I am coming to that. There are then ninety non-statutory undertakings, limited to a certain type of case. Of the twenty statutory undertakings five are privately owned—five are owned by companies—and fifteen are under the control of municipal authorities of some form or other. The five privately owned have within their statutory areas a population of about 109,000 people, and the fifteen municipal statutory undertakings have within the areas of their supply about 502,000 people. Of the ninety non-statutory undertakings twelve are situated in places of under 500 population, and they are omitted from this on for the purpose of my calculations. The remaining seventy eight are in areas, the total population of which is 164,000—not, of course, the total population served by these seventy eight non-statutory undertakings. In villages and towns with 500 population and upwards entirely without electricity, the total population is about 264,000. That was the situation, not exactly the situation as I found it in 1925, but the situation adjusted to the most recent figures of population, the figures in the last census, and the problem that faced us with regard to the whole Shannon undertaking was that a calculation showed that round about 1929, under ordinary conditions, the consumption of electricity in this country would have advanced to the region of about 70,000,000 units and in order to make this scheme remunerative, 110,000,000 units would have to be sold at the experts' price.
May I sum up that problem in this way?—that you had a population to be served by the Shannon scheme of about 1,035,000 people; that 75 per cent. of these people were in some way or another served, or had somewhere or another in their neighbourhood electricity undertakings, either of a statutory or non-statutory type; that the 25 per cent. of the population to be served under the projected lay-out of the Shannon system were entirely without electricity; and that in some way or another the natural growth of consumption, which would have reached about 70,000,000 units in 1929, had to be raised by extra efforts to 110,000,000. Three-quarters of the area was already in the hands of statutory or non-statutory undertakings. One-quarter was entirely without electricity but some way or other operating the scheme over the three-quarters already served or in the quarter without such service, sales had to be raised by 40,000,000 units. That was the problem as I saw it late in 1925, when for other purposes I had to make a visit to the United States of America. My purpose, however, was not completely disconnected with electricity. I had to survey the ground and see if specialists of certain types could be had; but while having that my first and main object I found it was not merely easy, but it was embarrassing to have on hands at the same time such a thing as the Shannon scheme, because I found that scheme had excited intense interest in America, excited great interest among those who were anxious to see initiative and enterprise develop in this country, and also had caused great interest amongst others who, being frankly without any altruistic ideas with regard to this country, were keen on seeing how the Shannon scheme was likely to work out.
I found myself approached from many quarters, and many discussions were raised in regard to this scheme, with regard to its prospects, with regard to its financing, with regard to its management, and so on, and on many occasions I was asked if the Government of this State would be prepared to consider the leasing of the Shannon as a concession to certain companies. I had no authority at that time even to discuss the matter. I had authority to learn as much as I could about electricity systems—systems of control and management, particularly on the supply side, and when I returned after that trip, when certain offers and approaches began to be made, not merely from America, but from Europe, I took the advice of the Executive Council, and with their approval sent letters to certain people who had made application to me that if they were prepared to make offers then, without giving them any guarantee that even the ideally best offer would be accepted, I was nevertheless prepared to receive their offers and to have them discussed.
I always inserted one proviso—that any arrangement would be put up here for consideration and that an arrangement which gave the best results to the consumer consistent with safeguarding the national interests, would be, if it was found good enough, recommended to this Dáil for its approval or rejection. I can come back to the results of that later on.
During the conversations I had in America and Canada—conversations in which I made it quite clear to those who had come to me that a certain Article in our Constitution, Article 11, had best be interpreted as showing a certain tendency in people's minds here with regard to the ownership and the control of national undertakings and emphasising certain other things —I found myself by great good luck one day in the midst of a controversy which seemed, at first, to have no great relation to the subject I was dealing with, but which on investigation proved to be very appropriate. I found there was a controversy in America with regard to what was called super power as against giant power, and although that controversy raged around me for several days I could not feel quite clear at the end that I could put my finger on the essential differences between super power and giant power. I did hear any amount of arguments that the one meant the inter-connection of isolated systems, whereas the other meant what was described as regional integration and that left me very little wiser than I had been previously. I found, however, there was considerable controversy and considerable heat engendered as to what were described as the social results of one or other of these two systems. Then for the first time I did discover one thing that did seem fundamental in this whole argument. The super-power enthusiasts were financiers pure and simple, and the super-power enthusiasts' attitude was that they must skim the cream in any district, that they must only go to where the load was good, and that one thing that never entered into their calculations, or if it entered it was only to be rejected, was the question of electrification of rural districts. The other people having, or at least, professing to have, a better idea of social service and standing for the decentralisation of population rather than for its congestion in big cities aimed rather at rural electrification, and that, if not the basis of their system, was certainly pointed to as one of the most advantageous social results from their system as opposed to the other.
