I do not think that it would be right to let an Estimate of this importance pass without saying a few words. Many of the things which I wanted to say have been said already. At the same time I think that in a matter of fundamental importance whoever sits on this bench should express his views.
There is not, I suppose, a country in the world whose people at the present time are not grumbling and complaining about the very heavy burden which the support of their defence establishments entail and I think that it is not anything new in history that that should be so. Notwithstanding that, all the time, we see nations keeping up their defence forces. There must be some reason for it. It is not for fun that people bear the burdens to the extent to which they are bearing them, but because they see that there is no way out of it. Some people think that there might be a way out of it if we could get collective security by means of leagues of various kinds such as the League of Nations, or the United Nations' Organisation and by coming to some arrangement by which the preservation of the liberty of the people would be secured other than by means of force. Up to the present that has failed. No doubt if it proceeded it would lighten these burdens tremendously, for if nations could agree upon some sort of international code and obey it and had need only for a police force to deal with occasional recalcitrants the burden on the nations of the world would be very much less. But, we have not arrived at that stage, unfortunately, and the people who have to spend their time in armies and the money that has to be spent upon the equipment of these armies are not made available, as they might be otherwise, for productive work which would improve the general standard of living.
However, the fact is that such an agreement has not been reached and that the nations have to-day, as they had in the past, to try to provide, each one, as best it can for its own security, On the smaller nations the burden is perhaps greater, relatively. There is this further factor about it, that the larger nations, by their very strength, have got a certain satisfaction in the expenditure, that they feel that the expenditure, if it is liberal enough, will be sufficient to provide them with the security they require. The smaller nations have the feeling that, even if they make the utmost provision that their means will allow them, it does not provide them absolutely with anything like a guarantee that their independence will be maintained by means of the forces which they raise.
We are a small people; we are in that category; and one of the first difficulties we have to meet in providing for defence is the impression that, because we cannot guarantee absolutely by the forces which we can raise to protect ourselves efficiently, at least to the point at which our independence would be absolutely guaranteed, we ought not to have any forces at all. That is the first thing that we have to deal with as far as the public mind in this matter is concerned. Because we cannot provide absolutely and completely a guarantee for our effective defence, should we give up the idea of defending ourselves at all? Should we simply, tamely, submit to whatever aggression may come against us? I doubt if there is anybody in this country who, if that is put squarely to him, would take the view that I think has been suggested by one or two of the speakers here and say that we should just tamely submit, that we should allow any aggressor that comes along to take hold of our country.
We have got then, I think, to agree that we ought not to take up that position, that we ought to do everything in our power to defend ourselves. The suggestion that we should allow ourselves to be defended by somebody else is, of course, foolish. Who is going to defend you for your sakes? Nobody. If any other Power defends you you may be perfectly certain that they will look for recompense one way or the other. They will take possession of you and, if they do, they will use the men whom you will not use to defend you; they will try to compel them; and the moneys that you are not prepared to spend, they will force from you. It seems to me that it is just foolish to suggest that we ought to allow ourselves to be defended by other people.
I think it is our plain duty to provide to the utmost in our power for our own defence. That is fundamental. If we want to provide for that, we must pay the cost, we must maintain the forces that are necessary to do that as adequately as we can. Of course, there is a limit. If there is a question of insurance, the ordinary man insuring his property or his life has to take into account what his income is. He has to ask himself to what degree he can diminish his effective income for the day in making provision for the future. But this matter of defence is a matter of life or death, ultimately; it is a matter of independence or dependence; it is a matter of having your own will, your own policy, made effective or being subject to the will of another people. When provision is made for defence what it is being made for is to preserve the right of our people to decide their own policies in their own way.
