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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 7 Dec 1960

Vol. 185 No. 6

Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 1960—Second Stage.

I move that the Bill will be now read a Second Time.

I appreciate that, in considering this Bill, Deputies will certainly have in the forefront of their minds its application to the action of the United Nations now proceeding in the Congo, but I should like, at the beginning of my remarks, to place the measure against the wider background of our attitude and obligations as a member of the United Nations.

On the second reading in July of the Defence (Amendment) Bill, 1960, which was limited to six months, I mentioned that, foreseeing the possibility that requests of the kind with which we were then concerned in relation to the Congo might be received from the United Nations, the Government had had legislation for this purpose under consideration for some time; and I indicated that it was proposed to ask the Oireachtas to pass a permanent Bill with a clause requiring approval of the Dáil by resolution before it could be given effect in any specific instance. The Bill before us is of this character.

As Deputies are aware, the Dáil approved unanimously on 25th July, 1946, a motion recommending the Government to take steps to secure this country's admission to the United Nations. On that occasion a very full debate took place in the House on the motion and on the United Nations generally. It is true that the Dáil and the country were then less familiar than they are today with the United Nations Charter, and that, because of the situation existing in the Security Council, the United Nations has evolved in a somewhat different way from what was anticipated at that time. In 1946 the Charter was little more than a year old and the Organisation had only just begun to function. Nevertheless, fourteen years later the debate which took place in July, 1946, can be held to have been extremely relevant to the implications of membership of the United Nations and, in particular, to the issues which arise in considering the present Bill. Two things will, I think, strike anyone who reads that debate now.

Firstly, there was a very proper insistence by all speakers on the obligations which membership of the United Nations would impose on this country. Secondly, there was, not only on the vote but in the many speeches made, a striking unanimity of view that this country should become a member of the United Nations despite its possible defects and the uncertainties surrounding its future development.

The Charter imposes on the members of the United Nations quite substantial obligations. Among the purposes set out in Article 1 is the taking of "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace"; Article 2.5 provides that "all members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Chapter VII of the Charter provides more specifically for members making available to the Security Council "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed force, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The obligations under this particular Chapter of the Charter received special attention in the debates here in July 1946. The failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree on the implementation of these provisions has, however, meant that they have not been implemented, and hence that the particular requirements there laid down do not at present apply. But the more general provisions to which I have referred concerning participation by members in action by the United Nations to maintain peace and to counter aggression are applicable; and they clearly indicate that such participation is required by the spirit of the Charter.

Apart, however, from the formal obligations accepted under the Charter there are, in my view, additional reasons why members and in particular small countries like Ireland, should be prepared to contribute positively to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations. All countries suffer, to a greater or lesser degree, from the consequences of international conflicts and disturbances. The smaller states are, however, in a particularly difficult position in such circumstances as, while they are inevitably affected by the results, their individual efforts can do little to influence world events. This at once explains and justifies that special interest they have traditionally taken in encouraging such courses of action as are calculated to avoid the danger of major conflicts which, in the present cold war situation, is inherently present in every international conflict or disturbance which arises in the world. Furthermore our own Constitution proclaims, as an aspiration of our people, concord with other nations, and, in Article 29, solemnly affirms Ireland's "devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations, founded on international justice and morality."

The Government are convinced, and I believe that this view is shared by all members of the House, that it is in the best interests not only of this country but of the world generally that we bend all our efforts to the attainment of these objectives and to the establishment of the rule of law in international affairs. It will hardly be contested that the United Nations represents the best—indeed, the only available—instrument in existence for channelling such activities. As we see it, therefore, it is not only our moral duty but in our national interests to support the growth of the influence and power of the United Nations, to acknowledge its right and function to act in any situation in any part of the world that may endanger peace, to encourage action under its auspices in such circumstances, and to be prepared where necessary to contribute from our resources to the fulfilment of these responsibilities by the United Nations.

It is for these various reasons that the Government recommends to the Dáil the Bill now before the House. Under it the Government of the day will have power to answer a call from the United Nations to make contingents of the Defence Forces available abroad as part of an International United Nations Force for the performance of duties of a police character. The Bill provides however that, except in certain clearly defined cases, the exercise of this power will be subject to the approval of Dáil Éireann in each instance.

While what is proposed is a permanent law which would be desirable and necessary even if the present situation in the Congo had never arisen, it is that situation which is the immediate occasion of the Bill. As Deputies know, we agreed last July, with the co-operation of the Oireachtas in enacting the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1960, to accede to a request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make a contingent of Irish troops available for the Congo in response to an appeal addressed to the United Nations by the Government of the Congo and endorsed by the Security Council. We did this because the request seemed to us, in all the circumstances, a reasonable one by reference to our membership of the United Nations, and because we were satisfied that the action which the United Nations proposed to take was in the best interests of the Congo, of Africa and of world peace, and that our participation in the action could contribute to its success.

In the intervening period the situation in the Congo has, unhappily, not improved as we had hoped. Indeed, that country has been beset throughout the past five months with a state of unrest, confusion and dispersal of authority which are most unfortunate. Few Deputies will doubt, however, that the Congo situation would have been a great deal worse than it now is, if the United Nations had not intervened, or, indeed, that the peace of the world might have been gravely endangered if, in the absence of action by the United Nations, there had been rival interventions in any form by the great-power contestants of the cold war. If the United Nations effort should fail there, the consequences could be very serious indeed, and not only in terms of damage to the effectiveness, power and prestige of the United Nations but also for the future of other new states now emerging into independence in the African continent, or hoping to achieve independence in the early future, and for the prospects of relaxing the world-wide tensions which threaten the general peace. We have, of course, no guarantee that the United Nations operation will succeed. For the sake of international tranquillity, we must sincerely hope that it will and that within a short time the Congo will be firmly set on the road of orderly government and internal stability. Such a development would not only eliminate all the dangers for international peace inherent in the present situation but would also provide a fruitful and most encouraging example of the power for good in difficult situations of the United Nations.

By virtue of the Defence (Amendment) Act of July the Government made available for the United Nations force in the Congo a contingent consisting of two battalions, of which the first went abroad in July and the second in August. The original request from the Secretary-General had called for only one battalion. A few weeks later, however, Mr. Hammarskjoeld advised us that the total forces available to the United Nations in the Congo were far from adequate for the needs of the situation, and he appealed for a second Irish battalion. Notwithstanding the deterioration in the Congo situation which had then become apparent, the Government decided to accede to this request also, but in so doing declared that the two battalions could not be available for more than six months, i.e. the limit of the period covered by the Defence (Amendment) Act. The Secretary-General was informed at the same time that any contingent this country might find it possible to send to the Congo thereafter could not exceed one battalion.

