There are a few points in connection with this Estimate I should like to bring to the Minister's attention. Before doing so, I should like to say that I agree with many of the other Deputies who pointed out the importance as a whole of this particular debate. It is very difficult in this House for Deputies, or for that matter for the Department of Defence or officers in the Army to formulate a defence system or programme for this country in its present tragically divided condition. It is really very hard, then, to be realistic about what practical steps can be taken to safeguard the welfare of the portion of Ireland which lies under the control of this Parliament. One thing we should be clear about in our minds is that all possible steps should be taken by this House and by the authorities of this State to protect, in so far as it lies within their power, the community within the State from attacks by any outside Power. Provided those attacks are made with the recognised weapons of warfare, it should be our aim to make it as costly as possible for any invader who might think it worth his while to utilise this base as a jumping-off ground for attacks on other countries, whatever those countries may be.
There is little, perhaps, that we can do in the line of defence against atomic or nuclear warfare. There is little that any country in the world can do about that except depend on Providence to save the lives of the civilian community. Perhaps we should deal a little bit more seriously with aspects of civilian defence in so far as they relate to evacuation, training of our people in the larger centres of population, first-aid precautions and instructions in protection systems from attacks of the atomic kind. That is about all we can hope to do in that regard.
If we make up our minds that our aim is to make it as costly as possible for anybody to invade this country, then we should examine what type of defence force is best suited to our needs in that regard. I think it has generally been accepted that elsewhere armies are very costly items of expense on the community as a whole and people seldom see anything but a very little return for the large expenditure that goes into the upkeep of an army and the purchase of equipment which, we hope, may never be used. We all hope there will never be need to use it in our defence.
It is, therefore, essential that we scrutinise the policy of the present Government in connection with the defence of the country and, in connection with it, the amount of money it is proposed to expend on an army and the type of army on which this money will be expended. My personal belief is that we should have a small army composed of personnel on a permanent basis and that this small army should consist of the cream of our soldiers, officers, N.C.O.s and men; that it would be highly-trained and mobile and at the same time capable of very rapid expansion and able to take in, in times of emergencies, larger groups who would be trained on a basis of three or six months a year. The actual size of this standing Army is something on which we can agree to differ —there may be differences of opinion as to whether it should be 12,000 or 8,000—and I do not propose to enter into the lists to discuss that particular aspect of the matter—I think it should be left to people who are more expert on that than we are to make recommendations as to what the actual size of that small but well trained force should be.
To augment that permanent force we need large reserves, and this, I think, is the most important point with regard to our defences. We have a very excellent body in the background known as the F.C.A. To my mind the idea behind the formation of the F.C.A. was excellent but I do not really think we can say that the F.C.A. to-day is functioning on a practical basis and that in cases of emergency we would have a first-class defence unit in the F.C.A. Deputy Collins—and I think other Deputies—the other day drew attention to the fact that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction— perhaps I should say lack of interest— among F.C.A. members. It is quite natural that that should be so as the type of training which they undergo certainly does not give them much encouragement to follow their period in that force by taking an active interest in Army matters. There is nothing as damning to a man's enthusiasm as to be subject to the same old routine meeting after meeting, the only real break being when they get a period of Army training which provides them with a little holiday, one might say, and that is all to the good.
I think we should examine this question of the F.C.A. on a broader basis. I think we must be one of the few countries in the world which depends on a voluntary force for its defence. The Irish people have been led to believe, by historians and others, that they are the greatest fighting race on earth and the idea seems to be abroad that there is no need here to provide or adopt the same methods of defence as other countries. In other words, we leave the defence of this country to the gallant few who may be prepared to offer their services in cases of emergency. My personal belief is that if this country is worth living in then it is worth fighting for and I think the time has come when the privilege should be offered to every able-bodied man in the country of training himself so that if his services are needed for the defence of the country in the future he will be there to man the gap.
I have very vivid recollections of my own period of service in the Army during the emergency. Perhaps I was one of those foolish young fellows who joined up in the defence of this country and, like many others, we hoped that we would have courage to do our duty when faced with the possibilities of an invasion. There were many young men in the ranks as privates, N.C.O.s and officers, who gave the best—when I say the best, I mean the richest years of their lives when their characters were being formed and when they would have a chance of success in the outside world —years of their lives in the Army service.
