I understand that the amendment on the Order Paper by Pádraic O Máille (to insert after the word "approves" the words "with the exception of Orders Nos. 29 and 30") is being withdrawn.
SHOP HOURS (DRAPERY TRADES, DUBLIN AND DISTRICTS) BILL, 1926. - RULES OF COURT—MOTIONS OF APPROVAL.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I propose to ask the Dáil to take up, firstly, consideration of the Rules of the District Court.
I am sorry this matter was not referred to earlier. I made inquiries yesterday as to which of these sets of rules would be taken first and I was assured that the High Court Rules would be taken first, as they were first on the Order Paper. The taking of the District Court Rules now makes a difference to some of us who are not quite ready to deal with them.
Then I will take the High Court Rules. I move:—
"That the Dáil hereby approves of the Rules of Court made by the Minister for Justice on the 13th day of July, 1926, under Section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 (No. 10 of 1924)."
These rules are submitted for the approval of the Dáil under Section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, emphasising the fusion of the former system of separate courts for equity and for common law provided for in the Act. The former separation and division of jurisdiction was productive of delay, of a certain amount of expense and of uncertainty to suitors, and, accordingly, new rules have been drafted containing detailed proposals for uniformity of practice in all matters in the High Court and for expediting proceedings and avoiding unnecessary delays. In addition to provisions contained in the Court Officers Act, 1926, referring to the amalgamation of establishments, other means of simplification and economy in staffing are introduced and more specifically dealt with, in particular as to the institution of the Central Office. One common form of originating summons for instituting proceedings or an action in any branch of the courts is provided, with the condition that the party issuing such summons in any case in which he is not entitled, as a matter of right, to a jury, shall mark on the face of the summons "non-jury." Generally speaking, that will apply to all proceedings except actions of tort, such as negligence or libel actions. The times prescribed for taking the various steps in bringing an action to trial have been lessened, and if any party is anxious for an expeditious hearing in a defended action there is no reason now why the action should not be ripe for hearing within one month from the initiation of the proceedings. The former practice of allowing one year to any party to appeal from a judgment caused needless delays and often the loss of the fruits of the judgment to which the party was declared entitled. The period of one year has, by Order 25 been shortened to 21 days. Within 21 days, the unsuccessful litigant has to decide whether or not he will appeal against the decision of the court.
The procedure in appeals from the Circuit Court is dealt with in Order 24. Some inconvenience has been caused by the considerable number of such appeals awaiting hearing, amounting to one thousand or thereabouts. It is hoped that the delegation to the Master of the High Courts of minor judicial cases will somewhat relieve the High Court Judges and allow more ample time to deal with these appeals. The rules, following the recommendation of the Judiciary Committee, fix the long or Summer Vacation to commence on 1st August and to terminate on 30th September. This change will give some 16 extra working days. In Order 35, a provision has been inserted for enabling law funds to be invested in certain new securities. Consequently such investments are made trustee securities. The following are the new securities—4½ per cent. Land Bonds; 5 per cent. Compensation Stock, 5 per cent. Dublin Port and Docks Board Stock, redeemable 1962/1985. In reference to the Schedule of Costs in Appendix 2 attached to the Rules, these matters refer to costs in litigious cases and do not include costs to solicitors under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881. The costs and fees payable to solicitors in respect of business transacted by them in the High Courts were increased by an Order dated 28th June, 1918, by the addition to the then existing scale of an amount equal to 25 per cent., and by a further Order dated 1st July, 1920, the costs and fees payable to solicitors in respect of business were increased by an addition equal to 50 per cent. in respect of the original prescribed costs. The scale now suggested is, with some few alterations, the scale of charges fixed in 1905, with the addition of 50 per cent. to each item. It represents as nearly as possible the same scale of fees as was chargeable by solicitors prior to these rules coming into operation. I may say that the scale of costs in connection with the High Court and Supreme Court is considered reasonable. That is all I wish to say by way of introduction.
Do chur mé leas-ruin sios do na Riaghlacha so. Since the first copy of the rules appeared very necessary changes have been made in Orders 29 and 30. We have now to use the rules as they stand. I see that in Rule 2 of Order 29, in the case of all summonses the notice shall be served personally in the Gaeltacht, etc. But the Gaeltacht has not yet been defined, and it will require an Act of the Oireachtas to define it. That is the only rule in which the word "personally" appears. It does not appear at all in Rule 3 in regard to summonses, and these summonses and notices may be served in any part of the Saorstát upon any person and if in Irish may be accompanied by a translation in English. So that from the beginning the the Irish language is going to be placed at a disadvantage until such time as an Act is passed by the Oireachtas defining the Gaeltacht. It also seems a bit strange why the word "personally" is used in Rule 2, but not in Rule 3. The Minister may be able to give an explanation as to why it does not appear in that rule. I hope the Minister will make a statement as to whether it may be possible to have legislation introduced defining the Gaeltacht. It is very important that the Irish language gets its proper place in the courts from the very beginning.
With regard to the statement made by Deputy O Maille, I wish to say that my attention has been called to the necessity in this Order 29 for ensuring that there shall be no delay in the translation. One could imagine that delay in the preparation of the translation would nullify a good deal of the effect of the Order. I leave that question of the use of Irish to other Deputies. I want to deal more generally with the Rules of the High Court and of the Supreme Court.
I think the House was led to anticipate that the new system, which was being inaugurated in respect to the High Court as well as the other courts, would lean towards reducing the cost of litigation. Unfortunately, from the very beginning of these rules, we learn that there is no intention whatever of reducing the cost of litigation. All the procedure and practice hitherto in force, except in so far as they are altered by these rules, are to be retained, and except from the point of view of time and possible delay which is sought to be avoided, there is no change in the procedure. It is the procedure which has necessitated so great a charge in the way of costs upon the litigants that is being perpetuated. I am not, now, referring to the scale of fees which, as the Minister stated, are retained for the future, as they have been for some years past. The ordinary method whereby an action is pursued, from beginning to end, is undoubtedly cumbrous and seems to have been devised for the purpose of adding to the cost against the litigant for the benefit of the lawyer.
