I move:—
That, since modern developments have greatly modified the usefulness of present expenditure on defence and rendered it wasteful in large measure, Dáil Eireann is of the opinion that a Select Committee consisting of 14 members to be nominated by the Committee of Selection, of whom six shall be a quorum, should be appointed with power to send for persons, papers and records to inquire into, consider and report upon the whole question of national defence expenditure.
I think the motion speaks for itself. However, I presume it is necessary for me to give to the House the various reasons why I and others outside the House believe that the time is ripe for an overhaul of our defence plans and our expenditure thereon. It is necessary to go back a little into the history of the Defence Forces and of the Defence Plan that we have at the moment. I propose to go back only a short period, to the end of the last war.
Deputies who were members of this House in 1947 and 1948 will recollect that a great deal of discussion took place here on what a suitable Army for this country would be—the strength, and the type of Army that we should have in this country. It was decided by the experts that the ideal system for this small nation would be a voluntary Defence Force, that this voluntary Defence Force would be based on a small but highly trained professional Army. When I say "small" I mean small by international standards, an Army, taking into consideration our social and economic problems and our financial position, that would be pretty large for a country like this.
The idea at that time was that if there was a danger of invasion or the likelihood of this country becoming embroiled in war we would have sufficient time to call out the Volunteers and that the regular personnel in the Army would have sufficient time to train these Volunteers. This plan was based on events of the last war. The first phase in France in the last war gave adequate time here to recruit and train an efficient emergency force. The post-war decision taken here was to build our defence on this nucleus of a Regular Army, assisted by the Volunteers if and when an emergency was declared.
The decision, as recorded in this House, was to recruit a regular standing Army with the strength of 12,500 persons. It is very important at this stage that though the plan was for a personnel of 12,500, that figure was never reached in spite of successive energetic recruiting campaigns. In other words, putting it very bluntly, the plan envisaged in the post-war period never materialised. We never had the strength in manpower that was envisaged in those earlier years. To-day we have less than 8,000 soldiers and at no period since then has the figure been exceeded. At the same time we have had the officer and N.C.O. element in the Army almost at full strength and we have continued gaily turning out officers in great style from the Curragh Military College.
Supposing the same position obtained to-day as did during the war period would it be unreasonable for me to suggest that it is demoralising for the officer personnel to be at full strength and not to have sufficient troops under their command for the purposes of training. I believe it is most demoralising and also that no officer can be really efficiently trained unless he has practical experience in handling and controlling troops. As I have pointed out, we have not enough troops for the officer personnel in our Army.
I do not intend to go into any great detail, because on this occasion I am trying to draw as broad a picture as I can. Our defence plan is based on the lessons of the last war and the last war and its plans are as outmoded as the bow and arrow. The hydrogen bomb, the guided missile, the atomic submarine, have brought revolutionary changes in the conception of warfare but, in spite of the fearful and fantastic changes that have taken place all over the world, this little country has gone on gaily and unashamedly with its outmoded system of defence. The ill thought-out plan to which I have referred never materialised but it has cost this country in the last ten years £58,000,000. In addition, we have spent another £3,000,000 on pensions for our retired Army personnel so that by next March we shall have spent approximately £61,000,000 in the last ten years on a defence plan that never materialised.
It might appear that £1,000,000 or £60,000,000 would be small change to a nation such as the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. who might spend it on the launching of one particular missile, but that £60,000,000 is a lot of money for a nation like this. I would be the last person in this House, even though I consider £60,000,000 is a large sum, to criticise that expenditure on defence if I knew or believed that it was being spent on a practical defence system.
Have we yet seen the light? What is the position? In spite of the changes to which I have referred in the present year we are spending over £6,000,000 again on this outmoded defence system. It may be worth while to give the House some information as to how the money is being spent. Before we pay a soldier or clothe or feed him we pay to civilians and civil servants attached to the Army out of the £6,000,00 no less than £938,435. That means we are spending this year almost £1,000,000 of the Defence Vote on civilians.
In case the Minister suggests I am taking this opportunity to criticise some of the civilian personnel we can break down that still further. Of the civilian personnel, 1,625 civilians are attached to the Army in various capacities as fitters, caretakers, carpenters and so on and they cost £650,000. We have 522 civil servants and they cost £288,000 so that we have a total of 2,147 civilians costing this year almost £1,000,000 in the defence system.
