When I had to report progress earlier to-day, I was referring to the last sub-head of the Estimate. Under that sub-head, Appropriations-in-Aid, I was referring to item 16, in which it was estimated that receipts from fuel, light, water, and barrack services would bring in £7,400 extra. I was wondering how that sum was to be secured in view of the fact that the Army is a decreasing Army—unless it be that the explanation is that there is an increased ration, or something like that, being given. I cannot find any other explanation.
Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence (Resumed).
An increase in the F.C.A. and in the Reserve.
Having dealt with various sub-heads, I would like now to say a few words on what appears to be Government policy in regard to the Army. I think personally that it is grossly unfair to the Army that every time there is a change of Government there is also a change of policy in regard to the Army. Members of the Army themselves are precluded from any participation in politics, and quite rightly so, but it is an extraordinary thing that, despite that, they find themselves the victims of politics. I remember making statements about this in the period of the former Minister of the Coalition Government, mentioning the facts I am mentioning now, expressing the same regret.
When I reassumed office in 1951, one of the first tasks I imposed upon myself was to go around the various barrack posts in the different commands and examine the situation that existed there. I found there were very large barracks capable of holding thousands of men and occupied only by hundreds. I found large dormitories or barrack rooms, that would hold anything up to 30 or 40 men, occupied by three or four men. I met that all over the place. I do not have to impress on Deputies how depressing that must have been to those who found themselves isolated in these large dormitories.
I was told that the reason why this was happening was for the purpose of keeping those rooms in condition and always ready for occupation if the necessity should arise. That meant additional fatigues for men who were already suffering from the effects of excessive guard duty and so on, as a result of the smaller numbers. That is not going to raise the morale of an Army and an Army must possess the highest possible standard of morale if it is to carry out the work for which it was established.
The securing of the freedom of this country took centuries. There were centuries of suffering and sacrifice before the measure of freedom which we enjoy to-day was eventually secured. I feel it is the duty of any Government elected and given the responsibility of carrying out the affairs of the State, to see that as far as lies within their power the largest possible Army, commensurate with what the State can afford, should be made available for the protection of that freedom. It should not be easily lost and it can be safeguarded only by having an Army of the peace-time strength, which was the minimum recommended by the Army authorities, namely, 12,500 men.
It is a peculiar thing that in every Book of Estimates since 1946 or 1947, that 12,000 has appeared regularly. We all know what happened in the previous 3½ years of Coalition Government, we all know that the Army was allowed to be reduced to an alarmingly small number. We know that the Minister at that time gave voice to the views that, as far as he was concerned, there was no necessity for a large Army. I hope nobody here thinks that 12,500 is a large Army—it would not represent a division in a normal ordinary Army. That was his view, that the Army was required here only for the purpose of ceremony or to give aid to the civil power in time of stress and danger. My colleagues and I have no objection to that; it is the natural procedure in every country in the world to use the Army for ceremonial purposes and to aid the civil power in time of stress and danger and there is no objection to it. I do not think we utilise it to the fullest extent for ceremonial purposes. I believe the more it is used in that way the closer it will be brought to the people and the more the people will have regard for it.
There is another aspect of the necessity for having a reasonably strong Defence Force, and that is that it serves as a reservoir for filling up the Reserve. A force of 12,500 is small, but it provides a Reserve at least, when it is established at that rate. It is very difficult to keep it static at that rate. I know from my own experience it was almost impossible, even though we raised the largest number of men in normal times that ever was raised in this State, though the medium of a recruiting campaign. I feel, nevertheless, that it provides that reservoir to the a Reserve and if we can get anything from 2,000 to 3,000 regularly flowing from the Army into the Reserve, in the course of time you are bound to have in reserve an Army of highly-trained, well disciplined men who can be called out in an emergency at very short notice.
It is due to the Army, if responsibility is placed on the Army for preserving the peace of this nation so far as it is humanly possible to preserve it and prevent anything in the nature of invasion, that it should be properly equipped and manned and it is up to this House to ensure that the Army is provided with all the manpower and equipment that the State can make available.