I came on that particular difference by accident, but that particular difference I found went right through all the arguments and controversies that I ever afterwards heard either about the difference between these two systems or as between public ownership or public regulation, and private enterprise under what was called public utility regulation. I found, for instance, that the Ontario system, which is, of course, a system of public or State ownership of the natural resources in so far as they are electrically producing and State ownership of the transmission system, and permission even to have State control and State ownership of distribution down to the consumer—that these people in the Ontario system, specially billed themselves as having had great consideration for the rural population, and that the system managed by them had, in fact, a greater effect upon rural electrification than any private enterprise, or private enterprise under public company regulation could ever have had in the United States of America. I discovered, in Canada, that as well as the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission there were systems corresponding to it in two other of the provinces, in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the regulations being pretty definitely the same, and that the idea of the boards, a chairman and two others to control, was identical.
That led to an investigation afterwards of just what were the different systems under which plant of the electric-producing type might be either owned or administered. A review of legislation through the countries of Europe and in America showed clearly that the whole tendency, as far as ownership of natural resources of the type of water power or fuel was concerned, was definitely coming to be regarded as a matter purely for State ownership and State control. When one entered on the second point of inquiry as to long distance transmission, although it was not so clearly defined and so completely achieved, there was again the tendency that long distance transmission should be under the control of, and that the property should remain in the ownership of the State or of the provincial authorities. When one got to local distribution there was somewhat a different story. But again I found a difference which had been quite clear to me before, but never had been made so concrete as I found it when this investigation went through.
I had often heard various arguments as to the results expected to accrue, on the one hand from what is called private ownership, and, on the other hand, Government or State ownership. But I never had realised just how completely absurd these two terms were to cover the variety of different organisations that might be set up under the name of one or other of them. One hears about State control. I found State control of about eight or nine different types operating as between railways, canals, power resources and harbours in different countries of the world. When it came to private ownership, we found quite as many differences in the actual details of the control or of the administration as were to be found on the other side. Allegations are made, and counter-charges made against them, as to the defects that ordinarily would flow from State control. Similar arguments are made, and rebutting arguments put up, as to the disadvantages likely to accrue from private ownership. But I found myself driven to what anybody inquiring in this way must be driven to—an inquiry not as to whether there are advantages and disadvantages arising necessarily from private ownership or State control, but given such and such an amount of private ownership or given such and such an amount and such and such a type of public ownership, are there likely to be defects arising from it naturally which cannot be countered by some obvious method in the actual details of administration?
That led to a further survey, and even in statutes in connection with undertakings like the South African railways or the German railway system, to explain the purpose of the Board or the administration set up in these two countries to govern the railways, the phrase used was this: that it was the duty of the administration to run the railways on business lines while keeping in mind the agricultural and industrial interests of the two countries. One found also in looking through all the varieties of types, either of public or private ownership, that came under consideration, that where any degree of public ownership had been settled upon there was pretty definitely in every case an equally strong decision that public ownership should not mean ownership and administration by a State Department in the ordinary way. The South African railways are handed over to two or three Commissioners plus a Minister. They are authorised to run the railways on business lines, while being mindful of the industry and agriculture of South Africa, and they are given a certain amount of freedom in regard to the employment of staff and their dismissal, and are given complete freedom with regard to the methods upon which the railways are to be administered. In Germany the situation is somewhat more complicated owing to the fact that the railways had originally been owned by the separate provinces, had come into the control of the Central Government, and again in 1924 were about to be leased out to a private company of a particular kind. In fact it is a company which could hardly be regarded as a private company. Half of it was to be nominated by the Government and the other half was to be nominated by the trustees. Trustees afterwards got a peculiar meaning under the Dawes' Report.
