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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 8 Jun 1934

Vol. 52 No. 20

In Committee on Finance. - Vote No. 3—Department of the President of the Executive Council—(Resumed).

Debate resumed on Motion:—
"That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration."—(Mr. Cosgrave).

When I moved the adjournment last night I had stated in reference to the economic war and what it arose out of that, at the time the Ultimate Financial Settlement was made and, subsequently, until its ratification by the Dáil, I was opposed to that settlement. Of course, the opposition or support of an individual does not alter the relative merits of any settlement. I was just putting my point of view at the time. The cry has been raised by the Government Party and, to some extent with success: "What right have we to pay a tribute of £5,000,000 to the British?" They might or might not have any right, but take the circumstances that confronted the Government of the day in making that settlement. They were, to an extent, dissolving partnership with the United Kingdom Government which had a combined national debt of £9,000,000,000. If we were to take our share of that in the ratio of 66 to 1, we would have to assume a liability of about £140,000,000. Now that has been brushed aside. Those of us who were brought up on the Sinn Féin doctrine remember the late Arthur Griffith's crock of gold, the Childers Commission Report, and all about the over taxation of the country. Had a united country put up that demand in 1926, I do not think there would be a public man in the country who would dare step aside from backing that demand and in all probability we would have had a better settlement than we did have. But we had not a united country. Nearly half the representatives of the people remained outside this House, while the Government that was inside with a little more than half the representation to support it negotiated a settlement. When that settlement was made it altered the situation. Up to a point it would be competent for an alternative Government here to repudiate that settlement, but that time passed early in July, 1927, and then the only way to get at the matter was by a revision and putting up a case.

It has been asked here why, at the last general election, Deputy Cosgrave could announce in Naas that if he were returned to power he would settle this economic war in three days. That has been asked here and iinuendoes have been thrown across here by the one man in the House least entitled to throw any innuendoes at anybody on any side of the House, Deputy Hugo Flinn. Other Deputies, including Deputy Davin—I am sorry he is not here now—asked was Deputy Cosgrave in negotiation with the British and, generally, Deputies have asked if Deputy Cosgrave would put his information at the disposal of this House. Apparently what is at the backs of the heads of the people opposite is that Deputy Cosgrave was treacherously in communication with the British on this matter and that he was prepared to do some kind of a deal, lowering the national flag, in order to get some temporary pecuniary advantage and use that temporary pecuniary advantage to get an advantage over his political opponents who now form the Government.

The Government know the situation in Europe as well as any Deputies on this side of the House. Take the situation in Europe from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles when Germany —of course we know she was compelled to do it—gave her signature to pay a war indemnity, called a reparation, of £6,500,000,000. Germany undertook to pay that. Later on there was the Dawes Plan when Germany kicked and said she was not able to pay, and it was agreed then that she should pay £3,000,000,000. In 1928 Germany kicked again and said she was not able to pay the £3,000,000,000 and the amount was reduced, I think, to £1,650,000,000. That agreement obtained until the conference at Lausanne in March, 1932. At that conference there was agreement between the countries there represented, and England was one of them, that they would forgive German reparations, that France and Italy would if England, forgave France and Italy what they borrowed from her and England, in turn, would forgive them if America forgave her. They all agreed on that principle and the underlying reason for it all was the decline in general wholesale prices throughout the world, or the apparent economic collapse of civilisation. In that condition of affairs these principles were accepted by European countries and, so far as we are concerned, the most important country to accept them was England. Was it not obvious, even apart from gestures made by British statesmen from 1932 up to January or February, 1933, when Deputy Cosgrave made that statement in Naas, that if we put up a case to Britain about the agreement we signed in 1926, when wholesale prices, particularly agricultural prices, were so many points above the average figure of 1932, we would be bound to get a readjustment? I observe that sinks home on the President.

It was very interesting to observe how it sank home with the Deputy's Party just a few days before the election.

The suggestion is that Deputy Cosgrave was in touch with the British. The President smiles and he says that this happened just before the election. What somersault did the President take just before the election?

Keep to your case.

How many thousand civil bills did the Land Commission issue to farmers throughout the country just before the election for annuities that the Land Commission itself could not legally collect? Were they not withdrawn and a promise given that if the President were returned the land annuities would be halved? It was just the very same plank in the platform as Deputy Cosgrave had offered. Why did not the President make that offer before he sent out the civil bills?

It was made months before.

That is a queer one for the President. Of course he had not the machinery at his disposal then that the fertile brains of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice introduced when they brought up "John Brown" from their native County of Mayo to implement the little piece of —well, I will not call it tyranny, but it is very near it—that the President was thinking of putting over. He promised to halve the land annuities. Now, was the President in touch with the British when he did that? Had he any guarantee from them that the land annuities would be remitted when he promised to halve them? Does he still adhere to the principle of arbitration through some nebulous formula of finding a chairman? Was he in touch with the British when he fixed 50 per cent. reduction? And if arbitration did take place, and if the award went against us where would the 50 per cent., amounting in £1,000,000 to £1,500,000, come from? Was it to be found by general taxation?

We asked Deputy Cosgrave that.

Had the President, and his Party, no more authority for making that statement than Deputy Cosgrave had for making his?

They had the money.

I should like to know where the money was and where it is. That statement was made by the President. Was it not risky for the head of the Government to reduce the land annuities by 50 per cent. under these circumstances? Or was it more or less a gesture to the British indicating that we would still settle if we got half the land annuities. If I were a British politician I would take it as a gesture that it meant that. Now the annuities were reduced nominally by half. Everybody, of course, will concede that the President had a perfect right to take up the stand he did as head of the Government; also that the people had a perfect right to take up the attitude they did and while the head of the Government had a mandate from the people he is perfectly right in going on as he is. That is the principle of representative Government, I take it. But the President, as spokesman of the Government, should not try to camouflage the position. I put these figures to the President:

In this economic war, which has been going on since 1st July, 1932—within a couple of weeks of two years—in the last financial year the British collected £4,500,000, but the Sinking Fund on the annuities for that period was not paid. So that that £4,500,000 represents, at least, as much as the British could claim if they did not claim for the Sinking Fund which was the whole payment the British made claim to. That represents a loss on the produce we exported to Britain of about £4,500,000 and that lowered the general level of prices for that period—it took £4,500,000 off the total. That level of prices ruled here in the home market for which I have no exact figures. Taking the last public census of production for the year 1929, and allowing for the claim made to increase tillage since, I find that as compared with 1929 the home and foreign markets for agricultural produce were about fifty-fifty. Now, owing to the drop in exports and the increased production, we are told that the home market must be absorbing considerably more than the export market, and it would be fair to assume that the loss in the general level of prices in the home market would be represented by an aggregate loss of £7,500,000. That brings the total agricultural loss through the economic war up to £12,000,000. When the last Land Bill was going through the House it was declared that the land annuities would be reduced 50 per cent. The original land purchase agreements gave the Land Commission power to collect 100 per cent. of the annuities. While the tenant purchaser paid 100 cent. of his annuities through the Land Commission he was under no obligation to anyone else for his annuities. The Bill last year reduced those original annuities by 50 per cent. Therefore, it reduced the annuitants' liability to 50 per cent. But the British are collecting £4,500,000 from these annuitants every day. Yet the President claims that he has helped the farmers by half the amount of the land annuities although he is sending out the sheriff to collect that half from the annuitants. I shall deal with that fact.

Already, we have lost £4,500,000, and on the home market we have lost £7,500,000, making a total of £12,000,000. Then the President says he will collect, and he has the sheriff on the move, and the John Browns on the move. And the Minister for Agriculture last night called the John Browns public-spirited citizens. Well, if those public-spirited citizens carry out their job £2,000,000 more will have to be paid by the people who have already lost £12,000,000 in the economic war. Then accepting the President's own figures for rates on agricultural land as £1,750,000 you get a total of £15,750,000.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted and 20 Deputies being present—

I am sorry that the fire is too hot for the Deputies on the benches opposite. I think in addition to that that the material is a bit too strong for their light brains. Between the losses and commitments of agriculture under the economic war régime, agriculture has to bear £15,750,000 in round figures. The original annuities were £4,000,000. I am acting on that figure. I am not taking any advantage of the legal position created by the Land Act of last year which reduced the original land annuities by 50 per cent. I would be within my rights in putting down that £4,000,000 as £2,000,000. That is the legal position and if the economic war was settled in the morning and we had a free market in Great Britain, without new legislation, the farmers would be liable for only £2,000,000. But I am not taking advantage of that. I am leaving it at the original figure of £4,000,000. On the figures given by the President we have: (1) the rates, £1,750,000. According to his figures we are paying bounties to the amount of £2,370,000. Of that bounty, it was admitted by the Minister for Agriculture, a sum of £700,000 is butter bounty and that £700,000 has been contributed directly by the co-operative creameries who are really farmers. Farmers own these creameries. That reduces the net bounty of £1,670,000. Adding to this the £4,000,000 and the £1,750,000 we get a sum of £7,420,000. Obviously, the difference between that and what the farmer is losing which I showed amounted to £15,750,000 gives you the figure of £8,330,000.

It is quite clear that that is a loss agriculture has to bear because of the economic war. I should like that the Attorney-General, who may be an expert lawyer, would get somebody who knows something about agricultural economics or any economics to advise him on this. Then he would not smile. The Government are still collecting in taxation these moneys. They have not altered the taxation. They have not reduced taxation to counterbalance these sums. They have not reduced taxation because of their refusal to pay to the British the R.I.C. pensions and the local loans, which together amount to about £2,000,000. The British are collecting these moneys in the form of special duties on Irish live stock and farm produce. In other words, the farmer is paying these. We hear a lot from the opposite benches, both inside and outside the House, about conspiracies not to pay rates——

A Deputy

Not to strike them.

Yes, not to strike them. But what about the Government that still imposes taxation to bring into the Exchequer the £2,000,000 to pay the local loans and the R.I.C. pensions just as their predecessors did? When their predecessors got that money they paid it to the British and the farmers were not asked to pay it a second time. The present Government is still levying the same taxation. It has not made one farthing reduction in the taxation because of their not having paid the British. That is the full circle. What happens? These very £2,000,000 that the Government say they will not pay to the British, together with the £3,000,000, are sums that the British are collecting. The President cannot deny that and nobody in this country can deny it. I question whether the President keeps a single bit of documentary evidence as to the amount of money the British are collecting from us. If he did he would not be making the terrible mistake he makes in estimating that the total of the British collection for the year ending 31st March last would be well below £4,000,000, while the British Chancellor of the Exchequer stated publicly that the money was well over £4,500,000.

