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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 27 Nov 1936

Vol. 64 No. 8

Adjournment of the Dáil. - Relations with Spanish Government.

The motion before the House is:—

That the Dáil at its rising this day do adjourn to Wednesday, February 3rd, 1937.

I move:—

To delete the words and figures "February 3, 1937" and to insert the words and figures "December 2nd, 1936".

I do so in order to ask the House to express the view that the Government should take the necessary steps leading to the recognition by us of the Government of General Franco in Spain. Recognising fully that the matter is delicate, we are taking this action now because, in the circumstances in which the Opposition finds itself placed by the continued silence of the Government, no other course is open to us. We have waited for months, daily hoping to hear the President in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs take the House, or at least the leaders of the political Parties in the House, into his confidence. From the abundance of facts which must officially be in his possession, we expected an explanation from him, if not publicity, then privately, on the position in Spain to-day so far as that position affects the fundamental principles upon which we here are all agreed.

Unfortunately, the President has adhered to his deliberate plan of keeping the leaders of political Parties in opposition to him in the Dáil completely in the dark with regard to the facts, or reports upon which decisions with regard to foreign policy are based. This is an undesirable state of affairs, and it has been repeatedly urged from these benches that political leaders should receive such information, in absolute confidence if need be, so that as far as possible there may be agreement on vital matters of foreign policy. Our representations have been ignored and so we must decide, on the information available to us, merely as members of the general public, what our course of action should be.

We have avoided as long as possible taking parliamentary action in this matter. We do so now with a full sense of our responsibility to the nation and even to what goes far beyond the boundaries of our own State. It is impossible to look on Europe to-day without being acutely conscious of the vital character of the struggle now being waged in Spain. It is not the fate of either party in Spain, not even the fate of the whole gallant Spanish people and their centuries-old glorious civilisation which are at stake. It is something more important even than these. It is the fate of European civilisation and of everything in it which endears it to us that is in the balance.

For a number of years past, for almost 20 years, we have seen that civilisation gravely threatened by the existence and activity of a State and a Party which have pursued their aims with a determination, a ruthlessness and a singlemindedness that should have been a warning to all statesmen who still attach value to European traditions. After a revolution which has no parallel in history, it has relentlessly attacked every pillar by which that European civilisation is supported. It is the outspoken, forceful, and never sleeping foe of Christianity, that Christianity which has supplied the most valuable element in our inheritance. The Soviet State has been almost equally hostile to every other form of religion. It has put atheism in the forefront of its programme. It has trampled underfoot every right of the individual and every right of conscience. It has denied the most rudimentary economic constituents of our civilisation. It has recognised no other standard of conduct, no other guide of its public activities, no other measure for its actions than their usefulness in promoting the victory of the Communist cause. It has spurned, as the invention of an effect bourgeois philosophy, all the canons of morality in which we have been brought up, canons which should shape our every action. In forcing its cause to victory over its own people it has shrunk from no terrorism and has been held back by no consideration of mercy. But the party that has been responsible for the triumph of Communism in Russia has always regarded its doctrine as meant, not only for its own people, but as a gospel to be spread by every method, secret or open, which would seem likely to help it to victory, with the aim of finally bringing the whole world under its domination.

There have been apparent advances and withdrawals, as external and internal circumstances dictated in the intensity with which the propaganda has been carried on. Many a statesman in Europe has probably solaced himself in recent years with the assumption that the Soviet Union has, apparently, finally settled down, within its own borders, content to take its place in a normal fashion amid the other States of Europe. Those statesmen and nations who have founded on that assumption a sense of security have paid no attention to the two-fold voice with which in recent years Moscow has been wont to speak. The Russian Foreign Office tries to attune its voice to the accustomed language of the Chancellories of Europe, but the work of spreading the gospel has been ceaselessly prosecuted by the other voice, the Comintern, the Communist International, with its Headquarters in Moscow and under the domination of the party which controls the Russian Government.

Twelve months ago it was possible for people to be misled by that apparent change of policy on the part of the Russian Foreign Office, but the events of the last year and, especially recent happenings in Spain, should tear the bandage from the eyes of everybody who has any interest in the higher aspects of our present complex social organisation. Whatever pretence there may have been in the beginning it must surely now be clear to everyone that the cause of the Caballero Government and the cause of the Communist International are identical. Moscow, Barcelona and Madrid form a common front. We have only to ask ourselves do we wish for victory for the cause for which these comrades stand. Let there be no mistake about it, the victory of the Communist cause in Spain would probably be a deciding factor for the fate of Europe. It is not a question which any person with a vision which extends beyond his own parish can regard as something in which he has no interest. The war in Spain is a war for the victory or defeat of Communism and all it stands for, with its denial of Christian principles, individual liberty, and democracy.

I do not see how a country with our history, our beliefs, our traditions and our ideals, moral, religious and political, can fail to withdraw recognition from a Government standing for everything we abhor and accord it to a Government that is fighting enemies that are the greatest we have to combat in Europe now or in the future. I am not suggesting that we abandon the policy of non-intervention. I am bringing forward this amendment, not for the purpose of criticising the Government for having adopted that policy. Of that policy we on this side of the House fully approve. I believe that the intervention of outside Powers would, as far as our human intelligence can judge, almost certainly lead to a general conflagration, a conflagration that might bring upon us at once these disastrous consequences that would follow inevitably but at a slower pace on the victory of the Red Forces in Spain. Considering the present position in international affairs, and considering any other machinery that might possibly be called in to preserve the peace, I can see no better method than the policy of non-intervention to prevent such a catastrophe.

