Dutch, the Swedish and the Belgian farmers do not get one more penny profit than that, and in many cases it is not touched on. This is the foundation of agriculture in Sweden. If you ask the Dutch farmer to make up what it is worth to him, it would be worth £7 or £8 per acre. Remember, there is no future in sugar-beet except for the first class farmer who tills and cultivates really well and who realises there is a good profit in improving his land.

He must set down as a big profit the fact that this crop will improve his land immensely if properly cultivated and make the succeeding crops much more remunerative. There is a substantial profit in that way, but only in that way, so far as we are concerned. In view of the fact that there is nothing in sugar-beet except for the first-class farmer—the farmer who realises what real profits are—this experiment is an act of faith by us in the Irish farmer. What are the indirect profits ? £4 per statute acre is £6 an Irish acre —a really good profit. In addition to that, as I say, you must have first-class cultivation, first-class tillage, first-class manuring and first-class fertilising, or you will not have a successful sugar beet crop. The very fact that you have a successful sugar beet crop means that you have had first-class tillage, the cleaning away of weeds, manuring, fertilisation and so on. If you have got that, you have got your land in far better heart. You have got it so that it will yield far more oats. You have got it so that it will grow wheat when it would not grow wheat before. You have got land that is improved in every respect. You have got land that will grow even better hay. The Dutch farmer uses this as a nurse crop for his land.

The Minister began by saying that beet will grow only on good land.

Mr. HOGAN

Even Messrs. Lippens do not know that. I do not know more than they. That is what we have to test. If you are to get good sugar-beet crops, you must have first-class cultivation. You must have your land highly manured and fertilised and have it brought back into really good heart. By doing that, you would get your net profit of £7 at the present moment. I am hoping in the future, when it is on a paying foundation, that you will get a net profit of £4, and in addition you will get your land improved by 15 or 20 per cent. for succeeding crops.

Is the Minister taking into account the value of the tops?

Mr. HOGAN

I call that an indirect advantage. You have to cut off the green leaves.

Is that included in the £4 profit?

Mr. HOGAN

No. You have that £4 profit. You have the opportunity of buying your dried pulp and feeding that to cattle to make manure for next year's crop. You have the indirect advantages gained by cleaning your land thoroughly, tilling it thoroughly, cultivating, manuring and fertilising it. But these are advantages that are only seen by the Dutch and Danish farmer and by the first-class farmer, generally, who realises what the indirect advantages of good tillage are.

There is the experiment, and I have told you its cost. The 5,000 ton factory is costing us about £15,000 a year more than England. We are satisfied with that. We think the Committee have done really well. We propose to have one factory set up, and we do not propose to go ahead with more than one factory, because we realise that when one factory has been operating for three or four years, it will teach us many lessons, and teach not only us but Messrs. Lippens and every other foreign prospector many lessons. We will have the experience, and we will be able to approach something like commercial terms for sugar-beet production in the country. Of course, it may prove that sugar-beet is impossible in the country, that we cannot grow the right class, the right quantity, or the right quality. If that be the case, we shall at least have explored the possibilities. The experiment will not fail for irrelevant reasons. We have got a first-class man. He knows his business. He is in a position to offer prices to the farmers which will tempt them to grow beet. There ought to be no likelihood that this factory will fail, for these reasons.

In dealing with this very important question, I am not concerned with the issue as to whether there should be one factory or two factories, or with the rival claims of the different companies. I am concerned with that portion of the question which deals with agriculture. I do not look upon this as a gift, or as a subsidy to agriculture. I look upon it as a subsidy devoted to research. I look upon it as a subsidy devoted to discovering whether beet can be grown in this country at a profit. This subsidy is a gift to research, and nothing else. When the claim was made here, that this was purely a gift to agriculture, I said it was bosh. That may be an ugly word to use, but I will proceed to prove my contention. The Minister has given us the average for Holland, after centuries of experience, at about ten tons to the acre.

Mr. HOGAN

Some years it is more, and some years it is less.

We can take the average as ten tons. That is a yield we may reach in time in this country. I thought twenty-four hours ago that we might assume an average of ten tons to the acre. When Deputy Magennis, on Tuesday last, mentioned 7½ tons or 8 tons as something that we might reach in the first few years of experiment, I thought he was understating the case. I thought that, with a yield of 7½ tons or 8 tons to the acre, this would be a useless proposition from the economic point of view. I still think that. Let us take 8 tons at 54s. a ton. That will give us £21 12s. per acre. How does that £21 12s. an acre compare with what I might describe as any of the other contemporary crops with beet? When I say that, I class mangels, turnips, potatoes, and, perhaps, rape as contemporary crops with beet. They are all used as manuring and cleansing crops, besides being profit crops.

