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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 17 Nov 1932

Vol. 44 No. 15

Control of Prices Bill, 1932—Report Stage.

I move amendment 1:

In page 5 to insert at the end of Section 16 a new sub-section as follows:—

(2) Regulations made under this section shall not have any force or effect unless and until they have been approved by the Minister.

During the discussion in Committee on this Bill it was suggested by Deputy Hayes that the regulations to be made by the Commission regulating the proceedings of the Commission should be subject to approval by the Minister. I have introduced this amendment to provide for that.

I rather think that Deputy Hayes went further than asking that they should be approved by the Minister. I think he wanted that they should have such approval by the Minister as would make them prescribed regulations and consequently would have to come before the House. The point was, although there is a precedent for having these regulations made in this way, that regulations involving such an important matter as this, indicating "the form and manner in which submissions shall be made and evidence given to the Commission, and in particular, whether such submissions and evidence shall be given viva voce or in writing,” and also “the admission or exclusion of any person to or from the sittings of the Commission,” should come before the House. After these regulations have been made, a breach of the regulations under sub-section (2) Section 17 will become an offence for which a man may be certified to the High Court, and the High Court may in fact punish him in like manner as if he had been guilty of contempt of the High Court. Consequently imprisonment may be imposed.

In a Bill of this magnitude which gives the Minister power to interfere over the whole range of trade in a specified article or articles which may afterwards be scheduled, it seems to me that the regulations which can be made assume an importance which would not attach to regulations under other Bills. What I understand Deputy Hayes was aiming at was not so much that the regulations shall not have any force or effect unless and until approved by the Minister, but should not have any force or effect until laid before the House, and then dealt with, in accordance with the regulations made under the Bill, whereby they come before the House, and, if a resolution is moved nullifying them, they are nullified without prejudice to the validity of anything done in the meantime. That was what was aimed at rather than having them approved by the Minister. This is a step, but it does not go the whole way.

I realise that we are not in Committee, but I would like to explain that the section in the Bill is precisely similar to sections in other Bills, notably the Merchandise Marks Act, in which case the regulations are made by the Commission entirely of their own volition and are not approved by the Minister. I cannot feel convinced that approval by the Minister is essential, but as a safeguard against the possibility of regulations that would give rise to trouble I will put it in. I do not think it is necessary that these regulations should be laid before the Dáil and approved, and it was not considered necessary in similar Acts in the past.

I make the point that other Bills had different scope. They were not going to interfere with ordinary trading concerns to the extent to which this is likely to interfere, and, while I do not say that the regulations are of such importance that they should be brought in, say, under Section 6, the House ought to get notice of them. If the Minister would give an undertaking that the regulations, when made, would be, in some way or another, brought before the members of the House, not by being brought in in the form which Section 6 ordains, but in a way that would give an opportunity to members of the House to question the Minister as to why he approved of regulations in a particular form, my point will be met.

I have no hesitation in giving that particular undertaking. I can arrange to have copies of the regulations made available in the library or circulated to Deputies.

Circulated to Deputies would be better, with all amendments to them.

Amendment I agreed to.

I move amendments 2, 3 and 4:

2. In page 6, before Section 19, to insert a new section as follows:—

The Commission may, in their absolute discretion, hold any sitting or part of a sitting in private and the reference in the next following section to a private sitting of the Commission shall be construed as a reference to a sitting or part of a sitting held in private.

3. In page 6, line 38, Section 19 (2), to insert before the word "sitting" the word "private."

4. In page 7, line 12, Section 21, to insert before the word "prohibition" the words "private sittings of the Commission."

These three amendments, which go together, are designed to meet certain objections which were raised in respect of Section 19 on Committee Stage. Sub-section (2) prescribes:—

It shall not be lawful for any person (other than a member or officer of the Commission) who attends a sitting of the Commission to disclose to any person any information acquired through being present at such sitting and which is available only by virtue of the powers of obtaining information conferred upon the Commission or an inspector by this Act.

Particular reference was made to the difficulty which that section would impose on representatives of the Press being present at meetings of the Commission. The three amendments, which it is now proposed to insert in the Bill, provide that the Commission may hold either private or public sittings or may hold a sitting partly in private and partly in public. If a sitting is private, the representatives of the Press, will not, of course, be present, and sub-section (2) will operate to prevent any other person in the capacity of, say, a witness, from publishing the information which he secures by being present at that sitting. When the Commission is sitting in public, representatives of the Press will be present and will be entitled to report the proceedings in the ordinary course. It is not easy to make arrangements which will provide for the privacy of the evidence given by a witness before the Commission, the privacy which would be desirable in many cases, and, at the same time, to provide for the proceedings of the Commission being published in the Press. I think that the amendments which I suggest make the best possible attempt to achieve that.

I raised this question on Committee Stage and I agree that the Minister has met, in a fair way, the objections that were then raised.

I want to raise a point from another angle with a view to getting an explanation. I can see the aim of these amendments, and I can recognise that they are well meant, but I want to ask this question: After these three amendments have been passed, sub-section (2) of Section 19 will only refer to private sittings?

Very good. Let us read it in relation to private sittings:

It shall not be lawful for any person (other than a member or officer of the Commission) who attends a private sitting of the Commission to disclose to any person any information acquired through being present at such sitting and which is available only by virtue of the powers of obtaining information conferred upon the Commission or an inspector by this Act.

The only thing which a person is precluded from publishing is such information as is obtained by being present at a private sitting and which he has got by virtue of the powers of obtaining information conferred on the Commission under the Act. Supposing a person is present at a private sitting, who is not an inspector or an officer, but who is somebody in or about a firm, and some information comes out incidentally. He is at liberty to publish that information because it is not information he has obtained through being "present at such sitting, and"—the "and" is the necessary word—"is available only by virtue of the powers conferred upon the Commission or an inspector by this Act." Supposing there was some firm being examined with regard to something or another, and there was an employee of that firm present and something comes out in the course of the private sitting. So long as that person can say that he did not get that information by virtue of the powers conferred on the Commission under this section, he is at liberty to disclose it. I think that is a serious gap.

It is necessary, I think, to have some such provision there. The fact that a particular person gave evidence, for example, without indicating the details of the evidence is something that could be disclosed. The general burden of that evidence could probably be disclosed, but where the Commission use their power to enforce the production of documents or to compel a witness to give evidence at a private sitting, in relation to his own business, in order to substantiate his statements, every person present at the sitting would be debarred from publishing that information.

I do not think so.

That is certainly what is intended and what the section will operate to do.

I gather that that is the intention but I do not think the section carries it out. The section says "a person other than a member or officer of the Commission"—that is all right, because members and officers of the Commission are attended to in the previous sub-section—but any other person who has attended a private sitting of the Commission is precluded from disclosing to any person any information he has acquired, but only if he has acquired it for two reasons, firstly, that he has been present at the sitting, and, secondly, that the information has become available to him through the exercise of certain powers conferred on the Commission or on an inspector under the Act. Supposing that there are some witnesses present—some members of a particular firm or its employees. They afterwards leave the employment of that firm, and if they have picked up certain information, it cannot be said that they have acquired that by reason of powers conferred on the Commission or on an inspector under the Act, and they are at liberty to disclose the information brought before the private sitting. Surely, the reason for the private sitting was to prevent anything being disclosed except what is published officially. I think that you are giving leave, here, to a person who has come to be present, power to disclose information afterwards, if he can say "I did not get it there by reason of powers conferred on the Commission to extract evidence under the Act."