What is that worth? Nobody can give an exact estimate of it. The only thing we can all agree upon, I think, is that it is worth making the utmost sacrifice that will ensure it. Now, we are in a position that people in this country have not been in, perhaps, for generations. We have passed through a time of crisis, a time of a great world war which was raging about us. We have got experience from that. We know in general what are the issues that will have to be faced. That experience ought to be made available, not merely for our people at the present time who are growing up and may not have understood it, but for the future. One of the things that ought to be done is that those of us who have lived through that and know what it means ought to hand down our experiences and try to make these experiences valuable for the people who come after us.
The experiences that we have had are these: That, when a great crisis arose we did not have the forces which we should have had to meet the emergency and to save the nation. At a certain time, if we had not built up quickly our forces, there is not in my mind the slightest doubt that there would have been pressure brought from the point of view of trying to get possession here and to make good that which we had not done for ourselves. We ought not to face that situation again. We ought to make sure that there will be no inducement to any outside Power to supply here, at any rate, the garrison that will effectively protect this country in so far as we can do it.
That matter was studied by people who had lived through the emergency, who had seen what the difficulties were, who had experienced the dangers that resulted from inadequate preparation in 1940 and 1941. I can say this of the General Headquarters Staff, that they were just as anxious as any member of the Government not to put undue burdens upon our people in the way of supplying money. From the financial point of view, they were as anxious as anybody else but they were, of course, anxious to do their job properly. We in the Government, having examined the matter with them, came to the conclusion that if we were going to provide a reasonable force we would have to have that minimum amount which has been mentioned here. It is true that the Estimates do not provide this year for that. That was because it was considered that recruiting during the year would not come up to that amount. If that is the attitude of the Minister, we have no complaint about it. But, our attitude was that if we could get up to that 12,500, which was the minimum set by the Headquarters Staff, who again we believe were cutting it down to the bone, then we should try to meet it. If the Minister is of opinion that the Estimate is simply designed to meet the amount we can get, and that it does not mean that he is not going to work up to that figure, then we have no complaint. But, our complaint is that the stopping of recruiting suggests immediately that that is not his objective. Nobody, of course, can say absolutely what the amount is but we have had a responsible body of men, being told that it had to be brought down to the minimum, going through it and estimating that the least regular force which would enable us to utilise our manpower in case of danger by expansion was the amount that was mentioned there as the establishment. I think the House would be wrong in approaching this from any other point of view.
Deputy Larkin has suggested there should be a committee of the House. What is the Government but a committee? Whatever Government is in office, it is in fact a committee of the House, got by the majority deciding upon it. That committee has all the opportunities of examining every figure that the Minister for Defence puts up. If the Government wants to have in front of it any officer of the Department, or desires to have any examination carried out as to any of the figures that are given and the justification for them, it can do that: and I suggest that that is the proper way of doing it. The Government has its responsibility. They can go into it in detail and that is the right body, which represents this House as far as the detailed information of the figures is concerned.
However, I am giving the view, which was the view of the last Government, that the responsible Headquarters Staff of the Army had carefully considered the need of cutting the figure down to the bone. The figure they would ordinarily give, if that consideration were not there, would be much higher, of course. The question is as to whether it is safe to continue cutting down. Is it safe to stop recruiting at the moment? I do not think it is. I think the world situation is not such as to justify us in thinking that an emergency might not occur within a year, or two or three years. No one can say exactly when, but anyone who looks at all at the world situation knows that there is a dangerous situation ahead. We are told, of course, by the Minister that if an emergency did arise we would have flocking to the colours all the young people in the country. It is quite possible that that would be so, but surely that only means that you need a bigger standing force, if anything, to handle them, so that these people's lives may not be put unnecessarily in danger, that they would be equipped and be capable of being directed, and so on.
