The particular matter that occupied a considerable portion of the Taoiseach's speech, even what has occurred as regards the question of conscription in the North, and the particular concession that has been given, shows the unnaturalness of Partition. With Europe facing the situation that it is to-day, with Great Britain and France having to face a situation in which their very existence will be at stake, knowing, as the British Government should have known, the importance of avoiding any cause of irritation between the Government of this country and themselves, it seems to me as if—not for the first time on their part—they were guilty of an incredible piece of stupidity, to put it no higher. As I say, when faced, as I am afraid we soon may be faced, with a situation that will test the good sense and the good-will of two Governments, whose fundamental interests should be identical, it is, to my mind, amazing that they should, so to speak, gratuitously, go out of their way to raise a matter of grave misunderstanding between these two States. I am sure the House shares with the Taoiseach the hope that anxiety in this particular matter will be quickly allayed. However, judging by the action of the British Government in the past, judging by the attitude of the British Government during the particular European crisis we are discussing, I feel in my bones that there is always the danger that the epitaph may have to be written: "Too late". I hope that, if they do make up their minds to meet this particular matter in the way the Taoiseach suggested, there will be no delay about doing it. The quicker it is done the better for both Governments and both States in the long run. I should have found it extremely difficult, as I say, at another period of British history to understand action of this kind or remissness of this kind— it can hardly be that, because I gather their attention was drawn to it, and drawn very definitely to it—on the part of that Government, were it not for the fact that I find it extremely difficult to find any rationale especially in their treatment of foreign affairs in Europe in the last three or four years.
There are a number of matters in this Estimate that we might discuss. The actual activities of the Department might be discussed, but I am not prepared to go into those things at the moment. I realise, possibly nobody more fully, the gravity of the situation and how necessary it is to direct the attention of the country and the attention of the Government to the consequences that war may have, not merely for civilisation but for ourselves. I think that in many respects the situation is much graver now than it was before the outbreak of war in 1914. I think the consequences of war now would be much more disastrous even than in 1914. I have a feeling that not merely our interests in the material sense but even our liberties, as we enjoy them here in the Twenty-Six Counties, may be gravely jeopardised or may come to an end as a result of this particular struggle. It is because I feel that many people in the country, though they are anxious about the international situation and are keenly interested in it, have, to my mind, failed to grasp the gravity of many of the issues involved, that I should like to direct the attention of the House to some of these issues.
In a way, I regret, and I am sure the Taoiseach regrets, that he had to make the particular statement he has just made on the question of conscription in Northern Ireland. That, unfortunate in itself, may have an effect on some people on the Continent inclined, and shall I say, anxious to misread the signs, and those people here who are also willing and anxious to misread the signs.
I can hope with the Taoiseach that war is not inevitable. No catastrophe of that kind is strictly inevitable. But for a number of years past, and particularly for the last 12 months. I certainly can see very little grounds on which to base any optimism whatever. Optimism is an excellent tonic. I can quite understand, and I have a great deal of sympathy with, the attitude of the English people in treating Munich as a great victory—a defeat so great that there was no other method of preserving the morale of the country except to hail it as a victory. I myself, I may candidly confess, greeted it at least as a postponement of the horrible catastrophe of war, whatever I may have thought of the price paid. There was at least that gain, but that anybody could seriously pretend that it settled, rather than unsettled, the situation in Europe was difficult to understand. For some people it was a tonic that they should pretend it was a victory.
There is no reason why here, situated a bit out of the way perhaps, we should not face the facts a little more realistically and realise what really happened, as possibly most people realise it now, and try to make out what is liable to happen in the immediate future, or if not in the immediate future, then in the course of the next couple of years. A number of people in this country, who assume that war may break out and are very perturbed at the prospect, who realise the horrible sufferings of war and the losses that may be caused by war—not merely material losses—do not realise that a war which breaks out now may well end in the defeat of the Western Powers. That is a possibility. Had I been asked 12 months ago whether it was a reasonable possibility, I should have said "No". Were I asked to-day I should be very slow to give even a hesitant answer.