I was hopeful that the new rules would have made it possible for the procedure of the courts to be carried on very much more economically than at present, or than in the past. I am advised that the method to which we are now asked to conform of making applications to the court by way of motion on the various stages of a law action has been, in fact, disused, if not abolished, in Great Britain for quite a number of years. There is some method known as a summons for direction whereby the court, at the request of either party, or of each party, decides what shall be the course to be pursued in regard to the method of carrying on an action—that is to say, discovery of documents, questions to be answered on oath before trial proper by way of interrogatories, inspection of documents, and examination of witnesses out of court who are ill. Many matters of that kind seem to have been provided for by a much more expeditious method which does not require the calling in of counsel at every point in the case. It is these matters that involved litigants in very heavy expenses. I thought we had reason to hope that that kind of procedure might have been simplified, and that those who are unfortunate enough to have to go to law would have been saved this peculiar method of taking money out of the pockets of the citizen seeking his rights under the law and putting it into the pockets of solicitors and barristers.
It is a recreation to some people.
If it is a recreation to some people I think there might be an entertainment tax on those people for the benefit of the State but not for the benefit of counsel.
Live and let live.
I am speaking on behalf of the business community, and am appealing that the Rules of Court that are to be adopted should be of such a character that would allow actions at law to be pursued at the minimum of cost and with the least expense. My attention also is drawn to a defect which again concerns the business community materially. I understand that, if any citizen of the Free State wishes to sue in England since the Treaty, it is essential he should give security for defendant's costs, but a citizen of Great Britain seeking to sue a citizen of the Free State in the Irish Courts is not required to give any security for costs. That is a matter which I understand could have been altered by the Rules of Court, and might well have been dealt with at this time. The method at present in operation seems to be unfair and places the Irish citizen in an unfair position in comparison with the English. That ought to be remedied in the preparation of those rules. My attention, too, has been drawn to Order XXIV, Rule 8:—
"The appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under the decision appealed from unless the Circuit Judge or the High Court shall so order, or unless within ten days after the decision a deposit shall be made of a sum to be fixed by the Circuit Judge."
I think that is a provision which ought to be turned round completely, that is to say, the execution should be stayed if an appeal is made, unless the court decides to the contrary. Appeals are made from the Circuit Court and the appeal is upheld, but the evil arising from the original decision may well have been caused and cannot be recovered from. Take the case of decisions under the Rent Acts where ejecments took place. There have been quite a number of cases where judgment has been overturned on appeal, but where the ejectment has taken place. The damage is done to the defendant and all the appeals, successful as they may be, will not remedy the evil caused by the ejectment. You cannot very well unscramble an egg, and it is only with great difficulty that you can put a family back into the house they have been ejected from under the new circumstances. If the appeals were certain to be dealt with expeditiously, we could understand the possibility of meeting a case quickly, but as we know, many of those appeals have been delayed for very many months, and there is really no likelihood that they will be overtaken within very few months; I think the evil of that may be very great. It is not reasonable to say that execution must be entered and effected unless a special decision is made by the court; the ordinary process should be that execution would be delayed pending the appeal unless the authority had reported to the contrary.
I think, though, apart from any detail, there is one outstanding defect with regard to those rules, and that is, that we are perpetuating a system of delay which involves, and seems to be designed to involve, heavy charges for lawyers, that at every stage of an action application should be made to the court, and that a solicitor, and perhaps two or three counsel shall be engaged in each application. I think that is the great defect in those new rules. The anticipation we all had was that the rules would tend towards simplification and the lowering of expense to litigants. I am not now dealing with what I think is another defect in those present rules, that is the desirability and the necessity for making provision for the poor person, in dealing with High Court cases. That is a matter which would require a good deal more consideration than I have been able to give it, but I fear there is a justification for asking the committee and the rule-making authority to take those rules back with a view to providing for a much greater economy of money as well as of time in the working out of a case in the court.
As far as I am concerned I am not very much further advanced than I was on the previous occasion when this matter was under discussion here. Generally speaking, I think as far as the Rules of the High Court are concerned, in so far as they adapt themselves to the proceedings of the court, they are not open to very great criticism. There is one thing we must recognise, and that is, when we are speaking of the costs we have got, in the Rules of Court, the cost as far as fees are concerned for barristers and all that sort of thing, but in examining those rules one would like to have had also the court fees before him. These fees to the court did not seem to have been issued at all and in so far as they may be, of course it is an incomplete record of what the expenses of carrying out the law will be. I think there is a feeling outside that the Minister will be inclined to sanction the courts being made self-supporting in the way of fees. I do not know whether that is so or not.
In Order IV. it would seem as if there were a certain amount of clash; at least, explanation is wanted in respect to No. XXVIII., Clause 2.
"Subject as aforesaid, except by order of the court, no costs shall be allowed to a plaintiff in any action or matter commenced in the High Court which could have commenced in the Circuit Court or the District Court, save such costs as would have been recoverable by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court or the District Court, as the case may be."
That seems to be rather a hardship except in so far as it may be nullified by Order IV (3):
"Whenever a claim indorsed on a Summary Summons is for a liquidated sum only, the indorsement, besides stating the amount claimed in respect of the demand, shall state the amount claimed for costs, and further state that on payment of such amounts for demand and costs within six days (or other time limited for appearance by any Order of the Court) after service of the Summons further proceedings will be stayed."
Perhaps it might be possible for the Minister to clear that matter up. There seems to be uncertainty as to the position. The question Deputy Johnson raised as to the cheapening of litigation is of very considerable interest to those concerned. I do not think any exception could be taken to the scale of charges for the High Courts. I think we must be satisfied to let things work out their own salvation. The trouble is that if these rules are passed and become operative, they will not be again subject to criticism in the Dáil. Deputies have not had adequate time or opportunity to go into such technical matters. After being some months in operation these rules should come before the Dáil again so that members might have an opportunity of criticising them. I do not know if that is feasible, but in passing the rules now, Deputies, more or less, disclaim responsibility for them, as there has not been sufficient time to criticise them. At some later stage Deputies should be afforded an opportunity of criticising their working.
That question was mentioned before when we were discussing how these rules were to be considered. I could not say off-hand what the exact procedure would be, but it does seem quite possible, as the Minister for Justice is the rule-making authority, and makes the rules eventually, that a motion could be introduced in the House by a Deputy, dealing with some particular aspect of the rules, after they have been in operation, and advocating the making of an amendment. That could be dealt with by the Minister and, as he said on the last day, he could then begin the process of amending the rules if it seemed good to him and if it were the view of the House. I think that is possible.
If that is so it would be quite satisfactory, so far as I am concerned. In the past we all know there was an immense amount of difficulty in getting any alteration made. If what you say is feasible, it is satisfactory so far as I am concerned.
I am not saying that alteration is feasible, but I think advocacy of alteration is feasible. Under the Act, it would appear that three parties are to be satisfied, the Minister, the majority of the Committee, and, subsequently, the rules must be approved of by both Houses. If you take the two Houses as separate, there are really four parties concerned.
