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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 25 Apr 1940

Vol. 79 No. 15

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army (Resumed).

Debate resumed on the motion:—
That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration.—(Dr. O'Higgins.)

Last night, Sir, on this Defence Estimate I got around to the question of A.R.P. and I was certainly surprised that some of the matters with which I had dealt about six weeks ago were raised again during this debate. I was particularly surprised because I found on the last occasion, to my surprise then also, that the Opposition seemed rather satisfied with the replies I gave them, and I did not think it would be necessary so soon again to explain what Government policy on the matter of A.R.P. was. Yesterday, in saying a few words on the general defence policy, I pointed out to the Dáil that I thought that, in the question of defence, military planning and policy was so interwoven that it was very difficult to go into any kind of detail without disclosing facts which it would not be wise from a military point of view to disclose, and I did suggest that it should be recognised that a wise reticence was necessary in such a matter as defence.

Dealing with this particular portion of the defence policy—A.R.P.—the opposite idea holds. A.R.P. cannot be any kind of success and cannot carry out the work they are intended to do except everybody concerned and affected has the fullest knowledge of what the proposals of A.R.P. are, why these proposals are made, and what is being done and is necessary to do in the matter. Now, I think it was Deputy Esmonde who said that the general public had not been informed as to what their duties were or what was their best mode of procedure in any particular emergency of this sort. I should like to point out to the Deputy that as long ago as, I think, last September, a booklet of instructions was issued all over this country, in any particular place which we called a scheduled area, which was a place that might be considered at least likely to be attacked. I do think that from that point of view a good deal of knowledge was given to the general public. The whole difficulty with A.R.P. is that nobody believes in their necessity. Possibly, that belief is correct, and I hope it is correct, but I do not think we are justified in sitting idly by, in view of the tremendous dangers that exist in the world to-day, or that we are justified in doing nothing to protect ourselves against such a possibility. In the eventuality which Deputy Hughes visualises as being possible, and in other eventualities which have been discussed by various members of the Opposition, I think it would be criminal folly on our part if we did not make such preparations as we could possibly make, consistent with utilising the greatest economy.

Last September I came along here into the Department of Defence to look after this particular matter, and I do confess that, when I was directed to take charge of the particular matter of A.R.P., I came to the Department of Defence as a scoffer: I came, I saw, but I did not concur. However, when I had talked with the various military officers and those who had been concerned in the matter of preparations, I began to get an altogether different slant on the subject of A.R.P., and I did consider that there was a grave necessity for our embarking on such a scheme. Now, as long ago as 1937, I think, Deputy O'Higgins, by question, raised this matter in the House, which showed that at that time the alert minds of the Opposition at least were thinking of the possibility of the need for such a scheme. At that time, Deputy O'Higgins was informed that the matter was under consideration and a scheme being formulated, and in 1937 and 1938 a sum of £1,000 was set aside in the Estimate for the purpose of initiating a scheme of A.R.P. Of that sum, in that year, only £85 17s. 4d. was spent. In the following year the amount set aside was £101,000, of which £48,921 was spent. In 1939-40, £94,594 was set aside and £90,635 was spent. The total amount spent was £139,641 17s. 4d. This year we are asking you to vote for us the sum of £116,855.

Some Deputies here have suggested that the Government acted in a panicky fashion in September, 1939. As far as we were concerned there was no panic but there was a good deal of anxiety throughout the country which was mirrored in the correspondence we received at our headquarters. There was quite a lot of anxiety in regard to air raids and in regard to gas attacks and I think our actions tended very much towards allaying that panic and quietening the nerves of the people. I have so little to say on this matter, having said it all before six weeks ago, that I find it very difficult to discuss it in the way I would like.

We will take the question of shelters, particularly trench shelters. I do not like trenches. I never liked them but I did not see any way of avoiding the making of trenches. A couple of years ago, about 1938, a military critic giving a lecture in London said that military science before a war seemed to be an exact science, like astronomy, but after the war it looked like astrology. Captain Liddel-Hart, a very famous critic, commented on that that it was very hard on astrology. That is true. No matter how well you plan, how much you think, how interested you are, conditions that obtain when a war starts may make a complete change of plan necessary and may make obsolete the things that you have been thinking and doing before the emergency arose. As I say, I never did like trenches and do not like them now, but it was necessary that trench shelters should be made in the areas where housing conditions were such as to create serious danger to the inhabitants of those areas in the event of attack. I want to insist that I do not consider the trench shelter as an ideal air-raid shelter at all. I do not think that we should proceed any further with the system of trench shelters and we have decided that we will not so proceed. I had a talk with Deputy Alderman Byrne a few months ago and he pointed out to me that, if possible, the various parks where trenches had been dug should be put into such a condition that they could be utilised as far as possible as children's playgrounds, etc. I agree with Deputy Alderman Byrne. The carrying out of that work was very much delayed by the timber strike and also by the corporation employees' strike but now we are getting that work under way and I think the whole thing will be cleared up immediately.

As against trench shelters there is also the question of basement shelters. There is quite a lot of basement shelter that could be made available here in Dublin and I think it is a much more satisfactory type of shelter than the trench shelter. This whole scheme of A.R.P. was entered into after a study of what had been done in any other country, after a reading of practically every manual that bore on the question and after watching what the effects of air raids were in any of the wars that have been fought recently. I think there is sufficient basement shelter in Dublin to supply whatever we need in the way of shelter. Speaking of this some time ago here Deputy Dillon asked how did we propose to do any proppings and strutting in the basements and I pointed out that any such thing would have to be done in a very rough fashion. But even at that, weighing up the likelihood of an air-raid here against the cost of a completely or almost completely perfect system of shelters, I came to the conclusion that in view of what had happened in air-raids elsewhere we might take a gamble even against turning basements into air-raid shelters by way of struttings and proppings because my understanding of the results of air-raids—and heavy air-raids—in towns of the type of Dublin has been that 90 per cent. of the casualties have been of those caught in the open and only 10 per cent. of the casualties have occurred to people who have had any kind of shelter. Even at that, the making of the trench shelters is defensible in the areas where they have been made. The first was made in Mountjoy Square. The houses there are fourstorey houses and old houses. The load of the population in those houses is heavy and I do think that the concussion and suction caused by a H.E. bomb would shake all those buildings like a house of cards. In the ordinary houses around the town I think the same necessity does not arise. Of course, Deputy Mulcahy mentioned Merrion Square. There is quite a number of faulty houses, not exactly in the square, but in the streets and lanes around the square and I do think that it was necessary to do in relation to trench shelter the things we have done and I do not think we would be justified in going further than completing those trenches.

With regard to basements, it is necessary, according to the Act, to serve a designation notice on any person whose premises it is proposed to take over for the purpose of the scheme. We have refrained from designating any place, no matter how suitable, because such designation is an interference with business and might possibly depreciate the property so designated; but I think that in the case of an air-raid, or an emergency position, we ought to be entitled to ask every householder to place his house as a shelter at our disposal for those people caught in the open. I do not know whether this could best be done by way of an appeal to citizens or by way of an order—I prefer the appeal— but I know that the response to such an appeal, in the event of an air-raid, might result in undesirable happenings. An air-raid in itself, however, is an undesirable happening and I think we ought to be free to choose the least of any evils that may exist.

I do not think an air-raid here is very probable, but it is not by any means an impossibility. Things have happened, as Deputy Esmonde pointed out a few nights ago, which are incredible, and these could very easily happen to us. We have to consider, as against that, the tremendous amount of money that would have to be spent in providing a proper service, and I do not think that, from any point of view, we would be justified in providing all the money needed to make a perfect service. Also, if there is an air raid on Ireland, it is more than likely that the place where it will take place is Dublin, where all our centres of trade are and where our railway net-works and transport services are. Practically 95 per cent. of our attention has been devoted to Dublin. The Dublin area has been divided into nine districts, and services of the necessary kind have been organised inside those districts. We have shelters, rescue and demolition services, medical services and fire-fighting services, including training and equipment.

I pointed out here, before, that one of the most necessary services we could have is a fire-fighting service. Money spent on such a service is money spent on something which has a permanent benefit and, therefore, there is every justification for a thorough organisation of a fire-fighting service. We have spent quite a lot of money on pumps, equipment and training in this respect and, in the same way, we have spent a good deal of money on medical services. With regard to our rescue and demolition service, I have to say that the building employers in Dublin have done more in that matter than we, ourselves, have done, and as well as the building trade employers, the employees in the building trade have very generously placed their services at our disposal. Of the money spent last year, £90,635, a sum of £11,000 was given as a grant to the Dublin Corporation. That was not the full amount of the grant due to them, but the balance of the grant due will be paid whenever the audited accounts are ready.

