Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 25 Mar 1947

Vol. 105 No. 1

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Defence.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Traynor)

I move:—

That a sum not exceeding £2,946,390 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1948, for the Defence Forces (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative expenses in connection therewith; for certain expenses under the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940 (No. 13 of 1939 and No. 2 of 1940) and the Air-raid Precautions Acts, 1939 and 1946 (No. 21 of 1939 and No. 28 of 1946); for expenses in connection with the issue of medals, etc.; and for expenses of the Bureau of Military History.

In my statement on the Army Estimate last year, I pointed out to the House that the establishment provided. for the permanent force in that Estimate was:—

"purely provisional and did not represent the definite peace establishment which had yet to be fixed and approved."

That establishment has now been fixed and promulgated and forms the frame within which the present Estimate, as far as personnel are concerned, has been worked.

The peace establishment, as finally approved, now consists of the following:— Officers, 1,356; non-commissioned officers, 3,709; privates, 7,795; Construction Corps, 2,470, total all ranks, 15,330.

In the present Estimate, that total has been distributed over four sub-heads as follows:— Sub-head A, officers and other ranks, 12,081; sub-head E, medical officers, 112; sub-head P (2), naval service—all ranks, 503; sub-head S (2), Construction Corps (including regular administrative staff), 2,634; total, 15,330.

But although the Estimate is based on the peace establishment, we have had to face up to the position that the numbers required by it are unlikely to be filled during the financial year, and have, therefore, by means of deductions, allowed for the numbers being below strength.

For that reason the Estimate actually provides only for the following: officers, 994; non-commissioned officers, 2,800; privates, 5,846; Construction Corps, 1,482: making a total of 11,122. We have thus allowed not for the peace establishment of 15,330, but for an actual strength of 11,122 all ranks, or a reduction on the peace establishment of 4,208 all ranks. The actual strength of the Army (including Construction Corps) on the 28th February, 1947, was 9,865 all ranks, so that provision is actually being made for a net increase of 1,257. Further, in this connection it should be pointed out that the present Estimate provides for 1,427 Army personnel less than the comparable figure in last year's Estimate. I, therefore, suggest that as far as personnel are concerned, the present Estimate is framed on a most reasonable and conservative basis.

General Mulcahy

The Minister is now giving us figures but they are not in accordance with the figures on page 327 of the Book of Estimates. Is he giving us a revised Estimate?

Mr. Traynor

No. I am giving the actual peace strength and the strength that we hope to secure.

General Mulcahy

On page 327 of the Book of Estimates the figures are given for 1947-8 as 1,088 officers and 10,973 other ranks.

Mr. Traynor

Making a total of——

Mr. Cosgrave

12,061.

General Mulcahy

The Minister is now quoting different figures.

Mr. Traynor

Is it the 15,330 that the Deputy is worrying about?

General Mulcahy

No. The Minister, as I understand it, tells us that his peace establishment will now be 15,330, and he is now quoting actual figures—994 officers, 2,800 non-commissioned officers, 5,846 privates, 1,482 Construction Corps, making, a total of 11,122, and he is giving us these figures as the estimate for this year.

Mr. Traynor

That is because we believe that that is the number we will be able to get, and no more.

General Mulcahy

I am asking is this then a revise of the figures on page 327 of the Book of Estimates?

Mr. Traynor

It is a revise to the extent that if the recruits come in we will still be entitled to go up to the highest figure but we are satisfied at the present time that we probably will not be able to get that number. If the Deputy looks at page 328 he will see a note:—

"Deduct in respect of numbers being below strength during the financial year."

In addition to Army personnel proper, the Estimate also provides for:—Chaplains, 19; cadets, 138; nurses, 118; total, 275.

So far I have dealt only with the permanent force, with their auxiliaries —chaplains, nurses and cadets. Turning to the First Line Reserve which has now absorbed the old Class A, Class B, the Volunteer Force, and the Reserve of Officers, we are providing for a strength of 694 officers and 5,056 other ranks. That is roughly about the present strength of this arm of the service, so that, in effect, it is assumed that during the year any increase will be balanced by wastage due to discharges, etc.

The Second Line Reserve constituted mainly by An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil contemplates a strength of about 60,000 during the year. The present strength is 41,463. In October, 1946, when the old L.D.F. had been absorbed and we began to concentrate on recruits for the F.C.A. proper, the strength stood at 37,380, so that during the last four or five months about 4,000 have joined this force. There seems no reason to believe that this force will lose its attraction and we are, therefore, budgeting on getting about 1,000 recruits a month during the financial year. In addition, it is hoped in the near future to organise a Second Line Reserve for our naval service, and in framing the Estimate due consideration has been given to that proposal.

Having thus briefly outlined the numbers of each arm which it is proposed to maintain during the coming year, I come to the question of cost. Taking the permanent force first, the Estimate provides for direct pay and insurance alone the sum of £1,469,656 in the six sub-heads A, D, E, P (2), S (2) and W, so that this direct element alone absorbs nearly £1,500,000 of the Vote. To this must be added the cost of such direct cash allowances as marriage allowance, or its counterpart in the case of officers, lodging, fuel and light allowances, ration allowance and clothing allowance. These are provided for in sub-heads B, G, K, and M, and amount to £576,890. Again, where allowances in cash are not drawn, allowances in kind are issued or issuable. These include such items as rations, fuel, medicines and barrack services, and over the nine sub-heads F, H, I, K, M, R, V, V (1) and X (2), they amount to £635,313. These allowances, whether issued in cash or kind, are as much part of a soldier's emoluments as is direct pay and they must, therefore, be taken into consideration in making out the cost of the soldier, and, as has just been shown, that cost to the State in the present year is £2,681,859. In this connection it must be pointed out that during the past year all ranks of the Army have received a substantial increase both in pay and allowances. In pay alone, there has been an average increase over all ranks of about 23 per cent. which accounts for an increase of £339,288 over comparable figures in last year's Estimate. In direct cash allowances there has been an average increase of about 7 per cent. which accounts for another comparable increase of £35,746, and in allowances in kind the figure is over 3 per cent., accounting for an increase of £11,333. Hence, the total comparable increase over last year's Estimate, following increases in pay and allowances, is £386,367.

The cost of the First Line Reserve (sub-head Y (2)) is approximately £137,793, made up as follows:—

	£
Personal grants	75,169
Pay	27,561
Cash allowances	23,994
Allowances in kind	10,864
Other services	205
Total	£137,793

Under the pay and allowances heading, we are providing 21 days' training for all officers and for non-commissioned officers above the rank of sergeant, and for 14 days for all others. In the figure of £137,793, it is being assumed that about 600 officers and 4,000 other ranks will attend for training. The increase in pay and allowances is again reflected in this sub-head to the extent of about £8,703.

The cost of the Second Line Reserve, mainly F.C.A., is estimated at £400,997, and includes:—

	£
Grants-in-Aid	60,000
Pay	79,535
Cash allowances	4,612
Allowances in kind	241,700
Hire of halls	15,000
Other services	150
Total	£400,997

As regards Grants-in-Aid, it is anticipated that about £55,000 will be payable in 1948 in respect of members on the effective list on 31st December, 1947, and that the remaining £5,000 will be required for quarterly payments for recruits joining during 1947. As regards training during which pay and allowances are issuable, it is expected that about 30,000 will be able to attend. The increase in Army pay and allowances has increased this sub-head by about £22,036.

As regards the civilian staff of the Department, the total provided by the Estimate is 2,077, of which 1,376 are attached to units in trades or other capacities, 35 are engaged in Cork Harbour on transport vessels, nine are employed as herds or caretakers, and 657 are civil servants, both permanent and temporary, in the Department. Their total cost under sub-heads C, S (1), T, and Y is £542,170, of which about £42,774 is directly attributable to the consolidation of pay and bonus and the increase in emergency bonus.

Turning from questions of personnel to that of stores, I should mention that the latter are of two distinct types —those of a warlike nature such as guns, ammunition, aircraft and war vessels, and those destined for ordinary use and maintenance, such as medical equipment, mechanical transport, petrol and oils, animals and forage, workshop tools and equipment, engineers' tools and barrack maintenance, including minor new works. The Estimate provides £406,446 for such ordinary stores. For warlike stores it provides a total of £326,810, of which £200,000 is for the purchase of three additional corvettes, £31,400 for aircraft and £95,410 for battalion equipment, ammunition and maintenance.

The remaining items covered by the Vote may be described as incidental services and comprise:—

	sub-head	£
Educational courses	A (1)	5,000
Equitation expenses	A (3)	5,000
Civil aviation	O (1)	500
Rents of lands	T (2)	2,666
Compensation	U	6,150
Telegrams and tele- phones	X (1)	29,150
Offences against the
State Acts	A A	2,414
Medals	B B	15,000
Miscellaneous items	X	2,160
	Total	£68,040

Under sub-head P (1), air-raid precautions, there is a sum of £15,940. This is entirely a relic of the emergency. No less than £14,685 represents outstanding claims which will, it is expected, fall for payment during the year, and the balance, £1,255, is for the maintenance of existing equipment.

Another item from the emergency is found in sub-head A (4), which provides £50,005 for gratuities payable in respect of service rendered during the emergency. This problem is now for all practical purposes at an end, but allowance must be made for late claims and the £50,005 provided should cover all requirements during the financial year. In this connection it may be of interest to mention that up to the end of February, 1947, the Department had dealt with 45,144 claims—these comprised 1,760 officers, 39,238 other ranks, 554 deceased cases and 3,592 applications which were ineligible. The total amount expended in emergency gratuities to the same date was £2,900,614. Sub-head A (4) also includes a token sum for £5 for re-enlistment bounties to meet any outstanding claims, and sub-head A (2) provides £100 for resignation, retirement or discharge gratuities payable under Defence Force regulations as distinct from gratuities payable under the Defence Force Pensions (Amendment) Schemes.

Summarising what has been said, the Estimate is thus seen to cover the following numbers:—Permanent Force, 11,397 all ranks; First Line Reserve, 5,750 all ranks; Second Line Reserve, 60,000 all ranks; civilians, 2,077, making a total of 79,224.

As regards cost, the Estimate can be summarised thus:—Cost of Permanent Force, £2,681,859, or 58 per cent. of the Vote; cost of First Line Reserve, £137,793 or 3 per cent. of the Vote; cost of Second Line Reserve, £400,997 or 8 per cent. of the Vote; cost of civilians, £542,170 or 12 per cent. of the Vote; ordinary stores, £406,446 or 9 per cent. of the Vote; warlike stores, £326,810 or 7 per cent. of the Vote; incidental services, £68,040 or 1.5 per cent. of the Vote; A.R.P., £15,940 or .5 per cent. of the Vote; gratuities, £50,110 or 1 per cent. of the Vote, making a total of £4,630,165.

During the past six months, 4,623 young men have presented themselves for recruitment but, of that number, 1,247 have been rejected on medical and a further 534 on educational grounds, giving a net intake of about 61 per cent. It may be said that our physical and educational standards are too high, but what we are aiming to secure is a first class recruit who in a few years' time will become a competent non-commissioned officer. The training done at our recruit depot is of a varied and intensive type, and I am assured that our standards are at least as high as those prevailing elsewhere. An interesting sidelight in our physical training methods is cast by the fact that over a period of six months the average gain in height of our recruits is ¼ inch, chest expansion ¾ inch, and weight 7 lbs. While we are doing our best to make recruits first class soldiers, we are at the same time doing our utmost to make the Army an agreeable and attractive occupation. To that end, we have already substantially increased the rates of pay and allowances; in sub-head M of the present Estimate provision has been made for a new walking-out uniform; in sub-head V we have provided for a new type of bed and wardrobe; and in sub-head S there is provision for the improved sanitation of certain barracks, for the erection of hand-ball alleys, and for the remodelling both of officers' and soldiers' quarters. It must be realised that nearly all our barracks are old and, indeed, out of date, and that if we are to have contented soldiers, we must give them the ordinary modern amenities of accommodation and living. I should like to press on at once with the remodelling of our barracks but, the supply of materials being what it is, we can make very little progress at present.

Deputies will observe that in the matter of warlike stores, the amount devoted to their purchase is only a small percentage of the total Estimate. The reason for this is that like other countries we are relying for the present on the latest type of weapons which were purchased during the emergency. It would be unwise to do otherwise, because we do not know yet what new weapons may be devised through the scientific research into arms. Our policy in the future, as it has always been in the past, will be to await developments, and then to purchase the best available to ensure that what we buy is most useful for our needs and within our financial resources.

During the past year we have purchased 3 corvettes for our Naval Service and provision is made in the present Estimate for three more such vessels. A corvette is a small type of destroyer, about 950 tons, with a displacement of 1,280 tons, carrying a complement of four officers, one warrant officer and 43 naval ratings. Its maximum speed is about 18, but its ordinary cruising speed is about 14 knots. The ships which we have acquired are fitted with the very latest type of equipment. They carry, for instance, the most modern radar and asdic devices, together with echosounding gear for determining depth, oropesa for mine-sweeping and the very rare and modern gyroscope compass. Their armament consists of one 4" gun, one 2 pounder, two oerlikon guns, and six depth charges. These vessels will be used not only for the defence of our coasts in an emergency but for the protection of our fisheries in peace.

The other modern warlike weapon, the development of which we are following with close attention, is aircraft. During the past year, four new Seafires and two Martinet towers have been purchased in addition to 12 reconditioned Magisters for training purposes. We expect four more Sea-fires before 31st March, 1947, and the present Estimate contains, under sub-head O, a provision of £31,400 for another four similar aircraft with miscellaneous spares.

The Army is, of course, primarily a military and warlike service but, nevertheless, it is not without its civilian use. During the past year, the Army gave its help ungrudgingly in saving the harvest, and for the 34 days on which it carried out such operations, it worked a total of 51,434 men days and carried 13,000 civilians in 580 vehicles. Again, during the recent blizzards when communication between Dublin and the South of Ireland was completely interrupted, the Army radio network was used to maintain essential services, and the Signal Corps helped in Dublin to restore some of the 5,000 telephone lines which were put out of action.

The total gross Estimate, as we have seen, is £4,630,165, but we hope to realise Appropriations-in-Aid of the Vote to the extent of £210,775. The net sum, therefore, which I am asking the Dáil to vote is £4,419,390, which is a decrease of £716,540 on the Estimate for 1946-47.

General Mulcahy

The Minister said there had been 4,623 offerings of recruits during the last six months and that 61 per cent. of these were accepted. I suggest to the Minister that as well as 1,247 being rejected on medical grounds and 534 on educational grounds there were 722 rejected on other grounds so that actually 46 per cent. of those presenting themselves were accepted and not 61 per cent.

Mr. Traynor

I do not think that is correct.

General Mulcahy

I give the Minister the figures. The Minister will see that 4,623 actually presented themselves as recruits and that only 2,120 were actually accepted.

Dr. O'Higgins

Less than half.

General Mulcahy

Some were rejected on medical grounds. Others were rejected because their physical standards were not sufficiently high and still others for other causes so that, in fact, only 46 per cent. of those presenting themselves were actually accepted. I think the Minister will find that is right.

Dr. O'Higgins

The percentage is correct but the figure is wrong or else the figure is correct and the percentage wrong, but both cannot be correct. On those particular figures, whether it is 60 per cent. or between 40 and 50 per cent. of the young men of this country found unfit for Army service, surely there is a big field for investigation and a big field for inquiry. Those figures, in themselves, are a damaging indictment of conditions in this country, if 30 per cent. of the young men are found unable to attain the simple medical standards in our Army because of health reasons. Men obviously would not present themselves for Army service unless they appeared to be physically fit, unless they had good physique and appeared to be in every way healthy and if the health standard of one out of three of our young men is below the Army standard, then the health standard is very low. The Minister says our health standards may be too high. May I point out that the health standards of our peace-time Army had to be lowered below that of the British Army because we were not getting sufficient recruits complying with the British Army standards?

Mr. Traynor

That is not my information.

Dr. O'Higgins

There is apparently a difference between the Minister's information and my knowledge. I do not think the race and the breed changed with the change of Government, and the Minister knows that I directly administered that particular field of work for a considerable number of years. I drew up the health standards that are there at the moment. I had my own reasons, and they were very sound reasons, for lowering the standards that were there—they were the British standards—when I took over. I admit it was in certain details, but they were important details, and the reason was due to negligence, that we had not developed and progressed in the care of infant children and youths to the same extent as other countries. That is as far as the health standard goes.

If we, after 25 years of self-government, after 25 years of compulsory school attendance, with all the force of the law behind attendance at the schools and with all the wealth of the nation behind free education, reach a point where we have to confess that a very high percentage of the young men of this country presenting themselves for Army service are educationally unfit to be trained as soldiers, then again there is something very seriously wrong, something which wants not casual, but serious and searching inquiry.

Every one of us knows that the educational standard for the acceptance of recruits is probably the lowest thing that would be worthy of the name of an educational standard. If they are merely able to understand and interpret orders, write their names and do a tot consisting of two and two, then they are up to the Army educational standard as recruits. This Army and every other Army that takes an intelligent interest in the men, in their progress through the Army and their welfare in life, endeavours to uplift and improve that very low educational standard. But if we are rejecting men, and a great number of men, because they do not reach that standard, then some other Department of the State has to stand in the dock and the Minister is entitled to complain, in the councils of the Government, of the health standards and the educational standards of the men coming forward. I think the Minister is making a serious, national mistake in trying to gloss over that here by saying that our standards may be unduly high. They are not unduly high. The standard for the ordinary recruit, either in health or in education, excepting certain technical services, is certainly very low.

On the general Defence Vote, I confess that I have completely lost interest in discussing it. I do not know that there is a Parliament in the world where discussion is so useless, so futile and takes place in the absence of any guidance, direction or leadership. The modern trend in our Parliament, followed this year with an absolute perfection in the way of mimicry of previous years, is to walk in and ask for a certain sum of money, to tell us how that money will be expended, how many thousands will be paid to so many men, how much will go on armaments and medicines, on transport and barrack maintenance. But we are not given any reason why the money should be voted, any reason why a sum of that particular size should be voted. A hint at what our defence policy is has never been given from that bench opposite.

Any other Minister for War in the world would paint as best he could, according to his information, a picture of world conditions. He would be concerned with his alliances, defensive as well as offensive; he would be concerned with his country's immediate responsibility or its commitments towards others. So far as we can glean, our policy is to keep out of any entanglements, to keep out of any wars. That policy has been steadfastly declared and determinedly upheld. That is one thing that is clear and beyond question.

Another thing that must be accepted at the moment as being clear and beyond question is that our nearest and our mightiest neighbour is never, in any set of circumstances, going to lay a finger on this country. Whatever doubts the Minister or others may have had on that particular point were completely dispelled by the experiences of the past seven years. There was that country armed to the teeth, with soldiers on the home front tumbling over one another for 80 per cent. of the period of the war. They were massing troops and had barely sufficient territory to hold all these troops. Their life-line was threatened and there was the biggest fear of defeat arising out of the lack of overseas supplies. Her ships were being sunk, her men were losing their lives, and her supplies were going to the bottom of the ocean for want of a foothold, a protection, along our western and south-western coasts. Even in that set of circumstances, fighting that desperate war, her very existence threatened and with the knowledge that our resistance could not in any circumstances be more than a token resistance, still she succeeded not only in keeping her hands off our country, but, notwithstanding that her ships were being sunk and the lives of her people lost, she continued to supply us with all the essentials, as far as she could, to keep our trade, commerce, economy, and even the comfort of the people of this country, assured.

At least we can say thanks. As a nation we can express gratitude for these services in such trying times. We can express appreciation of the spirit of a neighbour who, in such very terrible conditions, would give a thought even to our external difficulties with regard to trade, industry and supplies and, as far as could be, meet our requirements. One thing we cannot do after that experience is to suggest or to hint that there is any fear of interference or of invasion from that particular quarter. We start off to examine our defence expenditure in the absence of any lead or guidance from the person asking for that odd £5,000,000. In the absence of such studious reticence, the face of such studious reticence, with regard to the things that matter, we have reached a point where we can diagnose for ourselves that our studied and calculated policy is (1) to keep out of all wars and (2) that our nearest and mightiest neighbour is never likely in any set of circumstances to invade our shores. So that, as far as we are going to maintain an Army to meet an external enemy, we are going to maintain an Army to meet an external enemy that is sufficiently powerful to blast its way through the British naval defences. In other words, we are building up an Army, or pretending to build up an Army, that is going to meet an external foe that is sufficiently strong to challenge the might of Britain in the past. There is no getting beyond that. We are going to do that out of the sum of £4,600,000 and with an Army whose numerical strength is 12,000.