I am afraid I do not quite follow. If the Commission anticipate that they will have to use these powers and extract from some witness private information which the witness would be unwilling to give in public, they declare part of the sitting to be private, in which case the only persons present are those who have business there. Another witness, or someone else might be interested in the matters under examination. That witness under examination might give a lot of information which he would be quite willing to have published. The Commission might require and compel him to produce evidence. If unwilling to do so then this section operates but if the information was published he would be liable. It would be necessary to establish in the proceedings that such person had acquired the information as a result of the exercise by the Commission of its powers under this Bill.

It is available by virtue of these powers.

I notice that the Minister and Deputy McGilligan used the word "published," whereas the section says "disclose." Does the word "disclose" apply to a private conversation and make it illegal for a person to say anything he knows, although he has been sworn to observe secrecy?

Is there a precedent for that?

Yes. The position is this, that if someone is brought before the court and is charged with disclosing information contrary to the sub-section it is necessary for the prosecutor to establish that such information was available to that person, not merely by the fact that he was present at the Commission, but at the Commission in the exercise of its powers. It would be drastic, I think, if a person present at the Commission was liable to prosecution for disclosing something which might not be kept secret at all, but which he heard by being present at the meeting, even though the witness gave it voluntarily, and had no objection to publication— that it merely arose out of the fact that it was given at a private session. It think it is desirable to establish in the proceedings that a particular thing disclosed was extracted or revealed by the witness at the sitting, and by the exercise by the Commission of its power.

The phrase the Minister used gave me the example I was looking for. I want more secrecy about private sittings of the Commission. It is going to be an inquisitorial body, interfering with private trade being carried on, and therefore the exercise of these powers ought to be narrowed down in the extremest possible way, and any disclosure of information from the secret sittings should be prohibited.

Is it practicable to do so?

It will be only practicable to do so if it is possible to get evidence that there has been disclosure. I hold that there should be a penalty. As the Minister stated, if a person is present and hears information given by a firm voluntarily, and if the firm does not care whether the information is disclosed or not, I agree that there should be no penalty. As the information was given voluntarily and was not extracted it is therefore not brought within the provisions of the sub-section. But if it is given voluntarily, and if a firm does care about publication, and if there is no prohibition of disclosure being made, is that desirable? I want the Minister to hark back to his remarks about sub-section (1), that the only prohibition is to certain members or voluntary officers of the Commission. The answer made to me was that the change applies only to private sittings. If it applies only to a public sitting why prohibit disclosure by a member or by an officer of the Commission and not prohibit it by a member of the public who may be present? What is the difference? It cannot be something not disclosed at the public sitting which an officer or member of the Commission got by virtue of these powers. That could be held up in another way. You prohibit a member or an officer of the Commission from disclosing information disclosed at a public sitting but you do not prohibit a member of the public from disclosing.

I would understand it better if the Deputy would indicate what change might be made in sub-section (2).

I would cut out the last portion of line 40 to the end. If it is a private sitting why say that any information is given out when there is prohibition of disclosure? What do you want disclosure for?

The Minister's heart is getting soft.

The position is that I want to get the best into the Bill. My mind is open on it.

The Minister will agree that if a person is giving evidence and is asked a particular question which he answers, even where it is irrelevant, any disclosure may affect his business. A person says everything, feeling that he is secure. Even though it is not a relevant question, if the Commission wants the information, and if the information was afterwards disclosed there would be a penalty. I think the Minister should see that any evidence given and everything that happened at a secret Commission should be kept secret.

In my opinion, the amendment suggested would be much too drastic. It would make a person liable to a penalty of £50 if he revealed that a particular witness had given evidence.

If convicted.

That person would be liable to be brought up, but there is not going to be a conviction if there are not sound grounds for it.

If the Deputy leaves it as it is I would like to look into the matter to see if an amendment might be inserted in another place.

Would the Minister make it known to the other House what is the meaning of putting in the last proviso: "and which is available only by virtue of the powers of obtaining information conferred upon the Commission or an inspector by this Act"?

I will do that.

Amendments 2, 3 and 4 agreed to.

I move amendments 5, 6 and 7:—

5. In page 8, before Section 24 (4), to insert a new sub-section as follows:—

(4) Every price order shall be published in the Iris Oifigiúil.

6. In page 8, line 41, Section 24 (4), after the word "date" to insert in brackets the following words "(which shall not be earlier than the date of the publication of such order in the Iris Oifigiúil).”

7. In page 8, before Section 26 (2), to insert two new sub-sections as follows:—

(2) Every order under this section shall be published in the Iris Oifigiúil.

(3) Every order under this section shall specify the date (which shall not be earlier than the date of the publication of such order in the Iris Oifigiúil) on which such order is to come into force.

These amendments are intended to give effect to the proposal of the Associated Chambers of Commerce that price fixing orders should not operate until published, and should not be subject to retrospective legislation.

Amendments agreed to.

Amendments 12, 13, 14 and 16 are also consequential and provide for the publication of these orders.

It would be better to take them in their order.

I move amendment 8:—

In page 10, line 47, Section 32 (1), to delete the words "the said twenty-one days" and substitute the words "ten days after the service of such notice."

In the Bill as originally framed, when the Controller, consequent on the receipt of the inspector's report, reported that an unreasonably high price had been charged for any commodity, and proposed to issue a price certificate, he should serve on the seller a notice in the prescribed form indicating the things which are set out in the various paragraphs of Section 32 (1) (a). Paragraph 5 of that notice says:

requiring such seller within twenty-one days after the service of such notice to give to the Controller an undertaking in writing to charge in future a reasonable price for the commodity mentioned in such notice and ...

It is proposed to change the period of 21 days to ten days and this is consequential on amendment No. 11 which is being introduced in order to meet a proposal which was moved here on the Committee Stage. Amendment 11 provides that where such notice is served upon any seller of an article, such seller may within fourteen days from the date of the service of such notice request that the Commission hold an investigation into the general level of prices of that commodity, in which case the Commission would carry out an investigation and be satisfied that the application was bona fide and that it was desirable in the public interest that such investigation should be made. The general investigation would then proceed. It is necessary to reduce the period of twenty-one days in consequence of the additional fourteen days under amendment No. 11.

I do not think so. What was the "such notice" now referred to? Is it the notice referred to in paragraph (v) of (a) of 32 (1)? How does the other fourteen days affect that?

Otherwise, I see much too long a time elapsing between the time of the Controller issuing the notice and the making of the certificate. Paragraph (v) requires the seller of the article to give an undertaking in writing that in future a reasonable price will be charged for the commodity mentioned in the notice. It has been stated elsewhere that under any circumstances the period of twenty-one days there was much too long and that the seller in question— he being a person prepared to admit that he did charge an unreasonable price—should be able to make up his mind within ten days whether or not he was going to charge reasonable prices for that commodity.