I have a note here with regard to respirators. The question of the distribution of respirators was raised by Deputy Dillon. These respirators are packed in sealed tins filled with nitrogen for the purpose of preservation. They are articles which could be damaged and until there is a possibility of their being needed, it is better to have them packed in the sealed tins in proper stores. We have them in one of the barracks in Dublin, and I have arranged with the Dublin Corporation to set up assembly and distribution dépôts throughout the various city areas, so that, if necessary at any time, they can be rapidly distributed. We have also carried out the training of a more than adequate staff, capable of assembling these quickly and instructing other people in their use.

Here again is another debatable question: whether we were wise in purchasing gas-masks. It looks good military practice, if you have to come a long distance with a plane, to bring with you the weapon which is most destructive, and our information is that, weight for weight, the high explosive shell is much more destructive than anything else. Because of that, I think we are unlikely to have to deal with a gas attack; but one never knows, and the panic and nervousness of the people, as indicated by the correspondence in our files, would justify, even from the purely psychological point of view, the purchase of the gas-masks in order to allay that nervousness and to control the people's fears. We paid a sum of £35,000 this year for respirators. I am against the purchase of any more respirators. I think we have plenty for any purpose for which they are likely to be used. We paid this year £19,000 for additional fire-fighting apparatus. We paid for special types of respirators used by fire-fighters in particular cases, such as demolition work, a sum of £1,500. We paid £5,000 for steel helmets, £14,000 for protective clothing, and miscellaneous training cost £5,000.

I believe we ought to observe the utmost economy financially in the matter of A.R.P. schemes. When I entered the Department of Defence to look into this matter I came in as an unbeliever, but I was convinced from what I learned from military officers and others that there was really a need for putting these schemes into operation. I would like Deputies to examine the matter for themselves and try to satisfy themselves whether an A.R.P. scheme is necessary and how far it is necessary. I should like Deputies on all sides of the House to give us their assistance in trying to educate the public to any possible danger there may be in this connection. The trouble with A.R.P. is that you cannot build up a scheme successfully if there are different sections out to boycott it and if the people generally do not take an interest in the matter of A.R.P. I do not believe in spending a tremendous amount of money, but I do believe that some scheme is necessary and I would ask the support of the House in the matter.

I am sure the House listened to the Parliamentary Secretary with very great interest in the hope that he would possibly tell us something. So far as his contribution of last night is concerned, we did not get very much information; but on the subject of A.R.P. to-day the Parliamentary Secretary has told us a little. I think the chief criticism of the Department is that the money provided has been badly spent and the publicity is extremely bad. As regards the second point, the most immediate thing that comes to my memory is that I saw a reference in the paper to the effect that the auxiliary fire service was out for training in the morning recently, pumping from the Liffey. There was just a small paragraph in the paper. If arrangements had been made to have photographers there, it is possible, in consequence of the publicity, that additional recruits might be gained for a service which, to my mind, is an important one, as it can be advantageous in peace time just as in time of war. As regards the bad spending of the money, my criticism is that a certain amount has been spent with certain results whereas, if a little more were spent in the same way, the results would be very much greater.

There is one thing worthy of consideration at the moment and that is the provision of sirens. Certain premises in the city were designated and sirens have been fitted to them— whether or not they have been connected, I do not know, but they have never been used. Admittedly, there are certain difficulties in trying them out in time of war which do not arise in peace time because people may think that they are the genuine article. If the sirens have been fitted but have not been tried and an emergency arises and they are put into operation and 50 per cent. of the people do not hear them, it is very largely a waste of money, whereas the expenditure of a little more money might mean that the system could be made perfect.

There is another point to which the Parliamentary Secretary might have referred and that is why the ratepayers of the City of Dublin in particular should have been put to considerable expense in the dimming of the street lighting and institutions like Grangegorman and the Dublin Board of Assistance should be carrying out certain lighting regulations while night after night the Neon signs are blazing forth from the tops of buildings. These signs are as visible from a distance, and even more so, than the street lights.

In his remarks to-day the Parliamentary Secretary's publicity was bad. He gave no particulars as to the number of wardens who have volunteered for service in the City of Dublin. He gave no particulars as to the numbers of people trained in fire fighting. In fact, the whole thing, instead of being run as something in regard to which everybody ought to know something, is run as a hush-hush service. There was, a little while ago, a certain conflict of opinion between the Department and the air-raid wardens and I think the Parliamentary Secretary might have enlightened us as to whether that conflict of opinion has been completely dealt with and whether the relations were now totally harmonious, because unless they are it is obvious the wardens will lose all enthusiasm for their work and the time and trouble and money which have been spent creating that service will have been just wasted.

Another piece of information which we might have had relates to the number of private shelters which have been, or are about to be, constructed and we might have been told whether such shelters—I am referring now to those made by firms in the city—are purely for the use of the employees or whether any provision has been made for the public. On the subject of shelters, the Parliamentary Secretary was very critical of trench shelters, but I can assure him, from practical experience, that the trench shelter can be at times a very comfortable place. There is one great difficulty in this connection in Dublin and that is that the shelters have not been supplied with any system of drainage. I take it if anything does happen here that it is more likely to happen in the winter than in the summer and the lack of drainage may be a serious disability.

As regards the propping of basements to which the Parliamentary Secretary referred, that is a thing which must be done with steel plates and staunchions, which are not things that can be got at a minute's notice in war time. I wonder has consideration been given in the Department to the alternative of over-ground shelters. I notice of late in England that there has been a considerable development of that kind and I noticed in the paper the other day that the number of people who are, during the day time, in the City of Westminster, has necessitated the Westminster City Council increasing the number of shelters. These are for the most part constructed of 14-inch brick with a 9-inch reinforced concrete roof. Where the materials are all local there would not be the same difficulty as in securing the necessary steel propping for basements. Admittedly, we do not know here if these things are going to be required. We hope not, but it would be foolish not to make certain preparations.

On the question of respirators, I am in entire agreement with the Parliamentary Secretary that they are much better kept in storage for the moment. We know that left luggage offices and so forth in Great Britain are full of respirators which have been left in trains and buses, and they are much safer where they are. At the same time, I should like to suggest that the wardens could be usefully employed visiting all the houses in their areas and getting to know the people with whom they will have to deal if any emergency arises here and they could also discover approximately—it cannot be done definitely at the moment—the number of respirators that will be required and the different sizes that will be necessary for each person—I understand that they are made in different sizes.

If an emergency suddenly arises and if information is not available, it will take a considerable time to get it and in the meantime people may be supplied with respirators that are no use to them. This would also give the wardens the advantage of getting to know the people with whom they will have to do if anything arises. There is just one other remark I wish to make—the Parliamentary Secretary said that at the outbreak of hostilities, their one anxiety was to allay anxiety. The action they took was to have a complete black-out, a peculiar way, surely, of allaying anxiety.

I had not the advantage of listening to the Parliamentary Secretary last night. However, I read what to my mind was the very disquieting speech he made as reported in this morning's papers. If he has been correctly reported the Parliamentary Secretary raised very large issues in his speech last night. He raised the whole issue of how far the Army should be under the control of this House. The Parliamentary Secretary to my mind advanced an astonishing and an entirely undemocratic proposition that if there was a question of discipline or questions of the failure of the Army to carry out its work effectively, that these were matters entirely for the Army authority and not matters that should be debated in this House at all. If that is in any way a misrepresentation of what the Parliamentary Secretary said I will be very glad if he will put me right now. As I have already said I did not have an opportunity of listening to him, but if the words I have quoted be not a misrepresentation of the Parliamentary Secretary's words then he has advanced a very strange proposition and I sincerely hope that before this debate closes, some member of the Executive Council and if necessary the Taoiseach himself will come into this House and state what the views of the Executive Council are with reference to the control of the Army by this House. I say that because I consider this a public matter of very great importance. I do not think there should be any difficulty about the matter at all.