I am prepared to admit, from all the attention and cultivation that beet needs, that it is a better cleansing crop than the others, but it has yet to be proved to me — and perhaps to other people — that it is a better manuring crop — that it does not take more out of the land and that it does not need more manure. If it needs more manure, it is more expensive. If it takes more out of the land, it is not quite as valuable a manuring crop as any of the others. Let us take an acre of potatoes. Which is the better crop for a farmer to grow — an acre of beet or an acre of potatoes? It is said that this subsidy is a great boon to agriculture; that it is something flung into the mouth of agriculture to shut it up. But when you compare one crop with the other, there will be no hesitation in saying on behalf of agriculture: "We prefer the potato crop." The potato crop will mean about one-third of the labour. Perhaps I am understating it when I say one-third. From what we have been led to believe, it might mean less than one-third of labour. What is the price you are going to get for an acre of potatoes and what is the price you are going to get for an acre of beet? What price are you going to get for an acre of mangels and what price for an acre of beet?

Mr. HOGAN

Would the Deputy tell us the price for the potatoes?

At what particular period?

ACTING-CHAIRMAN

Deputy Gorey must be allowed to proceed.

Mr. HOGAN

I was looking for information.

If the Minister as a lawyer wants cross-examination, he had better let us have a law court.

Mr. HOGAN

I was genuinely looking for information. I understood the Deputy was comparing the profits from potatoes with the profits from beet. We got the prices for beet. I thought he was going to give us the profits to the acre for potatoes.

If the Minister asks me for the prices in the month of July, I have no hesitation in saying that potato farming in Dublin is worth from £60 to £70 an acre.

Mr. HOGAN

That is approximately a profit of about £40 an acre.

I said £50 or £60 in the county of Dublin.

Mr. HOGAN

I am merely pointing out that that would be equivalent to a profit of £40 or £50. The Deputy has given us the price of the potatoes — not the profit. The cultivation would cost about £20.

Farming is not so bad after all.

If cultivation costs him twice or three times as much in the case of beet and he gets £27 or £28 an acre, where is the comparison—there is none.

Mr. HOGAN

There is no comparison.

On the main crop, I have given my values on a very much reduced basis for July. The September prices would be different; still the choice is with the potatoes. I am not a potato grower. I do not know the prices from month to month. Nobody without an intimate knowledge of potato cultivation can talk with authority on the prices. But I can talk with some authority on the prices of mangolds, and their worth. I say that if I thought that we were only going to get 7½ or eight tons per acre of marketable beet delivered at the factory, I should say "Damn this project; it is a waste of money." But I believe we are able to do very much more than that. I believe we are able to get something near what the Minister talks of; some experiments carried out aim at something like ten tons per acre. Friends of mine in Leix and in Kildare have tried it, and they tell me that they can get something very near ten or eleven tons. I do not know how true that is. Of course, the topping of the beet is a matter of very considerable importance. It depends on how much topping you have to do. You have to take off, I understand, the exposed portion of the top. The portion exposed to the sun is absolutely unsuitable, and must be removed. But an acre of mangolds, say, at 20 to 25 tons per acre, and with very much reduced cost of production, will give the Irish farmer who is used to the one and not used to the other a better alternative. Without hesitation, the crop he will choose will be the mangolds as the more economic crop.

What is the price at which mangolds are sold?

I am satisfied to take £1 per ton. I have taken it at my own house. It does not represent the prices you can get, but let us say £25 an acre. I am not overstating the case when I say £1 per ton. I am understating it. I want to make my figures as conservative as possible.

I would like to inform the Deputy that mangolds are being sold at 15/- per ton at the moment in the town where I come from.

I might say that I got 28/- a ton for mangolds a few days ago.

I hope Deputy Egan will give us 1,000 tons of beet. I would like to know how many acres he is farming?

I gave 7½ tons to the acre as the result of the producer's inexperience in the beginning, with 15½ per cent. yield. I gave 15 tons to the acre, with 18 per cent. yield after experience.

Very well. Let us take these 7½ tons yield at the start, when the growers have not experience. That is what we are to expect for the first three years according to Deputy Magennis. It works out at about £20 per acre. At £20 per acre, this project is a gift to agriculture! This is the subsidy to agriculture! This is something flung at the feet of the agriculturist. This is what the Deputy objects to have characterised as "bosh."