Whole-heartedly desiring as I do the defeat of Communism and all it stands for in Spain and elsewhere, I do not believe that the policy of intervention could accomplish that defeat. Intervention might do irreparable damage in that respect, too. But what I advocate connotes in no way the abandonment of the policy of non-intervention. The recognition of General Franco's Government does not, it is clear, run contrary to that policy of non-intervention to which the Government is rightly committed. We, I am quite willing to admit, are but a small State. Our material resources are comparatively slight. We cannot sway the counsels of the European States, but against this I put certain considerations before the House. I do not believe that our influence in world affairs can be measured at all adequately by our material strength. There is another consideration of perhaps even greater importance. It would indeed be a pity, in this present struggle for and against Communism, in which all Europe seems determined to take sides, that it should seem to be left to those States that boast their non-democratic character to take the step of recognising as a Government that Party in Spain which is fighting our most deadly foe. I believe that Communism is in the end not only destructive of our civilisation but is more injurious to democracies than to dictatorships. It is fitting and necessary that a Christian and democratic State such as ours should give a clear and clean lead in this matter which involves a life and death struggle against the enemies of our common civilisation.

I have confined myself to the essential issues in the case. I have not dwelt on the sacrileges, the destruction, the atrocities, that have shaken our people to the very core, because I was anxious that the main issue at stake should be clearly put before the Dáil. I believe that a step of such paramount importance as this should transcend all party issues, that our national honour and more than our national honour is involved. It is of importance that the nation here should speak with one voice on this issue, and it does appear to me that the plain facts as they appear to all men indicate that whatever may have been the beginnings or the history of the struggle at present being waged in Spain, that struggle has now assumed a character of European and of world importance. It is not fitting that even by passive taking of sides we should as a nation interest ourselves in domestic quarrels between two sections of any people. The war in Spain, as I have said, has ceased to have that character. Ranged behind the Madrid Government are all the forces whose aims we, as Christians and as Irishmen, abhor. What I am asking the Government to do involves no military operations, no breach in the policy of non-intervention. It seems to me to involve merely the taking of a simple action which will bring this generation of Irishmen into line and into harmony with those who have gone before us and left to us a great tradition.

I think, and I hope the House will agree with me, that the Government of General Franco in Spain should be recognised and that recognition should be withdrawn from the combination which opposes him.

I beg to second the amendment that has been moved by the leader of the Opposition, I think he has made quite clear what we are asking the President to do. We are asking him to take such steps, and to assure the House that he will take such steps, as will lead to the recognition of what is called the Franco Government in Spain. As Deputy Cosgrave pointed out, there may have been a time when a number of well-meaning men may have been in doubt about what was at issue in Spain. They may have felt that the Liberal Government might have been given a chance. There were many more who believed that the best that could be said for that Government was that it partook of the character of the Kerensky Government in Russia in 1917. But that is not what is now at stake. What is now at stake is clearly and definitely the victory or defeat of the Communist International in Spain, the victory or the defeat of the Red cause in Spain, the victory or defeat of Communism.

We have several problems that divide us here in this country. I have never tried to slur over the seriousness of the divisions that politically divide the various classes and Parties in this country, but here is, I think, a matter on which every class in this country, every political Party in this country, every creed in this country, should be in full agreement, once they realise what is taking place in Spain, once it is clear to them that it is not merely a question as to who in future will rule in Spain, but that it is a question of what cause is to be triumphant in Europe. We cannot disguise from ourselves the tremendous change that has taken place in world outlook in the last 12 months. I feel that it is only because people still are able to shut their eyes to what is taking place or what has taken place in these 12 months, that there can be any hesitation or any doubt about the importance and the real significance of what is taking place in Spain at the present moment, and about the importance of the outcome of the struggle there. It is a thing that is not merely serious; it is urgent for the reasons indicated by the leader of the Opposition in introducing his amendment.

It is useless for us to say that we are against Communism, that we will not allow it to take a full root in this country, that we will stop it here once it openly shows its head and indulges in anything that is illegal. To adopt an attitude of that kind, to think that we can put an antiseptic iron wall about this country, is to live in a fool's paradise. We can do nothing of the kind. Even were we to look at the thing, as I strongly hold we ought not, from our own selfish point of view, our own selfish point of view would dictate that our sympathies and interests should lie with the defeat of the Communist Party in Spain in the war. I make no distinction, and I do not think the House or anybody who wants to face the issues ought to make any distinction, between the victory of Communism in Spain and the victory of Moscow. There may be controversy about matters of detail but there can be no doubt or no difference of opinion as to the common front that is being put up by the Communist Party in Spain and the Moscow Government.

This civilisation of ours has had to submit to many revolutions, revolutions that some people think have been salutary and that others regret, but I think we can all agree that never in its history has our race witnessed such a revolution as Communism implies—a revolution not content with ordinary destruction but bent on tearing up humanity and all the traditions handed down for centuries, tearing them up from their roots. Do not think that it was ever meant to be confined to the States or the countries or the people that comprise the Soviet Union. It never was. Never have we witnessed such a determined attempt as is being made to-day under our very eyes. Anybody who looks at the international situation at the present time must be appalled—I do not think appalled is too strong a word—at all the dangers that confront us. But is there any danger as serious or any danger as permanent as that represented by the declared victory of Communism over what they themselves boast to be one-sixth of the surface of the globe already, and its spread through western Europe, to one of the oldest countries in the civilisation of Europe, a country famous for its crusading on behalf of our civilisation and our Christianity?