It is suggested that we are helping the British; it is suggested that it is lowering the flag for us to say "Settle the economic war." The economic war is settling itself and settling the Irish people into the bargain. The British are collecting every penny they are claiming. I invite the President to stand up here and deny that statement if he can. We are taunted with surrendering to the British if we say "Settle the economic war." I throw back that taunt at the President and I ask him what have we to surrender? The British are getting all they want and if they said in the morning "We will stop this," the British would not get one penny more than they are getting now.

To whose advantage is it to settle the economic war? Not the President's surely, because the wild promises he made throughout the country would go into thin air and the country would know the President at his full value. If the President will not settle the economic war; if he will not settle this humbug, then let him take up the question and look at it from the position of a general in the field. Take a general in the field who has been either defending or attacking for two years. He had his army in dug-outs on the front and for two years his army was suffering, losing men and losing material. The war of attrition was telling on him but the enemy was going on with his ordinary avocations, as if nothing were on, losing no men and losing no material, just carrying on. Would it not be time in such a situation for that general to review the military position? I hold that it is up to the President either to settle the economic war or review the position and change his tactics. He is losing and the country is losing in the so-called war that is going on. Inevitably, there can only be one end to it. The longer the date of settlement is postponed the more difficult it will be for this country ever to recuperate again. Apart from the rights or wrongs of the economic war the President has failed. Assume that war is declared and forgetting who is responsible for it, let us all stand now behind the President. He is the General —the Field Marshal—and we are all solidly behind him and what is the position? Are we winning? Of course we are not. It all boils down to this fine point now, that either Mr. Neville Chamberlain's figures are right or wrong. If they are right we are losing and Britain is winning, and the time has come for us either to change our tactics or throw in the sponge. To those who had ever studied the relative economic position of those two countries the last thing they would think of would be to invite an economic struggle with Britain, for great as the disparity is between the two countries in a military sense it is nothing to the disparity that exists between then in an economic sense.

We had Hugo Flinn getting up here yesterday blowing that the longer this war goes on the better. The better for him and the few mushroom industrialists that have sprung up in this country through the protected handed-out State money that we have put up. We have pledged our credit and we are paying our taxes for the purpose of loaning money at a very low rate of interest to those industralists who had no experience of industry before: for loaning money to people who believe in their hearts that they will never be called upon to pay it back. In addition to that we have huge tariffs in order to secure them a market. Of course the longer the war goes on the better for them. They will have collared enough when the collapse comes—Hugo Flinn and the other Hugo Flinns.

Deputy Hugo Flinn. I beg your pardon. But Deputy Hugo Flinn and the other people with the queer names that were given here last week or the week before by Deputy Mulcahy, who have become our industrial magnates, can, when the collapse comes, disappear to nowhere from whence they came and we will be left to fry in our own fat in this country.

Will you give us the Irish of your own name?

All that I know about my name is that we did not come in the "good ships gallantly from the sunny lands of Spain." I do not care where the Beltons came from.

Matz, Lucks, Silverstein.

Anyhow, what is in a name? At any rate, I suppose that when the Beltons came here, in order to gain a foothold, they had to lick the Donnellys and we are continuing that in a friendly way. Now let the President address himself to this £8,000,000 of a loss. I will frankly admit my figures to be wrong when the President proves that. I have allowed for the bounties, for which provision to the extent of over £1,500,000 is being made. But the bounties will not go to agriculture any more. When the operation of the bounties was discussed last year the case was made that the farmer was not getting the bounties.

There is a special Vote for bounties, and I presume that the Deputy does not desire to forestall the discussion on bounties.

If permitted to do so I will go into as little detail as possible. I have used figures here to show a profit and loss account in a rough way. I think that I am taking up sufficient time without going into details.

Go ahead.

This is the first time that I have got an indication from the benches opposite that I was interesting to them. I am glad, at any rate, that they are realising they can be taught something, and more important still that they are prepared to learn.

It would be time for you to realise something.

The Deputy will realise something if he has any brains. I have seldom seen him display them for the benefit of the House. I admitted last year that when the bounties began to operate they would go down to the farmer but at the outset there was no question about it. They could not go down at once to the farmer and the shippers were making a good thing out of them. The case that was made here, and I accepted it as a sound case economically, was that when the dealers were getting these bounties there was competition between them. They went down to the fairs. The competition between them was keener to the extent of the amount of the bounties. The result was that the general level of prices was raised to the amount of the bounties. That situation could only obtain when there was competition for the goods that were being bought. Now there will not be competition, and therefore the bounties will not operate. They will not affect the price of fat cattle one iota, so that this sum of over £1,500,000, which is left in for bounties, will in the future be a gift to the shippers.

We will have no market for our fat cattle, which will be left on our hands. Fat cattle here average about 10,000 a month, or 120,000 a year. They will be left on our hands as surplus, and will either have to be shot and let rot, or thrown on the market to press down the level of prices from present values. We are starting this year facing an additional loss of £10 a head on 120,000 fat cattle, amounting to £1,200,000, but there is to be no change in the tactics of the war, which must go on, although our losses increase. The enemy, so to speak, is outflanking us every time, and we are left in the dug-outs shouting, "No surrender, boys." It is a humiliating position to be in. When he is replying, I am sure the President will point out, as he did before, what the Government is doing for agriculture, in order to mitigate the losses that have been sustained. He will say that they are providing a market worth £5,000,000 for farmers, if they would only grow wheat. In the coming year they are being offered £100,000 for doing so by way of bounties and subsidies. I stated yesterday that the increase in the price of wheat for the last 60 of 70 years was 18 per cent., while the increase in the price of store cattle was 340 per cent. I would be glad if these figures were reversed. It would be better for this country if the percentages were reversed. I quite agree that we want an economy that will put more land under the plough. The President asks farmers to change from an economy evolved in the last 60 or 70 years, following the price trend of agricultural produce, from the production of crops that give them the best profit. Our live stock has at great national expense been improved beyond recognition in recent years. The President wants to institute a system overnight, so to speak, that would endeavour to change that economy, wants to try to force the agricultural community to produce wheat, that had a price of only 18 per cent. above what it was in 1840, and to turn away from the production of store cattle that had a price 340 per cent. above what it was in 1840. That is asking agriculture to stand up to a terrible loss, a loss that is in no way compensated by a bounty of £100,000, even if farmers had not to put up most of the money in taxation.

The development of wheat growing here has nothing whatever to do with the economic war. If it has, then are we to assume that if the economic war was settled to-morrow wheat growing would be discontinued? The point I want to make is this, that whatever is given to subsidise wheat growing is given to meet the loss occasioned by the change in agricultural economy that the President and his Cabinet want to make. The bounty is given as compensation for the loss in changing from the old system to the new, but it in no way compensates for the loss that agriculture has suffered directly in the economic war. The same applies to beet growing. Beet growing in this country is costing £1,000,000 a year. To be more correct, the production of our requirements in sugar will cost £1,000,000 more than if we bought sugar delivered at the docks in Dublin. Neither of these subsidies is any compensation for our direct losses in the economic war. If the President wants to trouble about statistics he will find that there is not a terrible difference in the area under tillage compared with years ago. The newest doctrine, that we can develop that end, and not mind our cattle trade, is a product of the economic war, because the market for our cattle that we had built up in Britain has been taken from us. Of course, we are told that that market is gone. I have refuted with figures all the lying propaganda used to confuse the public, to take the mind of the people off the main issue. The market in Britain is there for us always. We have only to produce for it and to fight for our place in the sun against competitors. The cattle population of this country is about 4,000,000. There are about 1,000,000 calves born every year. Our requirements in finished cattle, as meat for the home market, are about 250,000 head, so that we have a surplus of 750,000 cattle. What are we to do with them?

The Deputy dealt with that yesterday and again to-day.

I will pass from that. Who is to bear the loss if the war must go on? The Government, while it has a mandate, is perfectly entitled to carry on the war on these lines, but, while the war is continuing and becoming a terrible burden on this country, why not distribute the burden? If the President refutes that statement, has he not been asked to set up a tribunal consisting of anybody he likes, to hear the case as to whether the whole burden of this economic war has not to be borne by the agricultural community; and to investigate principally the claim that Britain has got her whole demand; that the farmers have had to pay the annuities to Britain, that the farmer has paid his original annuities——

The Deputy must not repeat that. I have heard it twice already.

What I said last I was repeating in a way, but in the setting in which I was putting it I submit I was not repeating it. I said that the case was put up to the President to set up a tribunal to investigate a certain matter and these were the points in that case. I am quite certain that I have not mentioned before that the President was requested to set up a tribunal. These were the points that were submitted to be investigated if that tribunal were set up and the reply of the President to that was characteristic. Substantially it was this: "Whether the British are collecting the annuities or not, I must get these annuities." That is over the President's own signature, that whether the British collected them or not he must get them. Finally, the President went to the country. He promised the country that if he were returned to power the annuities would not have to be paid any more. What is the position now? The poor unfortunate dupe of a farmer who supported him has to pay him £1,500,000 and to pay £2,000,000 to John Bull as well.

If the Deputy cannot advance fresh arguments he will have to resume his seat. He must cease repeating himself.

Just in winding up, I am putting the case that the Government put to the country.

And won.

By deception, yes. I want to expose that deception. I shall not transgress the ruling of the Chair. I am satisfied that the Chair tries to be fair to everybody, but just in summing up I was going to cover certain items. The Ceann Comhairle might, perhaps, think that I was setting his ruling aside, so I will not go into that summing up. I have dealt with it in another way, and I shall certainly give the Party opposite credit for sufficient intelligence to be able to sum up on their own account.

Arising out of a statement made here last night by Deputy Belton, I should like just to detain the House for a moment or two. I recognise that I have already spoken in this debate.

If the Deputy has already spoken, he cannot intervene now unless by way of personal explanation.

It is, and anyhow the House is in Committee.

The Chair has the selection of Deputies to speak when two or more offer, and naturally calls on a Deputy who has not already intervened. I shall hear the Deputy briefly.

Deputy Belton last night wove a halo around his own head, as he usually does in the course of his speech, and he said that he was the first person in the Free State to raise the question of the retention of the land annuities. That is not so.

On a point of personal explanation, I said nothing of the kind.

We shall get the Official Report later if you like. If you did not state that, it certainly would be an exception to your attitude on most things. He quoted from a circular that he got out at that particular time.

Admitted.

At any rate, Deputy Belton was not the first man to raise the question. On another occasion I made the assertion here that Deputy Cosgrave was primarily responsible, as head of the Local Government Department at one time in the Dáil, for the question of the retention of the land annuities being raised. I quoted from the Official Record of that Dáil in proof of the assertion I made. I was challenged at the time by Deputy Cosgrave to quote where the report of the Commission on Local Government which recommended the retention of the land annuities had ever been adopted by the Dáil. I have gone to considerable trouble on the question and as I was challenged by Deputy Cosgrave I have looked up all the references since and I want to have this on record, that it was the Local Government Department that in June, 1920, without one dissentient voice, raised the question of the retention at home of the land annuities. On the 19th June, 1920, the Commission was set up. The reference is here in the Official Record of the Dáil, page 185.