I recognise that this House could not make an alteration without the Committee's concurrence. It is desirable that we should be able to ventilate in this House later any grievance that there may be under the rules.
There is no doubt about that.
Is it of any avail to suggest any alteration or amendment to-day? Has the Minister still an open mind? He has delivered the goods and is he satisfied that they are perfect? Would it be waste of time to raise the matter now?
The Deputy wants me to say "yes."
I do not know, but I want to know if it will save any purpose if the rules could be discussed now?
It may.
If that is so, I am prepared to state something when the Rules of the Supreme Court come up. Do I get from the Minister an indication that he is prepared to make any alterations?
I am prepared to listen very carefully.
Is the Minister in a position, following the arguments that will be advanced, to say that he is prepared to alter the rules?
If any practical suggestion is made, is the Minister prepared to adopt it?
I would like to hear it first.
Following on what Deputy O Maille has said regarding the position of Irish in the courts, it seems to me that it would have been more satisfactory if the Rules for the High Court proceeded on the lines of the Circuit Court, where it is stated that the proceedings in civil matters shall be carried on in the national language of Saorstát Eireann, or the English language. Either language may be used at any stage of the proceedings. I think that would have been a more satisfactory position. I would like the Minister to enlighten the Dáil as to why a distinction was made in the regulations in the High Court concerning the language. It has been stated that the rules, as far as the High Court are concerned, discriminate against the use of the national language. It would seem that such consideration as is given for Irish speakers, and those anxious to use the language, in legal proceedings is given only to those who happen to reside in that indefinite territory known as the Gaeltacht. Irish speakers outside that district—if and when it will be defined —will have no rights. I think that is a matter that the Minister would do well to explain.
Shall we proceed now to deal with the Circuit Court?
No, only the High Court. There is a separate motion down for the Circuit Court Rules.
Deputy O Maille raised the question of Rule 29, and the use of the national language in the courts. Rule 1 of Order 29 is intended to ensure that the court will be in a position to understand the evidence, for instance, of an Irish-speaking witness who is either unwilling or unable to speak English. Take the case, for instance, where in a jury trial, a juror expresses a preference to take the juror's oath in Irish. The judge, clearly must be in a position to assure himself that the juror has been duly sworn, and for that purpose the judge who does not himself know Irish might require an interpreter to inform him of the nature of the oath administered in Irish. It may be taken that there will always be a sufficient number of officials with a knowledge of Irish attached to the Court, a knowledge sufficient to do interpreter's work. The number of such officials in the court may be expected to be an increasing one. New recruits coming into the court staff will, owing to our educational programme, presumably have a good knowledge of Irish, and Irish will certainly be a compulsory subject for the examination for these appointments. What I would like to emphasise is that even at present when we speak of interpreters being attached to the court, it does not follow, by any means, that special men will have to be brought in here and now from outside the ranks of the present staff. I think we have, at present, sufficient men with a competent knowledge of Irish for the purpose of fulfilling Rule 1 of Order 29.
Underlying Rule 2 you have the idea that in the Gaeltacht, or the Irish-speaking portion of the country, the people who are brought to law should be summoned in the language which they habitually use and understand. On the other hand, it is recognised that the plaintiff, either in the Gaeltacht itself or outside it, may have no knowledge of Irish, and his solicitor may have no knowledge of Irish. To deal with that situation it is provided that if the plaintiff does not voluntarily provide an Irish version for his original or a translation for service in the Gaeltacht, then, in the interests of the prospective Irish-speaking defendant, the document must be translated in the Central Office so as to ensure that the defendant will at least have the document in the language which he habitually uses. That is the Gaeltacht position as covered by Rule 2.
Rule 3 is not of a local but of a general application. It deals with the whole Saorstát, and the underlying idea is precisely the same as that underlying Rule 2. It is recognised that the defendant may have no knowledge whatsoever of Irish, but if the plaintiff chooses to start his proceedings in Irish he must not be prevented from doing so. In the interests of the prospective defendant, whom we are assuming to be an English speaker, without any knowledge of Irish, the plaintiff may provide an English translation. If he does not provide an English translation, a translation will be done in the Central Office. It has been suggested that Rule 3, in dealing with the whole Saorstát, is not the exact opposite of Rule 2, which deals with the Gaeltacht only. It is suggested that Rule 3 should be limited to the operation of the area of jurisdiction of the State other than the Gaeltacht. That would mean that if a document were served in Irish in the Gaeltacht, no English translation would be necessary.
Underlying the difference between Rule 2 and Rule 3, there is simple realism, an appreciation of the facts of the position as they now exist and as we know them to exist. We have to face the fact that English is widely known and generally spoken in the country, and even in the Gaeltacht there will be found people who know no Irish whatsoever. Now take the other position. It is rather difficult to imagine a person outside the Gaeltacht who knows no English whatsoever. The point is that no practising lawyer in the whole Saorstát is in the position that he knows Irish perfectly and knows no English at all. No matter how much we may pretend to be independent of the trained lawyer, the fact is that when we come to serious law none of us is independent of him. In taking the basis for court practice, therefore, in the matter of the use of language, whether the Irish or the English language, we have to take the practising lawyer as a very important, and almost a fundamental factor in our review of the position. When we remember that even in the Gaeltacht itself very many solicitors have practised heretofore quite successfully without any knowledge of Irish, it will be apparent that it is simply illusory to pretend that we can carry on the work of the courts, even in the Gaeltacht, in Irish. I would put the dilemma, therefore, something like this —it is possible to carry on business everywhere in English in the courts, because the justice will know English, the clerk will know English, the practising lawyers will know English, and if the litigants or their witnesses do not know English, at least some of those whom I have mentioned, the justice, the clerk, or the lawyers, will know sufficient Irish to act as interpreter for those litigants or their witnesses.
Now take the other position. It is very hard to conceive a case where nothing but Irish is used. Remember that we are now dealing with the High Court, and that is the explanation of the distinction that Deputy O'Connell drew attention to. We are dealing here with the High Court and it is admitted straight away that there is not absolute equality of treatment between the Irish and English in the Gaeltacht, and in the rest of the area of the State. These rules are the rules recommended to me by the Committee, and I certainly maintain that they are put forward in a spirit of helpfulness and in a spirit of friendliness towards the national language. I have no patience whatever with people who pretend to think that the rules were framed in a spirit either of indifference, contempt or hostility towards the national language.