That is not what this relates to at all.

If the seller is of opinion that the price which he is charging, whether unduly high or not, is no higher than the general level of prices charged for that particular commodity, then he can, under the proposed new sub-section, set forth in amendment No. 11, request the Commission to carry out a general investigation into the level of prices, in which case: "The Controller shall not in any case, make, serve or publish any such certificate in relation to such person until the expiration of fourteen days from the date of the service of such notice." In other words, therefore, there is an additional period of fourteen days provided during which the Commission examines into the application and decides whether or not such an investigation of prices is required. If they decide that the application is not bonafide and that no such investigation is necessary, then, within that fourteen days, the Controller may issue a price certificate.

I do not think that the Minister has this right at all. Let us look at Section 32. It starts off by saying: "Where a report is made to the Controller by an inspector on a complaint referred to him for investigation, and the Controller, after consideration of such report, is of opinion that such complaint is well founded"— that means that previously there was a complaint by an individual which is referred by an inspector to the Controller. The Controller may throw it out. The inspector makes a report to the Controller and if the Controller, after consideration of such report, finds it well-founded, then the following provisions shall have effect, etc. In (v) and (vi), the small numbered paragraphs, what happens then? The notice may require the seller within twenty-one days after the service of such notice to give an undertaking in writing to charge reasonable prices in future, and, if such notice relates to a sale, to repay within twenty-one days. That is the section we are amending—the repayment section, and only that. What does the new amendment, No. 11, refer to in this at all?

I get the Deputy's point. It is a typographical error.

Would there be a consequential amendment cutting down the time for repayment? A complaint is made to the inspector and the inspector reports to the Controller that the complaint is well founded. The Controller serves a notice. The notice is different. The notice is that the seller, within some period of days— ten, fourteen or twenty-one—shall give an undertaking to charge a reasonable price and to repay. Then, in paragraph (c) "If such seller does not comply with the requirements of such notice, and such complaint relates to a sale or offering for sale retail the Controller shall do the following things"—and then amendment 11 comes in. Is not that the framework of this business?

Well, it is really, I think. In fact, and in time, it refers back to something that happens after the service of the notice on the person about whom the complaint is being made. Therefore, the Controller, before making a price certificate—an entirely different thing— shall serve on the seller a notice of his intention to make a price certificate on the following things—then the new amendment No. 11 comes in. But what is the purpose of cutting down the period of twenty-one days in which the seller can say whether or not he will undertake to charge reasonable prices for the commodity mentioned? The seller has got to make up his mind, having got the evidence of the complaint before him, having got the Controller's and inspector's point of view—he has got to make up his mind that he still thinks it a reasonable price. In order to make his case, he will have to bring in a multitude of things, such as his overheads, whether his trade is a cash trade or a credit trade, and many other things, and he has got to make his case as to whether he thinks he can stand up against this order. I do not think that in the circumstances three weeks is too long a time to give him for that, and it is only after he refuses at the end of the three weeks that you should proceed as to whether you will give him a price certificate or not. I think that the seller should have the time given to him originally, three weeks. His business is going to be attacked. If he accepts the notice, he has got to accept it for an unmentioned time, although the notice may contain a statement as to the area or the period.

As to (v) he has to give an undertaking to charge in future—not for a limited time—a reasonable price for the commodity. His whole business is really going to turn on this notice served upon him. It may tie him even against a change in the wholesale price. It is surely not too much to ask that three weeks should be given him to make up his mind whether to accept this reasonable price and whether he will repay the sum he is alleged to have overcharged.

I submit that in the case mentioned we are giving not three weeks, but a maximum of twenty-four days. Let us consider this. An allegation is made that on a particular occasion a particular seller sold a commodity at an unreasonably high price. The Controller examines the allegation and decides that it deserves to be investigated. An inspector investigates it, subject to the provisions of this Bill, and reports to the Controller, and the Controller, on getting that report, decides that the complaint is well founded. In other words, there is prima facie evidence, in his opinion, that an unreasonably high price is being charged. At that stage this section begins to operate. The Controller sends to the seller a notice in the prescribed form stating the nature of the complaint, the grounds for his opinion that the complaint is well-founded, and so on, and requiring that seller to give, within ten days, an undertaking that in future he is going to charge a reasonable price for the commodity and refund the amount of any overcharge made. If the person is in the situation described by the Deputy and is of opinion that the price indicated as a reasonable price by the Controller is not a reasonable price, then what happens? The new sub-section, amendment 11, comes into operation. At the end of ten days, if no reply has been received from the seller alleged to have charged that unreasonably high price, before the Controller issues a certificate he sends another notice to the seller informing him of his intention to issue the certificate and "the Controller shall not in any case make, serve or publish any such certificate in relation to such person until the expiration of fourteen days from the date of the service of such notice." Within those fourteen days, the seller may make representations to the Commission, appeal from the Controller to the Commission, on the ground that the price charged by him was the general price and request the Commission to carry out an investigation as to the general level of prices in the area, or in the county as a whole, for the commodity. The Commission consider that appeal and if they decide that there is a case for investigation, then the certificate drops; there are no fresh proceedings against that seller until the general price investigation has been concluded. If, on the other hand, the Commission decide that the appeal must be rejected, that there is no case for an investigation into the general level of prices for the commodity, then, at the end of the fourteen days, a certificate is issued. A person who considers that a price charged by him was a reasonable one, even though that was not the opinion of the Controller, reasonable in relation to the general level of prices of that commodity, has a maximum period of twenty-four days within which to take proceedings under the Bill to prevent the certificate being issued.

He has only ten days to make up his mind.

Ten days in which he need do nothing at all. At the end of that ten days he gets another notice from the Controller.

Of his intention to issue.

He gets another notice from the Controller that it is the Controller's intention to issue a certificate, but the certificate cannot be issued for another fourteen days after that, within which the seller may appeal to the Commission against the Controller.

I am not making any argument on the period that will elapse from the time the complaint is made and noticed as reasonable to the person, until the price certificate is made. I am making the point as to the time you allow a person to make up his mind whether he is going to have his business investigated. He has to survey the whole course of his business in ten days. He previously was given twenty-one days.

As this Bill stood he was. Nothing happened until the end of the twenty-first day after he got notice. On the twentieth day he could say "I will accept" or he could say "I will not accept." He had three weeks in which to survey the whole course of his business affected by the order. What does he get now? Ten days to survey the whole course of his business. Something that is going to happen to him thereafter may be postponed, but the machinery is set in motion after ten days. He previously had twenty-one days in which to consider the whole thing without any machinery being set in motion. After ten days under amendment 11 the Controller serves the notice in the prescribed form but he shall not make, serve or publish any such certificate until fourteen days from the date of service of the notice. The person may send in a statement to him that he wants the whole thing investigated. But he may not. Thereupon, the order will be made, presumably. He has to make up his mind within ten days after he gets the notice as to letting this machinery operate against him. That is the point I am at. He should get the three weeks. Cut down this other period if you like, but give him the original twenty-one days that was in the Bill as drafted. As I say, it is a very serious matter. Incidentally, may I ask, is the Controller a member of the Commission? I do not think he is, as the Bill is drafted.