The army in a democratic country is entirely under the control and ought to be under the control of the elected representatives of the people and that should be worked out in this way, that the Army was responsible to the Minister and to the Executive Council and that the Executive Council and especially the Minister is responsible to this House for the condition of the Army, for its efficiency, for its zeal and for its loyalty. If there is any grave failure in the way in which the Army carries out its work then the Minister is responsible to this House for the failure of the Army. I can quite understand the reasons which lay behind the Parliamentary Secretary's remarks. I can quite understand that when a very disturbing event, an event of great importance took place in this country, that a certain unit at any rate of the Army was found wanting. The Parliamentary Secretary wished to shield the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. He wished to draw a screen in front of them. He wished to make it appear that they were not responsible to the House. He wished to make it clear that a matter of this nature was entirely an Army matter and that it must be dealt with by the punishment or removal of Army officers and not dealt with, as in my humble judgment at any rate, it should be dealt with, that is to say by the resignation of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures and probably the Minister for Defence also. That is the meaning of Parliamentary control over the Army. It means that the Ministers who have got control over the Army should be responsible for the higher command, should be responsible for the way in which the higher command and also the lower command and the whole Army carries out its work. If there has been grave failure, the Minister is responsible to this House, for the failure may be directly due to the action of those persons who are either actually or potentially his nominees— that if they were not efficient in their places the Minister should have changed them long before anything happened.

Some years ago a serious position arose in the British Army. I quote the British precedent because, after all, Great Britain is the country in which modern democratic ideas had their birth. There was a mutiny or rather a threatened mutiny in the Curragh. Forthwith the Secretary of State for War had to resign. After that catastrophe of the Magazine Fort in this country, my view is that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures and the Minister for Defence should both have tendered their resignations and the resignations of both should have been accepted. I believe that is what would have happened in any other democratic country except this. Let us deal for a moment with the question of the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. What is he supposed to do except to see that the defensive measures are adequate and proper? And where is there a more vital spot, a spot more in need of defence than the spot where the ammunition for the Army has been collected and where it is stored away? What happened? We discovered that there is a Fort in which, as far as I have been able to judge from the newspaper reports, when the commanding officer went out—and, of course, commanding officers must be out from time to time—the next in command appeared to be a corporal of three years' standing. Here, a vital place, as I say, is not guarded by the very pick of the Army. It was guarded by some of the new Volunteer force and a few of the regular soldiers. The thing is very unpleasant. There you have soldiers whose cry, when there is an attack made upon the Magazine Fort, is "safety first". There is no attempt made to defend that post. "Safety first" is a very poor war-cry on the lips of soldiers.

There is nobody in this country who has a greater admiration for the regular troops of the National Army than I have, who recognises more clearly than I do the great debt this country owes to its National Army, or who has got a greater belief in the thorough efficiency of the old soldiers, and the regular soldiers, of our National Army than I have. In the case of this Magazine, I find that it is not the old soldiers, or the picked men, of our Army who were placed to defend this most vital spot, but for the most part these new untrained and, one is forced to say it, not very courageous Volunteers. That is precisely the kind of scheme which the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures should have first seen to. It was the very first place that he should have looked to. The first inquiry he should have made from the general staff of the Army, and I presume he did make it, was this: what force have you got guarding this most vital spot—the Magazine? Did he make inquiries, or did he, or did he not, see what methods were being adopted to guard it? Either way proves that he is equally inefficient. If he did not, then what on earth sort of work is he doing? If he did, then he was satisfied with what has been proved to be a most inadequate scheme of defence.

I have often been puzzled to think how on earth the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures puts in his day. He must have a very gloomy day, indeed. I remember a Parliamentary Secretary on one occasion informing this House apropos of nothing that, either before he went to bed or when he was in bed, he read two detective stories every night. Well, from the time that he goes down to his office until he leaves it, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures must, within the last few months, have had time to read every single detective story that has been published. I am very sorry for him. He goes down to his office in the morning and he has nothing to do. He can have nothing to do. Nobody has ever explained to this House what he is even supposed to do. This poor individual has to go down to his office every morning. Let us suppose that he gets there about 11 o'clock. He has to kick his heels from that hour until 4 or 4.30 in the afternoon with nothing to fill up his time. I have often thought that the most unpleasant time I have gone through was when I arrived at a railway station and had to wait three-quarters of an hour or an hour, because of a breakdown in the train due to arrive. I certainly have found those experiences most shockingly boring. It seems to me that this poor Minister is all day long in a sort of perpetual railway station waiting for a train which never can come in, for the simple reason that it has never started. He is there confined in a room with nothing on earth to do. In the early days of his appointment he ought, at least, to have seen to it that the Magazine was properly guarded. He either did not do that, or, if he did, then he did it in a most inefficient way. After failure following failure in his career, that Minister is at the moment in a post, the duties of which are absolutely nil.

I would like to know, and I think the whole country would like to know, what is the reason for having a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures at the present moment? I fling out that challenge to that Minister who, on the Defence Vote, is not even in his place in the House. That, in itself, shows how seriously he takes his work. But if he is not in his place in the House on the Defence Vote, may I express the hope, possibly it is a vain hope, that when the Minister for Defence comes to close this debate he will explain to the House precisely what help the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures has been to him in discharging the duties of his post?

In my opinion this Vote is altogether too high. Although I have asked for the information in the House I have never been told, nor have the people in the country been told, for what purpose this Volunteer force was ever enrolled. The Parliamentary Secretary in his speech last night, as reported in this morning's newspapers, said that the Army authorities think that it may be made a good force. I would like to ask: made a good force for what purpose? Modern history shows plainly that a small country, attacked by a large country, cannot defend itself, and that the main need of an Army in this country is one that we can rely on to keep internal peace. The properly trained and, I would say, brilliantly officered national Army that we have is quite adequate for that purpose. I challenge the Minister for Defence to tell us against what potential enemy this so-called Volunteer force has been enlisted. If we had not this Volunteer force, and if our expenditure on defence was the same this year as it was a couple of years ago, there would have been no necessity for the higher taxation proposals which were submitted to the House last September, or for the extra taxes on sugar and tobacco. We have been told that these taxes were put on for defence purposes, and yet we cannot be told against what potential enemy we are to defend ourselves. Those taxes were raised in order that this Volunteer force may be kept mobilised. I want to know why the people of this country should have these extra taxes put on vital necessaries of life in order to keep this entirely valueless Volunteer force mobilised. In my judgment, this Vote is altogether too high and it certainly should be referred back for reconsideration.

Mr. Brennan

I had not any intention of speaking in this debate, but it is quite possible that some misunderstanding may exist or may arise as a result of a statement made here last night by the Parliamentary Secretary. Firstly, he gave the House to understand that the position of a Parliamentary Secretary was an unenviable one, one that carried responsibility without his having any inside knowledge. Nevertheless, he immediately gave utterance to what might be described as a most extraordinary piece of inside information, if it were inside information. At least it appeared to some Deputies as being something he knew when he stated in effect that, if we had no Army in this country, the morning that hostilities broke out between England and Germany we would have had an invasion of this country by British troops. That statement was made in the House last night and the House is entitled to know whether there is any ground for that statement, or what was the meaning behind it. Did the Parliamentary Secretary mean that Britain was coming here as an aggressor if we had no Army in this country, or was Britain coming here, as the Taoiseach pointed out some time ago, as an ally?

This may be very important and its effects may be very far-reaching. We understood from the Minister for Defence that an order for munitions was placed by this country. It seems that the order ran into millions of pounds, but, according to the Minister, we only got £700,000 worth of the order. That order was placed with Britain—there is no need for hiding that fact. If the impression is to be created by the Parliamentary Secretary's speech that we are enemies of Britain and that Britain is an enemy of ours and would invade our country, then we may not look forward to any further delivery of munitions; at least that is how the matter strikes me.

As far as we on this side of the House are concerned, we are not against providing money for defence. I am not a military man, and I do not pretend to have any military knowledge. But I think that we are entitled to know on what foot the Government is standing at the present time. When the Taoiseach made his statement here on the Financial Agreement—I have it here, but there is no need to delay the House by reading it—he made what was considered at that time a very important statement with regard to the steps that should be taken by this country in future in planning its defence. We are now doing that, or we are supposed to be doing it. I do not want to ask the Minister at present whether the Taoiseach's ideas are being adhered to, because, as the Parliamentary Secretary said a while ago, there ought to be a wise reticence. I agree with that. But, when the Parliamentary Secretary makes the statement, as he did last night, that British troops would have been here on the very morning that Germany and England went to war, were it not for the fact that there was an Army here, that requires some explanation and we ought to be told exactly where we are. I hope the Minister will do that.

Before calling on the Minister to conclude, I hope it is understood that, when a motion to refer an Estimate back is tabled, the motion and the Vote are discussed together. There may be two divisions but only one debate. My reason for stating that is that some Deputies gave me to understand that they had a few minor points to raise on sub-heads. They have their opportunity now. When the Minister has concluded, if he is called upon to conclude now, two questions will be put but no further debate will be allowed.