Is it not time the Minister grew up and stopped playing with toys on the carpet? Is it not time the Minister grew up and realised that the raw material of the toys is millions of pounds wrenched and wrung from people who cannot afford it? Is it not time he grew up and faced the fact that our peace-time Army is an Army required for the same purposes as most other peace-time armies are required in small States—to stand by and behind the civil power, to give necessary and very desirable training to our young men, to set standards in health, physical development, hygiene, etc., to the young men of the country—a small force to play its part in the ordinary essential ceremonial of the State. That is what, in fact, we want an Army for. If we want an Army for any grander purpose than that, then there is no use in talking in terms of £5,000,000. There is little use even in talking in terms of £50,000,000 or £100,000,000. £50,000,000 or £100,000,000 would be a very insignificant demand if we were to forge a weapon to meet any external menace but £5,000,000 is an entirely inflated demand for the purposes for which, in fact, we want an Army.

Year after year for a very considerable period we have pressed the Minister and his predecessor for any information or any guidance, for any lead or any advice on these particular matters. It is no pleasure to any Deputy to be voting £5,000,000 of the tax-payers' money and to be doing that in blinkers, without information, without any answer to give to any intelligent tax-payer who asks the why and the wherefore of it, to any intelligent tax-payer who knows the ABC of elementary defence and who understands the difference between a land frontier and a sea frontier. Is there any answer in the Dáil debates or in the Minister's statement? Is it not obvious that the first line of defence of any island, the first line and the essential line, is the sea, the water defence, and that the next is the air— that it is on the approaches to that island that the enemy is vulnerable and that when an enemy is sufficiently strong to land and burst through all these defences, then, with a tiny island such as ours, and an Army such as ours, the game is practically at an end?

What is our first line of defence? According to the Minister for Defence what is it? Six corvettes. He might as well have six rubber ducks and he knows it. There is no justification in spending a few hundred thousand pounds on six corvettes and referring to them as the coastal or naval defence of the country. That would not cod a child of five years of age. If they are merely to be toys or show-pieces, then it is unjustifiable to be spending hundreds of thousands of pounds on them. The Minister in this House is talking to people with a certain amount of experience, with a certain amount of conscientious scruples. In asking them to accept six corvettes, as the coast or naval defence for an island of this size, he is asking them to accept what no single Deputy in the Dáil will accept irrespective of how he may vote. The air defences are on a par with that. This is an outcrop of the kind of stage play that has been going on for years—that because navies figured in the war of nations for the last six or seven years, no matter how small or how extensive, we have got to have a navy. We have got to have tanks because everybody else has tanks, no matter what their size.

The Minister tells us that they are our coastal defence. Of course they are our coastal defence, as far as this Estimate goes, but what is our real coastal defence? Is there not sufficient moral courage to say what our coastal defence is? What was our coastal defence right throughout the war, quite rightly and properly? Our coastal defence throughout the war, the defence of the water approaches to this country, was the responsibility of the second mightiest navy in the world, and we would be the greatest fools in the world if we did not make full use of that all through the war and did not closely co-operate so as to make that naval defence the more efficient by co-operation between it at sea and us on land. That is our naval defence, as strong as ever, as alert as ever, and it will do its job whether these six rubber ducks, these six corvettes, are purchased by us or not.

This kind of silly nonsense, this spending of money to cod some buffoon down in a bog, is not good enough. It is hard-earned money and money which the people, out of whose pockets it is coming, find hard to spare. This play-acting with the Army has to stop some time. Here we have a vast sum for play-acting and nothing else. These corvettes may have a function as tiny liaison vessels as between us and the Navy with which we have a perfect understanding—an understanding of which I approve and which I hope, in our own interests, will become more harmonious and closer—but what other functions these coryettes are to have, I do not know. The Minister dismissed them with the phrase that they will undertake our defence. I cannot take the Minister seriously—not when he is dealing with defence. I have never taken him seriously when dealing with defence and I doubt if his own colleagues do.

Mr. Traynor

I do not take you too seriously, either.

Dr. O'Higgins

Perhaps you will reach the age of wisdom some day and then you will.

Mr. Traynor

Like the buffoon down on the bog.

Dr. O'Higgins

He may be your like, but I would expect better and closer understanding and a keener intellect on defence problems from a person occupying your position. However, if the Minister wants to engage in a little back-chat over this, he can do so, but I propose to call a spade a spade. I am not going to stand for nonsense, whether it is bog nonsense or Minissterial nonsense, and I am not going to stand for salting the people, whether it is to please a bogman or a Ministerial lunatic, because there is not common sense, justice or intelligence in the demand put up here.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I hope the Deputy is not referring to the Minister as "a lunatic."

Dr. O'Higgins

To get back to the question of subjective and objective truth. I referred to Ministerial lunacy.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy said: "a Ministerial lunatic".

Dr. O'Higgins

"Ministerial lunacy," but I will amend it, if I used the other word. Instead of "Ministerial lunatic", I will say, in deference to the Chair and to the Minister, "Ministerial lunacy". Will that meet everybody?

Mr. Traynor

Thank you very much.

Dr. O'Higgins

We listened to the Minister's statement as to why this money is required. We got no indication of policy, but we are asked for £4,600,000 to maintain an Army of 12,000 men, and we are told in relation to the functions of that Army that they helped to save the harvest. They did, and they did excellent work. They did excellent work in view of all the disabilities and the limitations under which they suffered, by reason of the fact that they were living in barracks in cities, instead of living where they should be, in the rural areas. They were locked up in barracks while the farmers shouted for men. They were taken away from the land by attractive advertisements and attractive promises and were maintained in barracks, and the harvest was jeopardised up to the eleventh hour on account of the shortage of labour.

Leaving aside the question of our defence by corvettes and our defence against allcomers by 12,000 men, is it sound national policy, when hundreds of thousands are leaving the country, to absorb the few thousands left into barracks, to take them away from the land and to spend money on walking-out uniforms in order to make the Army more attractive, when there are many families without clothes, or with only ragged clothes, families who never knew what it was to have one suit for walking-in purposes and another for walking-out purposes but who had one suit or dress all the year round for all purposes? They are asked to subscribe now, in addition to an extra large Army, for an extra uniform for all ranks for walking-out purposes. I ask the Minister to come down to earth and to appreciate that there is a considerable amount of distress, want and poverty in this country: that the country cannot afford, in the absence of explanation, to have a vastly bigger and vastly grander Army in the peace times ahead than ever it was asked to maintain in the peace times behind. If there is some particular reason why we must quadruple the cost of our Army, increase its size and give it more uniforms for different purposes as compared with the pre-war period, we are entitled to be told what it is.

On the face of this Estimate, there is a reduction of £700,000 on the figure demanded last year. When we examine the details, we find that there is a reduction of £1,100,000 on demobilisation pay and gratuities, so that, leaving out of account the moneys paid in demobilisation pay and gratuities, for ordinary purposes we are demanding more for the maintenance of the Army this year than last year. We have been buying warlike stores in a frenzied, panicky kind of way anywhere we could get them, at any price, for seven years. We never expended any of these warlike stores. We were buying, but we were not utilising or expending, and surely we must have amassed very ample quantities of these stores. I know that it is the fashion to have something under every sub-head every year, but are we ever going to stop buying, and, vis-a-vis our declared and accepted policy, are we ever likely to start expending, to start using, our warlike stores, in any set of circumstances that can be pictured?

We want warlike stores, possibly, for our few week's annual manoeuvres. Beyond that, what do we want them for? Are we merely buying them to store them? Are we merely buying them to occupy spaces that are labelled in barracks for that particular purpose? Are we buying them for the same reason that we bought the corvettes—having got certain ports, they were lonely; we had to have something buzzing around the ports, just the same as we want ducks in an artificial lake or water lilies in a pond. We bought these corvettes because we took over the ports. We did not want the ports, and the forts around them had nothing to protect. The forts around the ports were designed to shelter vessels there. We had no vessels, so we bought the corvettes and put them in. Are we doing the same with regard to armaments—because we have the buildings, because they are labelled for that purpose, and because in most other armies there is such a sub-head? Are we filling the sub-head merely and filling the buildings? But, seriously, when we have been buying warlike stores year after year and not using them, not expending them, not wearing them out, —none of them being blasted to smithereens by enemy action or anything else—surely we have to cry halt some time. Has the Minister any explanation of that particular aspect of things?

The transport of our troops is going to be more costly this year—nearly half as much again as it was in a year of real emergency, when we did all the magnificent work referred to by the Minister of aiding the farmers, transporting their stock and grain and produce. We are going to spend half as much again this year and still we are rejecting men on the health standard. If we are going to spend all that in transport, it strikes me you could take legless men into your Army. Legs are not required. Mechanical transport will do the job. There is all this money for mechanical transport in one of the smallest islands in the world that is standing for an Army and paying and maintaining an Army. I think the Army would be healthier and possibly the race would be healthier if the Army were more real in itself and if we cut out completely any provision for year to year transport. Provide for the purchase of the vehicles but cut out any provision for the actual transporting of troops where we could scarcely design a straight route march within our territory that would be any distance worth worrying about to real soldiers living life and facing it in a real way. But, amongst our increases, we have this item and there again I think we are merely thinking of a number and doubling it. Petrol and oils are to cost more, warlike stores are to cost considerably more and then, of course, our naval service is superimposed on that.

Then we are to put down a new sum, and a considerable sum, as I want to impress on the Minister, it is considered in the light and in the face of circumstances that exist outside. We are going to provide an expenditure of £15,000 for medals—medals for people who are given two loaves of bread a week and two ounces of butter, medals for people who cannot buy a fourpenny egg, medals for people who are hard up against the stark, staring facts of life. Medals for what?—Medals for our heroic campaigners that marched from the Curragh to Athlone, from Athlone to Galway. Medals, medals, medals. Is not the knowledge within the breasts of these men that they were doing their duty, giving service to their country? Is not that sufficient reward? Why do they want expensive baubles on their breasts? Is there such a surplus of money around the country that we can throw away £15,000 on baubles? Should not we come down to earth? Fortunately, we were not in the war. Fortunately, we never had to fire a shot in anger or defence. Should not we thank God for our blessings and not ape everything that is done by the people who experienced all the horrors of war and who are, because of those very horrors, entitled to their campaign medals, etc., etc.? Must we always be strutting the stage, doing what the other fellow does, thinking that whatever Herr Hitler or Mr. John Bull does we must do the same thing, but we must do it from a point of safety? Nonsense that is not costly can only be amusing but nonsense that is costing hard-earned money should not be tolerated.

I cannot see any evidence in the Government, or in any one of the Ministers, that they realise that times are changing, that times have changed, and that people cannot afford to burn money merely for the fun of seeing it blazing. The money you are demanding is coming from the pockets of people that can very ill afford it. If money is wanted for any deserving purpose, for any sound purpose, for any good purpose, no matter how hard it is to find it, it will be given and there will be no grouse about it but we have reached the time when nonsense, once it costs money, cannot be tolerated.

Practically every sub-head in the Estimate is a demand for so much nonsense, so much play-acting, so much building up of stores, building up of expensive material, as against something that may never happen but which, if it does happen, will not happen until the other side of Tibb's Eve when all the stores and all the material that we have built up will be so much antiquated, useless junk—nothing else. We cannot give money for junk. We cannot give money for antiquities. We cannot vote money for armaments and all those things that are based on the design and the requirements of previous wars. Until we get some information, some sensible authoritative lead as to what requirements are indicated with regard to future wars, then we should be satisfied with all the junk that we have already accumulated and keep our money to buy the more modern material when thoughtful modern minds that have experience will indicate what that material will be.

The Minister referred to medical standards in our Army. I have one point to make on that: Be medical standards high or low they are standards and they should be adhered to. Nobody of any particular rank or influence should be allowed occupy any grade, from recruit up, who does not comply in full with the minimum standards required for that particular grade. I ask the Minister bluntly does that rule apply and is that rule adhered to and are we rejecting some because of medical standards and are we accepting others? The physical standard for a recruit is a fairly high standard. He is facing a period of hard training, hard work. He has got to be recruited or examined on the basis of being capable of standing up to the very severest training, particularly with regard to limb and muscles. An officer would not normally, or even under service conditions, be calculated to have to put up with the same physical tests as the infantry soldier.

Mr. Kissane

Surely a junior officer would?

Dr. O'Higgins

Now if we are going to go through the whole lot of them, starting with the major-general and doing the same with every rank, then I think we merely sidetrack, but at least I would answer the Deputy. The junior officer would do the same amount of marching as the soldier but he would march with a lighter pack and he would not have the same amount of physical work to do at the end of the march. If he gets his men at the end of the march to a new barracks the officer can get the other fellows to do the scavanging, cleaning up, and to get ready the barracks. Even a junior officer will get his grip packed and his accommodation prepared both where he is evacuating and taking up. The actual physical exertion of the junior officer will come nearer to that of the private soldier than any other officer but it will not be as heavy as that imposed on the private soldier.

I cannot understand a man joining the Army, a young man, apparently in the best physical condition, of high educational standard, who has attended to his studies for a couple of years in his spare time with the hope of securing a cadetship, being nominated or recommended for the cadetship by his commanding officers, sitting for the examination, passing the examination successfully, and then being rejected medically for a slight tendency towards dropped arches. Up to that point I can agree that that is a medical disability but two months later, his service up, he presents himself for re-attestation as a recruit; the record is there, and he is accepted. Surely those two standards cannot apply in the same Army. If he is unfit to be a cadet he is unfit to be a recruit and if he is unfit to be a recruit he is unfit to be a cadet. I only wish that we had hundreds of officers of the physique, type, and educational standard, etc., etc., of the particular soldier I have in mind——

Mr. Traynor

If the Deputy has a case in mind, can he not give us the particulars?

Dr. O'Higgins

I certainly will. I do not like using names here but if the Minister wants me to I will use it.

Mr. Traynor

The Deputy must be aware that the Department will, at all times, give him the fullest possible information to any queries he may make. That has been the custom of the Department and I cannot see why this particular question was brought into a Parliamentary debate when an accurate reply to a question can very easily be given in a written form.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Minister quite misunderstands me. I do not want a reply. I do not want information. I want common sense and I want elementary justice.

Mr. Traynor

If a wrong has been committed I want to see that wrong righted. Is not that what the Deputy is seeking?

Dr. O'Higgins

I am seeking to have no wrongs, to have no wrongs to be righted. I am seeking to have things done on a uniform standard. I do not think it is the function of Deputies to come in here and have wrongs righted. It may be the peculiar privilege of one young man who was rejected for cadetship to be able to approach a particular Deputy or any Deputy and I have no doubt the wrong will be righted. But how many are not in a position to do that?

Mr. Traynor

I am rejecting the suggestion that the Deputy is making, that any Deputy can do what the Deputy is suggesting now.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Minister is unduly touchy. The Minister has already told the House "if that has happened let us know the facts and I will right it". Now that may have happened not once but 100 times; what about the other 99 who may not have approached any particular Deputy, who may not have one to approach. The point I am making is this, and I am not trying to score a point over the Minister or his Department, that a medical standard should be a rigid thing and that it should not be varied for such a thing as dropped arches. Either dropped arches should be a standard which unfits a man for Army service or it should be ignored and not be the cause of unfitness but certainly if it is a cause of unfitness for cadet rank any disability of the limbs must more so be a cause of unfitness for recruits and for service in the line.

One word more. In this particular Vote I see sums of money for staffs, materials, etc., etc., for a number of sections, sub-sections and groups dealing with A.R.P.—"dealing with A.R.P.: 1947-48." Could not that money be more usefully spent? Proposing right through 1947-1948 to spend money or continue spending money either on the control, supervision or direction of A.R.P.! Surely, at least, that is a page of history that we can turn over and leave behind us. In that connection, huge stores, particularly medical stores, were purchased and stored throughout the country during the war, stores that are perishable in the long-term sense—silver-plated articles, vast quantities of materials made of rubber, drugs, medicines that are affected either by heat or by cold or by excessively dry weather or by moisture. In the main all those stores, or the great bulk of them, are still in different premises throughout the country. Is that not so?

Mr. Traynor

They have been turned over continuously.

Dr. O'Higgins

I know they are turned over.

Mr. Traynor

Therefore, they are not deteriorating.

Dr. O'Higgins

Of course they are.

Mr. Traynor

Because they are being turned over?

Dr. O'Higgins

Not because they are being turned over.

Mr. Traynor

Does the Deputy understand the term I am using? The explanation is a simple one. The original stores were not kept in hand but were being continuously replaced. The original stores were given out for use and replaced; that is the meaning of turning over. That has been done throughout the whole period.

Dr. O'Higgins

I am as much aware of that turn over at one end as the Minister is at the other. I was the acrobat engaged in the turn over at one end and I know the purpose of the turn over. I know the conditions of storage. I know that under the best conditions in our modern hospitals and under the most ideal conditions in our military hospitals there is a wastage of stores. All I am arguing is that that wastage should not go on for ever and that it is time now, instead of purchasing more, to use these particular stores lying at different points of the compass and merely taking up space and accommodation. They should be turned over into current stock and we should see a reduction under these particular sub-heads instead of an increase.

I want to see in the Department of Defence as well as in other Departments—though I think myself it is useless to express this hope—some little evidence of the very beginnings of a sense of economy, of an understanding of the necessity for economy, and of a desire to make well enough do. I want to see State Departments getting away from the reckless standards of extravagant expenditure, of spending money merely for the sake of spending, and I want to see as much consideration given to the people outside who have to pay as is given to the people inside who have to administer.

Major de Valera

Do I understand the Deputy to say that the only need for the maintenance of an Army is for the purpose of the internal peace of the country?

Dr. O'Higgins

That is the main purpose for which we need an Army today—to come to the aid of the civil power also for the maintenance of the necessary ceremonial, etc., of State; and, if you want the third, a small nucleus which would be capable of expansion in times of greater emergency.

Major de Valera

But you want an Army and not a police force.

Dr. O'Higgins

I want an Army for that purpose.

Major de Valera

Not merely a police force?

Dr. O'Higgins

Certainly not. I want the Taoiseach's policy of the past carried out.

Mr. Murphy

In 1928, shortly after the Taoiseach first entered this House, he discussed the then provision for the Army. If I remember the circumstances correctly he moved an amendment aimed at limiting the expenditure on the Army to £1,000,000. I take my stand here this evening on that. I have in fact been in agreement with him for a number of years on that particular question. The House is asked now to provide in this Estimate £4,419,390. Taking the Estimate as it stands, I think it is safe to say that the Army is the major item. It seems an extraordinary thing that, at the present time, we should have in this Estimate items like the provision of substantial sums for warlike equipment. One is forced to the conclusion that there has been a great deal of make-believe on this whole matter in the past. Even during the recent emergency I think there was a great deal of make-believe in connection with the Army and in connection with defence generally and we have continued in that make-believe right up to the present time. That is something which tends to irritate the people of the country as a whole rather than to imbue them with any sense of patriotic satisfaction, particularly at a time when there is grave distress and a daily struggle for food and supplies on the part of the ordinary people. It is absurd that in a time like this we should have an escort of cavalry for the President to functions such as those he attended during the last week. It is regrettable, and I think the time has come when the House should inject some sense of reality into the consideration of defence in this country.

It is not easy for the ordinary person to enter without some trepidation into the realms of international relations. It does seem quite clear now, however, that at least on the part of one of the great Powers in the last war there was never any intention of interfering with the neutrality of this country. I am not so sure that that could not be said for other nations also. It does seem to me that there was a good deal of make-believe about the whole matter of neutrality. I think that make-believe was effective and useful more as a political asset than anything else. The discovery about the ports is rather an extraordinary one. Some years ago the ports were obtained under an agreement and a great deal of money was spent in putting them into condition. That may, perhaps, have been necessary during the war period, but those ports are now in some places deserted and practically derelict. I do not know what assets they contain which could be realised or how far that realisation would go towards some reduction in this Estimate.

In my judgment the people of this country do not require an Army costing £5,000,000. In my judgment the people of the country have far more urgent problems on which money could be spent rather than on the provision of a picturesque and pageantlike detachment for ceremonial purposes. I think we are going in the wrong direction in pursuing a policy of this kind. Most ceremonial is meaningless. In my judgment the Army should be cut down for such a purpose to the barest minimum. Surely, if there is to be any hope for world peace or any hope of establishing an international organisation for the maintenance of world peace, it will not be done by spending substantial sums on an Army which this small and badly financed country can ill afford at the present time.

Might I say one pleasant word now before I close with regard to the Department of Defence? I would like to place on the records of this House my appreciation of the manner in which the Minister's Department discharges its duties. It is an extremely pleasant part of one's work to have any communications with the Department of Defence or with the Minister's office. Replies are prompt and bear evidence of the fact that a close investigation has been made into the matter inquired into.

In my opinion this Estimate, in the main, is one that ought to disappear from the financial provisions made by this House. To some extent any money provided for this service should be spent on something in the nature of an expanded national police force rather than on an Army. The Army should be pruned down to that extent and the money spent on it might be utilised for some more useful and productive service.

Mr. Coogan

I was very much disappointed that we had not from the Minister some picture of our defence policy, if we have one. I raised this matter before in the House and suggested that if it were undesirable to have our defence policy discussed in the House, then there should be some machinery set up by which Deputies of all Parties would know whether or not we had a defence policy. Listening to the Minister to-day, one gathered the impression that we have not a defence policy. It is questionable if we had one even during the war, other than the policy of marking time, awaiting developments.