Last month we initiated arrangements with the United Nations for withdrawal from the Congo by 25th January of the two battalions now there. When we did so, the Secretary-General requested that we should make available one battalion after withdrawal of the existing contingent. The Government have been giving sympathetic consideration to this request. The measures needed to give it effect, including the selection, equipment and inoculation of the personnel involved, are best taken over many weeks. The Government have, therefore, thought it wise to put a battalion in readiness for service in the Congo so that it would be available to go there in time should it be decided to send it. Only soldiers who volunteer for the operation will be included in the unit.

If, as I hope, the Oireachtas approves the present Bill, the legislative basis will exist for dispatching one battalion to replace the two now in the Congo when they have been withdrawn. I wish to make it clear, however, that whether or not this new battalion will go to the Congo will depend on two conditions. The first is that, in the judgment of the Government, the situation there requires the continued presence of a United Nations force and of European contingents in that force. The second condition is that the objective of a United Nations force in the Congo will still be as it was when the first contingent was dispatched, that of helping to keep peace and order in the Congo while the Congolese people and leaders are getting themselves organised and able to carry that obligation themselves without United Nations help.

I am sorry to interrupt the Taoiseach, but would he repeat the two conditions?

The first is that, in our view, the situation there should still be such as to require the continued presence of a United Nations force and of European contingents in that force. The second is that the objectives of the United Nations in the Congo should still be as they were when the first contingent was despatched, that is to say, keeping peace and order while the Congolese people and their leaders are getting themselves in a position to carry that obligation themselves without the help of the United Nations. If, when the time comes in a few weeks for definite action, these two conditions are fulfilled, the battalion will be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. It will be understood, however, that, as in the case of the first contingent, the period during which the new battalion will be available in the Congo will not exceed six months. This does not mean that we have reason to believe that the presence of some United Nations forces in the Congo will not be required even after a further six months. It is because we think that, in the prevailing tensions and climatic conditions of the Congo, it is not desirable to keep personnel there for longer periods than six months at a time and also because we think it is reasonable to limit our commitment in that way.

Because of the tragic loss of Irish lives in the Congo operations of the United Nations, and because the preservation of order and protection of lives there have involved clashes with sections of the Congolese peoples whom we desire only to help, and the possibility that similar clashes may recur before order is finally restored under a functioning and representative Congo Government, it is understandable that we face the enactment of this measure, and the possible dispatch of another Irish contingent, after the battalions now serving there have been withdrawn, with greater anxiety, arising from clearer appreciation of the hazards attending the enterprise, than we may have had in July last. I feel, however, that all Deputies, like the vast majority of our people, understand the importance to mankind of the task to which we have been committed, and that we could not, in conscience or in honour, withdraw from it so long as there is, in the judgment of the United Nations, a continuing need for our help.

Pending the elaborations and details of this proposed legislation by the Minister for Defence, which I assume will follow, I think the carefully considered statement of the Taoiseach calls for some remark. I feel sure the Taoiseach will agree with me that the occasion of permanent legislation for the purpose of regularising the dispatch of Irish troops abroad, in the service of the United Nations, for the preservation of peace is one that all of us would wish to avail of to pay tribute not only to the performance of our regular Army in preparing the contingent called for last summer with quite dramatic despatch and efficiency but also for taking their place in the Congo far earlier than might ordinarily be expected from what is a relatively young Army. I think this is a suitable occasion to express here in the Oireachtas our admiration of the credit done to this country by our Army's performance in that regard. Nor should this occasion pass without our mentioning again our sorrow and our admiration for the young men who gave their lives in the Congo in defence of a great principle, the preservation of peace far from our own shores but with the ultimate end of protecting this country from the possible consequences of a disruption of world peace.

It is right that we, who are responsible for sending them there, should refresh our memories and recall what we had in mind when we took the decision to despatch our troops so far from home. Here I make a certain reservation. When the Taoiseach spoke of appreciating, perhaps today better than we did last July, the great hazards, I think on reflection he will agree that we did appreciate the hazards and the dangers into which our Army was going but in the full knowledge of that we felt that even though some of them had to die so far from home history would have it to tell that they really died in defence of this country in the preservation of world peace and in the protection of Ireland from the consequences of a conflagration which might immediately start there and spread to destroy both us and a great many more. It should be a comfort even to those they left behind to realise that there can be no doubt whatever when they died in the Congo they were serving no illusory purpose but that of the ultimate defence of Ireland and the things for which Ireland stands in the world.

Let me say clearly that, in principle, we approve of providing Irish troops to assist United Nations action abroad for the preservation of peace. That being so, we approve the principle of this Bill. The Congo situation must naturally be present to our minds in the consideration of legislation of this kind although, as the Taoiseach rightly points out, this legislation is of a permanent character and does not relate exclusively to the Congo situation as it appears today. I think we do realise, and should keep constantly in mind, the rigours of service and the climatic and health difficulties that exist for Irish troops in the Congo.

I was a little surprised, therefore, to hear the Taoiseach say it was the Government's intention to accept as normal a six months' period of service in that area. This area, certainly the coastal regions of it, approximate to the old Gold Coast, now Ghana, in climatic conditions and I have always been told that European personnel serving there, whether in the Army or the Civil Service, have usually served a three months' term. That was considered as long as it was prudent to require people accustomed to our kind of climate actively to serve in conditions such as obtain in the Congo. It is true, of course, that in different parts of the Congo various climatic conditions prevail. Perhaps the occasion would be availed of before we conclude our consideration of this Bill to advert to the question as to whether the period of service in the Congo for our troops could be abbreviated by providing that they would return every three or four months while others take their place.

It is right for us to face the fact, which I believe to be true—and I do not believe there is any use mincing words about it—that if everybody decided they wanted the Congo situation to settle peaceably and the sovereignty of the Congolese people to be effectively implemented, there would be relatively little difficulty in achieving it. Let us not minimise the problem of bringing so large a territory as the Congo under what we understand as ordered government. Let us not forget or appear to forget the tribal character of the population and the special problems which arise there and which are not familiar to a normal European in established society.

I believe these difficulties could have been overcome, and could still be overcome, if outside nations were not concerned to keep the pot of dissension boiling in the Congo. If outside Powers make up their minds to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations to help the Congolese people to the achievement of ordered institutions, it will be a virtual impossiblity to bring about the developments we so earnestly desire, that is, that the people of the Congo should live in peace, freedom and ordered conditions under a Government of their own choosing. Nor should we recoil from the responsibility of naming the powers responsible for preventing a happy solution of the Congo problem if and when it becomes clear that the possibility of a solution has receded from our grasp. Let us continue to hope and to pray that the worst efforts of those concerned to maintain chaos will fail and that the purpose of the United Nations will succeed. I think it will be the duty of our Government, whenever and in whatever circumstances that duty may arise, having taken our full part in proportion to our resources, in the effort to establish the sovereignty of the Congo people in their own country, to name emphatically any power which seeks to frustrate the common purpose of the United Nations in which we have played our part.