What happened? At the end of the emergency they came out of the Army in droves and there was nothing for them only a small gratuity, which ranged up to about £180, to help them to start their lives in competition with the boyos who stayed outside during the emergency sitting on the side line. Men who took their chance and joined for the period of the emergency had to start at the beginning. It has to be remembered that the period of Army service, be it five years or seven years, acts as a distinct handicap to any man who has to face a civilian life in the future. The years in the Army may be well spent so far as training for the defence of the country is concerned but they are rather badly spent where preparing for the combat of civil life is concerned.
Each one of those thousands of officers, N.C.O.s and men had to face very keen competition when they came out of the Army and the result of that is there and cannot be challenged, that 60 per cent. of the men who served through the emergency served afterwards in armies outside this country. I never want to see that state of affairs in this country again. I do not want to see the position in which these young men joined the Army and the opportunists and other types were allowed outside to dig themselves in in the good civilian jobs.
As I said earlier, if this country is worth living in it is worth preparing oneself to defend it, and I think the Minister should examine seriously the possibility of giving that opportunity to all our young men—of serving their country for a short period, perhaps, every two years. This system works out well in other countries, and as far as the manhood of this country is concerned, it would be a decided help to them in their physique and in their outlook. In my own experience one can pick out an army man anywhere by his standing, his walk and his bearing. The course that a boy of 18 or 20 would undergo in the Army from the physical and educational points of view would be of an immense benefit to him when he would come back into civilian life. The period of training should be short and should be on a competitive basis. I believe in the long run this would be the cheapest form of defence force we could have. That is all I propose to say on that.
Other Deputies have dwelt on the dissatisfaction which seems to exist in Army circles to-day on various matters and I have no doubt whatever that a great deal of dissatisfaction exists and, I am sure, will exist for all time in the Army, and any little thing we can do in this House to improve conditions for the serving personnel should be done, and every Deputy who is in a position to make representations to the Minister should make them to strengthen his hand, if necessary, when dealing with either departmental officials or with the brass hats in the Army. I said at one time here before—I have not changed my opinion and I do not know whether it is as true to-day as it was when I was in the Army—that under the brass hats there are a lot of brass heads.
I propose to give to the Minister, and to put on the records of this House some of the reasons why there is a great deal of dissatisfaction, first, in the junior officer ranks and, secondly, amongst the N.C.O.s and men. In the Army to-day we have quite a number of young officers who were officers during the period of the emergency, that is from 1940 to 1946. These men were invited to stay on in the Army. To my mind, their conditions in the Army at the present moment are not the conditions which there were guaranteed when they were, shall we say, re-commissioned in 1946. I think it is better to have all this on the records of the House so that Deputies in the future can read of how these men were treated.
In 1946, commissions in the regular Army were offered to a number of officers who had served during the period of the emergency. Most of these were young officers, and they were asked to sign an agreement to the effect that they were willing to accept these commissions. The agreement had to be signed before the 31st March, 1946, for the purpose, mark you, that "continuity of service may be observed". This was interpreted to mean that they would continue to serve in the Army but that their status would change from that of temporary officer to that of regular officer.
This interpretation, by those young officers, was borne out by the fact that they did not receive the gratuity which was given to the temporary, the emergency officers who left the Army in 1946. This particular gratuity was one that only temporary officers were entitled to. The regular officers were not entitled to it. They were also convinced of this on another ground: that the temporary officers who, prior to the 31/3/'46, had relinquished their commissions to become cadets in the Military College had, on the completion of their cadetship, been re-commissioned in their old officer rank.
As regards the loss of money which they suffered by resigning their temporary commissions and going in as cadets, they were reimbursed for the loss they suffered during the period they were cadets. That, in the minds of the temporary officers who were invited to stay on in 1946 on a permanent basis, gave them the feeling that continuity of service would be observed, as far as they were concerned. However, "the powers that be" seem to have put a different interpretation on this idea of continuity of service. The emphasis would seem to have been on the word "service", so that in November, 1946, all the temporary officers who stayed on were re-commissioned, although none of these officers had at any time relinquished his temporary commission.