Have you asked yourselves what the spread of Communism there and the victory of Communism there would mean not merely for that country but for the whole of Western Europe? That is the issue which we have to face. When we speak of that danger I think one of its great elements is that public men, statesmen in many countries of Europe, will not realise the danger. It is exceedingly difficult, and it has always been exceedingly difficult, for a generation standing on the very threshold of a world revolution to realise that they are doing so. Surely it is up to the people who see that clearly, and who clearly see the danger, to put it before the people. I am often amazed at the apparent indifference shown by public men throughout Europe to the advance of that particular cause. I could only understand it on one of two assumptions, or perhaps both. One reason is, they do not know what that Communist cause stands for, and that is quite possible. They do not know it except in a vague and general way. There are many people who think that it is a kind of altruistic, humanistic, harmless, idealistic philosophy. It is nothing of the kind. It is something much more terrible and real than that. But I am afraid there are many statesmen and many public men in Europe who still regard it in that particular light. The other reason why they are so complaisant is this, that they will not face the danger of its coming to their own shores or beyond their own frontiers. They are playing with fire, and they do not know they are playing with fire.

I do not want to exaggerate; I do not want to indulge in any criticism within this country at the present moment. I can understand that there may be honest differences of opinion as to the best way of combating the menace, but I cannot understand why the seriousness of the menace should not be seen, and why the danger should not be kept continually before us. We are face to face with a doctrine, with a cause, with which there can be no possible compromise. We could only accept it by rejecting, by spurning, everything we have been taught to hold dear, and everything we have held and do hold dear. I admit that even with the triumph of that cause the human race will survive. It will! But if that cause triumphs it will be a very different civilisation and a very different human race, deprived of all the important values that we cherish. When we ask ourselves what are the alternatives, and when we answer that question for ourselves, I put it to the President ought the Government to have any hesitation in putting the necessary machinery in motion that will lead to the recognition by his Government of the opponents of Communism in Spain?

It is not a question as to whether the form of government that that Party will set up is the precise form of government which we should set up if we had the settling of matters there. That is not the question. I have particularly avoided that question because I do not think it is the issue. What we want first and foremost is the defeat of Moscow and the defeat of the Communist cause in Spain. I see no other possibility of that being achieved except by the victory of the present opponents of Communism in Spain. Ask yourselves is there any other alternative to the recognition of the one side or the other? We might prefer a parliamentary system of government. We do. As the House knows, I am strongly attached to that particular form of government. I do not believe it is effete; I do not believe it is worn out; but that is not the situation we are asked to face. The only alternative in Spain is victory for the Reds or for General Franco. There is no other possible alternative. In those circumstances, seeing that it does not involve—and it is made clear by the statement of the big countries in Europe that it does not so involve— any breach of the policy of non-intervention to which the Government is committed—is there any reason why the Government should hesitate to go on the road towards the recognition of General Franco?

It has often seemed strange to me that, just as I was convinced that the Communist menace was growing more and more, a large number of public men throughout Europe were lulling themselves into the security of the opposite opinion. I admit that spectacular action in interference in the internal affairs of outside States is no longer the official policy of the Soviet Government. I will admit that, but I claim at the same time that from the point of view of the triumph of Communism, not merely in Russia but in other countries in Europe, the situation is much more serious to-day than when that aggressive intervention, the fomenting of revolts, and ceaseless propaganda carried on in most countries in Europe were the order of the day. The situation is more serious to-day than when all that thing was patronised and carried out by the official Soviet Government. It is much more serious for the very reason that the Soviet Government is an established Government, and, as far as people can see, is destined to exist for a number of years at all events. People can point to it and say "Well, it works. You told us it would not work, and still it is working. It has done great things. It has done colossal things." That is a much more attractive thing to many people in Europe—accustomed to pay snobbish tribute to success without considering what the success serves—than the intribute to success without considering what the success serves—than the intervention of outsiders in their internal affairs. From that point of view, the propagandist value of Russia has increased tremendously, but, as Deputy Cosgrave has pointed out, that is only one side of the picture.

I have studied this matter for a number of years. In my readings I did not confine myself by any means to unfavourable critics. I have read the favourable and unfavourable critics of the Soviet Government, and I have read any speeches of the heads of the Soviet Government that I could get, provided they were written in a language I could read. One thing is clear: whether it is in Asia, Europe or Africa, the steady work of propaganda and fomenting of revolt has been carried on all those years—there has been not a moment's cessation. The Soviet Government, which a few years ago was pointing out the degrading character of that bourgeois assembly—this is what it called the League of Nations—can go to Geneva and can speak the language of that assembly quite as well as any of the older statesmen in Europe. All the time the Communist International, with its seat at Moscow, is engaged in ceaseless work of propaganda. That work of propaganda will differ in character with the diverging character of the different peoples for whom it is intended. That propaganda is ceaseless, sometimes open and unashamed, sometimes secret. But, you may say, the Soviet Government is not responsible for that. That is the Communist International! The Soviet Government and the Communist International are both under the domination of the same force. They are both voices of the same controlling force in Russia, namely, the Communist Party of Russia. In Russia, itself, the Government is merely the instrument of that particular party.

In connection with that, it is quite a revealing fact that for a number of years—I cannot speak as to what the position is at the moment—the real ruler of Russia had no official position in the Government. He was merely general secretary of the Communist Party. The Communist Party controls both the Government of Russia— which so often now makes such play of correct diplomatic action—and the Communist International, which acts far from "correctly," in the old hemisphere. I cannot speak of the new hemisphere. Unfortunately, therefore, the assumptions that some statesmen make about the situation being now much easier than it was ten years ago, rests on no solid foundation. The situation now is much more serious and much more dangerous from the point of view of the opponents of Communism than it ever was. Watch how cleverly the propaganda is done. Deputy Cosgrave alluded to that in the course of his speech.