Consequently the Controller cannot administer an oath. He cannot, therefore, take evidence on oath. So far as this part of the Bill is concerned, somebody comes along and makes a complaint to the Controller, not on oath. The Controller makes up his mind as to whether, prima facie, it is absurd or whether there is some sort of a case. In the second event, he sends out an inspector, who makes an investigation. I do not think this can be made on oath.

The powers of the inspector are defined in the Bill.

Yes, they are defined. The Controller, who is not a member of the Commission, has no power to administer oaths. I doubt if any delegate from him can administer an oath. At any rate, the inspector makes inquiries and the Controller, after some time, finds that the complaint is well-founded. He serves notice on the man, requiring him to charge a reasonable price. Again, I call attention to the fact that under paragraph (v) he is to charge in future, not for a specified time, a certain price. He has got to sit down and think: "I am charging that price; complaint is being made about it; somebody investigating in a particular way has found that it is an unreasonable price, as far as his judgment has been brought to bear upon it." He has to think of his whole business. Can he stand up against that? He will have to consider his overheads, the type of his customers, the credit he has to give, everything about his business; the things he may charge a low price for in order to get people into his premises as a set-off against the things he charges a high price for when he gets the people in. He has to consider all that.

Does the Deputy notice that it is "a reasonable price," not "the reasonable price?"

That is worse, if a reasonable price is the one that is certified by the Controller to him. If it is "a reasonable price" I should like to have a view expressed on that. If he is to be allowed to operate his judgment as to what is a reasonable orice, then the section is useless. But if it is a price which is to be judged from the point of view of whether it is reasonable or not in relation to the notice served upon him by the Controller, after complaint has been made, then he is going to be in a bad way. He has to certify that he will charge a reasonable price in future. Supposing the price of the article that he is selling goes up the next week, will he be made charge the old price on the notice, or can he even go above the price complained of? These are considerations that a man will have to ponder over in his mind before deciding whether or not he will allow this machinery relating to these price certificates to go against him.

The period now specified is ten days; previously it was twenty-one days. This legislation, to my mind, is going very seriously to upset trade. I do not think the difference in time between ten days and twenty-one days should be considered by the Government. Is it not recognised that if it gets about that a complaint is made in regard to the prices charged by a certain individual and an inspector is sent down to investigate, that man's business is going to be very considerably damaged, irrespective of whether the inspector finds for or against an unfair price? Is it not obvious that considerable damage is going to be done in such cases? If a man makes up his mind to submit his case for examination by the Commission he should get the twenty-one days that the Bill originally allowed instead of the ten days that the Government now propose.

I think the Deputy is over-stating the case. What happens? A complaint is made, a complaint which the Controller, with a knowledge of the general level of prices all over the country, may consider to be worth investigating. He sends down an inspector. The Deputy rightly admits that the seller knows as soon as the inspector calls that a complaint has been made. He has a certain amount of time in which to consider whether the price he has charged was or was not reasonable. The investigation is pursued and a report is submitted to the Controller. The Controller then takes a certain period in which to come to a decision. During all that time the seller can be examining his conscience with respect to the price he has charged. It is only when the Controller decides that an unreasonable price has been charged that the notice is issued. We should not be filled with consideration over the troubles of a man who has, under these circumstances, been deemed by the Controller to have charged an unreasonably high price. The notice is sent to the individual concerned that he has charged an unreasonably high price and he is given an indication of what the Controller considers to be a reasonable price. He is asked if he is prepared to agree to give an undertaking that he will in future charge a reasonable price.

That particular reasonable price?

Not necessarily. What is specified is a reasonable price for the commodity. He is given ten days within which he can decide whether he will plead guilty or not. Then he has twenty-four days in which to put forward a defence, if he has a defence. If he recognises that he cannot defend his position he has ten days in which to give an undertaking and to make any refund that may be necessary, because of the amount he has overcharged. If a trader considers that he has not charged an unreasonable price, that he should not be required to give an undertaking or make a refund, then at the end of ten days he gets the second notice envisaged by amendment 11. He then appeals to the Commission and he is allowed a period of fourteen days. He asks the Commission to investigate the general level of prices for the commodity in question.

If the Commission decides that his appeal is well founded and that the price charged by him was the general price, the issue of the certificate drops and the price investigation by the Commission proceeds. If the Commission decides that there is no ground for the appeal, that the general level of prices is quite satisfactory, that there is no need for a prolonged investigation and that the price charged by the individual was higher than the general level of prices, the appeal drops and the certificate is issued. There is a period of ten days within which a man with a guilty conscience can plead guilty and a man who has a defence to make has twenty-four days in which to make it. Every facility is provided under the Bill for the making of that defence.

In the event of an investigation taking place and that investigation proving that an unreasonable price was charged, will the provisions of Section 32, clause (vi), operate?

Does the Deputy mean an investigation by the inspector?

No, but an investigation on the appeal.

Paragraph (a), which includes clause (vi), operates before the certificate is issued at all. The person found to have charged an unreasonably high price is given every opportunity to make restitution and is warned not to charge that high price again. It is only in the event of an individual refusing to make restitution that he is punished and the punishment is the publication of the certificate in the local newspaper.

Which is going to wipe him out of business. It is all very well to talk about a man with a guilty conscience. It is an interesting way of fouling the whole atmosphere. The Minister has already declared that he has no evidence of profiteering. He has got complaints, but he did not say how numerous they were and he did not know how well-founded they were. He entered the qualification that he did not know whether they were well-founded. He has had complaints of individual traders charging one price one day to certain customers and a different price the next day. Because of that we are going to have all this interference with trade.

This can be a most impressive measure; it can also be a complete piece of futility. Let us consider this from the angle of the person who has not a guilty conscience and who is afraid that the Commission will not properly be able to investigate the conditions of his business. If this Bill goes through in its present form I think a man would be a fool ever to give in to the provisions set out in Section 32. He should always hold out and insist on an investigation. Again, when a price certificate is issued it applies to all the businesses in that area for the specified period, whereas if he gives in it will only apply to himself for an unspecified time and for a price in respect of which he has no indication.

It will be the price which, in the opinion of the Controller, is a reasonable retail price to be charged by such seller for such commodity.

Not by all the people of that district?

A man should always hold out—I do not care whether he has a guilty conscience or the best of consciences. The Controller will certify a price which in his opinion is a reasonable retail price. Later on a notice is issued requiring the seller to give an undertaking to the Controller that he will in future charge a reasonable price. We are told that the reasonable price referred to in paragraph (v) is not the same as that referred to in paragraph (iii).

There is a certain elasticity provided.

The old price would not be considered a reasonable price?