On a point of order, all that we have been discussing about the land annuities arose out of the Treaty position and the events subsequent to it. I submit that it is not relevant to refer to matters before the Treaty, because the whole case for the retention of the land annuities is based on the Treaty and on the 1920 Act.

Unfortunately this debate has gone back to 1847.

And also, unfortunately, the whole story as given from the book in front of Deputy Donnelly will completely refute him.

That is not a point of order.

On the 19th June, according to the Official Records, a Commission was set up. I need not read the terms of reference. Most Deputies, who were members of the Dáil at that time, will remember them. On the 6th August, 1920, an Interim Report was presented. That report was submitted, according to page 205 of the Official Records of 6th August, 1920. That Interim Report was prepared by the Secretary for Local Government, Deputy Cosgrave. On page 205 of the records I see that the report "was put and agreed to." I was challenged by the Deputy on another occasion to quote when that was done.

The report was put and agreed to, but what excisions had been made in the report put and agreed to?

That is the Interim Report. On 17th September, 1920, the Final Report was introduced by Deputy Cosgrave. Clause 5 of that Final Report—and this is what Deputy Cosgrave challenged me to quote—says:

"That the deficit in the accounts of local bodies, after making allowance for the economies set out above, be met by diverting land annuities and income tax from the British Government to the Dáil Exchequer."

That is page 49 of the Official Report of 17th September, 1920. Deputy Cosgrave challenged me to point to one solitary page where this was accepted. On the 17th August, 1921, Deputy Cosgrave also addressed the Dáil. He gave a review of the activities of his Department as reported on page 34 of the report of the proceedings of the Dáil on the 13th August, 1921. Here is what Deputy Cosgrave himself said:

"The Dáil's Commission's recommendations were adopted in the September session of the Dáil."

These are the words out of his own mouth. I have been told by him that I was corrected time and again on this matter and I was challenged to produce one reference to show where the Dáil had accepted the Commission's report. There is the proof, there is the reference from the official minutes of the Dáil.

The Dáil accepted the report with certain excisions from it and the Minister for Agriculture himself made a subsequent statement in the House that he had never agreed to the suggestion that the Land Commission annuities should be withheld.

I am giving the official record and that is my reply to Deputy Cosgrave's challenge. If the Deputy has any other authority he can produce it.

There are all kinds of gaps in the quotations made.

A Chinn Chomhairle, badh mhaith liom focal no dho a rádh ar an Mheastachán so ar son mhuinntir na Gaeltachta. Tá adhbhar casaoide agus éagchaointe againn san Ghaeltacht nach bhfuil an Rialtas so ag déanamh an méid a gheall siad dúinn. Níl gnaithe damh, ar ndóigh, a chur i gcuimhne don Dáil caidé is brigh don Ghaeltacht. Níl aon dream eile san tír a d'fhulaing oiread ar son náisiúntachta na tíre le muinntir na Gaeltachta. Fríd pian agus annró agus géar-leanamhaint agus cruaidh-smacht Gall chonghbhuigh siad beo dúinne teanga an Ghaedhil, an seód is luachmhaire atá againn indiu. Thug siad dúinne fosda tréithe béasaí agus cultúr ár sinnsir a thaisc siad go cúramch ó ghlúin go glún ó aimsir Mhílidh anall.

Agus caidé tá Rialtas dúthchais na tíre ag déanamh do na daoine seo? Chonnaic mórán agaibh an scannán sin "Man of Aran" agus ón phioctúr sin tá baramhail no tuairim agaibh goidé'n masla agus sclábhuidheacht atá ar mhuinntir na Gaeltachta le greim a mbéil a shaothrughadh. Chonnaic sibh nach bhfuil siad fallsa no leisgeamhail; chonnaic sibh a gcrodhacht, a gcneastacht agus a gcráibhtheacht cruthuighthe go soiléir. Anois ní in Arainn amháin atá na Gaedheala so acht ar chósda an Iarthair ó Cheann Mhálainn go Ceann tSáile. Agus amach ón bheagán atá an Roinn Oideachais ag déanamh don aos óg níltear ag déanamh pioc do na Gaedhil seo.

Na déantúis bhaile, bréidín, bróidnoireacht, cniotáil agus gréasobair, tá siad bun os cionn ag an chogadh mí-fhortúnach seo atá eadar sinn fhéin agus Seán Buidhe. Níl luach ar an bhó no ar an ghamhain no ar an chaora san Ghaeltacht ná ar scadán ná bradán ná gliomach. Tá aithne agam ar fheirmeoirí beaga a bhí a sáith den tsaoghal aca tá seal o shoin agus anois tá siad ag iarraidh na déirce. Tá an Bórd Sláinteamhail i dTír Chonaill ag tabhairt £2,000 sa mhí do na bochta agus tá an tsuim sin ag éirighe ó mhí go mí. Ar ndóigh, ní maith an comhartha é sin. Má gheibh fear na Gaeltachta obair míosa ón Rialtas ar na bealaigh mhóra goidé is brigh sin do fhéin agus a mhuirighin ar feadh na bliadhna.

B'fhearr leis go mór dá bhfuigheadh sé margadh dá dhéantúisí baile agus do thoradh a ghabháltais bhig. Is aisteach nach bhfuil fuath ar bith ag an Ghael don tSasanach gidh gurb iomdha éagcóir a rinne sé air san am a chuaidh thart. Duine críostamhail, cráibhtheach, Gael na Gaeltachta. Is léir leis nach bhfuil Sasanach an lae indiu mar an tSasanach a tháinig le Crombhell. Tá fáilte roimhe nuair a thig sé ar cuairt no ag iascaireacht no ag seilg. Tá sean-tairngireacht againn go gcaoinfidh an Gael ar uaigh an Ghaill. Badh chóir go machtnochadh an tUachtarán ar an tairngireacht sin. Saoileann Gael an Iarthair nach bhfuil adhbhar ceart leis an chogadh economiciúil seo atá anois ag scrios na tíre. Saoileann sé gur amaideach an mhaise don úachtarán bheith ag spairn le Seán Buidhe ar an sean-nós simplidhe sin: "Leig un an bhodaigh mé acht na léig an bodach 'mo chóir."

Saoilim féin gur so troid gan chéill mar dubhairt an Cáirdinéal Mac Ruaidrigh tá seal ó shoin, agus badh chóir é shocrughadh sul a mbéidh an tír scriosta ar fad. Guidhim an tUachtarán ar son mhuinntir na Gaeltachta an socrughadh sin a thabhairt' un cinn.

I have listened to this debate, and I consider that it is a pity that the island about which the President spoke some time ago has not materialised and that we were not all put on to it, because I believe that the country expects more from us, and I think it should be our duty to concentrate on things as they are to-day and as they will be to-morrow, and forget the past. Every conceivable subject has been dragged into this debate— 1916, 1920, 1922, and so on. I cannot, for the life of me, see what good that will do at the present time. It is the President's intention, to quote his own words, to so order the economic life of this country that no outside power can take any action against us. I take that to mean that he intends to cut off all our export trade. Is that wise? Is that a good policy? I say definitely that it is not, and I also say that the steps which have been taken by the Government to provide, so to speak, something for the agricultural community, in beet and wheat, will not prove the blessing which the President thinks they ought to prove.

Neither this Government nor any Government will be able to provide a substitute for our live stock industry. There has been a great deal of talk here about mandates. If there is one mandate which, in my opinion, the Government have got, it is a mandate for the settlement of this economic dispute with Great Britain. If it is not in the Fianna Fáil manifesto, it certainly was spoken of from every Fianna Fáil platform in the country. From every Fianna Fáil platform the statement was: "If you only support us once again we will settle the economic dispute in three weeks." That statement was made from every Fianna Fáil platform up and down the country.

Where was it made?

It was made every where—in my constituency at any rate —publicly and privately. According to Deputy Smith, I presume that he has no intention at all to bring about a solution of this unfortunate dispute, and I take it that the Government has no intention whatsoever to do so either. I stood up on a platform before I ever became a member of this House, and I said that I believed the Government were justified in reopening the financial settlements under the Treaty.

Hear, hear.

I say that still; but I do not believe that the attitude adopted by the Government to bring about a solution of that problem was the right attitude. As far as I am personally concerned, I think we should ask ourselves whether or not the farming community in this country is able to stand up to the sacrifices which they have been asked to make. That is the question which everybody should ask themselves. I say, definitely, they are not. We have cattle seizures and cattle sales taking place every day. The President asked some time ago who is to prove the inability of an individual farmer to meet his obligations? I would answer him by saying that a man's oath ought to be believed. I do not know that you can get any better justification for a man's statement as to his position than his oath. I know that very recently a man's cattle were seized and sold although he had signed an affidavit setting forth his position. I ask is that fair? I definitely say that it is not fair. Of course, the President sometimes thinks that these farmers have been living on the fat of the land, looking at the grass growing, and so on. This country is well known for its green fields and its fertile soil.

We produce the best live stock in the world, and there is scarcely an Irish man in any part of the world who was not very proud of the latest achievement of a horse that was bred in this country. God, in His wisdom, blessed this country in that way. We have not the same minerals as other countries have, but we have green fields and a fertile soil. In so far as I can see, Government policy is a direct negation of what nature bestowed on this country. We may have 60,000 acres of beet and 500,000 acres of wheat, but what shall we do with the rest of the land, considering that we have about 12,000,000 arable acres and that this country will not, for many a day, have a population large enough to consume our agricultural produce?

The English saw to that.

We are always taunted here with that, and it is a pity it would not be dropped. When we stand up to a case in all fairness before the Executive Council, somebody, like Deputy Donnelly, stands up to say that we are playing England's game.

I did not understand the Deputy to suggest or imply that.

It has often been said, and I think that it is about time it was stopped. I, for one, own a duty to the people I represent. That duty is to put the position, as I know it, before this House and before the Government. I should be lacking in my duty to my constituents if I did not do that. It is time that this talk of playing England's game was cut out. What is the position of the individual farmer? I am glad that the President is here, because it is very seldom that he adorns this House with his presence when any vote connected with agriculture is under discussion. He generally leaves these matters to the Minister for Agriculture. I ask the President what are the farmers' assets at the moment? They are his live stock—his cattle and so on. These are his principal assets. What is the loss on them? What would they realise to-day in comparison with what they would have realised before the economic war? I should say that the farmer is, roughly speaking, at a loss of 50 per cent. Yet, he is expected to meet all his obligations. There are obligations on the farming community other than rates and taxes. I want to tell the President that the total amount of rates payable by the farming community in my constituency in 1914-15 was £54,000. In 1932-33, the amount was £85,000 and, in 1933-34, £143,000. So far as I can see, the amount will be greater during the current year, notwithstanding that a Commissioner has been installed.

