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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 2 May 1939

Vol. 75 No. 11

Committee on Finance. - Vote 67—External Affairs.

I move:—

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £57,181 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1940, chun Tuarastail agus Costaisí Oifig an Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha, agus Seirbhísí áirithe atátá fé riaradh na hOifige sin (Uimh. 16 de 1924).

That a sum not exceeding £57,181 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Office of the Minister for External Affairs, and of certain Services administered by that Office (No. 16 of 1924).

Deputies looking at the Estimates will vote that the total this year is £90,931, showing an increase of £8,062. The increase is made up almost entirely of two non-recurring items, namely, a contribution of £3,684 towards the expenses of the Non-Intervention Committee with regard to Spain, and a sum of £3,940 for the mission to the United States. The rest of the increase is due to normal increases of salaries, and adjustments. On the other side there are receipts estimated to amount to £14,500. This brings the total net sum to be provided to £76,431.

The Estimate contains three new items for which the Dáil passed Supplementary Estimates during the year, namely, a sum for the repatriation of volunteers from Spain, a sum for the Austro-German refugees—£200— and £750 for the promotion of cultural relations with the United States. During the year, the Department continued to expand and develop. The first Minister for Belgium presented his credentials here and in a few days we are to have renewal of Spanish representation. I think I should say, in passing, how glad we all are that the civil war has terminated in Spain and how glad we are, also, that the new Minister will represent once more the Spanish nation here.

The state of tension abroad has naturally increased the responsibilities of our representatives abroad, to whom our nationals naturally appeal for assistance and advice in these times of anxiety. In the United States of America the services of our consuls were invoked in regard to 600 estates, which resulted in the distribution of some £32,000 to people in Ireland. Visas were issued in the United States at the rate of about 25 a day. I may, perhaps, say, in passing, that the changes in the passport, which I indicated we had under contemplation and consideration in February, have now been made. The new passport is being issued. I do not think there is anything further I need say on the details of the Vote.

Before the discussion goes any further, are we discussing both Votes together?

No; separately.

The reason I intervened was to prevent any misunderstanding. I think it would be better, as the Taoiseach suggests, to discuss them separately, that is, Votes 67 and 68.

I would suggest that it is much better not to have any mixing up of these things. They stand on a different level. I know that the Opposition has been anxious to have a debate on external affairs, and, I understand, of course, the anxiety that everybody feels at the present time; but I am not quite clear what particular aspects of the situation the Opposition wish to discuss. Nowadays, with the radio and the Press, and with everybody interested in the international situation, there is very little I can add to the knowledge which I am sure every Deputy already possesses about the situation. We all know its gravity. We all know the danger. We know that Europe is, in fact, as I said in a recent speech, an armed camp. As far as a small nation can do anything to remedy that situation we have tried to do it, but in times like these, when the Great Powers are arming as fast as they can, when expenditure on armaments is reckoned in hundreds, and even in thousands, of millions of pounds, it is obvious that a small nation's voice cannot be of much avail. However, in so far as we have been able to exert any influence, it has been on the side of peace.

Looking at it generally, it seems to us that there ought to be on this globe room for all of us and that it ought not to be necessary that there should be disastrous war, of the dimensions of which it is likely to be, in order to settle some of the differences that may cause it. In so far as we could do it, we have urged on the greater powers—because, in the long run, it is they whose interests are likely to provoke this conflict—that they should get into conference and try, in a peaceful manner, to adjust the differences that exist. I hope that war is not inevitable. I do not think it ought to be, but, undoubtedly, a greater disposition must be shown on the part of the Governments of the great Powers towards conciliation and peaceful adjustment of differences if this war is to be averted.

Should a war occur, the smaller nations, even though they themselves may have no desire whatever to be involved in conflict, are bound to suffer too. Heavy burdens are placed on the nations that desire to keep out of this war. Nobody can suggest for a moment, for example, that countries like Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries, desire war or have any purposes of aggression in mind, but they have to bear very heavy burdens for armaments for one purpose only—in order to provide that, should this war break out, the desire of their people to keep clear of it might be respected by the combatants on both sides. They realise, as we must realise here, that the only chance they will have in a conflict of that sort, the only chance there is that their rights will be respected, is that those who would try to interfere with them will not be able to escape without some punishment at any rate. I saw a statement by a representative of one of the Scandinavian states in which it was stated that, though they had no hostile intention against any other State, they were arming and bearing the burden of armaments in order that, at least, any State that might wish to attack them would not be able to succeed immediately even though, with the weight that might be brought against them, they might ultimately succeed unless some other assistance was given to them. We here have indicated our desire to avoid being involved in this conflict but, as I said here, it is not sufficient to wish to keep out of this war.

I think I have already indicated that, even though we were completely out of it and regarded by the combatants on both sides as having no desire to enter it, any such conflict will have very grave reactions here, even though we are not at all directly involved in it. But, apart from that, we have the duty to try to see that our wishes in that matter will be respected by the combatants on both sides. For that reason, we have asked that there should be a certain increase in our expenditure on defence. It may be urged—perhaps it could be urged with a certain amount of truth—that we should have begun earlier to note that and that the expenditure which we propose to make is not nearly what we should prepare for, if we want to be in a position in which real respect will be given to our desire to be neutral. The only excuse I can offer for that is that we are already fairly burdened with taxation; that there is a great deal of pressure of social services and so on, and the Government was very loath indeed to add to those burdens by expenditure on defence, on armaments. However, we have got to do our best, and I am perfectly certain that the people in this country are as willing as the people in any other country to defend their liberties.

With regard to external relations generally, we have no cause of quarrel, no dispute with any country, save the continuing dispute which we have with Great Britain. I say "continuing" because everybody knows that the settlement of last year, though it did remove all the causes of a particular dispute, did not remove one fundamental cause of dispute, namely, the Partition of our country. Everybody knows here, I think, and will admit that this Government has endeavoured to lay the foundation for really friendly relations between the two countries. It has endeavoured to do that in the only way in which it can be done, and that is by the removal of the causes of the dispute. Those causes, I need not go back upon them now, were largely, as far as this part of Ireland was concerned, removed. If this part were the whole. I think we could say that most of the troubles, the causes of dispute in the past, would have been removed. I could almost say practically all have been removed, but this continuing cause of dispute is poisoning the relations, and will continue to poison the relations, between the two countries as long as it is permitted to exist.

The difficulties of that position have been accentuated by the proposal which is at present, I understand, before the British Parliament, the proposal to conscript Irishmen in the Six Counties into the British Army. Everybody who was alive 20 years ago knows the resistance which such a proposition met from the Irish people here, and from the Irish people throughout the world. It was a question on which there was a greater amount of unanimity amongst our people than any other political question. The whole Irish race, here and abroad, united as one to resist it, and it will be remembered, so great was our hatred of this intolerable—because it was intolerable—aggression, that we actually pledged ourselves to resist it by every effective means, a pledge which got the support of Irishmen everywhere. The present proposal is in no wise different from the proposal at that time. It is a proposal by a foreign Parliament, a foreign Government, foreign to our country, to conscript Irishmen for the British Army. No legal points can cover the fundamental fact. We claim the whole of Ireland as national territory. That claim will remain, I believe, as long as the Irish nation remains, and will be asserted as long as there is any denial of it, or as long as any portion of our territory is cut off. To conscript, therefore, Irishmen who are inhabiting that area is an act of aggression.

There is no use in mincing words in regard to it. That is our attitude towards it, the attitude of the Government towards it, and it will be the attitude of Irishmen wherever they are. As I indicated in the question to-day, the Government have, in the strongest terms, protested against it. It is not sufficient, I think—in fact, I am sure it is not sufficient—that there should be a suggestion, a measure, in the British Parliament that this will not come in immediately, but can be held as a threat during a continuing period. That threat would be intolerable. Anybody who wishes for good relations between the two countries must realise that the continuation of that threat would be intolerable. I think I will be speaking for the Irish people here and throughout the world if I ask that that clause be eliminated from the Bill. As I said, no doubt lawyers will put forward a case for it, suggesting to the British Government, as this is part of the territory that they call the United Kingdom, that the British Government have a right to do this. But that is just the point; the point is that we deny that that portion of Ireland should be separated from our territory here.