I do not know if the Minister has taken the view that at the present time this island and the adjoining islands may be strategic back waters. I do not know whether he has taken the view that we can gamble on isolation saving us because the focal point of war, on present indications, is going to shift very far from us. If that be the point of view, we may be taking a very dangerous gamble. On a recent occasion the Minister assured me that we had no alliance with anybody, that we had no agreement with any other countries in defence matters; we had not even a gentleman's agreement. We seem to be ploughing along in unsplendid isolation.

I want to put the picture, as I see it, to the Minister. A definite alignment is taking shape in Europe and many Deputies are anxious to know whether the military experts in the Department of Defence, together with the Minister, are giving attention to that alignment and whether, in the event of certain developments taking place, we hope to retreat into isolation or neutrality, and avoid all commitments and hope, once again, that some exterior forces will protect us from ourselves. It is not necessary for me to go into detail or to paint the picture further. Everybody here knows that sooner or later a definite clash must come between the totalitarian States and what is left of democracy. Whether or not, in the event of that clash, this country is likely to be involved in war, we have to appreciate the position that we must take shelter somewhere.

Many experts in America and in Great Britain have expressed the opinion that Ireland and the adjoining islands are indefensible in a future atomic war. I am not an expert in military matters, but I do appreciate that, having regard to the very narrow territories which are involved in these islands—the geographical group known as the British Isles—in the event of atomic attack it is quite on the cards that these islands could be put out of commission in 24 hours. Many experts take the view that in these circumstances it is not worth while incurring further expense on the defence of these islands. They have come to the conclusion that the islands, as a group, are indefensible. So much so is that the case that we have a Royal visit to South Africa at the present time preparing the way for, perhaps, an exodus from the British Isles.

There are, apparently, three focal points in a possible future war that may emerge if the great powers cannot settle their difference soon— Canada, South Africa and the Middle East. I hold that, if these experts are right in their opinions, it is futile for this small, impoverished country to spend money on playthings and play toys. If that view is correct and if this country is as indefensible as the adjoining islands are, then we are only fooling ourselves by having an Army. When I ponder on that situation I think of the old, anonymous rhyme about the Duke of York's army:—

"The grand old Duke of York with his twice 10,000 men,

He marched them up to the top of the hill and

He marched them down again; And when they were up, they were up,

And when they were down, they were down;

And when they were only half-way up, They were neither up nor down."

I think if we examine the position of our Army we will find it is largely in the position of the army of the Grand Old Duke of York. I cannot say what percentage of the Army is occupied on maintenance work, what percentage is occupied on sentry duty, what numbers are engaged on protecting posts and what numbers are engaged in the various routine jobs of the Army, but I would say that a very small percentage of our Army at any given time would be available to take the field in an emergency. Speaking purely as a civilian, it seems to me to be futile to keep an Army of 12,000 men and regard it as a weapon of defence to protect us in the event of an onslaught, either from the sea or from the air.

The Minister told us that the peace-time establishment of the Army will be 15,330 men. Upon what criteria has that figure been arrived at? We are applicants for membership of the United Nations Organisation. I wonder if that figure includes the probable commitments in men, equipment and materials, which the United Nations Organisation, if we do become members of it, may, at any given moment, demand of us; whether we are arriving at this peace-time establishment in the absence of criteria of that kind and whether we are ignoring entirely the possibility of our ever becoming members of the United Nations Organisation. Are we working in complete darkness or are we taking into calculation possible demands that may be made on us by the United Nations Organisation or under some regional defence arrangement which I suggested on a previous occasion?

I have seen articles recently relating to our defence problems during the recent war. In these articles an exofficer has expressed the view that the Army was there to fight to the death, to fight to the finish, and he said that the Army would have given a very good account of itself.

I have no doubt whatever that our Army would have put up a gallant resistance, so far as it could. I have no doubt whatever that these officers and men, each and every one of them, would, man for man, have given as good an account of themselves as any Army in Europe but I do say that that resistance would have been futile. It is, however, futile to dwell on the mighthave-beens of the last war. The question for us now to discuss is whether it is worth while considering a military establishment at all here, in the sense of an Army, to preserve the integrity of this country in time of war. I personally subscribe to the view that it is not worth our time or trouble to expend money on a military establishment with that object. I have already stated here that I consider that our Army should be, first and last, a reserve for the civil authority; that its main functions should be to preserve internal order. I see no possibility of our Army being of any utility in any circumstances otherwise, except, perhaps, in the extreme case where we might be called upon to supply military aid under the United Nations Organisation Charter. If we were basing our military establishment on that ground I could subscribe to an Army of the strength that the Minister has indicated as our peace establishment but on no other grounds could I subscribe to that strength.

May I remind the gentlemen on the opposite benches of the time when, in the days of their irresponsibility, they advocated an Army of 5,000 men here at a cost of £1,000,000? They have got far away from those days. We are now multiplying the figures so far as numerical strength is concerned by three and the cost by five. I should like if this matter of defence, as far as this part of the country is concerned, were settled once and for all in some way so that we should not have to come here year after year to reiterate these points. It is undesirable for many reasons that we should be forced into that position. We are forced into that position by reason of the fact that we have never had from the Government any indication of military policy. Under the United Nations Organisation, two things are required of any member who subscribes to the Charter. In subscribing to the Charter, every member is expected to live up to the terms of the Charter and to abide loyally by the decisions of the Security Council. Two things required of any member who proposes to co-operate with other nations of the world in resisting aggression are the establishment of an air service and perhaps the establishment of a naval arm. Our air service, if we consider it in the light of an air arm to assist in policing the world and to enforce international law, is a byword. We have not developed that wing of our Defence Department at all to my mind. On the other hand, our naval arm reminds me of the navy the Lilliputians had once upon a time. When they set out for a war against their neighbours, they were very lucky to have a Gulliver to come to their aid. We have a Gulliver to come to our aid if our Navy ever embarks on any grandiose enterprise.

I think the Minister should take himself seriously in the case of terminology in relation to our corvettes. We should not designate these corvettes as a naval establishment. Let us call them what they are—fishery patrol vessels—and have done with it. Let us not give ourselves grand ideas or play up to the vanity of certain people by bluffing ourselves that we have a Navy. Five hundred and three men of all ranks and six corvettes could hardly, by any stretch of the imagination, be described as a Navy or a naval establishment. It certainly cannot be supported in any way from this side of the House as being in any shape or form essential to the defence of this country.

It is an extraordinary commentary upon our position after 25 years of selfgovernment that one out of every four men offering their services to the Army has been rejected on medical grounds. Despite all that has been said of social services and public health services, it is an extraordinary position to find that to-day one out of every four men offering themselves to the Army, is unfit. Presumably, the men who offered themselves were young, active, energetic men. When we look at the other side of the picture and find that one out of every nine offering themselves to the Army was rejected on educational grounds the question arises whether we have not arrived at a position of illiteracy in this country and whether something must not be done forthwith to put our educational system right. I do not think the standard of education required for the Army is a very high one. I am sure that the ordinary sixth or seventh school standard would suffice but apparently one out of every nine offering themselves for the Army, is not up to that standard.

As late as last night, this matter came before us in Dun Laoghaire at a meeting of the vocational education committee. We had occasion to look over certain applications for pupils applying from the national schools to get into our school. I took up four applications that had come in that day. One, a young girl named O'Brien, could not spell her own name. None of them could spell the word "cooking", two of them misspelled the word "December" and one misspelled the word "April". Three of them were unable to spell the word "Dominican", the convent to which they had gone to school. They made the most outlandish efforts at spelling the name of the school. There were four applicants who were practically illiterate and apparently the same condition applies in the case of applicants for the Army. I see evidence there of a necessity to do something to put our educational system on a proper basis. I might say that we had expert opinion at that meeting, and that expert opinion was that about 40 per cent. of the 14 to 15-year-olds could be regarded as satisfactory taking the country as a whole, that 30 per cent. were good and the rest unteachable. No wonder the Army has to spend money on continuation education when it takes recruits in, because the majority of those coming from the national schools at present cannot be trained efficiently for the modern duties of an Army.

The Minister mentioned the co-operation the Army had extended during the recent weather crisis. May I say, with all due respect to the Minister, that I do not consider that the Army played anything like the rôle it should have played in that crisis? So far as I could gather from the Minister, the Army set up a radio network to give information to the South and West and the Signal Corps assisted the Post Office, but it took them a long time to get on the move in County Wicklow and they did not move at all to the South or the West, so that the whole South and West were isolated for weeks without any effort by the Department to come to the rescue of the unfortunate people who were weather-bound, snow-bound and ice-bound in those areas.

In Kilkenny, Thomastown and along the River Nore we had a serious inundation. The Construction Corps was very near, in Waterford, and it would not have involved very much initiative to get the Construction Corps on the move in time to help in alleviating distress and to do whatever possible to stop the raging floods. So far as I know, no action was taken by the Minister's Department until representations were made by the people who were being flooded out to get the Army to come to their rescue. It was on Sunday, the day before St. Patrick's Day, that, having got in touch with the Department, we got them to move at all, and then all they could do was to supply blankets and bedding and, after a struggle, we got the military barracks for evacuees.

The Army, if it is to be maintained in this country, should be so dovetailed into the social and economic life of the people that, in emergencies of that kind, not small groups but thousands of men would be available for emergency work and to come to the rescue of people in distress. I do not hold at all with the idea that the military establishment should be marching up and down and preparing for a war that will never come off. If they are to be kept, they ought to be utilised in emergencies in various ways, and certainly the recent winter weather was an occasion when the Army might have been utilised to a fuller extent.

We had a large demobilisation of men from the Army last year, many of whom gave sterling national service all down the years from 1916. I question the wisdom of discharging many of these men and putting in their places an entirely new Army, if the Army is to be treated, as I say it should be treated, on a purely gendarmerie basis. Many of these officers and men could have been kept on to the age at which the Garda retire. The retiring age for Gardaí and sergeants is 57, and 60, and in certain cases 65, for officers, and many of these Army officers and men could have been kept on, as the Garda are kept on, if they were confined to the type of duty I have in mind, as a first-line reserve for the unarmed police. I see no other function for the Army here and I think it sheer waste of money to spend millions on a military establishment, which, under conditions of modern warfare, could not hope to put up a resistance for more than 24 hours to seven days.

We find provisions in the Estimate for £15,000 for medals and £16,000 for air-raid precautions, as well as increased amounts for mechanical transport and for petrol for the Army. Yet, when I appeal here for the allocation of money to relieve distress amongst flood victims, we cannot get a penny. A sum of £15,000 for medals and £16,000 for air-raid precautions would go a long way towards relieving distress in Kilkenny City and Thomastown to-day. We can spend £200,000 odd on a toy navy and yet we ignore the sufferings of our people and leave them to charity. The conditions in Kilkenny are so appalling that the State will have to come to the rescue and will have to wake up to a sense of responsibility in these matters. This Army Estimate could be cut in half and the money given to flood victims not only in Kilkenny but throughout the country, many of whom have lost their all, many of whom have lost their means of livelihood and many of whom cannot be rehabilitated in ordinary economic life for months to come. Yet, these people have to endure the folly of the provision of £15,000 for medals and £16,000 for air-raid precautions in this year of grace 1947.

I want the Minister to approach this problem of defence in a realistic manner. Let us settle this matter, once and for all. There are many viewpoints on the whole subject, I know, but if we could agree to a definite common national policy, we could settle on that policy and it would not be necessary to come to the House every year to discuss defence problems. Until we have a defence policy enunciated from the Government Benches, however, we shall be forced to raise these matters. I appeal to the Minister this year to take his courage in his hands and have the job done on the lines I have suggested.

Mr. McCarthy

We have heard this evening a most amazing speech from Dr. O'Higgins. We all know and have experienced the fact that he is a scathing and unscrupulous critic and that, in his criticism, he indulges in very extravagant denunciations. This evening, we had experience of that when he referred to the Minister for Defence as Minister for War and to his policy as Ministerial lunacy. Let us approach this subject of the national Army from a common-sense point of view, which so far has not been done. It amazes me that these critics on the Opposition benches this evening were so unanimous a few years ago, when emergency threatened the country, in appealing not only to the youth but to the aged to do their best to defend the nation and its territory against possible aggression. The people responded to that call and all sides of the House backed that policy to the fullest and the policy was effective. We are told that nobody meant to attack us, but if we had not made that preparation for defence, somebody would have marched into this country, if not to attack us, at least for his own preservation because, in preserving ourselves and our neutrality, we are playing our part in world affairs and the emergencies that threaten small nations from time to time.

To-night we have heard a great deal of discussion about this small country. There are countries in the world that are not as large as one of our provinces but nobody is calling them small miserable countries. For various reasons, many of these countries have been developed far more than our country has been developed and perhaps we are not paying enough attention to productivity and to the improvement of the soil. But the subject with which we are dealing to-night is a very different matter. When I hear the criticisms that are made about our Army, I am often very much surprised that this country in 1916 and, more particularly, from 1918 to 1921, when our nearest neighbour, then our enemy, had to mobilise a force of 4,000,000 men, defended itself successfully against those forces. We did it because the young men of the country, backed by the people, were imbued with one spirit—to maintain our national independence. They did it, thank God, for part of this country.

Mr. Coogan

They did it for the other part, too.

Mr. McCarthy

Speeches made as if our territorial boundary were the sea ignore completely that part of our country which is still in the occupation of a foreign Army. It is a matter of opinion as to what the particular strength of the Army should be but during the last seven or eight years young men have been brought into that Army by appeals from all sides of this House and in the most formative years of their lives their minds have been developed in a military school and with a view to a particular livelihood. Therefore, I think it would be unfair to many of them that they should be put out of the Army, at a time of emergency, when there is so much employment abroad. Let us recognise from the start that many of these young men are sons of the soil, that they are our own people. If many are rejected for health reasons, because of bad teeth, or fallen arches, or some minor defect, it does not mean, because they are not fit for the Army, they are not physically fit for other purposes. A man may be perfectly healthy and may not be accepted by the Army. We have seen that other countries are concerned about the same problem. Our nearest neighbour is much more concerned than we have been because they have been up against a more serious problem of home defence and have a more serious problem of defence all over the world, while we have merely our own nation, or part of it, to look after at the moment. In the world emergency through which we have passed, it is not surprising that that problem should arise for many nations who have had to endure all the trials and difficulties of the times.

A point has been made that many have been rejected for failure to reach the educational standard required. I have been told, rightly or wrongly, that regional incongruities and discrepancies of various kinds have disclosed themselves in the matter of recruiting, which would require investigation. I am sure that matter will be attended to in due time by those who have the interests of the country at heart, and who are in a position to know the details.

The corvettes have been mentioned. The Muirchu was regarded as a joke in this country because the trawlers that were plundering our coastal waters and the fishing banks were able to escape because of the slowness of that particular vessel. Surely any island nation should have vessels to defend its territorial waters. It is just as well that that service should be linked up with the Army because, in the event of emergency, the seacraft would have to play their part in conjunction with the land forces in defending our shores. These vessels would provide a very useful training for some of our sea-faring people who would otherwise go into the navies of other countries. Is it not far better that they should not be lost to this country and that we should have ships of our own, where we would maintain the spirit of national defence and where our men would be trained to protect our fisheries, rather than that they should be scattered to the ends of the earth?

Everybody agrees that we do not want big warlike forces. At the same time, while we are in a disturbed world, it is not so easy to cut down the forces that we have built up with the goodwill of all Parties in the House and in the country. The air force— small though it will be; we do not want any huge expenditure—will provide training for young men. Surely we should not stay behind all the small nations of the world and allow this country, that has suffered so much through the ages, to fall to pieces. It is not going to fall to pieces and the people of this country, young and old, will see that it will not fall to pieces and that there will be men there to defend it, whether they are in the Army or not, and that the spirit of this nation will be maintained, the teachings of Pearse will be preserved. In years gone by the unarmed man, illarmed at any rate, went out with Pearse to face the might of an empire for a dream, to save the nationality of a small country that had never been terrified by any Power opposed to it, who had kept on the fight. To-day it is not a question of fighting, it is a question of maintaining our position as best we can. It is a question of holding our own strength in a well-balanced way to face whatever is before us in these days of trial, to try to bring our partitioned nation into one unit again, not by force but by the strength and spirit to survive. This question of national defence is an important one. It will cost money. The money no doubt is provided by the people but it is for the people and for their interests and for the interests of this nation that will never die.

Mr. Cafferky

While listening to the speaker who has just sat down, I wondered whether we were discussing the Army Estimate or how we were going to achieve the independence of this country or maintain the little independence we have at the present moment. However, I suppose that in order to cover up it was necessary to bring in a little of the national outlook to deceive once more the people outside this House.

The Minister is asking for £4,419,390. I suppose it is the same Minister who, with his colleagues away back in the days before they entered office, criticised their colleagues who were sitting on the opposite benches as to the extravagance of the Army. They gave us to understand in those days that only a small Army was essential, and that £1,700,000, or whatever it cost then, was far in excess of what this nation could afford. The same gentlemen who led the Irish people to believe that this country could be defended by a smaller Army than the one that was then in existence and that it could be maintained at a smaller cost than what it was then costing are now asking the country to provide almost £5,000,000 this year. I would like to understand why the Party which advocated these things has now the brazen audacity or impertinence to come before the House in peace-time and ask for the sum which they are asking to-night. No doubt some of the back benchers of Fianna Fáil will get up and tell us that if we are going to have an Army or if we believe in having an Army we will have to have an Army and maintain it up to the standard of others. Otherwise let us get it out of our heads and let us have an efficient police force— one or the other. The point I would like to make here is that the Fianna Fáil Party entered office on false pretences.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy will have to deal with the Minister responsible for this Vote, not what Fianna Fáil did in office 15 years ago.

Mr. Cafferky

They were not in office then: they were in opposition, but they succeeded in getting into office by political fraud——

An Ceann Comhairle

There is a method of contesting elections.

Mr. Cafferky

——and the very Deputies and the Minister himself, now attack the Opposition when they take it upon themselves, which is their duty, to point out to the Minister his extravagance: when they point out to him that, to their minds, it is not essential to have an Army of the size for which he is fighting to-day and when they point out that it is not essential to spend thousands of pounds on medals, et cetera, which are not necessary in particular at a time when taxation is at such a high level and at a time when we cannot see any future insofar as the reduction of taxation is concerned. Because of that we wish to refer to some of the sayings of the Party who now govern this country to remind them that they have not achieved anything like what they intended to achieve or at least that they led the people to believe they were going to achieve when they got office. That is why I refer to the promises and to the misrepresentations they made when they were sitting where we are now.

I notice that there is a wide difference between the salary, wage, allowance, or whatever it is called, paid to the colonel, the general, the lieutenant, the non - commissioned officer and all the higher ranks of the Army and that of the private. That is one thing I cannot understand. Why is it that what are termed in the Army the "Brass Hats" are entitled to such an allowance when the ordinary soldier in the Army is only entitled to such a meagre allowance and that whenever, due to pressure, an increase is brought about every officer in the Army from the commanding general down must get an increase accordingly. That is a thing I object to. If an argument can be put forward for an increase in the ordinary private's pay I object to that increase being applicable to the higher Army ranks. It is one of the reasons, in my estimation, that has brought about this considerable increase. If we look at the difference of pay here we can see that it is sufficient to leave no interest whatsoever in the ordinary private soldier and it is no wonder at all that we have not got an Army to-day.

The Minister for Defence may not admit it but there are few young men who are interested in joining the Army to-day and every second one who was in the Army before demobilisation and who could got out and none desires to go back. Firstly, because they were not treated well while in the Army: secondly, because the allowance was so miserable and so small in comparison with that of the high-ranking officers; and thirdly, because of the unnecessary red tape—following on the lines of Britain, imitating the British Empire.

The ordinary private soldier who gets up in the morning has to queue up, or line up, before he goes to breakfast in order that the commanding officer or whoever is responsible can see that they are all in. Now the corporal or the sergeant or whoever is responsible for calling these men in the morning should be able to count and account for any soldiers who may be missing and any soldiers who may not have come in before midnight the night before. I think it is unnecessary to have these young men queueing with their mugs in their hands in the early hours of the morning before they go to breakfast. I think it is also unfair to these men the way they are treated as regards the mess in which they take their food—ordinary tables, bad cutlery, bad delf, the food in many instances not the best, the mess in which they eat in no way homely, nothing to make it look like a home. All that contributes to the discomfort of the soldier and all that inevitably makes the soldier hate Army life. That is the reason why the soldiers were so glad to get out of the Army with no intention of ever going back into it again. They loathed the unnecessary discipline and the unnecessary training. They loathed going over and over again every single little bit of mechanism in a Bren gun, a Thompson gun and every other kind of gun. They loathed the old methods of warfare and the ancient methods of defence. They were disgusted with Army life. All these things have turned the ordinary young man against ever joining the Army here. That is why the Minister for Defence is in his present difficulty.

