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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 5 Dec 1963

Vol. 206 No. 6

Central Bank Bill, 1963—Second Stage.

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.

The purpose of this Bill is to amend in three respects the Central Bank Act, 1942, which is the principal statute covering Irish central banking. The amendments are separate and distinct.

Section 1 is designed to give effect to a suggestion of the Central Bank that it should be empowered to purchase securities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—usually known as the World Bank—which was founded at the Economic Conference held at Bretton Woods in 1944 and of which Ireland became a member in 1957. The Central Bank is already empowered by section 7 (1) (h) of the Act to purchase, for the purpose of or through its General Fund, securities issued by or guaranteed by any Government. Although the members of the World Bank are Governments, its Bonds are not directly guaranteed by member Governments and, therefore, are not covered by section 7 (1) (h) of the Act. It is accordingly proposed to make an appropriate amendment to section 7 (1) (h) and to do this in general terms in order that the Central Bank will be empowered—if it so desires—to purchase securities which may be issued by any other international bank or financial institution formed by Governments.

I should say that, while World Bank Bonds are not guaranteed by Governments, they are effectively backed by the status and resources of the World Bank itself, and are regarded as investments of high quality in the United States, which provides the main market for them. Bonds have been issued by the World Bank on the international capital markets since 1947 and constitute an important part of its finances. The proceeds of Bond issues go to finance the activities of the World Bank, and are mainly concentrated on productive projects in the less-developed countries.

Section 2 of the Bill is intended to replace the provisions in sections 19 (4) (a) and 23 (6) of the 1942 Act regarding the ineligibility of the Governor and Directors of the Central Bank for nomination or election to the Dáil or Seanad or as Uachtarán. The Constitution provides that every citizen who has reached his 35th year of age is eligible for election to the office of President; it does not provide that disqualifications in respect of this office may be imposed by law. It is considered therefore that the provisions in the 1942 Act that the Governor and Directors of the Central Bank are ineligible for election to the office of Uachtarán could be regarded as unconstitutional, and the Bill will repeal them.

The 1942 Act also provides that the Governor or a Director, while he holds office, shall be disqualified from being nominated or elected and from sitting or receiving payment as a member of Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann. On the principle that the legislature should have first claim on a person's services, it is proposed to replace these sections by provisions that the Governor or a Director of the Central Bank who is nominated with his consent as a candidate for election to either House of the Oireachtas, or is nominated as a member of Seanad Éireann, shall thereupon cease to be Governor or Director of the Bank, and that any person who is for the time being entitled to sit in either House of the Oireachtas shall, while so entitled, be disqualified from being or becoming Governor or Director of the Bank. The repeal of the existing provisions is provided for in section 3 (ii) and (iii) of the Bill.

Finally, in section (3) (i) of the Bill, it is proposed, at the Central Bank's suggestion, to remove the prohibition on the payment of interest on deposits made with the Bank by Ministers of State, public authorities and the commercial banks. Section 7 (1) (b) of the 1942 Act empowers the Central Bank to accept such deposits but, as interest may not be paid on them, the Bank has, generally speaking, not exercised this power; potential customers naturally avail themselves of the alternative of placing their cash reserves and other uncommitted funds to earn interest at call, or in short-term liquid securities, elsewhere. The words "not bearing interest" were included in section 7 (1) (b) of the 1942 Act following a recommendation of the 1938 Banking Commission on the basis that the general rule at the time was that central banks did not pay interest on deposits.

In post-war years, however, the tendency has been to leave such matters as payment of interest to the discretion of central banks themselves so that they can exercise their functions freely as conditions require. The purpose of the restriction, in countries where it still applies, is to prevent central banks from competing with the commercial banks for deposits. In Ireland, there is, however, no danger of this as the Central Bank is not empowered to accept deposits from the public. The Central Bank considers—and the Government agree—that, in line with the evolution of its functions and with a view to strengthening the resources of its General Fund in conformity with the requirements of our expanding economy, the Bank should be free to offer such return to its possible depositors as, in the light of relevant circumstances, it might from time to time deem appropriate.