Let us ask ourselves, apart altogether from other issues which may be at stake, and there are other issues at stake, if such a thing happened, what would be the position of the liberties even of the Twenty-Six Counties. I cannot see our people continuing to enjoy their present liberties. We may say that the idea is fantastic. I heard people nine months ago denounce as fantastic many of the things which have become the realities of European politics at the present day.
Leaving aside the question of democracies and autocracies, I think it is quite possible that the Western Powers might be defeated. In that case, we could easily become, call it a protectorate if you like, an outpost against the United States. That is by no means an impossibility. But it is not a possibility of which the great bulk of our people reckon, any more than the people of Europe realised what was in front of them twelve, nine or six months ago. I want, therefore, every possible care given to the consideration of what may be the issues at stake for this country, even for those liberties of which the Taoiseach spoke. I have not the slightest doubt that the people of the country, as the Taoiseach said, like the people of any other country, will be prepared to defend their liberty. So were nations much more powerful than we are. Comparatively small nations were quite willing to defend their liberty.
I have not the smallest doubt that Czecho-Slovakia was quite willing to defend its liberties and fight for them I think nothing more cynical has occurred in recent history than the way in which certain statement gave as an excuse for the particular line which they pursued that they had saved a great deal of slaughter in Czecho-Slovakia. But the Czechs never asked them to do so. What happened then? Wisely these nations, ever so much stronger than we are, made up their minds to surrender. Do I despise them for that? I do not do anything of the kind. There was no alternative open to them.
For that reason I ask the House to consider what would be the outcome for us if there was a real defeat of the Western Powers. I say "Western Powers" because I leave aside now the question of autocracies and democracies. It is not our business to try to impose or wish certain people to have a certain form of government. That is beside the issue. A great deal of harm has been done, I am convinced, by raising false issues in that respect. There are other reasons, besides the form of government imposed on certain European States, why I oppose them. Independent altogether of the form of government they enjoy, I object a great deal to what they stand for in the sphere of civilisation, religion, and culture. I think it would be disastrous for Europe, disastrous for our values, for the things we prize most highly, I shan't say that the Western Powers should be defeated, but that National Socialism should have a chance of triumphing. That is the issue in which we are vitally concerned. I am not interested in what form of government the German people choose to have or do not choose to have, but I am interested that the particular outlook in life which National Socialism represents shall not be forced on other countries.
There is no good in pretending that this is all moonshine. There are very few countries in the two hemispheres in which there is not an intense propaganda going on. In the United States and in many States in South America propaganda has been going on in favour of that particular form of philosophy, outlook on life, secular religion, call it what you like. Is that for nothing? Does anybody think that the interest of that particular outlook on life stops at the frontiers of Europe? It does nothing of the kind. It envisages a great deal more than European domination.
Again, people will say that that is fantastic. When I see people making proclamations that mean world domination, and when these people have already proclaimed other things and carried them out, then I think it is time that people paid at least some attention to the words of these people. Therefore, it is well that we should recognise it, and I do not think the country recognises it. There is a certain amount of propaganda going on in this country—the extent of it I do not know. I think that particular form of propaganda is most marked and has caused considerable uneasiness not merely to the Government of South Africa, but especially to many of the Governments in South America. What is it for? A very short time after Munich, when all were to be friends, when a new world was to be built up on that extraordinary foundation that was laid there, Dr. Goebbels, charged with the complete propaganda of the Reich, said one thing which has remained in my mind since: "Had we been united in 1914, we should have world domination." Is that fantasy? I should have laughed at it myself a couple of years ago. Dare anybody laugh at it at the present day?