On last Sunday morning a marine was buried down in my constituency. He had been accidentally drowned in Cork. There was no guard of honour at his funeral. That was due to red tape. High ranking officers are well treated in the Army. High ranking officers are well paid and provided with the very best uniforms. The ordinary soldier is neither paid, nor fed, nor clothed. The fact that he is not paid leaves him open to all kinds of temptation and leads him into all manner of crime. That would not happen if every soldier had a reasonable allowance. Instead of spending this £4,500,000 on unnecessary provisions that money should be spent in raising the status of the ordinary soldier and giving him a certain amount of dignity. I disagree with Deputy O'Higgins with regard to the walkingout uniform. I think it is most essential that the soldier should be well dressed. I think the Army is something of which the people should be proud. I think we should endeavour to make the Army something of which the people could be proud. We either must have an Army or we must not. If we are to have an Army then we must make it a proper Army. The private soldier is the man who does all the work. The private soldier does all the really dirty work. A soldier to-day is not the man of 25 or 30 years ago. Twenty-five to 30 years ago the soldier was the corner boy and the ruffian. Nowadays you have decent men going into the Army and they expect decent treatment when they are in the Army They expect decent treatment from their Minister and from the Government of this country.

They are not getting decent treatment. They have their tea at five o'clock in the evening. From five o'clock in the evening until the following morning they must fast. Surely that is not fair or reasonable. They have to go out after five o'clock and with their meagre allowance buy food either in the canteens or in some restaurant. They cannot afford to do that. It may be said that if they return early enough to barracks they can buy a sandwich and a cup of tea in the canteen. Most soldiers do not want to go back to barracks early. They are entitled to enjoy themselves up to midnight. If they go back to the canteen they have to pay 1/6 or 2/- for a supper. If there are any savings to be made under this Estimate no saving should be made on the ordinary private soldier. The young man who joins the Army is just as much entitled to a decent standard rate of pay as his colleagues outside working in an industry, or factory, or office. The soldier is doing a job of work. He may at any moment have to undertake that work under very hazardous conditions.

At the present moment it is impossible to say whether one is in a state of peace or war. Actual armed conflict may break out at any moment judging by some of the recent speeches made by the representatives of the Great Powers. There is no guarantee of peace. If we are to have an Army we will have to make it such as will encourage and entice our young men into joining it. The only way in which to do that is to remove the existing red tape. We shall have to abolish unnecessary roll calls in the early hours of the morning, drinking out of chipped enamel mugs, eating out of chipped enamel plates, and sitting at bare tables in a canteen wholly lacking in any form of amenity. We shall have to make the soldier's life a more comfortable one. We shall have to give the soldier a little more free time with less emphasis on the filling up of forms for leave. If these things are not done no young man will be found to join the Army.

This Estimate may appear to be a rather large one. It must be admitted, however, that there is a reduction in comparison with other years. We need an Army of a certain size and standard. I think the estimation as to size given by the Minister is somewhat on the conservative side. The alternative to that is to have an effective and efficient police force but that, to my mind, would not be proper at the present time. If we were admitted into the United Nations Organisation and that organisation proves its worth and efficiency we should be required to make some contribution from the military point of view. One thing which should be done at the present moment is to train recruits and equip them in a proper manner so as to have them ready in case of an emergency arising. The country is not yet free. Part of our territory is occupied by an enemy. It is difficult to know how that particular part of our territory may in time become free, whether by force or by negotiation. So long as we have part of our territory under enemy control we must have a competent Army. We must have an effective nucleus capable of expansion for our own security.

I would like the Minister to consider this whole problem of red tape. The soldier is fed-up with red tape, with his conditions, with his pay, with the difficulty of obtaining passes out in the evening and the punishment he gets for staying out at night without permission. The soldier may meet a friend— a very special friend—and naturally would like to spend as much time as possible with that friend, so he overstays his leave. He is brought before a military court and there is a whole lot of unnecessary red tape. If the officer knows he is a good soldier, it is unnecessary to put him through all that.

The officers know the blackguards and the good men in the Army; they know the men who are constantly infringing on the rules and who hold their superiors in contempt. These may be very few in number. It is not necessary to treat every soldier in the same way as they would treat the man who is doing everything only what he should do. When the good soldiers are treated harshly they tell their colleagues outside not to have anything to do with the Army, that it is next to hell. That is one reason why we do not get recruits. The young fellows are frightened about the Army, or the very mention of it. Men talk of what they went through in the Army all during the emergency and of all the red tape and trouble from the higher ranking officers.

Captain Giles

Long ago we should have made the Army Estimate a matter of national policy. All Parties should be concerned as to whether we should or should not have an Army. In my opinion, no country in the world can do without a small standing Army, but in peace-time that Army should be cut down to the absolute minimum. Our Army is costing too much. I think £250,000 should be quite enough for our Army on a peace footing. As a member of the Army from its beginning, I am not satisfied with the speech Deputy Cafferky made. Judging from what he said, one would think all the soldiers were prisoners at one time or another, that they were bludgeoned, beaten with whips and that they have a very hard time. We must remember that all these men joined the Army voluntarily and I may say that they would not have done so if they felt they would be harshly treated.

Major de Valera

You were in the Army; you were an officer in the Army. The Deputy who spoke in that way had no Army experience, although of military age in 1939.

Mr. Blowick

A lot of men in the Army to-day and those who have left it can talk of the conditions they experienced there.

Captain Giles

As a general rule, the men in the Army are well treated; they are well fed and pretty well paid. If they do not want to join the Army, no one asks them to do so. There is no purpose served by saying that the Army holds certain terrors for recruits and that that is the reason they do not join the Army. Young fellows are not joining because there are too many other attractions. They can get £6, £8 or £10 in England and they get only £1 or £2 in the Army. They joined the Army because there was something spectacular in doing so when the war was on and because there was plenty of excitement. There is not much excitement now, nor will there be for a few years and that is why many young fellows do not join the Army.

Mr. Cafferky

What do you mean by "excitement"?

Captain Giles

The threat of war, for instance. Any young man of spirit will go where there is the threat of war, and where there is any excitement of that type. I would like the position in relation to our Army cleared up. We are emerging from the position where we were a semi-conquered people; we have got back some of our territory either by force or by peaceful means. We are not satisfied that we have fulfilled our mission. It will not be fulfilled for many of us until we have a united nation from north to south and east to west.

What size of an Army do we need in this country? That is a matter on which we should have general agreement. It is terrible to be wrangling and fighting always among ourselves. Let us have some definite decision as to the size of our Army and what we should spend annually on it. There are far too many Deputies here speaking as military experts. Many of them never formed fours in their lives. The Army Estimate is always too much discussed. Let us have a common outlook on the Army, let us agree how much we should spend on it and what should be its strength.

I would like to see a small foundation Army in this country and I would like to see every young man from 15 to 18 years getting at least two years' training. I do not mean that we should give them a war training, but we should train them to make them good, decent citizens, men of good character, men who can make their word their bond. Speaking generally, this is a most sloppy country and we have too many slick boys trying to live on others. It would be well for many of them to realise that the future is not so rosy and that in order to have a good future they must work hard. The harder they work the better.

Let us make our nation something worthy of the people. I do not mean that we should take our young fellows at 15 years whether their parents like it or not, but there should be some period in a young man's life when he could be given an Army training for two years. That will bring out the best in our young men and rid many of them of the worst that is in them. We could cut down our Army perhaps by 50 per cent. and concentrate far more attention on our police force. The police force at present is a soft and flabby force.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy will have an opportunity on another Estimate of discussing the police force.

Captain Giles

There should be some tightening up in the Army. As regards defence, we must have agreement that this country and the neighbouring islands should have a common defence. I do not mean that we should enter a war simply because Britain enters a war. Where do we stand as regards Britain in defence matters? Britain and Ireland should discuss that subject and see what we can do for the defence of all the islands. I do not mean that if Britain wants to enter a European war we should do so, but there is such a thing as the preservation of these islands and Britain and ourselves could have some common policy in that connection. We do not want to enter into military conquests of other countries.

In the last war we were in an awkward position; we hardly knew where we stood as regards Britain. We should have known whether Britain meant to take over this country for her own defence. I believe Britain said: "If you put up enough men in Éire to defend the coastline until we hold off Hitler's army, we will be satisfied." I am satisfied Britain did say that, and we put up our force and spent money in order to keep our word. I think the Irish people should be allowed to know that that was the situation. It would not be a bit of harm to tell them so. Nearly everyone in the country thinks there was a secret alliance between Britain and de Valera——

An Ceann Comhairle

The Taoiseach.

Captain Giles

——between Britain and the Taoiseach. The people think he was up to his neck in intrigue. I am satisfied he had a common understanding with the British but I do not say that he was up to his neck in intrigue. I would not object to the Taoiseach making an alliance for the purpose of common defence, making an agreement with the British for the protection and preservation of these islands. There is no reason why we could not stand over something like that. Our nation was bluffed through the last emergency. The people were led to believe that everything was done in an underhand way. There had to be a certain secrecy, but I think there should have been more open diplomacy in regard to certain important aspects and that the people should have been informed as to what was being done.

I ask the Minister to reconsider the whole position and see if we cannot find a unified policy, one that will be suitable to all Parties. In that way we could cut out half the debates here on many of our estimates. There is far too much bitterness and controversy here. In the lobbies we could easily fix on a common policy, but here we can fix nothing. The Army should be dealt with from the point of view of national policy. We should decide in peacetime upon something that will be suitable to all sides of the House and if war conditions should arise we could then have a unified policy appropriate to the occasion. In that way we would have more progress and more harmony here. The policy that should suit this side of the House in regard to Army matters should be equally suitable to Deputies on the Fianna Fáil benches. We are all Irishmen and good nationalists. We all believe in uplifting our country and I think that there is no reason why we should not be able to have a better foundation and a better understanding on an important matter such as defence. I would therefore appeal to the Minister to make a general review of the position so as to find out definitely the size of the Army we shall be able to maintain in future in this country.

Mr. O'Leary

I find it rather difficult to follow Deputy Cafferky on the one hand and Deputy Giles on the other. But I would remind these Deputies that a short time ago when a few officers were discharged from the Army there was uproar in this House. I should like to know whether Deputies, in view of that fact, want the Army to be reduced still further? If we cut down the Army, where are the men who will be discharged to get employment? They will be thrown into the ranks of the unemployed in the same way as have many of those who served during the past five years. I know many men who are willing to rejoin the Army but who find themselves ineligible because of the age limit. If a man is over 28 years, he will not be taken into the Army at present. I know a number of these men who were anxious for a military life and who, because they could not get into our own Army, crossed the Border and joined the British Air Force. To lose trained soldiers in that way is a mistake. It merely means that another nation gets the benefit of the training that we gave these men. We are all proud of the Army and there is no doubt that we need an Army. Other nations are building up their forces at present because of the unsettled state of the world. I certainly think that we should have a standing Army of sufficient strength to defend our shores and that we should not leave ourselves in the position in which we were when the emergency suddenly came upon us in 1939. We had an illequipped, insufficient Army at that time and the Government had to try to make up the deficiency by organising the Local Defence Force and the Local Security Force. The Army is the mainstay of the nation and is our last resource in time of an emergency.

I should like to bring before the Minister the case of young men who have left the Army and are on the reserve. Some of them are offered jobs in mentals hospitals in England and they have to apply for permission to leave Éire. I would suggest to the Minister that, as far as possible, any young man of that description who is appointed to a position in England should be facilitated in going there.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted and 20 Deputies being present,

Mr. O'Leary

I would ask the Minister to take special note of the point I have made with regard to men on the reserve. If they are held up too long it may mean that they will lose the employment which they are offered on the other side. I would also suggest to him that if the 12,000 men he requires are not forthcoming he should extend the age limit, because I know many young men to-day who are anxious to rejoin the Army but who are debarred from doing so by reason of the fact that they are over 28 years of age.

General Mulcahy

Deputy Giles quite reasonably asks that there should be a national policy with regard to defence. Our position is that we have endeavoured to do our part to get the Government to co-operate with us in this House in discussing defence and defence policy but we have been met with nothing but a rigid, inflexible, almost ignorant attitude on the part of the Government. The Minister, when he was last speaking on the matter here, charged us with being insincere in discussing defence here. May I say that there was no insincerity on our part in discussing defence matters here? We are compelled to realise by the general position of the world to-day that defence is a matter to which considerable thought has to be given and that it has to be planned in every direction.

If we object to the expenditure of this enormous amount at the present time and to being told simply that the Government want an Army twice as big as the pre-war Army, we do so simply because a statement of the Government's policy in these particular terms is an outstanding sign that they have given no thought to the matter at all.

The Minister has shown to-day, by the figures he has quoted with regard to what the Army is to be, what the peace establishment is set out by the Government to be, that he and the Government responsible for this policy are standing entirely away from the realities of the present situation and from their experience during the past six or seven years. If we are to deal with the strengthening of the nation as a whole, we cannot shut our eyes to the experience of the past six or seven years or to the general position in the world.

The question has been raised to-day: are we to have an Army as a police force or as an Army for defence purposes? If we are to have an Army for defence purposes—and there is no study of that aspect which should be left unattended to—it can only be attended to by the Army chiefs here studying what is happening in the world and taking advantage of the experience and thought in the world to-day. At present, so far as we can get any information from the Minister, so far as we can deduce anything from his statement, no thought of any kind is being given to defence as a national problem, to the kind of preparations we ought to be making for it. Nothing is done, but the hand is being dipped very deeply into the public purse. Young men are being induced to come into the Army, both as ordinary soldiers and as officers. They are being induced to come into an Army which has no future for them in the way of an intelligent spending of their lives at useful national work, on the one hand, and no future for them so far as their later middle years are concerned.

The Minister, when asked on quite a number of occasions, in the early part of this year, what the Army policy was, finally summarised his attitude when he replied to the Second Reading debate on the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill on 11th February, 1947. On that occasion, he declared:

"The approach of the Deputies who spoke on the question of defence policy generally appears to me to lack sincerity and conviction."

Earlier, he had said that, when the Opposition were talking about Army policy, they were inclined to mix up Army policy with external policy. Later on, he said that he had already stated:—

"This country had no consultations with Great Britain or the United States on defence matters."

Further on, he said:—

"All the nations of the world are at present building up stronger peace-time armies than they have ever had before."

Those statements appear at columns 729 and 730, and, at column 731, he said it was futile at this stage to make any assessment of the effect of membership of the United Nations Organisation on our defence policy. With regard to naval policy, he said:—

"Our naval policy, based on our experience of the recent emergency, is the maintenance of a small naval service which would patrol our territorial waters and cover our principal ports. It would be absolutely essential, from the point of view of the maintenance of our neutrality, that we should be able to ensure that our territorial waters are not used as operational areas for belligerent purposes. I think it can be taken for granted that the hastily organised measures which sufficed in the late war would not be adequate in any future conflict."

When I discuss Army policy here, I discuss it, on the one hand, from the point of view of to-day of the men who were in the emergency Army and the men who are being invited into the Army to-day and from the point of view of using our national resources to the best advantage to reinforce our general economic and defensive strength to-day; and, on the other hand, from the point of view of what defence problem is likely to arise for us in five years', ten years', or 20 years' time. What I object to in relation to the men in the Army to-day, the men being brought into the Army to-day and the men who were put out of the Army yesterday is that, at a time which is essentially a waiting period, when the Army authorities are not able to tell us what the defence problems of the country are likely to be to-morrow and not able to tell us on what lines they want the Army organised, on what lines they want it equipped and on what lines they want it trained to day, men of 47, 48, 49 and 50—non-commissioned officers and men on the one hand, and officers on the other— who had experience in our Army in recent years, are being pushed out of the Army into an absolute wilderness of unemployment, so far as the greater part of them are concerned, when they might be usefully engaged in the Army of to-day and young men are being taken into the Army who could be better occupied outside and who should be left outside, and being invited into the Army in such substantial numbers that they tell us they want an Army twice as big as they had before the war. That is a defence policy which deals with the greatest heartlessness with men who have served the State in the past, and with equal heartlessness with young men anxious to serve their country who are embarking on their calling in life.

I raised on the Adjournment here the other night the case of a non-commissioned officer who had spent a quarter of a century in the Army. Before that, he had been a volunteer in the Six-County area. Naturally, the man in the Army cannot marry very early in life, and he finds himself like others of his colleagues at 49 years of age with a wife and seven children, marooned in married quarters in the Army because of the very bad housing position which exists, due to the impossibility of keeping the housing programme going during the war. He is not able to find employment and his pension, after a quarter of a century's service in the Army, is 17/6 per week— less in terms of pre-war money than would be offered to an old age pensioner. He finds himself with a young family which has to be reared, educated and placed in life on that pension, if he were able to use it, but that pension is withheld from him because he is living in Army quarters and cannot get out.

I asked, in the earlier part of the year, for information as to the ages at which officers are discharged from the Army. The men who are being invited into the Army in such comparatively large numbers to-day in order to give us this Army two and a half times as large, are being invited into the Army in circumstances in which, if they are second lieutenants when they reach 45 years of age, they will be put out; if they are captains, they will be put out at 48 years of age; if commandants, at 51; if majors, at 54—or colonels, as the new description is. I do not know if the new description will take them up to 57. But the officers we are inviting to come into the Army to-day, if they are going to be treated as the officers of to-day are being treated, are being invited into a life profession from which they will find themselves, when they are less than 55 years of age, thrown out into the world with nothing but the equipment for finding employment that an Army officer has and, no doubt, in many of their cases, if they have a family, it will be a family whose education has still to be finished.

That is wrong to-day, if we had a defence problem. It is twice as wrong to-day when the defence problem cannot be positive. What are we doing? The Estimates for the year 1931-32, under sub-head A, provided for 477 officers and 5,700 other ranks, and the cost under sub-head A for that 477 officers and 5,700 other ranks was £510,000, of a total Estimate of £1,437,000. In the year before the war —1938-39—again under sub-head A, provision was made for 585 officers and 5,800 other ranks, and the total cost for pay was £570,000 out of a total Estimate of £1,672,000. In addition, there was a small amount of money, that is, £15,000, for pay for volunteers—2,900— but the actual standing Army had, in other ranks, simply 5,800 men. To-day, according to the Estimate—which has been changed somewhat by the Minister in the statement he made to us— there is provision for 1,008 officers and 10,973 other ranks, the pay under sub-head A being £1,142,000 out of a total Estimate of £4,419,390. We are asking for that size of an Army and for that cost even in the light of our experiences in the past and in the light of what we see statesmen throughout the world doing to-day in relation to the defence problems of countries that are capable of making greater provision. I think it marks completely and in the most pointed way the whole absence of thought on the part of the Government in regard to any of our problems.

No one will deny, in regard to the actual facts of the war situation here and what exactly did happen, that the military arrangements that we made in the beginning of the war were more elaborate than were necessary. The Army reserve was called up in the beginning and a considerable amount of it was let go and we had a much bigger Army during the emergency than the actual facts as they eventuated suggested were necessary.

There is plenty of reason why, beforehand, not knowing what was going to happen, people would make the elaborate provision that was made for manning the Army here but, looking back over it, we ought to learn something and we ought to realise the truth of what we suggested in September, 1939. I do not claim any credit for it because we had not the responsibility that the Government had but we suggested that it was the economic situation that should get first attention here, that it was the economic situation that was going to be the weak position for us and that the money that was being spent on the mobilisation of the reserve, instead of being spent on that, should be spent on other things, such as strengthening the foundations of the agricultural policy that was going to be pursued at that particular time, on shipping and other matters.

However, looking back, we can realise what the situation was and, insofar as I can interpret some of the remarks of the Minister with regard to the situation in the past, the policy seems to have been, and to some extent a knowing and considered policy, to fill a vacuum by building up an Army of 45,000 together with the local defence forces that were built up. That is, our policy was, for reasons considered good enough by the Government at the time, to spend an enormous amount of money in filling a vacuum. We know now, and we have it admitted by very clear implication on the part of the Taoiseach, that we filled the vacuum unnecessarily, at any rate, we filled it against very friendly nations—we filled it against the United States and we filled it against Great Britain—and there is no reason why we all would not look calmly at that situation.

Some people may even say there was a good enough reason for filling it but, in the new circumstances, is there any reason for filling a vacuum with a ground army in any defence situation that we are likely to meet within the next ten years? For anybody to say that we should do during a war in ten years' time exactly what we did during the last war would, I think, be very unintelligent. I do not think that anybody can have it in his mind that we would be likely to do anything like it at all.

Therefore, I feel that the men who were in the Army should have been maintained in the Army even though they were over the statutory ages. They are quite competent for the work that requires to be done to-day and for any work that is likely to be done to-morrow or the year after and it is entirely wrong to be inducing young men to enter the Irish Army to-day. They are entering an Army where there is no particular policy with regard to defence. They are in the beginning of their years of intelligence and outlook on the world and on life and a very large number of them will probably be very sorry as they grow older that they did not turn themselves to a different type of occupation and a different type of service in their nation's cause than the kind of service that they are being induced to turn themselves to to-day. The very facts that the Minister has disclosed with regard to the recruiting show that the Government policy is contrary to the common sense of the general run of the young people of the country. The Minister quoted certain figures with regard to the number of applicants who joined the Army during the last six months.