What is happening at the present? time? As far as I can see the policy of letting things drift is operating once more. When I left the Department the strength of the Army was something over 10,000 men; to-day it is in the region of 8,000 and I believe it will decrease very rapidly in the near future because of the fact that the 4,000-odd recruited in 1952 will be due for release unless they sign on for additional service. They are due for release any time from now on. In fact I believe that that exodus is now taking place.
A recruiting campaign was initiated by the Minister early this year but it was a half-hearted effort and it petered out, as the Minister himself admitted in the course of his speech. It was more or less a failure and it could not have been otherwise because there was no enthusiasm behind the effort and, if one wants to succeed in a matter of that kind, one must have enthusiasm. Now I am quite satisfied that the enthusiasm was there in the Army; it must have been there because the Army is always pressing for strength, for equipment and for the means of ensuring that they can carry out their responsibility. I can only assume therefore that the enthusiasm was not there at the head; those responsible were not earnest in their desire to keep the Army at the strength at which it should be kept. If it was possible to secure 4,000 odd men by recruiting in 1951-52, I cannot see any reason why it should not be possible to do the same thing again now provided the same enthusiasm is behind the effort.
They were let down after the Emergency. It was the Deputy let them down.
There are other reasons why we should have a strong Army. I do not like using the word "strong" because it seems to me to be somewhat inapt. Outsiders might be inclined to think it rather humorous to refer to an Army of 12,500 as a strong Army. Apart from the fact that such an Army will supply the Reserve necessary, there is the other aspect that, if we are really serious about preserving the neutrality of this State, then we ought at least provide the means by which we can protect that neutrality. No nation will take our statements that we are a neutral nation seriously if we do not ourselves make an effort to show that we can protect that neutrality; and the only way we can prove that is by keeping the Army at the highest possible strength and keeping the Reserve continually supplied with ever-increasing numbers.
We have, of course, the voluntary service. I am glad to hear from the Minister that that service appears to be increasing in numbers. That is very desirable but this country will always have to depend in the main on the highly trained, highly skilled and highly disciplined regular soldiers and the Reserve, the men who have taken on the task of soldiering professionally and who have equipped themselves with the ability to carry out that task effectively. Everyone remembers that it was from the somewhat limited sources of regular soldiers, augmented to some extent by the officers of the volunteers, that the splendid emergency Army was trained and disciplined. The possibility is that we shall not get the time that we had in those years to do the same thing again, and, if the time were shortened, the building up of an Army would have to be done by the most efficient possible men we could obtain. Naturally those men would be the highly trained effectives who went through Army training proper.
There is then another aspect and I think it is one which deserves some consideration. I refer to the possible effect of a strong Army in relation to the question of Partition. We have had members of this House—Deputies of the Coalition Parties and of the Fianna Fáil Party and Ministers— representing this State abroad at Strasbourg and elsewhere. On every, occasion on which our representatives have spoken on the question of Partition they have done their utmost to influence opinion abroad in relation to the Partition problem, always in the hope that they would gain sympathy, a sympathy which might be effective at some later date in solving this problem of Partition.
Most of those they addressed must have been fully aware that, while we were a neutral nation, we might not be in a position to effectively protect our neutrality and, for that reason, they may not have been as interested in Partition as we would hope they would be. I am pretty certain that what obsesses these people is always the possibility of the danger of attack on themselves. They would not be too concerned really as to whether we were or were not neutral: what they would be concerned about is the danger of this territory falling into the hands of someone who would use it effectively against themselves. They might be more sympathetic about the Partition question if they could be assured that such an eventuality was not likely to arise and that we could at least hold our territory until such time possibly as we would receive the necessary help to ensure the expulsion of invading forces. I think that is a matter deserving of serious consideration from the Government.
Some short time ago I read an article in an English newspaper purporting to represent the official view. I do not know who was representing that official view but the article was alleged to have been written by an Irish correspondent. It stated that the introduction of the A and H bombs had changed the whole outlook of the authorities in this nation with regard to defence; that the weapons with which the Army was equipped were now obsolete. I do not know who the official was or, in fact, if there was an official view—it may have been one of these articles written by someone who just simply wanted to write that type of article and wanted to show what he knew—but whoever the official was I can say this much that I am certain the view did not represent the view of any member of the Army. At least, I hope it did not, because the use of these bombs, either the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb, on this nation would just as effectively deter the enemy from using our territory as it would affect the population of the nation and if such a weapon were used on this nation I can only assume it would be used as an act of vengeance.
