I appreciate what Deputy Moran said. Really, the essence of what he wishes to urge was very much present in the mind of the Minister when this Bill was being framed. There were two problems to be solved. One was the measure of damages and the other the question of how far we should extend the scope of the dependents—how far he would stretch out the elastic. If the elastic is stretched too far it is bound to break. The more dependents you put in, the less there is for what Deputy Moran calls the principal person. We were fully alive to that.
On the Second Reading, we were anxious to get the views of Deputies of the House on how far we should widen the range of dependents. The Minister pointed out that he had left out a provision which is now being inserted—to bring in those people who stand in loco parentis to other people, and vice versa. It was felt that the number of dependents had gone as far as it was wise to go if not too far, but in deference to the views expressed by the House the Minister decided to bring in this amendment which will be moved by him to bring in people who are in loco parentis and vice versa.
There is the danger that if you widen the scope the damages, being only one sum, will be thinned out according as they are distributed. On the measure of damages we would like to have had more discussion than there was. Originally, we thought of following the principle that was laid down tentatively by Mr. Justice Casey, when Attorney-General, and bringing in a new measure of damages. We came to the conclusion, however, that to do that would make confusion worse confounded and possibly, after a whole series of cases in the Supreme Court, we would find ourselves with a direction from the Supreme Court that the principles laid down on the decisions in the Fatal Accidents Act are still to be followed.
There is only one sum for all dependents and the jury will judge how to divide that amongst them. The only safeguard against the danger adverted to by Deputy Moran is the fact that it has been decided by the Supreme Court that you must, in order to establish dependency, give evidence of the fact of dependency, the nature of the dependency and the amount. That decision was responsible for the practice that grew up of giving evidence by actuaries. Each dependent would have to make his case and prove it in court. It would then have to be left to the good sense of a judge or jury to assess the relevant claims of each dependent.