It is for every country to balance as to what it can afford. I would like if the Minister could get for me—I did not like to bother him privately during this debate for it, but it is one of the things which could be obtained easily— the comparative figures as to the relative costs of defence in this country and other countries, whether large or small. I think it would be found—that is my view, anyhow—that the cost of defence here is relatively much lighter than it is either in the larger or the smaller countries. Switzerland is one outstanding example—a small nation that has been able to preserve its independence through a long period. It has maintained that by continuing a policy of neutrality. That policy was guaranteed by some of the larger Powers, but the people of Switzerland had to pay heavily for it. They had to have universal service and relatively very heavy expenditure on their defence forces, but would you think that there is any person in Switzerland at the present day, or that there was anybody during the last war or before it, who would regret that expenditure, seeing that it guaranteed one of the means by which they were able to maintain their independence? Switzerland would be regarded, as the result of continuous freedom from attack—though possibly other characteristics would account for it, also—as one of the richest countries in the world, a very rich country from the point of view of the wealth of the individual citizen.
I am trying to argue the case that, in this matter of defence, we ought not be cheeseparing. I agree with the Minister that it is the duty of the Government to see that every £ is well spent. If there is any extravagance of any kind—for instance, money spent unnecessarily on telegrams or communications, as somebody said to-day, or money spent on transport unnecessarily —then by all means go into that and stop it. But in stopping recruiting and in endangering our being able to expand in times of crisis, a big fundamental mistake is being made; and I urge very strongly on the Minister and his colleagues to reconsider this particular matter. It is very easy to appeal, as is being done, in a spirit of braggadocio in one case and sneers in other, to people who do not think these matters out and who are living quite careless of the issues that are involved.
After that point regarding manpower in our regular Army, I would say by all means expand the Volunteer forces or the Local Defence Forces, by all means try to do that; but the Minister will find he cannot do either without the expenditure of money. To handle this, as has been indicated already in this debate, it is necessary to to have your reserves as well. I agree with Deputy Aiken that it is a terrible mistake not to call up the reserves for a refresher course. I think it was found last year that the officers who had not been called up for a number of years lost a good deal of the value of the refresher course, as they had gone rusty. If people can go rusty in a year or two, we run the risk of allowing that to occur by not bringing them up this year. That is apart from any question of contract with the men themselves. That aspect of it should be borne in mind, as to the extent to which there is a contract with the individuals in the reserve, who make personal arrangements ahead of time regarding the month for which they are likely to be called up and who suffer inconvenience and probably a monetary loss as well. The question of contract should be considered. It is on the Army and the reserve we have to depend in a time of crisis to train the new volunteers likely to come in.
With regard to weapons, it has already been pointed out that there is a nice balance to be carefully considered. There is no doubt that, if we had enough Lee Enfield rifles in the last war, even if we could substitute automatic weapons, we would be in a better position than that in which we found ourselves when we were begging from Britain and America to get rifles to put into the hands of the L.D.F. Surely we should not allow a position like that to arise again? Even though we may have to dispose of these weapons at a loss, if we get better ones, it is very much better that we should have that second-class equipment rather than no equipment.
If we have second-class equipment, it is part of our general protective scheme, part of the insurance we will have to pay to preserve our independence. I say that, if there is a doubt in things like that, do not leave people unarmed and unequipped, with the idea that there may be a more perfect weapon developed which would render obsolete the weapon you are thinking of using. I strongly urge the Minister to see that the best available weapons are put in the hands of our men, so that there may be at least an effective personal weapon for each individual who is likely to go into service in time of crisis. We ought to do that, otherwise we will not be in a position to defend ourselves.
The Minister said that if there is to be war it will be a total war. There is not the slightest doubt that that is the sort of war we shall have to face. In that case one of the big problems will be the possible evacuation of the civilian population. It may be that evacuation would be regarded as so impossible or ineffective that it might be better to let the population stay where it is and hold its ground. There was a period during the emergency when one of the most baffling problems was that of evacuation—getting it done quickly and thoroughly. It is a horrible problem to take people from a large centre of population and put them into the country and look after them. With the development of modern methods of warfare it is a problem which will have to be considered. The main point is, can you get a method of protection by which people can be left where they are, in their own homes? That would be the best way, but could we have a method of protection for them? If there is not such a method of protection, is it not likely that the best thing would be to evacuate people from these large centres of population and have them dispersed throughout the country? That is a matter which would come under the question of general defence.