I have tried to put before you what are the real issues in Spain. I should be surprised if there is any division of opinion on that particular point, but you need only read a number of papers—English papers shall we say? —you need only listen to the wireless, to see how cleverly it is being insinuated that the struggle in Spain is a struggle between Fascism and democracy. Read—listen to—the pronouncements of the official Labour Party in England on that point. Take their whole attitude to this struggle, and you will see the cleverness and you will see the success with which that propaganda is being got across, the success with which the real issue is being clouded over. Remember that that same Labour Party has rejected Communism, and yet, so cleverly has the propaganda been conducted, that. for them, in Spain, the struggle is between democracy and Fascism. It is nothing of the kind. For us, the struggle is between Communism and the foes of Communism. It was a remarkably clever thing in the way of propaganda to pretend that this is a struggle for the life of democracy and to pretend that democracy is, at the present moment. represented in Spain by the Government of Señor Caballero. It has deceived many—some quite genuinely; others, perhaps, had no objection to being deceived. That being so, however, is not that, as Deputy Cosgrave pointed out, all the more reason why we should take this step? Many things may be said about us. Many things can be said in our praise, and many things can be said in criticism of us; but, at least, the Government of this State can claim to be a Government based on the goodwill of the majority of the elected representatives of the people here. I know of no country to-day that is more democratic, from the Parliamentary point of view, than is our State with our Constitution here at the present moment. There are no exclusions for people over the age of 21. And the Government holds office at the will of the majority of the representatives elected on a basis of universal suffrage. Certainly, we can boast that there is no more democratic country in the world than ourselves at the present moment. It is all the more important, therefore, to take a step of this kind. It is, at least, an indication, so far as attention will be given to it, that there is a democratic country that believes in the necessity of defeating Communism; that the forces arrayed in Spain—that the sympathies of the peoples arrayed against the Caballero Government outside Spain—are not confined to those who repudiate what they call democratic government, at least of the Parliamentary type.

That is one of the important reasons why I should like this step to be taken by this Government. I do not know what the wars in the future may be. They may be something analogous to the old wars of religion. They may be wars of rival philosophies. I cannot go into that; but, at least, let us be clear that the cause of anti-Communism is not the cause of anti-democracy. I believe that, in bringing forward this motion, the Leader of the Opposition is expressing the will of the bulk of the Irish people. I believe that the emotion by which they have been stirred is a genuine emotion on their part. I believe that it was a natural emotion on their part.

If we had any doubt about the danger, nationally or internationally, coming from Moscow, the Spanish crisis, and the Spanish situation, ought to have banished all such doubts. What is at stake, as I said already, is our civilisation—every factor in that civilisation that makes it dear to us and that makes it valuable to us. Deputy Cosgrave referred to it as the Christian European civilisation, and he did so because he recognised that the Christian religion was the principal component part of that civilisation. Now, let there be no doubt as to what the triumph of Communism stands for. It stands, not merely for the destruction of Catholicism, not merely for the destruction of Christianity, but for the destruction of every kind of religion whatsoever—and that is no chance development on their part. That is a fundamental article of their creed.

May I point out to you—may I read for you—an extract from the address of the founder of that State: the founder of practical Communism—delivered, quite appropriately, to the Congress of the Young Communist League. I refer to an address by Lenin in Moscow in October of 1920; and you can see by your papers to-day that this policy is still being carried on. I bring forward this quotation for another reason, and that is, because, with a morality of the kind put forward here before our eyes, we shall be in a better position to understand a great deal of what is happening in Spain; because this quotation justifies the statement of Deputy Cosgrave that, so far as that cause is concerned, the ordinary rules of morality—the rules that we have been accustomed to and the rules that we observe—simply do not hold. This is not a momentary statement made in the heat of the moment by Lenin—he did very little in the heat of the moment. I can give you quotation after quotation of the same tenour from his followers. Therefore, with people who hold a view of morality such as this which I am about to quote, need we be surprised at any plotting or planning, or at anything that they do in Spain or elsewhere? I am afraid the quotation is rather long, but this is what Lenin says:—

"Is there any such thing as Communist morality? Of course there is. .... In what sense do we deny ethics and morals? In the sense in which they are preached by the bourgeoisie—a sense that deduces these morals from God's commandments. Of course, we do not believe in God. We know perfectly well that the clergy, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie all claim to speak in the name of God in order to protect their own interests as exploiters .... We deny all morality taken from super-human, or non-class conceptions. We say that this is a deception, a swindle, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landlords and the capitalists."

Now, here is what I want to come to particularly:—

"We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and the nature of the proletariat—but morality taken from outside of human society does not exist for us. It is a fraud. For us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class-struggle."

That is the issue I put to the House. That is the issue in Spain at the present moment. Therefore I should like an expression of opinion from the President on the matter.

Sir, as between the Government of General Franco and the Government of Senor Largo Caballero I suppose there is hardly anybody in this House, and very few in this country, who do not sympathise rather with the Government of General Franco. Whether the Spanish revolution was necessary is another question. I take the view that the Government in Spain having ceased to govern, having ceased to protect its citizens against the operations of thugs, the people who felt disposed to throw off their allegiance to it were morally justified in doing so. But whether, taking the wide view, it would not have been wiser for them and better in the long run for all concerned if they had decided on intensifying political activity and developing their party organisation for the overthrow of their enemies by parliamentary methods, is another question. Seeing the appalling things that have occurred in Spain since the outbreak of the revolution, one certainly feels inclined to wonder whether those who threw off their allegiance to the Government by methods of violence would not, however righteous their cause, have been wiser and more patriotic if they had adopted other methods. But that is a side issue. We do all of us want to see the Franco Government in preference to the Caballero Government.

