If that anticipation is fulfilled, I think the provision may be made in safety and without controversy. But, if that is the full cost of promoting this private Bill in the British House of Commons, there has been a great change in private Bill procedure since I had a vicarious acquaintance with it.
I direct the Minister's attention to another facet of this matter, on which I think a rational member of the House may ask reassurance. The form of this Bill is largely controlled by men who have been in the habit of studying legislation of this character enacted by the British House of Commons in private Bills. I am not for a moment suggesting that our own draughtsman has not given it careful attention, too. I expect that the general framework has been taken from analogous measures in Great Britain. I hope nobody has overlooked the fact that in Great Britain there is no written Constitution which is reviewable in its impact on any Statute of Parliament by the Supreme Court. I invite a practising member of the Bar, like Deputy Cosgrave, to give us his opinion on the Constitutional validity of paragraph 32:—
"Whenever it shall be needful for the committee to decide a question of fact they shall be at liberty to act upon such proofs and presumptions as they shall deem satisfactory, whether the same shall be legally admissible as evidence or not and their decision shall be final."
Did anyone submit that paragraph to the Attorney-General? Of course, what it clearly means to say is whether the same shall be within the limits of the established law of evidence or not. But for this Parliament to enact that something should be done whether it is legal or not, is something on which. I think, the Supreme Court will have a word to say. Here we have it that a tribunal in this country, deciding on the conflicting interests of two citizens, and the decision of which is final, shall be deemed to act, not only on such proofs as are submitted to them, but upon such presumptions as they shall deem satisfactory. Can you imagine the Minister for Industry and Commerce, if you were a railway clerk, and Deputy Corry, with the Minister for Agriculture, functioning on this committee and my coming before them with a grievance? Can you picture the presumptions that would start rolling around the room and the committee deciding I was a dishonest cut-throat and the best way to deal with me was to throw me down the stairs and break my neck? If they were called on to answer for that before a court of law, they could point to this Bill and say: "Dáil Éireann authorised us to found our decision on any presumption, so we did not let him talk at all; we threw him down the stairs before he could open his mouth, because we presumed him to be what we knew him to be, a pest". Can you suggest that that proviso will be approved as conforming to the requirements of a written Constitution, when the President of the High Court has expressed his opinion on a very much less succinct procedure?
Look at paragraph 58:—
"Any question as to the meaning of any provision of this scheme or any matter arising thereout shall be determined by the committee and their decision shall be final."
That might not render the Bill unconstitutional, but it has no meaning, because you could enact sections of that kind for ever in Parliament and, as far as I know, the courts will step in and deny the rights of Parliament to arrogate to itself functions reserved to the judiciary, such as the determination of disputes arising between citizens. It is quite a different thing if you go as a trade union to a railway company and say: "In consideration of the railway company bearing two-thirds of the cost, we will concede that the railway company, sitting with trade union representatives, can take a decision on any matter of fact, and we undertake in advance to be bound by it, not only for ourselves but for the members for whom we speak with full authority." That is a contract freely entered into between two parties and you can put any condition you like into it, given that the parties to it understand what they are doing in advance and that the party making a concession has made it freely in exchange for a substantial concession from the other party. We are not doing that. I think that this will result in a situation arising, wherein any member of the trade union, becoming involved in a dispute under the new fund, can go to court and possibly get the whole of this statute condemned as unconstitutional, just for want of a little direction at the beginning by having this matter scrupulously examined by a competent constitutional lawyer with a view to ensuring, in so far as it is possible, that no provision under it will be voidable because it conflicts with the Constitution.
The last question I want to ask is addressed exclusively to the Minister for Industry and Commerce. I heard going about town an elaborate story that the scheme here was adopted as an alternative to a very much larger scheme which was at one time contemplated by Córas Iompair Éireann for the provision of pension rights for all its employees. The story I heard was that a scheme had been submitted for implementation by a group of insurance companies, in exchange for an annual premium payable by Córas Iompair Éireann and that the firm that had devised the scheme would earn, perfectly legitimately, in commission, at the standard rate payable to any agent who gets business for his insurance company, an income of about £1,000 a year in perpetuity, that at some stage of the negotiations that whole arrangement was jettisoned but that as part of it, this plan was introduced. I should like to know now if any such proposals were made.