Therefore, he has to make up his mind to charge some price other than the old price complained of. "In future" seems to indicate an indefinite period. He has to undertake that he will charge what he thinks will be a reasonable price in future. There is no limitation in time. It is not laid down that the time can be specified, although it may be specified in the certificate. Take the man with a good conscience. As the Minister says, that man has time to consider everything from the moment the inspector calls. Will he? Of course, he will not. He is not up against this thing until he gets the notice. No man who has any business worries arising out of his ordinary avocations is going to bother his head about this to the point of making up his mind until he gets a notice. Then he will have to consider: "Am I going to have myself held up to odium and scorn by the publication of a notice in the paper, or do I think I can make it so clear to my customers that they will be inclined to cast odium and scorn on the notice that appears in the paper and that they will continue to pay the price I charge"? That is a pretty big decision for a man to take, even though he may have the very best of consciences in the matter.

I do not still see any reason for cutting down that period of twenty-one days. I think that it is small enough in a very serious matter like this. I do not care about what happens afterwards. The point is that certain machinery is set in motion after ten days. It used to be after 21 days. Because you enlarge the period in which the machinery will revolve and send out a price certificate is no excuse for cutting down the period inside which the man has to make up his mind whether or not he will subject his business to all this upset and investigation and the possibility of a price being fixed against him individually by notice in the paper. No reason has been given yet why that period of 21 days should be cut down. There are two distinct divisions of time and the first one is by far the more important—the period in which the man has to decide whether or not he will run the gauntlet of all this procedure. He really does not begin to think on the matter until he has got the notice served on him. He will always believe that he will have persuaded the inspector with regard to any complaint. If it is a case of a guilty conscience, he will give in at once. I am not thinking of that man. We have no examples of the man of guilty conscience put before us.

After all the ráméis which used to be talked about profiteering, with the report of the Commission on Prices and all the Departmental files before him, the Minister is not able to say that there is profiteering. Although he is not able to say that, we have this very inquisitorial process imposed upon an individual, and instead of 21 days, he is given ten days to make up his mind as to the ruin of his business or the running of the gauntlet of all this investigation. The ten-day period should be enlarged to 21 days.

It would be very easy for the person who was inquired into under this Bill to fulfil the requirements of Clause 5. Any man can give a guarantee in writing that he will charge in future a reasonable price, because that "reasonable price" will not necessarily have any relation to the "reasonable price" mentioned in the notice referred to here.

What that is intended to provide for is that certain representations may be made on one side or the other, and an agreement reached as to what is a reasonable price. In nine cases out of ten, that will have been done by the inspector when investigating the case. The Controller indicates what, in his opinion, is a reasonable price to be charged for the commodity. As a result of representations, he might agree that an increase of a penny or some small increase like that would be permissible. The Bill provides for these representations being made and considered. That is why different wording is adopted.

As regards Deputy McGilligan's point, I should like to have convinced the Deputy, but I do not see much prospect of it. The dropping of the period from 21 days to 10 days is a necessary consequential step on the introduction of amendment No. 11, which provides for another period of 14 days in which the person alleged to have charged the unreasonably high price may have the general circumstances affecting that price investigated by the Commission, with all the powers of that Commission. That seems to me to be a reasonable safeguard in the case of the person who, in his own opinion, is not, in fact, profiteering but merely charging what is generally considered in the trade, or in the trade in that particular district, to be a reasonable price. Reference was made to the fact that a slight mistake was made in inserting the amendment. It was intended that the period of 21 days in both paragraphs 5 and 6 should be changed to 10 days, whereas the amendment only refers to No. 6.

That is more than a slight change.

The purport of the amendment is the same. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of sub-section (1) of Section 32, the ten-day period should relate to both periods of 21 days provided there.

I was considering this in relation to the period in which the repayment had to be made. This change makes it a much bigger thing. The whole thing must be compressed into this period of ten days instead of twenty-one days, and that is a very serious change to make at this stage. I should like to ask the Minister where, in the Bill or amendment, is the provision regarding the price certificate in the case of an individual.

The Controller shall "make a certificate ...in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars certifying the price——"

What is the Minister quoting?

Paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of the same section: "which in the opinion of the Controller is a reasonable retail price to be charged by the seller for such a commodity." That refers to the price to be charged by the seller. It does not refer to the general level of prices to be charged for the commodity.

I should like to know the basis on which the inspector will arrive at a decision as to what is a reasonable price and what is an unreasonable price, as to what is profiteering and what is not profiteering. I should like to know if this price will have relation to the value of the commodity at the time—the market value?

Different traders in a town may make contracts at different times. A particular trader may enter into a contract which will subsequently prove unprofitable. There may be a fluctuation in the market value of an article, in the ordinary course of business. The trader may have entered into a contract for the supply of an article the market value of which drops. That trader may try to safeguard himself by charging what, in the ordinary course of events, would be a reasonable price. There may be other traders in the same locality who bought later on more advantageous terms. They may be underselling the other trader, who is merely getting what would, in the ordinary course, be regarded as a normal profit. That price might be regarded as profiteering having regard to the market value at the time, whereas the trader might actually be selling at a loss. On the other hand, the value of a commodity may go up considerably after a trader has entered into a contract. Would he be entitled, notwithstanding that he bought considerably under the market value, to charge the market value on the particular date on which he is selling? Would that be regarded as profiteering?

What I want to convey is this— suppose he had bought the goods at a price on a particular date, and the value of a particular article that he had bought had in the meantime gone up considerably, would it be reasonable for him to charge the market price, or would it be profiteering if he were to do so? The market price in a particular case might mean a very considerable profit. Of course there are fluctuations in the market price from time to time. Any man who is really a businessman has to speculate in buying goods from day to day. He has to take risks in buying and selling, and these everyday transactions bring him face to face with the risk of the article going down in value. The market may go against him. On the other hand, because of the possibility of balancing his account, he will be prepared to take risks. A man will be prepared to contract for the supply of an article at a date very much ahead. The profit on that transaction may compensate him for losses previously.

The difficulty I can foresee in regard to the inspector is this—how is he to arrive at what is profiteering in different circumstances? If the trader has to take a risk that the article may go down on the one hand, how can the inspector give a decision against him if the article goes up? The matter is most complicated. A businessman takes a contract on which he may lose money. Businessmen have to do that from time to time. They may incur serious losses in the event of the market fluctuating against them. If the market goes in their favour they sell, and make a profit when they are only charging the market value of the article at that particular date. From a particular commodity which he has bought a trader may have a considerable profit compared with the price of the article on the date at which he contracted. Will the inspector regard that as profiteering?

These are obviously all considerations that will have to be taken into account.

Taken into account by the inspector?

By the Controller. Surely the trader cannot have it both ways. The Controller would decide a question of policy like this, whether the price paid by the seller wholesale shall determine the price charged retail; or whether the market price was to rule. But the trader cannot get it both ways. There are two methods obviously which the Controller could adopt—either the trader is entitled to charge a higher price than the market price when he bought, but if so, he must charge a lower price if the market falls. The individual trader may charge higher prices than the wholesale price justifies him in charging. But these are questions to be determined by the Controller, and when coming to a conclusion he will apply to that all the facts supplied him by the inspector.