During the four days over which this debate has run the thought occurred to me that the ways of a Minister for Defence are hard ways. I came in here believing that in presenting an itemised account of the expenditure of my Department I was doing something that Deputies desired should be done, and I was rather surprised when practically every Opposition speaker, taking the lead from Deputy O'Higgins, made it clear that what was required was not so much an itemised account of the expenditure, which they said they could find in the Book of Estimates if they required it, but a detailed statement of policy. The rather extraordinary thing about that is that about 12 months ago my predecessor, the present Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, brought in a very detailed statement of policy and on that occasion what the Opposition said they required was an itemised account of expenditure. Now, it strikes me that the tactics of the Opposition are the tactics of "heads we win and tails you lose".

Another thing that occurred to me during the course of the debate, and which made me wonder if I were supposed to take the debate seriously at all, was the great divergence of opinion which existed on the Opposition Benches. On the front bench and on the back benches that divergence of opinion existed. I will give one example of what occurred on the Front Bench. Deputy O'Higgins, in the course of his speech, stated: "I do not believe that it is tactful to go out of our way to give offence to any country." That is a statement with which I would thoroughly agree, with which every Deputy who possesses any common sense would throughly agree, and which Deputy Brennan just a moment ago reiterated. We all agree with that type of statement. None of us believes that it is tactful to go out of our way to give offence to any country. The point I want to make is this. Deputy Dillon, sitting beside his colleague, did not share that view because Deputy Dillon immediately began to belabour the heads of two of the most powerful States in Europe. He, no doubt, saw the possibility of outdoing and outvying the good old Skibbereen Eagle because that is the only reason I could see why he should have gone out of his way to challenge the heads of these States or to use the violent language in respect of the heads of these States that he did use. The position of the Skibbereen Eagle is unshaken as a result of Deputy Dillon's assault but the position of “the three tailors of Tooley Street” is dangerous and they will have to look to their laurels. Otherwise, they will be stolen from them by the bellicose Deputy Dillon.

On the question of policy, I have a clear recollection of getting something in the nature of a White Paper. I am certain that every Deputy who had an interest in the debate got it and studied it carefully. If they did, they have very quickly forgotten the contents of the paper. In this House last year, Mr. Aiken stated the policy in the following words:—

"(1) Our sovereignty over the Twenty-Six Counties is complete and is so recognised internationally;

"(2) The only authority which can commit us to war is the Assembly of the elected representatives of the people—the Dáil;

"(3) It is not the policy of the Government to attack any nation and we have no commitment to join or to be involved in any war;

"(4) It is the policy of the Government to repel any attack which might be made upon our territory.

"These facts, I think, negative the possibility of our being at war with Britain unless we are attacked by her. Therefore, the only other situation which we have to plan for is the maintenance of our neutrality or attack by a Power at war with Britain. It is assumed that it is most unlikely we should be attacked by a Power not at war with Britain. In all probability, such an attack would come only from a Power seeking to make our territory the cock-pit of its war with Britain or as a base from which to attack her."

As regards the functions of the Army, Mr. Aiken defined them thus in 1934 in this House——

Is a member of the House entitled to allude to a member of the Executive Council as "Mr. Aiken"?

It was a slip. I should have referred to the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

I took it that the allusion was not intentional.

It is a petty point. The Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, who was then Minister for Defence, said: "The policy of the State as regards the Army is briefly to have a small, highly-trained, standing Army, which will serve as a pivot around which might be organised, developed and trained the entire reserve and volunteer forces, and, if necessary, the entire man-power of the State. To that end, the Army is being, and will be, provided with the most intensive training, the most up-to-date arms and equipment, and the most scientific warlike weapons which the State can afford." In view of this statement and similar statement made from time to time by members of the Government, I thought it would have been unnecessary for me to deal with this question again. We have absolutely no arrangements with any other Power, and like other neutral countries we cannot say whence attack may come. Our policy is to be prepared for attack from any source. Some Deputies suggested, during the course of the debate on this Estimate, that we should hold a secret session. I do not know why we should hold a secret session. I do not even know why we were asked to hold a secret session. We have no secrets to share, and the tone of the debate, as heard by me, showed so little restraint that I do not think it would, in fact, be a secret session, if held.

Why not, with such an effective censorship?

Under the Constitution, Army policy is the collective responsibility of the Government and they have no desire or intention to hand that responsibility over to a committee of the House.

Mr. Morrissey

Has not that been the policy in respect of the Army during the last 18 years?

Judging by the divergence of opinion on the benches opposite, I think that it would be a dangerous experiment to hand that responsibility over to a committee. Deputy Esmonde, Deputy Dillon and other Deputies referred to the position of the Army in the event of external attack. It was, I think, suggested by some of the Deputies that it would be unfair to ask the Army to attempt to repel an attack. Deputy Esmonde, citing what he considered to be the example of Denmark, seemed to think that the best way to deal with an invader would be to invite some prominent personage of this State to go out, meet him and welcome him.

That is an entire misrepresentation of what I said.

Deputy Dillon did not go quite as far as Deputy Esmonde went. He seems to think that the best way to rid ourselves of an invader's presence would be to make speeches, write letters and invoke propaganda from the Irish exiles abroad. After about 700 years of that type of stuff, we would once again, I suppose, shake off the invader. Happily, that is not Deputy Cosgrave's viewpoint. Deputy Cosgrave made very clear what the position would be. There, again, we have that divergence of opinion on the opposite benches which makes it almost impossible for Minister or Deputies on this side to know what the Opposition want or mean. Deputy Cosgrave said in the course of the debate:

"If the Minister wants to know what my view on the Army situation is, it is that, if we were faced with an invasion, the invasion should be resisted, and that there should be along with the Army the support of every citizen to resist that invasion. We should not follow the example of Denmark."

Deputy Cosgrave's view is my view, and it is the view of every member of the Government. It is the view, too, of every person who loves liberty and who wants to retain that liberty. Deputy Cosgrave's view is the view I am prepared to take as the view which will, in the long run, operate on the other side of the House if difficulties arise.

It has been argued that the Army would be of very little use against a powerful invader. We have never pretended that it could keep out an invader, but we do hold that it can withstand the first shocks of such an invasion and thus prepare and stiffen the resistance, active and passive, of the country. Without an Army, an aggressor could invade this country with impunity but, with the Army and with the stiffening of the people's resistance, an aggressor must think twice before acting. In this connection, the point has been made that we are relying too much on ground troops, that we should concentrate on the training of air pilots and the building up of a large air force with adequate reserves of pilots and machines. In point of fact, we are not neglecting the development of the Air Corps, which has already been considerably extended since 1932. Moreover, we are training pilots up to the full capacity of the machines at our disposal and, as pointed out in my opening statement, we are providing in the present Estimate for a number of short-term commissions in the Air Corps. The due development, or expansion, of the Air Corps is one thing and its substitution for ground troops is quite another thing. Apart from technical questions of strategy and tactics, we must remember, on the one hand, that our financial resources are very limited and, on the other hand, that modern aircraft is very expensive, that it becomes obsolete rapidly, that its life is short and its upkeep and maintenance costly. Apart, then, entirely from any question of strategy or tactics, the fact of the matter is that our financial resources would not permit us to have as large an air arm as we should like to have.

Deputy McGilligan, Deputy Hughes and Deputy O'Higgins referred to the Navy and its functions. Briefly, the functions of the vessels of the coast watching service are to assist the Army in the defence of the country by patrolling its coasts, by reporting the movements of any foreign hostile craft and, if necessary, by engaging such craft. They also perform the functions of protecting the fishing limits of the country. In this respect, it might be useful for me to inform the House that, since our craft went out on patrol work, they have been in action against foreign trawlers on at least three occasions. They have captured one foreign craft and brought her into port. They have fired at and very seriously damaged another foreign craft which refused to "heave to" when called upon to do so but, owing to the heavy seas, the vessel escaped outside territorial waters and got away by sacrificing her fishing gear while suffering damage to the extent of from £100 to £200 which, in its own way, is a heavy penalty. The M.I., on her first day out, went into action against another foreign trawler and, in spite of the fact that very heavy seas were running, and that conditions were very bad, she challenged this craft, which also refused to stand by, and damaged her very considerably. Again, owing to the high seas running, the foreign trawler got outside territorial waters and so escaped. These instances will show, I hope, that these vessels will be a very great asset to our nation in the future.

Did they see any Irish boats fishing?