There is the pulp and molasses.

Let us get at this question of the dried pulp. Who is going to get this pulp? Is it to be sold in the market or is it to be given away? Is it to be sold in the market as feeding stuff in competition with other feeding stuffs?

The supplier of the beet is to get it at 5/- per cwt.

Who is to get it? Is there anything in the Bill by which the grower must get the pulp or a proportion of the pulp?

Mr. HOGAN

Not in the Bill.

The grower gets no preference in the Bill. He gets no preference with regard to the distribution of the pulp.

Mr. HOGAN

It is not in the Bill, but the arrangement, as I have said three times, is that half the pulp is to be returned to the grower at 5/- per cwt. This is at about 50 per cent. less than the market price.

In England they are selling from £8 to £10 at the factory.

Mr. HOGAN

Per ton?

Mr. HOGAN

And it is to be returned here at £5 per ton.

I came in contact with beet growers in England. I do not want to damn this thing. I want to see a factory started and the experiment tested. I am satisfied to pay my share towards the expense of that experiment. I would not say so much on this matter were it not for the assertions made by Deputy Magennis about this gift that is being given to agriculture. I am prepared to say that this money is a gift to the nation, but least of all is it a gift to the agricultural community, which is a component part of the nation. With the estimated output per acre, and the price that you are going to pay, it will be touch and go whether you will induce Irish agriculturists to sow beet in sufficient quantities to supply the factory. I have come in contact with English farmers, and the Minister for Lands and Agriculture is only doing justice to the farmers of Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire when he describes them as the best farmers in Europe. I do not know other parts of Europe, but I have had experience of England, Scotland and this country. Undoubtedly in England and Scotland they are high-class farmers. English farmers have said to friends of mine, and myself, that this is no gold mine. I will not say any more about that. There is no gold mine there and I will not damn it any further.

Deputy Magennis has made reference to me and to another great man whom I always admire, Napoleon. I hope neither of us suffers by comparison. The Deputy said that this was in the main a question of subsidising the agricultural industry, and at that particular point I interjected the unfortunate word "bosh." The Deputy said that this was a subsidy in the interests of agriculture; he said it was that more than anything else, and at a later stage he said: "Will the farmers take it up and make good; will they be sufficiently enlightened to know that here is salvation?" He talks also about the foundation of agriculture. I am ready to admit that this may be the foundation of national prosperity, or it will help to be, inasmuch as it is going to employ a considerable number both from an agricultural and manufacturing point of view. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this is a national gift to revive industrial enterprise in the country.

Experiments are being carried out this year by our county instructors. They are going to have twenty-five plots in each county as an experiment with a view to seeing what can be done in the way of growing beet, and to ascertain where the suitable soil is. If you are going to make this a commercial proposition, beet must be grown in districts where they have paid particular attention to agriculture, and where there are good tillage farmers and cleaners. In addition, you will want to go to districts where there are particularly good cattle feeders. Without one you cannot have the other. You must have manure. Outside Dublin, where a lot of manure is made, and where the people get the benefit, the people must endeavour to make their own farm-yard manure, and you must have considerable cattle-feeding in winter in order to provide that manure.

Mr. HOGAN

For cows?

I prefer cattle. However, cows or cattle do not matter; either will give you a better manure content. Cattle-feeding will give you better manure than cow-feeding, for obvious reasons. I am more and more convinced, as a result of the debate and the Minister's statement, that Deputy Johnson's suggestion of a Select Committee is the soundest one. That Committee could inquire into the matter that is at present being experimented on. Listening to the debate, I have been wondering, in regard to beet growing or tobacco growing, which crop would pay best from the national point of view. I have not come to any conclusion on that subject at the moment. It strikes me that there can be a lot said in favour of tobacco-growing as against the growing of beet. I am convinced that Deputy Johnson's suggestion is a very wise one. I have been also struck by the fact that no director represents the Government on this company. For the subsidy they are prepared to give, they demand no representation. We have the experience gained in England to follow. We should try to reach the English standard of efficiency in regard to this crop. Even with the most optimistic of outlooks, I do not believe we can reach that standard right off.

Reference has been made to the quality of the soil. I am not competent, I know, to talk about the quality of the soil in Holland, which is a country largely composed of land reclaimed from the sea; it is a country that we must assume has a soil of deep loam with a considerable salt content. Any land reclaimed from the sea must retain some salt. It is a country more suitable for mangolds and more suitable, I would assume, for beet. If we take the Minister's figures as regards Holland, what hope have we of ever reaching that point?