What is the good of telling the farmer that the remission of half his land annuities compensates him for all these charges, and that he should be in a position to meet his obligations? Farmers have never, with few exceptions, developed into millionaires. With few exceptions farmers have never become very wealthy. They work hard for a living, and the loss which they sustain from time to time is more than the ordinary man can understand. I candidly admit that I am very concerned about the whole situation. I cannot see any prospect or any hope— I wish I could—for the farming community here. Wheat and beet will not settle the problem. As Deputy Davin said last night, the first charge on the lands should be the support of the farmer and his family. I echo that. The President will answer by asking "Who is to prove it?" I mentioned before that the courts would be the best place, and that a man's oath ought to be taken. In respect of income tax the citizen does not pay unless he has an income. That income will certainly be able to provide even in a meagre way for the requirements of himself and his family. The State does not step in and take from that man all his income. In the case of the farmer, they are stepping in and taking everything from him. It is about time that the whole situation was reviewed.

There has been a lot of talk about republics, the settlement of the economic war and so on. One wonders if there will be, even now, a realisation of the position in which the farming community is placed. If this war, so called, is to be carried on, there is no justification for placing the whole burden on the shoulders of the farming community. I know that the President has said that other sections of the community have come to the rescue of the farmers. That is not so. Is there any justification for saying that the bounties can reach the farmer? Bounties or no bounties, there is £4 5s. loss on every two-year-old beast in this country, even with the chance of sale. It was stated yesterday, and not denied, that licences had been sold in the cattle market in Dublin yesterday.

By Englishmen.

I say that that is a damn shame. Shippers who have licences at present have, so to speak, double the quantity of cattle they require to select from, and what you and I would do, if we were in the same position, is to get the cattle at the cheapest possible price. That is what they are doing and all I can say is that the whole situation which has been created with regard to these licences amounts to wholesale robbery of the farming community.

On a point of order, what has the issue of licences to do with the President's Vote?

Very well; I will cut it out.

The result of the economic war.

Is the President and his policy not responsible?

So far as I can, I never transgress the rules of debate——

You are trying to kill time on instructions. That is what you are doing.

And on this Vote or any other Vote I try to keep as much in order as I can. This question, however, has been referred to by other speakers and I think I was justified in referring to it in so far as it affects the whole problem.

That is a lovely smile.

The smiling beauties!

A favourite phrase of the President, or a phrase I have heard him use on more than one occasion, is that the Opposition was trying to drive the Government on the rocks, and he mentioned a conspiracy against the payment of rates and annuities. I should like to tell the President that he is at the helm and if the ship of State goes on the rocks he will have nobody to blame but himself, and it is not because he has not been told that there are rocks ahead. We have told him that many a time and I repeat it now. It has been said that he got a mandate for the continuation of this economic war and that he got a mandate for the retention of the land annuities. I have no doubt but that the Kaiser, the German Emperor, went into the war with the idea that he was going to walk through the world but he found, after a certain time, what he was up against. Did he carry on and allow his forces to be annihilated? He certainly did not. He reviewed the situation and like a wise general he saw that he had to cave in. Would not that be a fair lesson for the Executive Council to take? Could they not review the situation in the light of things as they are?

How are they?

Everything seems to be right with you and the people you represent, but I cannot take that view. I have never taken it and I will not take it in the future. I have pointed out the position as I see it, and I am sure I am justified in any argument I put up on behalf of the agricultural community of this country. One would hope that cognisance would be taken by the Government of the speeches which have been made from the Opposition Benches. During my time here I have heard the most conciliatory speeches that could be made by the Opposition and I think I heard, on one occasion, Deputy Dr. O'Higgins say that if they made a bargain, even if it was a bad bargain, they would stand behind the Government. What are you smiling at?

At you and your innocence.

You say that we are out to obstruct the Government in every way. We are out for nothing of the kind. We are putting forward the position as we know it. We know what all this is about and we know that it is the President's reference to a Republic which is standing in the way of a settlement of this dispute. One wonders where we are in connection with all this problem. I read a speech by the Minister for Education not so long ago, at a place called Rathmore, between Killarney and Mallow, in which he said it was all nonsense for people to be talking about a Republic for 32 counties. I commend the Minister for his candour. Of course it is, and you know it. That is the whole stumbling block in this situation. It is, however, high politics, and I do not want to get into them.

I think the Deputy must be aware that the Minister for Education contradicted that statement the day after it was published.

So far as that is concerned, all I can say is that I did not see the contradiction, but I certainly read the speech.

What about "Truth in the News?" They would not tell a lie, I am sure.

I do not wish to delay the House in connection with this problem.

Hear, hear.

What is the "hear, hear" for? Have I not as good a right to talk here as anybody else? I have not delayed the House on any occasion on which I stood up to address it. The least the Deputy should learn is a little manners. If he has not got them, it is time he got them. This sneering which has been carried on from the Deputies opposite is not a credit to themselves, to the country, or to the Party they represent. I have never unduly delayed the debate in this House. I put up my point of view as I am entitled to put it up, and it ill becomes Deputy Smith, or any other Deputy, to sneer and to talk as if we were here to do nothing but say "Hear, hear" to everything done by the Government. I am here representing the people, and I have as good a right to talk here as anybody else. I will talk, and nothing that anybody can say on either side will prevent me doing my duty to the people I represent. I think it is about time we cultivated a little more courtesy on both sides of the House, and developed a better understanding of the duties we have been called on to perform. We are here in this House, elected by the people of the country, and the standard of debate and the standard of conduct should be the ideal which every person in the country would follow. What do we find here? The most vulgar remarks and the most vulgar statements that can be slung across, and particularly from the Government Benches, at members who stand up here to put their views before the country.

Such as "foreigner,""Spaniard,""Jew,""Gentile," and all that.

Let us get back to the debate.

I never descended to those depths and I never will. I have not done so since I came into the House——

Lecture your own front bench then.

What about your front bench?

Deputy Curran is entitled to speak without interruption. Practically all the interruption is becoming intolerable, and in some instances it is continuous, irrelevant and senseless.

I have no command over the statements of members on either side. I speak here as an individual, and I put my case, so far as I know it, and so far as I can put it, intelligently before the House and before the people. I should like, before I sit down, to refer to one branch of our industry which is ignored and forgotten in this House, that is, the horse-breeding industry. I suppose it is because no Deputy is specially interested in putting up a case for it. What is the position? I said a while ago that every Irishman the world over was proud of the feat of one of our horses very recently. His sire had to be removed from this country owing to the economic dispute with Britain. I see the Attorney-General is shaking his head. I know that people engaged in bloodstock-breeding and in ordinary hunter-breeding through the country are very seriously affected by the present situation. I have been connected more or less with horses all my life. Taking a horse at the moment which is worth £100—an ordinary hunter, and it must be a nice one for that now— when there is £40 of that collected by the British it makes things very bad for the individual who sold him. The horse-breeding and hunter-breeding industry of this country was a great benefit to the farming community. I have known farmers who would not be in their homes to-day but for the horses which they bred and which they sold. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, I just want to make one appeal to the Government, and that is to explore every avenue to bring about a solution of this economic dispute with Britain before things have gone too far.

With your permission, Sir, I should like to ask Deputy Curran one question, and I should like him to answer it——

I will if I can.

Mr. Kelly

——because the tone of his speech has been very reasonable, I think we will all agree. Will you say if the President's position in connection with this economic dispute is not the right one, when he has always maintained that he is willing to have this dispute referred to a tribunal with an impartial chairman? Do you say that that action of his is not justified in connection with the Irish case at present? Will you give your own opinion? Never mind what the others may say. Is the President's attitude the right one, having regard to Ireland's interests, or is it not?

I suppose I am not in order. I think it is hardly fair to the House to have Deputy Tom Kelly and myself turn around and have a little chat.

We cannot continue the debate on the basis of question and answer from one Deputy to the other.

I am game every time.

Mr. Kelly

You should have answered it.

This debate on the President's Estimate is possibly the most important debate that we carry on in this House. The President is nominally—and I hope more than nominally—responsible for all the activities of the other Ministers, and I presume that it would be permissible on this debate to review the activities of the various Ministers and the policy of the various Ministers. I do not propose to go into that operation to-day, but I should like on this Vote to discuss matters generally. The President is primarily responsible for, I should say, the diplomatic, economic and administrative policy of his Executive. In regard to the diplomatic policy, we on this side of the House must express our disapproval. Without entering into the merits or demerits of the particular dispute from the consequences of which we are all suffering, one would like to say that it would have been advisable, in originally approaching a delicate matter such as this, that one should have remembered—at least the President ought to have remembered—that he is not always the stoutest fighter who rushes into a fight, when his objective might have been achieved by other methods. We have always maintained that, had other methods been pursued, the solution of this particular difficulty would long ago have been reached, and the people would not have suffered the consequences which they have suffered through the breakdown of the settlement of that dispute.

There has been a great deal of reference to the agricultural question and the activities of the Minister for Agriculture during this debate. I do not propose to enter largely into that, except to say it is beyond dispute that practically every branch and every item of the agriculturists' industry are at their lowest ebb. There was an attempt made to prove that one particular item of the industry—dairying —was in a good position. I think that attempt lamentably failed. I should like, for only a passing moment, to refer to agriculture. Deputy Belton, in his negotiations with the President and in his speech here, referred to the fact that the price of calves had dropped anything from £2 to £2 10s. per head, and that other expenses of the dairying industry, such as the replacement of cows, meant a loss of £4 or £5 to the individual farmer. I do not want to make any further reference to agriculture generally in this debate, but I should like to back up that statement. It is definitely true, and anyone connected with the dairying industry must know it is true. Agriculture has certainly suffered, and if agriculture comprises the chief wealth of this country every other industry is suffering with agriculture.

The position at the moment in this State of ours under the Fianna Fáil Government is that 80 per cent. of the people, and possibly more than 80 per cent, are existing on a dole, a bounty or a subsidy of some kind. The working people of this State are existing on a direct dole. It has been necessary to sustain the unemployed by a direct monetary dole. The farmers are subsidised in every existing branch of their industry. The commercial people and the manufacturers are subsidised. In fact it would be difficult to find a section of the community in this country at present which is not either on a dole or a subsidy. The economic position in this State was never at a lower ebb. The Government has failed completely in its economic policy. This breakdown has mainly come about, as I said a moment ago, by their failure to act in an intelligent manner as regards a particular dispute. I said it might be permissible to go over the various Ministerial activities, but I wish to refer to only one of them, and that is the Ministry of Justice. The administration of justice in this country has been anything but impartial.

