I wonder if it would be apposite for a person who, in this matter, primarily represents the tax-paying community, to say a word? This Estimate is naturally one in which technical knowledge plays no small part. Nevertheless, apart from the technical interest that soldiers and military men may take in the defence problems that present themselves at the present time, the people of the country must ultimately pay, and we must keep in our minds, when we are looking at these problems, the fact that in certain countries in Europe to-day the people are being required to choose between guns and butter. In some of those counties it is regarded as high treason to choose butter. If you choose butter you go to an internment camp. Now, we are all aware, whether we are technicians in this matter or not, of the modern development in armaments and of the immense growth of armaments in the last five years.
The primary problem of defence in this country is what we would do if our territory were threatened by a foreign invader. I would be very much obliged to the Minister for Defence if he would tell us now what is the general policy of the Government in that contingency. Is it to resist invasion? Is it to build up armaments here which would give an invader a formidable fight before he got in, because, speaking purely as a citizen and as one inexperienced in military technique, I submit that is an entirely unattainable objective and that our attitude before the world should be that we have no desire to invade any country, that we have no desire to acquire any territory, that with our resources, we are not in a position to resist any invader who proposes to enter our territory, but that we fix all and sundry with notice that no matter how powerful they are, if they invade Ireland they embark, not on a 100 years war, but on a 700 years war, if necessary, and fix them with notice also that we were invaded by Britain in the year 1172 and that though it took some time to get them out, we shifted them finally in 1921. Accordingly, we should inform them that if anybody wants to invade us in 1938, we do not propose to bluff or pretend for a moment that we have resources effectively to resist the modern army of a powerful State, but that by invading us they start a 700 years war, that we will start mobilising the Irish race from one end of the world to the other, that we will use our immense spiritual empire all over the world to assail them from every quarter we can and that we are prepared to take our chances in the long run. It may take time, it may involve suffering, but by the time they have digested us they will have indigestion, and they will be well advised not to undertake the invasion of this country at all.
Now, in my judgment—and I submit this with respect to the Minister who is a military man—in the existing state of the world that is a far more effective defence for this country than for us to be blustering round and suggesting that we are able to repel an invader fully equipped, because we are not. We have not got the money or the resources to purchase the requisite materials to repel such an invader. I think we are standing on the soundest defence that any small nation could have if we are able to say to an invader: "If you want to invade this country you are going to start a war, not only in Ireland but in every country all over the world where there are Irishmen. It is a war that will be carried on, on the economic front, on the propaganda front, and on every front on which we think we can carry it on. We have demonstrated very cogently before the world our ability to carry on such a war against a most powerful military Power located 30 miles away. If any Power, 500 or 600 miles away tries the same game they will find it much more difficult and even less profitable, if that were possible."
A second situation arises. If we take up that position I believe that we are in a very strong position, because we immediately discharge ourselves from the obligation of spending countless millions on futile defences, because the best that we could afford would be futile in the face of a wealthy nation's attack. We deliver ourselves from the deplorable obligation of ever having to ask our people to choose between guns and butter. We simply turn to the big guns and we say: "We decline to enter that race; it is a race we cannot win; it is a race we do not want to win, and it is a race we do not have to win, because we can fight any war that starts, and we will last longer than the other fellow in the heel of the hunt." But then a second consideration arises. The Prime Minister has said here, and said, I think, with the approval of all sides of the House, that this territory will not be used as a jumping-off ground for attack on Great Britain. He said that very explicitly. That undertaking has been very warmly received in Great Britain. It made a great impression in Great Britain and I have no doubt contributed to the improved feelings that exist between the two countries at present.
Suppose Great Britain comes to us and says: "While we admit that your best defence is to fix the world with notice that anyone who invades your territory embarks on a 700 years war, that is not going to be convenient for us. If one of our potential enemies is waging that 700 years war on you, we shall feel the breeze through our back-door and we do not want to feel that breeze. We do not want any powerful nation to get a foothold in your territory." Our reply, it seems to me, should be: "Neither do we, but we cannot stop them. We should get them out sooner or later, but we cannot stop them coming in." Great Britain then says: "Well, we want you to stop them. We want you not only to concern yourselves with the ultimate vindication of your own sovereignty, but we want you to concern yourself with the interior protection of our flank. It would greatly jeopardise that flank of ours to have this foreign enemy on your territory."