Mr. HOGAN

I did not say it was the best they could do.

That is the average. When one talks about averages in Holland, a country with centuries of experience, you are touching upon realities and actual facts. That is what we have to consider in this connection. We have had figures relating to Holland and Belgium — I do not know about France. I will not refer to the need in France, because that was touched upon by Deputy Cooper, who referred to the time when beet growing was a necessity. That was then started by the great man who, as Deputy Magennis stated, was somewhat similar to me. I think before this question goes very much further it should be put as a plain proposition to the people as to where this factory is to be located. The sooner that is done the better. The facts of the case, showing the average production per acre that may be expected in the first years and subsequent years, should be pointed out. Let the people know the facts and then come to a decision as to whether they are prepared to enter into a contract on these terms. Will the farmers sign the contracts? If they do not, there is no use talking about this factory. Before you start you want to be absolutely certain of that.

After telling them what you are likely to do in the first years, and what the price will be per acre, farmers will be able to compare the returns with other crops and say whether they are going to enter into these contracts or not. There is no use going on without taking the public into your confidence and especially the people who are going to grow beet. What is the good of having a fixed market if the crop is not an economic proposition? If the value of the crop goes down it will be going in the wrong direction. If the market goes up-hill the crop can be put in the same category as other crops. If this crop is not as good as the others that is a different matter. Unless the promoters of this enterprise take the people into their confidence they are riding for a fall. I do not believe there is going to be, under this proposal, any considerable addition to the area under tillage. I believe this crop will replace some of the root crops that are already grown. In some places there may be additional tillage.

Mr. HOGAN

This factory may not mean one extra acre of tillage.

I take it that it is going to replace the present crops and the present rotation.

With reference to the interjection that it is going to replace crops that are of greater value, then it surely is a net loss to the country.

Mr. HOGAN

It does not matter twopence whether this replaces other crops or not, or whether it will mean increased tillage. This is one experimental factory, and only one. If it proves that sugar beet is a sound proposition we can have half-a-dozen or a dozen other factories running on commercial lines, which will increase tillage and give employment. Of course, in effect there is bound to be a certain amount of increased tillage.

I take it that it is not going to be any addition to our manuring crops. It is more or less going to replace them. I hope it will be an addition to these crops, that it will mean more manure, and the feeding of more cattle. If it does that it will have achieved its object. The means for the production of manure must be winter feeding in all its phases and the use of artificial feeding stuffs. The fateful 100 days have been referred to by Deputy Magennis. During that period a considerable number of people are going to be employed in the factory. There are then some 200 other days during which these people will have to live, but will not be at work. I do not know where they are going to be employed for these 200 days. Possibly a considerable number of them may find employment in connection with the growth of the crop. Anyhow, the problem of the 100 days' employment is not sufficient to deal with our unemployment problem. Farmers must be convinced that 7½ to 8 tons per acre, at a guaranteed price of 54s., is good business. Otherwise I do not believe that farmers will jump at the price, or consider it a very tempting bait. Deputy Cooper, when speaking on this question, could have, I think, given a good deal of valuable information. If he had made inquiries he could have told us how to deal with the crop in Italy.

Can Deputy Gorey tell me how I could make inquiries when I had only twenty-four hours there? My plans had been made before I saw the placard that has been referred to. I knew nothing about the placard until I saw it.

It would be interesting if we knew what price the Italians are getting.

Mr. HOGAN

About 35s.

How many tons are they getting to the acre? That information would be interesting for farmers. The Minister says the price is 35/- a ton.

Mr. HOGAN

On the Continent. Here we are giving 54/-.

How does the Minister know the price in Italy when he was not there?

Mr. HOGAN

I said the Continent.

What is the tonnage per acre?

It would be better if the Minister and the Deputy did not enter into a debate.

It would be interesting to know what it costs to feed an Italian. The sooner you get into touch with the people from whom you are going to get supplies and ascertain whether they will sign contracts or not, the better. The proposal cannot be a success without them. It would be criminal to start without knowing how many people in an area of, say, 20 miles are going to sign these contracts. I support Deputy Johnson's proposal to set up a Select Committee.

For what? Is it to ask the farmers will they grow the crop?

To ascertain what position you would be in with regard to supplies.