The absence of equality simply arises from a recognition of the facts, and the Rules of Court are not intended as propaganda of any kind, linguistic or political. They are simply rules intended for the administrative convenience of litigants and their professional representatives. These provisions in the court, so far as the High Court and Supreme Court are concerned, bearing on the question of the two languages, are deemed by me and by my officials to be adequate in the face of the position which now exists in the country with regard to the language. If that position were to alter radically or substantially there might be a case for an alteration of the rules. In the position, as we now know it, I consider there is no question of any slight on the national language in the provision which is laid down here in Rule 29.
Will the Minister explain the reason for inserting the word "personally" in Rule 2 and omitting it in Rule 3? What is the reason for the limitation with regard to the summonses and notices that may be served in the language?
"Personally" in Rule 2 is in contra-distinction with substituted service—service on a solicitor or agent. The effect of that is, that if the service is on the litigant himself, who may conceivably be, and probably is, in the Gaeltacht an Irish speaker, and if the summons is in English, there must accompany it an Irish translation either supplied by the plaintiff initiating the action or translated for his convenience in the Central Office.
What is the object of confining that condition which is laid down in Rule 2 to notices served personally?
Because the litigant, the prospective defendant on whom the summons is to be served, might conceivably be an Irish speaker, and an Irish speaker only, and the summons served personally on him in the English language would not be an adequate initiating document at all to the action, because it could not be assumed that he had knowledge of its contents.
If it is not served personally, why should not the same conditions apply if it is served on the solicitor, if the solicitor accepts service?
He must get it translated.
I think it is simply a matter of recognising the fact that his solicitor would know English. If it happens that a solicitor knowing only Irish makes a complaint that he is unable to understand a document served in English, there would be a case for altering the rules.
There is a discrimination there.
Deputy Johnson confined himself rather carefully to generalities. He said that the old costly procedure is being continued; that there is no cheapening. He complains that a hope was held out of cheaper law, and he sees no sign of its fulfilment. Generally, he talked as if a cumbrous, unnecessary procedure, drawn up by trade unionists for the betterment of their own bank balances, was being continued to the detriment of prospective litigants. He did not come down to touch on any particular rule and to suggest how it might be altered, or what procedure was, in his opinion or in the opinion of his technical adviser, superfluous. In fact, a great deal of his talk on and around this subject of cost seemed to be without any advertence to Order 13 and its contents.
Order 13 deals with the minor judicial functions of the Master of the Central Office: "1. The Master may make any order which was a Side Bar Order under the practice heretofore in force. 2. In addition to the orders in the preceding rule mentioned, the Master may make any of the following orders." Then there follow thirteen additional Orders that the Master may make:—
(i.) Any order which under the practice heretofore in force might have been made as of course.
(ii.) An order for appointment of a guardian ad litem of an infant or person of unsound mind not so found.
(iii.) An order for a statement of the names of persons who may be copartners in any firm suing or being sued in an action or matter.
(iv.) An order for the extension of time for doing any act or taking any step in an action or matter.
(v.) An order for discovery, limited or general, or delivery of interrogatories in uncontested applications.
(vi.) An order for the appointment or discharge of receivers in uncontested applications.
(vii.) An order to dismiss an action with costs for want of prosecution or for failure to make an affidavit of discovery or to answer interrogatories.
Rule 7 states that counsel may be heard in any case before the Master, but the costs of such counsel shall not be allowed unless certified for by the Master; so that if counsel is unreasonably employed to carry through these minor and formal applications before the Master, it is open to the Master to refuse his certificate that such employment of counsel was reasonable or necessary, and costs will not be allowed in the absence of such certificate.
You are introducing free labour there.
The very granting of jurisdiction to the Master in these matters, instead of having them dealt with, as formerly, by a judge, will tend to make law cheaper. It may be presumed that under Rule 7 counsel will not be allowed in the costs unnecessarily. It is not likely that counsel will be disallowed in proceedings before the Master. If the Deputies turn to page 12, Rule 4, they will see that it is stated:
"Proceedings commenced by Summary Summons shall be heard on Affidavit. In all uncontested cases the Master may deal with the matter summarily. In contested cases in which the Master shall have jurisdiction, he shall in his discretion, decide the case himself or transfer it to the Judge's list. The Summonses shall be listed before the Master on the day upon which the same shall have been set down, and, if then in order for hearing, shall, if the Master is of opinion that the case is one for a judge, be put in the Court list for hearing by the Judge on the first opportunity."
In this rule, as in others, a genuine attempt is made to eliminate both delay and the consequent costs, owing to delay, on the litigant. Because the scales of costs are fixed at those obtaining in 1905, with the 50 per cent. addition in recognition of the altered money value, it should not be assumed that in a great many matters pertaining to practice and procedure there is not substantial reduction. The whole scheme of the Courts of Justice Act was to effect a certain shifting of jurisdiction from the high to the lower court. That, of course, involves straightaway a considerable diminution in expenses, quite apart from any reduction of cost in the lower court, but the mere fact of a local venue, or one, at any rate, that is more local than the High or Supreme Court, in itself effects a considerable casing of the financial burden on litigants. It is not possible simply to create the millennium and provide free law for the multitude.
Is that a sign of the millennium?
Cheap law is bad law.
Solicitors and counsel have to get their fees and the State must get, at any rate, some contribution from litigants towards the administrative cost of the courts. Deputy Johnson raised a point in regard to security for costs when the plaintiff is not resident in the Saorstát. If the defendant has a good prima facie defence and makes the necessary affidavit, he will have no difficulty whatever in getting an Order from the court ordering a non-resident plaintiff to give security for costs. That has always been the position, and will continue to be the position under these rules. I do not know where the Deputy got the suggestion that a non-resident man of straw could initiate an action and that there is no procedure or machinery whereby he could be compelled to give security.
That is not the point. That would entail an application that would involve calling in counsel, who would appear in court. My point is whether it is an automatic obligation that the plaintiff should give security, as it is in England, upon an Irish plaintiff.
My information is that in both cases it is a matter of motion for the court, both here and in England, for a non-resident plaintiff.
I think that Deputy Johnson's information is wrong, so far as security for costs on the other side of the Channel is concerned. I do not think, upon the initiation of an action in England by an Irish Free State resident, that there is an obligation to give security.
As a matter of fact, there is. I had a case recently in Glasgow, and without any such preliminary before the court, it was necessary to deposit the security.
Was it under an application to the court?
The deposit was required, at any rate.
It was on application.
Not before the courts.
It is not automatic.
It was automatic.
Perhaps the Minister would say whether it is a fact that a Belgian or Frenchman seeking to sue an Irishman in an Irish court, would be required automatically to give security for costs, but that that is not the case with a British subject?