The Taoiseach stated that the mind of the Government was that before despatching the third battalion to replace the two battalions we are contemplating calling home after their period of service, two considerations will fall to be examined: one, whether the situation still requires United Nations forces in the Congo and whether those forces require European contingents, and two, whether the conditions continue to represent a true effort to enable the Congo leaders and people to prepare themselves to take over and maintain their own government.

I see the force of the considerations mentioned by the Taoiseach but I think we have to clarify our minds so as not to constitute ourselves a court of appeal from the decision of the United Nations. At an early stage of this matter, the Taoiseach said that he did not want Irish troops serving under the United Nations insignia to be serving as Irish troops in the field, but to be recognised as serving as United Nations troops in the field. I think he is right. We are there only as participants with the United Nations, joining our common effort for a common cause.

I should be glad if, at some stage, the Government would face this dilemma. If we are to constitute ourselves a court of appeal from the decision of the United Nations that the situation still requires United Nations Forces in the Congo, and that force should contain European contingents, or as a court of appeal from the decision that conditions still continue in the Congo which require United Nations personnel there in order to facilitate the preparation and establishment of orderly government by the Congo leaders and people themselves, does that not carry us much further than the decision that we should send troops to the Congo?

If we set ourselves up as a court of appeal from that decision and signify and express dissent from the decision of the United Nations by withdrawing all our troops, despite their request that we continue to participate, surely then, if we, acting as a court of appeal from the decision of the United Nations, determine that the United Nations are not in good faith in seeking to maintain forces in the Congo with European contingents, and are not in good faith in believing in maintaining such conditions as will enable the Congo leaders and people to establish free government institutions for themselves, we are arrogating to ourselves the right to judge the United Nations and, if that judgment be adverse, and we reach the conclusion that the United Nations are no longer acting in good faith, we could no longer participate in an organisation we believed were concerned to prevent the Congo people from establishing their own Government. If United Nations forces, with European contingents, are maintained in the Congo for any purpose other than the purpose originally stated by the United Nations, I feel that our position would be extremely ambiguous.

I mention that now only because I think the Taoiseach understates the case by saying that he will review the two conditions he mentioned, and conceives the possibility of a situation arising, as a result of that review, in which the Government would determine to withdraw the two Irish battalions and despatch no battalion to take their place. If such decisions were arrived at on high policy grounds, very much wider issues would require to be considered. If the Taoiseach has any knowledge of such issues being in the offing, I suggest to him that, the sooner he lets us know about them, the better.

I fully appreciate the difficulties of keeping accurate day to day contact with every development in connection with the events in the Congo. I welcome and cordially approve the present visit of the Chief of Staff and the officers who accompanied him to visit the forces in the field. Quite apart from their purely military function, I recognise that the Government are in some difficulty in getting reliable political appreciation of the situation from day to day and week to week as it develops in the Congo.

The Taoiseach said, when the initial legislation was under consideration last summer, that he accepted the obligation to keep the Opposition as fully informed as he was in a position to do about the events in the Congo. I am bound to say that perhaps the Taoiseach did provide us with all the information that was available to him, but if he did, then I deeply sympathise with him in his responsibility as head of the Government, if the sum of the information which has reached him approximates to the sum of the information which has reached me from him, because, apart from some antediluvian resolutions passed from time to time in the United Nations Organisation in New York, faint duplicates of which were sent to me in envelopes from time to time, I have received virtually no information from the Taoiseach.

I think it right on this occasion to say that I did not conceive it to be my duty to maintain a barrage of questions to the Taoiseach who has plenty to do and many responsibilities to grapple with, or to clamour for information I felt that he might not be in a position to provide. The Taoiseach rightly emphasised, opening here today, that the decision taken heretofore in regard to our action in the Congo and our participation in United Nations activities received the unanimous approval of Oireachtas Éireann—of Dáil Éireann, in any case. I think he rightly attaches value to that unanimity.

I do not allege against him that he concealed from Deputy Corish and myself anything we ought perhaps to have known, but I am bound to record the fact that if he has no more information than he has imparted to Deputy Corish and myself, he must have very little. I am bound to record the fact also that if Deputy Corish and I have not appeared to be more exigent in our demand for information, it has been because we felt bound to regard the Taoiseach's undertaking as being one he would feel binding upon himself and that if he was not volunteering more information than he was, it was because it was not available to him.

I suppose it will not produce much result to make this affirmation, and yet I make it. I and any other Deputy could indulge in violent and inflammatory talk about the forces that all commonsense men who have knowledge of world politics know to be operating in the Congo at present. Anyone who knows anything of world politics at present realises that there are powerful forces seeking to insert themselves into the Congo situation and that the least interest of these forces is the welfare of the Congo people. I could animadvert angrily and eloquently on the iniquities of those who would exploit the Congo situation to serve a remote world purpose. I do not deny a temptation to do so, but it is atemptation I am going to withstand because I believe it would do nothing but cause embarrassment and difficulty, not only for our own Government but for our troops in the field.

Yet, I do not want silence in respect of that aspect of the matter to be taken as meaning that if other Deputies choose to get up and make wild and whirling allegations of what is proceeding in the Congo, these are the only voices being raised in defence of what they choose to describe as lofty ideals. The silence I impose upon myself, and which perhaps the Taoiseach shares in respect to these complex issues, is a silence deliberately chosen in the knowledge that certain fundamental principles have guided our actions heretofore and that we are in support of troops whom we have sent to the field to serve certain clear and peaceful objectives—the preservation of peace and the defence of the ultimate right of the Congo people to determine their own form of Government and to establish it in peace and order in their own country—that we have no other interests, that we are concerned to defend those interests, but are not so foolish as not to realise that other influences are operating, too.

I do not believe that any exhortation from any part of this House to Deputies to refrain from reckless and partisan talk will avail of anything. It is for that reason I desire to go on record as saying that, although whirling words may be spoken here, if they are not effectively and trenchantly rebutted in the course of this discussion, it is because we believe that higher interests, not least those of our own troops in the field, can best be served by watching these forces in discreet silence at this time and with the firm resolution that should they effectively frustrate the higher purpose of the United Nations, in which we have our small participation, it will then be time to take the appropriate steps.

In conclusion, we approve the permanent legislation on the grounds I have set forth. Naturally, we shall expect to hear from the Minister for Defence in the course of the debate some amplification of the administrative details involved in this legislation, on which someone more competent than I in respect to the technical administration of defence will have some comment to make from this side of the House.

