In 1937, with certain amendments in 1940. That is the regulation which is law at the present moment. I do not want to ride away on any kind of false track. I want to say definitely and candidly that that is a proper regulation for a Department of Defence to make, and that it is part of the essential and normal administration of barracks. If a very bad situation arises out of a regulation such as that, then it is a serious matter, and it is a serious matter to be attended to as a matter of urgency by any Department of State.
I complained from the seats opposite, and I complain from this seat now, that, under the kind of general regulations in operation here and the type of administrative outlook of local authorities, an ex-soldier just does not exist for purposes of housing. He is never in the queue; he is never in the race. If I put it to the public health authorities in the City of Dublin that there is an ex-soldier's family in barracks who are suffering from all these hardships outlined by Deputy Byrne and Deputy Larkin, and that there are houses going within the administrative area of the Dublin Corporation, they will say: "We have enough to do to attend to our own", as if these people were not members of the population of the city at all. There is not only the serious situation of withholding quarters, but there is what is worse, families growing up in these married quarters, girls getting married and bringing in the husbands. In the particular case to which there was reference, there were two young ladies married and two new families in process of creation, with dissension between the different units. The military police had no jurisdiction with regard to civilian personnel, and there was another problem—as Deputies will understand, an undesirable type of problem—arising in the military barracks.
There is a huge growing population over which there is no jurisdiction in our Dublin barracks. I should like to see that situation eased and solved at the earliest possible moment, and Deputy Byrne, at least, may be in a position to give a helping hand in that respect outside this particular building. I am trying to find a solution, and in the meantime I am standing over a thoroughly undesirable state of affairs, that is, a continuation of that position. The amending of that regulation would only make bad worse. The amending or rescinding of that regulation would lead only to total over-holding everywhere after a man's discharge, and let that situation grow more and and more acute, and you may have in the end a situation very much worse than the situation which at the moment is very bad.
With regard to this discussion on the Army generally, if I have any complaint to make, it is that the whole discussion started off, as it were, on the wrong foot. Deputy Traynor, in moving that the Estimate be referred back, made use of a figure and painted a picture of a proposed army of 12,500, all ranks, being reduced by the new Administration to 8,500, all ranks, and said that that was a very dangerous step to take in view of the degree of unsettlement and tension in Europe. That was a completely inaccurate picture of the situation and the proposals before the House at the moment. The difference, as I said by way of intervention two or three times —but without any effect—between the proposals I am putting before the House in the way of strength and the proposals which would have gone before the House if there had been no change in the Administration is a reduction of 764 soldiers. That is the difference in men between the proposal I am making and the proposals previously made by Deputy Traynor.
The only explanation of that grave error and misunderstanding is that the Book of Estimates was not properly studied or understood before that statement was made. As I pointed out, in the case of Estimates, the numbers are set out down along the line, with the finance on the other side, and then there is a deduction or a subtraction at the end, so as to make provision for the number of men whom it is proposed to carry within that financial year.
There is no good in anybody trying to ride away by saying: "In spite of that Book of Estimates the target was higher than yours, and, if we had reached that higher target, we would have gone higher." That is not the answer and that is not the position. In the British Parliament, there are two Bills—one providing the money for the year and the other the number of men for the year. In this Dáil, we have only one Estimate—an outline of the men and the money to be voted. When you vote the money in the subhead, you are laying down the number of men, and no authority would rest with either Deputy Traynor or myself to carry one man more than the sum asked for from the Dáil and voted by the Dáil allowed for.
Of course, the answer may be: a Supplementary Estimate. That might be the answer of Deputy Traynor and that could be the answer I would give. Any Minister can at any time depart from his original Estimate, with the authority of the Dáil, by bringing in a new Estimate. He would have to justify the new Estimate by pointing out the completely new set of conditions and, generally speaking, I think the practice of bad or slack estimation being covered up or bolstered up in the course of administration during the year by a Supplementary Estimate is a practice to be deplored, and a practice which makes the annual Budget to a great extent meaningless. In my opening remarks—I think, in the very first sentence—I said to the Dáil that, if the situation grew to such a point that there was a probability or a likelihood of any outbreak in Europe touching on or involving us, both Deputy Traynor's Estimate and my Estimate would be equally meaningless, and neither of them would have any relation to the situation which would then exist. In that set of circumstances I would feel bound to come to the Dáil with a Supplementary Estimate that would relate the cost of the strength of the Army in some reasonable way to that new situation.
Now in the course of the debate there were references from the opposite benches to the folly of not calling up the reserve this year and, not being content with branding that particular decision as folly, some people went so far as to refer to it as being a breach of contract. It is very easy to lead a debate in the wrong direction. The false start made by Deputy Traynor produced that semi-hysterical and lachrymose speech from his colleague, Deputy Colley whose very heart was bleeding at the thought of these human sausages who in a completely unequipped and untrained way were to be thrown into the inferno of war. If human beings were to be treated in that particular way because of the Army being under strength I think that he should have a quiet talk with his colleagues.
There was a reference to the reserve and I do not know if Deputies opposite felt that the security of the nation was being adequately provided for by a type of reserve that on paper was in or about 40,000 men in strength. On paper, I repeat, but where a situation existed where nobody in uniform could answer firmly out of that 40,000 how many were effective in any situation that might arise, we might find in that situation that we were relying on a defence that was to a very great extent a paper wall, on numbers on paper that could not or would not in any set of circumstances be put into the field.
That was the situation in regard to the F.C.A. It may be that a very, very high percentage of that 40,000 odd people were effective and available. It would be a distinct comfort to every one of us here if that were so, but that is a thing that must be ascertained and that must be ascertained at the very earliest possible moment. That is a thing that must and should with a reasonable Administration be ascertained before any plans are made for training and before the elaborate and expensve training organisation is finally decided upon. I propose this year to make a very, very energetic and thorough investigation of the whole position in regard to our reserve, and whatever is built as a result of that investigation will be built on solid ground, on rock if possible, so as to ensure that whatever second line defences we have, be they big or small, will be real defences and not defences of a strength absolutely and completely unknown. In order to bridge the training gap while that essential work is being carried out, the proposal before the Dáil is that the officers and non-commissioned officers, the potential officers and potential non-commissioned officers of that body be called up for training this year, and I wonder whether anyone has any fault to find with that. I believe that it is a sound proposal and I believe that with that proposal practically as many people will report for training as reported last year when they were all called up.
There is no intention whatsoever— far from it—to depart from that system of reserve or to neglect in any way that reserve force. I believe that it is invaluable and I believe that a sound and sensible way in which to get the greatest number available trained to a fair extent and to make them available rapidly is to have inside the barrack walls overhead machinery adequate to handle those forces when they are called up.
With regard to the first line reserve the situation is different and I think that the decision not to call up the first line reserve was influenced in only a very, very small part by finance. As was argued opposite the amount of money saved in that particular decision is comparatively slight and that decision was not arrived at purely or mainly because of the amount of money saved. It was arrived at mainly because of the decision to hold this year, or in the early months of this year at all events, an extensive and energetic investigation into the whole reserve position.
Now it was suggested that there was a breach of contract——