We will see what that meant. If these men had relinquished their temporary commissions they immediately became entitled to the gratuity which was made available for temporary officers, but they never received that gratuity and they never relinquished their commissions. Yet, they were re-commissioned as permanent officers in November, 1946 and thus they were deprived of the gratuity. But there was a graver wrong than that done to them.
I might point out at this stage that all those officers have two commissioning certificates, and yet they were not discharged. As regards the first commissioning certificate—I think it was in 1948 or 1949—a former Minister for Defence, the late Deputy Dr. O'Higgins, stated openly that, in so far as the inter-Party Government of that time was concerned he could assure the Army men that conditions of pay would certainly not worsen during the period of office of the inter-Party Government, and to give credit where credit is due, he sanctioned increases for Army personnel. The increases which he sanctioned were, mark you, sought by the Army men on the grounds that a severe rise had taken place in the cost of living, and on that basis the then Government decided to make more money available to meet that increase in the cost of living for Army personnel.
Let us see how this extra money was dished out to the Army personnel. Let us take the rank of second lieutenant, a single man in occupation of, or sharing, a room in the mess. He received an increase of 2/6 per day. This amount was added to his pay and was included in his returns for income-tax. But as soon as he was given that increase of 2/6 per day, which was added to his income-tax, another 2/6 a day was deducted from his pay for accommodation: in other words, for the room in which he was living or sleeping, so that in point of fact he became poorer as a result of getting this 2/6 a day increase because it was now subject to income-tax. In addition, if that second lieutenant took his 30 days holidays, he was still going to pay that 2/6 for accommodation in the barracks. As far as that second lieutenant was concerned, he would have been better off not to have received the 2/6 at all. The very fact that he received it made him subject to income-tax so that he immediately lost on the transaction. I would remind Deputies that that increase of 2/6 was given because of the rise in the cost of living.
Let us take another example of the generous way in which the junior officer personnel in the Army was treated. Let us take a married lieutenant. A married lieutenant, under this increase, continued to draw his lieutenant's rate of pay. There was no increase whatever given to him in spite of the fact that these increases were supposed to meet the increased cost of living. Instead he was guaranteed promotion to the rank of captain after eight years as lieutenant. This is the point I want to bring home. He was guaranteed promotion after eight years' service but those eight years dated from his second commissioning ceremony and if that man had served from 1941 to 1946 as a lieutenant that period of service did not count for promotion when he would be in the line of promotion to the rank of captain. Instead the second commissioning ceremony when he was re-commissioned in 1946 was the date from which the eight years were counted.
Let us now take the position in regard to the gentlemen a little higher up in the service. Under these increases which the then Minister was so good as to grant a married captain got an increase, as far as I can gather from investigations I have made, of 3/- per day; a married commandant got 6/- per day; a married lieutenant-colonel got 8/- per day and a married colonel got 10/- per day. Mark you these increases were given to meet the increased cost of living. It must be a terrible thing for a married colonel and a colonel's wife to live on what he got in comparison with the married lieutenant and the lieutenant's wife. The Minister at the time and others since got away with this by saying that they had given an increase and that they had handed over the money to the Army.
I grant that this House gave the Minister authority to give this money to the Army but what did the Minister do? He handed it over and the brass hats put their big long arms into the bag and took out what they wanted, and when they had finished there was not much left for the junior ranks. It was very evasive action on the part of the Minister to allow the senior Army personnel to decide who should get the increases and what the increases should be.
There is another pointer to the dissatisfaction that can exist in Army circles. Prior to this increase, which was said to be given in order to meet the increased cost of living, there was an allowance paid for children of married officers of the Army. Officers with four or more children under 18 years of age received 6d. per day for the fourth and other subsequent children. But this children's allowance ceased from the 1st April, 1951, except for those officers who already had four children prior to that date.