Getting these two items and putting them back again in relation with the Ontario Commission, or the Nova Scotia Commission, and the Commission which operated electric property in New Brunswick, one finds this, which was common to the whole lot—that all being under the ownership of the State, and the property still remaining invested in the State, there was set up an independent board with varying degrees of independence, according to the conditions of the country and the circumstances under which the board grew. There was an attempt made to set up a board, to make it as independent as possible of government; to get it as clear away from the ordinary type of Treasury control, and to get employees as much and as far away from the ordinary type of Civil Service recruitment and conditions as could be achieved.
In South Africa, about three years ago, an electricity commission was set up consisting of a chairman, and, at the beginning, two part-time members. It was definitely stated in a paper written by the chairman about the time of the World Power Conference that their whole aim and object was to achieve all that was advantageous arising out of State control and to add to that all that seemed to be advantageous from business management. Two things that seemed to be important items for consideration when the South African Board was being constituted were that there should be such sufficient affiliation with the State that the State's backing with regard to loans and ease to credit should be maintained, and that there should be such removal from the State that the ordinary conditions with regard to Civil Service appointments, and Civil Service methods of control and operation, should be done away with. That was achieved simply enough. Three men were given complete control as regards the recruitment and dismissal of employees. They were appointed for a certain period of years; they were themselves subject to dismissal at the end of that period, and presumably would have been or would still be dismissed if the results were not good. They had behind them the State for a certain period of years, with all the facilities for the raising of loans and the ease to credit that affiliation with the State might give.
Now, that was the one big fact that emerged from all this review of the different legislations and the different methods of administration in the different countries. There was one other thing that seemed to be quite certain, or, at least, was accepted as certain, and that was that the greater the consolidation of powers with regard to distribution, in the hands of a limited number of people, the greater the benefits that would flow to the consumer. That was assumed as axiomatic in America and Canada; it was a little more argued on the Continent, but everyone was coming to the same type of conclusion that the more one amalgamated authorities or controllers with regard to the distribution of electricity, the greater are the benefits that obviously would accrue to the consumers.
While conclusions of this sort were being formed by those interested in the matter in considering what might have to be done in this country with regard to distribution afterwards the particular interests who approached me both in America and on the Continent, again appeared. Letters had been written to them to say if they were prepared to put up the terms that seemed to them to be the best, on which they would be allowed a concession for the running of the Shannon distribution, that this would have to be considered, and a date was put for the receipt of any offer likely to be sent in. At a particular time further letters began to flow in from people who had been written to in this way, and emissaries from some of those interests began even to appear in the country. It became clear, or fairly clear, early on, that there were two or three points of difference that seemed likely to bring to an end any expectation that these people had of securing a concession in this country. First of all, the rates of interest on investments that ruled American conditions would be completely out of place and completely intolerable here. Secondly, the old question of rural electrification arose. It seemed to be always obsessing those interested in taking over concessions here that rural electrification would have to be started, that some attention would have to be paid to it, and that further attention would have to be paid to it as the years went on. That, apparently, appeared at once to fit in with the views of the particular interests in negotiation here.
There was also a third point which I argued myself in speaking to those people, and the point became clearer and clearer to them as their investigations developed in this country. They knew Article 11. They got its effect, or intended effect, fully explained to them when they came here, and they seemed to discover themselves that, not only did it indicate a definite tendency of the mind of people with regard to the control and ownership of such an undertaking as that of the Shannon scheme, but they got even a greater idea of the strength of that point of view than I myself had been able to get in any investigations I have made in the country.
There is another point. None of those people interested seemed to desire to appear in the light of competitors to each other. Most of them wanted to be promised that they would be regarded as the only probable concessionaires and then would proceed to work on a scheme which, when whittled down, might prove to be desirable. That, of course, could not be acceded to either. Nevertheless, investigations were made by three or four people who professed themselves interested in the beginning, and these investigations of theirs were pushed to a great point of detail in at least three instances. I can state so much in regard to these people; I cannot state very much more, because any letters which passed between myself and them had to be under a pledge, not of complete secrecy, but secrecy on certain points, and, therefore, further developments have to be left in a certain amount of secrecy. To one who understands the particular in-and-out play of those corporations in America and the Continent this will be understandable enough. But the net result of the whole thing has been that —(a) on account of the necessity for attending to the rural industries here; (b) in the face of Article 11 of the Constitution; and (c) because the likely interest rates that would be looked for from investments here would not be up to American or Continental conditions —no offer that could be considered came from any of these people. At the same time I have myself been developing the other side of that argument. The letters to those people always contained the phrase that offers that gave, or seemed to give, considerable advantage to the consumer would receive the more consideration, provided always the national interests were safeguarded. When one began to see how could that safeguard of the national interests be achieved by a concession given to a foreign company then the difficulties became greater and greater as the investigation went on.