Again, I would like to say that in quoting the percentage of persons accepted in relation to the number of people who applied he quoted a percentage that is misleading. Questions were answered on the 23rd of October last and again on the 11th of March which indicated that the figure he quoted as regards the number of applicants who joined the Army, 4,623, is correct but only 2,120 of these were accepted. That is, roughly 46 per cent. only were accepted and not the 61 per cent. that the Minister stated, because 1,247 were rejected on physical grounds, 534 were rejected on educational grounds and 722 were rejected for other causes.

Mr. Traynor

I would like to say that a figure was omitted which gave me the wrong calculation indicated—a figure of 700 which was not taken into the calculation, which should have been and which was not. Originally, it was there but it was omitted in the actual final printed statement. I am sorry. I want to make it clear, a Chinn Comhairle, that there was no intention to deceive.

General Mulcahy

I understand that perfectly, and I hope the Minister does not feel that there was any suggestion on my part that he was with-holding any information that he had. I just feel that, if it is a fact that only, roughly 46 per cent. of the applicants for the Army were accepted, we ought to face that frankly and that it would be wrong if we led ourselves to remain under the impression that 61 per cent. were accepted.

The number of recruits required to complete the establishment in October was 5,363. In six months we have got only 2,120 and it has left the Minister in the position that he has had to recast and restate to the Dáil to-day the figures that he hopes to have in the Army during the current year. It simply shows that the country is not ready to respond, and does not see the necessity for responding to the recruiting appeal to help to build up the Army to the strength that the Minister wants. I think that that shows a sound instinct on the part of young men in the country, and I feel that the whole defence policy in relation to the standing Army of to-day and next year has to be radically changed.

The Minister stated that he had not had any consultations with Great Britain and the U.S.A. in connection with defence matters. Well, we are unique in the world in looking after the question of defence. If we take up the attitude that we are simply going to have our own Army here, that we are going to equip it with the best equipment and that we are going to defend our country in our own way by ourselves, we are unique in the world. There is not a country in the world that is capable of defending itself in a military way from its own resources to-day: even defend itself in the old sense in the circumstances that existed at the beginning of the last war.

When we think of the way in which the last war ended, and when we think of the experience of the Japanese—for all their great warlike preparation and all their great war like training—when we think of the circumstances in which their military defeat was brought about, then we are certainly like children playing in a nursery if we persist in isolating ourselves from the rest of the world and in building up an Army, even two and a half times more than it was pre-war, and if we cling without any reference as to what its meaning is to the type of address that was made by the Taoiseach in August, 1945, at an Army shooting function in the Curragh camp who, when addressing 1,000 soldiers representing units in all parts of the country, said:—

"In these days when we are talking about atomic bombs it may seem that the lighter weapons— the personal weapons—of the soldier are not going to count a great deal in the future. That would be a tremendous mistake because it does not matter what other arms there are, the personal weapons of the soldiers will always be of importance."

We have not been told what are the circumstances in which the personal weapons of the soldiers of the Irish Army are likely to be of importance in this country in any defence problem that we see in the future. The British Premier speaking comparatively recently in relation to defence in the House of Commons said:—

"The House would realise that there were some limitations on what he could say of the present situation. We are still in the uneasy, transitional period of unsettlement after the disruptions of a long war, and our forces were engaged in preserving law and order in many parts of the world. It was still more difficult to speak with any certainty of the future. The United Nations Organisation had only just got under way, and the provision for collective security to prevent war in the future which was planned at San Francisco had not begun to be worked out. We had accepted obligations under the Charter which we intended to fulfil, but the extent and composition of the forces which would be required were yet unknown. Our defence policy must be dependent on what was worked out at the United Nations Organisation, because we desired to take our part in a great security organisation that would make not just one nation secure but all nations secure.

Besides this there has been the development of new and powerful weapons, weapons the advent of which may well affect future strategy and the future composition of our forces. Especially, there is the coming of the atomic bomb, and clearly these events must affect all decisions of our future defence. But time will be needed before we can assess fully this new position. It is perhaps fortunate that we have time. This time gives us a chance of planning during the period of transition, but in the meanwhile we have to plan ahead, in spite of all the unknown factors, to the best of our ability. But we have to recognise that this defence White Paper is something of a stop-gap."

They cannot see into the future. They do not know what the effect of their organisation or their strategy may be taking into consideration the type of weapons that were developed towards the end of the war. They have to mark time. They have to study, they have to think, they have to work, and they have to endeavour as it were to see into the future. We are making no attempt to see into the future. The type of Army that the Minister puts forward is the type of Army that we had in our time. It is the type of Army that was wanted when they came into office. It is the type of Army that has existed ever since—the pre-war type of Army developed to two and a half times its strength.

What is happening in the rest of the world? I have already indicated in this House that the Canadian Government has come to an understanding with the Government of the United States and that the Government of the United States is actually equipping at its own cost the Republics of Southern America in order that there might be uniformity of equipment, uniformity of training and uniformity of organisation. As between Canada and the United States, in January last Mr. MacKenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, disclosed that Canada and the United States had decided that their national defence establishment should continue to collaborate for joint security purposes. That decision was taken in the interests of economy and efficiency. No treaty agreement or contractual obligation was entered into. Mr. MacKenzie King stated that at any time either country might discontinue collaboration. He also stated that the United States and Canada had concluded a five-point military agreement to "encourage the standardisation of armed equipment, training and tactics, and to provide for the `mutual availability' of each other's military, naval and air facilities."

"Reports from Ottawa state that Mr. MacKenzie King disclosed yesterday that Canada and the United States have decided that their national defence establishments shall continue to operate for defence purposes, and said they would strengthen the co-operation of each country within the broader framework of the United Nations."

He said that collaboration was necessarily limited and based on these principles:

"(1) The interchange of selected individuals to increase the familiarity of each country's defences with the other. (2) General co-operation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises, development and tests of material of common interest. (3) Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organisation, methods of training and new developments. (4) Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country. (5) All co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all its activities in each country. Neither country will take any action inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter remains the corner-stone of the foreign policy of each."

One of the clearest experiences of the last war and of everything that has taken place up to the present time is that the United States regard the military integrity of Great Britain and of Ireland as an essential element in American security. Prior to the war we in this country were turning our eyes and stretching our ears in every direction in our endeavour to obtain equipment in such a way that no charge could be levelled against the Fianna Fáil Government that they were buying their equipment from Great Britain. We were digging out certain types of equipment for the Army from Czechoslovakia. We were digging out other types of equipment from Sweden, from France and from Germany. When war did break out we were entirely dependent upon Great Britain and the United States for our equipment and we were very glad to be able to obtain our equipment from those sources so that we should have something to put into the hands of our newly organised Army. Insofar as we may require equipment in a future world war or in a war in which Great Britain or the United States will be engaged from where are we going to get equipment to-morrow? From whom else do we want to get equipment? Do we not fully realise that there is no place to which we can turn if our country is endangered in a future war for equipment for our Army other than to Great Britain and to the United States? Is there any reason why we should not admit that that is so? If we cannot agree that that is so can we be told of any equipment we would be likely to acquire from countries other than those? Can we be told what those countries are?

One of the realities of the situation to which we must face up is the fact that in any defence problem of the future our equipment can only come from Great Britain and the United States. If we were threatened by any war to whom should we turn for protection? We declared by unanimous resolution by the Dáil some months ago that we were desirous of taking our place in the United Nations Organisation in order to contribute to the progressive, humane and peaceful purposes for which that organisation was set up. We declared our readiness to accept the terms of Article 43. There are three paragraphs in Article 43:—

"(1) All members of the United Nations in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

(3) The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and members or between the Security Council and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional process."

We agreed in our declaration made here to accept responsibility under that. The responsibilities we can accept are limited. They are limited to the resources of this country—the material resources of the country, the economic resources of the country, and the man-power resources of the country.

I say that we here in this Estimate are providing the world with an exaggerated idea of the extent to which we can give co-operation to other countries in fighting world wars. There is very little assistance that we can give. Our desire to join the United Nations Organisation is impelled largely because of the fact that we know we cannot afford to fight wars. Other countries have learned something of that, too.

We cannot afford to be fighting wars; we cannot afford to have the impact of world or other wars upon us. Why we cannot afford it is because our economy cannot bear it. We depend on co-operation, economically, with the rest of the world if we are to make the best use of our own resources and help them to make the best use of theirs. We are concerned primarily with our economic strength. We have no defensive strength if we have not a sound economic strength.

The contribution that we are prepared to make to the United Nations Organisation is an intelligent approach to world affairs, an intelligent approach to economy, to education and to the spiritual forces affecting the world as a whole. Our hope is that by being permitted to make our contribution in that direction we will do something to make the United Nations Organisation a place where the spirit will be such that they can permanently secure peace. If they cannot, then we are committed to giving assistance of a military kind, but it must be small, it must be limited.

If we are concerned with the defence of this country it must be very localised. Our defence problem is a localised one. We are lucky in our situation and we are lucky that in a war of such a devastating kind as we have just passed through the nations we are most closely connected with, geographically and economically, showed that they were very powerful protective influences to the east and west of us. We have every reason to wait and see what will be the outlook of Great Britain in its own regional defence before we spend money in a period that ought to be a waiting period. We have the great States of the world sitting down with longdrawn-out patience and great persistency of purpose to bring peace and harmony among themselves, to stand over the securing and the development of world peace.

We can very well wait before we start to build up an expensive Army here. Surely we have some hope that the negotiations between the four Great Powers will bring us a long period of peace. From the point of view of history it may be short, but from our point of view, living here and settling various plans for our economic, social and educational betterment in the next ten or 20 years, the period of peace that we can hope for from their work can be a long period and we ought not at this particular hour take money which is so badly wanted to energise our people and encourage them to develop and strengthen their economy, to improve our educational machinery and to better our social conditions. We ought not to spend that money this way, taking thousands of our young men to bring them unnecessarily into an Irish Army that cannot know what its organisation will be, that cannot know what its equipment should be and that cannot know what its training ought to be.

The Government are treating the Dáil almost in an insulting way with the kind of explanations that they offer, and that they expect the Dáil to receive, as to why we are building up this large Army. We want an Army here that will be army-minded, but the mind must be the biggest part of it, because it is study and examination and training in the higher branches of Army outlook that are wanted to-day. The people have had enough groundwork and the young men have had enough groundwork for the past six or seven years to be able to feel quite secure, for the next five years at least, that everything about groundwork is known.

During the last war we could not have defended ourselves against a substantial air raid, and particularly against a substantial aerial bombardment of the kind other nations suffered towards the end of the war when new weapons were developed. We had not sufficient equipment to resist. Does the Minister suggest that he is training and equipping the Army to resist aerial bombardment by aeroplanes or rockets or even to protect the people on the ground against it? Surely he cannot suggest that he is training a navy to resist invasion from the sea?

It is very important that over every aspect of this expenditure there should be a definite question posed by the Minister, and the questions he feels the military mind in 1947 should put against these possibilities ought to be plainly put and answered and the public ought to have the benefit of knowing about them. I feel that at the present moment the Department of Defence has become somewhat like the Department of Education in that some people have gone into a back room or an underground cellar and they expect us to take just their figures and their short statement that we must have an Army to defend this country as eternal distilled wisdom and we are not to question it.

The economic condition of the country, and the financial training, employment and social problems that are likely to face us within the next 12 months, will awaken us to realities and will make us see that all this thing is just pure rubbish and nonsense. It is a kind of carry-over from days when we had nothing to do but march and review and drill and train and hold organisation meetings and meetings to appeal for recruits. The preparation for the defence of to-morrow, if there is to be such a defence, is a very different thing and, in spite of the amount of the bill offered here to the people, they have no conviction that the slightest scrap of preparatory effort has been made. The fact that the Minister says he has had no consultations with Great Britain and the United States about defence problems is an indication to the people that all the money that is being voted to-day is being wasted and, insofar as it represents new men being brought into the Army, it is more than wasted. It is throwing away money to push young men along a path of life that will bring no satisfaction to them in the present year, next year or the year after. We might just as well be carrying on a maintenance party of the people who were there to build up our emergency Army or who, having come in during our emergency, wished to remain in the Army.

We might very well get the highest officers of our Army thinking along entirely new lines because the defence problems that will have to be faced in the future will be entirely new problems for us. There is no use in thinking that we can meet our part of these problems with a £4,000,000 or a £5,000,000 Army which is developed simply on ground lines.

The Minister has been challenged with regard to our corvettes. I would ask the Minister to give us a picture of what one of these corvettes is going to do for the rest of the year and what it is going to cost in men and maintenance to keep that service going. A few weeks ago he might have read that at Rushbrooke in Cork a corvette was remodelled and re-equipped as a cargo boat. When we consider the amount of money that it is proposed to spend on the maintenance of these corvettes to-day, and think of our transport position at the moment, would it not be much more useful if these six corvettes were remodelled and refitted as cargo vessels for the next two or three years to carry cargoes even in a coastwise trade from one port to another or to be employed in the trade between here and Great Britain?

Again, Deputy Dr. O'Higgins or some other Deputy asked why we were spending money on air raid precautions to-day. I should like to ask the Minister whether he has caused any inquiry to be made into the effect of any of the aerial bombardments that took place in the last year or two in the last war or whether any of the work that was done here as air raid precautions during the war, or any that is likely to be done in future, will be of any use against a bombardment of that particular kind. If we are not going to have a bombardment this year, next year or the year after, why should we spend all this money on air raid precautions during that period? The whole basis of the Estimate is simply a make-believe, a lazy carry-over from the past.

It is certainly time that our experience in the past should be examined in a spirit of realism just as the problems in the future should be considered in the same spirit. If we approach the matter in that way, the House will cut down substantially any Defence Estimates that are likely to be put before us for the next three years, because we shall impress on the military authorities our desire that high-class military thinking should be done at the top and the fact that that has to be done in relation to the thinking that is being done in Great Britain on the one hand, and in Canada on the other. We cannot do proper thinking without contact with men of experience, with men of responsibility. We have people closely knitted to us in our defence problem, which is the problem of the security of the North Atlantic, and if we do not realise the lines on which they are thinking we are simply going to act irresponsibly like children. The position here economically is a very serious one and we should not spend enormous sums of money on an Army, with all the implications that that connotes, while the foundations of our defence require very badly to be strengthened. This is a matter which will appear much more clearly before we are many years older.

Major de Valera

This Estimate every year evokes the same type of debate from the Opposition. It probably does so because it is easy to argue superficially that it is a Vote on which money can be saved. This Vote is in the nature of insurance and it is easy to argue, when the risk is not immediately imminent, that the premium should be reduced. For that reason, the Estimate for Defence should get more careful and detailed examination than is usually given it. I should like to see it approached from the standpoint from which Deputy Giles approached it. I do not agree with everything he said about defence but I do think he approached the matter without having at the back of his mind the opportunity of making political capital or of scoring points for his Party out of the Defence Estimates. I think that is the way in which it should be approached. We have to take an Estimate like this quietly and to realise that if there is money involved, it is in the nature of insurance. It is much too easy for gentlemen in the opposite benches to turn round and say that money should be saved. As a sort of catch-cry, we had a reference to toys with the implication that the Minister and the Government are squandering money on defence to satisfy their own whims. Deputies on the Fine Gael benches should be aware that it is constantly a problem for any Government in office to find moneys to finance essential services. The problem confronting any Minister in his administration, and the Minister for Finance in particular, is the problem of finding money. The tendency and the reaction of any Government naturally is to be tight about spending money rather than to be liberal with it. In questions of defence, as the whole history of the Defence Estimates prior to the last war shows, the tendency was not to spend enough on that essential insurance.

I should like, incidentally, to refute the suggestion made that these matters were approached without due examination. I can tell the Deputy that these matters were very carefully examined, but I make the point merely as an aside.

The fundamental thing in this is that, as a result of our experience in the past, it has been considered necessary to increase the Defence Vote as indicated here. The reasons have been given over and over again, but I propose to go over them though I know that I am doing nothing more than indulging in repetition, because what I am about to say has already been said. I asked a question in the course of a number of debates on this subject previously and apparently answers have been made to that question to-day. The fundamental point here, before you can approach anything in regard to defence, is: do you want a defence force here or do you want a police force? Deputy Coogan says that it is an auxiliary police force we want. I think he is wrong in that. Although I understood Deputy O'Higgins to say it in the course of his speech, in reply to a question at the end, he did say that he wanted an expandable cadre as well.

I shall take Deputy Coogan's view first. If you say you want only an auxiliary police force here, a force in aid of the civil power, I say: "Very well; that will be very much cheaper. You merely want rifles and light automatics,, and maybe a few mortars". It will be very much cheaper. You must organise it in a totally different way from the way in which an Army is organised and a strength of a couple of thousand should be sufficient. But if you make that decision, you must make it with your eyes open to the following likely happenings in case of war. This island has a certain geographical location, and in major wars heretofore and particularly so in the last war, it was a unit which must be defended. In the case of major operations, your defence will then have to be provided for outside. It will probably, and, I should say, almost of a certainty, necessitate the garrisoning of this island by troops who are not your own and that garrisoning must take place at the very commencement of these operations and any chance you have of maintaining neutrality goes.

You must weigh these things up if you decide on a police force. It will be cheaper, as I say, and you will save money on the actual Vote, but you are inevitably letting yourself in for the circumstances I have outlined, and in addition, we know as a matter of common fact that, even in the pre-operational stages, you will be involved in matters, such as the movement of troops or supplies, in an economic situation, that will have the effect of making the people of this country pay for the defence which somebody else will have to supply for them. In other words, as a nation—you may say that we are very small—and as a unit of territory, when you are involved in a defence problem, you are going to have to pay for it in one way or another. If you choose your police force, you will pay generally in the way I have outlined.

Looking at the matter in that way, the previous Government came to the conclusion that a defence force, in the sense of an Army, should be maintained here and I think they considered—it was up to them to consider—whether there would be merely a police force or a defence force here. I do not know on what basis they arrived at their conclusion, but I am sure that arguments of that nature affected them. It means this, of course, that there must be certain garrison troops here in time of war. If you are going to be involved in operations, or if operations come close to you, that garrison can be regarded more or less as an outpost and the first idea of our defence should be to be able to provide that garrison, and, so to speak, outlying piquet. That, as I think I indicated in a previous debate, was the general line of argument. I said it was justified and I still say it was justified in the event.

I quite agree with those Deputies who say—though I suggest that some of them have thrown it out as a smoke-screen and that it is not a fair representation of what people have said when arguing in favour of an Army here—that the matter of absolute defence for a country of this size is out of the question. Of course, it is. Nobody seriously suggests that, even if we were to man and equip completely every male in this country, the question of absolute defence under modern conditions can arise. That is not the suggestion. The point is that if you have your own Army, able to garrison the country here, that is for local security purposes in time of war, if you have that force sufficient to form an outlying piquet, and ready to repel reconnaissances—they may be only light and your capacity quite small but sufficient to deal with such things as preliminary reconnaissances and to take the first shock of operations when you are immediately involved, even though you last only one hour—that Army will have the effect of enabling you to determine more freely your mode of conduct and your policy in pre-operational periods and of enabling you to account for your own territory without occupation by foreign troops during the pre-operational period.

I said in another debate, and I say it again designedly, that if it had not been for the Army we had in 1940 another Power would, out of self-defence, have had to occupy this country, on the mere question of local security. The fact that our troops were there, able to perform that function and, so to speak, to hold that piece of territory which was not immediately involved, contributed to our neutrality and probably was the most effective way of preserving it in any event. It is considerations of that nature which must rule in deciding on the Army which you are to have here and not fanciful ideas about absolute defence, which, in fact, I can say have never been entertained by the people responsible for making decisions or for making recommendations to the Minister in this matter.

It is absolutely essential that we get clear in our minds what is the purpose of our Defence Force. Whether you are to be involved in actual operations and other implications are all matters for a later stage. I prefer to face the question of defence on that basis of garrisoning your own territory and forming that outlying piquet, so to speak, so as to account for a pre-operational period. I prefer that view because it is completely adequate for any further developments, particularly if you have regard to developments in other armies and in other States, and because it enables you to so organise your forces that your Army is capable of being an effective unit in a bigger organisation, if necessary. But these, as I say, are all later considerations and it is sufficient for the purpose of this Vote to approach it from the point of view which I have indicated.

I know that I have been repeating myself but it is absolutely essential to get that point clear because otherwise one is talking very much in the air on the question of defence. But once you have taken up the stand (a) that you want a police force only, or (b), that you require a defence force in the sense that I have indicated, then you must face up to the implications of your decision and it is the people who fail to face up to the implications of that decision who would be guilty of playing, rather than anybody else.