Several Deputies asked about the delay in the arrival of the M.T.I. They seem to have certain suspicions. They have suspicions about practically everything connected with defence and the Army in general. The M.T.I. left the upper reaches of the Thames in what was, possibly, the most severe weather experienced in either England or Ireland for a long number of years. My instructions to the officers and crew, when going over, was that they were to exercise every possible care, that the task which I wanted them to complete, and complete successfully, was the bringing home of the M.T.I. The coast around the south of England requires very careful navigation and, during this very severe weather, they had to put into port on several occasions. They did that because they wanted to ensure that the craft would arrive safely here and because they understood that the question of time was not to be allowed to prevent that safe arrival. The thick plate-glass windows of the vessel were smashed through by the heavy seas. The bedding and other material on the boat were drenched, and they had to put into port. It took several days to have these things dried. It took a much longer period to have the plate-glass windows replaced. From time to time, they put into port on the way around in order to ensure that their engines and everything else would be perfect, and to refuel. They arrived in Portsmouth. They were advised not to go on to Pembroke, which they were next to make, owing to the fact that there were mines about. They had to make their course across from Portsmouth to the nearest possible point on the Irish coast. The captain of the vessel decided to make Waterford his port of call rather than to risk making direct for Dublin. There, again, he was acting within his own discretion. He arrived in Waterford and he spent, I understand, two or three days there. During that time he refuelled and attended to some other necessary matters. I am not aware that anything of an untoward nature took place while in Waterford. They left Waterford that morning and they arrived in Dun Laoghaire that evening. The incident which took place in Dun Laoghaire was one of those things over which it is difficult to have control. Suffice it to say, that there was no raid whatever on the boat, and the rating who gave the false alarm, which in turn gave rise to the false report, has been discharged from the service.

A question was raised by several Deputies as to the delay in the delivery of stores. In the course of recent debates on the Army Estimate, a number of false statements have been made regarding the equipment of the Army and the purchase of war material. These statements are mischievous in that they are calculated not only to encourage a potential enemy but also to create misgivings in the minds of our people as to the ability of the Army to defend this country's neutrality. In order to remove any such impression, it is essential that the facts be stated. It has been said or suggested, for instance, that the troops are ill-equipped with fighting weapons or that the weapons which they possess are obsolete weapons. There is no truth whatever in that suggestion. Even if it had been true, the previous Government could not escape responsibility in that connection for it will be shown that they did not pay the attention which has been paid by us to the proper equipment of the Army. We came into office in 1932, and the first Estimates we presented to this House were those framed by our predecessors. In 1932-33 the Estimate for warlike stores was £51,983. In the following year, our first in office, it was represented by a slightly increased figure, namely, £56,672. After a very short time in office, my predecessor realised that the position regarding the Army's equipment was not satisfactory and he therefore concentrated at once on achieving two immediate objects—(1) to build up sufficient reserve stores of munitions and primary weapons that the general staff considered essential for the defence of the country; (2) to investigate the suitability of certain new weapons of defence and to familiarise all ranks with those which were found suitable.

Now, as the Minister himself pointed out to the Dáil, he was circumscribed in his efforts by the financial resources of the country and he had to be content with gradual and systematic achievement spread over a number of years. This is reflected by the Estimates for the succeeding years. Thus, in 1935 the Estimate for warlike stores was increased to £104,380. In 1936 it amounted to £71,475. In 1937 the figure reached was £160,683. In 1938 the sum was £137,125. Towards the end of 1937, that twofold object had been achieved. Sufficient reserve stocks of ammunition and of primary weapons had been accumulated in accordance with the plans. The general staff after due investigation had been satisfied that the best modern weapons were the Bren gun, a CzechoSlovakian invention, the Bofors anti-aircraft gun, a Swedish product, the Brandt mortar, manufactured in France, and the Landsverk armoured car, also a Swedish product. Meanwhile, sufficient quantities of these weapons had been ordered and delivered to familiarise instructors and, through them, the N.C.O.s and other ranks of the Army with their handling and operation.

The problem of aircraft had been handled in a similar manner. All the machines were of British origin. Now, here it should be noted that, at that time, for Great Britain or any other country, there was no other source of supply than the countries mentioned, and that the problem had become further complicated by motorisation. Towards the end of 1937 the problem of fully equipping the Army with those other weapons was investigated in the light of previous achievement and actual demonstration, and it was decided to complete the equipment. Inquiries were immediately set on foot to ascertain when deliveries could be made and where these inquiries showed that deliveries could be made at once, or that manufacture would be started on our behalf, immediate orders were placed for weapons. Reasonable deliveries were made against orders, and the actual position of the Army is much better than the Opposition apparently thinks. To see if deliveries could be expedited, personal contact was made by officials early in 1938 with the War Office. Although they were sympathetic they could not promise immediate delivery as they had naturally to satisfy their own requirements first. Certain inquiries were then made elsewhere by personal contact, but as these negotiations were not any more advantageous, firm orders were placed in England in the autumn of 1938. Though deliveries have not been in accordance with our expectations, they have not, nevertheless, been unreasonable, seeing that the whole situation has been complicated by the war.

Now, it is not correct to say that our stores are empty. In point of fact, they have never been fuller. It is not true to say that men were called up last September and that we had not sufficient primary weapons for them, and it is false to insinuate that the delay in delivery is due to our placing orders abroad. In my opening statement, it was stated that £460,651 was devoted to war-like stores. Deputy Mulcahy could not trace the figures making up that total, and said that we must have included clothing. We did not include the cost of a single brass button. Here is how the sum is made up:—Aircraft, sub-head O, £56,912; war-like stores, sub-head P, £121,267; fighting vessels, sub-head P (2), £279,972; and engineering stores, sub-head Q, £2,500, making a total of £460,651.

In the course of the debate on the Supplementary Estimate, 1938-39, on the 16th February, 1939, the Taoiseach said that of the £5,500,000 to be spent on special capital expenditure, roughly £2,000,000 was to be devoted to protection against air attack. "I am talking," he said, "in round figures."

Very round figures.

"Nearly £1,000,000 is to be spent in regard to aircraft defence by means of aeroplanes and so on, and there is about another £1,000,000 on anti-aircraft guns and ammunition." During recent debates it has been stated that the Taoiseach said that £1,000,000 would be spent on aeroplanes, but from the words which I have just quoted it is obvious that he was talking in round figures and that his actual words were: "Nearly £1,000,000 is to be spent in regard to aircraft defence by means of aeroplanes, and so on." For anti-aircraft defence it was proposed to spend £1,119,169, and on aircraft, etc., it was proposed to spend £780,074. Those two figures added together come to a total of £1,899,243, which is roughly the £2,000,000 which the Taoiseach had in mind.

Might I ask the Minister what was the second figure he gave? Anti-aircraft defence, other than planes—what were the items in that? The Taoiseach referred to anti-aircraft guns only. The Parliamentary Secretary bulked quite a number of others.

Against the sum of £1,119,169 for anti-aircraft defences we have actually placed orders to the extent of £979,429. As regards aeroplanes and so on, the figure of £780,074 included the sum of £300,000 for aerodromes. The latter project has not yet materialised, and, therefore, from the sum of £780,074 there must be deducted £300,000, leaving a balance of £480,074 to be spent on aircraft and accessory stores. Against the proposals of £480,074 we have placed orders to the extent of £329,021, leaving a balance outstanding of £151,053 in respect to material which has not yet been ordered. That material has not been ordered because we are awaiting deliveries against the orders which have already been placed.

A question was also raised in respect to coastal defences and as to whether the forts are being properly maintained or not. The equipment of the forts is being maintained at identically the same standard as the British maintained it, and sufficient men are at present stationed there—gun crews and so on—to meet any question of a state of emergency. We have also arrangements regarding trained crews which are now on the reserve and, in case of emergency, they could also be called in to lend additional strength there. The training of additional troops for the forts is always going on and is being continually reviewed.

Deputy MacEoin, in the course of his speech, referred to the fact that there was delay in payment for provisions purchased locally during the period of mobilisation, and delay in the payment of marriage allowances. The normal rule, and the ordinary practice of the Department, is to clear all contractors' accounts within a month of the date of supply, provided that the claims are presented at once by a duly certified receiving officer. If those conditions are not fulfilled, delay in payment is bound to occur. The onus, therefore, is on the contractor to see that the claims are verified and presented at once. No general complaint has been made about delay in payment of claims for provisions, and any particular delay was found on investigation to be due mainly to non-compliance with the regulations which I have just outlined.