If there is the slightest doubt, not merely about the particular form of secular religion for which Germany stands, but about the wish for world domination—as a preliminary, of course, domination in Europe—let anybody who has such doubt read the full translation of the famous book of Herr Hitler, "Mein Kampf," which is now available. I am not anxious to go into the archives to show what he meant there and what he meant here, if certain things were not borne out and brought up to date by the policy of that particular Government. I have just one quotation here, and perhaps I may be pardoned for reading it. Let anybody consider, in the light of the activities that we see in Europe and the propagandist activities in the two hemispheres, a statement like that I have quoted from Dr. Goebbels, and remember that the great boast is: "We are united now; had we been united in 1914 we would have world domination."
The conclusion is fairly obvious as to what is aimed at. Here is the master himself, and I see no reason to believe it is not his policy to-day. Speaking of an extraordinary disease that he is under the impression the Germans are suffering from, and which he calls hyper-individualism, he wrote:—
"During times of peace, such a situation may offer some advantages, but taking it all in all, it has prevented us from gaining a mastery in the world. If in its historical development the German people had possessed the unity of herd instinct by which other people have so much benefited, then the German Reich would probably be mistress of the globe to-day. World history would have taken another course, and in this case no man can tell if what many blinded pacifists hope to obtain by petitioning, whining and crying, may not have been reached in this way; namely, a peace which would not be based on the waving of olive branches and tearful misery-mongering of pacifist old women, but a peace that would be guaranteed triumphant by the sword of a people endowed with the power to master the world and administer it in the service of a higher civilisation."
Is that rubbish? Is that ridiculous nonsense? Thirteen or 14 years ago when that was written, the world might have laughed at it. Can the world afford to laugh at it to-day?
Another contingency I should like to ask the country to consider is this: If this crisis is postponed for a couple of years, and if the tension, as seems likely, continues so that you have continued crises—I mean if it does not burst forth in its full ripeness for a couple of years—there is this position that I feel few people envisage, but it is a possibility, and is partly borne out by rather recent pronouncements from the same source. I have recently contended that this crisis in world peace will be more serious than 1914 in its bearing on the question of individual liberties and States. A great deal more is involved now. There are terrific dangers apart from that, the dangers of the triumph of National Socialism on the one hand or perhaps Bolshevism on the other hand. Probably it is just a choice between them. I find it very hard to know which is the greater evil. At the moment I should say that National Socialism is the more dangerous. That is all I can say in favour of either.
There is very little difference between the two outlooks. Daily they are getting closer together, and were the personal element left out, I am quite sure the alliance that many of the Germans sponsor might become an active alliance of these two supposed enemies, they are so much alike. In the things I am most interested in, I say there is very little difference between the two, and if the Bolshevists triumph, as may happen, the people who will have to bear a large share of the responsibility, as well as the Bolshevists themselves who were primarily responsible, will be the so-called dictators and the premiers of a few great States in Europe. The dictators, on the one hand, and the so-called democratic premiers on the other hand have contributed to bring about the state of affairs we see to-day.
What chance has Europe of getting out of the present situation? I am particularly anxious to see how it will affect us. We see efforts being made now at the eleventh hour to restore confidence amongst the various Powers in Europe. There is a tremendous struggle, in the light of what has occurred in the last couple of years, to bring back a feeling of confidence to a number of the small and middlesized States in Europe. They are trembling for their very existence to take the side of any Power at either side. Either as an instrument to advance their own particular cause to victory, or to stave off defeat, do we think our liberties would be respected for a moment? I call attention to the fact that in some of his recent speeches —and it was noteworthy in the last speech as a particular case in point, as was the Reichstag one immediately preceding it—that there was very little reference to Russia. All his antagonism was directed against England and the United States of America. That is a situation I commend to the careful attention of the Government, and also to our people as a whole. These are factors that dare not be left out of a count. In our material interests and in our spiritual interests, and in the interests of the liberty of this country, it is not a matter of indifference to us as to who would come out of the maelstrom as victors. Our own spiritual interests could be very well at stake. Our liberties might be at stake; everything we hold dear might be at stake. Again, it is a great mistake, a mistake that British statesmen after British statesmen have made, not to pay serious attention to what people on the Continent say. It is assumed, when they make "extravagant" statements, at least the commonsense Englishman assumes, that they are not meant. That is the situation that faces not merely Great Britain but that faces as well the United States.