In general, this Bill is of a non-contentious nature and I commend it to the House.

The purposes of this Bill are small and need not give us very much trouble today. So far as the World Bank is concerned, it is purely a technical matter to suggest that the legislation must be amended to give the Central Bank the power to invest in World Bank securities. I think most of us believe that such power was there already and the World Bank is clearly in the same position as the participant Governments. As I understand it, this is only an enabling section and there is nothing that empowers the Government to direct the Central Bank so to invest. I would ask the Minister, just as a matter of record, to confirm that I am correct in that respect and that the Government have no power to direct the Central Bank.

The second matter raised here is the question of the qualification of the Governor and Directors of the Central Bank to become members of this or the other House. Without going into the method of election of the other House, I do not imagine that the fact that a person is a Governor of the Central Bank or a Director of that august body, no matter what his other qualifications may be, would be such as would ensure certain election to this Chamber. In fact unkind people might make other suggestions as to the possibility of such membership acquiring votes. However, I do not think we should bother ourselves very much about that.

In relation to the third matter here, there are a few points about which I should like clarification. Section 7 of the Central Bank Act, 1942, provides that the Central Bank may:

receive deposits (not bearing interest) from a Minister of State or any public authority or any Associated Bank or any other bank or credit institution carrying on business wholly or partly within the State.

I cannot find anywhere the definition of a credit institution and I should be glad if the Minister would enlighten me as to whether I have missed such definition either in the Act of 1942 or in one of the other Acts associated with it. I should like to know what is involved in relation to that inclusion.

The term "Associated Bank" is not defined as such in the Act of 1942 but, as far as I can recollect, it was defined in the earlier Currency Act of 1927 and, therefore, the use of that phrase is specifically clarified. The phrase "any other bank", I presume, would cover the case of a bank which is so licensed under the Central Bank Act but is not one of the Associated Banks. However, I am not clear whether the "credit institution" phrase has been adequately defined in the legislation. As we are now changing that clause of the Act, it is desirable we should know exactly where we stand.

As far as I can recollect—and I should like confirmation from the Minister in this respect also—the only other place in the Central Bank legislation where there is any mention of deposits bearing or not bearing interest is section 50 which provides that deposits may not bear interest but it comes into play only when the Central Bank is prepared to certify that a licensed bank is investing more than a reasonable proportion of its funds outside the country. It is, so to speak, a section designed to increase liquidity in Irish funds and it is not in any way a restrictive section in the sense of narrowing the credit base of a bank.

I understand that as regards this amendment, the matter is purely voluntary on both sides. The Central Bank will be empowered to receive deposits at interest. On the one hand, the Central Bank will not be obliged to receive such deposits and, on the other hand, no licensed bank will be obliged to make deposits at the Central Bank as a result of this legislation. It is desirable that the Minister should clarify that. He has clarified it to some extent in the copy of his speech which he has circulated, and I must extend on this occasion my thanks to him for his courtesy in supplying the copy and to congratulate him on the speedy manner in which he reacted to the mild reproof. It is a proper method of dealing with it and I am glad he has done it.

There is, therefore, if I am correct in my assumptions on this section, very little in it and certainly nothing that will make any real difference to the economy as a whole. Certainly there is nothing in it that will shake us out of our lethargy in regard to economic expansion.

The changes proposed in this are very trifling and it is perhaps peculiar that these changes, particularly in the light of the last paragraph of the Minister's speech, should be announced on the same day as the revised figures for national income and expenditure are published, figures which show that there was a very much over-optimistic assessment at an earlier date of our progress in 1962. The increase in national product of 2½ per cent in 1962 shows a very great slowing down from 1960 and 1961 and emphasises that there has to be a very great change if the targets suggested in the Blue Book recently issued are to have any possibility of achievement.