I do not wish to speak any more on this matter. From one point of view I prefer not to speak about it at all at the moment, but I know that I would not be representing the views of the Irish people if I did not make our position in that matter clear. Consequently, I have done so. I hope that this particular difficulty will be removed, but the difficulty arises immediately out of the question of Partition, out of the fact that portion of our country has been cut off from the national territory against the will of the vast majority of the Irish people. Only a small fraction of the total population of this country, a relatively small fraction of the total population of this country would vote for the cutting off of that area if it were put to a national plebiscite. We know that it is not Ulster; we know that there are only six of the nine counties in that area. We know that those six were cut off on no basic principle, corresponding to no historic fact of any kind, geographic fact or even economic fact. They were cut off for one purpose, to give the Parliament in Belfast or the majority in that area the biggest territory that they could hold with their majority. We know that of the six counties we could take out four and put them in a bloc—all the counties of the six except two on the sea border, namely Antrim and Down —and that if you took a plebiscite in four out of those six counties we would have a majority in favour of unity with the country; so that, in fact, it is only in the area east of the Bann—an area altogether less than a tenth of the area of the whole country—that there is any local majority for Partition.

I think that, as I said on other occasions, the more we make those facts known the better, because it is on an understanding and a knowledge of those facts that our attitude towards that whole question will be properly understood. We claim, then, that this island as a whole is an historic national territory. We claim that the present division is not based on any fundamental fact of history or geography or economics or anything else. It is purely a gerrymandered area. We claim it is only in a very small part of the area, less than half of it, that there would be anything like a local majority in favour of separation. All the interests of the people who are living in this island, as I believe also the interests of the people in the neighbouring island, would be better served if that division were ended. With regard to our external relations generally, as I have said, we are on friendly terms with every nation. We want to be on the friendliest possible terms with Britain, but this division of our country is the fundamental matter in dispute between us. If that were removed, and if the position in the whole island were similar to the position we have here, then I think I would need to make no reservation in regard to our external affairs.

I should like to be able to say, as I think on a previous occasion I indicated that I hoped somebody would soon be able to say, speaking from this bench, that we were at peace and in friendly relations with every nation in the world because we wish well to all nations. We believe that small nations benefit from peace more than they could possibly benefit from war. We believe, as a matter of fact, that nations, great and small, taking the long view, would benefit more by peace than by war, but at the moment I regret that it is not possible for me to make that statement without reservation. As I said at the start, I am somewhat in a difficulty, because I do not know exactly what are the points with which the Opposition wish to deal in this debate. They were evidently very anxious to have it but, perhaps, I shall understand their position better when I have heard some of the speeches.

The particular matter that occupied a considerable portion of the Taoiseach's speech, even what has occurred as regards the question of conscription in the North, and the particular concession that has been given, shows the unnaturalness of Partition. With Europe facing the situation that it is to-day, with Great Britain and France having to face a situation in which their very existence will be at stake, knowing, as the British Government should have known, the importance of avoiding any cause of irritation between the Government of this country and themselves, it seems to me as if—not for the first time on their part—they were guilty of an incredible piece of stupidity, to put it no higher. As I say, when faced, as I am afraid we soon may be faced, with a situation that will test the good sense and the good-will of two Governments, whose fundamental interests should be identical, it is, to my mind, amazing that they should, so to speak, gratuitously, go out of their way to raise a matter of grave misunderstanding between these two States. I am sure the House shares with the Taoiseach the hope that anxiety in this particular matter will be quickly allayed. However, judging by the action of the British Government in the past, judging by the attitude of the British Government during the particular European crisis we are discussing, I feel in my bones that there is always the danger that the epitaph may have to be written: "Too late". I hope that, if they do make up their minds to meet this particular matter in the way the Taoiseach suggested, there will be no delay about doing it. The quicker it is done the better for both Governments and both States in the long run. I should have found it extremely difficult, as I say, at another period of British history to understand action of this kind or remissness of this kind— it can hardly be that, because I gather their attention was drawn to it, and drawn very definitely to it—on the part of that Government, were it not for the fact that I find it extremely difficult to find any rationale especially in their treatment of foreign affairs in Europe in the last three or four years.

There are a number of matters in this Estimate that we might discuss. The actual activities of the Department might be discussed, but I am not prepared to go into those things at the moment. I realise, possibly nobody more fully, the gravity of the situation and how necessary it is to direct the attention of the country and the attention of the Government to the consequences that war may have, not merely for civilisation but for ourselves. I think that in many respects the situation is much graver now than it was before the outbreak of war in 1914. I think the consequences of war now would be much more disastrous even than in 1914. I have a feeling that not merely our interests in the material sense but even our liberties, as we enjoy them here in the Twenty-Six Counties, may be gravely jeopardised or may come to an end as a result of this particular struggle. It is because I feel that many people in the country, though they are anxious about the international situation and are keenly interested in it, have, to my mind, failed to grasp the gravity of many of the issues involved, that I should like to direct the attention of the House to some of these issues.

In a way, I regret, and I am sure the Taoiseach regrets, that he had to make the particular statement he has just made on the question of conscription in Northern Ireland. That, unfortunate in itself, may have an effect on some people on the Continent inclined, and shall I say, anxious to misread the signs, and those people here who are also willing and anxious to misread the signs.

I can hope with the Taoiseach that war is not inevitable. No catastrophe of that kind is strictly inevitable. But for a number of years past, and particularly for the last 12 months. I certainly can see very little grounds on which to base any optimism whatever. Optimism is an excellent tonic. I can quite understand, and I have a great deal of sympathy with, the attitude of the English people in treating Munich as a great victory—a defeat so great that there was no other method of preserving the morale of the country except to hail it as a victory. I myself, I may candidly confess, greeted it at least as a postponement of the horrible catastrophe of war, whatever I may have thought of the price paid. There was at least that gain, but that anybody could seriously pretend that it settled, rather than unsettled, the situation in Europe was difficult to understand. For some people it was a tonic that they should pretend it was a victory.

There is no reason why here, situated a bit out of the way perhaps, we should not face the facts a little more realistically and realise what really happened, as possibly most people realise it now, and try to make out what is liable to happen in the immediate future, or if not in the immediate future, then in the course of the next couple of years. A number of people in this country, who assume that war may break out and are very perturbed at the prospect, who realise the horrible sufferings of war and the losses that may be caused by war—not merely material losses—do not realise that a war which breaks out now may well end in the defeat of the Western Powers. That is a possibility. Had I been asked 12 months ago whether it was a reasonable possibility, I should have said "No". Were I asked to-day I should be very slow to give even a hesitant answer.

Let us ask ourselves, apart altogether from other issues which may be at stake, and there are other issues at stake, if such a thing happened, what would be the position of the liberties even of the Twenty-Six Counties. I cannot see our people continuing to enjoy their present liberties. We may say that the idea is fantastic. I heard people nine months ago denounce as fantastic many of the things which have become the realities of European politics at the present day.

Leaving aside the question of democracies and autocracies, I think it is quite possible that the Western Powers might be defeated. In that case, we could easily become, call it a protectorate if you like, an outpost against the United States. That is by no means an impossibility. But it is not a possibility of which the great bulk of our people reckon, any more than the people of Europe realised what was in front of them twelve, nine or six months ago. I want, therefore, every possible care given to the consideration of what may be the issues at stake for this country, even for those liberties of which the Taoiseach spoke. I have not the slightest doubt that the people of the country, as the Taoiseach said, like the people of any other country, will be prepared to defend their liberty. So were nations much more powerful than we are. Comparatively small nations were quite willing to defend their liberty.