Reference was made to buildings, and there was a suggestion that the Army ought to dispose of its barracks and buildings. That would be a terrible mistake. During the emergency one of our principal difficulties was to get adequate housing for the troops. The existing buildings were designed originally for certain purposes. They may not be perfect and may not be the type of buildings that we would have if we were to build them afresh, but they were designed for certain purposes and it would not be desirable to hand them over for a purpose for which they were not designed and that they might fulfil very inadequately, and leave our troops without necessary accommodation. The Army ought to be very slow in parting with any of its property. It should only do so when the Minister, the Headquarters Staff and the Government have satisfied themselves that they were not going to serve any useful Army purpose in the future.
Volunteer and local halls were mentioned for the F.C.A. I am all in favour of that. The only trouble with us was that materials were difficult to get and there was such a housing shortage that it was a question of what should come first. Housing for ordinary individuals—people getting married—constituted a very difficult problem, particularly with the shortage of materials, and one could not embark on anything like a large-scale building of halls in local areas in which volunteers could be trained.
Reference has been made to guard duty. The Minister should consider whether there is such necessity for doing guard duty, and the effect of that duty on his forces.
In the course of the discussion reference was made to finance control. I support the appeals made to the Minister on that point. I thought we had effected an arrangement with the Department of Finance that when estimates had been reached a detailed reexamination before orders were placed would not be carried out. Surely the officers in the Department of Defence ought to be trusted not to incur unnecessary expense if something happened in the meantime which did not justify it? I urge the Minister strongly to see that the Finance Department will not dictate the equipment necessary for defence purposes—that that should be decided by the Minister and his Department and the Government and, when a Government decision has been taken and money voted for a definite purpose, it ought not to be in the power of any officer in any other Department to cut that down. That should be done only by the Government that has taken the decision and approved the estimate.
It may appear to be a good thing purely from the Finance point of view, but that point of view can be met adequately by the care which the Minister and his officers are supposed to exercise with regard to expenditure. They cannot expend anything that has not been agreed upon by the Government after full consideration between the two Departments. The Government having agreed on certain money being made available for equipment and other purposes, the Department ought to be free to place the orders. Very often what appears to be a saving does not in the long run prove to be one; very often a suitable occasion is lost and I believe if you were, over a period, to take the losses that accrue through not making orders at the proper time and put them against the savings that appear to be made, you find the balance is not, as it might appear to be, on the Finance side.
The responsibility ought clearly to be placed upon the Minister and the Department of Defence to see that if anything arises which might suggest that they should not go ahead with certain expenditure, they will use their own discretion. In that way it will not be necessary to have that doubly checked by the Department of Finance, with all the delays that accrue through doing so and all the dissatisfaction and heartburnings that might arise from it. Dissatisfaction naturally arises on the part of officers who are trying to make the most of the money given them and to use it to the best advantage.
The Construction Corps was set up for a very special purpose. It was put on to the Army, not because it was felt that the Army would ordinarily be the very best body to handle it, but because there were certain rules of discipline involved and it was largely a question of discipline. There were certain rules of discipline that could be enforced by the corps being associated with the Army that could not be applied otherwise and it was felt that it would be better to have these young men associated in that way with the Army. It was a question very often of building up their bodily strength and putting them in a position to use their bodies in different forms of employment afterwards. If that corps is to be removed from the Army, I suggest that there should be a reconsideration of the problem that arises in connection with young people of that kind because, having no employment immediately available, they may deteriorate. If they are brought under the discipline of a corps of that kind and taught to do certain work and are given reasonably good conditions, they will in my opinion get a proper beginning in life. I think that it is worthwhile that that should be examined. I think, however, that there will be a fairly general agreement in the House that we ought to have a defence force which will enable the nation to defend itself to the utmost in time of crisis. Half measures are the worst of all and we should not put ourselves in the position that if and when a crisis comes and we are called upon to defend ourselves to the utmost we are not able to answer that call. The question of defending ourselves to the utmost brings up the thorny and complex problem of compulsory military training. I think that in a time of real crisis the nation, if it were to defend itself to the utmost, would be compelled to take steps in that particular direction and to introduce a measure of that particular kind. Fortunately during the late emergency we were able to get on without that, but it was in many cases unfair to put the burden upon those who volunteered.