That brings us to the only other possible means by which the nation could be attacked. It could be attacked from the land, it could be attacked from the sea, or it could be attacked from the air and in my opinion the Army of the present day and which has been so well equipped, and which I hope will be better equipped, could resist for a considerable time such an invasion. In any case, we have to assume always that such an invasion would be carried out by one of the warring elements involved in some world strife, and again, it would be a question, as it was in the past, of retaining our territory for the longest possible time until such time as we could receive help from one of the other interested parties in such a world strife.
That is the reason why I think that the Government should ensure the continuation of the Army at the highest possible strength that it is possible to secure and I am prepared to admit that it is difficult to secure that high strength, and I am prepared to admit that even with the strenuous efforts which I made and which I pushed to the uttermost limits, that we did not even reach the maximum figure, but it was not for want of effort. Therefore, I say to the Minister, there should be no let-up in the effort to secure recruits and they will not be secured through the medium of half-hearted efforts such as the effort that was made in the recent recruiting campaign. That is all I can describe the effort as—a half-hearted effort.
As far as this State is concerned, the Army of the State is purely a defence force; it has no aim of securing territory outside the four shores of Ireland and I do not think—although the Minister made some allusions to it in the course of his statement—that we need be interested in securing any of these nuclear weapons. I do not see to what use we could put them if we had them, and, therefore, I think it is safe to say that any money that would be likely to be expended ought to be expended on weapons that the Army authorities themselves are recommending. They are still seeking weapons of a particular type. These, I understand, are available and when I was leaving the Department we had actually carried out tests with the particular type of weapon in which they were interested.
I would be anxious to know if the Minister or the Department, through the Minister, has secured any of these weapons or secured them even to the extent to which I had got the authority of the Government. I would be glad to think that we were securing additional equipment and it was for that reason I made the appeal to the Minister to-day that the £800,000 which exists under sub-head P of the Estimate should be utilised to the uttermost limits in securing this equipment which is now available. Nobody can say that the reason why the money was spent was because the equipment was not available. It is fully available at the present time and I think the Minister could make a special effort to secure as much as possible of that equipment.
That, I think, is as much as I desire to say on this Estimate. I would conclude by again making this appeal; the freedom which obtains in this country to-day was dearly-bought freedom and it ought to be protected in the fullest possible way, and I am perfectly satisfied that, as far as the Army itself is concerned, if the necessity should ever arise to put the training, the discipline and the weapons which they have been given into effect, that that will be done and done in a courageous and splendid manner. I have no doubt whatever about that.
I do not intend to intrude very long on this debate, but there are certain facts of Army training to which I would like to draw the Minister's attention. There is quite a wide range of new weapons available to the Army on which a good deal of training has been done by Army personnel themselves. I think it would be very wise for the Minister for the purpose of encouraging and making interesting the training of the F.C.A. to have these weapons made available to them for instruction purposes as early as possible. I do not altogether subscribe to some of the views expressed by the former Minister and I feel that we have to face the reality of the situation and realise that in the future much of our main Reserve strength is going to be in the F.C.A. and that if we are to maintain the growing expansion of the F.C.A. we can only do it by a diversion of interests and by making available to them as quickly as possible the variety of new weapons now available to the Army.
I think the Minister will have to explain to the Dáil, and through the Dáil to the country, what the real difficulties are with regard to the First Line Reserve. We have had a good deal of discussion over the years and some of us have been very insistent, both during the former tenancy of office of the Ministers of the inter-Party group and during the tenure of office of Deputy Traynor that something should be done to ameliorate the general conditions of the Reserve. There were tremendous difficulties created—I am saying this deliberately —by slowness of progress and practical stagnation of promotion in the Reserve. If the regulations are to be continued to be interpreted in the manner that the civil branch of the Army interpret them, interest in the Reserve will become even less.
There are other difficulties with which the Minister must come to grips as rapidly as possible in the peace time situation. There is a good deal of discontent in relation to the housing of married personnel. There has been a good deal of difficulty over the years in relation to the making of some kind of an arrangement with local authorities as to the practicabilty of supplying houses for personnel leaving the Army. These are problems that are vital in the general question of morale as referred to by the former Minister.