Supposing the Western Powers collapsed in a quick war, supposing you have that hatred of democracy that is continually preached and denounced, what would happen? My own view is that no country has the right to impose government on another country, because that is a matter for the people themselves. But that is not the view of certain people, and even in England there are people who object to Germany and Italy merely on the ground of the form of Government they have. For that there is no justification. But you need only read the speech of the German Chancellor to see the hatred of democracy. The only difference between his attitude now and 12 months ago is that added to the hatred of 12 months ago there is contempt, and that is a much more dangerous situation. He now tilts, even more than at Great Britain, at the United States of America. We have a supreme interest in that particular matter, and it is because I am anxious that the Government should not leave any of that side of the question out of account that I stress it. It is highly desirable that there should be good relations between this country and the Government of Great Britain at all times, and particularly now. That is the reason I hope that this difficulty that has arisen about conscription in Northern Ireland will be quickly put aside. That that should be the cause of unfriendly relations between the two countries seems to me to be unthinkable. It is not merely a question of the British Empire being at stake; we are not particularly interested in that except in so far as it might concern ourselves; but we are interested in the fate of the Commonwealth of Nations so far as that affects ourselves; and that anything should occur to prevent harmonious relations between the two countries, in view of the present crisis, is almost unthinkable. I think it is a duty, not merely on our own Government, but on the English Government, to prevent any such thing happening. That seems to me to be quite clear.
I cannot speak, of course, from a military point of view. I do not know what advantage our harbourages would be at the present time to any country, or whether their defence is necessary or not. As I say, I cannot speak on that, but let us suppose that our harbours should become a nesting-place for, let us say, German submarines, in the event of war, acting against foodships coming in, not alone to England, but into this country, what would be our position? I do not want to put the Taoiseach into the position of having to answer questions that might possibly damage this country at the moment, but I do want the Government to consider well what our position would be likely to be.
We speak of an invasion of our neutrality and of our hitting back. Well, let us look at both points of view. Again, I put it before the Government and before the House, and I should like the House to put it before the country— because I think that this is the most serious situation that we have had to face—suppose Germany violates our neutrality by dropping bombs on Dublin, how can we react to that? Even if a war were to break out to-morrow, I do not suppose anybody expects us here to send a single soldier out of this country; but in the case that I have given, such as the dropping of bombs by, let us say, Germany, on Dublin, how then could we react against Germany? I do not desire that there should be any misunderstandings between the two Governments that would mean that both would be really fighting against their own interests. But in times of stress that is precisely, unfortunately, what may occur.
There is another point that I want to make clear. What will our problem be in the case of war? Whether we regard ourselves as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or whether we are merely utilising King George VI for the purpose of certain external affairs, or whether we regard ourselves as having a republican Constitution, our position will not be determined by that, and I think that those who assume we would be in a better position if the present situation were changed are mistaken; but the fact is that our position will be determined, not by these considerations, but by our geographical situation and by the necessities and desires of the other countries that are at war. In a life-and-death struggle such as this war is going to be if it breaks out, does anybody think that the Germans, or the people of any other country, are going to allow themselves to be wiped out of existence merely for the sake of observing our neutrality? These are matters that I should like the Government to consider. This is a very difficult period in our history, and we must face it. It may be only a couple of months before the war may be upon us, and again, the incredible may happen, and the whole situation may quieten down— though I do not think there is much hope of that. Again, there may be a continuing crisis going on for a couple of years or longer, with a continuing changing of the European situation, but that is just what concerns us. I think that the Taoiseach himself pointed out on one occasion the great strategic importance of our country's position in the event of such a war. It is quite true that we in this country are only on the verge of Europe, but it is also true, perhaps unfortunately for ourselves, that to some extent we are in the centre of the world. We are on the outskirts of Europe, but, to some extent, our island commands the approaches to Europe. If, then, as I say, you wish to be neutral, and German submarines, or the submarines of other hostile countries, come in and use your harbours, how will you deal with them? Supposing that we have our full independence here, what about the question of foodstuffs?