I have no objection to the general principle embodied in this Bill. In 1946, the House unanimously agreed that we should apply for membership of the United Nations and when we were ultimately accepted, there was no objection from any side of the House, or indeed from any section of the community. The only thing I find peculiar is that, although we have been a member of the United Nations for a number of years, this is the first piece of legislation introduced to enable us to fulfil our obligations to the United Nations. I do not blame anybody for that. However, it seems strange that various Governments—and I suppose I must take my share of the responsibility—omitted to introduce such legislation. It was only when the Congo affair, as it is sometimes described, arose this year that enabling legislation of a temporary nature was first introduced.

We are told by the Taoiseach that this is the permanent Bill to enable us to send contingents abroad. While approving the general principle, I should like to ask the Taoiseach some questions. The word "contingent" is very loose. I wonder would the Taoiseach consider having it defined in greater detail? A "contingent" can mean anything. I do not know the exact strength of the armed forces at present but I assume it is in the region of 10,000.

Eight thousand.

In this Bill, we are giving permission to the Government to send up to 8,000 men to places such as the Congo. Must we not have regard not alone to the population and resources of the country but to the size of our Army? Any other country in the United Nations would, I think, agree that we should send forces to places such as the Congo in accordance not only with our population and financial resources but certainly the strength of our Army. A situation could arise in which the United Nations might request us to send a contingent of 1,000, 5,000, 6,000 or even up to 7,000 men. We should have an assurance from the Taoiseach that such contingents will always be a fixed proportion or percentage of our total armed forces.

Perhaps in present circumstances one would say that we need not worry about that but the world situation changes so rapidly that there might come a time in the near future when it would be necessary for us to maintain a pretty big proportion of our Army on active service in this country. So far as Section 2 is concerned, the Taoiseach should make quite clear what is meant by the word "contingent". At the present time we have two battalions in the Congo, which amount to approximately 1,300 officers and men. That is a pretty big contribution from an Army of approximately 8,000 serving soldiers. I am not saying that we are more than filling our quota in making our contribution towards the policing of the Congo but it does seem to me to be a pretty big proportion in relation to the strength of our armed forces.

In July of this year, great stress was laid on the nature of the work and the activities in which our soldiers in the Congo were to be engaged. Their duties were described as being of a police character. All of us are conversant with the duties of the ordinary policeman—he is expected to maintain law and order. I know it is difficult for the Taoiseach to describe exactly the type of activities in which our soldiers are engaged in the Congo but it does seem to some people that they are engaged in duties that could not be described as being of a police character.

The question I raise today is whether or not they are fully equipped to carry out the duties assigned to them. Objection was taken in this House recently to questions being asked about the nature of their equipment and the plea was made that such questions were not fair to the relatives of the soldiers killed in the Congo recently. I have no intention, and I am sure there was no intention in the minds of the people who raised those questions, to hurt in any way the relatives of those who died in the Congo in recent weeks, but that does not mean that we must not raise our voices in this House to ensure that our soldiers in the Congo will have a reasonable chance of defending themselves and of survival in any conflict in which they may be engaged.

When the temporary measure was introduced and discussed in the House in July last, I raised the very same questions. I said that it would be too late afterwards to examine our consciences as to what should have been done in order to ensure that our soldiers in the Congo would be adequately equipped to look after themselves and ready to meet any situation that might arise.

The situation in the Congo at present is not very clear to the majority of the people of this country. How far the Taoiseach can go in telling us the actual situation, I do not know. The overall authority in the Congo rests with the United Nations and, in particular, with the Secretary General and some of his assistant secretaries. There has been some concern, and there still is, as to the nature of the duties in which our soldiers are required to partake.

Deputy Dillon has already referred to this matter and has referred to the fact that the Taoiseach has kindly communicated to him and to me, and perhaps to some other members of the House, certain information which comes to him through the United Nations. I should like to thank him for that information, but when I speak here this morning, I speak on behalf of the ordinary folk who would like to know a little more about the Congo and about the part the Irish soldiers are playing there. There were allegations here last week which were answered by the Minister for Defence regarding the incident in which Irish soldiers lost their lives. There did seem to me to have been quite a long delay between the time at which the ambush took place and the time at which word of it was sent back to the headquarters from which the patrol was operating. It did seem to me that the patrol could have been better equipped. That is not the fault of the Minister for Defence or the Government; it is the fault, if there is a fault, of the United Nations.

I think our soldiers in the Congo should be given a fair chance. We know that it is not their task to mow down the Congolese but they should have a fair chance to protect themselves and the best chance they could be given is to provide them with adequate equipment. The Taoiseach should assure us that our soldiers are equipped as best they can be and that all measures will be taken to ensure that more lives will not be lost.

I think the Minister for Defence also said that this particular patrol did not have a wireless transmitter. I know that our soldiers were in a fairly primitive part of the world but surely it must be within the resources of the United Nations to provide such an elementary piece of equipment to a patrol in the year 1960.

I could not follow the Taoiseach in all he said and it might have been a good thing if he had circulated at least a portion of his speech to the House. He said that we would send contingents in future to places like the Congo, if, in our view, the situation still required it. He used the words "if, in our view." The Taoiseach should expand further on that matter of our sending further troops to the Congo. I may have taken him up wrongly.

He referred to the Congo.

He did, but I should like to ask him what is the extent of our obligations to the United Nations. If they make a request and if we have responsibility and obligations to them, can we refuse that request? If the United Nations say that they want another battalion or two battalions, do we send them or not at our own discretion? I should like to have that point cleared up and perhaps the Taoiseach would refer to it when replying.

I know that the Government are kept in the picture by reports from the United Nations but I should like to ask the Taoiseach if we have any reports from our own representatives in the Congo. So far as I am aware, the only Irish people in the Congo are the soldiers serving there. I advocated in July last that there ought to be somebody sent from the Department of External Affairs who could send back reports to the Government from the point of view of the Irish people. I wonder if that is still possible, bearing in mind the present situation in the Congo. I know that there was an incident last week when a diplomatic representative—I think, of Ghana—was molested in Leopoldville. I think it would be a tremendous advantage to the Government if they could communicate his reports to some degree to the Irish public and it would allay the undoubted fears that are in the minds of a number of people here.

I think the Taoiseach should also consider a Parliamentary delegation to the Congo. I do not suggest a delegation of anything like 12 or 15 or 20 people, but I honestly think the Taoiseach should consider sending a Parliamentary delegation to the Congo to see conditions for themselves, to try to assess the political situation there and, in particular, to satisfy themselves, or otherwise, that the conditions under which the Irish soldiers are carrying out these police duties are satisfactory. A delegation of three or four from the Seanad and Dáil would, I think, certainly help to allay the undoubted fears which many people here entertain at present.