But this motion is in effect a vote of censure on our own Government for their attitude towards the Spanish conflict and for their alleged indifference to the general menace of Communism. Frankly, I cannot see any ground for that censure and I do not think that the speeches of Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy O'Sullivan have given us any ground for that censure. I should have thought that if they considered that the Government should before now have recognised General Franco, it was incumbent on them to indicate what they believe to be the test of the right moment to recognise a revolutionary government. Surely the test is not merely our sympathies. Suppose a revolution broke out in Germany or in France in which some of the rights of the Catholic church were involved, a revolution which for some reason or other attracted the sympathy of people in this country. Just at what moment would it be proper to recognise the revolutionary government instead of the previous Government? That is a difficult problem, and it is a problem with which neither Deputy Cosgrave nor Deputy O'Sullivan has attempted to deal. Perhaps Deputy McGilligan or somebody else may do so later in the debate.

I take it that the test accepted by the world in general is whether or not the new Government has obtained de facto control of the country of which it claims to be the legitimate Government. There are a great many nations in the world which are concerned in this matter besides ours. So far the

Government who recognise General Franco have been those of the Fascist line-up—Fascist countries and countries controlled by them, such as Albania. But the world in general has adopted the course for which President de Valera is being censured by the Opposition. It is suggested, for example, that we should recognise the Government of General Franco without any consultation with the other Governments of the British Commonwealth? Have we faced the difficulties of the constitutional position that would be created if the King and his Ministers in this country were to recognise one Government in Spain and the King and his Ministers in other parts of the Commonwealth were to recognise another Government in Spain? Is it suggested that we should pay no heed at all, apart from the British Commonwealth, to the attitude of countries such as the United States of America, or the Scandinavian countries, or Belgium, a country as Catholic as we are? I think we have a right to expect a great deal more light to be thrown by the Opposition upon their principles of action in this matter before we can agree to censure the Government for the line they have, so far, taken and are taking. I believe that the ultimate victory of General Franco is pretty certain, and I believe that our Government will be amongst those most ready to recognise his Government when the right moment comes. Frankly, I have not enough experience of these matters to lay down a hard and fast rule as to when that moment will come, but I suggest it is better for us to act in concert with the general body of countries other than Fascist countries. I am not eager to see this country linking itself up with Fascist countries, while other countries, which are not in the least Communist, are standing aloof.

It is folly to talk as if the mere action of this Government in recognising General Franco was going to make a fundamental difference in the whole situation. Recognising General Franco to-morrow would contribute little or nothing towards the prospect of General Franco's victory. Therefore, what we have to be guided by is what is correct—and what is the normal diplomatic practice. I would much rather, in forming our conclusions about that, that we should act in concert with the other Governments of good-will which are neither Communist nor Fascist.

As regards the Communist peril in general, we all sympathise with the denunciations we have heard of the Communist International, and of the horrors which have taken place in Spain, but what are the practical suggestions of Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy O'Sullivan with regard to Communism? They say that the Government has shown undue indifference to the subject. Just what do they want the Government to do? There was a speech made a few days ago by the very amiable and very able Director of Organisation of the Fine Gael Party on this subject, and I imagine, as it was obviously carefully prepared, that it would not have been made unless it had behind it the full authority of the leader of the Opposition. In it Mr. Burke said:—

"In May of the present year in Wexford Dr. Ryan expressed the Government view in the following words: `If people said that in their opinion the best form of government for this country was the form of government in Russia, they were bound to protect them and allow them to put their views before the people.' "

A little lower down, after elaborating the subject, Mr. Burke said:—

"The attitude of Fine Gael had always been, and would always be, directly opposite to that of Fianna Fáil in this matter."

Again a little lower down, he said:—

"No Government can afford to ignore the wishes of the people in a matter so close to their hearts. At the moment a great non-political movement had arisen in the country which would, no doubt, in due course force the Government's hand and secure that adequate steps are taken to check the moral and national menace which has been growing in our midst."

I have said before that if there are organisations, Communistic or otherwise, in this country which are advocating the use of force for the overthrow of the Government, it is right they should be prosecuted and suppressed. But the quotation I have just read to the House goes far beyond that and plainly suggests that people who hold Communist opinions, who are in favour of the form of government that exists in Russia—which, by the by, is a form of government that could only inaccurately be described as Communist, because Communism in Russia has been a failure, and every day they seem to be dropping further and further away from Communism— should be prohibited by law from expressing their views. I can only say that I totally and absolutely disagree with that.

I do not believe that is the way to fight Communism. That is not the way in which Communism is being successfully fought in Great Britain, America and elsewhere. If you look at countries where Communism has been conspicuously successful, like Russia, Mexico or Spain, you will find that these are countries which were not noted for their liberalism. You will not find that even before the advent of Communism they were remarkable for the liberty of speech that was encouraged in their midst. The very way, to my mind, to increase the risk of popularising Communism is to turn your back upon the principles of democracy and to try to suppress free speech. I hope very much that these ideas do not represent the last word or the last thoughts of the Opposition Party on this subject.