I have not the smallest doubt that Czecho-Slovakia was quite willing to defend its liberties and fight for them I think nothing more cynical has occurred in recent history than the way in which certain statement gave as an excuse for the particular line which they pursued that they had saved a great deal of slaughter in Czecho-Slovakia. But the Czechs never asked them to do so. What happened then? Wisely these nations, ever so much stronger than we are, made up their minds to surrender. Do I despise them for that? I do not do anything of the kind. There was no alternative open to them.

For that reason I ask the House to consider what would be the outcome for us if there was a real defeat of the Western Powers. I say "Western Powers" because I leave aside now the question of autocracies and democracies. It is not our business to try to impose or wish certain people to have a certain form of government. That is beside the issue. A great deal of harm has been done, I am convinced, by raising false issues in that respect. There are other reasons, besides the form of government imposed on certain European States, why I oppose them. Independent altogether of the form of government they enjoy, I object a great deal to what they stand for in the sphere of civilisation, religion, and culture. I think it would be disastrous for Europe, disastrous for our values, for the things we prize most highly, I shan't say that the Western Powers should be defeated, but that National Socialism should have a chance of triumphing. That is the issue in which we are vitally concerned. I am not interested in what form of government the German people choose to have or do not choose to have, but I am interested that the particular outlook in life which National Socialism represents shall not be forced on other countries.

There is no good in pretending that this is all moonshine. There are very few countries in the two hemispheres in which there is not an intense propaganda going on. In the United States and in many States in South America propaganda has been going on in favour of that particular form of philosophy, outlook on life, secular religion, call it what you like. Is that for nothing? Does anybody think that the interest of that particular outlook on life stops at the frontiers of Europe? It does nothing of the kind. It envisages a great deal more than European domination.

Again, people will say that that is fantastic. When I see people making proclamations that mean world domination, and when these people have already proclaimed other things and carried them out, then I think it is time that people paid at least some attention to the words of these people. Therefore, it is well that we should recognise it, and I do not think the country recognises it. There is a certain amount of propaganda going on in this country—the extent of it I do not know. I think that particular form of propaganda is most marked and has caused considerable uneasiness not merely to the Government of South Africa, but especially to many of the Governments in South America. What is it for? A very short time after Munich, when all were to be friends, when a new world was to be built up on that extraordinary foundation that was laid there, Dr. Goebbels, charged with the complete propaganda of the Reich, said one thing which has remained in my mind since: "Had we been united in 1914, we should have world domination." Is that fantasy? I should have laughed at it myself a couple of years ago. Dare anybody laugh at it at the present day?

If there is the slightest doubt, not merely about the particular form of secular religion for which Germany stands, but about the wish for world domination—as a preliminary, of course, domination in Europe—let anybody who has such doubt read the full translation of the famous book of Herr Hitler, "Mein Kampf," which is now available. I am not anxious to go into the archives to show what he meant there and what he meant here, if certain things were not borne out and brought up to date by the policy of that particular Government. I have just one quotation here, and perhaps I may be pardoned for reading it. Let anybody consider, in the light of the activities that we see in Europe and the propagandist activities in the two hemispheres, a statement like that I have quoted from Dr. Goebbels, and remember that the great boast is: "We are united now; had we been united in 1914 we would have world domination."

The conclusion is fairly obvious as to what is aimed at. Here is the master himself, and I see no reason to believe it is not his policy to-day. Speaking of an extraordinary disease that he is under the impression the Germans are suffering from, and which he calls hyper-individualism, he wrote:—

"During times of peace, such a situation may offer some advantages, but taking it all in all, it has prevented us from gaining a mastery in the world. If in its historical development the German people had possessed the unity of herd instinct by which other people have so much benefited, then the German Reich would probably be mistress of the globe to-day. World history would have taken another course, and in this case no man can tell if what many blinded pacifists hope to obtain by petitioning, whining and crying, may not have been reached in this way; namely, a peace which would not be based on the waving of olive branches and tearful misery-mongering of pacifist old women, but a peace that would be guaranteed triumphant by the sword of a people endowed with the power to master the world and administer it in the service of a higher civilisation."

Is that rubbish? Is that ridiculous nonsense? Thirteen or 14 years ago when that was written, the world might have laughed at it. Can the world afford to laugh at it to-day?

Another contingency I should like to ask the country to consider is this: If this crisis is postponed for a couple of years, and if the tension, as seems likely, continues so that you have continued crises—I mean if it does not burst forth in its full ripeness for a couple of years—there is this position that I feel few people envisage, but it is a possibility, and is partly borne out by rather recent pronouncements from the same source. I have recently contended that this crisis in world peace will be more serious than 1914 in its bearing on the question of individual liberties and States. A great deal more is involved now. There are terrific dangers apart from that, the dangers of the triumph of National Socialism on the one hand or perhaps Bolshevism on the other hand. Probably it is just a choice between them. I find it very hard to know which is the greater evil. At the moment I should say that National Socialism is the more dangerous. That is all I can say in favour of either.

There is very little difference between the two outlooks. Daily they are getting closer together, and were the personal element left out, I am quite sure the alliance that many of the Germans sponsor might become an active alliance of these two supposed enemies, they are so much alike. In the things I am most interested in, I say there is very little difference between the two, and if the Bolshevists triumph, as may happen, the people who will have to bear a large share of the responsibility, as well as the Bolshevists themselves who were primarily responsible, will be the so-called dictators and the premiers of a few great States in Europe. The dictators, on the one hand, and the so-called democratic premiers on the other hand have contributed to bring about the state of affairs we see to-day.

What chance has Europe of getting out of the present situation? I am particularly anxious to see how it will affect us. We see efforts being made now at the eleventh hour to restore confidence amongst the various Powers in Europe. There is a tremendous struggle, in the light of what has occurred in the last couple of years, to bring back a feeling of confidence to a number of the small and middlesized States in Europe. They are trembling for their very existence to take the side of any Power at either side. Either as an instrument to advance their own particular cause to victory, or to stave off defeat, do we think our liberties would be respected for a moment? I call attention to the fact that in some of his recent speeches —and it was noteworthy in the last speech as a particular case in point, as was the Reichstag one immediately preceding it—that there was very little reference to Russia. All his antagonism was directed against England and the United States of America. That is a situation I commend to the careful attention of the Government, and also to our people as a whole. These are factors that dare not be left out of a count. In our material interests and in our spiritual interests, and in the interests of the liberty of this country, it is not a matter of indifference to us as to who would come out of the maelstrom as victors. Our own spiritual interests could be very well at stake. Our liberties might be at stake; everything we hold dear might be at stake. Again, it is a great mistake, a mistake that British statesmen after British statesmen have made, not to pay serious attention to what people on the Continent say. It is assumed, when they make "extravagant" statements, at least the commonsense Englishman assumes, that they are not meant. That is the situation that faces not merely Great Britain but that faces as well the United States.

Supposing the Western Powers collapsed in a quick war, supposing you have that hatred of democracy that is continually preached and denounced, what would happen? My own view is that no country has the right to impose government on another country, because that is a matter for the people themselves. But that is not the view of certain people, and even in England there are people who object to Germany and Italy merely on the ground of the form of Government they have. For that there is no justification. But you need only read the speech of the German Chancellor to see the hatred of democracy. The only difference between his attitude now and 12 months ago is that added to the hatred of 12 months ago there is contempt, and that is a much more dangerous situation. He now tilts, even more than at Great Britain, at the United States of America. We have a supreme interest in that particular matter, and it is because I am anxious that the Government should not leave any of that side of the question out of account that I stress it. It is highly desirable that there should be good relations between this country and the Government of Great Britain at all times, and particularly now. That is the reason I hope that this difficulty that has arisen about conscription in Northern Ireland will be quickly put aside. That that should be the cause of unfriendly relations between the two countries seems to me to be unthinkable. It is not merely a question of the British Empire being at stake; we are not particularly interested in that except in so far as it might concern ourselves; but we are interested in the fate of the Commonwealth of Nations so far as that affects ourselves; and that anything should occur to prevent harmonious relations between the two countries, in view of the present crisis, is almost unthinkable. I think it is a duty, not merely on our own Government, but on the English Government, to prevent any such thing happening. That seems to me to be quite clear.