On Section 3, I should like the Taoiseach to say whether or not this is the fact in accordance with the proposals in the section: I take it that, as far as the present personnel of the Army are concerned, they would not be required to go in present circumstances to the Congo, unless they volunteered, but, on the other hand, is it a fact that as far as new recruits are concerned, it is obligatory on them to go abroad, if they are so directed? As far as I can see from that section, that is what is meant— that future recruits, from the date of the passing of this Bill, will be required to go to any place abroad to which they are sent by the Army or by the Government, but as far as present personnel are concerned, they will be asked to volunteer and may refuse to go abroad.

I approve of the general principle of the Bill and I should be obliged if the Taoiseach would satisfy my mind on the questions I have raised.

On a point of order, I think the Minister should now explain the sections of the Bill. The Taoiseach moved the Second Reading but he has not given any explanation of the sections and I think, to put the matter in order, the proper procedure now would be for the Minister to explain the measure. The questions Deputy Corish raised in the latter part of his speech could then be properly raised on the statement made by the Minister.

The Second Reading has been moved and if the Minister wishes to intervene, that is a matter for the Minister.

It is not a point of order but if it will facilitate the Dáil, it can be done.

Was that point of order not more relevant after Deputy Dillon's speech?

Why did the Deputy not make it then?

I think the Minister said——

If the Deputy thinks it will facilitate the House, the Minister will explain the Bill.

Yes; I think it would make things right if the Minister would explain the various sections.

The Second Reading of the Bill has already been moved.

I can give a general explanation of the Bill. As the House knows, the Bill is necessary to permit of external service by our troops with international United Nations forces. It is intended to cover the despatch of personnel to unarmed United Nations forces such as the Observation Group in the Lebanon or the Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine, as well as to armed forces such as that established for duty in the Congo. It will be noted that only in the case of international forces engaged in the performance of duties of a police character will the question of sending Irish contingents arise.

Under Section 2, it is provided that the prior approval by resolution of the Dáil will be required in any situation in which it is proposed to send a contingent consisting of more than 12 members of the Permanent Defence Force to an armed United Nations force. This upper limit of 12 has been set to meet situations in which the United Nations might seek the services of only a small number of specialists or key personnel for an armed force and it would not be considered necessary to approach the House with a resolution of approval in the case of the despatch of such a small number or in connection with contribution of personnel to unarmed organisations such as those I mentioned earlier, those in the Lebanon and the Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine.

Section 3 deals with the question of liability for external service——

Could the Minister deal with paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of Section 2? It states: "the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force..." Does that mean the Government could send any force at all?

The contingent is intended to replace——

What could be the size of the reinforcement?

That will be a matter for us to decide naturally, bearing in mind the availability——

I am sorry, but is it the Dáil or the Government would decide it?

In that respect, it would be the Government. If the resolution had already been passed to despatch a contingent in a certain instance, then the question of replacing them or reinforcing them would obviously be a matter for the Government to decide, in the light of the circumstances obtaining.

I was dealing with Section 3—the question of liability for external service. This is the point Deputy Corish raised. The liability for external service will apply in the case of existing members of the Permanent Defence Force only where they consent in writing to accept it, while personnel who join after the date of the enactment of the Bill will be liable for service abroad as part of their normal conditions of service. In other words, anyone who is appointed or joins the Army after the Bill has been passed will accept, as part of his conditions of service, liability for service abroad with United Nations forces.

Section 4 provides that troops serving with an armed United Nations force will be regarded as being on active service. This will not apply in the case of personnel serving with unarmed United Nations forces. The point there is that there are different disciplinary provisions in connection with personnel who are on active service as against normal peacetime.

Section 4 also provides for some necessary amendments of the Defence Act, 1954, in the matters of a transfer of personnel between service corps, transfers to the Reserve, and discharge. Under the Defence Act, 1954, soldiers enjoy certain rights in these matters and experience has shown that in order to secure that flexibility and stability, without which it would not be practicable to assemble and maintain abroad in future a contingent such as that dispatched to the Congo, some curtailment of these rights is necessary during actual service abroad. That is the experience we have gained in respect of the contingent that has been sent off already. Experience has shown the necessity for this curtailment of these rights under the Defence Act, 1954. The intention is, therefore, that as regard these matters a period of service abroad will carry the same restrictions as are already laid down in the Defence Act, 1954, in connection with a period of emergency at home. The position in these respects of personnel already serving abroad is safeguarded under subsection (7) of Section 4.

The provision in subsection (5) of Section 4 is made for the purpose of removing a doubt as to the applicability of the regulations in question to courts-martial convened abroad for the trial of personnel of the Defence Forces on offences relating to the person or property of a person not subject to military law. Under existing legislation, the convening of such courts-martial would depend on the consent of the Superintendent of the Garda Síochána within whose district the offence was committed. This restriction has accordingly been removed in connection with external service. These courts-martial will, of course, be convened by and consist of officers of the Defence Forces, and will be otherwise strictly in accordance with the provisions of our existing Defence Forces legislation.

Section 5 of the Bill is designed to grant facilities in the matter of the making of wills, facilities which it is customary to provide for soldiers on active service. The main purpose is to provide that the will of a soldier on active service may consist of a document not attested and also that a mere verbal statement of his wishes will be sufficient, if such statement can be satisfactorily proved.

Section 6 has been included in order to secure the formal registration here of the death of any member of an Irish contingent serving abroad and, in cases where families accompany members, a death or a birth in the family. I should like to mention by way of explanation that in certain circumstances the United Nations authorise personnel to have their families with them. Two of our officers serving with the Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine were so facilitated. This section is being given retrospective effect to 1st October, 1960, in order to cover the deaths which have already occurred in the Irish contingent in the Congo. The proposed arrangements will facilitate the procurement here at home of certificates in respect of births and deaths occurring abroad.

Sections 7 and 8 of the Bill do not appear to call for any comment, except to say, in connection with the repeal of the temporary measure, due to expire in January next in the ordinary course, that the position of personnel already serving abroad has been safeguarded in the preceding sections.

As I have already stated, it is the intention to have the troops at present in the Congo home by 25th January next and no member of that contingent will be on external service after that date, unless, perhaps, at his own written request and in accordance with the legislation now before the House. When I say "perhaps at his own written request," I want to make it clear that the mere fact of a person applying to stay on in the Congo after 25th January does not mean that his application to stay on will, in fact, be accepted.

I think I have covered all the different sections in the Bill. If, however, there is any point upon which Deputies are not clear, I shall be happy to deal with it before we pass on to the Committee Stage.

It has been clearly stated that we approve the principle of the Bill. The Bill calls for very little comment. I am glad the Minister has explained the various sections. Sometimes, when sections are not explained, it is not clear what is intended. However, that is not the situation with regard to this Bill.