Who can tell what will happen in the event of an outbreak of war? Suppose that Spain happens to be on the side of the Axis Powers? There, at all events, there is a potential harborage for submarines—not merely against Great Britain but against foodstuffs for ourselves. The very existence, not alone the welfare of the United States of America may depend on the capacity to cope with these. I do not know whether the United States of America will come in to a war of the type that is possible in Europe at the moment. I could not prophesy as to that. That they have taken up a strong attitude with regard to the present crisis is quite clear, but what their attitude will be in the case of an actual European war, I could not say; I am not sure. That they would come in ultimately, if the war lasted long enough, is highly likely; but beyond that nobody can prophesy, and neither can anybody prophesy as to how quickly they would come in even if they did eventually come in. Let us suppose a modern European war lasting three years. Does anybody think that there would be any of our civilisation left? Let us try to remember the Napoleonic wars, which lasted, roughly speaking, about a quarter of a century. About 100 years afterwards we had the Great War, which lasted four years, and which put a much greater strain on the peoples of Europe than the 25 years of the Napoleonic wars. Surely it will be admitted that a war at the present time, lasting for a year or a year and a half, would be much more disastrous in its effects than the four years of the last war, and, from what I can make out, some of the European Powers at the moment are preparing for such a war.
In view of these possibilities, we have to consider what our position would be, and I want the Government to consider this matter very seriously, because, as I say, it is our very existence that may be at stake, and, I fully believe, it will require a great deal of clear grasping of the situation and, possibly, often, a great deal of restraint, even in the coming months, if we are to avoid steps that may ultimately be disastrous. I am sure that the Government will take every means to avoid that, but I wish to impress upon them the necessity for considering calmly and coldy, with as little emotion as possible, and as objectively as possible, where our interests are likely to be, and where we are likely to be at the end of the war if it breaks out. It is very easy for some people to say that we are on the outskirts of Europe, and that we are not likely to be affected by such a war. Many people say: "Thank goodness, we are not like Holland, just on the borders of Germany." Many other people say: "Thank goodness, we are not like Switzerland." Certainly, we have certain advantages if such a war were to be confined to the Continent of Europe, but it is not going to be confined to the Continent of Europe.
Nobody has put that more strongly than the Taoiseach himself—the extreme importance of our position— when he said that some of our ports were equivalent to several Gibraltars. As well as I remember, that was the phrase used. Possibly, it was a patriotic exaggeration, but at least so far as I can see merely an exaggeration, and not a complete misrepresentation of the situation. We may think that we can sit quietly here and take a ringside seat and watch what is going on. Now, if our position is such as the Taoiseach has said, is it likely that we shall be allowed to take a ringside seat? Can we, any more in this than in other matters, take up the line that so many in this country are inclined to take up: "Well, what is it to us what happens to certain people in Germany, whether they are kicked out or not; let us attend to our own affairs." May I raise a question on this Vote, namely, the way in which the people have not responded—I am not speaking now of the Government —to the claims that people of our faith from other countries have on us? They may say "we are not our brother's keeper", but if we are not, and if we take up that particular line, we are possibly apt to get into the other half of the famous advertisement of Bovril, "Alas, my poor brother."