And to go and ask the farmers if they will grow beet?

According to Deputy Magennis, you will be able to get from 7½ to 8 tons of beet to the acre. We are going to give you 54/- a ton, and you may reach more if you are lucky after some years' cultivation. Will you sign? Some machinery should be set up.

You propose a Select Committee to do that?

I do not care what sort of committee. It will create more confidence than your method.

That is your proposal?

It is not my proposal.

I thoroughly welcome the introduction of this Bill, and I do so, first of all, for the general reason that I think it is a very definite step towards the economic development of this country. It is for somewhat similar general reasons I approved of the introduction of the Shannon Bill, and, if possible, I think I have even greater enthusiasm for this scheme and its potential value to the country than I had for the Shannon scheme.

Even though it is a further departure from Free Trade?

Mr. EGAN

That is an unkind interjection. So far as the real basis of this scheme is concerned, there is no question that, as Deputy Gorey pointed out, the real difficulty will be to get the beet grown. The scheme, so far as I can see it from a very close examination, is almost foolproof, except on that point. In that connection, I wish to say that I absolutely agree with Deputy Gorey that it is absolutely necessary that a considerable amount of propaganda will have to be undertaken in the tillage districts where this factory is to be erected for the purpose of getting the farmers to guarantee to grow beet. Everyone who knows anything about farming knows that farmers are a very conservative people. They do not like to change their established customs and they take a great deal of persuasion and education before you get them to engage on any large scale in any new scheme of tillage or other farming operations different to that to which they have been accustomed for a number of years. Deputy Gorey seems to think that there is very little in this for the farmers and seems to ridicule the suggestion of Deputy Magennis that it was in the interests of agriculture that this factory was being started. I consider that this will be of very great benefit to the farmers eventually. I also think, taking the price to be paid for beet, it compares very well indeed with the price for mangolds. It is, at least, as good and indeed rather better paying crop at 54s. a ton. One cannot compare beet-growing with any other class of crop. It is not fair to compare it with barley-growing or oat-growing, and you would have to compare it with a root crop. From my experience of farming I consider that a fair average yield for mangolds is about 20 tons per statute acre at 20/- per ton. I am aware that there is wide divergency of opinion as to the prices which mangolds will obtain. As I interjected a moment ago, they are offered in my town for 15/- a ton and they are excedingly hard to sell. On the other hand, Deputy Conlan stated that he got 28/-. That would depend to a large extent on the quantity available. I venture to say that if there were 100 tons of mangolds they would not fetch 28/- nor even £1. You have to consider the circumstances of the time in which they are offered and the quantity likely to be required.

They have been quoted at £2 a ton in Naas market.

Mr. EGAN

I am glad the Deputy has told me that because I think I will do business in Naas market. A few weeks ago I had 40 tons to sell and I wrote to the people with whom I do business in Dublin but I could not get a price worth looking at.

You should have sent them to Naas.

Mr. EGAN

I do not want to make any detailed comparison between beet and mangolds as there is no comparison. Mangolds are not saleable in any quantities whereas sugar-beet will be saleable, certainly all that can be grown for a considerable time once the factory has started.

Does the Deputy tell us that mangolds cannot be sold?

Mr. EGAN

I can say that there is not a ready sale for mangolds.

Is not the jam industry being developed in the country?

Mr. EGAN

The Deputy has knowledge of the tricks of the trade I do not profess to have. Not only will the farmers get 54/- per ton for beet, but they have a chance, in my opinion, of getting 5/6 or 6/- a ton more. We have not experimented sufficiently to be in a position to state what would be the percentage of sugar in the Irish grown beet, but I am convinced that beet can be grown with a percentage higher than 15 per cent. of sugar content. Friends of mine have got up to 18 per cent of sugar, and consequently I think there is quite a strong chance that the farmer will get not only 54/- but possibly up to 59/- or 60/- per ton. In that connection I may mention that the average sugar content in Belgian beet is 17 per cent.

Can the Deputy say what is the percentage in England?

Mr. EGAN

I think the average is about 15 per cent. One of the reasons why people are advocating beet-growing is that the yield of the succeeding corn crop is considerably increased. I have been assured by people growing beet that they can get an increased yield of anything from 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. There has been a good deal of discussion about the financial terms of this factory. I do not propose to enter into the relative merits of the schemes. My chief concern is that I would like to see the factory started.

Debate adjourned.
The Dáil adjourned at 4 o'clock until 3 o'clock, Tuesday, 16th June.
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