We all want to see this country secure against the propaganda of the Communist International, and the way to achieve that is by conducting our Government and our national life in accordance with Christian ideas; spread principles of class harmony instead of class hatred throughout the country; to see that people really care about their fellow-men and suffer with their sufferings and are interested in alleviating their misfortunes. The fear I have is that a sort of hysteria is being created in Ireland owing to all this excitement about Communism that may result in doing just the kind of thing that may increase Communism rather than dispel it. For my part, I believe that President de Valera and his Government are perfectly willing and even eager to recognise General Franco's administration when the proper moment comes, and there has been nothing in the speeches delivered from the Opposition Front Benches which suggest to me that they have clearer ideas on this subject than the Government has, or have more sense of responsibility on this subject than the Government has.

The President to conclude.

On the amendment.

There is no right in the mover of the amendment to reply.

The usual procedure, when there is a Motion on the Adjournment, after those on the Opposition Benches have expressed their views, is that the Government closes. If I am to close I am prepared to do so now.

The mover of the amendment has not the right to reply or to conclude the debate.

Am I to understand that the only Government speaker will be one speaker to conclude the debate?

I have no control over that.

May I ask through you, Sir, if the only Government speaker is going to conclude the debate?

It depends on what questions are raised. If the only question raised is the question of recognition, I will conclude, but if there are other questions such as unemployment, for instance, that is another matter.

Am I to understand that the only person on the Government Benches who is going to take part in the debate will be the one Government speaker, and that he will conclude?

Let us have the amendment with no speech against it and then we can get on to the motion. I understand the amendment will be put first. Three Deputies have spoken on it and there has been no reply.

The usual course is that the motion and the amendment are discussed together, that the Chair calls on the mover of the motion to close the discussion, that the amendment is then put, and the motion subsequently, with the amendment added, if it becomes a substantive motion, or the motion itself.

There is an amendment before the House. I assume it will be put and will be either carried or defeated. If carried, it stands as a substantive motion. If defeated, the motion to adjourn stands, and surely speeches are allowed on that?

I submit that the practice in this House, in a case like this, has consistently been such as the Chair has just indicated.

I suggest quite the opposite. I do not accept any such statement from the President.

The records will show it.

I have indicated what is the position as far as the Chair is concerned. The motion is moved and the amendment is moved. The motion and amendment are discussed together. The mover of the motion has the right to reply and to close the discussion. Then the amendment is put. Afterwards, the motion is put, if the decision is such that the motion can be put.

Do I understand from your ruling, Sir, that if the President now speaks on the subject matter raised by Deputy Cosgrave in his speech, no one will be allowed to deal with the subject afterwards?

I am ruling according to the accepted and continued practice of the Dáil.

I want to be clear as to the implications of the practice. Do I understand from your ruling that if the President speaks now on the subject matter raised by Deputy Cosgrave no one will be allowed to speak on that subject afterwards?

I will only call on the mover of the motion to conclude.

After the amendment is put?

I did not say that.

There is an amendment before the House. It is, apparently, going to be put to a division without any speech being made against it. That is a rather absurd situation, but let that be. After that I understand that you then take up the motion and say that only one speech will be allowed on the motion? Surely that is contrary to every ruling of the House?

It is the consistent practice in the House.

It has not been so. I have spoken on several occasions on motions after amendments have been taken.

Not on adjournment motions. There is a form. Let us get the records.

The motion and the amendment are before the House together.

Let us know where we are. If this amendment is put and defeated, is there to be no speech, or only one speech? I could understand a situation in which there will be no speech allowed, but I cannot understand a situation in which there will be one speech only.

I have indicated what the practice is.

Is it what I have said—that there will be one speech only after the amendment has been put?

I have indicated that the motion and the amendment are before the House and that the mover of the motion has the right to reply and close the discussion.

Is he allowed to do that after the amendment is defeated?

To close the discussion.

Is there to be a separate debate on the motion? That is what I want to know.

There never has been.

The Chair can only say what has been the continued practice in the Dáil.

I am still in the dark as to what you intend to do.

When the occasion arises the Deputy will understand it.

It will be too late then to rectify the mistake.

I take it that if I am called upon to conclude the debate that concludes the whole debate; that the whole question at issue in this motion and amendment is finished, and that the Dáil will then adjourn.

Can the President not give us any reason why he wishes to insist on that procedure?

Because it is the proper procedure and was so adopted generally by the House. That is the reason.

I deny the practice and I do not agree with the reason.

The records will show what the practice is.

It is not the practice.

The President to conclude.

Is this on the amendment?

The President is concluding the discussion.

I suggest that the amendment ought to be put before the President is called upon, or if the President is speaking on the amendment, that the motion will be before the House afterwards.

We do not always think alike, but I think Deputy MacDermot has replied sufficiently to the speech made from the opposite benches to warrant, if I care to use it, my allowing the amendment and all go to the House without any word from me. I think any reasonable person who has listened to him, or who will read what he has said, will agree that the point of view which he has expressed is the right and proper point of view. There are things about this particular amendment which tend to excite suspicion. There has been a long campaign in the Press all directed to try to make it appear that somehow the Government in this matter of Spain was lacking in public duty or was not representing the views of the majority of the people in this country. There has been, from the opposite benches, a continued effort since 1931 to try to mend the fortunes of their Party, and to build up a case for Fascist organisations on the ground that this Government was sympathetic to Communism. Everybody knows that that is fundamentally untrue and false. I do not think there is anybody in the country who looks at the Government's action dispassionately who will not be satisfied that the Government have no more use for Communist philosophy than has any member of the Opposition.