We are providing in our amendment that if a trader finds that the general level of price is such that the prices charged could not be regarded as unreasonable, then he can appeal from the Controller to the Commission, and have an investigation into the whole matter. If that investigation shows that there has been no excessive profit taken, then no price certificate is issued against the trader. It seems to me that this Bill has, if anything, been carefully framed in order to make it rest as lightly as possible on the traders of the country. My feeling is that this part of this Bill will not be operated to any undue extent at all, and that the existence of these powers in the Controller and the existence of the machinery of investigation will prove a deterrent to that particular thing. The machinery is there in the Bill to check any profiteering that may exist.

Profiteering which does not exist.

I have not said it did not.

The Minister said there was no evidence of it.

There is not the slightest doubt that I have received allegations of complaints; resolutions have been passed by public bodies and there is a large number of other indications.

There has been no concrete evidence given to the Minister.

What is evidence?

Something that would make the Minister make up his mind that there was profiteering.

I had no machinery which could get the evidence. There should be existing in the State machinery by which evidence could be secured in reference to allegations like that. Then that matter could be properly investigated and action taken if the complaints are justified.

There is such machinery there at present.

There is not.

The Minister has already such machinery.

The Minister refers to unreasonable prices on the part of the trader. Leave out of account altogether the case that the trader deliberately sets out to cheat any of his customers. Leave out the trader who operates with what the Minister calls a guilty conscience. Let us take two traders in the same town. The whole method of the running of these two businesses may be completely distinct. One may have a large staff. The other may run his business by his own family. Take also into account the fact that one trader gives credit and the other does not. In such cases there may be considerable difference between the prices charged by two traders in the same town.

When the Minister speaks of a reasonable price and when he expects the inspector to investigate the question of charging an unreasonable price I submit to the House that it has never been made quite clear in this discussion as to what was meant by "unreasonable charges." Is it "unreasonable" in reference to the actual business of that particular trader? If it has not that particular meaning I suggest that it is most unfair and that it can operate most unfairly to the trader. It may really amount to asking him to run his business at a distinct loss leaving altogether out of account any profit. There must be a complete investigation into the running of the business of that particular man. I suggest that that is a most complicated investigation requiring the most detailed knowledge of that particular business. I wonder is the same inspector expected to be an expert in the running of different types of business? It is difficult for an outsider to determine how business in one particular line can be run, but if he is to investigate the grocery business and the drapery business I doubt if the inspector will be found to have the capacity for doing that.

I am afraid that the Minister has not a sufficiently clear idea as to how business is run by the ordinary traders in the country. The inspector will have to investigate into overhead costs. Now, very few country traders get their accounts audited. I am aware that some of them have done it quite recently. They have brought in an auditor for income-tax purposes. In this case the trader has to make up his mind in ten days whether he is going to enter into that investigation when a charge is being made against him, or an allegation has been made that may be perfectly unfair. That period may be altogether inadequate for the trader to make up his mind. The Controller will fix whether there is a fair price or not, but in reality the only evidence that the Controller has before him as to the running of that man's business is what the inspector sends to him. He is completely dependent on that one presentation of the case. It may be that that inspector is not capable and cannot be capable of understanding the complications of running a business. I think if the Minister had experience of how the ordinary shopkeeper in the country town runs his business he would see the extreme difficulty the shopkeeper would have in making up his mind in a case where he has no desire to cheat anybody, whether he is capable of presenting a case to the Commission for investigation. The ordinary country trader does not keep books, though I know that recently as a result of the activities of the Inland Revenue Commissioners a number of people have got in auditors to tell them where they stand in these matters. They have only the very vaguest idea as to what their running costs are, and yet the Minister expects a man to make up his mind on all that particular matter — because he is visited by an inspector in ten days. I suggest that this is a most unreasonable demand to make of a shopkeeper. I am dealing only with the shopkeeper who is acting in perfectly good faith, and who is charging what seems to him a reasonable price. We have no indication as to what the Minister means by a reasonable price. We do not know whether it is a reasonable price for that article in the district— and from some of his remarks I understood him to mean this—or a reasonable price in reference to that particular business. You may have an average price for a district that would mean selling at a loss and bankruptey for one particular man in the way he runs his business.

I want to ask the Minister a question. I asked the wrong question before. I asked a question about a price certificate; I want to ask it now with regard to a price order. A price order cannot relate to an individual only. Is not that so?

That is quite so, and no certificate can be issued in respect of a commodity not subject to a price order.

I do not see why anyone should ever accept anything under the first sub-section of Section 32. If he gives in on Section 32 he is going to give an undertaking to charge in future a reasonable price—not the reasonable price—and certainly not the price of which complaint has been made. What "in future" means we do not know. What will happen if he gives that undertaking and breaks it we do not know, because what follows under sub-sections (b) and (c) only comes into force if he fails to comply with the requirements. If he gives an undertaking in writing to charge in future a reasonable price he has complied with the requirements of the notice, has he not?

Very good. Supposing he thereupon overcharges after giving the undertaking, what is the penalty for the breach? Is it laid down here? I do not see it. He could give an undertaking in writing and the next day charge the old price. Is that so? What is the purpose of the section? That is one point. Supposing, however, he does not give that undertaking—supposing he is an honest individual and says "I will not give the undertaking"—then we may issue a price certificate. There is one thing at any rate he avoids by refusing to comply with the requirements of the notice, and that is a refund, because under the price certificate he cannot be compelled to make a refund. Is that not so?

Why should he give an undertaking which is accompanied by the necessity for a refund, when he could, instead, have a price certificate? The answer is, of course, that the refund may be done secretly as the notice may be kept quiet. The certificate is published. That is an important point he has to determine within ten days, because when ten days pass he cannot avoid either of two things happening—a price order being made for the area or a price certificate, applicable to him only, being issued.

Investigation of the general level of prices does not necessarily mean a price order.

It may though?

He is faced with either of two things. As I say, he can balance against a price certificate and its publicity the fact that he will not have to make a refund. He can go a step further and say "I will give no undertaking, but when notice is served on me that a price certificate is going to be made I can produce evidence that the level of wholesale prices does not show me to be any greater profiteer than anybody else." Thereupon he can throw the whole area into the dispute, and if anything happens after that it is going to be a price order for the whole area and no refund to be made by the individual trader. It is a rather complicated provision. I do not know if it has been thought out, or if that is supposed to be a scheme of the punishment appropriate.

Let us take the man with a guilty conscience who has overcharged but who knows that three or four other people in the neighbourhood are overcharging with him. Somebody makes a complaint about him. We know how complaints will be instituted against one particular individual and not against others—and he has a notice served on him requiring him to repay. He says "no." Notice then comes upon him for a price certificate and again he says: "I can give evidence against two or three traders in the area." He thus saves himself a refund, and saves himself the publicity of the price certificate, because it will not be applicable to him alone —it will be applicable to the whole area. Is that the punishment for the individual guilty man against whom a complaint is made? I suggest that the whole section should be taken back, with the other section about which some doubt has been raised here, and brought up again with those things fully considered.