As regards the marriage allowances, there were 1,983 on the marriage register prior to mobilisation. No delay whatever took place in respect to that particular group of individuals, because those individuals were able, naturally, to comply with the requirements of the Army. When we called up the Volunteers and the reserves a regulation was made that all Volunteers or reservists who were married men on the 1st September that year would be entitled to the marriage allowance. Large numbers of those men, of course, failed to conform to the requirements, although those requirements were thoroughly explained to them. For instance, a man had to produce a certificate of marriage and had to produce birth certificates for children for whom he was claiming, and, where those were not forthcoming, it was not possible to pay the allowance in full. It was paid in part, in order to alleviate any likely hardships, but I understand that, on a former occasion, a vast sum of money was lost through dealing with the question of marriage allowances without taking due notice of the necessity to examine carefully the marriage certificates and birth certificates also.

Deputy Hughes mentioned the question of supplies of coal. Of course, the Deputy will understand that when the emergency broke out we took over various outlying positions far removed from our ordinary barracks. We had to get in large quantities of extra coal and we had to secure places where coal could be stored. In some of those instances, it was, as the Deputy mentioned, in fields. I went to the trouble of examining this question of coal being thrown on the ground in order to allow cars to get into a field easily, and I found that when that was done the coal was recovered and the amount of the coal used did not exceed from 4 to 6 cwts.

Deputy MacEoin, and also Deputy Hughes, referred to transport. I think Deputy Hughes' worry was that learners were careering round the public highway. In actual fact, Army drivers must have had some civil experience and most of the men who were given control of a motor vehicle had such civil experience, but, even if they possessed that civil experience, they were always put through certain tests. Those tests took place within the confines of the barracks, and when the officer carrying out the tests had satisfied himself that those men were, in his opinion, competent to take out a car the car was taken out on the public highway, accompanied by the instructor, which no doubt lent colour to the impression that the driver was learner. In actual fact, the man should not be described as a learner, and I cannot quite understand that any of these men were driving in a manner that could be described as dangerous to the public. As a matter of fact, the Army would not tolerate the system that operates in respect of civilians; that is, that if a civilian goes out and purchases a car, he can get a friend of his or somebody else to take him out on the road and show him how to drive the car. That is the usual way in which the civilian learns to drive a car, but that would not be tolerated in the Army.

Would the same apply to motor cyclists?

Yes. As a matter of fact, motor cyclists are even more carefully supervised. On the question of the difference in rates of pay for Army medical officers that was raised by Deputy O'Higgins, that whole question of the pay for Army medical officers has been discussed fully in this House already. The apparent anomaly of two officers of the same rank receiving different rates of pay is a result of the new scheme and is simply due to a desire not to deprive the officers who were serving before the scheme came into operation of any of their existing rights.

Does the Minister hold that they were not deprived of pre-existing rights? What I mean is this: that, prior to the scheme, promotion carried so much pay.

Where these officers had a certain figure with regard to pay, that figure was not interfered with, but those coming in later on were subject to a lesser rate of pay.

But I contend that pre-existing rights were taken from them.

It may seem an anomaly, as the Deputy suggests, but I think this thing is operating fairly, and I think the existing rate of pay should be left with the officers while they are serving, even though the new men coming in may have a lesser amount. That is the explanation for this matter of two officers, who may be serving side by side, having different rates of pay.

Yes, but on a point of accuracy, might I ask the Minister this? If a man had a certain rate of pay, and if a Government regulation entitled him to increased pay on promotion, and that right to increased pay on promotion were taken from him, has not that man been deprived of pre-existing rights?

Well, as I say, I am not closely conversant with this whole question, but, as I have pointed out, the matter was fully debated in the House between the Deputy and my predecessor.

But was the person to whom I have referred not deprived of pre-existing rights?

It would seem as if he were, from what the Deputy says, but I am not admitting that he was.

Well, the Minister holds the position of Minister, and let us suppose that a Parliamentary Secretary has a salary of £1,000 a year and that it is stated, in a regulation, that he will get a salary of £1,750 if he should be promoted to the position of Minister; if another regulation is brought in afterwards to say that if he is promoted to the position of Minister he will still get his £1,000 a year, and his £1,000 a year only, does not that regulation deprive him of pre-existing rights? That is all I am asking the Minister.

Well, yes. If the Deputy puts it that way, I suppose it would.

Now, Deputy Brodrick raised the question of engineer stores, and he seemed to be in some difficulty about that particular sub-head. I think he had the impression that we were spending less this year than we spent in former years and that there was a greater necessity in fact for spending more this year than last year. That, however, is not the position. The figure for this year, as compared with the figure for last year, shows an increase of £1,335. The figure for 1939-40 includes the figure in the annual Estimate for that year of £5,650, plus £20,000 taken in the Supplementary Estimate last month. The £20,000 was simply for reserve stocks, and it would not be repeated annually at all.

Deputy Moran raised the question of the evacuation of Castlebar. The evacuation of Castlebar was necessitated by the reduction in the strength of the Army and by the considered judgement of the General Staff, and that is a thing that has to be considered. Deputies McGilligan and Brodrick also asked what is the provision of £15,611, in sub-head AA, intended to cover. Under that sub-head the following provisions are made:—pay and allowances to officials, £5,743; conveyance of prisoners, £300; food for prisoners, £8,668; clothing, blankets, etc., for prisoners, £900.

Deputy Cosgrave could not find a particular figure under sub-head A. He saw that the sub-head showed a decrease of 72 in numbers, and an increase of £76,000 in money. In actual fact, he quoted the net figures instead of the gross figures. The numbers are based on averages and indicate that, over the whole year, we propose to maintain 72 men less than in 1939, and the gross figure shows that the cost is £5,000 less. The gross figures show the cost of maintaining, over the whole year, an average strength of 11,939 men for 1939, and 11,867 for 1940. The net figures show that, over the whole year, 1939, the average actually maintained was 10,351, and not 11,939, and that, for the whole year 1940, we expect to maintain an average of 11,801. The annual and Supplementary Estimates for 1939 were based on the following averages:— 6,864, other ranks, for six months; 18,796 for one month; 14,169 for two months; and 12,003 for three months; giving an approximate average for the whole financial year of a figure of 10,351.

Deputy Davin referred to the question of pay and allowances for the personnel employed on the patrol and motor vessels. Seven officers and 15 members of the crews of the Fort Rannoch and the Muirchú are paid the personal salaries and wages which they were in receipt of from the Fisheries Services, prior to their transfer to the defence force. The remaining officers and men are in receipt of Army regimental rates of pay, together with certain additional rates of pay according to qualifications. The latter are also entitled to the usual rates in respect of lodging, fuel and light, and ration allowances, in the case of officers, a marriage and ration allowance, and in the case of men where the conditions of entitlement are fulfilled. The number of officers and men who were called up on permanent service is 464.

Deputy Davin was anxious to secure these figures. The number of men called upon permanent service was 11,706. The number of officers exempted from permanent service, 137, and the number of men exempted from permanent service, 5,583. He was also anxious to know if the rate payable in respect of ration allowance was increased since the outbreak of the European war. The ration allowance for both officers and men is revised every six months in accordance with the contract price of rations and the allowance has been revised upwards since last September.

Deputy Cogan referred to the fact that we had commandeered hay—I think it was during the farmers' strike —and brought it to feed elephants in the Zoo. The actual position was this: The hay was the property of the authorities of the Zoological Gardens but they had no way of getting it in and they appealed to the Army authorities to bring the hay in in order to feed the elephants. Otherwise, it was their opinion that the elephants would have to be destroyed. I gave permission to have the hay transported in order to save the lives of the valuable elephants. There was no question whatever of commandeering.

Deputy O'Sullivan referred to an item in the Estimates for a magazine. He wanted to know was this a new magazine and where was it. It is a new magazine and it is on the Curragh. It has been found necessary to have this new magazine constructed to hold the ammunition that the Opposition appear to think that we have not got.

I hope they will hold it.

That would be a good one to have raided.

We have more ammunition than our present Army could use in years.

That is the reason for buying more?

And we will continue to buy more, yes. We will continue to do the things that some of the Deputy's colleagues on the opposite benches are demanding that we should do—purchase more and more warlike stores.

We are really asking what they are being purchased for. The Parliamentary Secretary was going to tell us that but he forgot.

He told us but there was a slight alteration in the tale.

Deputy Byrne, Junior, asked some questions in respect of the annual training grants—Individual Proficiency Grant and Sluagh Proficiency Grant. The annual training grant was paid at the conclusion of the annual training. The disposal of the remaining two portions is still under consideration, and every effort is being made to expedite a decision. Questions of proficiency arise there, questions of proficiency in respect both to the individual and the Sluagh, and these difficulties are being overcome as quickly as possible.