With regard to any number over 12, a resolution will have to be passed before they can be sent abroad. On the analogy of an illegal assembly, anything over three may be regarded as a contingent, but up to 12, no resolution will be necessary. As far as the resolution is concerned, the Oireachtas will be fully informed of the future intentions of the Government in relation to action elsewhere than in the Congo. This is a permanent measure. Let us hope we shall not have any more situations like that in the Congo, but, should such situations arise, the Government will have authority to send any force that may be required after a resolution has been passed by the Oireachtas.

The power to send unarmed forces —observers, or whatever they may be —is very essential. With regard to the question of liability for service, it is right that the Government should decide a matter of that kind after a resolution has been passed by both Houses. We can be proud of the fact that this country has grown up and there is no longer any cavil at a proposition of this kind. That is a welcome indication. The definition of active service is essential. I hope the Government will interpret it in its broadest connotation.

On the question of transfers, as the Minister pointed out, serving personnel have certain rights in their particular units. In a situation such as exists in the Congo at the moment, it is not possible, of course, to keep people in their respective units. Therefore, it is only natural that the commanding officers would have authority to transfer them from one corps to another for the better administration of the unit.

In that regard, I approve of the proposal in relation to court martial proceedings to enable them to take place abroad as well as at home and to be carried out in the most effective way. I am not clear as to whether United Nations personnel in other armies may be called. I am anxious to have it confined to officers of the Irish Forces——

——rather than that officers of other forces should participate. Provision in relation to wills is something that has existed in respect of the British and American armed forces for a considerable time. It is a useful addition here but there is a danger of abuses in it. I am not happy about the position in regard to verbal transmission but I suppose in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, it is the best way out of the difficulty. I am glad it is made retrospective to this year.

Generally speaking, the Leader of the Opposition has stated our position on this matter. With him, I want to pay a tribute to the work of the Army in their preparation for the sending out of these units and the speed with which the arrangements were carried out. It is clear that a great effort was made to ensure that their health would be preserved while on active service; inoculation as far as humanly possible has been given. Therefore, what Deputy Dillon said about the three or four months' period of service does not apply now as it did in the past. Three or four months' service in Africa was previously regarded as a long time because there were no antibiotics or vaccines to protect the health of the troops. Today there is a great improvement in that regard and the six months' period is safe enough because of the care the medical personnel in the Army has taken.

I approve of the Bill and I trust that the nation will not be called upon to act on its provisions very often. I trust also that the United Nations will succeed in their objective in establishing in the Congo an independent nation for the Congolese people and that we will have played our part in establishing the necessary form of government.

At the outset, I want to make quite clear my attitude towards the United Nations. I believe that if this attempted rescue action of the United Nations forces in the Congo fails, then not only will the situation be desperately serious from the point of view of the Congo itself and its unfortunate people, but the repercussions of its failure throughout the world must be positively calamitous for the future of civilsation. Therefore, I, as much as anybody in this House, want the Congo action to succeed.

Because of my anxiety in that regard, I have at times questioned the Taoiseach in order to see if there was anything we could do, small and all as we are, to help the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjoeld, in his formidable task in the Congo. I do not wish to take advantage of the Government's difficult position in this matter but I believe their attitude since July could be described either as extraordinarily ingenuous, on the one hand, or extraordinarily irresponsible, on the other. With the scantiest possible knowledge that any private Deputy in Parliament could have, it seems clear to myself and Deputy McQuillan, at any rate, that this Congo action was taken at a time when serious political developments were taking place, that is, of course, the proposed secession of Katanga, the proposed partition of the Congo. It was clearly taken at the time when the military considerations were of certain importance and when the political considerations were of equal, if not of greater, importance.

In these circumstances, we suggested, so that Government would be au fait with the remarkably quick-changing situation in the Congo, that a personal political representative of the Taoiseach should be sent to the Congo with our forces thus enabling us to take any action we thought fit in the circumstances. The Taoiseach refused to consider that suggestion. It seems to me he attempted to establish the most remarkable situation conceivable. He attempted to attribute to the United Nations, and to Mr. Hammarskjoeld in particular, the quality which we normally attribute to the Pope in the Vatican—the quality of infallibility. According to the Taoiseach, we contributed this force to the United Nations forces in the Congo, and thereafter their actions were independent of any considerations we might have or the Government might have about developments in the Congo.

I am glad to notice that the Taoiseach is now prepared to repudiate that doctrine of infallibility which he attributed to the United Nations, and has now admitted to us that there could be circumstances in which the Government might decide not to accept their obligations under the United Nations Charter or their interpretation of their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

I should like to remind the House that on Wednesday, 23rd November, the Taoiseach answered a Question put down by Deputy McQuillan and myself. In volume 185, column I, of the Official Report, the Taoiseach said:—

I there pointed out that the Irish contingent in the Congo would be subject to the orders of the United Nations Supreme Commander and not to the orders of the Irish Government and that, while it could be said that we were not sufficiently informed about the situation...

A remarkable admission as I pointed out at the time——

...we should not, in my opinion, regard ourselves as being under any obligation to make that appreciation.

I have already dealt with that astonishing statement made by the Taoiseach——

I still think that the attitude there defined is correct, despite the very confused and complicated political situation which still prevails in the Congo. In my view, therefore, it would be a mistake to act in the manner suggested by the Deputies.

It is quite clear that the Taoiseach is now prepared to make a reappraisal of the situation in the Congo from our point of view. He said circumstances are envisaged under which it might be necessary for us to recall our troops or not to send another battalion.

I have not the advantage of the Leader of the Opposition or the Leader of the Labour Party of being kept in close contact, as they have said, with developments as they are reported back to the Taoiseach. I am completely dependent on what I read in the papers. I read as extensively as I can in my attempts to assess the development of the situation in the Congo. I am, I need hardly say, not only disturbed about that situation but also about our attitude during the months in which our troops have been in the Congo. In order to know whether my fears are unfounded, or my conclusions unwarranted, I should like to examine the position as I see it developing, and as I have seen it developing since last July when we sent our troops.

This debate is being carried out in the shadow of a very threatening situation—civil war. Ever since the 11th or 12th July last when Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kasavubu asked for support——

The Deputy is aware that this Bill relates to the despatch of a contingent of Irish troops for outside service. The question of internal Congo politics is not in order and cannot be debated on this Bill. If the Deputy wishes to do so, he would be in order in putting down a motion for a discussion on that matter.

Is the Leas-Cheann Comhairle aware that the Taoiseach, in his opening remarks, outlined Government policy with regard to our position in the Congo? Surely if the Taoiseach is allowed to read the Government views on our position in the Congo from a written statement any Deputy is entitled to give his views?