I cannot speak, of course, from a military point of view. I do not know what advantage our harbourages would be at the present time to any country, or whether their defence is necessary or not. As I say, I cannot speak on that, but let us suppose that our harbours should become a nesting-place for, let us say, German submarines, in the event of war, acting against foodships coming in, not alone to England, but into this country, what would be our position? I do not want to put the Taoiseach into the position of having to answer questions that might possibly damage this country at the moment, but I do want the Government to consider well what our position would be likely to be.

We speak of an invasion of our neutrality and of our hitting back. Well, let us look at both points of view. Again, I put it before the Government and before the House, and I should like the House to put it before the country— because I think that this is the most serious situation that we have had to face—suppose Germany violates our neutrality by dropping bombs on Dublin, how can we react to that? Even if a war were to break out to-morrow, I do not suppose anybody expects us here to send a single soldier out of this country; but in the case that I have given, such as the dropping of bombs by, let us say, Germany, on Dublin, how then could we react against Germany? I do not desire that there should be any misunderstandings between the two Governments that would mean that both would be really fighting against their own interests. But in times of stress that is precisely, unfortunately, what may occur.

There is another point that I want to make clear. What will our problem be in the case of war? Whether we regard ourselves as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or whether we are merely utilising King George VI for the purpose of certain external affairs, or whether we regard ourselves as having a republican Constitution, our position will not be determined by that, and I think that those who assume we would be in a better position if the present situation were changed are mistaken; but the fact is that our position will be determined, not by these considerations, but by our geographical situation and by the necessities and desires of the other countries that are at war. In a life-and-death struggle such as this war is going to be if it breaks out, does anybody think that the Germans, or the people of any other country, are going to allow themselves to be wiped out of existence merely for the sake of observing our neutrality? These are matters that I should like the Government to consider. This is a very difficult period in our history, and we must face it. It may be only a couple of months before the war may be upon us, and again, the incredible may happen, and the whole situation may quieten down— though I do not think there is much hope of that. Again, there may be a continuing crisis going on for a couple of years or longer, with a continuing changing of the European situation, but that is just what concerns us. I think that the Taoiseach himself pointed out on one occasion the great strategic importance of our country's position in the event of such a war. It is quite true that we in this country are only on the verge of Europe, but it is also true, perhaps unfortunately for ourselves, that to some extent we are in the centre of the world. We are on the outskirts of Europe, but, to some extent, our island commands the approaches to Europe. If, then, as I say, you wish to be neutral, and German submarines, or the submarines of other hostile countries, come in and use your harbours, how will you deal with them? Supposing that we have our full independence here, what about the question of foodstuffs?

Who can tell what will happen in the event of an outbreak of war? Suppose that Spain happens to be on the side of the Axis Powers? There, at all events, there is a potential harborage for submarines—not merely against Great Britain but against foodstuffs for ourselves. The very existence, not alone the welfare of the United States of America may depend on the capacity to cope with these. I do not know whether the United States of America will come in to a war of the type that is possible in Europe at the moment. I could not prophesy as to that. That they have taken up a strong attitude with regard to the present crisis is quite clear, but what their attitude will be in the case of an actual European war, I could not say; I am not sure. That they would come in ultimately, if the war lasted long enough, is highly likely; but beyond that nobody can prophesy, and neither can anybody prophesy as to how quickly they would come in even if they did eventually come in. Let us suppose a modern European war lasting three years. Does anybody think that there would be any of our civilisation left? Let us try to remember the Napoleonic wars, which lasted, roughly speaking, about a quarter of a century. About 100 years afterwards we had the Great War, which lasted four years, and which put a much greater strain on the peoples of Europe than the 25 years of the Napoleonic wars. Surely it will be admitted that a war at the present time, lasting for a year or a year and a half, would be much more disastrous in its effects than the four years of the last war, and, from what I can make out, some of the European Powers at the moment are preparing for such a war.

In view of these possibilities, we have to consider what our position would be, and I want the Government to consider this matter very seriously, because, as I say, it is our very existence that may be at stake, and, I fully believe, it will require a great deal of clear grasping of the situation and, possibly, often, a great deal of restraint, even in the coming months, if we are to avoid steps that may ultimately be disastrous. I am sure that the Government will take every means to avoid that, but I wish to impress upon them the necessity for considering calmly and coldy, with as little emotion as possible, and as objectively as possible, where our interests are likely to be, and where we are likely to be at the end of the war if it breaks out. It is very easy for some people to say that we are on the outskirts of Europe, and that we are not likely to be affected by such a war. Many people say: "Thank goodness, we are not like Holland, just on the borders of Germany." Many other people say: "Thank goodness, we are not like Switzerland." Certainly, we have certain advantages if such a war were to be confined to the Continent of Europe, but it is not going to be confined to the Continent of Europe.

Nobody has put that more strongly than the Taoiseach himself—the extreme importance of our position— when he said that some of our ports were equivalent to several Gibraltars. As well as I remember, that was the phrase used. Possibly, it was a patriotic exaggeration, but at least so far as I can see merely an exaggeration, and not a complete misrepresentation of the situation. We may think that we can sit quietly here and take a ringside seat and watch what is going on. Now, if our position is such as the Taoiseach has said, is it likely that we shall be allowed to take a ringside seat? Can we, any more in this than in other matters, take up the line that so many in this country are inclined to take up: "Well, what is it to us what happens to certain people in Germany, whether they are kicked out or not; let us attend to our own affairs." May I raise a question on this Vote, namely, the way in which the people have not responded—I am not speaking now of the Government —to the claims that people of our faith from other countries have on us? They may say "we are not our brother's keeper", but if we are not, and if we take up that particular line, we are possibly apt to get into the other half of the famous advertisement of Bovril, "Alas, my poor brother."

That may be our position. But we need not be so much ashamed of ourselves. Greater nations than ours have, unfortunately for themselves, taken up that position. That policy of splendid isolation that has been preached by certain circles in England has led to peculiar developments, and has led almost to the very undermining of the whole position of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the Empire itself. It is rather interesting to see one of the strong advocates of Partition in the North, one of the most patriotic of them all, the man that has played a very peculiar rôle in the international politics of Europe in the last six months: it is a very peculiar thing indeed that when the British Government announce a certain policy there are certain forces that seem to know better than the Government themselves what that policy is. We had an interesting example of that last September when apparently the London Times and a man like Lord Londonderry had a better insight into what Government policy was going to be than the official spokesman of that Government. There was a ray of hope for peace the other day when we saw the same Times belittling the pledge given by Mr. Chamberlain to Poland. It did the same thing last September. It was repudiated last September, and it was proved right by events. It belittled the pledge of the other day, and it was repudiated.

I have not seen some of the maps that have been published in Germany. I am not referring to the one that Deputy Mulcahy adduced the other day, but I have heard a great deal about them. But taking these, and the pledges and the actions of that Central Power, which cause nothing but the gravest uneasiness for the future of every country, what is the excuse for wiping out of existence Austria and Czechoslovakia? We are told, of course, that there was no employment of force. In other words, if you are so strong that your forces cannot be resisted it is a virtue to attack the weak: it proves the very height of your virtue. One small nation after another has been wiped out, and the rest are in a state of nerves. Why should not they be? Can we hope to escape? Possibly that can be discussed more appropriately on the next Vote, but I sometimes ask myself, when I watch the development of modern European politics, whether or not the day of small nations has passed with the claims of the bigger nations, some of them put forward cynically and openly and the others to follow suit when the time comes.