I think we are entitled to say to Great Britain in these circumstances: "We have made our plans for defence. We have considered our resources. We have made up our minds that the only effective way to defend our territory is by a combination of arms, propaganda, economic pressure and a mobilisation of the Irish race throughout the world. You want for your protection an entirely different line of defence, but it is for your protection, and if you ask us to equip an immensely expensive armed machine, immensely expensive gun emplacements, immense stores of ammunition, in fact, an adequate force to repel an invasion until such time as your army can come to our aid and drive the invader out, then you ought to pay for it. That is a scheme of defence primarily concerned with your safety and not with ours. We are quite prepared to help you in pursuance of the Prime Minister's undertaking that this country will not be used for a jumping-off ground. We are quite prepared to help. We are quite prepared to enter into some kind of negotiations with you but we are not prepared to authorise you to come in and take over the defence of this country under any circumstances, any more than France would permit you to come in and take over the defence of her country. But, if you say to us, `In addition to the plans you have in mind for the protection of your territory, we want you to equip yourselves to repel an invader, we want you to create an Irish Army and Irish bases from which to conduct resistance to a foreign invader, our reply is, `We are quite prepared to do it, but you must pay for it because that part of the defence would be primarily designed for your protection and if that part of the defence is an essential part of any joint plan that may emerge from consultations between your general staff and our general staff, then, while we are quite prepared to finance the expense of the defence that our general staff think requisite for the protection of our territory; if there are further measures that the joint general staffs consider requisite for the protection of your territory, albeit that they are to be taken by the Irish Army and Irish Government and that their maintenance and development are to be an Irish responsibility, if they are to be done for your protection then you ought to pay for them.' "
I put it to the Minister that that is not a chiselling or mean or unreasonable attitude for this country to take up. Our obligation is to defend our own territory. I think, very wisely, we realise that it is not in the interest of this country, nor in the interest of democracy, nor in the interest of individual liberty anywhere in the world, to see Great Britain or the Commonwealth of Nations destroyed. I say quite definitely and plainly that the interest of the Commonwealth of Nations is Ireland's interest. I say quite definitely and plainly that the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the Commonwealth of Nations is Ireland's interest. But in the joint problems of defence there should be joint responsibility for expense. Each of the sovereign States-members of that Commonwealth has the obligation to defend its own territory. If any one of those States-members turns to a fellow State-members to ask for its aid, then it should be prepared to finance at least part of the cost.
So far I have referred to the defence problem arising out of the possibility of invasion—a remote possibility, not completely remote, not so completely remote as some Deputies might perhaps imagine. But there is another aspect of defence upon which I should like to hear the Minister when he comes to reply. Apart from the actual prospect of invasion, there is the modern technique of demoralising the community by aerial attack, striking at vital points by aerial attack. We are in future going to have in this territory the Rhynana air base, we are going to have the oil refinery in Dublin, we are going to have Ardnacrusha, and we may have one or two other tactical factories of that kind which might become military objectives which a foreign Government at war with Great Britain or at war with this country might be seriously concerned to destroy.
What do we propose to do to meet that? I think we ought to face that problem for ourselves. I would be interested to hear from the Minister what the Government's view is, first, on the cost and feasibility of adequate anti-aircraft defence. I am told of a new gun which the British Government have just evolved and are at present equipping their vital centres with—I think it is called the 3.7— which is a great advance in efficiency on any anti-aircraft gun yet produced. I will be interested to know whether the Minister has entered into negotiations with the British Government in order to secure supplies of that gun for our defence here and if he thinks we will be able to get supplies from the British manufacturers, or a licence to manufacture, if he proposes to establish the munition works here of which he was speaking some months ago. Secondly, I should like to ask the Minister, if we contemplate any expansion of our armed forces at all, whether we should not concentrate on our aerial arms rather than on infantry or land forces.
It is manifest, with our population, that if it becomes a question of mere numbers we cannot compete with any European nation at all. But, if it be a question of courage, daring, and skill, such as is involved in aerial warfare, then I think we can put up as good a show as any of them, and I would be happy to think that our anti-aircraft defences were supported by an adequate air force. After all, if we had a fairly good air force in this country, we could advance to meet any invading fleet of bombers that was advancing upon our territory and put up a very good show; put up so good a show that we might make it extremely difficult for any advancing air fleet, which had to cross Great Britain to reach this country at all. If, having treaded its way over the British defences, it had to meet a really formidable Irish air fleet over our own coast, I think we might reasonably hope to repel that type of aggressor who was trying to violate the integrity of our territory.