Is it permissible, on an Estimate like this, to take each one of the Ministries——

I do not intend to make more than a passing reference.

Has the Estimate for the Department of Justice not been taken recently?

So has that for the Department of Agriculture. It is a well-known fact that different measures of justice have been extended to various sections of the community. While I do not intend to develop that particular matter at any great length, I think I am bound on a Vote such as this to make some passing reference to it. Those people belonging to the organisation represented on this side of the House have been subjected to every possible coercion that the law or the ingenuity of the Executive could devise. We would not have objected to that if the particular measures taken were within the law; but the law even has been violated to try and coerce the people on our side.

I said that the agricultural industry was beggared. That is plain to anybody who knows the position. We know that the working classes, owing to the failure of agriculture, are in a very bad state. The recent introduction of a certain measure giving monetary relief to the unfortunate unemployed is in itself a justification of that statement. Were it not for subsidies and doles the commercial section of the community would also, possibly, be in just as bad a position. Agricultural income and capital have been depleted. The farmers have been forced to deplete their capital, in part by Great Britain by the forced collection of a disputed debt, and for the rest by the Executive Council, under threat of seizure if they did not hand over what they had left. I am not afraid to admit that I advanced the argument that the Executive had no legal right to rob the farmers of the money extracted from them in payment of annuities. The Government have made that legal by Act of Parliament. They had no moral right to take that money which had been previously collected; but morality, apparently, is outside the scope of what the Government consider good politics. You have broken the back of those engaged in agriculture, and the back of labour, and you are breaking the back of the industrial community. But you have done a greater injury to the people of this State—you have robbed the people of their pride. Reduced to poverty by your actions, they are supplicants for alms and there the great danger lies. Once you start a man or a nation on the hobo track, it is difficult to get back on the path of real endeavour.

This is a policy in which we are asked to co-operate—this destruction of a people's economy. We are taunted with denying co-operation and with resisting the will of the people. I should like to ask the Executive: Who are you that set yourselves up as apostles of co-operation? Have you, by speech or action, ever done anything to make co-operation possible? Have you ever exhibited any desire to co-operate with us when you were in opposition? Was there any expressed willingness to help us to fulfil the expressed desires of the people when we were a Government? Was there even a liberal tolerance in speech or act? Did you refrain from hindering when you felt you could not help? Was there even a recognised submission to the thrice-expressed desires of the electorate? Your attitude, whether in opposition or as Government, has always been to coerce. You tried to coerce certain sections of the people when you were in opposition; you continued to coerce them when you became a Government. But the bully who constantly terrorises is often the first to yelp when he is hit back.

The President possibly imagines himself a political giant and thinks that those who oppose him are pigmies and should be removed. His actions recently have substantiated that. He was too big to submit when he was in opposition; he considers himself strong enough now to subdue. Granted that we are pigmies and that the President is the giant, may one venture to remind the President that, though it may be excellent to have a giant's strength, it is tyrannous to use a giant's strength; that tyranny, particularly tyranny which reduces people to poverty, begets unrest; that from unrest springs opposition and often revolution; and that even giants can fall like humpty-dumpty?

We on this side of the House hold that the Government have failed completely, both in diplomacy and in administration. They have practically ruined the principal industry of the country. They have reduced our exports both in quantity and value. If there is a continuance of this policy it looks as if this country will be placed in commercial quarantine. Perhaps that was the original intention of the Ministry. One remembers the suggestion of a mural enclosure. It certainly was not the expressed, and I hope it is not the desired, wish of the electorate. Perhaps, it is idle to advance the proposal that, even at this hour, the President should come off his high perch and do what any reasonable section of the community would expect that he would do—retrace his steps and set about negotiating on the problem that has brought us all our difficulties, in a reasonable manner, in a manner in which any real diplomat would set about it, at a peaceful conference around a table as somebody suggested yesterday, with all his cards on the table and with all the cards of Britain on the other side of the table, if you like, and hammer out this question as it ought to be hammered. If he does that, even though there was a want of co-operation on the present Government side, a lack of assistance when we were in many a difficulty, we will still co-operate with the President.

The President rose.

Is the President rising to conclude the debate?

Mr. Kelly

Do you want to keep it going?

There are other Deputies who want to speak.

This debate has now lasted——

Is the President raising a point of order?

I am going to speak.

The President is not concluding?

I am going to speak at this stage, if the Chair permits me.

I, for one, desire to speak.

Will the President now conclude the debate?

Why did not Deputy Mulcahy speak to-day?

There were other Deputies speaking all day.

I am long enough in this House to recognise certain tactics.

Is the President concluding? Am I to understand that if the President speaks now, I will be permitted to speak after him?

Two Deputies besides Deputy Dockrell got up to speak at the same time as the President got up.

Mr. Kelly

You had all day yesterday.

I have not called on the President to conclude. I am calling on the President to interlard his remarks.

Not to conclude?

I have not called upon him to conclude.

I am long enough in this House now to recognise certain tactics. This debate has lasted for portion of Wednesday, yesterday and all through to-day, and it is quite obviously the intention of the Opposition to continue it into next week or prevent me, as they have done on many previous occasions, from getting a reasonable time to answer the points that have been made in the various speeches. On a Vote of this kind it is usual to concentrate on one or two of the main issues. It would be clearly impossible if, on this Vote, every single matter which could be raised on the Estimates of all the Departments were to be raised, and had to be replied to. I am going to confine myself in my reply to what I regard as the main points raised, and I think these were fairly raised by the two speakers who led the debate from the Opposition side, Deputies Cosgrave and MacDermot. As I can see it, Deputy Cosgrave raised the whole question of what is called the economic war, the dispute with Britain, the economic and financial dispute with Britain, and Deputy MacDermot went even more fundamentally into the whole question of Government policy when he spoke of our political objective and our political policy. I think it would be better if I began with the second.

We have heard a good deal about statesmanship. It is a very common contrast to say that such and such is politics and is not statesmanship. I think it might not be any harm for us to ask ourselves here what true statesmanship should aim at, either in regard to out own internal affairs of regard to our relations with other countries and other peoples. In our case it is particularly difficult to separate the two, because internal polities dealing with the welfare of our people as a whole has been so interwoven with the question of our relations with a neighbouring people that fundamental in the minds of everybody who had the interests of our people at heart was the question of the relationship between ourselves and the British. I have not written this; I am not composing an essay, but I would take it that in broad terms the statesmanship that should commend itself to any thinking person in this country would be that which would aim at the highest living for as many individuals as possible within the nation. Their material welfare and comfort would naturally play a very large part in that, but not the largest of all, and, consequently, I would put it, as I have put it, that the true aim of statesmanship in this country or in any other country should be to secure for as many of the citizens as possible the highest standard of living, not material merely, but spiritual as well.

Looking at statesmanship from that point of view, we can understand all the efforts that have been made in Irish history to secure the freedom of our people, because anybody who studies the matter at all deeply will realise that it is only in freedom, through the freedom of the nation, that it is possible for statesmanship to effect its aims in regard to the people. Freedom, complete and absolute freedom to manage their own affairs, to order their own lives, to determine the laws under which they live and freedom to decide in all the circumstances of the case what their relationship with other peoples should be—that is essential if the aim that I have set out as being the true aim of statesmanship should have any possibility whatever of being secured. Our people then, right through the centuries, have striven to secure complete freedom as being fundamental in the question of statesmanship. I have said that it is impossible in our case to distinguish the internal from the external aim, because that aim of statesmanship, that effort of statesmen throughout the centuries has been interfered with by an outside power. The British came to this country, secured their power in it, not with the will of our people, but as invaders. Our people will never be satisfied— that is clear—so long as this foreign power strives to hold here, where it has no right, dominion in any form over our people. If we look round amongst, say, the Parties in this House, we can judge very easily of their aims, or statesmanlike point of view, and the hopes that these aims will lead in the direction I have indicated. We have, first of all, occupying certain benches here, those whose dreams for the welfare of their people amount to this: that we should be almost indistinguishable from the British by being governed in the one Parliament, at the head of the Empire, to uphold which they say, and as Deputy MacDermot has said, the blood of so many Irishmen has been shed. They have no desire to be distinguished, in any particular way, from the British.

Who are they?

If the Deputy will wait he will see easily enough. They have no desire to appear in any way different from the British. They say they are Irishmen, as good Irishmen as we are; and they hold that it is in their regard for the welfare of the individual citizens of this country that they hold that view. They held that view against the obvious majority of the people for many years. They held the view that the connection which they desired with Britain was naturally maintained by the presence here of an army of occupation and the coercion of the vast majority of our people, and they did, as they said, as Irishmen, believing that that was in the best interests of the people of this country. We had an exhibition of what that meant a short time ago, when the Oath was being removed in this House and when, in a manner which seemed inconceivable to me, with obvious emotion, Deputy Thrift opposed the removal of that Oath. How anybody could think that an oath imposed from outside, submitted to unwillingly, could have any effect upon the welfare of our people, is something that passes my comprehension. But there it was and there it is. They have accepted the Treaty position now, though they have abandoned that Oath sadly, and with emotion, as was shown by Deputy Thrift. They claim that their ideals were held by them, honestly, for the welfare of the people of this country, notwithstanding the fact that all history should have proved to them that they were wrong; that it was a hopeless attempt of theirs to secure the happiness or contentment of our people in that connection. But they stubbornly held to it; and it was necessary for the people of this country, time after time, against terrible odds and with terrible sacrifices, to demonstrate to them that that aim could never be realised in the direction in which they hoped for it.

What was the obvious test that should be applied? The obvious test was to see that the people of this country would be the judges, freely for themselves, as to what their political relations with Great Britain would be. And if they did apply that, and took any note of the resistance they would have long ago abandoned that attitude—that is, if they were ultimately anxious for the welfare of our people, and were approaching it from the point of view of statesmanship, or the point of view in which they would help, and not from the selfish or class point of view.