The Chair understands that the Taoiseach commented briefly on the position in the Congo in relation to the Irish troops there. The Deputy in possession has just given notice that he is about to embark on a debate on the internal politics of the Congo. That matter is not in order.

In his opening remarks, the Taoiseach went back to our entry into the United Nations— back to 1946—to explain the reasons we applied for membership of the United Nations. He followed the entire development and gave his views from a written statement on Government policy and gave his ideas as to when we might take steps that would appear to be contrary to existing policy in connection with that operation. Surely, in those circumstances, a Deputy must be allowed sufficient scope to reply to the best of his ability to the case made by the Taoiseach with regard to our intervention in the Congo?

The Chair was referring to the remark made by Deputy Dr. Browne. He was about to discuss the internal politics of the Congo.

May I say that this is a Bill designed to establish for all time the right of the Dáil and the Government to send troops abroad? It is a continuation of the Bill passed in July during the debate on which we were permitted to discuss the situation in the Congo, and which I certainly discussed. Furthermore, is it not a fact that the only case that can be made against this Bill is a case made against the desirability of sending troops abroad and the desirability of giving this power? That is merely the case I was trying to make.

The Deputy would not be in order in discussing the internal affairs of the Congo for which the Government have no responsibility. The Deputy must keep to the Bill which deals with the sending of Irish troops to serve abroad.

Surely I am allowed to discuss the case against sending Irish troops abroad?

The Deputy may do so.

That is all I want to do. We are discussing this decision in the shadow of a meeting which is taking place today in the United Nations in which it is understood that a number of nations—four of the 15 nations —who now have troops in the Congo are seriously considering the withdrawal of those troops. The reason they are seriously thinking of withdrawing their troops from the Congo is that, in their opinion, they are being misused. I want to put it to the Dáil that our troops have been misused, on the political side certainly, during their time in the Congo since July last.

I put to the Taoiseach once again the desirability of sending a personal representative, a political representative, to the Congo in order to enable us here to assess the situation fully. The position is that the United Nations are now divided on this whole Congolese operation. We ourselves, on Tuesday week last, voted against the Western alliance, if you can call them that, the Western powers, in their attempts to stop the Afro-Asian Conciliation Council going to the Congo to assess the position there. Further, we abstained in the vote taken to decide as to whether the present so-called head of the central Congoless Government, Mr. Kasavubu, or his representative should be seated at the United Nations. Therefore, it seems to me quite clear that there is considerable confusion at the United Nations and a considerable difference of opinion, and that our Government is not at all satisfied about the action of the United Nations forces in the Congo.

As the Taoiseach said in his opening statement, we were invited into the Congo by Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kasavubu to try and restore order. The result of his invitation to the United Nations forces, of which we were a part, is that he, Mr. Lumumba, now finds himself in jail, a deposed Premier. It has been said that our force was intended and will be intended to act as a police authority or a police force. Nobody would quarrel with that suggestion, but on which side have we acted and on which side do the Government intend to act in the future? During our time in the Congo we have stood by and watched the elected Premier of the Congolese people, Mr. Lumumba, who had the largest single party in the House of Representatives——

Surely that does not arise? The internal politics of the Congo do not arise in this Bill. I have already pointed out to the Deputy that if he wishes to discuss these matters, he can put down a motion.

Surely I can make a case against sending troops to the Congo?

So long as the Deputy is in order. The Chair maintains he is not in order now. He is getting away from the Bill.

Our troops have been used in the Congo to establish a dictatorship under Mr. Mobuto, who has taken the Premier of the Congo, Mr. Lumumba, and imprisoned him, having beaten him up. Our troops did not act as police in that situation. They acted as observers. They stood by while it went on. When I talk about "our troops" I am talking about the United Nations forces, but our troops could easily have been there. Surely it was our responsibility to intervene in that case? The United Nations forces should have intervened in that case. Are our troops to continue to accept the position where Mr. Mobuto is now effectively a military dictator in the Congo, responsible to nobody?

Is it not a fact that the United Nations have now little or no control in the Congo? Is it not a fact that the United Nations have asked the present so-called head of the Congo, Mr. Kasavubu, for information about Mr. Lumumba and their request has been completely ignored? Is it not a fact that the United Nations have asked Mr. Mobuto for information about Mr. Lumumba and have been told they will not be allowed to see him? Is it not a fact that in the Congo at the moment a state of anarchy reigns and that our troops necessarily have been party to the development of that situation, or to the deterioration of that situation, and that our Government have stood by while the Belgium mining interests have reinforced the troops which existed in the Congo at the time of the alleged leaving of the Congo by the Belgians? Instead of 1,000 Belgian troops, there are now 6,000 Belgian troops there as a result of a recruiting campaign carried on in Belgium?

We, as part of the United Nations force, have stood by. That is not a police action. It is simply a futile procedure. Are we going to continue that policy? It is quite clear now that the situation has got completely out of hand and that if we send these troops to the Congo, we are sending them into a situation which is highly dangerous from their point of view because of the imminence of civil war. We are sending them into a situation in which it appears they have absolutely no powers whatever. This is due primarily to the fact that the Belgians made no serious attempt to establish a position in the Congo wherein the Congolese people might take over Government. Further, they took every possible precaution to ensure that Mr. Lumumba, who was the real elected leader of the Congolese people, would not become the effective Premier and they worked, from the time of the liberation of the Congo until the present day——

Are we discussing the Bill or the politics of the Congo?

——for the deposition of Mr. Lumumba.

If the Deputy continues to refuse to pay attention to the Chair, the Chair will have to take drastic measures.

The Taoiseach in his opening statement referred to two conditions which might arise in the near future and which might change the Government's attitude with regard to sending a further contingent to the Congo. They were, first, if it were decided it would be more advisable to have a non-European contingent in the Congo and, second, if the objectives of the United Nations forces had changed in the meantime. Surely Deputy Dr. Browne is entitled to a definition on these two particular aspects as pointed out by the Taoiseach? To comment efficiently and intelligently, it is necessary to widen the scope of the Bill.

The Chair cannot allow any widening of the debate and must hold Deputies to the matter before the House. The Bill is a machinery Bill to enable the Government to send Irish troops to the Congo. The national position in the Congo is not a subject for debate on the Bill and the Deputy is not in order in continuing on the line which he has adopted.

One of the purposes of the Bill is to give authority to the Government to send troops to the Congo and is a Deputy not entitled to give his views as to the situation in which troops should be sent?

This is a conditional power that we are giving to the Taoiseach; it is a power conditional on the decision that it is desirable to send our troops to the Congo. Surely we can put the case in which we may suggest that there are certain conditions in which the Government should not send out troops? That is all we are trying to do. The Government may not accept our views but we should be permitted to discuss the conditions under which we would not send out the troops. The Taoiseach has said that there might be conditions under which we would not send troops and surely we are entitled to discuss those conditions?