The obvious thing, of course, would have been, in case a concession had been granted, to have some sort of utility commission regulating their efforts, their prices, and their services, just as there is in America and elsewhere. But it was when one began to get that type of regulation and that type of control down to details of a particular organisation that might come into the country, and began to consider what it meant, that that feeling against leasing to a corporation, which had never been present and on which no decision had been taken, began to work definitely for rejection. There was always an argument of principle that would have to be used, as I told these people, even on the ideally best offer that might be made. There is no necessity to go into it in great detail, as the question hardly arises, but it arises in considering the type of board to be set up by this Bill, and in considering whether it is suitable to allow a board to be set up to do what one would have hesitated to allow an outside foreign body to do in the country.
Electricity, as a service, has almost begun to be regarded as essential. If full control of that concession had been handed over to a private company, operating for gain in this country, with financial commitments in another country, its methods of obscuring its whole charges, its wage sheets, its payments to employees and the percentage of its expenditure on its original capital would have been most difficult to follow. Yet it would have been necessary to follow all these things, if the control of this service had been handed over to an outside body to operate for gain in this country. There would, secondly, be the thought that one was handing over to a foreign body the control over such a technical matter as the development or the blocking of industry by easing the charges in the case of some industries, or stiffening them in the case of others. How that would fit in with the programme of industrial development is hard to see, except that methods of control would be made much more distinct and easily worked than seemed possible.
Similarly, on ordinary matters which the Electricity Board will have to deal with, it would seem in itself to be a dangerous thing to allow such a thing as a tariff policy with regard to electricity to be so handed over. That is to say, the method of charging, the scales of rates, and the conditions of service, would be controlled by an outside body, under whatever regulations of a public utility type that could have been put in upon them. Finally, there would have arisen a question which, if put to me two years ago, I would not have been disposed to regard as of the same importance as I regard it now, after two years' experience. That would be the question of training native engineers, native employees, in all branches and placing them in important positions in regard to the whole control of the Shannon generation, transmission, and supply. These are things I mention here, not as an argument to be used against concession to an outside company, as the question does not arise, but they are things which fall for consideration when one considers the Board to be set up, and whether this is the type of Board to which these things also shall be handed over.
I think there are differences which will justify us in taking the steps which we propose to take in this Bill. The net result of all investigations, letter-writing, and negotiations, came to this, that, whether or not there had been any private organisation in the field, my view decidedly would be this, that the dangers of handing over to anybody operating for gain such services as these, with all the attendant circumstances, were so great that it simply could not be attempted. Something had to be put in its place, and that was the next matter for debate. Again, with just as little hesitation as I would have decided on granting to a private body, I would also hold that, from the efficiency point of view, to allow a scheme of this sort—down to the supply to the consumer, and serving him in a way he would have to be served, and getting from him money he would have to pay for such service—to be run by an ordinary Government Department would be quite as dangerous. In saying that, I am passing no criticism on the Civil Service as we find it at the moment. The Civil Service was not recruited for the purpose of running business undertakings like this, and to say that civil servants recruited in a particular way, and having certain conditions with regard to appointments, promotion and retirements, are not suitable persons to run a scheme of this sort, is simply to say that this was not in contemplation when these people were appointed. Nobody could say that they were picked for the purposes of this Bill, and I doubt if anybody could say that they are suitable for the purposes of this Bill.