I pass now from that section which has admittedly, in this part of Ireland, given up that foolish dream of theirs to that section who would have a Sacs-Shasana or make a new Britain in Ireland. Now we pass to another section—a section that represents a larger part of our population without doubt. I would call them Dominion Home Rulers. They existed in the past; they exist in the present. The effect of their policy is not, I am quite willing to grant, the same to-day as it would have been 20 years ago or even ten years ago. They are a considerable portion of our people. If you analyse those who to-day are preaching a policy of what is called Dominion Home Rule, as the political aim of this country, you find them of two classes. There are those, like Deputy MacDermot, who frankly, and apparently with conviction take that view as representing the ideal political status for our people and for our country. There is another section that without the slightest doubt have been driven into that camp slowly as a result of the Treaty position. It does not represent what they freely would have aimed at, or set forth, as the ideal of our people at all. That that is so, you can see from the speeches delivered constantly on the platforms of their Party. The section that accepts Dominion, status, even for the whole of Ireland, does not represent, in my opinion, either the traditional aims, or the present aims of the majority of our people. Deputy MacDermot, I have no doubt whatever, thinks it does. He suggests that constantly, and, not being above politics, he would like to have the test put at the time that would be particularly suitable to himself and his Party and those who have that particular idea. He is very anxious, for instance, that it should be put at a time when the threat that was issued at the time of the Treaty is still ringing in the ears of a large number of our people and has never, in fact, been withdrawn; and that it should be put at a time when we are suffering from the first effects of an attack upon our economic life. He is a good politician and he would desire, naturally, that the test should be put at a time which would give him the best hope of proving that those sharing his view are a majority. Now, I do not want to suggest—if he truly believes that along the line which he has indicated is to be the greatest happiness for our people—that he is not justified in trying to get that line adopted. But I would suggest to him, if he is wise, that if there is any hope of happiness lying along that line he should wait and have the test put under conditions under which it would be realised that the test was a fair one and that there would not be some impetus given to those who oppose it, too violently or even too vigorously to oppose it in its application and development.

I come now to the third class in this country who are called Republicans. They may have different ideas as to the social structure of a Republic or some differences as to the methods by which it should be striven for, but they can be put in the third class at any rate, as those who are not satisfied either to be in a position in which they can scarcely be distinguished from the British or in a position in which their situation would be that of, say, Canada or Australia, even if the full position, status and conditions that obtain in regard to Canada, Australia or New Zealand were to obtain here and that they were conferred on the whole island. That third class, I am suggesting, may be called generally Republicans, because under the flag of the Republic you have people who have not bothered very much about the particular forms of government that should obtain under a completely free system; nor have you people who have bothered very much about the social structure of the State when complete freedom is achieved. The main idea behind that is to keep all such united on the ideal of complete freedom. By complete freedom I mean that the people of this country should be permitted freely to choose their own form of government and that in the question of determining their relations with other States they should not be compelled by threats from outside to enter into relationships which they do not think are in their interests, but that they should have the same freedom for determining these relationships as, say, France, Spain, Italy, Germany or any other country might have in determining whether they would enter into treaty relations or negotiations with other States.

I hold, and I do believe that no reasonable man can fail to agree, that it is along the latter line that you are going to have true happiness and prosperity which it should be the aim of statesmanship to secure for the people. I am satisfied with that because if it should prove to the advantage of our people to have association of a certain kind with other people, they would be better able to determine that from a position of freedom, than they will from a position in which they are going to be compelled. In the one case they would be free agents. I suggest also that no other nation will want any association with us except that other nation also considers that that association is to its benefit. Therefore, I hold that those in Ireland in the past who strove to secure the complete freedom of this country were true statesmen, statesmen from the highest point of view, and that we, who are striving in the same manner to secure the complete freedom of our country and keep that as our aim, are showing, not that we are politicians but that we are statesmen, if there is any meaning at all in the word. What is it that prevents us all in this country from uniting upon that basis?

May I put it to the President that we are all united? We are all united in the desire for complete freedom for the country and the only issue between us is as to the best way to use that freedom.

Unfortunately, we are not all united on that. I was pointing a few moments ago to Deputy Thrift and his colleagues, who do not happen to be in the House at the moment, but they do not want complete freedom for this nation. They did not want it in the past. I am not misrepresenting their aims in saying that they want to have as close connection as possible with Britain, and that that is their idea of the way in which the happiness, prosperity and greatness of our nation lie. We are not all united. Neither are we united if we eliminate and forget about those. Unfortunately, we are not. I have not the slightest doubt that Deputy MacDermot, notwithstanding his professions about a desire for complete independence, has been so mesmerised, if you like, by the idea that we could not exist independently of Britain, that he can only think of an association of one form or another with Britain as the ideal for this people. I do not think that we are united on that.

What I say is that if we can get unity then a beginning will be made, and then we can test whether the direction in which we are at present leading the country is a right direction or a wrong direction. I should like to think that we all felt like that, that we would be prepared even to face the economic disadvantages that might arise from complete freedom. There are economic disadvantages from which the people of Holland suffer; there are economic disadvantages from which the people of Denmark suffer; from which the people of Belgium suffer, and from which the people of Switzerland suffer, in not being united to bigger economic units. But is there any Party in any one of these countries who would go to their people and, if they were true national statesmen, say that they should give up the freedom that they and their forefathers had struggled for in the past— the right to govern themselves in their own way—in order to be swallowed up in some larger economic unit for the material advantages that that association might afford? And if we were to unite in this country on the prime fundamental issue there would be little difficulty, in my opinion, in regard to other issues. Of course, there would be difficulties and differences with regard to manner, method, time and the rest of it.

Leaving that for the moment, let me come to the other question: What is our present position? Do we agree upon that? Have we agreement as regards the facts of the present situation? Whatever difficulty there may be as regards agreeing upon a name, and the direction that has to be followed, the consequences of which we have to foretell and not see, there ought surely to be no difficulty whatever on coming to agreement as to the facts of the present position, which are clear before our eyes. The Deputies on the opposite benches, some of them, say we are free at the moment. It is quite clear that Deputy MacDermot, if he was not completely forgetful, thinks it does not matter to a nation, to its future happiness, or its present status, that a large portion of it should be cut off, or that a foreign power should maintain on part of the territory, which is admittedly its territory, their troops. There is a nice bit of quibbling on the part of Deputy MacDermot when he says that the independence or the freedom of this part of Ireland is no more affected by the presence of British maintenance parties in Cobh, Berehaven, Lough Swilly, or anywhere else—that there is no more difference in that in regard to our status—than is the independence of Spain affected by the occupation of Gibraltar. He is, surely, not serious in saying that the cases are parallel. But I might go a little bit farther: A Spaniard might very well say and feel that the occupation of Gibraltar did affect in a material way the liberty of Spain. He would certainly, I think, as a Spaniard, looking at the situation, feel very much happier if that portion of the country, which was formerly Spain, was occupied by Spain instead of being occupied by Britain. But, at any rate, it is not regarded as Spanish territory to-day, but Cobh is regarded as Irish, and so is Berehaven, and it is all nonsense for us here to pretend that we could ever be neutral. I am not talking now about the question of theoretical neutrality. I am talking of the point of practical neutrality: that we could be neutral in a war in which Britain was engaged when British Forces were clearly in occupation of our harbours, and when there was a Treaty provision which said that in time of war or strained relations, Britain was to be afforded such harbour and other facilities as they might require for the defence, as they would put it, of the coasts of this country.

Document No. 2.

Document No. 2 has nothing to do with it. Of course, Deputy Mulcahy does not like at all to have the situation examined. It hurts, and yet we are the people who will not face facts. If we are to see the situation properly, and know where we stand, we must examine the facts and not close our eyes to them. If the alternative is to be that of Deputy MacDermot: to acknowledge ourselves slaves, and not to have the courage to go and effect our emancipation, I say it is still worse to try to hide yourself from that position, if it is the position, and to pretend to yourself, in order to avoid the necessity for making the effort, that you are not slaves, when it is obvious to everybody that you are.

Let us face the situation. I am using Deputy MacDermot's words. If he has used them in one connection I have the right to use them in the other. If, then, we are going to see where we stand we must examine these things properly. We are supposed to have Dominion status. Where is the British Dominion that has its ports occupied by British maintenance parties? Are the ports of Canada occupied? Are the ports of Australia occupied? Are the ports of South Africa occupied? Of course, they are not, and if Canada or Australia or South Africa wants to-morrow to be effective in its neutrality and to say: not merely will we not actively engage in a British war on our territory— whatever there may be from a purely theoretical point of view in the point that when the King is at war we are all at war—but a foreign nation anyhow will see that British troops are not in our ports. As a rule, when there is a war on a nation that is fighting does not want to add to its enemies, and unless South Africa or Australia or Canada were, by some active steps, to engage in a war its neutrality, I believe, would be respected by other Powers. I will admit that if there was some exceptionally good reason there would be an excuse in that theoretical doctrine that when the King is at war all the States of the British Empire and the States of the British Commonwealth similarly would be at war, but in our case the occupation of our ports does deny us one of the fundamental rights that a free nation should have, and that is the right to keep out of a war if it did not want to be in that war and if it did not feel that its interests were affected.

We have not got, then, the essence of Dominion status as it is called. We have not got that in reality here in the Twenty-Six Counties so long as our ports are held by British troops. To talk of the freedom of Ireland, when the Six Counties are occupied, as they are at present, indistinguishable from the point of view of politics from Britain, is almost as nonsensical as to talk of this part of Ireland being really free. You might as well talk of the freedom of the prow of a vessel, the stern of which is anchored to the shore. While it is capable of certain movement, it is not capable of getting freely out to sea. By these two facts, the partition of our country, and the occupation of our ports by British troops, we have not got here what any Irishman in the past ever called freedom or, in the present, could honestly call freedom. If we are going to have true statesmanship, we have got to secure the fundamentals which will enable our people to live the fullest life; we have got to try to work for that freedom in the best manner that appears open to us.

Deputy MacDermot is able to do all sorts of things. He can interpret the minds of the British Government for us; he can interpret the minds of the British nation. He is able to assure us that if we take the steps to secure as much of that freedom as we think at the moment is within our grasp, there would be no action taken by Britain with regard to it. Of course he tells us there would not be military action. That is quite possible. But we would rather have even that much from the mouths of Mr. Thomas and Mr. MacDonald and from British statesmen than from the all-knowing mind of Deputy MacDermot.

We asked for an assurance in this matter. We asked it in circumstances which made it reasonable that we should ask for it, because the suggestion by Mr. Thomas was: "Oh, you want to have it both ways." He said, in other words, what Deputy MacDermot said, that we were not prepared to face the consequences of being a separate nation or, as he put it, "a foreign nation." I say we are. I say that the majority of the people are. I said that we would put it to the test. The moment these threats are removed it can be put to the test. I have no doubt whatever that the moment it is tested, the only consequences the Irish people need apprehend from their action would be that they would become to Britain as Denmark, Holland, Russia or some other country would be to them; that then the majority of our people would be prepared to face the position that Switzerland has to face, that Holland has to face, that Denmark has to face, that all small nations of the world beside bigger political units have had to face. At the start, of course, we would have to suffer a considerable shock. British policy has strained and turned us away from the natural equilibrium here. Our whole economic policy has been strained, and like elastic when strained, if it is cut it will recoil. When we were children we tried that many times. If you are suddenly turned from a position in which there is equilibrium, and if there is an economic strain, there is certain to be a sharp recoil. Those responsible for the welfare of our country have to bear that in mind. I think the majority of our people bear it in mind. They may not analyse it as Deputy MacDermot, perhaps, would analyse it, but they have that shrewd judgment, instinct, if you like, which explains all that to them. Naturally, in a case of that kind, they like to get a little time to reorganise, in order that the recoil would not be as sharp or as severe as it would be otherwise. Deputy MacDermot was taunting us, that the courageous thing was to cut our loss and take the economic and other consequences. He is particularly brave in that, but he wants a line of action in which such consequences would not occur.