I have dealt with the implications of the first decision. Now I shall deal with the implications of the decision that you are going to have an Army. Well, the first has nothing to do with any abstruse military principles. It is simply the ordinary business principle that if you do not spend enough and if you do not build up the Army sufficiently to be worth while for the purpose for which you have it, then do not have it at all. What is the sense or what would be the sense of, say, spending half the money that is proposed in this Estimate with the effect that it goes down the drain because you are not achieving anything?

What is the use of doing that? Is it not better to spend a sum that will be sufficient to meet the purpose for which you need your defence force or not to spend it at all? In other words, pay a premium that will support the policy or do not waste your money. Now, where are we on that in regard to the Army?

Before I go to that I want to comment upon the question that, I think, General Mulcahy mentioned, the question of ground forces. Notwithstanding modern developments in the air or with long-distance weapons, there will always be a necessity for the occupation of actual territory, and in regard to the rôle of our defence force, as I have outlined it, our ground forces must come into the picture, just as during the last war in all theatres the percentage of troops on the ground was very large. But that is an aside.

On the question of what we should spend—we know that before the war we believed, against the views of our own military officers, that a defence force of, say, about 5,000 should be sufficient and that, on a force of that size, you could build a reserve and expand an emergency army to meet a war situation. But what did we find in actual fact? We found that that was not so. Under exceptionally fortunate circumstances, we were able to get six months' grace and incorporate a large portion of our reserve in our standing Army, in our permanent force, before the need arose for an emergency army here. Even then the job of building up an army, which never amounted to more than two divisions, was almost beyond the capacity of the force in existence at the beginning of March, 1940. I would like Deputies to take that as a definite, reasoned, careful statement on my part. I make it with personal knowledge. The Army that we expanded on in 1940 was nearer 10,000 than 5,000, and it was barely done. If the 1940 emergency had hit us in 1939 we probably would not have been able to effect the expansion. Now there is, I am sure, one of the reasons why the Minister found it necessary to increase the size of the peacetime Army.

I have given on the last Temporary Defence Forces Bill reasons in support of these statements. I do not propose to repeat them now. Any Deputy who is interested can find them there. But the fact was that the old pre-1940 Army was found to be inadequate, that we survived the crisis of 1940 providentially, through the accident that there was a phoney war period from September, 1939 until 1940. I would like Deputies to consider that on the question of strength and also that the strength ultimately arrived at was the minimum that I should imagine the staffs could recommend after a very careful examination. Everybody may be very well sure that there was nobody more anxious than the Government and the Minister for Finance, and even the Minister for Defence, to economise under this sub-head if it were at all possible and to economise to the greatest extent possible. But the limit comes, as I have indicated, when your economy is reduced to the point where it is an economy no longer but that the moneys you are spending are simply thrown down the drain because they cannot be effective for the purpose for which they are voted.

I think it would be well if Deputies considered things in that light. I will not deal with equipment now. That was also dealt with on another occasion.

General Mulcahy

The only thing that was said about it on the other occasion was that we did not know how to equip or what to equip with.

Major de Valera

What was said on the other occasion was this—that a general equipment programme—and the Deputy will understand what I mean by that——

General Mulcahy

No.

Major de Valera

I am using "equipment programme" in the sense of a general equipment programme for the future of the Defence Forces.

General Mulcahy

I am afraid, in 1947, I do not.

Major de Valera

A general equipment programme is premature in my opinion. I am expressing a personal opinion but, of course, certain items of the equipment which we have got, to which the Deputy refers, are still effective and in particular, as I mentioned on another occasion, ammunition for that equipment may have to be purchased now because there is risk that that particular ammunition may not be made——

General Mulcahy

Ever again.

Major de Valera

——in the future.

General Mulcahy

And what will we do when war comes?

Major de Valera

——and it is still effective. Take the 4.5 howitzer. The Deputy knows every bit as well as I do that a 4.5 howitzer is actually in a sense more suitable to this country than the weapon which replaces it and the 18-pounder in the British Army because of the nature of the terrain. Now that is a perfectly effective and useful military weapon, particularly useful in this country. It is not suitable or cannot compare with the 25-pounder gun-howitzer for desert warfare for instance, but it is a perfectly good weapon, and we have some of them and we would be well advised to stock ourselves with ammunition for them. However, that is a little bit beside the main discussion on this Vote.

General Mulcahy

I think it is very pointed. It means that the Deputy proposes we train with weapons that will never be made again, never be used again.

Major de Valera

I said no such thing but it is quite likely that they will continue to be effective for quite a while. They are extremely useful for training and will be replaced probably with only a weapon of a similar nature. While we have stocks of ammunition they remain effective and they carry us through an interim period——

General Mulcahy

——of peace.

Major de Valera

——with every likelihood of their being available for garrisons. The Deputy will remember, I am sure, as a member of the Defence Conference, that we got 60-pounder field-guns for coast defence that were antiquated for ground use because they were horse-drawn and so forth, but they fitted the bill very well for the other purpose. However, that is going into a sideline technicality and I have no desire to do that at all. I want to confine myself to this question which in a sense is a vital question: Why the size of the Army at the moment, which the Deputies on the other benches have raised? I say that that size after mature consideration is the minimum size that it is worth while having at all: that if we find we cannot have that for the limited defence purposes I have outlined then we shall have to face up to it that we cannot have an Army at all. But let us face up to it and ask do we want one or do we not. If we do we will have to pay for it, and then if we find we cannot pay for it, let us say so frankly and let us realise the implications of having no defence force at all, only an auxiliary police force.

The Vote has gone up. It has inevitably gone up in the circumstances of the increase in numbers. Deputies will also appreciate that the cost of maintaining a soldier has gone up, rates of pay have gone up, general expenses have gone up, as in other things, and that would be reflected in a Vote of this nature. The increase in this Vote is accounted for, firstly, by an increase in strength and secondly, by an increase in the actual costs, due to rise of pay and other things, which is more or less inevitable. The only way we can cut the Vote is to cut the size of the Army and I have given my reasons why I think the size of the Army, expensive and all as it is, should not be cut. If we do we will be throwing money down the drain and making the people pay for nothing.

Now a perusal of these Estimates will show that there is nothing extravagant at all in regard to such things as warlike stores. There is just that sum for ammunition. Well, there is no use in having the Army if you have not got for them warlike stores. I do not think I can add anything further to this debate, but again, to stress the principal matter: if you are going to have your defence make it worth while.

Mr. Cafferky

Does the Deputy think the allowances of the private soldier are sufficient, comparing them with those of the commanding officer?

Major de Valera

Everybody would like to pay the soldier more and more. The Deputy has not been at all accurate in his statements. I do not know whether the Deputy has ever been in an army——

Mr. Cafferky

No, Sir, and I have not the slightest intention.

Major de Valera

The Deputy is excusable on the basis of not knowing as much as he might.

Mr. Cafferky

I expect a great deal from you as a major.

Major de Valera

Every one of us would like to see private soldiers, workers, everybody, paid everything we could give. I want to remind the Deputy that increases actually were, I think, given—I have not had a chance of looking into my figures, but increases were given at one stage during the emergency when they were not given to officers. I am subject to correction on that. The second thing is that in any business, any organisation, remuneration goes with responsibility and the standard of technical knowledge required.

In an army you are merely reflecting what happens in every other part of the community. The skilled craftsman is paid more than the labourer. Actually the remuneration of people in the Army, considering the responsibility they have—non-commissioned officers and officers—is not extravagant. Take a captain who is a junior officer. A captain is responsible for, and was during the whole of the emergency, say, about 200 men. He had full responsibility for training them, feeding them; he had responsibility for stores—a big responsibility for stores for which he was surcharged if he defaulted. The total amount of money for which he was responsible as represented by these stores was very, very considerable and, in fact, an army captain had more administrative and financial responsibility than many a civil servant or official of a company in ordinary business who was paid very, very much more. I think that that statement is not in any way exaggerated. I can understand the Deputy making a case to pay the soldier more. We would all like to see the soldier paid more. We would all like to see every type of worker paid more. But there one is up against general economics and one cannot subscribe to the theory that everyone in the Army should be paid equally, if that is what the Deputy means.

Mr. Cafferky

You do not think I am so foolish.

Major de Valera

If you admit that, then you must examine your figures carefully. As a result of such examination you will find that there is not a very great disparity between them and the conditions you find in ordinary business and commercial life, or the general standards of other State services except that, compared with business and the State service, from the Chief of Staff down the Army is probably badly paid.

With regard to conditions in the Army I want to point out just one other mistake the Deputy makes. During the emergency everybody had to rough it and I can assure the Deputy that the officers roughed it just as much as the men. That was inevitable because of the expansion in 1940 and because of the actual conditions imposed by the emergency. But that cannot be taken as the background for the future. Prior to the war, the then Minister for Defence had made very substantial improvements. A new dining hall was erected in Portobello Barracks and plans were ready for other barracks. The old method of parading with mug and plate had been abolished and the troops were supplied with delf.

Mr. Cafferky

Was that during the emergency?

Major de Valera

It was not during the emergency. You could not do it during the emergency. It was an emergency. It was an emergency for the soldier as well as for everybody else. Every one of them roughed it in a wholly admirable way and every one of them took it in good part. From what I know of the plans for the Army of the future, every effort is being made to make living conditions for the private soldier more comfortable. I agree that it would be a good idea if it were possible to arrange the rations so as to make a later evening meal available. It must be remembered, however, that a lot depended on the officers in the old days. A number of officers were very successful in being able to save from the very liberal rations a soldier got at that time so as to provide a supper, and I never heard any complaint about the standard of the food. There may have been rough cooking.

Mr. Cafferky

With the Chair's permission, if the Deputy would walk down Dublin in disguise and go into a publichouse, where it would not be known that he was Major de Valera, and get talking to the ordinary soldier he would get it in detail.

Major de Valera

I was a private with them.

Mr. Cafferky

But you were the Taoiseach's son.

Major de Valera

I was a private with them and a non-commissioned officer with them for two years and I was with them under conditions which were a lot better than the Deputy thinks they were. Undoubtedly, during the emergency there was a lot of rough cooking. We had to take it rough. I inspected the rations myself—and I think Captain Giles will agree with me, or any other member of this House who was in the Army— and I know that the food supply for the troops was of the very best quality and very adequate in quantity. With regard to supper rations, very often a good commanding officer would manage to have something for his troops every night and many of them did.

Mr. Cafferky

With the permission of the Chair, I do not deny that the food was of good quality but I am speaking of the way in which it was cooked and presented.

Major de Valera

I have said that during the emergency in many places it was certainly rough and ready, but I wonder if the Deputy or anybody else cooking behind a hedge in open country, or in the middle of a bog, would do any better. In barracks in peace-time there should be no complaint especially if the scheme which the Minister and his predecessors were endeavouring to bring into operation is carried out. I see no cause for complaint there. As I say, the emergency was an emergency.

On the question of discipline, I merely want to say that an army is an army. Discipline is necessary and certain restrictions are necessary for all ranks. It is a matter of human psychology.

Captain Giles very fairly faced the most important issue before the House when he said that this matter of defence is of fundamental importance. It is something with which we cannot play. It is easy to involve oneself in liabilities to-morrow by playing for a point at the moment. It is much too easy. It is much too easy to say that we will not spend any money now and piously hope that we can mend our hands when a crisis comes. The lessons of 1939 and 1940 have taught us that we cannot do that. A figure of 5,000 has been mentioned and that figure has been harped on. That figure may have been justified before the war but we know in the light of our experience now that double that figure would hardly be adequate in the future.

Mr. Cafferky

Then the Government owes an apology to the Opposition.

Major de Valera

The Deputy is now playing politics again. Is there any use in our trying to face a matter fairly and squarely if that effort is going to be made an opportunity for gaining a political point? That is what it comes to in the end. Why can the Deputy not take the same approach as Captain Giles? I can argue with Captain Giles but I cannot argue with you. Every Deputy must examine this matter for himself. There are debatable points in it. If it is a question of a minimum force or none at all, our approach must be realistic. If none at all, then we will be involved in those problems which I mentioned at the outset.

Mr. Cogan

I agree with Deputy Mulcahy and the other speakers who approached this on national rather than on Party lines. National defence is of such importance that it is not in accordance with the interests or the dignity of the nation that questions of defence should be made Party issues. We have before us a clear-cut definite issue as to whether or not we are justified in increasing our Army to two and a half times its pre-war strength and increasing our expenditure on defence likewise. I hold that no adequate case has been made for this enormous expenditure. Deputy de Valera has laboured the case and endeavoured to show that this is an insurance premium and that, if we fail to pay it, we may suffer grave losses in the future. But before one insures against any risk one must satisfy oneself as to the nature of that risk and Deputy de Valera has not been able to indicate the nature of the risk we are facing.

He talked about the position this country would be in if we had not an Army sufficient to garrison it on the outbreak of a war. He seemed to be talking in theory and not in accordance with the realities. He seemed to be discussing the matter as if this country was not an island but part of a mainland upon which there were a number of rival military nations. If we were part of such a mainland his argument might have carried some weight, but this country is an island and we have no land frontier with any nation except Great Britain and before we consider the question of defence we have to consider the possibility of aggression from England. To consider defence in theory alone without trying to weigh up what is likely to happen in the next war is, in my opinion, futile. The likelihood of the British army advancing from the Six Counties into our territory in the event of a world war is remote. It did not happen in the last war and it is less likely to happen in the next.

But the greatest mistake which I think Deputy de Valera made was his attempt to fight the next war on the history of the last one. He talked about what might have happened if there had not been a "phoney" war for the first six months. Can anyone seriously tell this House that the next war will last for six months, or even for six weeks? Have we any guarantee that the next war will not be finished inside six minutes? With the implements of war which have been perfected and with the instruments that may be perfected within the next five or ten years, if such a period is given, there is hardly any possibility that the next war will last for any considerable period. It may be, for all we know, that all the inhabitants of this country or of whatever other country is attacked will know is that there is just a blinding flash and the whole thing will be finished.

Deputies realise how much everything in connection with defence is, so to speak, in the air, and those who take an independent view on these matters and who are not committed by Party allegiance to the Government policy, feel that it would be wiser to go slowly and think carefully before we throw one or two million pounds unnecessarily into the Government's policy of defence and, not alone throw that amount into that policy, but draft into the defence forces men who might be more usefully employed in the ordinary economic life of the nation.

Deputy de Valera more or less admitted the weakness of his case when he said that an equipment programme at the present time is premature. If you do not know how an army should be equipped, it is very hard to know what kind of Army you will have and what its size will be. If you do not know the nature of the equipment it is very hard to decide how much of your defence policy will be involved in an air force, how much in a navy, how much in a mechanised force or how much in relation to the ordinary infantry. Therefore, until you settle some general policy in regard to equipment you cannot decide with any certainty what the size of the Army should be. One Deputy's guess in that connection is as good as another's.

It would be helpful and desirable if, having regard to world conditions, having regard to what is likely to happen in the event of war taking place in the next five or ten years, and having regard to the nations likely to be parties in such a war, there were consultations between the higher officers of our Army and those of the armies of Great Britain and the United States. That would be a prudent step, a step which might save our people from wasting a considerable amount of money developing theories of defence which have no basis whatever in reality.

The Minister rather sought to disarm criticism of the Defence Forces by pointing out that the Army had other useful functions in addition to defence. He said that the Army had assisted in the harvest campaign last year and assisted very materially in restoring communications during the recent blizzard. I entirely appreciate the services which the Army rendered in that way, but one does not keep an army merely for the contribution which it may be able to make in economic emergencies. Since the matter has been raised, I should like to say, as a farmer, that farmers are deeply grateful to the Army for the services they rendered during the harvest campaign. Farmers generally with whom they came in contact paid a very high tribute to the personnel of the Army who were engaged in the work of assisting in the harvest. The soldiers proved in the harvest field that they were not only men of fine physique but also willing and efficient workers. It is only right that the feeling which has been voiced by so many farmers throughout the country should also be expressed in this House.

Deputy Cafferky made a statement which I think he did not intend should be taken at its face value and which, I am sure, he would like to have corrected. He said that the Army of to-day is not composed of corner-boys and ruffians as was the Army of 25 years ago. I am sure he was not referring to our Army of 25 years ago when he made that statement. He may have been referring to armies in general in other countries. So far as our Army is concerned, from its very inception it has been composed mainly of men of the very highest character, of men of high standing in the community.

I think the Army of 25 years ago, as far as personnel was concerned, compared not unfavourably with the Army of to-day, which is, of course, also of a high standard. I am glad that a high standard has been fixed for recruits who are to be taken into the Army but I think that before men of good character, good physique and good education are taken into the Army from civil occupations, there should be a clear-cut decision as to what our defence policy is and upon what lines it is intended to pursue that policy.

It was a matter of interest, I think, to all Deputies, a matter which caused, I think, some uneasiness, that so many applicants for the Army had to be rejected. Over 500 men who applied were rejected on educational grounds alone. That does not seem to reflect highly on our system of education. I do not think that a very high standard of education is demanded by the Army and one would expect that a man who is physically and mentally eligible, should be able to pass the educational standard. Yet we have a very high percentage of those who presented themselves rejected, on educational grounds. The fact that a fairly large percentage was rejected on physical grounds is also a matter of grave concern. The Minister mentioned that 700 were rejected on other grounds. I should like if the Minister, in replying, would explain what the other grounds were. If it merely meant that a number of applicants were under age or over age I could understand it, but it is difficult to envisage such a large percentage being rejected on grounds other than educational or physical qualifications.

The Minister did not refer to the Construction Corps, which is included in this Vote, but I think there is some provision for a larger expenditure under this heading. It would be well if the Minister would let us know what his hopes are in regard to that force and whether or not he thinks it has any future. It appears that if the force is to justify itself it must be a Construction Corps; that is to say, it must construct something, it must do some useful work and leave some useful work behind it. Not alone must it train men but the proof of its success must be its ability to produce. Whether by the improvement of land, by the provision of fuel, or whatever type of work the men are engaged in, they must leave some definite work behind them. Otherwise the men themselves will feel that they have been engaged in a futile occupation and the nation will feel that the expenditure involved has been wasted. The allowance provided for the men is very small and it would seem to indicate that the Minister has a very low estimate of the quality of the men who are going to be taken into this force or of their ability to do useful work. I am not sure whether a Construction Corps associated with the Army affords the best type of training for the men or whether it would not be better to have the force completely under civilian control. I should like to hear the Minister, when he is replying, tell us what his plans are in regard to the future of that force. If he sees no future for it, it is futile to go on spending money on it. If it has a future, I think the men who make up its membership are entitled to more than 2/- per day having regard to the present value of money.

Mr. Blowick

I think that the House approached this Vote with two considerations in mind. One was the question of the maintenance of an army, air and sea force with a view to the defence of this nation; and the other was that, at least in peace time, when an emergency or aggression does not confront us, we must take into account the capacity of the people to bear the expense of this defence. Just before the last European war broke out a very strong appeal was made to young men to join the Defence Forces, not alone the Army itself but the L.D.F. and the L.S.F., and I must say that the response was magnificent. This nation showed very clearly that, even though it was a small nation and even though outside nations might feel that they had a certain responsibility to defend us territorially, we were determined to defend our own position to the last, even though we might be ill-equipped and they knew we were ill-equipped.

I have no doubt whatever that if any nation—England, Germany, America or any other nation—attempted to invade this country during that period, they would have got a very hot reception, and our thanks should go out to those who joined the Army at that time. Some Deputies spoke of men joining the Army out of a spirit of adventure. That might be true of some, but it was not true of the great majority of men who joined the various Defence Forces. Many of them were plain country boys who joined the L.S.F. and the Army for the purpose of defending what we had got, determined to hold what we had, to put up a fight and to show anybody who came in from outside that it was not going to be a walk-over.

We have returned now to peace and, regardless of recent speeches by President Truman and counter-speeches by Molotov and Stalin, I do not think we are very near a world flare-up, or at least a world flare-up that will threaten us. I have no experience as a soldier, and, as a matter of fact, very few Deputies have experience of defence matters. There are not two Deputies in the House capable of speaking from the purely military point of view, but I hold that asking at this stage for an amount of £4,500,000 for the Army is going a little too far. What I should like to see—I do not want to be misunderstood or misrepresented later—is a small, very well-trained and well-equipped nucleus of an army, a nucleus trained and designed specially for expansion, and rapid expansion, in case of any attempt on our territory in the event of a future war; but, in face of the present situation in the country, I do not at all agree that we are justified in spending £4,000,000 on an army.

The Minister during the war years, before I came into the House, asked for as much as £11,000,000 for defence. That money was granted without a murmur and if he had asked for twice that amount, it would also have been granted without a murmur. If an emergency situation arose again, requiring very heavy expenditure for defence purposes, I have no hesitation in saying that any Government sitting on those benches, no matter from what Party it was formed, would meet with a very ready response from the people with regard to men and money for defence. But the time has come when we must clip expenditure. I speak not as an expert, but as one who knows very little of the working, the cost or the equipping of an army, but I hold that a sum of £2,000,000 should be enough at present for the type of army I have described. We do not want to carry an enormous Army in years of peace. There is absolutely no threat and no danger of a threat to our territory, and, even if there were, we have all the equipment which was available during the emergency and we also have available a great number of men who are fully trained and who would step in. For that reason, there is no need to ask at this stage for £4,500,000.