I think I have answered most of the queries that have been put to me this time. Perhaps when Deputy O'Sullivan referred to the fact that I made that remark on my Supplementary Estimate I should have told the Deputy that I thought I answered all the questions that it was necessary to answer. That might have made it more clear.

Deputy Dillon, in the course of his speech, referred to the fact of the Minister for Defence storming around the various barracks in the country. I want to assure Deputy Dillon that while that is what he probably would do himself—because I think his tendency is towards storming everything— I did not storm any position. I merely went round and made a careful inspection of certain barracks in the country in order to inform myself as to the conditions which existed in the Army. I was accompanied on that inspection to every post by the Chief of Staff, and, in order to make certain that I would be properly informed, I asked him to bring some expert officers with him. A careful inspection was made of a large number of posts, including the forts, and I very much wish that it would be possible for members of this House to have seen the high state of proficiency which was visible to me. I am sure the members of the Army would be delighted if it were possible for members of this House to pay similar visits.

In closing this debate, I want to say that another statement made by Deputy Dillon, in respect to my predecessor, is quite untrue. My predecessor on no occasion ever released a man from custody who was guilty of insubordination. As far as I am concerned, as long as I am in the position of Minister for Defence, I will see that discipline is carried out in the manner in which the Army authorities desire that it should be carried out, and in no circumstances will I ever interfere in matters of discipline between the persons who have to be disciplined and the Army authorities.

Some of the statements which have been made in this House are damaging statements to the Army. They are liable to make people who were desirous and who were anxious to overthrow the authority of the State believe that they have an easy task on hands. On the other hand, they are equally liable, in my opinion, to have a deteriorating effect on the personnel of the Army. A thing has only got to be said often enough and people will begin to think that there is something in it. As far as I am concerned, and following the visits which I have paid to a large number of commands to which I have just referred, it is my opinion that the Army was never in a finer position, in a finer condition, or a better Army than it is to-day. I hope that position will be maintained in the future, and it can only be maintained with the full co-operation of all the Deputies in this House.

May I draw the Minister's attention to the fact that, despite the queries put by separate Deputies as to what are the functions of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, he has not indicated in the course of his summing-up to what extent he has been, is, or hopes to be assisted in his Departmental duties by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. I take it that that is an oversight on his part, and I am sure he has some observation to make on that particular point.

It was not an oversight. I think such a question addressed to me is addressed in bad taste, and it is not my intention to answer such a question.

It is in the Estimate.

We are asked within the Minister's Estimate to vote a sum of money for the office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. It is on the Minister's Vote. It is the Minister's responsibility to give an answer to the question raised by Deputy Hannigan if the Minister in question does not come in to answer for himself.

I think that if the Deputy looks at the Book of Estimates he will get the information he seeks.

He will get the information that there is such a person. The question put was, what does that person do and why are we paying £200,000 or so for that particular office? What are his functions? What are his duties? What does he co-ordinate? Those are the questions to which the Deputy referred.

The Minister did not refer to the matter of the losing of their jobs by volunteers and the reservists who were called up.

In that respect, the fact is that the House was informed on a former occasion of what I undertook on behalf of these men who were called up and later exempted. I corresponded with practically every chamber of commerce in the country and I am glad to say that they all agreed to co-operate. We also got into touch with certain large firms who also agreed to co-operate, but it is a fact that there are certain employers, not very large, who did not co-operate to the extent of giving these volunteers back their positions, and it may be necessary for me to bring in legislation to ensure that such men will get their positions back.

There are certain sub-heads upon which I desire to ask questions. The putting of the motion will be the final business and we will not have any chance of asking questions thereafter. If nobody has any question to raise on the sub-heads down to sub-head O—General Stores— I should like to ask the Minister how many aeroplanes are included in the sum of £56,912 which may be spent under the aviation section before the end of the financial year.

I am not quite familiar with the procedure, but the Ceann Comhairle has pointed out that there would be only one debate, although there might be two Votes, and he asked, before calling the Minister to conclude, whether any Deputy had any questions to ask, and when nobody had any question to ask he called on the Minister to conclude.

On a point of order, this Estimate is before the House and there has been a debate on a motion to refer it back. Before the motion is put and following the general discussion, I submit that the House is entitled to take each of these items and to raise any question on it, while not indulging in a debate on any point except in so far as it is necessary to have an exchange of speech in order to get information. There is no point that I want to raise on any sub-head down as far as sub-head O, and I submit that I am entitled to ask for an explanation of the point I have raised.

I believe the Ceann Comhairle has ruled that, at the conclusion of the Minister's statement, questions might be put, but that it would not be allowable to reopen matters that should be raised on the general discussion of the Estimate. These questions can be put to the Minister in a short way.

It has been indicated in a Parliamentary reply to me that there is a sum of £56,912 for what are termed "naval and military stores" under the aviation section. The Minister spoke of these to-day as aircraft, and I should like to know how many aircraft will be obtained with that amount during the current year.

I cannot give that information. I have not got it, as a matter of fact.

Again, I submit that it is one of the things that completely prevent reasonable understanding or discussion that the Minister should come to the House to discuss this Estimate and tell us that he does not know how many additional aeroplanes are going to be got in the present period.

The Minister has replied to the question.

The Minister has told us that he knows nothing about it.

I have not said anything of the kind.

The Minister is unable to tell the House how many additional aeroplanes are included in that sum.

I am not able to guess how many aeroplanes we are likely to get, and that is what the Deputy wants me to do.

The Minister tells the House in this Estimate, and he asks the House to vote for it, that £56,912 is provided——

For that sum, possibly about five.

On sub-head P (2), I am informed that the Minister made a certain statement with regard to the new craft which has been purchased. Can the Minister tell us in that connection what were the nationalities of the boats which have, from time to time recently, been attacked by any of these armoured craft of ours, and, secondly, whether I am to understand from the statement he made to-day that the new boat, the M. 1, can function only in comparatively calm water. Is that a fact?

I should say so, yes.

Will the Minister also state the nationalities of the boats upon which fire was recently opened?

They were of various nationalities. I think they were French and British.

Was whatever happened in that connection recently, so to speak, for the protection of the fisheries of the country? It was not a case of invasion of territorial waters, or any particular technical point like that? It was apropos of the protection of the fishery interests of the country?

For whom are the fisheries being protected?

They are undertaking the protection of the fishery industry.

Who is to get the benefit of whatever protection the naval craft of this country give the fisheries around the country?

The Irish people.

Does the Minister know that if we have two trawlers operating at the moment under Irish auspices, it is the most? Are we, in fact, firing on boats which are fishing in order to bring fish into this country, because, if so, we are only adding to the expense of an already dear commodity?

The Minister has indicated that the M. 1 can operate only in comparatively calm water. There is a figure of £172,000 set down here for capital purchases of fighting vessels. Can the Minister say how many vessels are to be purchased for that sum, and whether any of the vessels being purchased are vessels which will be capable of operating when the sea is rough?

We are purchasing six vessels of the M. 1 type, and while I say that they are not vessels we would send out into what might be called very turbulent waters, I understand that they are capable of standing up to seas off the western coast. There would be no question, in my mind, anyhow, of sending them outside the territorial waters in rough seas, nor should their functions carry them outside the territorial waters.

What is their draught?

It is a light draught. I could not say exactly what it is, but I think it is four feet or something like that.

Does the Minister say that six of these can be purchased for £172,000?

Five. We have purchased one already.

And paid for it out of last year's Estimate.

It is paid for, anyhow.

There is a sum of only £172,000 in this year's Estimate, and if five more are to come, the other must have been paid for otherwise.

Mr. Brodrick

As regards sub-head Q, is there a change in the policy of the Department of Defence, seeing that the expenditure in connection with engineer stores has been reduced from £25,650 to £6,985?

The Deputy was not in the House when I explained all that in detail, and I am sure if he refers to the Official Report he will see the explanation. I think the Deputy is quite mistaken in his view.

Mr. Brodrick

What I noticed was the big reduction in the estimated expenditure.

I pointed out that there was a sum of £20,000 for reserve stores. That is non-recurring. The sum this year is in excess of the sum last year.

We raised a question on sub-head BB—the Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. Can we now get an explanation as to the functions of this expensive new office, the duties of the Minister and his responsibilities, what defensive services he coordinates, and the total cost of that Department? There are so many people with salaries shown here; so many with slight sums added to their previous salaries and a dash at the back of some 200 names. Rooting through the Estimate, it appears that the total cost of the new Ministry is something over £400,000 a year. I want to know what return the Parliament, the people, or the Department of Defence are getting for that expenditure.