I do not think that can be done overnight, but if we plan to do it ultimately, the sooner we put our hand to the task the better. Aeroplanes take time to get, but difficult as it is to get supplies of aeroplanes, it is infinitely more difficult to train pilots. I would be interested to hear the Minister's expert view, but I should imagine that the really vital difficulty about building up an air force is not so much getting machines as training the men and having supplies of well-trained pilots. That will certainly take time, but I am sure the material is there, and if we approach it in the same way as the British Government has done and make it an attractive profession which would draw the best type of men, I do not see why we should not have as good an air force here, in proportion to our resources, as any country in the world.
There is one small matter and another matter of wider import to which I should like to refer before concluding. How much importance should we attach to the appearance of troops who are not on formal parade? All of us are jealous of the high reputation of the National Army. All of us would be anxious that the Volunteers would present a creditable and dignified appearance. No one expects men to come off manoeuvres as neat as a pin; no army could, and they probably would not have done their duty at manoeuvres if they did.
But, ordinarily, when troops on the move, not at manoeuvres, but on the move from barracks to barracks, are walking in uniform, they are generally appearing as members of the State forces. Is it a desideratum that their appearance should be as neat and tidy as one would expect the appearance of a member of the Gárda Síochána to be? I suggest that it is, and I would be interested to hear from the Minister if, in his judgment, the troops and the Volunteers recently have come up to his expectations in regard to that matter.
I know, and am glad to say, that one does meet fellows wearing both uniforms who arrest one's attention by their admirable appearance, and I am sorry to say that the way they look causes one sometimes to think how much better others might look if they took as much care of their external appearance as these fellows do. It may be that the Minister will reply that that is not a primary consideration in the Army: that the men in the Army have more to think of than keeping themselves as neat as pins. But I think it does matter. I think that from the general point of view of morale and discipline it must help them. I admit that I know little of the internal affairs of an army. On that matter, the Minister is qualified to speak where I am only fit to ask the questions.
The last thing I am interested to hear the Minister on is this: if we are to turn our backs, as I think we must turn our backs, definitely on the proposal to build up a vast army in this country simply because we could not pay it, maintain it or equip it, should we not concentrate on building up an immensely efficient army of small units which would excel in their particular sphere. If we are to do that, can we afford to dispense with some of the officers who have helped to build that army up, hold it together and establish its morale during the difficult years through which we have passed? I would very much like to see our army of the future built up into a small efficient organisation, consisting of a number of units, each one specialising in its own particular sphere—there are now so many spheres in ordinary army life—and each one being the very best of its kind. I think that would be an ambition worthy of the country. I think that is the kind of army of which we might be legitimately proud. We can never stage military reviews like Berlin, Rome or Moscow, and I do not think that we want to. I do not think that we should be proud to be able to do so, but I do think it would be something of which we might be legitimately proud if we had a comparatively small body of technicians who would be equal to any military problems that might be propounded to them, and from whom could be drawn a general staff second to none in Europe. That would take time, and involve some difficulty in giving them the kind of training requisite to reach that degree of efficiency. But, unless we set some objective before us, we will get nowhere at all. We will simply be running round in circles and wasting our time.
I would be interested if the Minister could tell us what exactly he envisages as the ideal towards which the Irish Army should aim. My ideal would be to see a series of small units, the best of their kind in the world, concentrating on the technical sides of military science, and proving themselves to be a body from which a general staff might be drawn that might compare favourably with the general staff of any army in the world. I do not think that is impossible. In fact, I think it is quite possible if we put our minds to it. That is the road along which, I think, we should travel, definitely rejecting as technically and politically unsound all "ballyhoo" and "hullabaloo" about building up a mighty defence force in this country calculated to repel all-comers. That should not be the line of country that we should travel. If, as a result of consultation, it becomes desirable to meet the threat of invasion by forces adequate to repel it until such time as our allies are in a position to throw irresistible assistance into the field, then our allies should be consulted as to what they are prepared to do to foot the bill. If that is not the plan, then we should turn our back on that kind of thing altogether, realising our impotence to resist violence by violence in the existing state of the world, and take refuge in the absolute safety that we ultimately have by our record as being able to carry on a war of independence for ever, if that were necessary, but, in fact, to the point of exhaustion of anybody who attempts to conquer this country.
Mr. Brasier rose.