He reminded me of a scaffold in front of a large building. We all know the pulley and the bucket that is used for lifting up cement. I can imagine a few of those regular fellows there, having hoisted one of their companions a pretty good distance with the rope, sneering at him when he was at the top, saying: "If you object to the position, why can you not loose yourself, by cutting the rope?" That is what Deputy MacDermot wants to see done. I say commonsense would suggest to anybody with the interests of this country at heart, that we should get a little nearer to a state of equilibrium before the final cutting would take place. One of the things this Government is trying to do by its general economic policy is to get the country into a position of strength for the time when the final cutting will take place, as I am sure it ultimately will. I do not believe in attempting to prophesy. It is a vain thing. The world is changing and events change. It is a foolish person who really believes in his own prophecy to the extent that he regards it as certain. But I am willing to prophesy that that cutting, whatever may be the relationship entered into afterwards, will take place. It is becoming easier as time goes on, because there is, in the first place, realisation on the part of the British, who are forcing certain connections upon us, that these forced connections are not ultimately to their benefit. There is also, as far as this country is concerned, and the world generally, a consolidation of opinion, which gives greater hope of ultimate unity than has been possible in the past, so that the ultimate cutting, to my mind, will take place. Under the policy the Government is developing, a policy of self-sufficiency, a policy to make us less dependent than we were on the British market, when the time comes for the ultimate snapping of these connections, it will have less reaction on events here, and our nation will suffer far less than it would otherwise suffer.

Deputy Curran was speaking a short time ago about our green fields. He stated that we have in our rich land our share of the world's wealth; that that is our compensation for being denied some of the rich mineral resources that other countries have. I was sorry the Deputy was interrupted at a certain point, because I was hoping the sequence of his idea would lead him to ask what these green fields were for. Were they not intended to maintain a population? Were they meant simply for bullocks and herds, or were they meant to maintain the natural population which this country should have? Were they meant for those markets which we heard spoken of from the opposite benches, desirable markets which we had built up? I remember a colleague once saying to the British: "You did not buy our butter from us because of our beautiful blue eyes."

The British gave us these markets because they got from us goods of a certain class which they wanted and which we were able to supply better than any country in the world. Though they may resist that tendency for a time, they will not be able to resist it permanently and just as in the past they desired certain things from us because they were the best that could be supplied—when I say "the best" I mean both in quality and in price and better than could be supplied by other countries—so in future, if there are goods which we have to offer, which would be, taking all things into account, better value than they could get elsewhere, you may be perfectly certain they will come and take them.

But it was not we who built up these markets. I do not think those who speak about our building up these markets would like to suggest that the Irish people consciously got rid of half their population in 80 or 90 years in order to secure these markets. We heard about the relative price of wheat and store cattle as if there were some wonderful unexplainable thing about it, some mystery that economists could hardly hope, even with much burning of midnight oil, to understand. As far as we are concerned in any case, the prices for wheat were determined by the fact that there was a world market for wheat here and that the prairie areas, the undeveloped areas in Canada and elsewhere, were permitted to supply this market in competition with us. The world price of wheat went down and the price of store cattle, we were told, went up. It went up because our market was the most convenient source from which the British could obtain their supplies, whether of fat cattle or store cattle. They wanted to take their people off the land and put them into the workshops, knowing that in the factory and in the workshop they were going to get a better reward for their labour than they would if they were to remain on the land. They were only anxious that in the farmers of this country they should have a source of supply and we supplied them. We supplied them with fat cattle but they had certain agriculturists too, and they thought to themselves that they would do better by giving us the less profitable part of the trade, that they would have the quick turnover and the quick profits which were involved in the finishing of the store cattle which they got from us.

We worked in with the general British economic policy. It suited them and we suffered from that because they had the industries and we were left as the agricultural backwoods, if I might so put it. We are suffering and have suffered, as some of the Western States of America are suffering.

A few days ago I was speaking to a former member of the Government in Western Australia. He was complaining of the neglect of the interests of that part of Australia by the towns and the industrial centres in the East. We were the agricultural hinterland from which they got their supplies and they got them practically at their own price. It was a price better than the price we might have got elsewhere, with world competition I admit, but we had a special place in that market on account of our position. It was so much better that our people went into that industry but finally we had to go into it, in competition with other places like the Argentine and so on, with the result we are not to-day what we were half a century or three-quarters of a century ago.

To-day our supplies are in competition with the chilled and frozen meat of countries thousands of miles away. You have the position in the British market to-day, as everybody who studies the position will have to admit, that the British agriculturists, on account of the change in taste, the ability to buy, and the general competition of foreign countries, are complaining almost as loudly as a section of our farmers here are complaining, some of them more so. What are we to do? We have been taunted with saying that that market is gone. I say that we have got to face the economic facts if we are to bring about any remedy. We have to face the fact that the market that we enjoyed in the past, economic war or no economic war, will never be there for us again.

Where did it go to?

To Argentina and to the other countries that are supplying Britain with meat as a substitute for the meat that we supplied, and also to the British farmer himself, because the British have realised that the economy which served them so well through the greater part of the nineteenth century, which might be described as one mainly of manufacture—getting in raw materials, getting in food and putting their people to manufacture—that that policy can no longer hold and is no longer the best for them, because that policy depended on their getting a sufficiently large market for their manufactured goods. As the markets for manufactured goods are closing to the British, they begin to realise that they cannot now, as they did before, profitably employ practically all their people in manufacturing industries. They see the wealth of their land and they say: "If we cannot get foreign markets for the products of the industry of our industrial population we cannot increase that industrial population. There is no use in producing goods that cannot be sold. We shall have to turn these hands to the production of things which can be sold, namely, the products of our farming industry." These can be sold, because they have the power of protecting their markets. From a policy of almost complete dependence on manufacturing industries, the British are going on to a more balanced economy such as they have in France and elsewhere.

When we are asked how can the country subsist without this cattle industry, I admit that it will be hard, that it will be very hard, and that the change is going to affect us. I believe, however, that in the long run, as I said before, if that market which we had, under the economy of the nineteenth century, with free trade and all the rest of it, were to obtain, what was in store for our people was a still further diminution of our population, and that our population of 4,250,000 would have diminished to, perhaps, 2,000,000 in the same period, or even in a shorter period, than that in which the population diminished from 8,250,000 to 4,250,000. Thinking of the community and the nation as a whole, I am satisfied that it will work out, ultimately, for the best interests of this nation, that the change of economy, which we would have been in favour of, is going to come about.

No case has been made in this debate against the economic policy of the Government, but against the economic war that the Government is pursuing.

I shall come to the economic war in due time. I started out, in this speech, to try whether we could not get down to some fundamental things in which we can stand together; to see whether there were things in which we could agree in order that the differences that exist between us may appear in their perspective— that minor matters should not be exaggerated and that we could come down to the discussion of things that are big and that really matter. First of all, I spoke of the political policy of this country. I said that the Government here stands for the policy of complete freedom, and that that policy, in my opinion, is the right policy, not merely from a sentimental point of view at all, but that it is the right policy from the point of view of the development of our country and the happiness of our people. I asserted that if that were put to a test we would have the same results here to-day as we got in 1918 when a majority of, I think, about three to one of the representatives of the people were elected in favour of complete independence for the country as a whole.

I then went on to speak about the general economics of this country in our relations with Great Britain, and I pointed out that the economy of the past, which led to those green fields, of which we also are proud, was an economy which meant, ultimately, the destruction of our nation as a nation, because it meant the destruction of our population. I suggested that these markets were not markets for which we deliberately sought in that way; that if we had our independence here during that period—and I have not the slightest doubt about it—we would have protected our industries; we would have maintained whatever industries existed and developed others; we would have kept a fair balance in agriculture as between tillage and cattle production; and that, when we had secured a stable economic condition here, we would have been very happy to export whatever surplus of cattle we might have. What happened, however, was that, as the raising and feeding of cattle did not require the same population in the country, the people who had capital were able to buy the land, and you had the population of the country driven out by these people in order to secure larger areas of land. That policy was one of the chief incentives to those clearances of the land which took place in the middle of the nineteenth century. It was this so-called attractive and profitable cattle market that brought about those clearances. I said that that policy led to the destruction of our people, and I said that that was a thing that no native Government would have permitted. I asserted also that, in my opinion, the change over to the new policy—whether you regard it as a voluntary or an involuntary change over—is going to work out to the ultimate benefit of this nation. I believe also that that has been the faith of everybody who thought on Irish economic matters up to, at least, the end of the nineteenth century.

Once we have got some sort of an understanding about these things, there may be some hope for co-operation. Deputy MacDermot says that he wants complete freedom. Very well; if that is so, we agree. I, certainly, do not want anything for the Irish people except this—that they should be free to determine for themselves, without any outside pressure, such pressure as would not be exerted, say, upon Belgium, France, Switzerland, or some other country, their own form of government or their own governmental institutions. That would be the first thing that I would require. The second would be that, as regards their relations with other countries— particularly with our nearest neighbour—these relations should be determined on a basis of equality; in other words, that questions of trade compacts, defence compacts, or any other kind of relationship, should not be determined on the basis that Britain could say to us: "You must take this whether you like it or not, because it is in our interests," just as they will say to us: "We want to occupy Cobh and to have our maintenance parties in Lough Swilly or Berehaven." Our answer to that is, that that is not the sort of relationship or the basis for agreement on which there ever can be permanent satisfaction or permanent understanding between our peoples. That is one of the reasons that I am against all these treaties or compacts or any agreements of that kind, which would appear to bind our people to something which is against the national sentiment and the national feeling. That is the primary objection to these things.

One of the reasons that I opposed the Treaty was because I was sure that as soon as it was signed, our people—or at least large sections of our people—would resist it, and that ultimately we would come to the position in which we find ourselves now, that when we wanted to assert our rights we would be faced with a signed contract, and that the British would be able to say to us: "You signed this—you gave your word for this— and we will hold you to your bond." I believe that all contracts of that nature are harmful to the country, and I believe also that they are harmful to the best relations between Ireland and Great Britain. Many things have been said about us from the Opposition Benches. I have worked with members of the opposite benches, and I do not believe that any one of them can say truthfully that at any time I have not striven for the best possible relationship between the two countries. I believe that it is to our interests to be on good terms with our neighbours, and I believe it is to our neighbour's interests to be on good terms with us. It is commonsense, and it ought not to require any special commendation. I have said that these good relations are possible and easily attainable on one basis, and on the only basis on which these things ever can give any hope of permanency, because if you have settlements purporting to settle things that they do not settle, it is obvious that you are only in a stable position for a period.