In the short time available to us since we received the figures for national income and expenditure this morning, it would appear to me that they show that in 1962 some £40 million of the increase in national product at current prices was due entirely to inflation of prices or, putting it another way, to a decline in the value of money—that only some £16 million was a real increase. Of the balance of £56 million, £40 million represents merely a decline in the value of money. Taking that on the figures, it would seem that as a result of the Minister's stewardship in the year 1962, the value of money decreased by just under six per cent. That is not a thing of which any Minister for Finance can be proud—to feel that in one year the value of money decreased by six per cent.

I do not think this Bill will do very much to provide any alteration of that pattern and I hope that when we get to the figures for 1963, we shall find that there has not been a similar reduction in the value of the Irish pound during the current year. I am afraid we will find it, though I do not quite understand at what actual date those figures were taken, whether they are averaged over the whole year or whether they are a global adding up of the entire GNP in the year, or whether the Central Statistics Office take them at certain dates and average out on that.

One thing is quite certain, that is, that the figures in relation to national product will show a very substantial increase because of the decline in the value of money, because of increases in prices following on the imposition of the Minister's turnover tax, so that those figures for the moment will not be up because of a genuine rise in production. A six per cent decline in the value of money in one year is a serious matter. I think it is a matter which should engage the urgent attention of the Government to ensure that such an increase in 1962 will not be followed by a worse increase in 1964 and that Governmental policy will be devoted towards the suppression of those causes that would mean the value of our money would decline rather than that they should, by their own positive action, decrease the value of the note or coin in people's pockets.

As far as the question raised by Deputy Sweetman on section 1 goes, he is right in saying it is an enabling clause. There is no direction to the Central Bank that they must invest in World Bank Bonds and the Government will not be in a position to give them a direction to that effect at any time. "Credit institution", as far as I know, is not defined in any of those Acts but is a general term for dealing with those various institutions dealt with in the Bill. I should like to have a look at it before the next Stage of the Bill is reached to see if there is any reason why we should deal with the definitions already given.

Again in this clause there is no compulsion on the Central Bank to offer interest to commercial banks or Government Departments; neither is there compulsion on the Government or on the commercial banks to make lodgments with the Central Bank. It will be purely a voluntary effort on both sides. This is one point on which I must disagree with Deputy Sweetman. I think it is an important function, because it will enable the Central Bank to become a most important financial institution within the State. Deputies are aware that for some years the commercial banks have been doing clearing for internal transactions with the Central Bank and it was possible to pay interest because the money was there for a specific purpose, but if a commercial bank, instead of making a lodgment with some of the finance houses in London, thought it well from the point of view of the country to make some lodgments with the Central Bank in order to provide for its liquidity, they could do it, but not because they would get interest. This will enable the banks to increase that movement for the purpose of liquidity with the Central Bank instead of with London, and we may reach the position eventually where the greater part of that particular asset of the commercial banks will be held here rather than in London.

Where will the Central Bank keep its liquid funds—in the vaults?

They will be able to hold on to some of them. They, in turn, may have to invest some of their money in London but there is no reason why the Central Bank should not get the benefit that the finance houses in London are getting now and have that marginal profit instead of having it leave the country.

It will be only a percentage.

For a long time to come, it will be only a percentage. Meanwhile, we may become a very powerful country, well able to look after ourselves, but that will not be for a long time.

If by "ourselves" the Minister means Fianna Fáil, I agree.

I have very seldom Party points like that in my mind. The Deputy always has. I was talking about the country in general. The Deputy may be curious to know in what circumstances a Government Department would make a lodgment there. I intend to lodge some of the assets of the Post Office Savings Bank Fund with the Central Bank to give some of the business to the Central Bank as we do at the moment, and to have a proportion of that fund in London, so that it can be at call if there is any rush on the Post Office Savings Fund. There again, that may grow costly and in this we may use the Central Bank for the purpose of putting any amount we think necessary in liquidity.

Could the Minister give me a list of the other banks and credit institutions that will be enabled to avail of these facilities?

I shall do so.

Question put and agreed to.
Committee Stage ordered for Tuesday, 10th December, 1963.
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