Thus, as between an unlimited private corporation on the one hand, and an unlimited State Department on the other, the decision had to be made that they were almost equally objectionable and that something in between had to be found. The South African situation fell for consideration again. There you had three Commissioners—a chairman and two part-time colleagues— given complete power with regard to recruitment and dismissal of staff and payments. They were to be judged by results. They were given certain tasks to do and they were to be judged whether they performed those tasks successfully or not. That situation offered lines on which an advance could be made. Similarly, too, the Swedish Board of Control, with regard to their whole electrical system, came under review. The Swedish system is, more or less, what we are attempting to follow in this Bill, with certain changes made to fit the circumstances here. In Sweden there is a board comprising a chairman and four members, and associated with that board there is a managing directorate consisting of a managing director and four persons who are called bureau chiefs. These correspond to the heads of departments of a business of this sort. The chairman and his four colleagues—the managing director and the chiefs of bureau being present when certain things are under discussion—operate the whole Swedish system. They have successfully operated it since 1908, when the first Act was introduced, and much more successfully since the second Act, consolidating the results of the first, was passed.
All that had been discovered at this time was that there had to be set up a business board. Its numbers were still to be debated, qualifications of members still to be considered, powers of a more detailed type still to be thought out, but there had been a decision taken of this kind early, that there should be control of the Shannon plant when built and handed over, and control of the transmission and distribution down to some point then not determined, and that the board set up should be independent of Parliament and of Government as far as that could reasonably be arranged; and that that board should have behind it the resources of the State in order to enable it to supply this almost essential service. If one were to take example from abroad the best type of board would seem to be one limiting the number of people given complete control over the employees— given tasks to do, given a certain time in which to accomplish those tasks—and judged on the results they had achieved themselves, having that control of the staffs at the end of a certain period. That being to a certain extent determined, one had to get back and see at what point control by this board of electricity in this country is to stop, or how far they ought to be allowed to go.
There, again, we come back to these figures I have previously given—325 towns or villages to be served, a population of 1,035,000 to be served; 110 undertakings of some sort or other occupying three-fourths of the area of possible supply for Shannon current, and one-fourth more or less a virgin field upon which this new authority could work in order to make the scheme remunerative, whilst the supply which ordinarily would have grown to 70,000,000 units in 1929, had to be increased to 110,000,000 units. A division must be made, and a division I have already made, of these undertakings. There are fifteen municipally owned undertakings in the country set up and financed by particular local authorities, and their idea is service and not gain. These fifteen undertakings serve 502,000 of the people who may, at some time or another, be served by the Shannon current. There seems no reason why, on an ordinary amalgamation process, the fifteen municipally-owned undertakings should not be consolidated into one and managed centrally. There were obvious advantages in that course. There were the advantages which would ordinarily accrue from centralised control, the keeping down of overhead expenses, and the question not merely of less staff but of a better and more expert staff, on account of the variety of work which a central board would have to do.
There was little or no hardship involved, inasmuch as the money had been raised and a certain amount paid off, and if a new authority took over the moneys not yet paid them, took over the rates that had to be paid, and gave a supply at least as good as the municipal undertakings, there seems to be no reason why there should be any outcry against that. The five privately-owned statutory undertakings are in a different position. They serve a certain amount of population, nothing like so much as the big municipal undertakings serve. These companies have come into being and are operated for the purpose of gain. They sunk a certain amount of capital in them in an endeavour to get profits. A different situation arises in regard to them, but in the interests of the better provision of electrical supply to anybody in this country who desires it, it seems unreasonable that companies supplying five areas should be allowed to block consolidation if that consolidation seems otherwise desirable, provided always that terms can be arranged upon which the five companies could be recouped for whatever money they had put in, and some attention given to their prospects of obtaining profits from investments over a period of years. That has been attended to in the details of the Bill. There are 78 non-statutory undertakings, serving also a small number of the community, or rather not serving the number I have spoken of. These 78 non-statutory undertakings would include in their areas about 164,000 people. A non-statutory undertaker is not bound to supply except those to whom he chooses to give current.