Speaking about international agreements, I wonder where the greatest contempt has been shown for international agreements? I saw that a British statesman made the statement the other day that you could not trust the word of the dictators. He was an optimist in thinking that you could trust the word of any leading European statesman so far as international agreements are concerned. I mention that because that is a situation we have to face. We cannot ignore it. You may tell me quite truly that England and France made Hitler, and that since he came into power they have consolidated his position. What, if they did? That does not make his position at the present moment any weaker: it makes it all the stronger, and it makes that Power a menace, not merely to England and France but to every country in Europe. We have to face that: we cannot ignore it. It is small comfort to us that great Powers, to their own detriment, let that menace develop. We certainly cannot ignore the menace, although I say that a number of people in this country are doing it. I am not referring now to the Government, but I do say that there is a certain underlying campaign almost in favour of that particular Power.

Can anyone be certain of knowing what that Power stands for? As I have said already in this House, it seems to me to be almost the very personification of evil. It is not because it is autocratic that I object to that form of Government—that is not my business—but it does personify a great deal more than that, and for that reason I object to it. What is the position? At the present moment, if a fortnight passes without a major crisis, is there not a feeling of relief, almost of optimism all over Europe? The fact that you were deceived last week does not prevent you from being optimistic about next week. From the fact that last week's crisis is over, following one a fortnight before, and that this does not lead to another crisis, people assume that everything is all right. I see no justification for optimism of that kind.

I hope, like the Taoiseach, that war is not inevitable. I recognise certain changes that have taken place. If you take the political or rather the strategic position of the world, I should say you would find that as the result of the war of 1914 to 1918, Great Britain, to a large extent, lost the position that she previously had in the world, as arbiter, so to speak, in Europe. That position has automatically gone to the United States of America. Whether that country decides to intervene or not, it will be found that ultimately her interests will be bound up with Europe, as the President of that country has so often demonstrated. She will be in Europe to the same extent as Great Britain used to be in the great wars up to the end of the nineteenth century, and even after the nineteenth century. She will inevitably be brought into that position. That makes her position one of considerable importance.

I should like the Government to weigh very carefully, having in mind the interests, spiritual and political, the liberty that we ought to enjoy and the material interest of this country, and to shape its policy on them. I know very well there will be a number of people anxious to drive the Government into other directions. It will require a certain effort to resist pressure of that kind. But I feel it will be essential for the future welfare of this country that the Government should not yield to thoughtless clamour of that kind, no matter from where it comes. The Government will be wise to pursue coldly, calmly and undeviatingly the best interests of the country if they take that line.

I support the Taoiseach in the fullness of the restraint with which he makes his protest with regard to the threat of conscription in Northern Ireland and the passing of conscription. We hope that his hope in that matter will be realised and that the provisions in that respect, whatever they are, that are in the Bill at present before the British House of Commons will be removed, and that they will be removed at the earliest possible moment. The interests that concern us here are, naturally, the interests of our own people. The interests of our own people are not only their material interests at home and their spiritual interests at home, but they include also the ideals our people have with regard to world conditions, and the general world position of civilisation as a whole.

In the same way we are concerned at the present time with our national strength and our own national resources. It seems to me that the Taoiseach in dealing with this matter, however unprepared, and for whatever reason he has, ought to take the House or the country as a whole into his confidence with regard to the present situation. He wound up his statement with the suggestion that he hoped somebody, speaking from the Government Benches, would be able some day to say: "We are at peace with every nation on earth." He regretted it was not now altogether possible to make that statement without reservations. The implication he made before was that the only reservation he found it possible to make with regard to the external affairs problem at the present time is that Partition exists. I do not think it is treating our people fairly as a whole, in the most important debate that we ever had on external affairs, to discuss external affairs on the assumption that we are at peace with every nation on the earth, and that the only blot on the picture is that we have Partition. It is particularly unfair to treat our external affairs problem in that way, at a time when the British are continuing their unenlightened, blundering attitude with regard to this country as a whole.

As far as we are concerned here, either there is going to be peace in the world or there is going to be war. If there is going to be peace, we could concentrate on the problems we have here. These are the problem of unemployment, the problem of the reorganisation of our agricultural interests, and problems regarding the bettering of our educational and social position generally. If, on the other hand, the Government is satisfied that there is a danger of war, then, apparently, we cannot go ahead with these things; we cannot use up the money at our disposal for these purposes, and we cannot devote all our energy and attention to these matters. While the whole action of the Government and their general policy to-day imply that war is a likely thing, our discussion on external affairs implies that we have no troubles to expect from anybody outside. There are very many indications in the situation throughout the country that the people want a more definite lead from Parliament in quite a number of these matters than it is getting.

We are going to defend our country, we are told. The Taoiseach is full of hope that the people of this country are going effectively to defend the liberties of the country against any aggression. At the present moment, the Minister for Defence is reorganising his Army; carrying out many developments in the Defence forces, and changing his present Volunteer force for another Volunteer force. But the results that the Minister for Defence is getting do not show in any way that the young men of the country are convinced that a crisis exists, even to the extent that our normal Army strength is to be kept up to its present figure.

I see in the practical failure of the recruiting campaign that the young men of the country are not convinced that there is a crisis at the present time. If the thing had not been so absurdly proceeded with, I would see in the dissipation of the Minister's Forces the clearest possible evidence that the young men of this country have not been convinced that a war situation exists at the present moment.

In the same way we have the action of the Minister for Industry and Commerce and the action of the Minister for Agriculture seeming to indicate that they do not realise the position. The way in which the Minister for Industry and Commerce is dealing with the preparations for the supply of raw materials and food stuffs for the country from outside, and the Minister for Agriculture is dealing with the question of the increased tillage that there ought to be in the country, show that neither of them realises the position with which the country is faced. The Minister for Industry and Commerce is responsible in one Department, and the Minister for Agriculture in another Department, but in neither sphere is there any indication that there is any clear appreciation of the seriousness of the situation with which this country would have to grapple in the probable or possible event of war being brought about. Nor, in the same way, in the approach of the Ministry to foreign affairs matters generally is there any evidence of that. The Taoiseach on a number of occasions here pointed out how difficult it would be in the circumstances of a European war to preserve our neutrality here. But the Taoiseach has recently been swinging back more and more on a statement of policy as if it were isolated neutrality.

There is one thing that the Taoiseach has encouraged in the country, and that is the development of a spirit which is so easily raised in this country, a feeling of irritation, antagonism and hostility to Great Britain. That is one of the things which very definitely is arising out of the general treatment of foreign policy by the Taoiseach. His contribution to this debate to-day can do nothing but exaggerate that to some extent, although I appreciate the firmness and the restraint with which he dealt with the question of conscription in the North of Ireland. If this country is to be prepared for what will result from a European war, then we have to be much more unified in our outlook on things here, and we can only be unified in our outlook on things here when we get an opportunity of facing the facts, and it is of the greatest possible importance that the Government should show the country in some way what the facts are, because if the Government proceed as they are proceeding at present, we are going to find ourselves in a war situation without the type of army we would require to have and without the type of outlook on our neighbours and on the general problems of the country which it would be essential for us to have if we are to deal with matters in a suitable way.