The question is how are we best to defend our philosophy and the philosophy of the vast majority of the Irish people in our attitude towards life, and prevent organisations with a completely and fundamentally different policy from making inroads here? I hold with Deputy MacDermot that the attitude of the Government in this matter has been fully justified. I am convinced, as convinced as I am of anything, that had the present Opposition, with their outlook, continued in office after 1931 we would have had a very different position in this country to-day from the position which we have. I believe that their whole attitude was one of reliance upon force, that reliance upon force, on the one side, was bound to beget reliance upon force on the other; and that we would have rapidly developed here into a position similar to the position that we have had on the Continent before either Fascism or Communism triumphed. I, for one, did not want to see that position brought about here. I think that anybody who is working in that direction is wilfully moving in a line which is opposed to all the true interests of this country. We came into office just after there had been a campaign to pretend to the people of Ireland that Communism was making rapid headway here. We had people in responsible positions going around telling authorities in the Church of the Communist cells that were being established. They said they derived their knowledge from secret information which they had received. We came into office and saw these reports. Deputies who care to take the trouble will, I think, find in the journals of the House that I read from these reports, and showed the very opposite to what was being pretended publicly and privately.

During the time we have been in office, we have seen a gradual waning of the little strength that Communism had in this country until it has practically disappeared. If the contrary policy had been pursued, I believe you would have thrown on the side of these relatively insignificant groups a strength that did not fundamentally sympathise with them—the strength of labour and other groups who feared that this was only an attempt to found here a Fascist State in which their just freedom would be denied. The policy of hitting on the head everybody who is opposed to you is a convenient policy for those who are strong enough to do so. There is no doubt that it will silence opposition for a certain time but, in the long run, you are not going to kill any ideas, good or bad, in that way. You are going to give strength to false ideas by preventing these false ideas from being examined home.

Hear, hear!

The examining home of these ideas in our country is, I think, the best possible safeguard against any inroads by Communism. Therefore, so far as the Government's attitude on this matter is concerned, we have nothing to regret, nothing to retract and we do not purpose changing it.

With regard to the immediate question of the recognition of General Franco's Government, I was hoping that, before the debate would conclude, I would get a copy of what Deputy Cosgrave said in the introductory portion of his speech, which I happened to miss, so that I could see its purport. As his speech proceeded, I seemed to gather that the Government was being accused of not being willing to cooperate with other parties in the House on matters of foreign policy. The trouble is—it is obvious to everybody— that co-operation is almost impossible. It ought not to be so but, if you are to have co-operation, you must have a frank and free interchange of information. My experience up to the present has been that when even small matters went to the opposite side of the House, they were in the Press almost as soon as I was told that contact had been established. It is quite clear that you cannot have co-operation in these circumstances.

Would you give an example?

I cannot give examples now.

I cannot give even one now, but I have a distinct recollection of matters which went to the other side of the House and which were in the hands of the Press as soon as they went there.

Mention a topic.

What I state is the truth, and I can substantiate it. I could give you examples in the proper time.

Your memory does not bring even one example to your mind?

My recollection of any one case is not sufficiently accurate to enable me to give an example.

I shall carry on without permission from the Deputy.

Now, we know where we are.

I agree that it would be of great benefit to the country, as a whole, if matters of foreign policy were dealt with here as they are dealt with in other countries and if it were possible for the Government and for the Opposition in matters that affect the interests of the country externally to reach some sort of understanding by which the interests of the country as a whole would be put above any Party interests. I am afraid we have not yet reached that position. No effort, so far as I am aware, has been made by any member of the Opposition, the leader included, to find out from us, confidentially or otherwise, our attitude in this matter. I am aware that Deputy MacDermot at one stage had intended to ask questions about the matter but I take it he deemed that the time for asking these questions had not yet arrived and, therefore, did not pursue the matter. Beyond that, I have got no indication from any member of the Opposition of a desire to find out what were the principles we were likely to act upon in this matter. The principles are clear. They are well-established principles—the principles on which any prudent Government or any prudent State would act in matters of this kind.

Obviously, if you recognise a new Government, you should recognise it when there is some clear indication of stability—some clear indication that the Government will, in fact, continue to be able to speak on behalf of the nation of which it is the Government. I do not think that that moment can be said to have arrived in the case of Spain. The question of our sympathies does not enter into this matter; it is a question of what is the usual practice, what is our right in the matter and what is our duty. I hold that we would not be justified at this moment, on the basis of ordinary prudence, in according the recognition we are asked to accord by the 2nd December or some such date. Everybody knows that if, as is predicted on the opposite benches, General Franco does become the head of a de facto Government in Spain, he must immediately receive de facto recognition from those who have interests in Spain and who have, therefore, in regard to these interests, to deal with some authority in Spain.

These grounds of prudence on which it is customary to act do not need to be explained. I think they are self-evident to everybody. It would be ridiculous, obviously, to give recognition to a Government that was unable ultimately to maintain itself. It certainly would not lead—I am talking in general—to cordial relations between the Government of one country and another if the relations had to be with the restored Government. I do not say that that consideration applies altogether here, but it is the general basis on which, as a prudent rule, recognition is not given before there is a fair hope of stability. But we are told that the interests are of such importance that we ought, in order to help General Franco, give this recognition. I do not think there has been any attempt at all to show that it would, in fact, help General Franco that this recognition should be accorded. We are told that the cause of Christianity demands it. It is extraordinary if that is so, when the head of Christianity in the Vatican State has not himself deemed it prudent or right so to accord, and the difficulties there are not of a political character clearly, because if there were any considerations of that sort the present position, as far as Italy is concerned, would not stand in the way.

Consequently, the Holy Father in not having given recognition already must believe that it was not in the best interests of Christianity that that recognition should be given. We are freer, perhaps, and can take more lightly the consequences of our acts. I do not know that recognition on our part would involve any grievous consequences to us as a people, but if we take it on the high grounds of protection and help for Christianity, then I think, at least, that we ought to hesitate when the head of Christianity has not deemed it wise or prudent to give the recognition that we are asked to give.