Let us see how that works out. The result of that decision to discontinue those children's allowances on 1st April, 1951, means that you can have at the moment two officers of the same rank, commissioned on the same day and one of them with only four children receiving children's allowance in respect of one child and the other officer with six children receiving none at all. That is the position that has arisen as a result of the decision to discontinue the allowances from 1st April, 1951. I do not want to be uncharitable but there is something sinister in the fact that the children of the older and senior personnel were practically reared when that decision was made.
Another point which shows the dissatisfaction that exists to-day with regard to service in the Army is in reference to the retiring age which was agreed upon by a former Minister in this House. I want to make it quite clear that I believe myself that, when the decision was made to alter the retiring age, it was done with a view to giving certain preferential treatment to the older men in the Army—pre-Truce men. I have no objection to giving preferential treatment to pre-Truce men provided it is not going to do an injustice to the younger people in the Army who expect to get promotion from now on.
When the decision was made by this former Minister to alter the retiring age many of the senior officers had then reached the retiring age. Many had their families reared and their houses purchased and were living in quite favourable circumstances. The retiring age for commandants was extended from 51 to 54 years of age with one year for pre-Truce service; for lieutenant-colonels from 54 to 57 years plus one year for pre-Truce service and for colonels from 57 to 60 years plus one year for pre-Truce service. If we follow this up it will show how the openings which should be available to-day to the younger men in the Army are closed for many years and when you have officers held down with no hope of promotion you are going to have dissatisfaction. If that dissatisfaction is present in the commissioned ranks it is going to find its way down into the ranks of the N.C.O.s and privates.
When the seniority list and the retiring age limit was set up the position to which I referred earlier on with regard to the temporary officers became clear. The temporary officer who served from 1940 to 1946 and was re-commissioned in 1946 now found himself, as a result of this seniority list, in the position that although he had been a lieutenant from 1940 all during the emergency he now became junior to any lieutenant who had, by November, 1946, been two years out of the Military College. If that is not favouritism I do not know what favouritism is. It meant that the man who stayed in the Army in 1946 on the impression that his standing would not be altered found himself junior to the man who went to the Military College from 1944 on. I do not think that was a fair way to treat those young men but that is not the worst part of the picture.
In connection with this promotion trouble that exists, we can come up a little closer to the present day than 1951. It was bad enough to have this situation pan-out in 1951 but in 1954 when it became apparent that this extension of the upper age limit for the senior officers was going to affect the promotion of certain younger officers in the Army, there was a further change made Now when I refer to certain junior officers in the Army I am referring specifically to those who were closely connected with the senior personnel who were about to retire. It was found that the existing age limits, the retiral ages fixed, would block the avenue of promotion for these younger men. A step was taken in 1954 to ensure that that would not result in harming the chances of those younger men and the way that was achieved was by giving a further extension. This extension amounted to two years extra on top of the one year for pre-Truce service. Therefore, these senior ranks of commandant, lieutenant-colonel and colonel, in addition to getting one year's pre-Truce service in 1951, got two years more in 1954.
I do not think many members of the House will understand the implications of that move but it amounts to this, that that extra period of service given to those men will enable them to stay on long enough to ensure that those temporary officers who were re-commissioned in 1946 in the Regular Army will now reach the retiring age at the same time as these senior officers. That means that when these men, shall I describe them as the formerly temporary officers, reach retiring age, at the same time as these senior men, there will be room left for rapid promotion for the remainder of the younger men who are in the Army to whom I have already referred as being closely connected with the senior ranks who got the privilege I mentioned.
The Minister should make a careful inquiry into this because I am satisfied from the investigations I have made that it is very cleverly organised. I want to see in the Army equal opportunity for all serving officers whether they were cadets or emergency officers. There should be no discrimination whatever in regard to these men. I can assure the Minister that this 1954 manoeuvre, as I would describe it, has resulted in a most discontented junior and middle group in the Army. I might describe it as an ulcerated stomach in the Army and it has had the effect that many of the officers have now a complete lack of interest in Army matters and many of them are turning to sidelines to the detriment of their Army work and of the Army in general.