As a result of the inadequate presentation of the facts by the Government of the people, there is a trend in certain quarters in the country to support the attitude of the German Government, utterly ignoring the aspect of that Government's policy about which Deputy O'Sullivan has just spoken, and there is a tendency to go back to the old cries of antagonism to Great Britain. Whether such difficulties as we have with Great Britain as a result of Partition can be settled at present—and if Great Britain were in any way sensible she would endeavour to settle them at present— and whether they are settled or not, they can have no bearing on the outside world forces which will impinge upon us if war breaks out. On the other hand, we are definitely of mind here—and I am quite sure that Deputies on the Government Benches and the people of the country as a whole are satisfied—that the interests and ideals of our people are bound up with the maintenance of the strength and security of countries like Great Britain, United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa and France, and that if, as Deputy O'Sullivan stated, these countries were either injured or destroyed, the type of world we think of in our ideals would no longer exist, the economic and social position of our people would be an impossible position and our liberties and economic well-being would be lost, so that it is of the greatest possible importance that, apart altogether from what difficulties we may experience at present, we should raise our heads above these difficulties and look at the general facts of the situation.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce said the other day that he had examined how arrangements were to be made to safeguard the ocean-borne supplies of food to our people. We are concerned with making arrangements to safeguard those ocean-borne supplies of food and we are concerned with making arrangements to safeguard the bringing of the raw materials to our people which are necessary for the upkeep of our industrial life here. The country as a whole ought to have some picture, and it should get it from the Government, as to the extent to which this country is relying on external food and external raw materials for the keeping up of the people's life here, and it ought to know the countries on which we are likely to have to rely in order to bring those supplies here securely. Whether war comes or whether war does not come, my belief is that the more we concentrate on our own economic well-being here, the better we are prepared for war, and we have to eliminate as far as possible all the petty political feelings which are likely to distract our people from following out sane and sensible policies.

Deputy O'Sullivan dealt with the position of the United States and with the position of the United States as placed somewhat in the forefront of German criticism at present. If it were necessary for the United States Government to enter into a war in Europe, United States forces could not be landed in Europe without the cooperation of the people of this island. That was manifested to a great extent in the Great War, and questions like that which would arise are questions which should be gone into by the Government, who should place the broad, open facts of the situation before the people so that they may not be confused if a war decision requires to be taken.

Out of great evil, good can sometimes come. I think the proposal to conscript our people in Northern Ireland for the British Army has shocked all parties in Éire. It has happily been abandoned, but it has served this purpose, that it has thrown into greater relief than had hitherto been done the absurdity of Partition and the deadly danger of Partition to the survival of the Commonwealth of Nations. I have argued with friends in England, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, as a believer in the Commonwealth of Nations, that Partition was a matter in which they might properly take an interest, if they believed, as I believe, that the interests of the world at large would be served by the survival of the Commonwealth of Nations, because I felt that, sooner or later, Partition might create a situation between this country and Great Britain which would precipitate grave and deplorable events for her and for us, and ultimately for the Commonwealth of Nations itself. I think the thought of the British Government in 1938 advancing a claim to do that from which she recoiled from attempting in 1918, before the protest of a united people in this country, shows the world and our fellow members of the Commonwealth of Nations the dynamite danger of continuing the Partition arrangement, quite apart from the inherent injustices that it involves for our country.

I want to see Partition abolished, as the Taoiseach does, and as every political party in this country wants to see it abolished, because I believe it to be a loathsome injustice to our people and to our nation. I want to see it abolished, also, because I believe it is a standing menace to the Commonwealth of Nations which I regard as not only of vital interest to this country but of vital interest to freedom, democracy and decency the world over. I want to sound this note of warning. The cause of Irish reunion is not served by pouring oil on the flames of hatred that past injustice has ignited between our people in this portion of the country and our people in the six counties of Northern Ireland. No intervention by Great Britain can satisfactorily terminate Partition unless Partition is terminated with the goodwill of the people of Northern Ireland. Rightly or wrongly, our people in Northern Ireland—unhappily—look upon England as their protector. When I say "our people", I mean our Orange and Protestant fellow-countrymen, who are our people, who are just as Irish as we are—every bit. Unhappily, they look upon England as their protector. It can never serve the interests of Irish unity that we should create in their minds the indelible impression that we purchase their betrayal by the country upon whom they look as their protector. We have got to win not only the barren acres of Ulster but the hearts of the people who live in it. We are not going towards that goal by disowning them, by repudiating them as Irishmen and by denouncing and outraging them as they not infrequently denounce and outrage us. Whether we like it or dislike it, the Craigavons, the Brookes and the other Ministers of the Northern Government are as Irish as the de Valeras, the Lemasses, the Cosgraves and the Dillons—every bit. They were born in this country and they have spent their lives in this country.

I fully acknowledge the difficulty of winning the consent of those people to reunion but no satisfactory or enduring peace can be built on their coercion. That is not an easy fact to face but any disinterested person must face it if he loves his country. I do not despair that that reconciliation can be effected. I believe it can be done in our time but it is not an easy job and it is not made easier by stirring up new discords or stimulating old quarrels between us. Personally, I should sooner see that reunion achieved without British intervention of any kind. We got the English out of this country and my only advice to them would be to stay out. I should far sooner see reunion effected by Irishmen making peace, one with another, in our own country. All the goodwill we can get from Great Britain or Canada or any other friendly nation is welcome, but the less intervention we have in the domestic differences that divide us— whoever was responsible for starting them—the more satisfactory will the ultimate settlement be.

Having dealt with that aspect of our external relations, the Taoiseach said to-day that he gathered that we had read the newspapers, listened to the radio and knew as much as he himself did about what was passing in the world; therefore, he did not know what we wanted him to talk about and proposed to wait and listen. This is not the first time the Taoiseach wanted the last word. But he did not sound convincing. Our situation is perhaps a little too grave to permit of manoeuvring of that kind. I do not think that it serves any useful purpose. I do not think that there is room to go chasing one another up and down the country in an endeavour, by creating political embarrassments for one another, to make it impossible to do the right thing. Whoever sits in the place of the Taoiseach in circumstances such as we find ourselves in to-day is in a difficult position. His difficulties are made no less by the public men of the country preserving a deathly silence and inviting the unhealthy rumour and the malicious behind-door conversations. In a democratic country, where we have a Parliament, the useful thing is to discuss these difficulties with all discretion, but as frankly as the circumstances permit, and with no desire to make cheap political capital out of the vital interests of our common country.

I think that the people want a lead. In the confusion in which all of us find ourselves the people of the country want some clear indication of where our duty as a nation lies, so that, having got a clear indication of what the Taoiseach may think or what we may think, they may accept or reject it or fashion a policy of their own. We achieved sovereignty and independence, and I think that a great many people forget that these things carry with them extremely uncomfortable responsibilities in addition to the luxury of freedom. One of these uncomfortable responsibilities is to realise that we are standing out on our own in a storm-swept world, and that we have got to ask ourselves if the wind changes direction, how will we fare. Deputies in this House might ask themselves this question: Supposing that the portions of the world from Southampton to Singapore were under the control of Germany and of the Nazi Government, what effect would that have on the people of this country? I think a great many Deputies would be tempted to reply: "None whatever." God forbid they would ever get the dark awakening of the experience. What would happen to a small nation like Ireland, if the particular methods of diplomacy employed by the German Reich during the last two years were the order of the day here? What would happen if, when a small nation such as we are, made its protest or made representations that its interests were being interfered with, the reply was given that it was very lucky to escape incorporation in the Reich, and if the condition of a continued independent existence was that all our legislation and all our future international relations should be submitted to Berlin before they were acted upon? What would we feel like if a trade delegation came to negotiate with us and informed us that the alternative to concluding our agreement was to be incorporated in the economic system of the other party to the proposed agreement, and that we could sign on the dotted line or take the consequences? We have never known what it meant to feel that wind blow about us. How would we like it if we had the experience?