I now get back to my original point. The ten day period is to let the man make up his mind as to whether or not he will start certain machinery in operation. He may then, within fourteen days, succeed in diverting the whole inquiry from himself on to the traders in the area, but he has got to make up his mind in ten days as to whether he will face the possibility of a public notice against himself, or whether he will take things quietly and pay the money over. As I say, under the section, according to what the Minister said, he could pay the money over, give an undertaking in writing to charge a reasonable price, and on the next day proceed to charge the old price. Then I suppose the whole thing has to be gone over once more—all this business about complaints and notices, the inspector making an investigation, the inspector reporting the result of that investigation to the Controller, the Controller serving a notice on the individual trader, who can give an undertaking in writing to repay to the individual by whom the complaint has been made, and go on as before. If that is the purpose of the Act I say no more.

It is quite clear from what the Deputy has said that the trader who proposes to act in the way the Deputy has suggested has twenty-four days to do it in.

He has not. He has ten days to make up his mind as to what he will do.

He has ten days to determine his tactics, and twenty-four days to carry them out. That is one point established. The second point is this. What happens in the second period of fourteen days is that the trader appeals from the decision of the Controller to the Commission, but the Commission may decide on that appeal that a price investigation into the general level of prices of that commodity in the area is not necessary— in other words, that the appeal is not a bona fide appeal on that ground—and consequently a price certificate is issued. The only other point made by the Deputy was that the trader may rattle off a guarantee straight away, and proceed to ignore it immediately afterwards. The trader could conceivably do that, but conceivably if he does it he is going to bring much more trouble on himself than if he risked the price certificate in the first instance, because it is going to mean continuous investigation by inspectors, and the continuous giving of those undertakings. At some stage he will be caught out, and those undertakings of his will appear in public.

How can they appear in public?

When a prosecution arises.

How will a prosecution arise?

After a price certificate has been issued.

He will never get a price certificate issued against him. He will give the undertaking.

Yes. He will undertake, and break the undertaking.

He is only bound to give an undertaking in writing. There is no penalty for a breach of the undertaking.

No, except this, that it is going to lead to undesirable publicity for him.

How can it lead to publicity if the inspectors are bound to silence and if all the other people interested are bound to silence?

The inspector is not bound to keep silent on the fact that he is investigating a complaint. There is nothing like that in the Bill. In fact, the reverse is in the Bill. The inspector is required——

To notify the public? Show me where that is.

He is required to investigate such complaint and for that purpose to interview the complainant, to require him to give such information as may be reasonably required, to interview the seller and give such information as may be reasonably required, and if any person refuses to furnish the inspector with such information he is liable to be fined.

And if he gives the information there is no prosecution.

Yes, there is. If an inspector visits a trader in a country town to inquire into prices there, that fact is not going to be known.

We heard that before. That means his business is damaged by the mere fact of the visit.

Yes, and the effect of two or three visits would damage it more.

There can be no publication by the inspector to the public.

No, there is no formal publication of the fact. A complaint is made.

Would it not be a complete abuse of the inspector's powers if he were to indicate anything to the public that happened?

Yes, certainly, to make a public announcement of the business he was engaged on.

As one interested in the provision line, is the Minister aware that, from time to time, prices possibly change five to six times in one day? When the inspector is arriving at a decision in regard to what is a reasonable price, what is a reasonable profit, what would be profiteering, or what would not be profiteering, what is the basis on which he would consider the prices charged as being profiteering or otherwise? What I want to bring home to the Minister is this, if a man has entered into a contract and with the fluctuation of prices that contract becomes what we consider a bad deal, in other words, that the market has gone against him, and the prices go down considerably, what happens? It is unnecessary for me to point out to the Minister that competition in every line of business is sufficient to bring down prices and, beyond yea or nay, the market has gone against him, and he is going to lose on that transaction. On the other hand, if the price of a particular commodity for which he has paid a certain sum appreciates, in other words if the market has gone in his favour, where do you draw the line with regard to what would be reasonable, or what would be an unreasonable price, making due allowance for the losses he might sustain for entering into a bad contract; and also taking into account the fact that after he has made a good contract by which he is making a profit and as a result of the fluctuation of the market that particular commodity has depreciated in value, in the meantime, since he entered into the contract? Now it might be said that it would be unreasonable, that it might be profiteering, when he is only getting the market value of what was the wholesale price of that particular commodity at that particular date. But if he entered into a contract at a time when the value of that particular commodity was much lower than the market value was at a subsequent date, would you consider that profiteering?

If you want my personal opinion I would say that, if the trader has given his customer the benefit of any reduction in the wholesale price and suffered a loss on that reduction, then he would be entitled to get the advantage of any increase in the retail price, or any decline in the wholesale price. I mentioned the two principles upon which the Controller could operate.

You would not consider it profiteering for a man who entered into a contract, it often occurs in the provision line, perhaps three, and, in some instances, six months ahead, thus taking a risk in speculating (and any good business man will speculate) if he wants to make his business progressive he must take his profits and his losses together. When the value of a particular commodity goes down in the market he must always have to meet it, and, needless to say, if others bought on better terms than he has, he will have to bring his terms to suit his customers. Otherwise they will take his customers—to retain his customers he must come down and meet their prices. Consequently, he must sustain a considerable loss if the contract he entered into was more than the market value at that date. On the other hand, if the market goes up and he has entered into that contract, and the market value of that particular commodity at a date subsequent, say, three months from the date he entered into the contract, is considerably over the price he contracted at, do you say that is profiteering?. It is the market value of the commodity at that particular date and he has to meet with competition which we hit up against every day in business. He had to take his losses when the market went against him. Now he is only looking for the market value, and the market value might appear, to any one not well acquainted with markets, an unreasonable one. Would that be regarded as profiteering when he has previously suffered a loss on a previous contract? I take it for granted the inspector will refer to the invoices, and in referring to these invoices I hope will have a good knowledge of the business and of the fluctuation in prices, and that he will make reasonable allowance for one and the other. If you have a fixed standard and you do not take into account losses as well as profits it will be very difficult to arrive at what is a reasonable price.

Have the words "reasonable price" reference to the individual business that is being investigated?

That is the Minister's own view.

That is the instruction to the Controller, not merely in reference to business in that particular area, but the profits and losses, expenses, efficiency and inefficiency of the particular business.

Yes, that is clearly stated in (i) of (c.)

Then the inspector will be able to give sufficient information to the Controller to enable the Controller to come to a decision on that matter.

Amendment No. 8 agreed to.
The following amendments were agreed to:—
In page 10, line 56, Section 32, (1), to insert after the word "shall" the words "subject to the provisions of the next following sub-section."
In page 11, line 8, Section 32 (1), to insert after the word "shall" the words "subject to the provisions of the next following sub-section."— (Aire Tionnscail agus Tráchtála.)