I am not the only Deputy in this House to point out this dissatisfaction, but I have given reasons and I am prepared to argue these reasons outside the House. It is my intention to pursue this matter into the future. I must confess—and I might put that on record, too—that, although I have been in the Army myself, due to the pressure of my constituency work and other work in connection with my position as a public representative, I did not give the time that I should have given to investigating the position of men who served, and with whom I had the privilege of serving, during the period of the emergency. I did not take the time to ascertain some of their grievances, but I have done so in recent times and the position is far worse than I thought it would have been.
I have dealt to some extent with the situation in regard to officer personnel. I do not wish to delay the House but I would like to raise a matter in connection with N.C.O.s, privates and other ranks. I wrote in 1953 to the former Minister, Deputy Traynor, about this, and he was courteous enough to send me a very comprehensive and detailed statement of the position in the Army in regard to personnel who are unfortunate enough to suffer from T.B. There seems to be an extraordinary mentality abroad at the present time in regard to soldiers who suffer from T.B. When we look outside at the change in mentality which has taken place in this country in the last eight or nine years on health matters and then consider the mentality in Army circles as to how soldiers who are serving men should be treated when they are unfortunate enough to suffer from T.B., it is high time that the headlights of publicity were turned on that mentality in this House. To put it very bluntly, a member of the Army who contracts T.B., although he may have seven, eight or nine years' service, will get no disability allowance or pension when he is discharged from the Army unless he is able to prove that he contracted T.B. during the period of the emergency, between 3rd September, 1939 and 2nd September, 1946. If he is not able to prove that he contracted T.B. during that period, he is out, and he has to depend on civilian life for rehabilitation. To give an indication of the way the Department look at it, I will quote from the letter dated 12th September, 1953, which I received from the then Minister for Defence, Deputy Traynor, in this connection:—
"Up to the present the principle has been followed of providing in the Army Pensions Acts for pensions in respect of wounds or injuries attributable to Army service during any period, but for pensions for ill-health due to disease, only in respect of periods such as the April, 1922-September, 1924, active service period and the emergency period, during which the soldier is exposed to an abnormal extent to the risk of disease."
They are the only two periods during which members of the forces will be recognised as being entitled to disability allowances in respect of T.B. even if they contract that disease while serving in the Army in August, June or July, 1939, or in December of 1946. If they contract the disease before or after the emergency period they are out; there is no hope for them as regards a disability pension.
This view of the Department was expressed in the following terms in the letter written to me:—
"The view which has prevailed as regards peace-time Army service is that the duties of the members of the forces in peace time are no more arduous or exacting than those of many sections of the adult population of military age, and that the much improved conditions of present-day soldiering are conducive to physical fitness and involve at least, no more risk of disease than the normal conditions of work in civil occupations."
That is the mentality of the Army authorities with regard to the danger of contracting T.B. by Army personnel. I wonder do they take into consideration the fact that during peace time soldiers undergo hardships that are almost as bad as they would be expected to undergo in times of warfare? I wonder do the people who planned out this realise that the manoeuvres which the troops undergo can have a very severe effect on the health of those young men? I wonder is it realised that sleeping in bivouacs in wet weather is conducive to T.B.? How many civilians are expected to sleep in the open or in bivouacs or to stay up on route marches for nearly six or seven hours in all kinds of weather?
There is no comparison and I want the Minister to ensure that the necessary changes are brought about as quickly as possible to enable the Army personnel to enjoy the same benefits in regard to contracting T.B. now as were enjoyed during the emergency period.
I do not know whether the Minister has yet been approached but I know he will be approached by the Organisation of National Ex-Servicemen. The organisation has taken up this matter and we know that the former Minister was sympathetic in his approach to their case and in his meeting with these people. It takes time in a Department to make changes but I feel sure that if the former Minister were still there these changes would have been made by now and I am asking the present Minister, his successor and a man who, as Deputy Barry mentioned, is well liked by the Army personnel, to show his keen interest in their welfare by tackling that particular grievance which exists among soldiers of all ranks.
The other and final point to which I will refer is the necessity for making an examination into the conditions of service and promotions made between 1948 and 1954. If he makes that examination, the Minister will find that he will have no trouble in establishing the reasons why these soldiers have this feeling of dissatisfaction. It exists among the junior personnel of the officer rank throughout the country to-day.