We claim the right to move about the world quite freely. Have any Deputies ever asked themselves why are the oceans of the world free to the passage of peace-loving men? Is it not because the British Navy and the United States Navy police them? Is it not because we have come to know, in recent years, that where the Stars and Stripes and the much-abused Union Jack float there is usually the rule of law and there is also substantial justice for a peaceful man going about his legitimate work? Anyone who has travelled the five seas of the world knows that; but supposing that for the British flag and the Stars and Stripes, and the French Tricolour, you substitute the Nazi Swastika and the Japanese Sun, and travel the world under that dispensation, and live in the world controlled by that combination, I wonder how much our liberty-loving Irish democrats will like it? Supposing that we make up our minds that we would not like it, that that system of world relations, based on our knowledge of what the United States and Great Britain and France stand for, is more to our liking than what would be substituted by the combination of the so-called Anti-Komintern Pact, can we, as an independent nation, in the event of a conflict between these forces in the world, proclaim that we are disinterested, that we stand aside and do not give a hoot which side wins? In our own interests, thinking of nothing but Ireland, is it wise to do it? Remember that we have now got upon us the sometimes appalling duty to determine what is Ireland's interest in the far wider sphere of world politics than we have had to face during the 700 years that we were subject to Great Britain. During those 700 years we had no problem except the one—and that was to get the British out of Ireland. We could ignore world development, and the only hope we had was that some major disaster would overtake Great Britain which would enable us to shake off our yoke. That was our only interest in international affairs. Having got Great Britain out of the country, we now stand alone in the storm-swept world when we are taking counsel as to how Ireland's interest might best be served, and it is a responsibility that we have got to grow up to take now, or we might do a desperate harm to the long life that lies before the Irish nation. I put it to the House that, in the event of the kind of conflict taking place that threatens now in Europe, we could not be indifferent to the issue, that it is vital to Ireland that one side should win. If that is true, I wonder has the Government considered certain contingencies that may arise?

Deputy Professor O'Sullivan pointed out that in any future world conflict, the United States of America, willingly or unwillingly, is almost certain to be drawn in. Supposing that she were, what would our reaction be to a request from the United States of America for harbour facilities in our ports? It seems likely that the safe conduct of troops—never mind food or supplies— from across the Atlantic would largely depend on the defence accommodation that could be enjoyed in our ports. Would our attitude to the United States of America, smashed by the Nazi-Japanese combine, and menaced as she may be, be that we do not give a hoot, that we were neutral, would take no sides, give her no accommodation, and if her ships sank, would allow just so many of her crew on our shores as could swim ashore, and then intern them here? Or would we say to her: "You are welcome to all the hospitality of every kind that we can offer, and anybody who does not like that, anyone who has any complaint about our bidding your men welcome and giving you all the comfort and help that we can, can lump it"? Has the Government considered that? If they have not, I think they ought to.

I do not demand that the Government should come out and lay down a cast-iron policy on Monday or on Tuesday, because we all know that in the dynamic state of world affairs what may be the appropriate policy on Monday may be quite out-moded on Tuesday. But what I do ask is, that the Government will consider the contingencies that may arise in the light of Ireland's interests, and that the Government, having determined how best Ireland's interests might be served, will have the courage to give the country the lead on the right road. I think it right to say now that no Government in this country could contemplate sending an expeditionary force to Europe, no matter on what side we are involved, no matter how deeply interested we were in one side or the other prevailing, because we have neither got the equipment nor the resources to equip an effective expeditionary force in any European enterprise. Any force we might despatch, mixed in the mighty armies with all their equipment, in a European conflict, would serve no useful purpose and could give no really useful aid.

I think it is expedient to state that now. I feel that it may be expedient to state other things now, but we who are in this position of opposition, must recognise that the Government may have information which has not been communicated to us, which stays their hand, imposes upon them a greater measure of reticence than such information as we have would suggest was necessary. Whatever measure of reticence they may determine to impose upon themselves, no consideration should exonerate them from the responsibility of examining these questions in their own council and in reaching very definite conclusions upon them. These conclusions once reached, they should take effective measures to prepare our people for the things that it is necessary in defence of the interests of Ireland to do: to prepare our people to be equal to the task, the immense responsibility (1) of recognising what is the true interest of Ireland, and (2) of showing the courage, moral as well as physical, of doing that, recognising that the interest of Ireland to-day may demand action which it requires very real moral courage on the part of some people to advocate.

God forbid that at this first really great crisis of our independence, the first time that we faced the world in turmoil as an independent nation, any past history, any reluctance to face facts, any poverty of moral courage, should paralyse our efforts, should prevent us from doing the things we ought to do if we are to play our part in preserving, not only for ourselves but for the whole world, liberty, decency, democracy and, above all, the right to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.

I think there is no Deputy here who does not appreciate the gravity of the situation and the responsibility which rests upon the Government in the present international crisis. My object in rising is simply to offer one suggestion, a very small suggestion, perhaps. Why is it not possible for the members of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition Party to meet in consultation, as they do in other countries where the Party system prevails? Ministers may say, perhaps, that the Opposition Party here have nothing to offer to them by way of advice or information or help. I think, however, there are few who will not appreciate that the leaders of the Opposition Party are men who have for a number of years carried on their shoulders the responsibility of Government and I am sure they feel to the fullest extent the gravity of the present situation. I am sure they are sufficiently patriotic to give all that is best in them to help the Government to arrive at the wisest and most prudent decisions on questions affecting the interests, if not the very existence of this country. For that reason I think that while it is right and proper that this Parliament as the representative national assembly should discuss matters of external interest frankly and openly, there are many aspects of international affairs which can only be effectively dealt with in conference between the leaders of both big Parties in the House.

There is another aspect of this question. At the present time there is great need for calmness and confidence amongst our citizens. We know that the Opposition Party command the confidence of a fairly considerable section of the citizens and the fact that they are in consultation with the Government on matters relating to external affairs would be reassuring, at least to their supporters, and would for that reason strengthen the national position. We know that in times such as we are living through any decisions taken may have the most far-reaching effects. Any mistake made by the Government may result in complete disaster, not only for the material interests of the country, but even for the very independence of the nation, because that, too, may be at stake. Therefore, I think there should be no hesitation whatever on the part of the leaders of both Parties, whatever differences may exist between them or whatever differences may have existed in the past, in consulting with the fullest possible confidence and frankness.

Some of the statements made by Deputy O'Sullivan are such that I think this House could not entirely accept them. I do not think the people of Ireland would be prepared to go as far as Deputy O'Sullivan has gone in supporting one side against the other in the present international crisis. I think the people of Ireland realise that no matter how much sympathy they may feel with the United States, perhaps, or with Great Britain, in the present position in which they find themselves, they must recognise that this nation cannot offer a sufficient military contribution to justify them in taking sides. We also must realise that in the last Great War this country made the greatest of all blunders, and that was the blunder of taking sides with two of the great opposing Powers. In the early stages of the war we had this country definitely on the side of Great Britain and her Allies, and when the war had gone on for two years we were definitely as a nation on the opposite side. That was a position which should never have been allowed to develop. That is a position which must not be allowed to develop in the future; yet it is a position which could develop unless our leaders are extremely careful, and for that reason I think the whole situation should be carefully considered, and considered in consultation between the Leaders of both big Parties in the House.

I think Deputy Dillon made some complaint that I had not spoken perhaps as fully on the international situation and our relation to it as I might. I think that there is hardly any question on which our people are so well instructed as this, strange as it may appear to Deputy Dillon and to some others who have spoken. The difficulty in this country has been one fact, that is, that the people see now, as they have seen in the past, a certain aggression, and that they naturally ask themselves, if this is going to continue, does it matter very much for us who it is that is engaged in European wars? Now, I know that that attitude is not the attitude of some of the members on the Opposition Benches, but the last speaker has indicated how, at the beginning of the war, in 1914, the majority probably of the people in this country was on one side and how, before the war was ended, the majority was on the other side. The reason for that is clear— and anybody who has lived through it knows why—because that war, on one side, was said to be a war for the freedom of small nations and, if it were really to be a war for the freedom of small nations, our people could not help saying to themselves: "If that be so, why is this small nation, which is older than any of them, and which has been working for its independence and struggling for it for centuries, deprived of its independence when the freeing of it required no war to be fought?"