I want to make it perfectly clear that I do not want to see the country left completely without an Army. I do not agree with some of the speakers who spoke about an armed police force because that is pure humbug. An armed police force to meet a future emergency or threat would make this country a laughing-stock in the eyes of the world and particularly in the eyes of any nation with any designs upon us.

I am sure, however, that it is quite within the bounds of possibility and quite within the scope of the experts in the Department to devise some kind of small force which could be trained and equipped and made capable of rapid expansion and of absorbing men already trained who have been disbanded. We have, in addition, the F.C.A. which would give a very good account of itself and which could step readily from civilian life into Army life with very little training and brushing up.

Now that peace has returned, the very least we can do for the taxpayer who responded so magnificently when we were compelled, through no fault of our own, to make heavy demands upon him, is to cut down these demands as much as possible, always taking into account the country's safety and always looking into the future in an effort to see what shape future war or future attack will take. We have heard various references to future wars not lasting six hours or six minutes and we have been told about the atomic bomb. We must take all these things into account. No doubt, the advance of science is rapid and possibly the speed of that advance will increase, so that nobody living now can visualise what form a war may take in ten, 15 or 20 years' time.

I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that we could save £2,500,000 of this sum of £4,500,000 and that the money could be devoted to other useful work, the necessity for which has been argued from time to time. I am deliberately referring to drainage and I intend to make only that reference to it. We refrained from pressing or embarrassing the Government during the emergency, when we were living in extraordinary conditions, and when the Government's hands were pretty full, but the war has now been over for some 15 or 18 months and we should take stock afresh of the whole situation.

To keep the Army up to wartime standards, or close to wartime standards, is not sound national policy. It may be argued that to do otherwise would be to put a few thousand men out of the Army. They can be put into much more productive employment, with the saving in cost which would be effected, and very useful productive work, which is a crying need at the moment, would be accomplished.

The Minister said that we have three corvettes. I should like to see more money being spent under this subhead, because the failure of our Navy in the past, the Muirchu, to deal with the depredations of foreign trawlers has been forcibly brought home to us. These French trawlers came to within a few hundred yards of our coast, raiding the finest fishing beds along the west coast and behaving as if the place belonged to them. The Guards were quite willing to co-operate, but there was nothing on the sea to chase them, and if a few more of these craft were got I, for one, would not raise my voice in protest. We are an island nation and should be as sea-minded as any other nation with as much coastline as we have. I would not object to a little more being spent under this heading if some of the Army expenditure was clipped. A sum of £338,469 is provided for sea defence, but more should be provided, because our fisheries, a valuable industry, were absolutely plundered during the war years, and before, by reason of the lack of adequate craft to chase the trawlers and bring them to justice. Now and again, there were prosecutions, but they were worthless. The trawler's tackle was usually confiscated, but they could afford it because the harvest was rich and they were back again in a couple of weeks after punishment was inflicted on them.

From time to time men who have been in the Army have complained to me about the preference they are supposed to get in the matter of employment and the means of obtaining a livelihood in civilian life. I ask the Minister to give sympathetic consideration to any of these cases I bring to his notice, because some of them have not been dealt with fairly, or it appears to me from the evidence I have got that they have not been fairly dealt with by Departments other than the Minister's. I would ask the Minister, in the event of my bringing any of these cases to his notice, to take up the individual cases with the Ministers concerned. These men feel very aggrieved. They have given three, four or five years' service, as the case may be; they have run the risk in case of war of losing their lives. They would have given their lives cheerfully to defend the country. Now they feel they have been turned down, that the Government used them for the time and have now thrown them aside. While some of the complaints I have received may have been exaggerated, I am quite sure that others were well-founded. It does not matter what political affiliations they may have, since they have left the Army, they should all get a fair crack of the whip, in recognition of their service.

Mr. Commons

I have listened patiently to Deputies from both sides of this House, chiefly from the Opposition, giving their views for or against the expenditure of the £4,500,000 asked for in the Estimate for the Army and for the defence of this country for the coming year. It has been said, and said rightly, that the real question is, should we or should we not have an Army? If we mean to have an Army of any value in modern warfare, £4,500,000 is not sufficient. It would require £40,000,000 or £50,000,000 or maybe £60,000,000. In fact, we would want to put a rifle or some weapon into the hands of every man of military age in the Twenty-Six Counties in order to constitute ourselves a force that would be felt if a conflict should arise in the world again.

On the other hand, if we are to do without an Army or if we are to cut the Army down to the minimum and to keep the expenditure on the Army at a figure that the country can afford, £1,000,000 or £1,500,000 should be sufficient to train a small standing Army which would be held in readiness, capable of expansion in the event of emergency. The question of the strength of the Army must be reduced to this: How much can the people pay, how much can the taxpayer afford? Is it more important to spend £4,500,000 on an Army or to spend £3,000,000 of that on something that would create profitable employment, that would keep our people at home, and that would make a contribution to the national pool of production? That is what counts.

We were fortunate to escape involvement in the last world conflict. That escape was attributed in the country to the statesmanship of the Government. When the war was over we were told in this House that it was by the good-will of Mr. Churchill and the late President Roosevelt. No matter how it was brought about, we were fortunate in being kept out of it. The question arises: Should we keep on spending money on an Army which, if war were to come to our shores, would be of very little use and which would be absolutely insignificant compared with the armies in the world? Consider modern weapons. Consider the effect of the first atomic bomb that was dropped on the City of Hiroshima. I remember listening to the radio announcement of that occurrence. It simply said: "An atomic bomb was dropped on the City of Hiroshima, which disappeared in a cloud of dust." If the time should come when we would have to fight against atomic bombs, of what use would our little Army, with its rifles, bayonets, trench mortars, howitzers, tanks and lorries be then? What good are we against the forces of modern warfare?

I know it is a difficult problem for the Minister or for anybody else to know what to do. If we align ourselves with our nearest neighbour, there will be an outcry from the people and we will be immediately involved in war. Yet, we have made application for admission to the United Nations Organisation. If that organisation had accepted us, we would have been committed immediately, according to the terms of admission, to supply men and weapons and to involve ourselves in the next war whether we liked it or not. So far, we do not really know where we are. We do not know what emergency may arise or what the world position is or what state the mighty nations of the world are in at the present time with regard to war.

I have been sent to this House to represent a majority of the people in my constituency—not to satisfy the Minister or the Opposition or anybody else, but to satisfy those who sent me—and they definitely do not want this expenditure on an army. Therefore, I find myself immediately on the side of those who are opposed to the expenditure of £4,500,000 of the taxpayers' money on what has been described as this "most expensive play-thing."

We have good soldiers. Nobody can deny that the infantry man in this country is as good, if not better, in his own way, than any man of his type in the world. We have only to remember the number of Victoria Crosses and other honours awarded to Irishmen in the English Army and in the American Army to realise that our position as fighters is as good as ever it was. There is no doubt that if we had been invaded, our men would have given a perfect account of themselves.

Take the issue of rifles that was made to the L.D.F. with 60 or up to 100 rounds per man. Of what value was that? That could be fired in a single day. Where were we going to get ammunition? We were entirely at the mercy of our neighbour, Great Britain, and of the United States, from whom we had to buy ammunition and everything else for our guns. Therefore, I think that at least £2,500,000 of the money being spent on the Army could be devoted to much more profitable work—work that would be of much more value to this little island, that would satisfy the people of this country, and that would give some of the finest of our soldiers a living at home.

We will soon reach the stage, at the present rate of the flight from this country, when there will be very few people left who will be fit to be taken into the Army. We see that 30 per cent. of those who applied have been rejected. They, I dare say, would go to England if they could get permission to get out. In my own constituency four-fifths of the able-bodied men who are unemployed are waiting to see if they can get permits to go down in the pits or something else. I ask the Minister, if an emergency were declared again to-morrow, if those men, seeing no future before them, would enlist in the Army and fight for this country knowing that after their efforts, in spite of their sacrifices, there would be no alternative but to stand outside a labour exchange and queue up for the few shillings dole?

No, Sir. The real defence of this country is fading slowly but surely away because unless we have man-power to carry our equipment and our guns around and to build up our Army we will not get very far in the establishment of an Army whether it be big or small. With the drift of the man-power, the finest of our soldiers, from this little island, I think that the expenditure of this money is simply and solely nothing other than a pretension on the part of the Government—an effort to keep in the people's mind the idea that there may be a war at some time in the future and to use it to the advantage that they have used the war for the past two or three elections, i.e., to get themselves returned again to power.

We are to have six corvettes to defend our island. Well, now, that is amusing. When the war was on we had no corvette at all. We had only the Muirchu steaming around, slowly, being laughed at by every aeroplane that flew overhead and being sneered at by every submarine that stuck its periscope over the water. But that was not our fault. We could not afford to have anything more and we cannot afford these six corvettes. I would be in full agreement with the purchase of these six corvettes if they were to be used to chase trawlers from stealing our fish. But they will not. They are simply and solely for our coastal defence. When we think of the very short tussle there would be between a corvette manned by good, brave, daring sailors and a submarine that might decide to take it on in a conflict we must realise the weakness of our coastal defence.

If we could get somebody to give us at a reasonable price six battleships, those of the calibre of the Graf Spee, or something like that, then I would say we would have a sort of defence that would be able at least to give as good as they would get, but the people cannot pay for those corvettes or pay for anything of that sort. Five hundred and three men! When we think of the Hood that was sunk in about five minutes by one single shell from 14 miles range and brought down something like 1,400 men—I forget the exact figure but I think it was something in that region—surely it makes men wonder what chance our navy would have in the war in the future.

Therefore, I agree with the Opposition speakers who say that the spending of this money is pure waste. I am one of those who will agree that if we have an Army in this country we should have an Army graded down to its very minimum of men, well-trained, with very little distinction between officers and men, each of them with the common idea in his mind—each one of us has to turn round when the time comes and train a certain amount of the raw recruits that will come before us and mould them and make them into soldiers as the case may be. We should not model ourselves on, or ape, our next door neighbours, by having armies for ceremonial purposes.

We want some ceremony but I agree with the speaker in the Labour Benches who said he thought it funny that we should have a cavalry of men attending the President. We should stand very little on ceremony and things of that sort. Then we are told of the extras that are being given to soldiers. We are told of the new walking-out uniform that the soldiers are to get. We are told of the extra pay they are getting and we are told of a whole lot of other extra things that they are to get. Nobody can deny that the private soldier is entitled to at least a means of living, but I think, with regard to the walking-out uniforms and all that sort of thing, that there are plenty of hard-working taxpayers who are paying their contribution to this State who have very bad types of walking-out uniform.

Some of them have very bad suits of clothes; some of them have very bad pairs of shoes, and yet they have to turn round and pay this £4,500,000 to keep our Army marching on manoeurves, marching down to Cork and marching back again, marching down to Galway and marching back again, marching to the Curragh and marching back again when the world and everybody else knows—the Minister knows better than I do because it is his business—what would happen if suddenly we were involved in war and if 1,000 aeroplanes appeared over this country. How short a space of time this country could keep out an invader even if every single man who could carry a gun went out and died in defence of this little island which, I can assure the Minister, a lot would do. But with the present system that prevails, as he must admit and must know, a great many would not reach out and fight for the country.

The Government must realise the vast difference there is between an armed nation and a nation in arms. They are two entirely different things. If employment had been provided for those 250,000 that have gone in the past 12 years: if each man of those were at home and if he had a home to defend, if his house were his castle, he would go out and die outside his door—even with a rifle and a fixed bayonet—and then we should have a chance, then it would be worth while spending money on the Army, then this country would be worth defending because it could take care of its population and take care of its manhood and womanhood. There is an increase in everything but there is a decrease in the actual population which has to produce and provide everything. Napoleon said: "An army marches on its stomach." If our Army at the present moment had to march on its stomach it would not march very far on two ounces of butter and six ounces of bread a week.

Mr. Davin

Are you sure of that?

Mr. Commons

That is what we are told, anyhow. I think some of those millions that are being thrown about so freely on corvettes and walking-out uniforms could be turned to far better use. An American soldier was once asked his opinion of corvettes. He said: "I reckon the holes in the plates would keep out the larger type of fish all right". They are not very modern or very up-to-date vessels. The same applies to our aeroplanes. The aircraft and corvettes of to-day may be of very little use in 10, 20 or 50 years' time. What is the use of spending money on Army stores? What is the use of spending money on ammunition and guns? Deputy Mulcahy pointed out that we may be buying ammunition now which will be completely obsolete in the future—buying ammunition for guns which may never be made again. What is the use in wasting the taxpayers' money? We talked in the same way last year on the same Estimate but the spending of money has gone on. This money should be diverted to a more useful purpose such as drainage, afforestation or land reclamation. In the two years almost £10,000,000 has gone. At least part of that should have been spent on something more productive. This is a pretence and surely the time has come when the Government should face reality. Surely, the time has come when the Government should realise the condition of the country. One has only to walk down the streets of this city to see the appalling conditions in which people live. There is no work. There is no fuel. There is no food. It seems absurd to support an Army when one remembers that in the most modern warfare this country could be wiped out of existence in a day or two days at the very most.

Provision is made in this Estimate for the transport of troops. I cannot see the necessity for transporting troops here, there and everywhere all over the country. I cannot see why any increase is necessary under that sub-head.

Provision is made for medals. Nobody grudges a decoration to a man who deserves it. Our soldiers in the last 25 years have been very, very lucky and not one of them, except perhaps the unfortunate few injured in the Glen of Imaal, deserves or is entitled to a medal of any description. I suppose very few will get medals but a few thousand pounds are being provided for that purpose. All these small items added up make quite a big total. It must always be remembered that this is £4,500,000 of the people's money. It is not the Minister's money nor the Opposition's money. In my constituency at the moment the Fianna Fáil policy and everything connected with it is dead, buried and forgotten. The people in my constituency do not want to see £4,500,000 spent on an Army. I can assure the Minister of that. It may be necessary for us to have a skeleton Army. I believe myself that a skeleton Army will be sufficient. If we must have an Army costing £4,500,000 the only use to which it will be put will be the keeping down of riots and disorder arising out of unemployment, lack of fuel, lack of food, lack of housing and the thousand and one other problems with which the ordinary citizen is daily beset. Those problems might be solved if we had not to pay for this Army. It would appear now as if the Government's policy of piling on taxation is to continue in the future, but some day—I hope before very long—that policy will be stopped. The sooner it is stopped the better it will be for this country.

Mr. Flanagan

There is one very important point in which I am interested under this Vote. I would like to draw the Minister's attention to the alarming discontent that exists among those men who have left the Army. Judging from the volume of complaints I have received from ex-Army men in my constituency it would seem that they have been very harshly treated insofar as employment is concerned. The Minister was responsible for making the call which brought these young men into the Army. I think it is now equally his responsibility to see that some more sympathetic consideration is given to them in the matter of securing employment. The present position is deplorable. It is something of which any Government should be ashamed. It is something of which no Irishman could be proud. The Minister and the Government made an appeal to the young men of this country to come forward. They came forward and they gave their services gallantly and bravely when the country was in danger. These young men should be given every encouragement and every help to re-establish themselves in private life. I have known cases where applications from ex-Army men for employment were not even considered. Within the past week in my constituency an ex-Army man applied for a position as bailiff and failed to secure that position. I am sure the Minister knows there were not very many applicants for the position of bailiff. It is a job that has very great difficulties attaching to it. There was only one Army man in the district and he was well qualified and entitled to the job, but his application was turned down, despite the fact that he was promised every assistance from the Army authorities. This unfortunate man has now to seek a livelihood outside the shores of this country.

I should like to draw the Minister's attention to the fact that there are numerous appointments in his Department and I would like him to see that when vacancies arise applications from men who gave good service in the Army, for these posts, will get sympathetic consideration. Will he take the necessary steps to see that preferential treatment is given to such men? I have information from a very good authority which leads me to believe that quite recently a number of appointments were made in the Minister's Department and that certain persons who were in the employment of the Electricity Supply Board at £5 a week got these posts. It is very bad policy for the Government to take men from other employment, where they had good wages, and give them positions in the Department of Defence, when there are so many unemployed ex-Army men anxious to get some job which will establish them in life. It is most unfair, when men are in good employment elsewhere, to take them over and give them new positions. They should be left in that other employment and they should not be given jobs over the heads of more deserving men. In that instance I believe no consideration was given to men who gallantly served the country when the country needed them. Points of this nature are of very great importance to these men. If they had known they would get the treatment that they are now getting, they would have been very slow to offer their services in defence of the country.

A good deal was said by Deputy Commons and others on the subject of whether we should have an Army. The figure of £4,500,000 that this country is asked to provide for the upkeep of an Army is nothing short of lunacy. It is an outrageous and a fabulous sum. I cannot see what benefit the taxpayer will get from the Army. Even if the necessity arose to call up our troops, whom are they going to defend? I think there will be nobody left in the country if the Government policy continues to operate on present lines and the huge volume of emigration that proceeds day by day continues. It is a disgrace to ask the taxpayer to subscribe so very heavily to the upkeep of an Army that is used only for ceremonial purposes. A Deputy referred to the sight seen occasionally in the city when the President moves from place to place with his cavalcade of horsemen, with Army tanks and troops following him. All that is codology and nonsense. The taxpayer wants none of it. It is time the Government took stock of the speeches and promises they made in their early days of office. They told us they would do away with this rot and codology. It is too expensive to have an Army purely for ceremonial parades. We cannot afford it. It is foolish of the Minister to encourage such codology.

Provision is made here for the transport of troops. Where are the troops to go? It is foolish to provide money for this purpose. I have seen troops being moved in my constituency. Numbers of Army lorries passed with only one or two men sitting at the backs of the vehicles and about 50 soldiers followed on motor bicycles. They were using up petrol unnecessarily. If these men were anxious to be transported from place to place, why could they not use the lorries for that purpose? That is something that gives room for thought to the taxpayer, who has to foot the bill for all this waste.

I hope the Minister will give the applications of ex-Army men for jobs the sympathetic consideration they deserve. We will never need an Army in this country, I believe, and it is a downright waste of money to build one up. We could not possibly compete with any other army in the world. I cannot see what useful purpose an Army will serve. The money the House is asked to provide for the Army would be better spent if it were devoted to agriculture, to assist the people in increasing the nation's wealth. It is unfortunate that the Government has seen fit to continue this policy of squandermania in connection with the Army, while, at the same time, we have demands coming from more deserving quarters. The taxpayer is opposed to this Army expenditure. I believe that this huge demand is unnecessary and unjust at the present time.

Mr. Davin

I join with other Deputies who expressed the people's opinion that the sum asked for is far in excess of what should be demanded of this small State for the particular service under discussion. The defence policy of any Government claiming to be a democratic Government should, in existing world circumstances, be decided only after consultations with the representatives of all the other Parties in the House. I think that has been done by every other Government that operates under the Parliamentary system. It has been done in France, in Great Britain and in other countries and this Government, which in reality represents only 50 per cent. of the people although it has a majority in the House, should not have fixed any figure for the Defence Forces until they had consulted the representatives of other Parties.

The Government, in its wisdom, thought fit, during the recent war, to set up a Defence Advisory Conference. Before the Estimate was sanctioned, the members of that Defence Conference were consulted and, under the conditions under which it was set up, that body had to approve of the Estimate before it was finally submitted to the House for approval. I am not going to suggest, because it is the duty of the Government if it considers it wise to do so, that such a body should be set up again, but the Government might at least have consulted the other Parties in the House before deciding to demand such a high figure as is now submitted for approval.

Deputy Murphy reminded the House that the Taoiseach, when he was the Leader of the Opposition, on the 26th April, 1928, in the first speech he made in the House on a financial motion, ridiculed the proposal of the Government then in office for £1,500,000 for the Defence Forces of the country. He actually suggested in his speech on that occasion that the figure demanded at the time—£1,500,000—should be reduced by £500,000 and that the cost of the Army should not exceed £1,000,000. Even if we make allowance for the reduction in the purchasing power of money, the figure should not exceed £2,000,000 in present circumstances, and many people may suggest that even that figure would be excessive. I would much prefer to see the difference between £2,000,000 and £4,500,000 set aside by the Government for the purpose of propping up the basic industry of this country, or for the purpose of subsidising farmers, who are unable to do so themselves, to pay a decent rate of wages to agricultural labourers. The Government, of course, will claim that they and this House as a whole have committed themselves to an applicacation for the protection of the United Nations Organisation.

If it is the policy of the Government, after careful consideration, to join in a world organisation of that kind, whose aim is to protect its members who may be attacked in any future world war, surely there is not the same necessity now for maintaining an Army for the purposes of defence here as there was before deciding to join the United Nations Organisation? Our defence policy should be related to our international attitude on defence matters.