That may be our position. But we need not be so much ashamed of ourselves. Greater nations than ours have, unfortunately for themselves, taken up that position. That policy of splendid isolation that has been preached by certain circles in England has led to peculiar developments, and has led almost to the very undermining of the whole position of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the Empire itself. It is rather interesting to see one of the strong advocates of Partition in the North, one of the most patriotic of them all, the man that has played a very peculiar rôle in the international politics of Europe in the last six months: it is a very peculiar thing indeed that when the British Government announce a certain policy there are certain forces that seem to know better than the Government themselves what that policy is. We had an interesting example of that last September when apparently the London Times and a man like Lord Londonderry had a better insight into what Government policy was going to be than the official spokesman of that Government. There was a ray of hope for peace the other day when we saw the same Times belittling the pledge given by Mr. Chamberlain to Poland. It did the same thing last September. It was repudiated last September, and it was proved right by events. It belittled the pledge of the other day, and it was repudiated.
I have not seen some of the maps that have been published in Germany. I am not referring to the one that Deputy Mulcahy adduced the other day, but I have heard a great deal about them. But taking these, and the pledges and the actions of that Central Power, which cause nothing but the gravest uneasiness for the future of every country, what is the excuse for wiping out of existence Austria and Czechoslovakia? We are told, of course, that there was no employment of force. In other words, if you are so strong that your forces cannot be resisted it is a virtue to attack the weak: it proves the very height of your virtue. One small nation after another has been wiped out, and the rest are in a state of nerves. Why should not they be? Can we hope to escape? Possibly that can be discussed more appropriately on the next Vote, but I sometimes ask myself, when I watch the development of modern European politics, whether or not the day of small nations has passed with the claims of the bigger nations, some of them put forward cynically and openly and the others to follow suit when the time comes.
Speaking about international agreements, I wonder where the greatest contempt has been shown for international agreements? I saw that a British statesman made the statement the other day that you could not trust the word of the dictators. He was an optimist in thinking that you could trust the word of any leading European statesman so far as international agreements are concerned. I mention that because that is a situation we have to face. We cannot ignore it. You may tell me quite truly that England and France made Hitler, and that since he came into power they have consolidated his position. What, if they did? That does not make his position at the present moment any weaker: it makes it all the stronger, and it makes that Power a menace, not merely to England and France but to every country in Europe. We have to face that: we cannot ignore it. It is small comfort to us that great Powers, to their own detriment, let that menace develop. We certainly cannot ignore the menace, although I say that a number of people in this country are doing it. I am not referring now to the Government, but I do say that there is a certain underlying campaign almost in favour of that particular Power.
Can anyone be certain of knowing what that Power stands for? As I have said already in this House, it seems to me to be almost the very personification of evil. It is not because it is autocratic that I object to that form of Government—that is not my business—but it does personify a great deal more than that, and for that reason I object to it. What is the position? At the present moment, if a fortnight passes without a major crisis, is there not a feeling of relief, almost of optimism all over Europe? The fact that you were deceived last week does not prevent you from being optimistic about next week. From the fact that last week's crisis is over, following one a fortnight before, and that this does not lead to another crisis, people assume that everything is all right. I see no justification for optimism of that kind.
I hope, like the Taoiseach, that war is not inevitable. I recognise certain changes that have taken place. If you take the political or rather the strategic position of the world, I should say you would find that as the result of the war of 1914 to 1918, Great Britain, to a large extent, lost the position that she previously had in the world, as arbiter, so to speak, in Europe. That position has automatically gone to the United States of America. Whether that country decides to intervene or not, it will be found that ultimately her interests will be bound up with Europe, as the President of that country has so often demonstrated. She will be in Europe to the same extent as Great Britain used to be in the great wars up to the end of the nineteenth century, and even after the nineteenth century. She will inevitably be brought into that position. That makes her position one of considerable importance.
I should like the Government to weigh very carefully, having in mind the interests, spiritual and political, the liberty that we ought to enjoy and the material interest of this country, and to shape its policy on them. I know very well there will be a number of people anxious to drive the Government into other directions. It will require a certain effort to resist pressure of that kind. But I feel it will be essential for the future welfare of this country that the Government should not yield to thoughtless clamour of that kind, no matter from where it comes. The Government will be wise to pursue coldly, calmly and undeviatingly the best interests of the country if they take that line.