The question now is whether in a time of real crisis in which the nation would be called to defend itself to the utmost it would not be necessary for us, as it is necessary for other nations, to have compulsory military service. If that is envisaged the best way in which to reach that objective is to have training in advance. If you do not do that it means that you will throw away valuable lives. Consequently that is a question which must be examined very, very carefully and a matter which must be discussed and considered. I know that compulsory military service has many objections and I know that it means a certain hardship on the individuals and upon families, but if we are serious about defending ourselves to the utmost in a time of real crisis then I think sooner or later we shall have to face up to that situation. I am attempting to deal with this matter as realistically as I can. I am anxious that the people should consider this matter and think it out for themselves and that they will not adopt the policy of hiding their heads in the sand and ignoring the realities of a situation which may gravely concern this country should there be another major cataclysm.
With regard to the question as to the best method of defence, I think most people would admit that if a nation can maintain its neutrality that is all the better. On the other hand, people may feel that the issue involved is one which immediately concerns them and that they ought to play their part in dealing with that issue. The question then arises as to what is the best way in which to do that. Obviously that is a matter which ought to engage the attention of the Government. I would urge that in the actual position of world affairs as it seems to me now— I do not think I am an alarmist, but we have lived through one crisis during which I think no imputation could be made upon us that we lost our heads just as I do not think it likely that we shall loose our heads in any crisis that may arise in the future—it would be a very bad policy on the part of the Government to ignore that which other nations think is threatening. It would be very foolish on our part to adopt that policy.
Anybody who studies world affairs must realise with a great degree of certainty that there is even now a situation which can very easily develop into war. To use an old phrase, it is not wise to wait until the drums beat to sharpen one's tusks. We must prepare. We must have a long-distance preparation, if you like, so that if there is a war in which our interests are affected and our principles are threatened the nation will find itself in a position in which it can defend itself to its utmost. It may find itself on one side or the other, or it may be neutral. In any case the foundation of all defence is that you will set out to defend yourself to the utmost of your power.
Most of the people on the opposite side of the House have suggested that the speeches made here have been of a Party character. I have tried not to introduce any partisan element. I do not think the speeches have been of a Party character. Talking about cutting down expenses must make for popularity. Cutting down expenses is something that is immediate. Maintaining our defences is something that is more or less in the offing. Remember, that the people who will blame you most if you do not make adequate preparation are just those people who now complain most bitterly about the cost of that preparation. If an emergency arises and you are not prepared those are the people who will blame you and say that you were blind when everybody else knew that this was threatening, but you did not see it and you did not make preparation. You run the same risks of government and you must face up to the same unpopularity as you would if you were making provision, for instance, for supplies. If you are preparing for an emergency and you make provision for supplies and the emergency does not arise you are compelled then to dispose of those supplies at a reduced price and you are blamed because you made a provision which proved unnecessary. It is, however, much better to be blamed for making a provision that ultimately proved to be unnecessary than to be blamed for not making provision for something which ordinary people were able to foresee. I would urge that if there is a possibility of mistake in this matter it would be better that the mistake should be made in making the provision rather than in neglecting to make the provision.
It is in that spirit that we ask the Minister to take this Estimate back to his colleagues and reconsider it. It is in that spirit that we ask the Minister to put the question to himself as to whether the present, with the world situation such as it is, is an opportune time in which to cut down our Defence Forces, in which to stop recruiting and not to call up the reserve. My view is —and I think it is the view of most people in this State—that the situation is such that that is not a wise course.