Once an undertaker applies to become regulated by statute, then he incurs certain obligations, and an area is prescribed within the limits of which anybody who asks for current at a particular rate must be supplied. It is not so with non-statutory or unauthorised undertakers. They are more or less free lances. They have to get permission from the local authority with regard to the breaking up of streets and roads if necessary, but beyond that they have no touch with any controlling authority. Of these non-statutory undertakings it can be said that about 50 per cent. of them supply only about 47 or 48 per cent. of the possible consumers in their areas. When I say there are 78 of these undertakings operating in areas the population of which is 164,000 I do not by any means want to be taken as saying that these 78 undertakings actually supply current direct to 164,000 people. In recent years attempts have been made to get these undertakings to become statutory, to put themselves under control, submit themselves to regulations and incur obligations towards consumers, and to give the consumers in the areas the protection that is given under the statutory undertakings. It has been found impossible, or nearly impossible, to draw away the non-statutory undertakings and make them enter the fold of statutory undertakings. The non-statutory undertakings, therefore, are in a different class from either the municipally or the privately-owned statutory concerns. They have areas which they might have served, comprising a fairly large number of people, and they give a service which is good, bad, or indifferent, according to the particular locality and the particular state of the plant, its installation, and the condition in which it has been since maintained, but they are under no control, and they have been given no monopoly right in any area, and no promise has been held out to them that at some time they would not escape action that would have a discouraging effect on them. With regard to them a different attitude has to be adopted, and that attitude is shown in the details of the Bill. But having this million odd people who are possible consumers of Shannon power, having a consumption that is to be raised from 70,000,000 to 110,000,000 units, and having no injustice caused by either the consolidation of the municipal undertakings into one, or the buying out in terms to be fixed, if not by agreement, then by arbitration, of the company or privately-owned undertaking, there seem to be no real obstacles against that, but there seems to be a considerable argument in favour of allowing the new authority to be set up to take over the control completely and entirely of the distribution of supply.
There were two other arguments which weighed in coming to that decision and in giving additional powers to the Board. A great deal has to be done in this country by way of education as to the uses of electricity, a great deal of propaganda has to be done in order to encourage the use of it, and if one were simply to set up a centralised Board allowing all the statutory and non-statutory undertakings to operate under it, that Board would have as its field of operations a mass of people to the number of a quarter of a million, and would have removed from the scope of its authority—the way being blocked by some type of middleman— three-quarters of a million of people.
The Board, the central authority, can most easily and readily appoint canvassers and propaganda agents for the purpose of increasing the sale of electricity through the country. Was it right that it should appoint these people, that they have at their hand power generated more cheaply than the ordinary supply association could generate at, and was it going to hand over that power at a lower rate and spend money in educating the people through means of propaganda in order to get more consumers and see this greater number of consumers fall into the hands of privately owned companies—for all the non-statutory undertakings are privately owned—or else fall into the hands of the fifteen municipal under takings?
Similarly, too, if the Board were to stop short, having under its control all the distribution of electricity over the whole country, and was not given one other power and facilitated in one other way, then again the achievement the Board had put forward might easily be blocked.
In this Bill the central authority has a certain amount of funds at its disposal, and those funds may be utilised in accordance with the provisions of the Bill. One of its sections speaks of the provision of electric lines, wires, apparatus and appliances. One of the greatest obstacles to the spread of the use of electricity is the expense that has to be incurred at one time in wiring a house. It was considered desirable that, in order to overcome and ease that difficulty, the Board should be given sufficient funds, so that it could enter upon such an item as the wiring of a house, and have the sum involved repaid over whatever term of years the Board itself has authority to repay in respect to the advances made to it by the Central Fund. That is the facility that I spoke of, but the extra power given goes a little bit further. When one considers that where people in an area have the desire for electricity and have got over the difficulty of, firstly, getting a good and efficient supply and getting it at all times, and, secondly, have got over the financial difficulty of raising the money with which to pay for the wiring of houses, there is the third point on which the users of electricity sometimes find themselves disappointed in the matter of service, and that is in the provision of electrical apparatus of all types.
Outside of Dublin, Cork, and possibly Limerick, there are very few houses in this country which go in, either as separate concerns or even as an identifiable part of their business, for the supply of electrical appliances. Generally speaking, as everybody knows, what happens is that you have some man selling both electric bulbs and potatoes or electric bulbs and butter over the counter together. The provision of electrical appliances is simply a side line with him. Sometimes that man enters into it because he knows that a certain number of people want a particular thing, but as to making any investigation as to the proper types of appliances or marketing them in a decent way, or doing anything to give an article which will have good service—of that there is very little. Consequently it has been decided that, in addition to the numerous powers which the Board shall have under the Bill, there shall be given to it the power to make purchases and to sell all manner and types of electrical appliances.