We may have strong views about certain things, and the members on the opposite benches are at far greater liberty to talk about them than I am, but the fundamental thing which is going to affect Irish public opinion is whether we have, as a nation, that independence which is our right. It is useless to say that these things can be put aside. They are fundamental in the thought of our people here and, before there can be any question of our entering into any type of crusade, that question has got to be settled for our people. I know Deputy Dillon would say that the other evil is greater. You will have difficulty in convincing people that an evil which is a threatened evil is going to be greater than the evil that exists. It is because I want our own people here, who are interested in the big issues at stake, to realise what is fundamental in the thought of those who do not take their view at the moment that I say these things aloud. I think them. I might, perhaps, have kept them to myself were it not for the fact that I am asked by the Opposition to talk frankly on these matters.

Now, with due deliberation, the Government has set the aim of its policy, in the present circumstances, to preserving a position of neutrality. We believe that no other position would be accepted by the majority of our people as long as the present position exists and, in taking up that position, we are fully alive to all its difficulties and all its responsibilities. I tried on a previous occasion when we were speaking here on this subject to indicate what these difficulties were likely to be. I did not go into it in detail but, under present conditions, very little ought to be sufficient for thinking people to understand the situation for themselves. Perhaps I am wrong, but I give credit to our people for having as sound general political sense as any people in the world. They have shown that, I think, throughout their history. Therefore, I think it is not necessary to go into the detail which members of the Opposition seem to think necessary in order that our people should be fully alive to the dangers and responsibilities of the present situation. However, as I have been asked to do so, perhaps I should go into some of these details a little bit more than I have done.

The position is very different now from what it was in 1914-18, as far as we, in this part of the country, are concerned. The difference is this—a fundamental difference—that in 1914 our wishes had nothing to say to the matter. We had no Government here that was responsible for safeguarding the interests of our own people. The British Government were here at the time. On them fell the responsibility of making arrangements for supplies of whatever kind were necessary, as well as for the "general protection," as they put it. They were responsible for seeing that, as far as it could be possible in war-time, the trade which was fundamental for the life of our country should be continued, and so on. The British Government have no responsibility now for matters of that sort. We have the responsibility, and a very heavy responsibility it is. We know perfectly well that the supply of the materials which we will need if there is a prolonged war will largely have to come in here on British ships. No other ships will be available anyhow, as long as Britain has command of the sea. We have not the ships ourselves to bring them in. It is necessary for us, for our economic life, to continue our trade and to send out the agricultural produce, with which we have to purchase these other materials which we require. Therefore, it is necessary for the Government to make arrangements with the British Government so that these essential services should continue. I want also to get people to remember that, during a time of war, life here cannot go on exactly as it goes on in these times. The moment a great war begins essential supplies will be very difficult to get. Some of our industries will have to close down after a relatively short period, for want of the raw materials for their products. Take, for example, the motor assembling industry. The building industry, for want of timber, may have to slacken down, and close down after a particular period. Therefore we shall have here in this country a very serious problem with regard to employment. We may expect, also, to have a large number of our people who are temporarily resident in Britain coming over. Our transport is bound to be seriously affected by the difficulty there is likely to be in getting sufficient petrol.

I have a long list here of other directions in which the normal life of this country will be affected. I do not want to give them all in detail, but I have said enough to indicate that those who think they will not be affected by a war, even if we are neutral—as I hope we will be able to remain—and that our life here will go on as if there was not a great war at all, are making a very big mistake. The experience of the last war will have taught outside Governments also —will have taught the British Government, for example—that it is necessary to control prices, and the help which on the last occasion the increase in agricultural prices was to this country may not be there any longer. No one, then, could really exaggerate the seriousness of the difficulties which will confront this country if war should break out. We want, therefore, from everybody in the country the co-operation which alone will enable us to surmount those difficulties. I was glad to see by the speeches which were made from the Opposition Benches to-day—I am not to be taken as agreeing with many of the things that were said, and perhaps it is just as well for us on each side of the House to avoid going too much into this fray, even in words— that members on the Opposition Benches realised the gravity of the situation, and the difficulties that would present themselves to this country if a war should break out. If that spirit prevails throughout the country in regard to those who support the Parties that are represented here, I have no doubt whatever that, despite the gravity of the difficulties, we can surmount them. We will have difficulties at the start. There is no doubt whatever about it. We must be prepared to be patient with those, because it is quite impossible for a small country like ours to make such provision in advance as would enable us to be fully prepared to meet all those difficulties. The cost would be tremendous, and at the present time even if we were prepared to take the risks involved we could hardly purchase some of those supplies. In any case, the cost, regarded from an insurance point of view, would be so terrific that we could not adequately provide for all the difficulties that will face us, any more than we could for instance adequately provide armaments which would ensure us against attack from any quarter. It is well, then, that the seriousness of the situation should be understood by our people, and, if the debate has the effect of bringing that seriousness home to everybody, and making everybody realise the importance of unity in effort, it will certainly have served a good purpose.

My dislike to having the debate at this time was due to the fact that I was anxious that the matters on which we differ—and we do differ, I think the Deputies on the opposite benches will be the first to admit, on a number of fundamental things—would not be the cause at this particular time of weakening any spirit of co-operation that there is in the country. It is true, as Deputy Dillon said, that we are facing a situation which this nation had not to face for centuries, if it ever had to face a similar situation before. We have not had the experience of looking ahead and making all the provision which other nations who have had to face great wars before have had. We can look and learn from their experience, as far as possible, but the situation is going to be a completely new one for our people. I hope that those who were alive in 1914, and were able to understand political situations at that time, will not make the mistake of thinking that the situation to-day, as far as this nation is concerned, is exactly the same as it was in 1914— for it is not. If this fundamental difficulty that we have in getting agreement on political matters were not there—I refer again to the existence of Partition—it would be a relatively easy task to get the unity which is essential for our people in a crisis of this sort. That is why I have been so anxious to try to get rid of it at all times. I appreciate the element of truth that there is in the remark which Deputy Dillon made in regard to the Northern situation. I have said, too, that we want not the territory alone, but the hearts of the people there as well. I have said that recently a number of times, and Deputy Dillon was but using practically the same words as I have used in that connection. We do not want to coerce anybody, but we do say—and we must continue to say it, as it is a basic truth —that a section of our countrymen up there are being coerced. There is a section of our people who are at this moment undergoing coercion—the people in South Down, South Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Derry City. The people in all that area—as I have said already this evening, in practically all the area except that east of the Bann— are being held in that situation against their will. It is not we, then, who are proposing coercion at all.

Coercion is in existence against portion of our people, and there is no use in saying that that at a time of crisis should not do damage. It is there, and it is doing damage, and that is going to be fundamental in the views of our people in this crisis. I am sure everybody on the opposite benches realises its fundamental importance as much as I realise it, and that they will admit that the things we have been trying to do—they may not agree that they are essential, or that they are vital—and whatever element of success has attended our efforts, have removed certain causes of misunderstanding between Great Britain and ourselves. I think they will also admit that if this final difficulty were removed the vast majority of the people of the country would desire to be on friendly relations with those in the neighbouring island. The whole aim of Government policy is to get that situation right. So far as the war situation is concerned, we believe it is in the interests of our people—as we have here a small nation which has suffered severely for centuries—to try to avoid being involved in that struggle. That the issues are great, and that we cannot afford to be indifferent to them, I shall admit; but at the same time our people here will consider that their first and primary object must be to try to get here that freedom for the whole country which our people have been, on every occasion on which there was a crisis for 700 years, trying to secure. I do not think that I need say anything more.

Vote put and agreed to.
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