I do not know what the Deputy means by "automatically." If an application were made there might be very little demur in granting the application, because of the absence of residence, but here, as in England—I repeat as in England— the matter is one for a special application. It may be one that may be very readily granted, and I can quite understand why it would be very readily granted, but there is no such thing as a rule demanding that automatically——
My information is that under Order 29, Rule 2, of the existing Irish Rules of Court, the defendant is not entitled to make the plaintiff give security for costs solely on the ground that the plaintiff resides in England or Scotland, and that the effect of that is, that unless the defendant in Ireland can make a case in the court, the British subject coming over will not be bound to give security.
No case has been made here for any alteration of the rule. The matter is a matter of application, a matter of motion, and there is no difference between that procedure and the procedure in Britain in regard to security for costs from non-residents.
Does the Minister contend—because I can only take his word—that the procedure is identical in the case of the Englishman suing in Ireland and the Irishman suing in England?
I do.
If that proves not to be the case on further inquiry, will the Minister bring in a new rule?
No. What I mean is that I am not prepared to give a definite undertaking. I will consider whether it would be advisable to bring in a new rule. The Deputy raised a question on Order 24, Rule 8, which states: "The appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under the decision appealed from unless the Circuit Judge or the High Court shall so order, or unless within ten days after the decision a deposit shall be made of a sum to be fixed by the Circuit Judge, not exceeding the amount recoverable under, or the value of the property affected by the said judgment or order, together with costs." The object of this rule is to prevent the abuse of people appealing merely to gain time. There is a great deal of that at present. The idea is, when final judgment is given, that the party proposing to appeal should satisfy the Circuit Judge of his bona fides in regard to the appeal. It may be assumed that the Circuit Judge will not refuse to stay execution if the prospective appellant has any reasonable grounds for appeal. An automatic stay of execution would lead to the abuse that people would appeal who had no real hope of having the decision reversed, but solely for the purpose of gaining time. That rule is put in by people who have a very full knowledge of that abuse, and with a view to meeting a situation which notoriously exists. I think that completes all I have to say on the points that have been raised.
Motion put and declared carried.
The Dáil adjourned at 7.5 p.m. and resumed at 7.45 p.m.,
in the Chair.
It would scarcely be feasible to go through these Circuit Court Rules in detail or to attempt to treat of them rule by rule. I would ask Deputies in considering these rules to remember that Section 48 of the Courts of Justice Act confers a very wide jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, and that it is necessary, in considering this court and its jurisdiction, to clear one's mind completely of any fancied analogy that may be there with the old County Court and its very limited jurisdiction. Under Section 48 of the Courts of Justice Act cases involving a considerable amount of money, up to £300, can be determined by the Circuit Court. The Committee, therefore, in considering the question of the procedure to be adopted took as their guide, in many respects, the former procedure of the High Court as laid down in the Supreme Court Rules of 1905 which, prior to the passing of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, applied throughout the country to all common law cases where the amount involved exceeded £50. The Committee, I take it, were also influenced by the fact that for all practical purposes this Circuit Court, in the vast majority of cases, must be deemed to be the final court. An appeal on the stenographer's notes from the Circuit Court to the High Court is coming more and more to be recognised by practitioners, both solicitors and barristers, as an appeal on a matter of law. I think it is true to say that the judges of the High Court have made it clear that, where the basis of the appeal is simply a suggestion, that as between Witness A, who swore one thing, and Witness B, who swore another, they are not prepared to review, and still less, to reverse, the decision of the Circuit Judge. The Circuit Judge had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and in a direct conflict of evidence, as between one witness and another, he took a particular view.
I think the experience of barristers and solicitors who have brought appeals from the Circuit Court is that the High Court is not prepared to reconsider the decision of the lower court on matters of fact or on matters of conflict, as between the evidence of one witness and the evidence of another. My idea is that the tendency will increasingly be to have appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court only where there is a genuine point of law involved in which the professional advisers of the unsuccessful litigant consider that the Circuit Judge was at fault or in error, and in the hope of securing a different judgment in the higher court they would bring their appeal. I ask Deputies to remember, firstly, that in considering this Circuit Court we are considering a court with jurisdiction up to £300, and that very many large and important actions, libel actions, possibly which take a day or two days in the hearing, are pitched for damages falling at or under that level of £300. I ask them, also, to remember that we are dealing with a court which may substantially, for all practical purposes, be regarded as a final court, so that there is no real analogy with the County Court of the past. The Committee, I take it, were very conscious of factors of that kind and adverted also to the practice which obtains in other countries, particularly in South Africa, with regard to a court which corresponds very closely to the Circuit Court of our system.
Now, as the amount involved in many cases would be considerable, and as the right of appeal to the High Court under Sections 61 and 62 of the Courts of Justice Act must be taken on the stenographer's notes of the evidence before the Circuit Court, it was necessary to provide machinery by which the nett issue between the parties would be before the court, and by which neither party would be taken by surprise at the hearing. To ensure that, many matters such as pleadings, discovery of documents, and applications for particulars were necessary in the practice and procedure of these courts. The High Court, so far as an appeal is concerned, deals for practical purposes only with whether the Judge of the Circuit Court trying the case mis-directed in law. The High Court have decided that on the true construction of Section 61 of the Courts of Justice Act, if facts are proved at the hearing before the Circuit Court which support its finding, that finding shall not be reversed, notwithstanding that the High Court Judges hearing the appeal might feel that, had they been in the position of trying the case in the first instance, a different result might have ensued. It is, therefore, of very real and vital interest to litigants to have all the facts in their favour proved before the Circuit Judge. When pleading for discovery of documents and particulars of that kind, it would be very difficult for the solicitor for the litigant to know what case had to be met and what evidence he should offer. As I have pointed out, owing to the view taken by the High Court as to appeals, it is essential that all the material facts should be brought to the knowledge of the Circuit Judge. The former procedure of the issue of a civil bill and of no further pleadings in cases under £50 was satisfactory enough, because if a party to a case were taken by surprise before the County Court Judge, he was entitled to appeal to the Judge of Assize, and have a complete re-hearing with oral evidence.