I move amendment No. 11:—

In page 11 before Section 32 (2) to insert the following new sub-section:—

(2) The Controller shall, before making, serving, or publishing a price (retail) certificate or a price (wholesale) certificate in relation to a commodity, serve on the seller to whom such certificate, if made, would relate a notice in the prescribed form stating his intention to make, serve, and publish such price certificate and whenever any such notice is served on any person the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—

(a) the Controller shall not in any case make, serve or publish any such certificate in relation to such person until the expiration of fourteen days from the date of the service of such notice;

(b) if before the expiration of the said fourteen days, such person applies in the prescribed manner to the Commission to investigate, in case such certificate, if made, would relate to a retail price, the retail prices or, in case such certificate, if made, would relate to a wholesale price, the wholesale prices, charged for such commodity in the area where such person carries on business and states in such application the grounds on which it is based, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—

(i) the Commission shall forthwith hold a preliminary inquiry into such application; and

(ii) the Controller shall not, in any case make, serve, or publish such certificate until the Commission have concluded such inquiry; and

(iii) if, as the result of such inquiry, the Commission are satisfied that such application is bona fide made and that it is desirable in the public interest that such investigation should be made, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say, the Controller shall not make, serve, or publish such price certificate, and the Commission shall forthwith make an investigation as to whether unreasonably high retail prices or unreasonably high wholesale prices (as the case may be) are being charged in such area (including the area where such person carries on business) and the Commission thinks fit, for such commodity and such investigation shall be deemed to be a price investigation within the meaning of Part III of this Act, and the provisions of that Part relating to the following matters, that is to say, proceedings consequential on price investigation, price orders, validity of price orders, revocation and amendment of price orders, and offences in relation to price orders, shall apply accordingly; and

(iv) if, as the result of such preliminary inquiry, the Commission are not so satisfied, the Controller shall at the conclusion of such inquiry make, serve, and publish such price certificate."

We have already discussed this amendment.

Was it not decided that this amendment was consequential on some other amendment?

Yes, it is consequential upon amendment No. 8.

There are two small changes in it then. Ten lines from the end of paragraph (iii) should read: "where such person carries on business as the Commission thinks fit."

That is a misprint. "And" has been put in there instead of "as."

Then in paragraph (iv) the word preliminary before inquiry goes out.

Quite so; it is unnecessary. "Such inquiry" obviously relates to the preliminary inquiry.

It still does relate to the preliminary inquiry?

Why put it out then?

The Parliamentary draftsman thinks it is redundant.

Is there any other inquiry mentioned?

No, there is no other inquiry mentioned in this part of the Act.

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move amendments Nos. 12, 13 and 14, which are consequential:—

In page 11 to delete Section 32 (3) and substitute the following:—

"(3) Every certificate under this section shall specify the following things, that is to say:—

(a) the date (which shall not be earlier than the date of publication thereof in pursuance of sub-section (1) of this section) on which such certificate is to come into force; and

(b) the area to which such certificate is to apply"

In page 12, before Section 35 (3), to insert a new sub-section as follows:—

"(3) Every order under this section shall be published in the Iris Oifigiúil and every such order shall specify the date (which shall not be earlier than the date of publication thereof in the Iris Oifigiúil) on which such order is to come into force.”

In page 13, before Section 39 (2), to insert a new sub-section as follows:—

"(2) Every manufacturer's price order shall be published in the Iris Oifigiúil.

Amendments put and agreed to.

I move amendment No. 15:—

In page 13, line 56, Section 39 (2), to delete the words "in addition to fixing a maximum price."

The sub-section after the deletion of these words will commence "Every manufacturer's price order shall specify the following things." It is purely a drafting amendment. The words are unnecessary in the sub-section.

Still they do not disturb what is down there. As far as Section 39 (1) is concerned the Minister may under certain conditions make an order referred to as a manufacturer's price order, and that order must fix, if it does anything, the maximum price of such commodity. What then is the objection to retaining the words "in addition to fixing a maximum price"?

I have no objection to them. This is put up as a drafting amendment, the words being considered unnecessary.

Unless there is some reason given for it I do not see why they should be deleted.

They are clearly unnecessary. Sub-section (1) provides that on receipt of a manufacturer's price report in relation to a protected commodity the Minister may, if he so thinks fit, make an order fixing as the maximum price for such commodity such price as he thinks proper. Sub-section (2) then goes on to state "every manufacturer's price order shall specify the following things, that is to say," The order must fix the maximum price, and consequently the words "in addition to fixing a maximum price" are not necessary.

Would you not want to insert the word "also" there?

It is not necessary. The manufacturer's price order must be an order fixing a maximum price.

Why not go on then and say that it shall specify certain things in addition to specifying a maximum price? Is there any danger in letting these words in?

Sub-section (2) provides that the order must specify these things, the date on which it comes into force, the duration of the order, and the area to which the order will apply.

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move amendment No. 16:—

In page 13, line 58, Section 39 (2), after the word "date" to insert in brackets the following words "(which shall not be earlier than the date of publication thereof in the Iris Oifigiúil.)”

This amendment is also consequential on those we have discussed already.

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move amendment No. 17:—

In page 14, line 55, Section 43, to delete all words after the word "order" to the end of line 18, page 15, and substitute the words—"or a price certificate has been entered into before the date on which such order or certificate comes into force and the whole or any part of such contract is to be performed after such date, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—

(a) nothing in Part III, Part IV, or Part VI of this Act shall affect such contract or any of the terms thereof;

(b) anything done under such contract shall, for the purposes of Part III, Part IV, or Part VI of this Act, but not further or otherwise, be deemed to have been done before such date.

(2) Where a tender to supply any commodity at certain prices during a certain period has been accepted before the date on which a price order or a price certificate relating to such commodity comes into force and the person making such tender is legally bound, subject to the terms of such tender, to supply such quantities of such commodity as may from time to time be ordered from him during the said period, every contract affected by an order for such commodity during the said period and after such date shall be deemed for the purposes of sub-section (1) of this section to have been entered into before such date.

(3) In this section—

the expression ‘price order' means any order made by the Minister under either Part III or Part VI of this Act, and

the expression ‘price certificate' means any certificate made by the Controller under Part IV of this Act."

This amendment gives effect to an undertaking which I gave on the Committee Stage to meet an amendment introduced, I think, by Deputy Good. The section as it stands relates only to Parts III and VI of the Bill and provides that these parts of the Act shall affect nothing done in pursuance of a contract. It is clear that that should apply also to Part VI which relates to the new prices certificate. It is intended to provide that where a contract is entered into that contract will not be upset by the issue of a prices certificate.

Will this section get over the difficulty raised by Deputy Davis a short time ago?

This only relates to a case where a trader has entered into a contract to supply goods at a particular price. The contract is not to be prejudiced by the issue of a price order or a prices certificate.

Every sale is a contract. If you only buy a box of cigarettes it is a contract. What the Minister evidently means is the acceptance of a tender for the supply of goods. The word "contract" would cover the sale of goods that are not intended to be covered here.

The proposed sub-section reads:—"Where a contract for sale of any commodity"——

You have strained the word "contract." Every sale of goods no matter how big or small is a contract. You mean a tender to supply goods for a certain period at a certain fixed price. There is liable to be confusion in the legal meaning of the word "contract."

It has a fairly definite meaning in these cases.

Amendment put and agreed to.
Question—"That the Bill be received for final consideration"—put and agreed to.

Is there any objection to taking the Final Stage now?

We might allow it to be taken later this evening. There are some Deputies who want to speak on it who are not here now.

I have no objection to allowing it stand over until to-morrow.

We can take it before the Relief Vote this evening.

Ordered accordingly.

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