Accordingly we have come by different stages to what is in front of the Dáil in this Bill. The general idea of the Bill can be quite easily grasped. It sets out that as soon as may be after its passing there shall be set up a Central Board consisting of a Chairman and of not less than two and not more than six additional members, and that they shall be appointed by the Executive Council. They may be appointed for a period of five years or less, and will be eligible for re-appointment at the end of that period. The Board will, themselves, have the sole control and the sole rights with regard to the recruitment and to the dismissal of whatever staff they think fit to employ for the carrying out of the powers to be given to them under this Bill. Certain functions are set down as the general duty of the Board. These are set out in Section 18, and thereafter the particular duties and powers of the Board are defined.
The first thing that the Board must do, once it is established, is to assist in the carrying out of the remainder of the Shannon construction, because there are certain parts of that construction which will depend upon the demand that is shown in certain areas. Possibly the first thing that the Board must do after its appointment is to make as rapid a survey as possible of the demand or the likely demand for current throughout the country, and having made up their minds as to what that demand is likely to be, then they are to advise those who are dealing with the Shannon constructional operations as to locations, certain lines and certain other questions that will have to be decided with regard to the type of material and its location.
That is one duty which the Board will have thrown upon it immediately with regard to the complete construction of the partial development of the Shannon scheme. After that it will have other functions arising out of the Shannon scheme. Portion of the Shannon scheme may be completed earlier than had been expected. One portion of it, indeed, has been pushed on for a particular purpose, and that portion will be handed over to the Board as soon as it is completed and ready for use. The Board will then have to operate it, and meet and bear the charges arising out of that operation—the cost of renewals and maintenance of the particular part of the plant that has been handed over. It is common knowledge that one of the circuits—that is, No. 4 circuit, which is the south-easterly one—has been pushed forward and will be ready for the transmission of current quite soon. That current will not be Shannon current. It will be current derived elsewhere. The operation of that circuit in so far as it will be property belonging to or built under the operations of the Shannon Electricity Act, will be handed over to the new Board, and that Board will have to operate, take control of, meet and bear all the expenses of its management, renewal and repair. After the Shannon undertaking has been completed in whatever particular sections may be decided on, the Board will take control as soon as the formal handing over has been made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce to it, and from that point on the Board will become responsible for the charges, the same as they will in regard to the No. 4 circuit when it is completed and handed over.
The Board will become seized of the whole Shannon plan, will have to maintain, operate and bear all the management expenses and generally operate in a way that is best described under certain details of this Bill. Outside that the Board is going to be armed, if this Bill gets through in its present form, with the fullest powers possible to enable it to enter into every phase of the supply and local distribution of electricity to the people in the country. It may enter into new areas. It may advise, and may indeed insist, on the location of certain circuits in places where it desires them. It may enter into the area of operation of an authorised undertaker and may enforce upon him certain powers which are set out here in detail but which may simply be described as these: They may control, in the sense of taking over and running for a period of years, the undertaking of any authorised undertaker. They may insist, instead of controlling, say, that their schedule of rates shall be such and such, and say that their services shall be of such and such a standard, and if the undertaker complains or raises an objection, that objection or complaint has to be considered and the Board, in the alternative, may either acquire or take over the plant.
Finally, and above everything else, the Board, under the terms of this Bill, will be given at any time the power to enter upon the undertaking of any authorised or non-authorised undertaker and take it over on terms set out in the detailed sections. With regard to the non-authorised undertakings, there is a section in this Bill which, within a certain period, if this Bill becomes an Act, lays down that there shall not be allowed in this country anybody dealing in electricity except two classes of people, those who are described as (a) permitted undertakers, or (b) authorised undertakers. That section is meant to convey the likely fate of the non-authorised undertaker in this country. It will be for the Board to determine, in the early months of its existence, whether or not it will elevate to the rank of an authorised undertaker some of the non-statutory undertakers at present existing. That, of course, has its reaction also upon the non-statutory undertakers. If elevated to that rank they fall into line with the authorised undertaker, and are subject to the regulations of its members; consumers have a right to demand a supply, and must get it under particular conditions and so on.