Therefore, what some people may regard as complicated methods of procedure, are necessary for the protection of litigants themselves. They are introduced solely in their interests. An exception has, therefore, been made in cases which might have been brought in the old County Court, that is in cases where the amount involved does not exceed £50. Under Rule 165 no pleadings will be necessary in such cases except the court so orders. Further special jurisdiction in interlocutory matters, such as attachments, injunctions, and garnishees, and all powers ancillary, all jurisdiction vested in or transferred to the court is given by Section 57 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. The procedure for the obtaining of such interlocutory relief is to be prescribed by the rules. The procedure prescribed is, we consider, as simple as can be made. Practically the only other procedure which did not exist in the County Court, and which is provided in the Circuit Court, is the obtaining of summary judgments. By Section 66 of the Courts of Justice Act, the Committee are required to make rules for the granting of summary judgments in appropriate cases. It is in the interest of litigants generally that there should be a speedy method of obtaining judgment, and that a plaintiff to whom money is due should not have to wait the sitting of the Circuit Judge in a particular town before he could obtain his judgment.
That, briefly, is the scale of costs for the court. Accordingly, under Rule 450, it is proposed that the High Court costs, less one-third, will be applicable in cases which were outside the jurisdiction of the old County Court, pending the drawing-up and publication of a detailed schedule of costs. In cases within the old County Court jurisdiction the former County Court costs will be applicable. That rule is purely temporary and provisional pending an agreement between myself and the Rule-Making Committee of the Circuit Court as to a detailed schedule of costs. I may say that this Rule 450 would not meet with my approval as a permanent proposal with regard to costs in the Circuit Court, but as a temporary expedient bridging over the time when detailed proposals as to costs can be put forward, I consider it sufficiently good. A reduction of one-third on what the costs of what the same action in the High Court would be under the old scheme of jurisdiction does not represent entirely the relief to litigants. Deputies will remember that quite a considerable relief is involved in regard to witnesses' expenses, which in particular cases will, of course, be very much less by reason of the local venue, so that in attempting to arrive at an estimate of the reduction you have to take into account a reduction of one-third of what the cost would be in the same action taken in the High Court under the old system and the reduction in the expenses of witnesses arising from the fact that the venue is now local.
It is hoped to have a detailed scale of costs prepared by the Committee at as early a date as possible, and when prepared and made by me they will be brought before the Dáil and the Seanad. This proposed scale of High Court costs, less one-third, is considered reasonable as a temporary expedient, and is simply put forward in that way. I think I should mention that we—not so much the Committee as myself and my Department—had considerable difficulty in forming a just estimate of the value of pleadings in the Circuit Court. I met the most widely different points of view with regard to them from people who, from the nature of their position, were detached and impartial, and must be taken as competent to form a weighty opinion in the matter. On the one hand you have the suggestion that things could go on pretty much as they were, and that there was nothing really intrinsically valuable in pleadings. On the other hand, you had quite definitely the view that it was a thing arrived at as a permanent, or practically permanent, administrative code for the procedure of the court; that it was essential to ensure that the time of the courts would not be wasted, that issues should be clearly knit in the more serious cases where larger amounts were involved before the cases came into court, that the parties and their professional advisers would at least be agreed on the point of what it was they disagreed about, what had to be determined by the court, and that the field would have been cleared and a straight issue brought before the judge and thrashed out.
One can understand that a solicitor or barrister, going into court with no knowledge of what kind of defence might be put up to his action, might conceivably be taken very much at a loss and very much by surprise, with unfortunate results for his client. Take the simplest form of action—an action for money due or for goods sold and delivered. A solicitor might consider he had a perfectly straight case and yet be met by a surprise defence involving an allegation of fraud on the part of agents of his clients. He might be wholly unprepared for a defence of that nature, and one can only suppose that he would be driven to the resort of applying for an adjournment. It might not always be possible to get an adjournment simply because an unexpected point was raised by the defence. One can conceive that if that position were stereotyped in our rules, if there were no clearing up of ground or joining of issue before the actual case came on for hearing in court, frequent miscarriages of justice might result. I ask Deputies to consider that and to consider it with special reference to the fact that I have already somewhat stressed—that this Circuit Court, quite unlike the county courts in the past, is practically the final court, that there is no real appeal on matters of fact, that the appeal lies on stenographer's notes, and is tending more and more to be an appeal on points of law and not an appeal as to the facts of the case or in the hope that the High Court may take a different view from the Circuit Judge on a conflict of evidence between Witness A and Witness B in the lower court. The proposal is that pleadings be dispensed with in those cases which fell within the jurisdiction of the County Court of the past—cases ranging from £50 downwards—and that from £50 upwards to the limit of jurisdiction, £300, pleadings be necessary. I think there is a wholly exaggerated idea as to the part played by pleadings in contributing to the costs of an action. Pleadings are, in fact, almost the smallest part of the professional fees involved in a suit and, perhaps, the hardest-earned money. Up to eight or ten years ago, the drafting of pleadings by counsel in a case was a matter of one guinea. It is now a matter of two guineas. Considering that the whole basis of the lawsuit is settled in that process of pleadings, that the issue is knit as between plaintiff and defendant, that charge cannot be said to be extravagant.
I may say that I went outside the Rule-Making Committee for enlightenment and advice on this question of pleadings. I consulted men who had been in the ring, who had been active practitioners—both barristers and solicitors—and who are no longer in active practice; who are detached and aloof and could not be said to have any direct or personal interest in the kind of advice they gave. I received conflicting opinion from very competent persons—ex-barristers and ex-solicitors —who, I believe, were genuinely anxious to give the advice which they considered in the best interests of litigants and of the general community, and with the minimum of advertence to the interests of those who are still in the ring—those who are still active practitioners, whether at the bar or in the solicitors' profession. I do not feel disposed to interfere with the recommendation of the Committee in that matter—certainly, not without a trial and without some observation of the results. It is a rather serious thing to contemplate the complete abolition of pleadings, when you consider that very frequent and very serious miscarriages of justice might take place as a result, and when you consider that the appeal that lies is a very limited and very restricted appeal now—simply an appeal on stenographer's notes, without any further oral hearing.
The argument is strong that the surprise defence may take even the most experienced practitioner off his guard and find him wholly at a loss to promote as he should, and as he might, with better notice, the interests of his client. I recommend these rules to the Dáil, as put forward to me unanimously by the Rule-Making Committee of the Circuit Court, and I ask the Dáil to clear its mind entirely of any analogy with the County Court of the judicial system which obtained in the past.
I put down two motions, one of which was to ask the Dáil not to approve of these rules, while the other had reference to the possibility of altering the figure £50 to £100. The Ceann Comhairle has ruled that the second motion is not in order, and there has been circulated an alternative motion. Slightly altering the language of the first motion. The alternative motion was as follows:—
"To delete all words after the word ‘Dáil' and to insert in lieu thereof the words ‘refuses to approve of the Rules of the Circuit Court, because the Rule-Making Authority has not formulated rules which will enable all cases to be brought to trial in the simple form that at present exists, without the necessity for ‘pleadings' and the heavy charges upon litigants which the system of ‘pleadings' will involve."