Is it true that there will be such an extraordinary wastage of men at the end of this period of service? Is there any real fear on the Minister's part that there will not be a substantial take-on for new periods by those who are now arriving at the end of their first period of service? If there is to be such wastage as mentioned by Deputy Traynor, there must be something radically wrong somewhere within the Army and there is no good in coming here to talk about building an Army up to a strength of 12,500 if the situation is as indicated by the former Minister that the 4,000 recruits built up from 1951 to 1952 are likely, in the main, not to elect to take on for a further period of service.
I do not believe for a moment that there is any validity in the argument that there is some extraordinary difference as between 10,000 or 12,000 men when we are dealing with the question of neutrality or the protection of the neutrality of this island. I have said repeatedly, and I say again, that whenever the situation arrives in this country that people are required to rally to the defence of the nation there has never been any shortage of men forthcoming. If the Minister can nurture that impetus which is now in the F.C.A. by fostering it with training in a variety of weapons and breaking down the monotony of their training by a constructive, cohesive, advanced type of training for them and a stimulation of an advanced type of competition within that body, he will be building a reservoir of the type of Irishman who has always been in the vanguard of the defence of any cause which the nation found itself fighting for, the volunteer type of soldier who is learning the art so that he can perfect himself for any eventuality.
I shall not delay the House. I do not want to traverse the question of Army policy. I feel the Minister should be slightly guarded about any ill-judged haste in buying equipment merely because it is now freely available. We must be realists and adapt ourselves to the time and the situation.
I would support one facet of Deputy Traynor's argument, that the Minister should be directing more and more attention to civil defence. In the course of the last week we have read of immense air raid precautions against atomic raids that are being carried out in other countries. I am not for a moment suggesting that we might indulge in that elaborate type of temporary evacuation or trial evacuation but I do nor think the time has come for some dissemination of information and for training of the people in the technique of civil defence that might be needed in the event of the world being stricken by another catastrophe of war.
I shall not for a moment subscribe to the suggestion made by Deputy Traynor that there was only one basis on which the nation might be attacked. He suggested that if somebody used nuclear weapons against this country they might make it impracticable for themselves to use the country subsequently as a base. I do not think there is any reality in that argument. I should hope that such a catastrophe would not befall the nation, as I am sure Deputy Traynor also hopes, but I do feel that the Minister will have to direct the people's minds by a course of training that will attune them to the civil defensive measures that would be practicable in the event of such an occurrence.
The whole trend of equipment is changing so rapidly that I do not think it is wise for the Government or the Minister to rush into purchases at the moment. I understand from examination of the situation and from discussions that the Army is reasonably equipped in the type of weapons we might call traditional. Any purchases should be designed towards introducing more modern technique and more modern weapons. Above all, the Minister must get to grips as quickly as possible with the task of making available the basis of civil defence in the event of an attack by nuclear weapons.
One point mentioned by Deputy Collins is, in my opinion, of grave importance, that is, the question of housing. Year after year, Deputies have mentioned the problem in relation to the housing of married members of the Army and we understand that the situation is grave in Dublin. The same difficulty arises in the case of men who are retiring. It is vitally important that the men of the Army should be housed. Deputy Traynor knows that we had to mention on previous occasions the position in regard to men stationed in the South. It is appalling that men in such a service should be deprived of the right of decent homes. The number of married quarters available in the South of Ireland is anything but satisfactory. The right of a soldier to decent living accommodation to rear his young family is vitally important. I remember raising this matter before in this House and pointing out that, were it not for the fact that local authorities were so willing to cooperate in the allocation of local authority houses, the Department of Defence would have to face this problem much sooner than they intend to do.
As regards the other matters mentioned by Deputy Collins and Deputy Traynor, it is quite obvious that we are inclined to take different views as regards the strength of the Army. I have said before and I say again that, even before the period of 1948, the so-called strength of the Army was only paper strength and Deputy Traynor must know that the reports which were submitted to him as Minister in that period showed that a recruiting campaign could not be successful and was not successful owing to the conditions under which many of the men had to serve during the emergency period. I move to report progress.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 22nd June, 1955.