Apart from these remarks, I rise particularly to ask the Minister if he will be good enough to state the number of men who have been demobilised since the emergency and who have been furnished with certificates that they are medically unfit. I have come across a number of cases where individuals have made application for a pension or gratuity, whichever you like to call it, as a result of being demobilised under these conditions. Some of them had very long service. In one case a man had 23 years' service but the individual concerned has been told that he is not entitled to any gratuity, pension or allowance or to any grant from any fund under the control of the Minister for Defence because he has been discharged from the Army as being medically unfit—suffering from tuberculosis. It is curious that the Army authorities did not discover that he was suffering from tuberculosis when he was in the Army. That certificate, given to a discharged soldier after such a long service, is not the kind of recommendation that is calculated to get him a decent job in civilian life. I understand that the number of people discharged as medically unfit, suffering from tuberculosis and, as alleged in this case, suffering from the disease before they joined the Army, reaches a very high figure. I should like to have some information from the Minister as to why it was not discovered that they were suffering from the disease before they were discharged.

I had experience myself of the case of a young man who had been employed in the transport services of the country and who joined the Army during the emergency. When a man joins the Army he is supposed to pass a medical examination. This man was passed as medically fit. Apparently, it was not discovered by the medical officer who examined him that he had an injured foot, an injury sustained in a football match many years before. However, when he was on a route march in the West of Ireland one day, he had to fall out and he was brought before the medical officer. The medical officer then found that he was suffering from an injured ankle and he was discharged from the Army as medically unfit. He came along and presented himself for employment in the transport undertaking in which he was previously employed. As a result of the discharge which he held from the Army, it would not have been right or proper for the official of the transport company to take that man back into his employment. If he had come there with an ordinary discharge it would have been quite in order and, as happened in several other cases, he would have been reinstated in his previous employment without question. I advised this young man, who appeared to be physically fit in every way when he joined the Army, to go to a private medical practitioner and not to show him his Army discharge and that he would probably get a certificate of physical fitness from him. He got that certificate of fitness from his private medical practitioner and he was reinstated at once in the transport service. If he had tendered his official Army discharge papers to the transport company concerned, he probably would not have been reinstated in his former employment. I understand that that is not an exceptional type of case.

I think that something should be done to meet the case of individuals— particularly those who had long service—who are discharged from the Army as medically unfit, especially those who are discharged as suffering from tuberculosis. I know from experience that the Minister has probably a good deal of sympathy with cases of that kind.

I wonder whether there is now, or whether there is likely to be in the future, any fund at the disposal of the Minister which would enable him to pay some compensation by way of lump sum or pension to those people —I hope the number is small— who have been discharged after long service from the Army, suffering from tuberculosis. There is an obligation on the Minister and on his officials to do something in these cases because, if they were suffering from tuberculosis before they joined, that should have been discovered on the day they were first examined by the Army medical officer. If a man serves in the Army for 23 years—and Deputy Flanagan is personally aware of one of these cases, as well as I am—he is entitled to some compensation, gratuity or pension at the end of such a long and faithful service.

Mr. Traynor

I find it rather difficult to begin my reply in view of the fact that such a difference of opinion on various questions has been revealed between members of the same Parties. Little has been said in regard to this Estimate that was not said on the Supplementary Estimate which I had to bring in here recently and on the Temporary Provisions Bill which preceded that Supplementary Estimate. The same type of information for which I was asked on those occasions has been asked for again, in spite of the fact that I gave what I considered to be a reasonable explanation of the questions which were then asked.

I do not think I can add anything to the answer which I gave on those occasions. The question whether this State should or should not have an Army is one which the Government must decide. The Government has the responsibility as long as it is the Government for the defence of this nation. As long as it has that responsibility it will face up to it in the same manner in which it has been facing up to it since it came into office.

The Taoiseach on one occasion in this House gave a guarantee to Great Britain that the territory of this State would not be used as a base of attack against her. I submit to the House that the guarantee given by the Taoiseach on that occasion still stands, and that, if we are to ensure that this nation will not be used as a jumpingoff ground for an attack on another nation, it is our duty to have an Army, and to have an Army which, in our opinion, will be at least capable, in the event of an emergency, of training the greater Army which it would be necessary to bring into being. I think that is a reasonable way of looking at the situation which has to be faced up to. I cannot, like Deputy O'Higgins, make wild prophecies as to the future. Deputy O'Higgins, in the course of his speech to-day, said something like this—that our nearest neighbour is never again going to lay a hand on this country. That may be true, and I sincerely hope it is because I am sure I am voicing the opinion of every Deputy when I say that it is our anxiety, the anxiety of our people, to live at peace with our neighbours. We are not an aggressive nation. We have never attempted to attack any nation or any people, but we must always be prepared to defend our own rights and liberties, and we cannot defend these rights and liberties which are common to our people without having an Army.

As I said on the occasion of the debate on either the Supplementary Estimate or the Temporary Provisions Bill, so far as we are concerned, we are prepared to defend the position we occupy at present. It is very easy for Deputy O'Higgins, who has no responsibility in the matter of the defence of this State, to tell us that Great Britain is never again going to lay a hand upon us. As I said, I hope that he is correct, but I am not going to accept Deputy O'Higgins' prognostication on that question as an accomplished fact. If, by any chance, I was foolish enough to accept it, or the Government as a result of any advice I might tender to them were prepared to accept it, I know that the first man to attack the Government for whatever might result from their weakness in accepting such a position would be Deputy O'Higgins.

Mr. Davin

Their army is in the Six Counties.

Mr. Traynor

What relation has that to the matter I am talking about?

Mr. Davin

It makes it a bit laughable.

Mr. Traynor

The position, as I see it, is that as a free nation, a free people, we must be prepared to protect that freedom. We must be prepared to give some assurance to our neighbour that we are in a position to protect our independence. I think it was Deputy de Valera who stated that, if we had not had the Army we had during the emergency, there is no question that England, for her own protection, would of necessity have had to come in here. I do not think there is any doubt about that. But they were satisfied, I feel sure, that we had an Army which, as some Deputies on the opposite side said, was prepared to fight to the death rather than allow this country to be overrun. Because they believed that, no doubt they felt it would be a greater economy to them to let us do the defending of this State, so far as it was possible for us to defend it, rather than that they should have to send in here ten, 12 or 20 divisions in order to keep us in subjection, because, as Deputy Dillon himself said here on one occasion, if we were overrun, he could guarantee that we would for seven more centuries, as we had for seven centuries in the past, resist that aggression.

Deputy Cosgrave, who was Leader of the Opposition in 1940, when the question of the defence of this nation against invasion was being discussed and when certain doubts as to the wisdom of doing it were expressed by certain Deputies, said:—

"If the Minister wants to know what my view on the Army situation is if we were faced with invasion, it is this, that the invasion should be resisted and that there should be along with the Army the support of every citizen to resist that invasion."

Some of the speeches which have been delivered during the course of the debate have been very far from giving either support to the Government in its very heavy responsibilities or encouragement to the Army in the work they have to prepare themselves for, and some of the suggestions which have come from members of the Opposition— including the Leader of the Opposition who made references to recruitment, which, in my opinion, were unworthy of him—are most harmful to the morale not alone of the Army but of the people.

General Mulcahy

Nothing is more harmful to the morale of the Army than the treatment of some of the soldiers who have been put out and who wanted to stay in the Army.

Mr. Traynor

A number of suggestions have been made by Deputies, including Deputy O'Higgins, of which I know I should not take any notice, but, at the same time, it is very difficult to allow these statements to pass without making some challenge in respect of them. I know that Deputy O'Higgins exaggerates grossly and does not mean half of what he says, that what he states he states for propagandist purposes rather than as constructive or helpful criticism. He talks about the Minister playing with the Army as if he were playing with a lot of toys—playing with airplanes, tanks and corvettes—just because he wants to move them about as a child would move toys about. We know that that sort of talk is purely propagandist talk. I do not move the members of the Army about to please myself, nor do I go out of my way to recommend to the Government the purchase of tanks just because, as the Deputy said, some other nation is buying them and why should we not buy them, nor do I advise them to buy corvettes merely for the sake of buying corvettes.

We are buying any equipment that we are buying for the purpose of defending this nation, as far as it is possible for the people to defend their nation. If atomic bombs are dropped upon us in the manner in which Deputy Commons talks about, we can do no more against them than any other nation can do but the Deputy knows as well as I know that every nation in the world is training infantry men and he knows all the military specialists in the world to-day are stating that in future the soldier will be just as necessary as he has been in the past. Any man who knows the elementary methods of defence of a nation knows that. It may be correct to say that an atomic bomb dropped on a city will wipe it out and leave it in dust and ashes. It is equally true to say, however, that the people who are left, who are not struck by the atomic bomb, will continue to resist aggression as peoples all over the world have always resisted aggression. I believe that as long as the human mind is what it is that will be the reaction to any type of weapon, no matter what it may be, that may be produced for destruction of humanity.

When Deputy O'Higgins talks about no reason being given for the expenditure of the money to be voted, I must confess I do not know what he means because the Estimate is there in the Book of Estimates and there is the statement which I made and God knows that statement was detailed enough for anybody to be satisfied with it.

It is rather depressing, and I think it is a great pity, that Deputies should go out of their way to make sneering references to the naval service which we are endeavouring to establish. References were made to Canada. I have no doubt that Canada, like ourselves, had to make a start at some time and that there may have been a time when Canada had less methods of naval defence, perhaps, than we have to-day. A Deputy made reference to the fact that we are an island nation. To our disgrace let it be said that we do not act as an island people. We should have had, since the establishment of this State, a mercantile marine that would have placed us beyond any question of danger in emergency or in peace. Yet, it took an emergency to bring us into the position where we endeavoured to establish even a mercantile marine. Now we are endeavouring to establish a small naval service. It may be costly but I venture to suggest that it will pay dividends in the future. Its purpose is not, as the Irish Independent went out of its way to suggest in a leader which they went to the trouble of writing, arising out of a statement which I made in this House, to attack the naval forces of any other nation and the leader writer of the Irish Independent knows that as well as I know it and as well as some of the Deputies who made their sneering references to this service know it. They must know that the main purpose, in the first instance, is to establish a naval service to train men to be efficient naval men, in course of time; to produce a reserve from that naval service which will go into the mercantile marine and which will in time of emergency be available for the naval service whenever the naval service may require their help.

It is also the purpose of this particular service to provide a fisheries protection force for this State and, in addition to that, we have very great hopes that a hydrographic survey of the coast of this nation will be undertaken and completed by that service. Far from going out of their way to make this service the joke that they would appear to desire to make it, they ought at least to give it the charity of their silence if they are not prepared to support it at this stage. I think their lack of support is based on their lack of knowledge of the purposes to which this naval service would be placed.

The question has been raised here, and rightly so, I suppose, in regard to the standard of education in this country. The remarks which have been made arise out of the fact that a large number of young men were rejected for the Army on educational grounds. I should say, in defence of that, that the standard of education in respect to recruitment for the Army is at a higher level now than it ever was before and that may be one reason for the rejection of such a large number of young men on that particular ground.

A number of Deputies referred to exArmy men who are still seeking employment. Deputy Flanagan referred to one particular case of which I should like to have particulars because, as far as the Department of Defence is concerned, I want to say that no person is employed in that Department who did not give service in the Army. Therefore, I find it rather difficult to reconcile the statement which Deputy Flanagan has made with the facts as I know them but, if he has evidence of any particular case in which he thinks justice was not done, I should be glad to have the particulars and would be quite prepared to investigate them.

Lest anyone thinks that the Government or myself or the Department of Defence have induced people to join the Army during the emergency on false pretences, I want to refute that idea. First of all, we did not have to promise anything to any of the men who joined the Army.

They joined the Army because there was an emergency and because the life of this nation was in danger and they did not require any promises. They came in here, as some Deputies said, from purely patriotic motives, prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives. At the end of the emergency the Government, recognising that patriotism, did what I think neither the Deputies in this House nor the men themselves were expecting, that is, they gave them these emergency gratuities for the services which they gave during that period and I am thoroughly well aware that very large numbers of the men concerned were not only deeply grateful for that gesture but that they were rather surprised and pleased. In addition the Government gave them certain privileges in respect to employment, and ex-members of the Defence Forces are well aware that a special register of unemployed demobilised men is being maintained in the Department of Social Welfare and that every effort possible is made to aid these men so registered to get employment. In this connection an industrial history card, giving full particulars of the Army service and other qualifications of every person discharged or released from the Defence Forces on and from the 20th September, 1945, has been transmitted to that Department.

Special competitions, confined to persons who served in the Defence Forces during the emergency, are held from time to time by the Civil Service Commissioners for various positions in the Civil Service and these ex-soldiers are thoroughly well aware of these facts and they know that they can secure all the necessary information in respect of these vacant positions in the Civil Service from the Civil Service Commissioners in O'Connell Street. Members have already sat for these examinations and have been successful in securing positions as a result of these examinations. All sorts of concessions have been given to ex-members of the forces in regard to these Civil Service posts such as a year—I think it is a year—for every year of service in respect of their age. In other words, if the age limit is 30 years of age and a man has six years' service he is entitled to six extra years, that is, he can enter for the examination six years above the age limit. He gets special marks which are not available to the ordinary candidate who is entering for that examination and, therefore, he starts in the particular competition with a very large handicap in his favour. There are all sorts of subordinate posts in the Government service such as labourers, messengers, firelighters and for every single one of these ex-soldiers are given preference. It is the same in respect of temporary postmen, the same in respect of temporary clerks in employment exchanges. The same preference applies to posts under local authorities, and in semi-State bodies such as the Electricity Supply Board, Bord na Móna, Aer Lingus and any such body of that kind. In all these they get a preference. Córas Iompair Éireann has taken in a very large number of ex-soldiers as conductors and a large number of men as drivers.

It is quite possible that, in spite of all that we have endeavoured to do in regard to placing these ex-servicemen in employment, there are not enough vacancies to go around and we will have to face up to that situation. If the vacancies are not there it is not possible to put these men into them but I mention the various things that have been done in order to show the House that the statements that have been made about throwing these men on the side of the road are not in any sense correct.

I was sorry that Deputy Murphy joined the chorus of people who told me that we are just playing at make-believe. There is nothing make-believe about the Army at the present time. We have either got to have an Army or we have got to decide that we do not want an Army. If we want an Army we will have to have an Army that will be capable of making itself efficient to train any personnel that we would require to have trained in the event of another emergency. The Army we have estimated for here to-day is the minimum that we believe—the absolute minimum—would be capable of carrying out that task. I am not going to subscribe to the view that there is not going to be another emergency, that there is no danger. Deputy Mulcahy has joined the rôle of the prophets and he says that there will be no danger for the next three, four or five years. Again, I say that I hope that his prophecy will prove a correct one. I sincerely hope that, but, in the position which I occupy, I have to assume all the time that there may be an emergency and, because I must assume that there is a danger there always, I must be prepared to meet the danger. The only method I have of meeting that danger is to ensure that there will be an Army capable of carrying out the task which was carried out in 1940, not as effectively as many of the Deputies of this House seem to think, but which was nevertheless carried out, and which was aided very largely by an element of luck in spite of the fact that we got sufficient time to turn the personnel who came in into reasonably good, ready-made soldiers.

Deputy Commons wanted the Estimate cut by at least half. At the same time, without noticing himself, he also argued that we should have kept all the men who had reached the end of their service in the service; in other words, he made an appeal that we should have increased personnel rather than reduced personnel.

He wanted us to do that at half the cost of the present Estimate. I do not know how he deals with these matters, but I am sorry that I would not be able to do that. If we want to have an Army of the size which we estimate for, we have to pay for it. The answer that a number of Deputies may give us is that we do not want an Army of that size, and it is a matter of their opinion against mine.

Somebody—I cannot say who it was but, if I do not make a mistake, I think it was Deputy Mulcahy—talked about our going all over the world to purchase equipment because we were not playing with our friends in England. Of course, that is balderdash.

General Mulcahy

It is a fact.

Mr. Traynor

It is complete balderdash from the point of view of the suggestion which the Deputy tried to convey to the House—that it was done out of pique or something of that sort. We purchased in Czecho-Slovakia a number of Bren guns and I think it is to the credit of the Army authorities that they were the first to see the value of this type of gun. They went to Czecho-Slovakia and purchased quite a large quantity, as much as it was possible to purchase, but not as much as they would have liked to have got. They were very pleased with themselves and at a later stage England was so satisfied with the value of this gun that I understand the authorities there purchased the right to manufacture this particular weapon in England.

We bought some armoured cars in Sweden. The reason we purchased them in Sweden was because they were a special type of armoured car which peculiarly suited this country; not because we were not playing with our friends across the water, but merely because the cars suited our purpose. I suppose it is true to say that the bulk of our equipment is and has been purchased from England and probably will continue to be purchased there until such time as there is free purchase again in the world in the happy days of peace which, I hope, will come soon.

Deputy Cogan was worried about 700 recruits who were rejected for reasons other than the reasons which were given—that is, education and physical fitness. The other reasons for rejection were under age, over age and bad records, criminal records. These were the reasons why these boys were rejected.

The Deputy was also interested, and I am glad he was, in the Construction Corps. He asked what work they had accomplished. The Construction Corps has accomplished many very valuable tasks. They built a magnificent road in the Cloosh Valley in Connemara. They made a road through a valley where no road existed before, a road which has brought untold blessings to the people of that isolated district. It was probably one of the toughest jobs they undertook. I saw the conditions in which the men lived and worked and certainly the district in which they worked was one of the most isolated I ever saw. It was in that particular area that they did one of the finest jobs of road work I have seen.

They also made a first-class road up at the Arigna mines, a road which has been praised by the various county surveyors who inspected it. They have reclaimed a large amount of land in Tramore; quite a fine job was done there. They undertook a vast amount of work in saving turf for the Army. At present they are making additional runways in Baldonnel and in Gormanston and they have also done a great amount of work in the various rifle ranges in the matter of building up embankments and repairing the ranges proper.

This would have cost a pretty considerable sum had it to be done otherwise, so the Construction Corps is doing its work very well. We have two training depôts in connection with the Construction Corps, one in Naas and one in Fermoy. In those depôts there is a magnificent syllabus of training of which the men are given a certain period of months in educational matters alone, so that many of the boys coming into that particular service will go out, I feel sure, blessing the day they joined it.

I think it was Deputy Cafferky who complained about the amount of money the soldiers are getting. A private, one star, with a wife and four children, taking his soldier's pay, his wife's allowance, his rations and accommodation and uniform, earns £4 17s. 0d. a week. That is the pay of a private soldier, one star—that is, the lowest grade. A sergeant receives £6 1s. 6d. a week, a company sergeant £6 12s. 0d. and a sergeant-major £7 2s. 6d. I do not think that anyone can say that the soldiers are not being fairly paid. I think these figures will speak for themselves.

I believe I have fairly covered the questions which have been raised. I would have liked to have dealt a little more with the general question of the Army, but I think I have said all that is necessary.

Question put: "That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration."

The Committee divided: Tá, 24: Níl, 42.

Tá.

• Blowick, Joseph.
• Broderick, William J.
• Browne, Patrick.
• Cogan, Patrick.
• Commons, Bernard.
• Coogan, Eamonn.
• Cosgrave, Liam.
• Costello, John A.
• Davin, William.
• Fagan, Charles.
• Finucane, Patrick.
• Flanagan, Oliver J.
• Giles, Patrick.
• Keating, John.
• Keyes, Michael.
• McMenamin, David.
• Mulcahy, Richard.
• Murphy, Timothy J.
• Norton, William.
• O'Higgins, Thomas F.
• O'Leary, John.
• Redmond, Bridget M.
• Reynolds, Mary.
• Spring, Daniel.

Níl.

• Aiken, Frank.
• Allen, Denis.
• Bartley, Gerald.
• Beegan, Patrick.
• Blaney, Neal.
• Boland, Gerald.
• Bourke, Dan.
• Brady, Brian.
• Brady, Seán.
• Breathnach, Cormac.
• Brennan, Thomas.
• Breslin, Cormac.
• Briscoe, Robert.
• Burke, Patrick (Co. Dublin).
• Butler, Bernard.
• Carter, Thomas.
• Corry, Martin J.
• Crowley, Honor Mary.
• Derrig, Thomas.
• De Valera, Eamon.
• De Valera, Vivion.
• Flynn, Stephen.
• Fogarty, Andrew.
• Gorry, Patrick J.
• Kennedy, Michael J.
• Killilea, Mark.
• Kilroy, James.
• Kissane, Eamon.
• Lemass, Seán F.
• Little, Patrick J.
• Loughman, Frank.
• Lydon, Michael F.
• Lynch, James B.
• McCarthy, Seán.
• McEllistrim, Thomas.
• Moran, Michael.
• O'Grady, Seán.
• O'Loghlen, Peter J.
• O'Rourke, Daniel.
• Rice, Bridget M.
• Traynor, Oscar.
• Walsh, Richard.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies McMenamin and Browne; Níl: Deputies Kissane and Kennedy.

Question declared negatived.

Vote put and declared carried.

Progress reported; the Committee to sit again.