The Deputy is permitted to state the position to which he refers but he is going into details on the political situation in the Congo.

It is difficult to generalise about the situation because it concerns individuals. It is a complex political problem and unless we are permitted to mention names we cannot define the political situation involved.

Is it not a fact that a resolution has to be passed to send the next battalion to the Congo?

Under subsection (1) of Section 2.

That is not a point of order.

If a resolution is necessary. Deputy Dr. Browne's contribution would be relevant on that resolution.

This is subsection (c) which sets out that:—

The contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.

Then there is not going to be such a resolution?

I want to be quite clear on this matter. I disagree with Deputy Dr. Browne's point of view but if Section 2 means that the force will go as a result of that section, and not as a result of a resolution, in my view he is in order.

The Chair points out that Deputy Dr. Browne is going into too much detail. He is entitled to deal with the matter generally and if he wants to do that the Chair will not stop him, but in the detail into which he is going he is not in order.

The matter is too serious to be decided in a manner like that.

That may be so but the Chair must observe the rules of order.

This is a desperately serious situation. I may be wrong in my conclusions but I happen to be a Deputy elected by a certain number of people and some of those who elected me may agree with the view I am putting forward. I am in a minority but I am quite conscious that it is much easier to hunt with the pack than to take the minority point of view.

The question of majority or minority does not arise with the Chair.

I am very much concerned that this United Nations action might fail. It is a matter of great seriousness from the point of view of this country and I want to know whether I am right or wrong. If the Taoiseach does not agree with me then he can refute whatever points I make which may not be valid. It seems to me that our troops in the Congo have been used and, if they are sent out again, will continue to be used to establish a military dictatorship in the Congo, to effect the deposition of the elected Parliament of the Congo, to secure the deposition and imprisonment under the most brutal conditions of the elected Premier of the Congo and to secure the partition of the Congo.

Surely that is something against which any Deputy of this House must protest in the strongest possible terms. I believe that our troops are being used for these basic purposes, unconsciously, unwittingly and unwillingly, if you like. I think that some protest should be made by somebody against that action in the past and such continued action in the future.

There is the attempted secession of Katanga. Are we to stand by that as we have stood by it up to the present? Are we to stand over the attempted secession by Mr. Tshombe of the most valuable part of the Congo, the Katanga province in which are situated the uranium mines and great deposits of cobalt and copper? It is a financial disaster and we cannot be part of it. Lord Brookeborough has insisted on the partition of our country; Mr. Tshombe has insisted on the partition of the Congo. We are a party to Mr. Tshombe's action——

These are matters relating to the internal situation in the Congo and may not be relevantly debated on the Bill. The Deputy has gone over these points at least three times.

It seems to me, therefore, that some protest should be made against the Government's decision on this matter and the fact is that I am making the protest.

Arising directly out of the Bill, could I ask the Minister to explain paragraph (c) Section 2 (2)? It speaks about "the contingent is intended to replace in whole or in part..." while paragraph (b) of Section 2 (2) says that "... not more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force" may be sent out. What I want to know is this: Is it possible for the Minister or the Government to send out under paragraph (b) Section 2 (2), 12 members anywhere without reference to the Dáil? That seems to me perfectly permissible. I do not see any objection to it but is it possible for the Government to reinforce the 12 men by any given number of troops? I should like that point to be clarified—will it continue to be necessary for the Dáil to be consulted on any occasion that the Government may consider it desirable to send forces abroad where those forces number more than 12 under this subsection which permits the reinforcement of a contingent of the Defence Forces without saying what the size of that reinforcement might be?

The next point I should like clarified is this question of the position of volunteers under Section 3. This Bill makes a fundamental change in the position of serving soldiers in the Defence Force and I appreciate the Minister's problem that it would be impossible to send troops abroad until they volunteer. I wonder is it necessary for the Minister, or why is it necessary for him, to hold the men who have already volunteered to their offer? Is it possible for the Minister to answer that?

The Taoiseach has had second thoughts on the whole question of the Congo in the light of developments and surely it should be permitted to humble members of the Defence Forces to have second thoughts also? I wonder if it will be possible for the Minister to forgo that insistence on holding to their offer the soldiers who have volunteered and whose offer to volunteer has been accepted? Why is it necessary for him? Does he not feel that the volunteers will continue to come forward and make it possible for him to send a force abroad?

I do not know—and I should like to know—what is the purpose of Section 6?

The Minister may by regulations, made with the consent of the Minister for Health, provide for the keeping of a record of—

(a) the death of a member of the Permanent Defence Force,...

I do not understand that. It may be perfectly obvious and perfectly reasonable but I do not understand why that should be considered necessary. I believe that the Government, as I said earlier and said in July last, appear to have seriously misjudged the whole problem which faces us in the Congo. I am glad that the Taoiseach now gives us an assurance that there are certain circumstances in which he might decide not to send a further contingent to the Congo.

I wonder at what stage does he propose to tell the House and the people what these conditions might be? Could the Taoiseach tell the House in his reply whether he approves of the developments that have taken place in the Congo? Would he also tell the House whether he has made any protest, as have so many of the Afro-Asian countries and the United Arab Republic, against the decision of Colonel Mobuto to imprison Mr. Lumumba? Does the Taoiseach accept the present status of Colonel Mobuto as effectively the head of the Government——

That is a matter relating to the internal position in the Congo and it does not relevantly arise in detail on the Bill. The Deputy is entitled to refer to these matters but not in the detail into which he is going. Might I also point out to the Deputy that he has already asked this question on two occasions?

It is a question which the Leader of the Opposition has also asked. If I were satisfied, or if the Taoiseach would satisfy us, that we would get an opportunity of discussing this matter—both the withdrawal of troops and the conditions under which troops would be withdrawn or not sent out again—then, of course, I should be satisfied even though I am reasonably satisfied at the moment that a good case can be made for either protesting against the position which has developed in the Congo or for withdrawing our troops if those protests are ignored, or for refusing to send another contingent to the Congo. I think that the Taoiseach appears to have acted under the impression that all of us in the House were as fully conversant with the situation in the Congo as apparently the Leader of the Opposition and Deputy Corish are because of the special information that has been made available to them. I think it would be advisable from the point of view of the public because there is a certain amount of public disquiet about the present position in the Congo, a certain amount of public concern as to whether our troops are being used in the right way, or coming down on the right side. The Taoiseach would greatly clarify the situation if he would make it quite clear that we object to the situation which has developed, which is the appearance of the military dictator, Mr. Mobuto, and the effective partitioning of the Congo and the displacement of the Premier, Mr. Lumumba.

Debate adjourned.
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