I have listened to the Minister's statement and I have tried to appreciate the weight of the argument he advanced for making this system of pleadings the normal system in all cases where the issue is value for less than £50. He did not by any means convince me of the necessity of making that the normal procedure. I feel desirous of asking him at once whether, in fact, the working of the Circuit Court during the last two years has produced these cases of miscarriages of justice, and whether it has been ineffective in normal cases or not. The effect of the rules, I am advised, will be in the normal cases—the cases which are less difficult—to increase greatly the charges upon the litigants. I can understand the plea of those who are very anxious that the regular machinery be invoked and that all the forms should be adhered to by the plaintiff and the defendant before the case comes into court. I can understand quite well that the average barrister would desire that that system should be perpetuated and extended. I have no doubt that he would desire that the £50 minimum should be removed. But while it is necessary to have proper regard to the advice of barristers, I think the business of the Dáil is to consider this matter from the point of view of the public, who are the litigants, and to consider what will be the likely charges involved by the new system as compared with the existing system.
Something more than that.
The question I ask, in the first instance, is where the procedure of the Circuit Courts at present has failed. What are the faults to be found with the Civil Bill procedure? I am not able to find out any very great objection, and while I am informed that it is desirable, and in many complicated cases necessary, that there should be pleadings, these cases can be provided for. It is a comparatively small matter to get a court to decide upon the application of one party or the other as to pleadings, but the normal course should be to dispense with pleadings. My information is that probably not more than 25 per cent. of the cases that are tried are cases that would require pleadings. It is undesirable to impose the obligation for pleadings in the other 75 per cent. of the cases.
The Minister has quoted £50 which is referred to in Rule 155. That was the limit of the jurisdiction in the County Court. On many other occasions we have been reminded that £50 pre-war was not quite the same as £50 is to-day. The jurisdiction is, therefore, lessened, and we are imposing upon the public the obligation to follow out a more expensive procedure than was the case under the old county courts.
What does the Deputy mean when he says the jurisdiction is lessened?
The meaning is that £50 was the limit of the jurisdiction of the County Courts and no pleadings were required. £50 now will buy very much less than £50 in the days before the war and, therefore, the trader, or the farmer, who is indebted to the extent of £50 has not had the same value for his £50 that he would have had in pre-war days. That is to say, the value of money is less to-day than in pre-war days, so that to bring us on to the old level of the County Courts in respect of the charges upon litigants you would need to raise that £50 to £100. Are we to contemplate that the work of the Circuit Courts is to be, in the main, those difficult cases —libel actions and the like? It is natural for the Minister to quote the difficult cases.
I am inclined to believe that the great majority of the cases that will be tried in the courts, even for over £50, will be for goods sold and delivered. They will be for payments of accounts for goods which are disputed one way or another. If we are going to make necessary this rather detailed and difficult procedure, which requires at once the bringing in of counsel, it is going to be an added charge upon the public. It might reasonably be argued by some people that that will act as a deterrent for those fond of law. I do not think these are quite the motives that should inspire us. We have to do our best to make it possible for citizens between each other to get substantial justice in the courts according to law. It has been the belief of many that substantial justice can be obtained where people meet face to face before a judge and state their case as well, and probably much better in the majority of cases, than if the cases are made by solicitors beforehand, with statements and replies and restatements and further replies. The jargon of the court is such that the plaintiff probably does not understand, and very often finds himself involved in discussions and what seem sometimes to be mis-statements and perjury. In a very large number of cases, indeed, the appearance of the parties before the judge is a much more satisfactory way of trial than having to go through the course which pleadings involve. There is an alternative way possible where it is obvious that the case is going to be a difficult one, where one side or the other may make an application to the court for a statement of claim, and what are called pleadings. That should be the course to adopt in the minority of cases, but we ought not to impose upon the majority the necessity for this course which will, undoubtedly, involve the bringing in of counsel to every case over £50. The Minister dealt with the question of costs and with this proposal: that the High Court scale, less one-third, should be the scale for the Circuit Courts. He explained these fees were only temporary; he was not prepared to justify them as permanent, but that they were sufficiently good to be going on with, and he hoped and intended that there should be a scale produced and submitted at some later time. I wonder whether the Minister is really satisfied with this scale proposed, which is one-third less than the High Court charges, and whether there is any difference between himself and the Rule-Making Committee upon this matter. He spoke of this as temporary, but that is not quite satisfactory as an explanation or as an inducement to the Dáil to pass these rules. The procedure is such that it will be for the Committee to decide whether they will be permanent or not.
The Minister cannot say "they are only temporary"; if the Committee think they are satisfactory they can say: "We are going to make them permanent."
Perhaps in the last resort.
The Minister of course can change his committee.
I have an opportunity to change my law.
Yes, the Minister will have an opportunity to change the law, but it is not satisfactory to try to persuade the House that these are temporary and that in a short time he will be able to persuade the Rule-Making Committee to agree to a change which he thinks is satisfactory.
May I put it to the Deputy that I did it in another court— the District Court?
Yes, but that is the point. The very fact that the Minister altered these rules of the District Court would warrant me in saying that he should have held up those Circuit Court Rules until a similar revision had taken place. The fact that he has not done so is tantamount to saying: "I was dissatisfied with the District Court Rules, and I held them up. I am passing the Circuit Court Rules with those charges, and that is sufficient to assure the House that I am temporarily satisfied with them."
The drawing up and agreeing on a detailed schedule of costs for the Circuit Courts is very much a bigger task than arriving at the schedule of costs within the District Court, and would require a good deal more time and more frequent conferences than were necessary in the case of the Rule-Making Committee of the District Courts. I have agreed on this as a temporary expedient, and with as little delay as possible would set to the work of endeavouring to arrive at an agreement with the Rule-Making Authority of the Circuit Court on a reasonable schedule of costs. This is there temporarily. It is a rough rule that for the present costs will be what they would be in the High Court, less one-third, and I ask Deputies to remember, in addition to that, that there will be considerable reductions under the head of witnesses' expenses.
I am not quite so sure that the saving will be so great in witnesses' expenses as the Minister suggests. If it is a case that the court was sitting near the residence of the plaintiff it might be true to make that claim for the area covered by the Circuit. Take Circuit No. 3, from Castleblayney to Lifford, for instance. That is such a very long journey that it is easier to get to Dublin. Circuit No. 5 is from Sligo to Port Laoighise. I think it might be easier in many cases to get to Dublin. However, that is not material to my argument.