As Deputy MacDermot has said, the Opposition have made no case for this amendment which is, as he pointed out, in fact intended to be a vote of censure on the Government. Our line has been in accord with the general line taken by States in circumstances like these. Germany and Italy have accorded recognition, but they have accorded recognition for very clear and immediate political motives. There is no doubt whatever about it. I think that most people will admit that these are in the interests of a certain form of Government, and a certain form of State, rather than one such as has been referred to by Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy O'Sullivan. We do not believe in their theory of the State any more than we believe in the Communist theory of the State.

There is, I am glad to see from the opposite benches, agreement now, though there was a time in which one might very well begin to doubt it, that our people believe in a democratic form of government, and that a democratic form of government is, in fact, at least for us in our circumstances, a better form of government than any of the others. We are gradually getting to agree upon certain fundamentals, and I think it is generally to the advantage of the country that that should be so. On this matter of sympathy, in so far as that is concerned —I think there is very little difference, in the main, between the sympathies of people on the Government Benches and those in the Opposition as far as their views about Communism are concerned. The Government then propose to act in this matter with the prudence with which it is right that States should act. If I felt as strongly as the members on the Opposition Bench pretend to feel, that recognition by us would mean what they suggest it would mean, then I feel we could not stop at mere recognition. I feel that we would inevitably be involved, if we were serious about it, very much farther. We could not simply take the easy way of a mere gesture. If all these things are involved we should be prepared to do very much more and go very much farther, and, if we are not prepared to do these things, I take it it is on some grounds of prudence, and I am wondering whether the grounds of prudence which would justify us going farther than is suggested would not also suggest that we should not go even that far at the present moment. That is the view, at any rate, that we take here. The general principle is based on this: that peoples and States ought to be allowed to get that form of government which they themselves are prepared to accept. Unless we are prepared to go very much farther, we cannot, I think, in wisdom give any recognition until it is quite clear that we have a position in Spain that is likely to last.

We have taken up the position of non-intervention. I am glad to see that the Opposition have agreed that that policy was a wise one. The trouble to-day, unfortunately, is that there is a tendency on both sides to make Spain a general battle ground, to have the people who sympathise with the one side or the other put all their forces there. That can have only one effect— a general European conflagration, and I do not believe that such a conflagration would help either the people of Spain or the causes that we would like to see triumph. I think the people of this country regret that Spain is in the condition in which it finds itself. The true wish of all our people would be to see that struggle end as quickly as possible, and end on conditions which would enable the majority of the people of Spain to live and progress in the way in which they desire. It has been many a time said here that Spain is a great old Catholic nation. There is hardly a doubt that the vast majority of the people in Spain believe in Christian truths, and want these Christian truths, and the philosophy that they naturally entail, to triumph.

Precipitate action on the part of this Government in recognising General Franco would not, in my opinion, lead to the best interests of Spain, nor would it achieve the results which the Opposition evidently think they would achieve if we adopted their views. I, therefore, think that the policy of the Government is in accordance with the usual practice, that it is the right and prudent policy, best in the interests of this country, best in the interest of Spain and best in the general interests of world peace.

Will the President answer one question? Is it proposed that our representative accredited to Spain will continue to be so accredited?

Our representative is not in Spain at the present time.

I said accredited to Spain. Is it proposed to continue that arrangement as at present?

We do not propose to make any change for the moment.

Therefore, he is going to be continued.

Our representative is here at home at the moment.

Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand part."
The Dáil divided: Tá, 65; Níl, 44:—

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Bourke, Daniel.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Corbett, Edmond.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Corkery, Daniel.
  • Corry, Martin John.
  • Crowley, Timothy.
  • Daly, Denis.
  • Davin, William.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Doherty, Hugh.
  • Everett, James.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Geoghegan, James.
  • Gibbons, Seán.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Hales, Thomas.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Jordan, Stephen.
  • Keely, Séamus P.
  • Kelly, James Patrick.
  • Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Kissane, Eamonn.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • MacDermot, Frank.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Moane, Edward.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Murphy, Patrick Stephen.
  • Murphy, Timothy Joseph.
  • Neilan, Martin.
  • Norton, William.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Dowd, Patrick.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Pearse, Margaret Mary.
  • Rice, Edward.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Francis C.

Níl

  • Anthony, Richard.
  • Beekett, James Walter.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Bourke, Séamus.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Broderick, William Joseph.
  • Brodrick, Seán.
  • Burke, Patrick.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John Aloysius.
  • Curran, Richard.
  • Daly, Patrick.
  • Davis, Michael.
  • Davitt, Robert Emmet.
  • Desmond, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry Morgan.
  • Dolan, James Nicholas.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Finlay, John.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Keating, John.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McGuire, James Ivan.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Minch, Sydney B.
  • Morrisroe, James.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • O'Leary, Daniel.
  • O'Mahony, The.
  • O'Neill, Eamonn.
  • O'Reilly, John Joseph.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Redmond, Bridget Mary.
  • Reidy, James.
  • Roddy, Martin.
  • Rogers, Patrick James.
  • Wall, Nicholas.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.

On the motion, do I take it that you, Sir, are adhering to your ruling that it is the general practice that no further speeches are allowed?

And I will not be allowed to reply to the Minister for External Affairs, or his Parliamentary Secretary?

I am not going further than stating the fact that it is the continued practice of the House.

Then I protest that it is not the practice.

Motion put and declared carried.
The Dáil adjourned at 2.45 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, February 3rd, 1937.
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