The total cost of the staff employed in the Department of Censorship, which is, I suppose, the Department responsible for practically all the expenditure, including the £15,473 shown in the Army Estimate, is approximately £52,180.

What then, is the cost of the Censorship Department, which the Minister has deleted from his calculation?

I have told the Deputy that the total cost of the staff employed in the Censorship service, including the £15,473 shown in the Army Estimate, is approximately £52,180.

Does the Minister say that the amount of all these salaries shown here is inside £52,000?

I understand so.

If the Minister takes them out of the other Departments he has referred to, he will find that he is considerably out in his figures.

I think the Deputy is wrong.

We will say it is £52,000 a year. I am not going to argue on that. It is a very big sum of money. What duties are carried out for that money?

Multifarious duties.

What defensive services are co-ordinated by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures that are not the responsibility of the Minister for Defence?

I am certain that this form of debate is not in order.

Neither the Minister nor I is the judge of order.

The Ceann Comhairle very definitely invited Deputies to ask any questions they had to ask before I would rise to speak and it is my impression that he said that he would not allow any questions after I had concluded.

The Minister will concede this, that on the general debate these questions were asked. They were not answered. They are merely being repeated now because they were not answered at the proper time.

I answered all questions and I went into very great detail to answer some of them.

Will the Minister repeat the answer he gave in relation to this particular Ministry?

I have already answered that.

Will the Minister tell us the duties of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, and what services does he co-ordinate that are not already under the Minister for Defence?

Will the Minister deny that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures has no duties to perform?

Of course he has.

The House will probably recollect that I protested against having to enter on this debate at a time when nobody had spoken from the Government Benches, and I particularly asked that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, whose salary is involved in this Estimate, should come to the House and speak to the House. Can we now arrange that this debate be adjourned until the Minister attends in this House and answers the questions that have been raised regarding his office?

The Chair has no power in a matter of that kind.

I appreciate that, and I would not have spoken if it had been explained from the Chair that the Chair had not the power to make the Minister attend here and speak. I should like you to put to the Minister for Defence a query whether he would not be prepared to adjourn the debate until the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures would arrange to come here and speak.

There are various methods the Deputy could adopt in order to find out the information he seeks, such as putting down a motion.

But this is the appropriate time, when we are voting £52,000 for a new Ministry. Surely somebody ought to be in a position to tell us why it is considered necessary to have this new Ministry and why the Minister is not here to tell us that himself?

I understand the Parliamentary Secretary attended here in order to speak for the Minister.

He attended here to speak for more than the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

We were prepared to give him every chance. He stands for his own Department, and surely he is not going to speak over the heads of two Ministers who insist on being dumb-bells themselves?

Mr. Byrne

I have a question I should like to put to the Minister.

There must be some limit in the matter of questions.

We are being asked to vote over £50,000 for a new Ministry. It is not for a Ministry that was dealt with before. Before we vote this money we are entitled to know what the money is intended for. We are entitled to know the functions of the office and the services it is proposed to co-ordinate. There was such an office in another country, a great country that is at war. It was abolished in that country.

Mr. Byrne

I have only one question to put to the Minister. I should like to know if he is satisfied with the results achieved from the censorship? Does he not think that the time has come to relax a little and not have the City of Dublin full of dangerous rumours? Would it not be better to let the public know what is going on, to a certain extent at least, and not have rumours going around causing harm everywhere?

The Deputy was permitted to ask a question, not to make a speech.

The Minister would have nothing to do then at all.

Mr. Byrne

The city is full of dangerous rumours.

Can we get any answer with regard to the Office of the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures? Are we now establishing a precedent that we are going to have a Minister who refuses to attend here and answer questions in relation to his office?

Mr. Brodrick

He cannot answer if he is doing no work.

The Deputy knows as well as I do that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is responsible for the Censorship Department. The Deputy knows also that the Minister is responsible for A.R.P., with the Parliamentary Secretary acting under him. He is also, I understand, responsible for the organisation or the establishment of the Red Cross. These are works that he has undertaken. I cannot see why almost 50 per cent. of this debate was aimed directly at the Minister. The debate, to my mind anyhow, took the form of a grossly personal attack on the Minister, for what particular reason I am not aware.

The Minister is stretching his imagination.

That may be, but if the Deputy reads the Official Debates he will see whether I am right or not. He can read Deputy O'Sullivan's attack and Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's attack, and he will see at whom the debate was aimed. I was amazed at Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney to-day applying himself almost solely to an attack on the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, and only at the end of his speech did he mention anything in relation to the Department of Defence.

The Minister, in my opinion, has made rather a serious statement that may have international complications. The Minister told us that the services that are under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures are:—A.R.P., the censorship and the Red Cross. I wonder if the Minister ever read the Geneva Convention? We have subscribed to the Articles of the Geneva Convention, and I want to know when it was decided in this country to make a Government service of the Irish Red Cross, and to bring it under a Government Department?

That is what the Deputy wanted me to state—to state something that would have international repercussions and——

Wait now. This is too serious to be passed aside in that kind of way. Will the Minister tell us if the Irish Red Cross is a Government Department, and is it part of the duties of a Minister to organise, supervise and administer that? Is it or is it not?

I say no, but that he organised it and that he was responsible for establishing it in this country.

He established that before we ever heard of a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

Might I point this out to the Minister—the Minister has himself announced that half the debate on this Vote was a censure of the way in which the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures performed his duties and functions. The net result is that that Minister absents himself and cannot face the music. He will not speak on it and his colleague, the Minister for Defence, will not answer for him until at the end of a series of questions he tells us that he has three functions.

In reply to the question put by Deputy O'Higgins, we find that one of these functions has been withdrawn from the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. Does the Minister now realise the impression that is to be created in the public mind that this has been a job found for the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures when he——

I will allow no further discussion. The matter is put once and for all.

Question:—"That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration"— put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 46; Níl, 59.

  • Belton, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George C.
  • Benson, Ernest E.
  • Brasier, Brooke.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Broderick, William J.
  • Brodrick, Seán.
  • Browne, Patrick.
  • Burke, Patrick.
  • Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
  • Everett, James.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
  • Hickey, James.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Hurley, Jeremiah.
  • Keating, John.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Curran, Richard.
  • Daly, Patrick.
  • Davin, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Dovle, Peadar S.
  • Esmonde, John L.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, Timothy J.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas F.
  • O'Sullivan, John M.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Reidy, James.
  • Reynolds, Mary.
  • Rogers, Patrick J.

Níl

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Cooney, Eamonn.
  • Crowley, Fred Hugh.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Flynn, John.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Fogarty, Patrick J.
  • Friel, John.
  • Fuller, Stephen.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Hannigan, Joseph.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Kelly, James P.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Meaney, Cornelius.
  • Moran, Michael.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Munnelly, John.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, Ted.
  • Rice, Brigid M.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Laurence J.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies P.S. Doyle and Bennett; Níl: Deputies Smith and Seán Brady.
Question declared lost.

Before the main Vote is put, I would like to know whether the Minister answered a question I put to him in my speech last night. The question was in reference to the mechanical transport of the Army, and whether it was being kept under cover and in mechanical order.

As far as it is possible, it is being kept under cover. In one or two places it is being kept in the open. The mechanical transport of the Army is in perfect condition, and is inspected regularly.

Can the Minister give me any idea as to what percentage of it is not under cover?

I am not able to say, but I should say that it is a very small percentage of the total.

Is it intended to put it under cover?

Yes.

Main question put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 55; Níl, 42.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Ailen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Cooney, Eamonn.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Flynn, John.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Fogarty, Patrick J.
  • Friel, John.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Hannigan, Joseph.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Kelly, James P.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Meaney, Cornelius.
  • Moran, Michael.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Munnelly, John.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, Ted.
  • Rice, Brigid M.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Laurence J.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.

Níl

  • Belton, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George C.
  • Benson, Ernest E.
  • Brasier, Brooke.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Broderick, William J.
  • Brodrick, Seán.
  • Browne, Patrick.
  • Burke, Patrick.
  • Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
  • Cole, John J.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Davin, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Esmonde, John L.
  • Everett, James.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
  • Hickey, James.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Hurley, Jeremiah.
  • Keating, John.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, Timothy J.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas F.
  • O'Sullivan, John M.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Reidy, James.
  • Reynolds, Mary.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Seán Brady; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
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