There is nobody on the opposite benches—not even Deputy MacDermot —who is more dissatisfied than I am with a step-by-step policy. Deputy MacDermot objected to my statement of our policy a short time ago, when I said that we were heirs to a certain position. I do not believe that there was one person in the country who did not understand that. This whole position was not of our creating. Our whole attitude was in opposition to it, because exactly of this want of permanence, of this fertile provision of irritation between the two countries. I wanted—and those who stood with me wanted—to try to get to something that would have permanency in it and that would lead to satisfaction and to closer co-operation, if necessary, between the two countries, because I am not blind to the fact— and I do not think any other person can be blind to it—that there are common interests between the two countries. For instance, take this question of the trade between the two countries. I have referred to it many a time on the public platform. I admit that there are things which the British need from us which we can supply, and that there are things which we need from the British, and which we will continue to need—for some time at least—that the British can supply. We are prepared to say to the British at any time: "Very well, we shall give you a fair preference in the things we have got to get from outside, if you, similarly, give us a preference in the things of which we have to dispose." That is the sort of bargain between countries that can last. It is based on equity and on common interest. We have never said to the British at any time that we are not quite prepared to sit down and consider matters of that sort. We have, in fact, frequently and very positively indicated that we are. The British said: "No; we shall not sit down on that basis. You must accept your contractual obligations, the obligations that have been contracted in the name of your people, as the basis of any further understandings." These treaties and documents, called contractual obligations, are standing in the way of any proper settlement. They are put up every time. We know that these cannot be kept by our people. We say quite definitely that our people will not keep them, because they were forced upon our people with threats and our people never submitted to them.

Of course, there are people who will say: "Every war is settled by a treaty in the acceptance of which there is a certain amount of force involved." So much the worse for the world. That is what has happened in the past. What has resulted from it? A treaty became only a truce. The treaties that have lasted have been those based on common or mutual advantage. The peace of the whole world is threatened to-day. By what? By a treaty dictated as the result of a successful war. The peace of Europe was threatened for about half a century before that by a similar dictated treaty. There is no use in telling us that that is what is done. If what is done lod, in the past, to wars and the misery of peoples, why should that be held up to us as something that we must, of necessity, accept, as something that is good to accept? Surely, we ought to do our utmost and to make big sacrifices to avoid entering into commitments which we know our people cannot keep, when it is not in the nature of things that they should be kept. We tried to prevent such a treaty and compact being made. When I say that we are heirs to this position, Deputy MacDermot ought to have no difficulty in understanding what I mean. The majority of our people did not support us in that. They were led to believe that, through this Treaty, they were going to get freedom, to achieve freedom. We say: "All right. We have done our best to get the majority of the people to take another road. They have refused to take it. We represent a certain section of our people. We believe that, ultimately, we shall get a majority to go back along these lines with us. We want to get to that position as quickly as possible." If we have to get to any place, we must take stock of the position in which we find ourselves and of the forces at our command. We are quite frank with the British in this matter. We say: "We have no enmity towards you. We have no desire to injure you in any way. We are simply out to secure our own rights. We believe that, in securing these rights, we will be acting not only in our own best interests but in your best interests and not unjustly towards you."

On a subject like this, which covers the whole field of national, political and economic policy, a considerable time would be required to develop the arguments. One could talk about this subject for a long time. I do not pretend that I have, by any means, exhausted it. I have, however, indicated to those who are opposing us what our general aim and general philosophy on this whole matter is. We are heirs to a certain position and we are developing from the position in which we find ourselves along the direction that is open to us. One would imagine by the taunts which have been used that this was merely a matter for getting out and saying what fine fellows we are and damning the consequences. No person of any responsibility will look upon it in that light. We have got to secure our aims with due advertence to the possibilities of successfully making each step.

Deputy MacDermot said that the position could be explored in its full content in a few minutes. There was the Oath question. I do not know whether it was in Deputy MacDermot's maiden speech that he opposed the First Reading of that Bill but it was in one of his early speeches that he did so, no doubt in what he considered the best interests of our people. But surely any man of commonsense, living in this country, must have known that the abolition of a test like that was going to remove one of the gravest causes of internal trouble.

It has. It has not completely eliminated it, if that is what the Deputy means. But it has given to every thinking person who is a republican, and who wants not merely the joy of declaring a republic but the establishment solidly of a republic, an opportunity of seeing how that can be done without, first of all, having to fight his own people. That is what it does. It gives every person in this country who believes in the right of the people to rule themselves, to work out and determine their political affairs here—it gives every such person an opportunity of coming in here without sacrificing any principles whatever. He is asked to do nothing but accord to people elected here the same status as himself or herself—that, as representing the people here, they can take decisions on national policy and work them out. That is quite a different position, as regards democratic right and as regards the possibility of making an advance, from the position we would have been in if there were barriers at the door to stop anybody from entering here unless he first of all appeared to forswear his republican principles. That was a very serious barrier. It was a barrier which gave excuse, at any rate, to people who wanted to indulge in violent opposition. I remember how different was the preaching from these benches of certain members of the Opposition when they were over here from the preaching that we have heard recently from them. When they sat here, as I have said on a previous occasion, the power of Government was almost absolute, There were no qualifications. It was a sheer, rank heresy for anybody to suggest that the majority could possibly do wrong or that the representatives of the majority could possibly do wrong. When the same Deputies change from this side of the House to the opposite side, we hear them, with far less excuse, repeating the same arguments in order to justify the position which they would wish to take up and to justify opposition, and even forceful opposition, to the elected Government.

There are people who know perfectly well that there are limitations, and it is because of the fact that there are exceptions and limitations in that way that it is so important for us to try to get political agreement upon some rules of action. I have at all times striven to get political agreement in this country on the basis of acceptance of some things as indefeasible, as things that should not be given away, no matter how they might be purported to be given away—some sections of a treaty which our successors might not respect, but which would be difficult for them to reject if they wished to do so; at any rate not put them into a position in which they could not morally reject treaties that were imposed by force and which meant the subversion of the independence of the country. I do not think that even in international law as it is accepted at the present time a treaty would be held to be valid which meant the complete subjection of an independent nation. It is not, at any rate, done. There is a certain respect for that sovereignty or individuality of a nation but in our case there was this definite attempt completely to destroy our independence. We wanted a sort of political agreement on the basis that there were things upon which we should agree: (1) that the independence of this country no matter who purported to give it away, should be preserved, and that any change affecting that independence, no matter how practical it seemed at the moment, would not be supposed by those who were a party to it to be binding upon those who came after them and who wished to assert the independence of the country; (2) that all lawful authority in this country was from the people under God; (3) that the only way in which we could get a practical working out was that there should be acceptance of the principle that the majority of the people ultimately and in each particular case, in the ordinary way, should determine from day to day the national policy. We wanted this in order to get political stability here and the first step towards that, obviously, was the removal of the Oath. Yet Deputy MacDermot opposed it and he opposed it in the name of a contract that had been made, he said. Perhaps I am wrong, but that was the impression he made upon me. I do not know on what other grounds he would oppose it.

I dislike very much interrupting the President but, in my special case, I opposed the removal of the Oath on a different ground from that. I said that I was scarcely able to interest myself in the question of whether it was in accordance with the terms of the Treaty or not, but I opposed it on the general ground that we should either go out of the Commonwealth altogether or be content to remain in it on the same basis as the other members of it.

The Deputy has reminded me of the exact terms, and I think that that is so. In fact, I accept that it is so. It was the "bad manners" speech, I remember. It was international bad manners—that was how the Deputy put it—and we should do it in quite a different way. Surely it must have been evident to the Deputy or anybody else that if we had the right to remove it, it was in the national interest that it should be done, in that it cut at the very basis of democratic representation and democratic rule, and, therefore, that it was very much a vital matter in the interests of our people that it should be done away with? I simply wanted to point out that, working on these fundamental lines, it is obvious that treaties rashly entered into are about the biggest stumbling block that can be put in our way and that agreements which we believe cannot be kept and that are entered into from the point of view of the expediency of the moment, without any regard to the ultimate consequences, are most unwise and are not statesmanlike.

If I say that of the Treaty, what have we got to say of this document, on the head of which we are supposed to pay over the annuities? This is the precious document. I brought it as an exhibit here. I will show it to you, and if you have a smile left, you will smile when you see it. Here is the document which is the basis of the British claim and which is so formal in its character that it could not be brought for ratification before Parliament. This is the document whose terms are hidden away since the 12th February or whatever was the date on which it was signed in 1923. We never got hold of it until we heard of it as the fundamental document to which Mr. Thomas referred in his dispatch of 9th April, 1932. This is the document which is the thing that is standing in the way; this is the contractual obligation which is standing in the way and preventing us from being able to sit down with the British. We are prepared to do it, but they will not do it unless we accept this document as binding. What happened was this: This document was entered into and it was hidden away, and our predecessors before they left office feed counsel, gave terms of reference to them, and presented them with documents to tell the Irish people their case with respect to the land annuities. Did they get that document? No, that document was never given to them. There is a reference to the Ultimate Financial Settlement which was the second document and here is what the lawyers who studied that case said of it:

"Clauses 1 and 2

which are the clauses on which Mr. Thomas relies

of the Ultimate Financial Settlement have no relation to nor are they any authority for such payment."

They did get the second, which Mr. Thomas calls the confirming document, and our predecessors gave these to counsel to be examined, and this is their judgment upon it as a contractual obligation:

"Clauses 1 and 2 of the heads of the Ultimate Financial Settlement have no relation to nor are they any authority for such payment."

Then this is the authority—this which should be entered into with great care! Did you ever see such a thing of patches and shreds? Look at it! Pages blank! Not even a line drawn through them! It is not even signed by the two signatories! It is dated 12th February, 1923, and this is the document which is the basis of the economic war!

Put it in the museum.

Undoubtedly, it will ultimately go to the museum. We have one paragraph here; then two paragraphs and then another paragraph, followed by a bit here and then another piece of a paragraph. Did any lawyer, or did anybody who drew up even a small agreement, ever see a document drawn up like this? This is the only copy we have got, and it was hidden away and nobody cared a thráneen or bothered about it from 12th February, 1923, when it was signed, until 9th or 10th April, 1932, or whatever was the date on which we got Mr. Thomas' dispatch. At that time, I put officials working in the archives to dig out this document which committed us to payment of the land annuities.

I move the adjournment.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again on Tuesday, 12th June, 1934.
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