The case I desire to put to the Minister and the House as a reason why they should not confirm those rules is one of a debtor who is not quite so familiar with the requirements of the law and the practice of the courts as a solicitor would be. I can see a great deal of unnecessary trouble for that man in the requirements of those rules as compared with the comparative simplicity of the procedure at the present time. I take Rule 143 and onwards. "A defendant intending to defend shall, within ten days after service of the originating document, enter an appearance, by lodging with the County Registrar a memorandum that he intends to defend." A debtor is served with a summons that he intends to defend, and within ten days he enters an appearance. Then in 147 and onwards we find time-tables something like this: A summons is served on the 1st March, let us say; ten days afterwards he enters an appearance. Then it appears, according to 147 (b) that the plaintiff serves a notice that he is going to move for summary judgment. "Where the defendant has entered an appearance to defend the plaintiff may move the court by motion for summary judgment" in certain cases. "Such a motion shall be made on not less than four days' notice not delivered more than ten days' after the date of the defendant's appearance."
The defendant has entered an appearance and ten days after the summons is served and any time within the ten days the notice that summary judgment is to be moved for is served. The paragraph reads:—"Such a motion shall be made on not less than four days' notice delivered not more than ten days' after the date of the defendant's appearance." Any day within ten days, even two days or one day, notice may be served on the defendant that a motion for summary judgment is to be made, and within four days' that motion may be made. If the case were where the defendant lived at one end of the district and the court was sitting at the other end of the district, if the plaintiff lived in Sligo and the court was sitting in Port Laoighise, what is the position of that defendant? He has to appear at the court, and in the meantime instruct solicitors, and generally has to take such proceedings as will almost ensure that judgment will be entered against him for non-appearance.
It seems to me that the rules are going to work seriously against the interests of the poor defendant, especially the defendant who is not very familiar with lawyers, legal procedure and the jargon of the courts. Everything in the rules rather suggests that the solicitor who is called in to advise the defendant or the plaintiff, as the case may be, would immediately have to call in a barrister, because formal pleadings have to be drawn up and the solicitor has too much to do. So that is going to add very greatly to the cost. I think it will be agreed that the judge in the class of case I am thinking of, which probably represents the bulk of the cases that will come into court, can get to the heart of it on the evidence given by the plaintiff, the defendant and the witnesses. Something that happened in the course of the proceedings in court may not have been entered on the pleadings—and if I understand the matter rightly, no reference can be made to new facts that may come out in the course of the evidence—so the judge cannot deal with it. That may be necessary and desirable in intricate cases, where very correct legal procedure is required, but the great majority of cases that we are familiar with do not require that particular kind of procedure.
I think it is a distinctly retrograde step to demand of litigants that they shall go through this process. I think it is complicating legal procedure, complicating the work of the courts, and not simplifying them. So far from doing what we all set out to have done, to simplify the work of the courts, and make the attaining of justice easier, we are going the other way and making it harder. I think it is distinctly retrograde, and I think we ought to ask the Minister and the Rule-Making Authority to alter these rules, and to make new ones, which would ensure that in the great majority of simple cases, such as the recovery of debts, the procedure at present operating should continue, and that the normal course should be to carry on by civil bill.
I second the amendment. The Minister undoubtedly made a very strong case in favour of the rules and the pleadings that have to be entered, but I suggest that he is impressed by the opinion of the Committee that drafted the rules. One can very well appreciate, from the lawyer's point of view, the desirability that he should know everything about the case to be made before he goes into the court. To do so puts him in a very strong position. If he does not understand the case very well he will be able to read up the law before the court sits. In consequence of knowing the opposite side he will be able to make a case for his client. But, when we are up against the position from the point of view of the ordinary layman, as to what it is to cost in order to obtain justice at the smallest possible expense, we have to consider whether it is worth the money or not. The position of the Committee, which the Minister is supporting, would incline one to the view that it might not have been a bad thing to have had some one representative of the ordinary citizen on the Committee. I think there is great weight in the arguments of Deputy Johnson. In the great majority of cases, as Deputy Johnson says, a lawyer would be able to see the point very early in the proceedings. If there are exceptional cases, where it is necessary that pleadings should be entered, a motion made by either side should entitle them to do so. When that is so it will very often involve the employment of barristers. Many solicitors down the country will consider whether that costly practice is worth the money. There is a case for the revision of this rule. When considering the position outlined by Deputy Johnson, concerning Rules 143 to 147, I might say a letter appeared in the Press a couple of days ago over the signature of a lawyer, in which it was pointed out that if a Donegal trader issues a civil bill against a man on this side of Muckish——
What is the Deputy reading from?
A letter that appeared in the "Independent."
Who is it signed by?
A lawyer. I am making a point although there may not be any weight in it.
I want to get the reference. Is the letter signed?
It is under a nom-de-plume, "An Fear Dlighe"—the lawyer.
I merely wanted to know if there is a name to the letter. If there is not a name to the letter it is an anonymous letter.
You may call it that if you like. If there is nothing in the argument you can say so. This man makes the point that Deputy Johnson makes or that I might make. I am in the Circuit Court area this lawyer deals with. I do not know who the lawyer is.
Do you know whether he is a lawyer or not?
He talks like one.
Yes, like some of them. I am in the Circuit Court area that Deputy White is in and that Deputy Dolan, of Leitrim, if he were in his constituency, would be in. The Minister can imagine the position that would be created under Rule 147. A defendant enters an appearance to defend and the plaintiff moves for summary judgment. All this is to take place within a few days. Let us suppose the court has risen in a particular district and moves on from the northern end of Tirconaill to the western end of Cavan. Has the litigant in west Tirconaill to move on with the court? It is the only thing he can do. If he is to prove that he has a case he must do it. That is not cheapening the law or making it possible for poor men to prove they have a reason for entering a defence. It is putting them in the position that, regardless of whether or not they have a case, a decision must be given against them. I do not believe that under such a rule as that the administration of justice can be satisfactory.
The Minister may say he believes the point of view of the Committee is the correct point of view, and he is not prepared to make any alteration in this rule yet. If the position under this rule is as we understand it in its relation to the administration of justice in our courts, I say that before we meet again next November, the Minister will have forced on him the necessity for amending these rules. I strongly support Deputy Johnson's motion.
It has been decided to take Deputy Heffernan's motion at 9 o'clock, and, in the circumstances, I desire to move the adjournment of the debate until to-morrow at 3 o'clock.
Debate adjourned accordingly.
resumed the Chair.