Now let us compare the proportion of Army personnel, men charged with the defence of the country, and the civilians. For every civilian we have four privates, or it can be put the other way round. For every four privates in the Army we have one civilian in some capacity attached to the Army and drawing out of the Army Vote. I do not think it is unfair for me to suggest that on that proportion there is room and scope for a committee such as I have suggested to make a thorough examination as to the necessity or desirability of having that number of civilians attached to the Defence Forces.
Let us look at the Army personnel. Speaking subject to correction in regard to changes that may have been made recently—because I am referring in all this debate to the Book of Estimates for the current year—we have 1,330 commissioned officers in the Army and that includes all officers in the Army and in the Naval service. Their total pay packet is £1,080,000, that is to say another sixth of the total sum available for Defence. Between N.C.Os. and corresponding ranks in the naval service the pay is £890,000 and the pay for the private soldiers and sailors is £1,288,000. Putting it more briefly, the pay of the combined officer and N.C.O. element ranges within a few thousand pounds of the £2,000,000 figure. In other words, almost £2,000,000 goes on their pay while the pay of the soldiers and the naval service is £1,288,000. The pay of the officers and N.C.Os. combined exceeds that of the privates by £698,000. It would be logical to conclude that we are top heavy with regard to our officer personnel or else we are not paying the bottom ranks enough in proportion. I do not know which is the correct conclusion, but I suggest there is room for inquiry.
Let us have a look now at the strength of the officer personnel versus the privates. If we take officers and N.C.Os. together we get a proportion of one officer for every 1-3/5th private. If the House is not satisfied with my lumping together commissioned and non-ocommissioned, I shall give the figures separately. We have a commissioned officer to less than seven privates, or a commissioned officer to a little over six privates. Can it be seriously suggested in those circumstances that an officer can be trained efficiently in his duties? Practical exercise in the field and elsewhere must be an absolute joke when one has only paper battalions to lead, guide and train. I want to put it on record now that the officers and N.C.Os. are, in my opinion, first-class men despite the handicaps under which they labour. It is a tragic situation to have first-class officers and N.C.Os. sitting twiddling their thumbs for the last ten years waiting for the recruits that never turned up.
With regard to pay, there is one point I want to clarify. I omitted dealing with the amount of money that is being paid out in pensions to officer personnel. It is something that needs serious examination. In the Book of Estimates this year we have a figure for pensions for officers who retired before the Minister used the scythe on the top ranks recently. We have one general, two lieutenant-generals, four major-generals, 17 colonels, 35 lieutenant-colonels and 119 commandants and the total sum paid in pensions this year is £124,655. Mark you, that figure will increase because next year, due to the action taken by the Minister in retiring a number of old-timers from the Army there will be a bigger bill to meet for pensions. I do not criticise the steps he has taken. Possibly the idea was to give a chance to the younger men. I believe, however, that he should have waited for a reorganisation before promoting the younger men.
It is interesting to note that a number of these retired officers hold down other State jobs and thereby help to fill the emigrant ship. As far as the State is concerned the principle should be "one man one job." In my opinion, one pay packet from the State is sufficient. There is room for examination there of the Defence Plan. Having waited ten years for recruits who never turned up, is it not time we were logical and cut our cloth as far as officer personnel is concerned? Quite apart from the evolution of weapons and the improvements that have taken place, is not the plan we have futile even in existing circumstances? The expenditure involved is both extravagant and wasteful.
I shall turn now to the Air Corps. Any criticism I make is not of individuals. I have nothing but the greatest respect for them, and some of them, I am glad to say, are amongst my best friends. But my regard for the Army will not prevent me criticising the defence plan. A decision was taken here a few years ago to equip our Air Force with Vampire jet planes. These were purchased to train our pilots in handling such planes. Three planes were purchased at a cost of £147,000. I read somewhere that the emphasis should be placed on the word "vampire"—the bloodsucker—because these Vampires fairly sucked the money out of the Exchequer. A greater waste I do not know. They were hardly off the assembly line in Britain when, as far as Britain was concerned, they were obsolete. The runways at Baldonnel had to be extended. In the course of the recommended reconstruction first-class arable land was acquired. When the work of making the runways was finished the cost to the State was over £600,000. And this was to allow three jets to land!
Anybody will realise that three jets on their own are of no use to the Air Corps. When the three were purchased they were the first of a proposed contract—which I agree had not been fully signed—for nine. Every Air Corps likes to have a squadron, and in any squadron we have nine aircraft. We first purchased three, and the hope of the Army personnel who advised the Government was that six more of these obsolete planes would be purchased. Luckily enough, public opinion and developments in the jet world saved us that expenditure.
